

973 C28ha v.1 52-38819
Carman
History of the American people

MAIN

kansas city



public library

kansas city, missouri

Books will be issued only
on presentation of library card.
Please report lost cards and
change of residence promptly.
Card holders are responsible for
all books, records, films, pictures
or other library materials
checked out on their cards.

~~01116 0015 1041~~

A
HISTORY
OF THE
AMERICAN
PEOPLE

VOLUME ONE

TO
1865

VOLUME

I

TO 1865



NEW YORK: *ALFRED A. KNOPF*

1952

A
HISTORY
OF THE
AMERICAN
PEOPLE

B Y

HARRY J. CARMAN

Columbia University

A N D

HAROLD C. SYRETT

Columbia University

L. C. catalog card number: 52-5073

❖	THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK,	❖
❖	PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.	❖

Copyright 1952 by Harry J. Carman and Harold C. Syrett. All rights reserved. No part of this book in excess of five hundred words may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages and reproduce not more than three illustrations in a review to be printed in a magazine or newspaper. Manufactured in the United States of America. Published simultaneously in Canada by McClelland & Stewart Limited.

FIRST EDITION

To M.M.C. & P.M.S.

Here individuals of all nations

are melted into a new race of men, whose labours and posterity will one day cause great change in the world. Americans are the western pilgrims, who are carrying along with them that great mass of arts, sciences, vigour, and industry, which began long since in the east; they will finish the great circle. The Americans were once scattered all over Europe; here they are incorporated into one of the finest systems of population which has ever appeared, and which will hereafter become distinct by the power of the different climates they inhabit. The American ought therefore to love this country much better than that wherein either he or his forefathers were born. Here the rewards of his industry follow with equal steps the progress of his labour; his labour is founded on the basis of nature, *self-interest*; can it want a stronger allurement? Wives and children, who before in vain demanded of him a morsel of bread, now, fat and frolicsome, gladly help their father to clear those fields whence exuberant crops are to arise to feed and to clothe them all; without any part being claimed, either by a despotic prince, a rich abbot, or a mighty lord. Here religion demands but little of him; a small voluntary salary to the minister, and gratitude to God; can he refuse these? The American is a new man, who acts upon new principles; he must therefore entertain new ideas, and form new opinions. From involuntary idleness, servile dependance, penury, and useless labour, he has passed to toils of a very different nature, rewarded by ample subsistence.—This is an American.

MICHEL-GUILLAUME JEAN DE CRÈVECŒUR:

Letters from an American Farmer (1782).

P R E F A C E

J. B. BLACK in *The Art of History* contends that every age interprets "the record of the past in the light of its own ideas." We have preferred to take Black's words as a warning to historians rather than as a definition of written history, for we have made a conscious effort to judge the past in the light of the past and to avoid imposing the standards of our generation upon preceding generations. On the other hand, we have not renounced our right to interpret the past, for we have constantly tried to present the events of American history in meaningful patterns and to point out what we think is the significance of these events.

Our approach to history is eclectic. We do not think that the past should be studied from a single viewpoint or that it can be explained by one theory to the exclusion of all other theories. But, while rejecting any over-all thesis, we have not failed to take a stand on controversial issues. In each instance the nature of the issue has helped to determine our stand; and the fact that we have advanced a succession of different interpretations rather than used the same interpretations for a succession of events accurately reflects our conviction that every historical event is unique.

The organization of these volumes represents a compromise between the chronological and topical approaches to the material under consideration. We have divided American history into a number of comparatively large periods, and within each period we have dealt with a series of major topics. This method necessitates some repetition, but in a book that is designed for students repetition in our view is an asset rather than a defect. In addition, the organization makes it possible for the student at the instructor's discretion to omit certain chapters or sections without destroying the thread of the narrative. In the selection of topics, we have proceeded on the hypothesis that no part or period of American history is inherently more important than any other, and we have therefore sought to present fully the political, diplomatic, intellectual, social, economic, and religious history of the American people.

HARRY J. CARMAN
HAROLD C. SYRETT

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE is an outgrowth of Professor Carman's *Economic and Social History of the United States*. We have used the earlier work, which covers the period from the first settlements in America to 1876, as a point of departure for our first volume. At some points we have expanded Professor Carman's material, and at others we have cut those portions of it that seemed unsuitable for a general textbook, but in every instance we have subjected it to extensive revisions. In addition, we have supplemented it with a full account of American diplomatic and political history.

Throughout the preparation of these two volumes we received considerable assistance from a number of friends and colleagues. Professors Herman Ausubel, Donald N. Bigelow, Henry F. Graff, and Chilton Williamson of Columbia University, Professors Michael Kraus and Oscar Zeichner of the College of the City of New York, Professor Oscar Handlin of Harvard University, Professors Frank Freidel and Fred A. Shannon of the University of Illinois, Professor James A. Barnes of Temple University, Professor Joe L. Norris of Wayne University, Professor R. J. Ferguson of the University of Pittsburgh, Professor Burke M. Hermann of Pennsylvania State College, and Mr. Thomas R. Hay furnished us with invaluable criticisms and suggestions. Lois Green Clark of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. read the entire manuscript and showed unusual skill and knowledge in criticizing both its form and content. Mrs. Patricia Syrett typed most of the manuscript, and both Mrs. Syrett and Miss Margaret Carscadden performed a variety of generally unpleasant tasks associated with the work on this book. Both, moreover, treated its authors with remarkable tolerance and patience. Mr. James P. Shenton and Dr. Walter P. Metzger of Columbia University helped us in the preparation of the bibliography. We are also indebted to Professor Bigelow and Mr. Charles E. McCarthy for the assistance they gave us in checking the proof.

We are jointly responsible for whatever errors this book may contain.

HARRY J. CARMAN
HAROLD C. SYRETT

C O N T E N T S

I. <i>The Old World Expands</i>	
1. MEDIEVAL EUROPE DISCOVERS ASIA AND AFRICA	3
2. COMMERCIAL RIVALRY AND A NEW ROUTE TO THE INDIES	7
3. FRUITS OF DISCOVERY	11
II. <i>The Settlement of Colonial America</i>	
4. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA	23
5. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EMIGRATION TO COLONIAL AMERICA	28
6. THE COLONIAL POPULATION	33
7. VOLUNTARY AND FORCED EMIGRATION TO AMERICA	35
8. COLONIAL LAND SYSTEMS	40
9. THE COLONIAL FRONTIER	45
III. <i>The Colonial Economy</i>	
10. AGRICULTURE	48
11. FUR TRADE AND LUMBERING	54
12. FISHERIES	57
13. MANUFACTURING	60
14. COMMERCE AND TRADE	64
15. COLONIAL CURRENCIES	68
IV. <i>The Colonial Society</i>	
16. LIFE IN TOWN AND COUNTRY	71
17. RELIGION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	77
18. DECLINE OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHURCH	82
19. INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS	85
20. ARTS AND SCIENCES	91
V. <i>The Administration of the Colonies</i>	
21. POLITICAL CONTROL	96
22. REGULATION OF TRADE	100
23. REGULATION OF INDUSTRY	104
24. LAND AND CURRENCY POLICIES	107

VI. *The Conflict of Interests*

25. THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES	112
26. PLANS FOR REFORM	116
27. THE CRISIS IN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION	120
28. THE GRENVILLE PROGRAM	124
29. THE COLONIAL PROTEST	129
30. THE TOWNSHEND ACTS	131
31. SOUTHERN GRIEVANCES	134
32. RADICALS AND CONSERVATIVES	136
33. COERCION	139
34. THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS	143
35. INDEPENDENCE	147

VII. *Revolution*

36. CIVIL WAR	153
37. WAR FINANCES	158
38. PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS	162
39. VICTORY AND PEACE	165
40. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN WARTIME	172
41. INTERNAL REVOLUTION	175

VIII. *The Confederation and the Constitution*

42. CONFEDERATION	185
43. FRONTIER PROBLEMS	190
44. FOREIGN AFFAIRS	197
45. CRITICAL YEARS	199
46. RADICAL PROTESTS	202
47. MOVEMENT FOR A STRONGER UNION	205
48. DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION	208
49. RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION	214

IX. *The Federalists in Power*

50. ORGANIZING THE NEW GOVERNMENT	223
51. LAUNCHING THE CONSTITUTION	225
52. HAMILTON'S FINANCIAL POLICIES	229
53. ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL CREDIT	231
54. FOREIGN PROBLEMS	236
55. THE JAY AND PINCKNEY TREATIES	240
56. JOHN ADAMS'S ADMINISTRATION	244
57. THE REPUBLICAN TRIUMPH	248

X. *The Turn of the Century*

58. THE SOCIAL ORDER	253
59. RELIGION	255

60. LITERATURE	261
61. JOURNALISM	265
62. THE ARTS	268
63. EDUCATION	271
XI. <i>Republican Rule in War and Peace</i>	
64. THEORY OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY	279
65. PRACTICE OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY	282
66. EXPANSION AND CONSPIRACY IN THE WEST	287
67. TRIALS OF A NEUTRAL	295
68. MADISON AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS	300
69. WAR OF 1812	307
70. PEACE	311
XII. <i>America Moves West</i>	
71. SETTLEMENT OF THE OLD WEST	316
72. PROBLEMS OF THE TRANS-ALLEGHENY SETTLER	320
73. FUR TRADE IN THE FAR WEST	325
74. THE MIDDLE BORDER MOVES WESTWARD	329
75. THE FRONTIER AND AMERICAN CIVILIZATION	334
XIII. <i>Nationalism and Sectionalism</i>	
76. A NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY	341
77. JOHN MARSHALL, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE AMERICAN UNION	346
78. ERA OF GOOD AND BAD FEELINGS	351
79. THE TARIFF ISSUE	356
80. EMERGENCE OF NEW PARTIES	360
XIV. <i>Jacksonian Democracy</i>	
81. NATURE OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY	366
82. JACKSON AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY	370
83. NATIONALISM AT HOME AND ABROAD	374
84. WAR ON THE BANK	379
85. VAN BUREN'S ADMINISTRATION	385
86. BREAK-UP OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY	388
XV. <i>The Northern Farmer</i>	
87. MOVEMENT FOR AGRARIAN IMPROVEMENT	393
88. IMPROVED TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES	396
89. EXPANSION AND REORGANIZATION	401
90. AGRICULTURAL SPECIALIZATION IN THE NORTH	405
91. PROBLEMS OF THE NORTHERN FARMER	410

XVI. *The Southern Farmer*

92. THE LAND	414
93. THE PEOPLE	417
94. THE GREAT STAPLES	421
95. AGRICULTURAL METHODS	426
96. FARM AND PLANTATION	428
97. THE SLAVE SYSTEM	431

XVII. *The Rise of the Factory System*

98. ORIGINS OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM	439
99. GROWTH OF INDUSTRY	442
100. THE FACTORY OWNER	447
101. THE FACTORY WORKER	448
102. LABOR CONDITIONS	452
103. BEGINNINGS OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT	454
104. THE WORKER IN POLITICS	456
105. TRADE UNIONISM	461

XVIII. *Merchants and Shippers*

106. ROADS AND TURNPIKES	464
107. INLAND WATERWAYS	469
108. CANAL CONSTRUCTION	472
109. RAILROADS	477
110. DOMESTIC TRADE	483
111. OVERSEAS COMMERCE	485

XIX. *Patterns of Protest and Reform*

112. HUMANITARIANISM	492
113. ABOLITIONISM	499
114. UTOPIANISM	503
115. TRANSCENDENTALISM	507
116. LITERATURE	512
117. JOURNALISM	519
118. RELIGION	522

XX. *Continental Expansion*

119. MANIFEST DESTINY	530
120. AMERICANS IN OREGON	531
121. AMERICANS IN TEXAS	537
122. THE ACQUISITION OF TEXAS AND OREGON	541
123. AMERICANS IN NEW MEXICO AND CALIFORNIA	543
124. THE MEXICAN WAR	546
125. THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH	551

XXI. *The Politics of Sectionalism*

126. THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF SECTIONALISM	560
127. SLAVERY AND SECTIONALISM	563
128. SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND EXPANSION	565
129. THE COMPROMISE OF 1850	569
130. THE FAILURE OF COMPROMISE	575
131. THE STRUGGLE FOR TERRITORIES	582
132. THE INTENSIFICATION OF SECTIONAL CONFLICT	587
133. THE ELECTION OF 1860	591
134. THE SOUTH SECEDES	596
135. WAR	601

XXII. *The Civil War*

136. THE ARMED FORCES	606
137. SUPPLYING THE ARMED FORCES	609
138. FROM BULL RUN TO VICKSBURG	615
139. FROM GETTYSBURG TO APPOMATTOX	620
140. FINANCING THE WAR	623
141. ATTITUDE OF EUROPE TOWARDS THE WAR	629
142. EUROPEAN AID FOR THE CONFEDERACY	633
143. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH	636
144. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH	639
145. GOVERNMENT BY COALITION	642
146. END AND BEGINNING	648

Appendix

1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE	653
2. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	657
3. UNITED STATES POPULATION, 1790-1860	670
4. ADMISSION OF STATES TO THE UNION, 1789-1865	672
5. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1824-1864	673
6. PRESIDENTS AND THEIR CABINETS, 1789-1865	674
7. JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1865	680

Bibliography.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CLASS ASSIGNMENTS (PP. 690-6)

682

Index

follows page 746

ILLUSTRATIONS

IN THE TEXT

<i>Title Page Of Hakluyt's Voyages</i>	PAGE 18
<i>A Typical Indenture</i>	37
<i>Farming Tools of Late Colonial Times</i>	53
<i>Churn, Spinning Wheel, and Loom</i>	62
<i>A Colonial Tavern Sign</i>	76
<i>Join or Die</i>	149
<i>Continental Paper Money and Currency</i>	159
<i>The Providential Detection</i>	247
<i>Title Page of William Dunlap's Andre</i>	262
<i>Ograbme</i>	299
<i>Advertisements by New Orleans Slave Trader</i>	436
<i>Title Page to a Guide Book for Travelers</i>	468
<i>The Anson Northrup, a Steamboat on Western Waters</i>	471
<i>Bringing Back the Rum</i>	493
<i>The American Eagle at the Beginning and End of Buchanan's Administration</i>	586
<i>A Lincoln Campaign Poster for the Election of 1856</i>	593

PLATES

<i>Tobacco Culture</i>	FACING PAGE 134
<i>Savannah in 1734</i>	135
<i>The Able Doctor, or America Swallowing the Bitter Draught</i>	135
<i>A Page from the Molasses Act, 1733</i>	166
<i>The Title Page of Thomas Paine's Common Sense</i>	166
<i>The Title Page of the Articles of Confederation</i>	166
<i>The Four Most Important Magazines at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century</i>	167
<i>Thomas Jefferson</i>	358
<i>Albert Gallatin</i>	358


<i>James Madison</i>	358
<i>John Adams</i>	358
<i>Alexander Hamilton</i>	358
<i>John Marshall</i>	358
<i>A Foot Race</i>	359
<i>The Downfall of Mother Bank</i>	390
<i>Despotism</i>	391
<i>The Monkey System, or Everyone for Himself at the Expense of His Neighbor</i>	454
<i>General Harrison's Log Cabin March: A Quick Step</i>	454
<i>Andrew Jackson</i>	455
<i>Daniel Webster</i>	455
<i>Henry Clay</i>	455
<i>John C. Calhoun</i>	455
<i>An American Factory in 1855</i>	486
<i>The Atlantic</i>	486
<i>Lockport on the Erie Canal</i>	487
<i>Dewitt Clinton</i>	487
<i>A Mississippi Flatboat</i>	487
<i>Sacramento City in 1849</i>	582
<i>Pork and Beans in the Gold Diggins</i>	583
<i>Progressive Democracy—Prospect of a Smash-up</i>	614
<i>The Copperhead Party—In Favor of a Vigorous Prosecution of Peace!</i>	614
<i>Abraham Lincoln</i>	615
<i>Ulysses S. Grant</i>	615
<i>Jefferson Davis</i>	615
<i>Robert E. Lee</i>	615

M A P S A N D C H A R T S

[BY THEODORE R. MILLER]

1.	<i>Physical Contour Map of the United States</i>	PRECEDING TEXT
2.	<i>Colonial Settlement, 1620-1760</i>	PAGE 41
3.	<i>The United States after the Treaty of 1783</i>	191
4.	<i>Date of Approval and Distribution of Votes in the Ratification of the Federal Constitution</i>	220-1
5.	<i>The Louisiana Purchase and the Lewis and Clark Expedition</i>	292
6.	<i>The Ohio Country</i>	317
7.	<i>Routes to the West, 1760-1840</i>	319
8.	<i>The Acquisition of Florida</i>	343
9.	<i>The Growth of the Negro Population in the Southern States</i> (Harry J. Carman: <i>Social and Economic History of the United States</i> , Volume II)	432
10.	<i>Slaves and Cotton in the South, 1860</i>	434
11.	<i>Immigration into the United States, 1820-60</i> (Harry J. Carman: <i>Social and Economic History of the United States</i> , Volume II)	450
12.	<i>Paths of Inland Commerce</i>	472
13.	<i>Railroads in 1860</i>	482
14.	<i>The Oregon Controversy</i>	533
15.	<i>The Expansion of the United States in the Southwest</i>	550
16.	<i>Territorial Growth of the Continental United States</i>	553
17.	<i>Trans-Mississippi Routes to the West</i>	555
18.	<i>Slave and Free Territory in 1850</i>	574
19.	<i>The Missouri Compromise and the Kansas Nebraska Territories</i>	577
20.	<i>The Election of 1860</i>	595
21.	<i>Comparison of North and South, 1860</i>	612

500 MILES



OF THE UNITED STATES

A
HISTORY
OF THE
AMERICAN
PEOPLE

VOLUME ONE

TO
1865

CHAPTER I

THE OLD WORLD EXPANDS

1. MEDIEVAL EUROPE DISCOVERS ASIA AND AFRICA
 2. COMMERCIAL RIVALRY AND A NEW ROUTE TO THE INDIES
 3. FRUITS OF DISCOVERY
-

COLONIAL America was a frontier of Europe. Its discovery, exploration, and settlement were only phases of a much larger movement that was to bring Europeans in contact with the peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The history of this expansion comprises the first chapter in the growth of American civilization.

1. MEDIEVAL EUROPE DISCOVERS ASIA AND AFRICA

A THOUSAND years ago western Europe was a small, isolated portion of the earth, practically unknown to, and largely ignorant of, the rest of the world. The Roman Empire of antiquity, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean almost to the Persian Gulf and entirely surrounding the Mediterranean, had long since disappeared. Even the political structure of Charlemagne's empire had disintegrated. Much of Europe was in the feudal stage of development. The arts were little cultivated, and most of the relatively sparse population knew only the bare necessities of life. Many cities had fallen into decay, and in different parts of Europe intercity trade had become insignificant. Compared with ancient and modern times, there was little travel or communication between one locality and another, and each community,

whether manor or town, was largely self-sufficient, producing most of its own food, clothes, weapons, and tools. The feudal lords, both lay and ecclesiastical, spent their time hunting, jousting, carrying on petty warfare, administering the affairs of their private estates and their principalities, and performing their ecclesiastical functions. For support they depended upon the labor of the peasantry.

During the next seven hundred years certain great social forces—economic, intellectual, spiritual, and political—combined to make western Europe the center of the modern world. By the opening of the eleventh century, foreign invasions had ceased, civil anarchy was declining, and commerce was increasing. City life, especially near the sea, began to thrive, and the trading classes grew in importance. Settled under the walls of towns, merchants handled increasing amounts of both local and foreign business. Daily or weekly markets in the open square, in the closed market hall, or more often in shops or stalls, provided facilities for the exchange of goods. As a consequence of this economic expansion, trade between Europe, on the one hand, and Africa and the East on the other, increased. Barter tended to give way to a money economy. Manufacturing, though somewhat primitive in character, developed; agricultural production increased; and a distinct class—the bourgeoisie—with social and political ambitions came to figure more prominently in the life of the times.

Supplementing this economic development, and in many respects reflecting it, were the Crusades. By helping to break down the barriers of isolation, the Crusades stimulated intercommunication. Europeans saw new scenes and new ways of doing things. They became acquainted with each other; they discovered common needs and desires, common feelings and ideals. At the same time the crusaders came into contact with the culture of the East, which in many respects was more advanced than their own. Not only did they perceive that the Moslem's food, clothing, art, and customs were different from those of western Europe, but they soon learned that his conception of the world and of life did not correspond with their own. Returning crusaders, bearing tales of what they had seen and experienced, aroused in others a desire to know more about the non-European world, its products, its peoples, and its culture.

Probably the most important result of the Crusades, however, was the stimulus they gave to commerce. Trade between the East and the West, extensive under the Romans, did not completely disappear with the barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire, and the Crusades affected this commerce between Orient and Occident in several ways. A constant demand for men and supplies led to an increase in the number and size of ships and improvements in the art of navigation. As the West became better acquainted with such commodities as muslin,

damask, rice, sugar, lemons, apricots, and garlic, commerce in these and other Eastern articles multiplied. Europeans formed commercial relations with new peoples and established new markets for western European products in the Greco-Arabian world and in other regions hitherto unpenetrated. They discovered or opened up new commercial routes; they added to their knowledge of geography; and they adopted and exploited many advanced forms of commercial techniques. European cities, whose revival antedated the Crusades, increased in size and number. This economic expansion fostered the development of capitalism, and in Italy, where a large number of Oriental industries were introduced, the merchant and banker class grew more powerful. Finally, the Crusades enabled Christendom to recover naval control of the Mediterranean.

Scarcely less important than the Crusades in broadening the mind of Europeans, adding to geographical knowledge, and giving new impetus to commerce and economic expansion were the remarkable journeys and explorations of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century European travelers. In the first quarter of the thirteenth century an increasing number of Europeans, inspired, among other motives, by missionary zeal, curiosity, commercial ambitions, and desire for wealth, began to penetrate the unexplored lands to the East. By the end of the century, Christian missionaries, adventurers, and traders had visited many parts of Asia and had given Europe a wealth of information about Tartary, China, Japan, Persia, and India, not to mention many intervening lands. In the cloisters of monasteries and on the quays of seaports, priests and merchants alike related the wonders of these Far Eastern lands, of their populous cities with walls of silver, of palaces roofed with gold, of rivers of pearls and other precious stones. Of the accounts written by many of these travelers none is more interesting than *The Book of ser marco polo, the venetian, concerning the kingdoms and marvels of the east*, with its picturesque, though astonishingly accurate, description of Cathay and of the civilization of the Great Khan, its vivid, though exaggerated, account of Cipangu (Japan), which Marco Polo never actually visited, and its vague and extravagant statements about the "twelve thousand seven hundred islands" of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Voyages of discovery were also stimulated by the belief of learned men that the earth was a sphere and that India could be reached by sailing around Africa. The theory, first entertained by the Egyptians and later by the Greeks and Romans, that the earth was round came to be generally accepted by scientifically minded men in the Middle Ages. In addition, many navigators and pilots accepted the view that the earth was round. "I have always read that the world, comprising the land and water," Columbus said, "is spherical, as is testified by the investigations

of Ptolemy and others, who have proved it by the eclipses of the moon and other observations made from east to west, as well as by the elevation of the pole from north to south." Mohammedan travelers and geographers—such as Ibn-Khordabeh, Ibn-Haukel, and above all the great Arabian geographer Idrisi—who had seen ships on the Indian and Pacific Oceans undoubtedly believed that the "Golden East" could be reached by sailing around Africa. Even before Marco Polo had returned from China, two Genoese seamen, Tedisio Dorio and Vivaldi, had made the attempt "to go by sea to the ports of India to trade there." But their galleys, which passed through the Strait of Gibraltar and headed southward, never returned.

Long sea voyages were not generally practicable, however, before a number of important advances had been made in the art of navigation. After 1300, marked improvement was made in cartography. Instead of basing their work on half-mythical data gathered in part from biblical and literary lore, many map makers began to give heed to exact measurements and outlines. One especially notable advance was made in the construction of sailing charts, which by the fifteenth century pictured with considerable accuracy the coasts of Europe, North Africa, and western Asia. In addition to these charts the mariners of the fifteenth century had access to world maps constructed by learned geographers and cartographers. Equally important were the compass and the astrolabe (a Moslem invention, the forerunner of the quadrant), which are known to have been in use during the latter part of the fourteenth century. By means of these two instruments sailors could determine both direction and location north or south (latitude). The chronometer and longitude tables were in use before the end of the fifteenth century. With these instruments, with larger ships, and with improved navigating charts, the mariner was now, more than ever before, free to sail the seas in quest of new lands, new peoples, new trade routes, and new sources of wealth.

Even before these improvements, as early as the eighth century, adventurous Vikings bent on trade and plunder piloted their vessels out of the Baltic and North seas. In the next century they colonized Iceland, and before A.D. 1000, they had touched the coast of Labrador. In 1341, the forgotten Canaries, identified by the Italian Lancelot Malocello in 1270, were rediscovered by the Portuguese. Before the end of the fourteenth century both the Madeira Islands and the Azores were visited by Europeans.

Significant as these achievements were, they were dimmed by the discoveries and explorations made under the auspices of Prince Henry of Portugal during the next century. Motivated by an interest in trade, by a desire to spread Christianity, and by curiosity about the unknown world, this remarkable man, himself an accomplished cartographer and

seaman, devoted his energies to geographical discovery. It was while engaged in a campaign against the Moors, first in 1415 and again in 1418, that he learned of the caravan routes extending from Tripoli, Ceuta, and the other Mediterranean towns southward across the Sahara and the Soudan. Over these routes, Moorish prisoners informed him, came gold, wines, textiles, and slaves from the Senegal and Gambia river regions and from the gold and ivory coasts on the Gulf of Guinea. News of this rich trade "inspired him to seek those lands by way of the sea." Returning to Sagres, he established a maritime school. Unparalleled for its equipment and scientific methods and backed by the resources of the state, it attracted the leading navigators of Europe. Year after year increasing numbers of caravels sailed southward from the neighboring port of Lagos. In 1418 the Portuguese discovered Porto Santo; in 1441 they rounded Cape Blanco; in 1433, Gil Eannes passed Cape Bojador; and some years later sailors employed by Prince Henry discovered Cape Verde. Finally, mariners like Nuño Tristam, Dinis Diaz, and the Venetian Cadamosto pushed southward as far as Sierra Leone. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, Portuguese mariners had sailed along six hundred miles of the west African coast; in 1460, when Prince Henry died, they were familiar with fourteen hundred miles more.

2. COMMERCIAL RIVALRY AND A NEW ROUTE TO THE INDIES

THE GROWTH of commercial capitalism greatly facilitated this search for new trade routes. During and following the Crusades a class of wealthy merchants and bankers developed in cities along the routes of trade. Accumulating small amounts of capital from trade and other sources, they gradually built up a business system that was characterized by the substitution of money for barter, the loaning of money at interest to government and Church, and the development of an elaborate banking technique—including bookkeeping, bills of exchange, stock companies, investment in commercial and industrial enterprises, and speculative trading. Powerful Florentine houses of the Bardi and Peruzzi financed Edward III of England, the Medici, and the Papacy. Rich German bankers like the Fuggers, Welsers, and others invested extensively in such enterprises as mining, manufacturing, sheep raising, and wheat growing. Staunch supporters of ventures that promised new markets and new fields for investment and financial exploitation, these bankers and merchants were invaluable supporters of overseas trade and exploration.

Closely associated with the development of capitalism and the desire of some of the middle class to increase their profits were the commercial-financial relationships between Europe and Asia. Commerce between the two continents developed rapidly from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. From the markets of the Orient came an ever increasing volume of expensive luxuries—precious stones, fabrics of cotton and silk, rugs, glassware of all sorts, perfumes, dyes, woods, gums, ivory, medicaments, and, most important of all, spices. These furnished Europe's lords and kings, bishops and abbots, and wealthier merchants and their families, with articles of personal adornment, with food, and with furnishings for their palaces and manor houses, their churches and cathedrals and guild halls. In return, Europe sent to the East woolen fabrics, wines, coral, metals, furs, sulphur, slaves, oil, honey, amber, and grain.

These exports, however, were insufficient to pay for the imports, and the balance of trade in favor of the East drained the European merchants of their gold and silver. Though without adequate mines of her own, Europe in the days of the Roman Empire and again during the Crusades had gained a sufficient gold supply by exploiting and plundering Syria and Asia Minor. With the end of successful crusading and the overthrow of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1291, however, this source was cut off, and for a hundred and fifty years or more the gold and silver coin and bullion of Europe flowed from the agricultural regions of northern Europe to the commercial centers of the Mediterranean, and thence eastward, much as it had for centuries past. The resulting money stringency was marked by falling prices, debasement of the coinage, forced loans, bankruptcies, attempts to prevent the export of gold and silver, and the retarding of many European industrial enterprises.

Commerce over the routes between Europe and Asia was both dangerous and expensive. Journeying over bleak mountains, hot deserts, and sparse plateaus, through all kinds of weather, the merchant was subject to assault and robbery by highwaymen and numerous lawless tribes who made their living by plundering. To princes and officials, high and low, in the more civilized states through which the routes might pass, he was forced to pay tribute that was sometimes even confiscatory. The merchant who elected to send his goods by sea often fared not much better, for pirates might steal or storms destroy the cargo, and port dues were usually more excessive and unreasonable than were tributes in the inland towns. All such losses and taxes were passed on to the consumer. Added to these was the cost of transshipment and the middlemen's profit, for no merchant brought goods all the way from India to Europe. A pound of pepper or a piece of fabric, for instance, might change hands a dozen times before it reached a Mediterranean port, and each seller made a profit. Thus the commodities that

were purchased for a mere trifle in the markets of the East sold often for exorbitant prices in the West.

Although Italian statesmen, geographers, and merchants blamed the non-Christian middleman for the high cost of Oriental goods and preached a new crusade against him, he alone was not responsible for high prices; for as soon as the products of the East reached the Levantine cities scattered along the shores of the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, they were monopolized for the most part by Italian merchants, especially Venetians. For centuries these Italian traders, who frequently formed an influential part of the population of many of the Near Eastern cities, handled the bulk of the commerce between Europe and Asia. To the wharves of these cities came Venetian galleys laden with European produce for Oriental consumers; homeward bound they carried cargoes of coveted products from the East. Such goods as were not consumed in the Italian cities were sold to foreigners. Through the passes of the Alps came the traders and merchants of south Germany and the "backcountry" of northern Europe for wares that they in turn disposed of in their home cities such as Augsburg, Ulm, and Nuremberg, or sent to the French fairs or to the merchants of the Hanse towns of North Germany and the Netherlands. With England and Flanders, the Venetians traded directly, and year after year, until 1560, their merchant fleets passed through the Strait of Gibraltar on the way to these northern countries.

By the opening of the fifteenth century, Venice had become the commercial-maritime center of Europe, overshadowing her Mediterranean rivals, Pisa, Genoa, Marseilles, and Barcelona. With a population of approximately 190,000, she had an army of 40,000 men, a commercial fleet of 3,000 ships, and an enormous annual revenue. Not only was she the distributing point for the wares of the East, but to her markets and warehouses came the products of Europe for re-export. Above all, her merchants and princes, because of their almost exclusive monopoly of the Levant trade, grew rich—some of them fabulously rich—to the envy of the merchants and rulers of the rising nations on the Atlantic, who were deprived of the major profits of the Oriental trade. Their jealousy of Venice was a major factor behind their determination to seek a new route to the East.

This search for new routes was also facilitated by the rise of national states. In the early stages of their evolution the kings of these new national states—Portugal, Spain, France, Sweden, Denmark, and England—were only nominal rulers; effective authority rested in the hands of powerful feudal lords, each of whom was practically sovereign over one or more of the many geographical fragments into which each country was divided. Upon these lords the monarch was dependent for

funds, military forces, and the administration of the law. Every effort on his part to limit their authority or to change the existing order they vigorously resisted. The monarch soon realized, however, that in the rising middle class he had a powerful ally, for the merchant hated and sought escape from the feudal system with its hierarchies, private wars, robber barons, arbitrary exactions, and varying customs duties, its hundred systems of coinage, and its multitudinous local courts from which there was often no appeal. He wanted order, uniformity, and above all security; and he soon came to appreciate that the attainment of these objectives hinged on the establishment of a strong central government. He realized, too, that such government would in all probability mean better roads and bridges, wider markets, and increased protection for his interests. The merchant class, therefore, often rallied to the support of the monarch in his struggle against the feudal lords for supremacy. Its wealth, in the form of taxes, enabled him to raise a paid standing army and to hire loyal officers. In short, the success of the monarch in his efforts to unify his country geographically and to exercise his royal prerogatives depended in large measure on the prosperity of the middle, or bourgeois, class. For him their wealth spelled power and prestige, and it was this fact that helped to enlist the support of the rulers of the rising national states on the Atlantic seaboard for maritime exploration and discovery.

The changes in Europe's political and economic institutions were the principal forces that encouraged mariners and their backers to persist in their search for an all-water route to the East. By 1471, Portuguese explorers had crossed the equator. In 1486, Bartholemew Diaz, the third member of his family to carry the Portuguese flag along the shores of the "Dark Continent," rounded the Cape of Good Hope and turned northward into the Indian Ocean, only to be forced back by threats from his mutinous crew. Nevertheless, the long-sought passageway had at last been found, and twelve years later, when Vasco da Gama anchored his fleet at Calicut on the southwest coast of India (shortly before Albuquerque had carried the flag of Portugal to the Spice Islands in the East Indies), the Portuguese triumph was complete. Meanwhile Columbus, who was an expert sailor, a skilled maker of charts, and a firm believer that the Indies might be reached by sailing directly westward, had made his great voyage and discovered America.

It was once customary to attribute both the Portuguese explorations and the discoveries by Columbus to conquests made by the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth century. These infidel people, so the old accounts ran, having conquered Syria and Asia Minor, cut off the old trade routes to the East and made it essential to find new commercial arteries to the Orient. This theory, however, has been disproved. In the first place, not all the trade routes had been blocked by the Turks when Vasco da

Gama made his memorable voyage to India. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that Constantinople, largely because of basic changes in European economic organization, was on the decline long before its capture by the Turks; that the Turks did not deliberately interfere with trade; that under their regime commerce was little or no more hazardous than it had been under their predecessors; and that, next to the Italians, the Turks themselves were the heaviest losers by the change.

The exploits of Columbus and Vasco da Gama were soon equaled and even excelled by others. In 1497, John Cabot, a Genoese sailing under the English flag, anchored off the North American coast at Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, or Labrador. In 1500, Cabral, in attempting to follow the Da Gama route to India, was driven off his course and discovered the region now known as Brazil, which he claimed for the king of Portugal. During the same year Hojeda and Pinzon sailed along the greater part of the northern coast of South America, and in 1501, Americus Vespuccus, a Florentine for whom America was named, followed a long stretch of the same continent. About a decade later Balboa discovered the Pacific, and in 1522 the *Victoris*—sole survivor of Magellan's fleet of five ships—reached Spain after sailing around the globe.

3. FRUITS OF DISCOVERY

SPAIN and Portugal were the first European states to obtain territory as a result of the new discoveries. The Portuguese began the colonization of Brazil and established a trading empire in India and the East Indies. They controlled most of the slave-trading stations along the coast of Africa and were thus enabled to add considerable sums to the enormous profits accruing from the Oriental trade. Their commercial ventures in the East helped to make the Indian Ocean and western Pacific regions tolerably well known to Europeans. But Portugal was unable to support such a far-flung empire. With a relatively small population and few resources, with a government honeycombed with graft and corruption, and with no adequate means of distributing her Eastern merchandise or protecting her monopoly, it was only a question of time before she would be compelled to relinquish what she had so long worked for. Her dreams and ambitions were cut short when in 1580 the Spanish monarch Philip II became ruler of Portugal and proceeded to subordinate Portuguese interests to those of Spain.

The Spanish had been no less active than the Portuguese. Setting out to conquer, rule, and exploit, by the end of the sixteenth century they laid claim not only to their holdings in the Eastern hemisphere but to all the coastal regions and portions of the interior of South America,

and to the West Indies, Central America and Mexico. Adventurers like Ponce de León, De Soto, Narváez, and Coronado—attempting the conversion of the natives or searching for treasure, slaves or a short passage to the South Seas—headed expeditions that explored much of the interior of the southern half of the present United States. Comparatively few permanent settlements were made in this region, however, and it was never an important part of the Spanish colonial empire. Until 1630 the little town of Sante Fé, with two hundred and fifty Spaniards and twice as many half-breeds and Indian dependents, was the only Spanish settlement in New Mexico. Twenty-five neighboring missions served ninety pueblos claiming ninety thousand resentful converts. Fifty years later the Spanish population of New Mexico numbered approximately twenty-five hundred, nearly all of whom were living in the upper Rio Grande Valley. In Florida, St. Augustine was the only important town founded by the Spanish; it had a population of about five thousand when the English took possession of it in 1763.

Both Spain and Portugal attempted to monopolize the commerce of their colonies. By the papal line of demarcation of 1493, supplemented the following year by the Convention of Tordesillas, the two countries agreed to divide all newly discovered lands between them, Spain obtaining all west of an imaginary line 370 leagues (1,110 miles) west of Cape Verde Islands, and Portugal all east of it. Within their respected spheres, each country attempted to keep trade and wealth for itself. All trade with the Spanish colonies was supposed to be carried on by Spaniards in Spanish vessels from specified Spanish ports to specified colonial ports. Portugal used the same technique. Such a policy, it was reasoned, would enable the home merchants to market their goods in the colonies in return for raw materials or gold and silver. At the same time ship owners would benefit, and the government would obtain large sums in export and import taxes as well as a share of the products of the mines.

Before the middle of the sixteenth century no nation seriously challenged the title of either the Portuguese or the Spanish to their far-flung empires. But with the spread of Protestantism and Spain's determination to maintain a monopoly of the world's mineral wealth, competition for empire became active. The countries that turned Protestant—countries whose commercial and capitalist classes had often objected to the restraints imposed by the papal bull—no longer felt bound to respect the claims of the Iberian states. Already the Dutch, economically, politically, and religiously oppressed by Spanish rule and on the verge of revolt, were earning a large portion of the profits of the Portuguese trade with the East. English buccaneers—Hawkins, Drake, and others—waged an unrelenting offensive against the Spanish monopoly, raiding and plundering the coast towns of Spanish America and capturing Spanish

treasure-ships on the high seas. Even the port towns of Spain did not escape molestation.

Against such activities Spain protested in vain, for her rivals came more and more to realize that her power rested in large measure upon the wealth that she obtained from the New World. For example, Richard Hakluyt the younger, Anglican clergyman and leading geographer of Elizabethan England, wrote: "If you touch him [Philip] in the Indies, you touch the apple of his eye; for take away his treasure, which is *Nervus Belli*, and which he has almost out of his West Indies, his old bands of soldiers will soon be dissolved, his purposes defeated, his power and strength diminished, his pride abated and his tyranny utterly suppressed." In similar vein Francis Bacon wrote: "Money is the principal part of the greatness of Spain; for by that they maintain their veteran army. But in this part, of all others, is most to be considered the ticklish and brittle state of the greatness of Spain. Their greatness consists in their treasure, their treasure in the Indies, and their Indies (if it be well weighed) are indeed but an accession to such as are masters of the sea."

Spanish mastery of the sea was seriously impaired by the English. King Philip II of Spain, in his desire to restore England to Roman Catholicism, first tried to marry Queen Elizabeth, who came to the English throne in 1558; but failing in this he engineered several conspiracies to supplant her with her Catholic rival, Mary Queen of Scots. His efforts, however, succeeded only in uniting the English people in their enmity toward Spain. Elizabeth on her side lost few opportunities to weaken those who would destroy her. She assisted the Huguenots, or French Protestants, secretly and then openly; she intervened in favor of the Dutch, who were rebelling against Spain; and she connived with the English sea dogs in their warfare on the Spanish monopoly. Philip finally resolved to subjugate England and humble its Queen by means of his "Invincible Armada." Its defeat in 1588 marks the decline of Spanish maritime supremacy. Within three years, eight hundred Spanish ships were taken, and in 1596 the Englishman Sir Thomas Howard captured and plundered Cádiz. Even more important, these attacks on the Spanish fleet paved the way for the establishment of rival empires beyond the sea.

The Netherlands built the first of these empires. Beginning their maritime career as fishermen, the Dutch, long before they revolted from Spain, had built up a profitable carrying trade, bringing cloth, tar, timber, and grain from the Baltic and North seas to Spain and France in exchange for wines and liquors and other products of southwestern Europe and the East Indies. The revolt of the Netherlands and the union of Spain and Portugal not only augmented this trade but gave the Dutch a golden opportunity to secure colonial possessions. In 1595, the year following their exclusion by Philip II from the port of Lisbon,

they made their first voyage to India. Direct trade with the Spice Islands increased annually, and by 1602 at least sixty-five Dutch merchantmen had made the return voyage from India. Scarcely less significant was their capture of 545 Spanish and Portuguese ships in the thirteen years from 1602 to 1615. In 1602 the Dutch East India Company was chartered, and in a few years it not only established new trading posts along the African and Asiatic coasts but succeeded in ousting the Portuguese from the rich islands of the Malay Archipelago and in monopolizing the bulk of their commerce. Under the auspices of the Dutch West India Company, trading posts were also established in the Americas. The most important of these included settlements along the coast of Brazil, in Guiana, in the Antilles, and at the mouth of the Hudson. But the Dutch were unable to maintain their empire intact; in 1654 they lost their last stronghold in Brazil, and ten years later the New Netherlands, their most important American colony, passed into the hands of the English. Throughout the seventeenth century, however, they dominated the carrying trade between Asia and Europe and increased their Baltic and Mediterranean commerce. Not surprisingly, they were envied by many English and French merchants.

France was more tardy in building up an overseas empire than her continental neighbors, Portugal, Spain, and Holland. During the religious wars that continued intermittently from 1562 to 1598, French commerce and industry suffered serious setbacks. French merchant vessels practically disappeared from the Atlantic, and with the exception of one or two attempts by the Huguenots to make settlements in the New World, nothing was done to follow up the work of the Florentine Verrazano, sent out by Francis I in 1524, or that of Cartier, who made his first voyage to America in 1534.

As soon as civil strife ceased, however, foreign and domestic trade began to revive, and French businessmen manifested a renewed interest in overseas expansion. Henry IV and his Huguenot minister Sully subsidized a merchant marine, built up a navy, and encouraged the formation of powerful mercantile companies. In 1603, Champlain, in the employ of one of these companies, sailed up the St. Lawrence to the rapids above Montreal and explored the Acadian coast as far as the Bay of Fundy. Five years later, under the patronage of Henry IV, he laid the foundations of Quebec, destined to be the capital of New France and the center of French endeavor in America. Under Richelieu, who virtually ruled France from 1624 to 1642, and Colbert, minister of Louis XIV, the French Empire in America was expanded until it included all eastern Canada, the great central valley of North America, French Guiana, Haiti, and over a dozen of the Antilles, including Guadeloupe and Martinique. In the Old World the French established trading posts on the African coast, laid claim to Madagascar, and gained

a strong foothold in India, where they had thriving commercial centers at Surat, Chandernagor, and Pondicherry.

Sweden also made settlements in America. During the seventeenth century Sweden rose to the position of a first-class power and, like her neighbors, desired to extend her commerce. In 1638, a Swedish company established a trading post on the Delaware. The venture, however, proved unsuccessful, and in 1655 New Sweden surrendered to the Dutch.

As an empire builder, England, in comparison with her rivals, enjoyed certain advantages. The English Channel protected her against the ravages of ambitious and warlike neighbors. Because she was not forced to maintain powerful armies to safeguard her boundaries against dangerous enemies, she supported no military caste. On the other hand, her insularity compelled her to concentrate on her navy; and as her navy grew in power, she was increasingly able not only to protect the homeland but also to seize and colonize distant lands and to incorporate them into her growing commercial and colonial empire.

Moreover, England's imperial fortunes were favored by certain inherent weaknesses that characterized the peoples of the Continent. Eastern Europe, still landlocked, was consuming its time in petty warfare. Central Europe was still feudal. Even England's neighbors across the Channel were cramped in their efforts to establish colonial empires. The Dutch were handicapped by their small numbers, and they mistakenly concentrated upon trade instead of settlement. France, though she had leaders interested in colonization and a much larger population than England, dissipated her resources in interminable and futile dynastic wars on the continent and in domestic religious strife. Portugal made a gallant start in the field of colonial enterprise, but she had neither the resources nor the power to compete successfully with Britain. And Spain, administratively and financially mismanaged, early headed for disaster.

No less important than England's position of insularity and the weakness of her rivals was her rapidly increasing middle class—small landholders, merchants, manufacturers, money lenders, and shop keepers. Interested in profits that would enable them to better their standard of living, they were often ardent advocates of overseas expansion. In their opinion, no venture afforded greater opportunity for the acquisition of wealth than did commerce beyond the seas. They furnished most of the leaders and managers, nearly all of the capital, and many of the pioneers for the founding of England's overseas domains.

That England, by the opening of the seventeenth century, had a flourishing middle class ready to embark on the enterprise of colonization was due in no small measure to the fact that she had rid herself of feudalism. The backbone of the old feudal order had been broken by the Wars of the Roses. Tudor absolutism had further subjugated the feudal

aristocracy, both lay and ecclesiastical, and feudal ideals and the feudal economy were gradually giving way to a more or less bourgeois regime. Accompanying this transformation was the disappearance of serfdom and the subsequent changes in the English rural economy. With the increase in woolen manufactures in the sixteenth century and the consequent demand for wool, tillage often gave way to sheep raising. Landlords, motivated more by profits than by humanitarian interests, extinguished the traditional rights of peasants and enclosed sizeable portions of the common lands; the dispossessed tenants furnished England with prospective New World emigrants.

England did practically nothing in the way of exploration and colonization for half a century after the Cabot voyages of 1497-8. During this period she was too much absorbed in domestic affairs to engage in either overseas trade or colonial experiments. Moreover, she was debarred from any part of the newly discovered world by the papal bull of demarcation. But, thanks to fishermen who with increasing frequency visited the banks of Newfoundland and to the increasing rumors about the unexplored wealth of the New World, interest in America was kept alive; and with Elizabeth's accession to the throne and the ensuing contest with Spain, this interest grew rapidly.

Several influences stimulated this interest in expansion. In the first place, the struggle with Spain focused attention on America. Many leading Englishmen, even before the destruction of the Armada, expressed the opinion that by planting colonies in America, England would be strengthened and Spain correspondingly weakened. In 1583, for instance, Sir George Peckham, after calling attention to the enormous wealth that Spain derived from the New World, declared that it was time for his countrymen to awaken "out of that drowsy dream wherein we have so long slumbered" and to set about colonizing America. The following year Hakluyt in his *Discourse concerning Western Discoveries*, written for the enlightenment of Elizabeth, urged the government to establish between Florida and Cape Breton posts from which attacks could be made on Philip's fleets in order to weaken his grip on America. Sir Walter Raleigh was especially outspoken "against the ambitious and bloody pretences of the Spaniards who, seeking to devour all nations, shall be themselves devoured."

Closely related to this desire to weaken Spain were considerations of patriotism and national prestige. The England of the sixteenth century was very different from that of the fourteenth. Feudal decentralization had given way to unification and nationhood, and the spiritual overlordship of the Papacy had disappeared in the Reformation; an insular patriotism had developed. Many Englishmen now argued that increased area and population would not only strengthen England by adding to her resources but would enhance her prestige and standing. On this

ground, Sir Ferdinando Gorges advocated expansion. "Nothing," he said, "adds more glory and greatness to any nation, than the enlargement of their territories, the multiplying of their subjects."

The desire to get rich quickly, the hope of every adventurer in every age, was another motive for colonization. The achievements of the great seamen, so admirably depicted by Hakluyt in his *Voyages*, stirred the English in much the same way as, generations before, the adventures of Marco Polo and the other Asiatic travelers had roused the curiosity of Europe about the East. The stories of profits ranging from 100 to 400 per cent likewise whetted the appetite for riches. Englishmen, it was believed, could find mountains of precious metals, just as the Spanish had found riches in Mexico and Peru. It was in part this idea that enabled Gilbert and Raleigh to undertake their experiments in America. It was the same idea that enticed the first Englishmen to Virginia, where gold and silver are "more plentiful than copper is with us." Even as late as 1760, Thomas Jeffreys incorporated the following item on the Far Northwest in his standard atlas of America: "Hereabouts are supposed to be the Mountains of Bright Stones mentioned in the Map of Ye Indian Ochagach." All of the earlier American colonial charters were granted on the assumption that gold and silver would be found, and each contained a clause reserving a fixed amount, usually one fifth, to the monarch.

Still another motive for colonization was the desire of many to see the natives of the New World christianized. Indeed, English Protestants were alarmed by the fact that "Spanish Papists" were winning the red man to God, and felt it their duty for the sake of the true faith to "instill into the purged mindes" of the heathen "the sweet and lovely liquor of the Gospel." Supporters of earlier colonizing companies asserted from time to time that the spread of Christianity was one of their chief aims. "The Kingdom of God will be enlarged," said one, "and the tidings of His truth will be proclaimed among so many millions of savage men and women who now live in darkness in those regions." Captain John Smith declared that "gaining provinces adds to the King's crown; but the reducing Heathen people to civility and true Religion, brings honour to the King of Heaven." Nearly all the colonial charters specifically mentioned the spread of Christianity as an object of settlement.

The belief that England was overpopulated also stimulated interest in expansion. Although the increased money supply, expanding trade, the extension of the wage system, and the multiplication of enclosures caused economic growth, they also increased social inequality. England in 1600 was wealthier than in 1500, but this wealth was largely concentrated in the hands of the upper and middle classes. With the influx of precious metals, prices shot upward, and the cost of living increased many fold. Beef, for instance, rose from one cent a pound in 1548 to



THIRD AND LAST VOLUME OF THE VOY- AGES, NAVIGATIONS, TRAF- fiques, and Discoueries of the *English Nation*, and in some few places, where they have not been, of strangers, per- formed within and before the time of these hundred yeeres, to all parts of the *Newfound world of America*, or the *West Indies*, from 73. degrees of Northerly to 57 of Southerly latitude;

As namely to *Engronland*, *Meta Incognita*, *Esotoriland*,
Tierra de Labrador, *Newfoundland*, y^p *The grand bay*, the gulfes of *S. Law-
rence*, and the River of *Canada* to *Hochelaga* and *Saguenay*, along the coast of *Aram-
bec*, to the shores and maines of *Virginia* and *Florida*, and on the West or backside of them
both, to the rich and pleafam countries of *Nueva Bifaya*, *Cikola*, *Tiguer*, *Cicut*,
Quintrá, to the 15. provinces of the kingdome of *New-Mexico*, to the
bottom of the gulfes of *California*, and y^p the
River of *Buena Guia*:

And likewise to all the yles both finall and great lying before the
cape of *Florida*, *The bay of Mexico*, and *Tierra firma*, to the coasts and Inlands
or *Nova Spatia*, *Tierra firma*, and *Guiana*, y^p the mighty Rivers of *Oreouque*,
Difolebe, and *Marumone*, to every part of the coast of *Brasil*, to the River of *Plak*,
through the Straights of *Mogilan* forward and backward, and to the
South of the said Straights as farre as 57 degrees:

And from thence on the backside of *America*, along the coastes, harbours,
and capes of *Chili*, *Perru*, *Nicaragua*, *Nueva Hispania*, *Nueva Galicia*, *Culiacan*,
California, *Nova Alizon*, and more Northerly as farre as 43 degrees:

Together with the two renowned, and prosperous voyages of *Sir Francis Drake*
and *M. Thomas Cavendish* round about the circumference of the whole earth, and
divers other voyages intended and set forth for that course.

Collected by *RICHARD HAKLUYT* Preacher, and sometimes
student of Christ-Church in Oxford.



Imprinted at London by *George Bishop Ralfe*
Newberie and *ROBERT BARKER*

ANNO DOM. 1600

TITLE PAGE OF RICHARD HAKLUYT'S THIRD VOLUME OF
THE VOYAGES

*The Reverend Richard Hakluyt, student of Christ Church in Ox-
ford, compiled this volume for the purpose of inspiring his country-
men to help build an English empire overseas.*

four in 1588; pork and mutton more than doubled in price during the same period; and the cost of other food products and of clothing rose accordingly. People of moderate means with approximately fixed incomes were forced to economize in order to make ends meet. The wages of workingmen did not increase appreciably, or at best trailed the rising commodity prices, and thousands were reduced to beggary and vagabondage; jails were filled, and crime increased. Contemporary authorities attributed this economic distress to overpopulation and as a remedy suggested colonization.

Among those urging this solution was Sir Humphrey Gilbert, who in 1576 pointed out: "We might inhabit some part of these countries, and settle there such needy people of our country, which now trouble the commonwealth, and through want here at home are enforced to commit outrageous offences whereby they are daily consumed with the gallows." Christopher Garleill, another staunch advocate of colonization, asserted in 1583 that emigration would be a boon to "our poor sort of people, which are very many amongst us, living altogether unprofitably and often times to the great disquiet of the better sort." Hakluyt entertained the same view. "These petty thieves," he said, "might be condemned for certain years in the western parts." In a pamphlet entitled *Nova Britannia*, published in 1609, the author, after stating that money and people were necessary for successful colonization, declared that England had "swarms of idle persons, which having no meanes of labour to relieve their misery, do likewise swarm in lewd and naughty practices." It would be most profitable for England, he went on to say, "to rid our multitudes of such as lie at home, pestering the land with pestilence and penury, and infecting one another with vice and villainy worse than the plague itself." Still another pamphlet declared that there was nothing "more dangerous for the estate of commonwealths than when the people do increase to a greater multitude and number than may justly parallel with the largeness of the place and country: for hereupon comes oppression, and diverse kinds of wrongs, mutinies, sedition, commotion and rebellion, scarcities, dearth, poverty, and sundry sorts of calamities, which either breed the conversion, or eversion, of cities and commonwealths."

Of all the influences upon English expansion, none perhaps was more important than the desire of the centralized national state to be economically self-sufficing and politically independent. According to the so-called mercantilist theory, which had come to be almost universally accepted by men of the sixteenth century, this desire could be realized if the nation possessed a large and permanent stock of gold and silver. It was common belief that these commodities, always in demand and always acceptable in payment for services or goods, represented the wealth of a country and that the nation's strength and prosperity de-

pended absolutely upon the amount of specie at its command. Englishmen had observed that Spain was powerful and apparently prosperous as long as gold and silver flowed into her coffers from the New World. Besides, an adequate supply of gold and silver was necessary for national defense at a time when international struggles were frequent and when credit as yet was relatively undeveloped. Since England did not possess rich deposits of precious metals, she was obliged either to seek possession of mines outside of Europe or to build up her stock of gold and silver by means of privateering and favorable trade balances. She had recourse to both means; but as the imaginary picture of America as a treasure house of gold, silver, and precious stones gradually vanished, statesmen came more and more to depend upon commerce as a source of specie supply.

The cardinal feature of the mercantilist doctrine was admirably expressed by two seventeenth-century English writers, Edward Misselden and Thomas Mun. Misselden, in his *Circle of Commerce*, published in 1623, wrote: "If the native commodities exported do weigh down and excede in value the foreign commodities imported, it is a rule that never fails, that then the Kingdom grows rich and prospers in estate and stock, because the overplus thereof must needs come in, in treasure." Mun, in a pamphlet entitled *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade*, (1664) declared: "The ordinary means . . . to increase our wealth and treasure is by foreign trade, wherein we must ever observe this rule, to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value." In other words, the value of a country's exports should always exceed that of her imports, and this difference, or balance of trade, would be paid in money or in additional goods. Suggestions made by the mercantilists for fostering a favorable balance of trade were many. In general, however, they advocated a large population so that there might be adequate labor and consumers; the promotion of trade and circulation of money within the state for the purpose of ensuring prosperity; the encouragement of home manufactures and the exportation of home-manufactured articles; the prohibition of foreign manufactures by the imposition of high customs duties; the granting of government subsidies or bonuses to infant industries; the negotiation of treaties favorable to the middle, or commercial, class; the establishment of colonies for markets and sources of raw materials; and the fostering of the fishing and shipping industries as valuable auxiliaries of trade and naval strength.

At the time of Elizabeth and the first Stuarts it was not easy for England to apply the mercantilist theory. For lack of many natural resources she had long been compelled to import certain essential commodities from foreign countries. From the Baltic states, Sweden, Russia, Poland, and the Germanies came naval stores for her shipping, and potash necessary for her basic industry, the manufacture of woolens. From southern

Europe came salt, sugar, dried fruits, wine, and silk. First the Portuguese and then the Dutch supplied English merchants with dyes, saltpeter, and spices from the Far East at greatly increased prices. And two thirds of the fish consumed by the English was purchased from foreigners, principally from the Dutch, who were entrenched in the fishing industry.

Not only was England dependent on her rivals for staple necessities, but she was now confronted with the problem of finding adequate markets abroad for her own commodities, now increasing in both variety and volume. Trade with Catholic Spain was precarious, and the Spanish habitually confiscated English vessels that dared to trade with the Barbary States, on the ground that the English brought "armor, munition, and forbidden merchandise to strengthen the infidells against these parts of Christendom." Venice opposed English commercial activities in the eastern Mediterranean; Denmark imposed onerous charges on English merchantmen passing through the Danish straits; and France excluded English goods by tariffs and arbitrary taxes. Prolonged civil strife had undermined the Flanders market for English wool, and English traders in Russia no longer enjoyed exemption from customs duties. Even the privileges that English merchants had long been granted in the German towns were being withdrawn.

To statesmen and businessmen, commercial and colonial expansion seemed the remedy for these pressing problems. By direct trade with India the products of the Orient might be procured independently of the Dutch and at less cost, and new markets might be opened up for English goods. Similarly colonies in America might be both a source of supply and a market for English products. No longer, they reasoned, would England be dependent on the Dutch for fish, or on the Baltic States for naval supplies, or on European markets for the sale of manufactures. If her trade could be diverted from foreign into national channels, she would become not only economically self-sufficient but prosperous and strong. "Our moneys and wares," an advocate of colonization wrote in 1606, "that now run into the hands of our adversaries or cold friends shall pass into our friends and natural kinsmen and from them likewise we shall receive such things as shall be most available to our necessities, which intercourse of trade may rather be called a home-bred traffic than a foreign exchange."

Before the sixteenth century had passed, gentlemen adventurers like Gilbert and Raleigh, dreaming of glory and wealth beyond the seas, and a greater England, composed of extensive feudal or proprietary estates, had made their efforts to plant colonies in the New World. Though they failed, they inspired others. Less than a century later the foundation of the British Empire had been securely laid; colonies had been founded in Virginia, Maryland, New England, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Guiana, and the lesser Antilles, and trading posts had been established along the African coast and in India.

CHAPTER II

THE SETTLEMENT OF COLONIAL AMERICA

4. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA
 5. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EMIGRATION TO COLONIAL AMERICA
 6. THE COLONIAL POPULATION
 7. VOLUNTARY AND FORCED EMIGRATION TO AMERICA
 8. COLONIAL LAND SYSTEMS
 9. THE COLONIAL FRONTIER
-

THE ENGLISH settlements in North America were the products of the joint endeavors of colonizers and colonists. The colonizers were entrepreneurs who in their capacity as either proprietors or members of trading companies sponsored the establishment of colonies in the New World. The colonists—or actual settlers in America—were drawn from a wide range of classes, nationalities, and intellectual backgrounds. Most were Englishmen, but many came from the European continent, and still others from Africa. Some hoped to escape persecution; some viewed the New World as a land of unbounded economic opportunities; and some emigrated because they were forcibly seized and shipped across the Atlantic. But all—however reluctantly—were to become Americans, and all were to contribute some portion of their past to the new civilization of which they were to become a part.

4. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ENGLISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA

SIR HUMPHREY GILBERT was the first Englishman to attempt to colonize the New World. His first expedition, which sailed in 1578 with a patent granted by Queen Elizabeth, was defeated by the Spanish, and the second ended in disaster in 1583, when Gilbert and his ship were lost in a storm. In the following year Gilbert's half-brother, Sir Walter Raleigh, having obtained a renewal of the patent, sponsored an expedition that explored the coast of the region that Elizabeth named "Virginia." Under Raleigh's direction, efforts were then made to establish a colony on Roanoke Island in 1585 and 1587. The survivors of the first settlement returned to England in 1586, and the second group of colonists disappeared without leaving a trace. The failure of the Gilbert and Raleigh ventures made it clear that the tasks that they had undertaken were too big for any one man, and within a short time the trading company had supplanted the individual promoter as the chief agency of colonization.

Trading companies were commercial or semicommercial corporations, chartered by their respective governments and modeled in part after the merchant adventurers of an earlier day. Their members included not only rich merchants but noblemen of high rank, gentlemen, and government officials. The Virginia Company of London, for example, which planted the first successful English colony in America, was composed at one time of 659 persons, including 21 peers, 96 knights, 58 gentlemen, 110 merchants, and 282 citizens. Like corporate stockholders of today, each member of a trading company shared in the profits according to his subscription. Such a company might be given powers not unlike those of the state itself. Usually it enjoyed, with greater or lesser exceptions, complete authority in the region specified in its charter; it elected its own officers, made its own by-laws, raised and coined money, regulated trade, disposed of corporate property, and provided for defense. On the other hand, it was by no means completely independent of its creator. Often it could do nothing contrary to the laws of the mother country, and it constantly relied on the mother country for protection. In return the company was expected to strengthen the nation by opening up new channels of commerce, by maintaining a favorable balance of trade, by supplying material for the navy, and by weakening commercial and political rivals.

More than fifty of these companies were chartered by England, France, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark before 1700. By 1588, England

alone had chartered six: the Muscovy, Cathay, Baltic, Levant, Moroccan and African companies; and in 1600 the famous English East India Company was founded. As colonizing agents these trading companies furnished the money and leadership necessary for transferring emigrants from the Old World to the New. Four colonies subsequently part of the United States—not to mention others in Canada and the West Indies—were, in part at least, the work of trading corporations: Virginia, founded in 1607 by the Virginia Company of London; New Netherlands, planted by the Dutch West India Company in 1621; Massachusetts, established by the Massachusetts Bay Company in 1630; and Delaware, begun by a Swedish commercial company in 1638. Even the Pilgrims, who founded Plymouth in 1620, were financed by an English merchant, Thomas Weston, and his associates.

In 1606 the Plymouth Company and the Virginia Company of London received from James I a charter that granted each of them a tract of land on the Virginia coast a hundred miles in width and a hundred miles in depth. Under the terms of the charter, the land of the Plymouth Company was to lie between the thirty-eighth and forty-fifth parallels and that of the Virginia Company between the thirty-fourth and forty-first parallels. It was further stipulated that the colonies of each of the companies had to be separated by at least one hundred miles. The Virginia Company immediately began preparations for colonization, and on May 24, 1607, its first group of settlers founded Jamestown.

The inhabitants of Jamestown suffered countless hardships. By the autumn of 1607, 76 of the 104 original settlers were dead; in 1616 only 350 of the 1600 that had been sent by the company were still alive; and in 1624, despite the fact that there had been more than 4000 arrivals since the colony's founding, only 1200 had managed to survive Indian attacks and the vicissitudes of life in the wilderness. Without the able and aggressive leadership of Captain John Smith, Jamestown undoubtedly would have suffered a fate similar to that of the Roanoke settlements, and it was not until 1616, when an improved method for curing Virginia's tobacco was discovered, that the ultimate success of the colony was assured.

Although the stockholders of the Virginia Company viewed Jamestown as a business venture, they obtained no returns on their investment, for the expense of maintaining the colony always exceeded the value of the relatively small amount of products that the settlers shipped to the mother country. The company's charter was liberalized in 1609 and in 1612; in 1619 communal ownership gave way to private holdings; and in the same year the colonists were permitted a representative assembly. But none of these changes enabled the company to pay its way, and in 1624, James I annulled the company's charter. Virginia became

a royal colony, and the control of its governmental affairs passed to the Crown.

Thirteen years after the founding of Jamestown, a small band of Englishmen settled at Plymouth in the present state of Massachusetts. The so-called Pilgrims—Separatists, some of whom had migrated from Scrooby, England, to Holland—sailed for the New World in the *Mayflower* and reached Plymouth Bay in December of the same year. Before landing, 41 of the 100 settlers signed the “Mayflower Compact,” which provided for the establishment of a democracy and was also designed by its authors as a device for preserving law and order in the new colony. Despite a severe first winter during which more than half the inhabitants died, the colony survived, and most of its members were soon making an adequate living from the fur trade, farming, fishing, and lumbering. Although the Pilgrims had been given permission to settle on the land granted the Virginia Company, their ship had been blown off its course and their colony was situated on territory that had been assigned to the Plymouth Company. But the Council of New England, which had taken over the Plymouth Company’s grant, made no move to oust the Pilgrims, and in 1630, William Bradford, the Governor of Plymouth, secured title to the land occupied by the colonists. Moreover, by 1641 the leaders of the colony had succeeded in paying off the last of the debts to the group of London merchants who had financed the venture. For the next fifty years the settlements in and around Plymouth comprised a self-governing community. In 1691, however, William III transferred the political control of the Plymouth colony to the Massachusetts Bay colony.

Far more important than the Plymouth colony were the Puritan settlements at Massachusetts Bay. In 1628, some English businessmen, most of whom were Puritans, secured from the Council of New England the land between the Merrimac and Charles rivers. In the following year this grant was confirmed in a charter that Charles I issued to the Massachusetts Bay Company. Salem, which was founded in 1628, was the first town to be established by the company. Others soon followed, and when John Winthrop, the company Governor, reached Massachusetts in 1630 with the charter, colony and company became one. By the end of 1630 there were well over a thousand settlers in the towns of the Massachusetts Bay colony, and during the “Great Migration” of the next decade, 25,000 more arrived. In 1684 Massachusetts’ charter was annulled, and in 1691 it became a royal colony.

Emigrants from Massachusetts were responsible either in whole or in part for the establishment of the colonies of Rhode Island and Connecticut. In 1635, Roger Williams, a Puritan divine, was ordered out of Massachusetts by the General Court because of his religious views. The

following year he settled at the present site of Providence, Rhode Island. He was soon joined by others, and by 1643, Portsmouth, Newport, and Warwick had been founded. In 1644, Parliament conferred on the Narragansett Bay settlers the right of self-government, and in 1663, Charles II granted Rhode Island a charter. Massachusetts Puritans also migrated to the Connecticut Valley, and in 1635 and 1636 they founded the towns of Hartford, Wethersford, and Windsor. There were, however, other settlers in the valley. Inhabitants of Plymouth had a trading post in the vicinity of Windsor; Lord Brook and his associates had erected a fort at Saybrook at the mouth of the Connecticut River; and in 1638 John Davenport and Theophilus Eaton founded the Puritan colony of New Haven. In 1662 the various valley towns and the colony of New Haven were placed under a single administration in a charter granted by Charles II to the colony of Connecticut.

New Hampshire and Maine were also in large part products of Massachusetts' expansion. In 1623, Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason, both of whom were Englishmen, were granted the region between the Merrimac and Kennebec rivers. Six years later they divided the area; Mason took the western portion and named it New Hampshire, while Gorges assumed control over the eastern part and called it Maine. Neither man, however, was a successful colonizer, and the lands under their jurisdiction were largely occupied by settlers from Massachusetts. Within a short time the Bay colony was claiming jurisdiction over the inhabitants in both New Hampshire and Maine. It was not until 1679 that New Hampshire was separated from Massachusetts and made a royal colony. Maine continued as a part of Massachusetts until 1820.

Several of the continental colonies were founded by proprietors rather than by trading companies. Sir George Calvert received a charter for Maryland in 1632; a group of proprietors obtained a patent for the Carolinas in 1660; Lord John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret received New Jersey from the Duke of York shortly before his conquest of New Netherland in 1664; William Penn obtained the right to establish his colony of Pennsylvania in 1681; and James Oglethorpe and his associates obtained the charter for Georgia in 1732. These proprietors acted from a variety of motives, but in most instances they wished to increase their personal fortunes and, incidentally, their country's prestige. Sir George Calvert—a talented Roman Catholic gentleman from Yorkshire, who was raised to the peerage as Lord Baltimore by Charles I—was primarily interested in colonization as an economic venture; he and his successors were for the most part indifferent to the political and religious creeds of their settlers. William Penn, who was born of moderately wealthy parents and trained at Oxford where he cast his lot with the despised sect of Friends—or Ranters, or Quakers, as they were

then more frequently called—looked to America as a place where he might not only establish a haven for his persecuted brethren but gain profits as well. Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret launched the project that led to the founding of New Jersey because they thought it promised a fortune in land speculation. Even those favorites of Charles II who received the vast ocean-to-ocean tract known as Carolina dreamed of immense profits as well as imperial self-sufficiency. James Oglethorpe, on the other hand, viewed his colony primarily as a haven for imprisoned debtors and as a buffer state against Spanish and French aggression.

Like the trading corporations, proprietors were free to establish whatever institutions they pleased that did not conflict with the laws and government of England. Like the trading corporations, too, they supplied the capital for establishing their overseas domains. Proprietors expected to derive their profits from the leasing or sale of land, quit-rents, customs dues, and a share in whatever mines might be discovered. The Penns and the Calverts, as well as less well-known proprietors, induced as many people as they could to settle in their “plantations,” much as modern boards of trade or chambers of commerce boom their towns or cities. The following excerpt from one of Penn’s Old World advertisements—for the Penns and the Calverts and the other proprietors were ingenious advertisers for settlers—does not differ materially in its psychological appeal from the advertisement of a modern real estate man: “The Richness of the Air, the navigable Rivers, and thus the prodigious Increase of Corn, the flourishing conditions of the City of Philadelphia make it [the colony] the most glorious Place . . . Poor People, both men and women, can here get three times the wages for their Labor they can in *England or Wales*.”

The proprietary colonies had varying fortunes, but all except Maryland and Pennsylvania were eventually placed under royal control. New Jersey was divided into East New Jersey and West New Jersey in 1664, but in 1702 the parts were reunited to form a royal colony. In Carolina the settlers in the northern part of the grant, most of whom were drawn from Virginia, had little in common with those in the settlement at Charleston. In 1719, South Carolina rebelled against the authority of the proprietors and began its separate existence as a royal colony. Nine years later North Carolina was made a royal colony. Despite the high hopes of its founders, Georgia grew more slowly than the other colonies, and in 1751, when it, too, became a royal colony, it had less than nine thousand inhabitants.

Two of the English colonies in North America—New York and Delaware—were acquired by conquest. In 1664 an English expedition demanded and obtained the surrender of New Netherland from its Dutch Governor, Peter Stuyvesant. The Duke of York, who was the brother

of King Charles II, became the proprietor of the province. With his acquisition of New York, the Duke of York also claimed authority over the Dutch and Swedes who had settled in what is now the state of Delaware. In 1682, however, he transferred jurisdiction over the Three Lower Counties—as Delaware was then called—to Pennsylvania. Delaware became a separate colony with its own assembly in 1703, but it remained under the ultimate authority of the proprietor of Pennsylvania until the Revolution.

5. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EMIGRATION TO COLONIAL AMERICA

THE SOCIAL, economic, religious, and political conditions in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made thousands anxious to emigrate to the New World. The rapid influx of gold and silver following the discovery of the New World brought economic hardship in many places to the lower classes of Europe. In England, particularly in the eastern and southeastern counties, this distress was aggravated by the economic upheaval that followed the enclosure movement, by the depreciation in the value of money, and by the European wars, which deprived England of her cloth markets. The towns and countryside swarmed with those unable to secure a livelihood, and the jails and almshouses were filled with beggars and those who had resorted to petty thievery to stay alive. "Our country," Sir William Pelham wrote, "was never in that want that now it is . . . for there are many thousands in these parts who have sold all they have even to their bed straw, and can not get work to earn any money. Dog's flesh is a dainty dish."

Under such conditions the unemployed regarded America as a refuge and were quick to heed the inducements offered by projectors of colonies, whether proprietors or trading companies. Often the government authorities compelled the more timid to emigrate by authorizing colonial agents and patentees of land to seize for their uses men and women of the lower classes, especially paupers and prisoners. An English commission in 1633, for example, was appointed "to reprieve able-bodied persons convicted of certain felonies, and to bestow them to be used in discoveries and other employments." Even the gentry felt the pinch of hard times, and many of them were reduced to straitened circumstances in their effort to "keep up" with the standards of enterprising traders or *nouveaux riches*. John Winthrop, a country squire of Suffolk, a man of modest estate and one of the leaders of the emigration to America, complained that his "means here are so shortened as he shall not be able to

continue in that place and employment where he now is"; the standard and cost of living had so increased that "no man's estate will suffice to keep sail with his equals." Winthrop shared the current opinion that England was overpopulated:

This land grows weary of her inhabitants, so as man is here of less price amongst us than a horse or sheep. All towns complain of the burden of their poor though we have taken up many unnecessary, yea unlawful trades to maintain them. Children, servants, and neighbors (especially if they be poor) are considered the greatest burden. We stand here striving for places of habitation (many men spending as much labour and cost to recover or keep sometimes an acre or two of land as would procure them many hundred as good or better in another country) and in the meantime suffer a whole continent as fruitful and convenient for the use of man to lie waste without any improvement.

Although social and economic upheavals were major causes of emigration to America, they were by no means the only ones. Closely associated and often intertwined with these changes were religious conflicts that also drove many to the New World. With the rise of new economic classes, and the growth of nationalism and individualism, the religious unity characteristic of medieval Europe disappeared. In many western and central countries, often after great disturbance or outright civil war, state churches replaced the universal Church. By the time of Elizabeth, England had established Anglicanism; Sweden and many of the German states had established Lutheranism; and Scotland and Holland had each given official blessing to their respective varieties of Calvinism. Often in conflict with these official Protestant churches, as well as with Catholicism, were many small religious sects such as the Anabaptists, Moravian Brethren, Pietists, Seventh Day Baptists, Dunkers, and Quakers. The revived interest in the study of pagan literature, the translation of the Bible into the several national languages, the great multiplication of books made possible by the printing press, and the growing emphasis of businessmen and scholars upon things of this world rather than the next contributed to the disruption of the medieval Church and helped release the flood of religious controversy and ill will. From the day that Luther began his revolt against the Roman Catholic Church early in the sixteenth century down past the close of the seventeenth century, Europe was the scene of religious turmoil and religious persecution that, directly or indirectly, led to the emigration of thousands to the New World.

In England there were two dissident religious groups, the Catholics and the radical Protestants. Henry VIII had done little more than repudiate the pope and confiscate ecclesiastical property; but before the

end of Elizabeth's reign there had been many changes in both administration and discipline that were unacceptable to both these groups. The irreconcilable Catholics could not, of course, accept any church headed by the king of England rather than the pope. On the other hand, the radical Protestants, who were often well-to-do townsmen and lesser gentry, felt that the English Church still leaned too much toward Rome and the doctrines and practices of the medieval Church. In numbers, each group represented only a small minority of both clergy and laity.

After Henry VIII broke with Rome, the Catholics occupied a most precarious position. They enjoyed a brief respite from persecution and martyrdom during the reign of Queen Mary Tudor, but under Elizabeth they were again proscribed. At the beginning of Elizabeth's reign laws were enacted forbidding any Catholic to hold office or employment under the Crown, to hold any ecclesiastical office, or to receive a university degree; to attend Mass; to speak, write, or circulate any arguments or appeals in favor of the ecclesiastical claims of the Catholic Church or in derogation of the royal supremacy or of the English prayer book. Moreover, every Catholic was required by law to help support the Established Church and to attend its services. Penalties for violation of these laws varied from fines to execution for treason. Before the opening of the seventeenth century these legal restraints were supplemented with even more rigid legislation: Catholics who refused to take the oath of supremacy or who by word or speech supported the claims of the Papacy could be outlawed and their property could be confiscated for the first offense; for the second, they could be executed for treason. After 1568 when Mary Queen of Scots arrived in England, the anti-Catholic code became even more severe; and by 1603, when James I came to the English throne, the lot of the English Catholics was, legally at least, most unhappy.

By 1600, many Catholic leaders, keenly disappointed with the course of events, believed that Catholicism could not be re-established in England and that the most they could ever hope for was toleration. But even toleration was denied. True, James I ordered the anti-Catholic laws to be suspended while his son, Charles I, was seeking a Spanish bride, and in 1622 imprisoned Catholics were released on bail or freed completely from persecution. But after the Spanish marriage scheme had failed, the lid was clamped down more tightly than ever. Even Charles I's marriage with Henrietta Marie of France did not entirely serve to lift the ban against the followers of Rome. Meanwhile some Catholic leaders tried to encourage their persecuted brethren to move to America, but few undertook to go; the great majority preferred the risks of persecution to those of emigration. There is much evidence that the anti-Catholic laws were not strictly enforced; and the Catholics were always in hopes that their position might change for the better.

Certainly the accession of the Stuarts and the powerful interposition of Spain and France gave them cause to expect the dawn of a better day. Furthermore, the intolerance in America made them hesitate; and, in some respects most important of all, many of them were of the nobility and higher gentry, and therefore not of the classes from which the overwhelming proportion of colonists was drawn.

The radical Protestants, or Puritans, as they are usually called, were individualists who desired to carry the Reformation to its logical conclusion. As Calvinists they tried to follow the absolutely unconditioned will of God as expressed in the Bible; every detail of their lives—even their clothes, the names they bore, and their most ordinary social usages—was regulated according to the Scriptures. They held that faith in God, rather than good works and compliance with a medieval ecclesiastical system, was the way to salvation. They believed that God, by “His gratuitous mercy, totally irrespective of human merit,” fore-ordained which individuals were to be saved and that “by a just and irreprehensible but incomprehensible judgment,” He condemned all others to eternal torment. Although differing among themselves on certain points, the Puritans were in general agreement that the Catholic Church was corrupt, immoral, and an agency of the Devil. All, moreover, were dissatisfied with Anglicanism, which they held to be a compromise between Romanism and thorough-going Protestantism. They believed in simple forms of worship; elaborate ceremonials had no place in the Biblical Christianity that they so ardently professed. Such practices as making the sign of the cross, celebrating saints’ days, and kneeling to receive communion they regarded as likely to breed superstition. They also believed that the organization of the Established Church should be simplified; the power exercised by bishops and archbishops was “unlawful and expressly forbidden by the Word of God,” and their offices “anti-Christian and devilish and contrary to the Scriptures.” Some favored merely limiting the power of the higher clergy, but the majority wished to abolish the episcopal organization altogether and to reorganize the church on presbyterian or congregational lines. Lastly, the Puritans freely criticized the lax standards of their time; they bitterly attacked immoralities and extravagances and condemned as sinful many innocent enjoyments.

The majority of the Puritans believed in the ideal of a single united national church and did not at first intend to destroy or withdraw from the Anglican fold; their primary aim was to gain control of the national church and then to transform it in accordance with their views. A Puritan minority, however, composed of farmers, laborers, and artisans, and known as Independents, were convinced not only that the Established Church could not be purified but that the very idea of a national church closely united with the state was wrong. The spiritual and temporal

commonwealths, they maintained, should be absolutely separate, and the church should consist of independent congregations, each with power to choose its ministers and other church officials. Unlike the majority of the Puritans, the Independents were not particularly aggressive, and were tolerant even in religious matters.

Both Elizabeth and the early Stuarts attempted by repressive measures to make Puritans conform to the Established Church. At the Hampton Court Conference in 1604, James I asserted that he would make the Radicals conform, or harry them out of the land, "or else do worse." Under Charles I conditions deteriorated. The suspension of the laws against Catholics filled the Radicals with alarm. Matters came to a head when in 1629 Charles dissolved Parliament and set himself, through his ministers Laud and Wentworth, to the task of destroying Puritanism in all its forms. Harsh laws were enacted and harsher decrees promulgated. As persecution increased, thousands of Puritans, having lost all hope of ever securing control of the Established Church, turned to America as the only avenue of escape. They belonged for the most part to the middle strata. A few were noblemen possessing landed estates; some were merchants of considerable wealth; others were professional men and university graduates; but by far the greater number were landed gentry and yeoman farmers.

With the overthrow of Charles I and the establishment of the Commonwealth the tide turned. The Puritans, now in the saddle, resolved to impose their orthodoxy on all classes of the English people. As early as 1641, orders were issued for the demolition of all images, altars, and crucifixes. Two years later the Solemn League and Covenant pledged Parliament and the Puritan leaders to do away with "church government by archbishops, bishops, their chancellors and commissaries, deans and chapters, archdeacons, and all other ecclesiastical officers depending on that hierarchy," and to "reform religion in England" in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government according to the Word of God and "the example of the best reformed churches." Although the Commonwealth guaranteed toleration for every form of Christian belief "provided this liberty be not extended to popery or prelacy," both the Anglicans and Catholics, as well as lesser religious sects, were under a cloud. From 1640 to 1660, therefore, the very classes who had persecuted the Puritans found themselves persecuted. This persecution, added to the turmoil and ill-fortune of civil war, in turn drove Anglicans and hundreds of their followers to the New World.

The recalling of Charles II to the throne in 1660 marked the end of Puritan domination in England. The Established Church, which twenty years before had seemingly received a death blow, rose again apparently more vigorous and powerful than ever. Once again Puritans, Quakers, other Protestant groups, and Catholics became the targets of oppression;

rather than undergo continued persecution, many of them elected to join their brethren beyond the seas.

Political conflict in England during the seventeenth century also stimulated emigration. During the greater part of the Tudor regime Parliament had been willing to let the monarch take the initiative; but with the expansion of commerce and the growth of a wealthy, individualistic middle class, Parliament began to assert itself. Toward the close of Elizabeth's reign it demanded a greater share in shaping the affairs of the kingdom. The Stuarts tried to check its growing power; a long-drawn-out contest between king and Parliament followed. The House of Commons insisted that the king respect not only the fundamental privileges of members of Parliament but also certain ancient rights of the "people," including freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, exemption from unlawful taxation, and the right of petition. It became increasingly evident, as the contest progressed, that the middle class was determined to give Parliament effective control over legislation and taxation so that its interests, as well as those of the king and landed aristocracy, should be forwarded. Nevertheless, rather than suffer the pains and tribulations of this long conflict, many chose the uncertainties of distant colonization.

6. THE COLONIAL POPULATION

EXACT figures are lacking, but as early as 1640 there were more than 65,000 Englishmen in America. Of this number approximately 14,000 settled in Massachusetts, 1500 in Maine and New Hampshire, 300 in Rhode Island, and 2000 in Connecticut. Of these New Englanders only about 4000 were, in a strict sense, Puritans. Between 1620 and 1642, 1500 English colonists settled in Maryland and 8000 in Virginia. During the same period the number of Englishmen who emigrated to the English West Indies was more than double the number that went to New England: Nevis received about 4000, St. Kitts between 12,000 and 13,000, and Barbados some 18,000. After 1640, civil war, the regime of Cromwell, and the restoration of the Stuarts sent a more or less steady stream of emigrants to the New World. New England in 1689 had about 80,000 people; Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas together boasted a slightly larger number; and the Middle colonies had 40,000—in all about 200,000. The population of the English West Indian islands increased even more rapidly.

Closely rivaling the English in numbers and influence were the English-speaking Presbyterians from Northern Ireland, the so-called Scotch-Irish. These were the descendants of the Presbyterians from the Scotch

lowlands who had moved to Northern Ireland following the expulsion of the Irish in 1611. They had settled as tenants in the six northern counties of Ulster, where the land had been confiscated from the Irish and regranted to English speculators (composed for the most part of London merchants) as part of James I's program for subduing Ireland by settling it with Scotch and English colonists. Despite the hostility of their Catholic neighbors, frequent friction with the English government, and the vicissitudes of war, the Scotch-Irish had prospered, and by the close of the seventeenth century Ulster alone had a Presbyterian population of more than a million farmers and businessmen. The economic and religious grievances under which the Ulsterites, as dissenting Protestants, had begun to suffer now weighed very heavily. British landlords and businessmen, with an eye to greater profits, induced the government to enact legislation for the purpose of checking Irish competition. The Navigation Acts (1660-3) cut off direct trade with the colonies; heavy duties practically prohibited the importation into England of Irish exports, including stock and dairy products; the Woolen Act of 1699 forbade exportation of Irish raw wool and woolen cloth; and discouraging regulations and inadequate markets ruined the linen industry. Even the cultivation of tobacco was forbidden. These restrictive measures applied to all Ireland, but their effect on Ulster was especially disastrous. Moreover, the Test Act of 1704 outlawed these Presbyterians, questioned their marriages, closed their chapels, and discontinued their schools. They were compelled to pay tithes for the support of the Church of Ireland, an Episcopal organization cordially hated by the great majority. Finally, when the original leases began to expire between 1714 and 1718, absentee landlords doubled and in some instances trebled the rents. At the same time, prolonged droughts ruined the crops, and smallpox and other diseases took a heavy toll of life.

Angered and discouraged, thousands of Scotch-Irish turned to America, and by the eve of the Revolution it is estimated that more than 300,000 had made new homes on the other side of the Atlantic. Fifty-four shiploads reached the port of Boston between 1714 and 1720, and an even larger number landed in Philadelphia during the same years. Although the Scotch-Irish came to all the colonies, by far the greater number settled in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. In New York and New England their settlements were small and quite scattered. Cheap land attracted most of these people to the colonial frontiers, where they soon developed an individualistic, self-reliant society very different from that of the older settled coast regions.

Ranking next to the Scotch-Irish in numbers were the Germans, victims, in large measure, of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) and the seventeenth-century wars of Louis XIV. In emigration to America these

people saw an avenue of escape from the poverty and destruction that surrounded them on all sides, and by the opening of the eighteenth century a steady stream of German farmers and artisans from south Germany, the valley of the Rhine, and the German cantons of Switzerland was pouring into the colonies of the Atlantic seaboard. The advertising of Penn and other proprietors helped to attract the Germans. During the reign of Queen Anne, books and other literature were distributed through the Palatinate and other German provinces encouraging Germans to come to England so that they might be sent to English colonies. It is estimated that fully a third of Pennsylvania's pre-Revolutionary population was German. Other thousands settled in New York, in the frontier regions of Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, and in other colonies. By the end of the Colonial period there were 200,000 Germans in America.

To the seaboard colonies came several other peoples. Hundreds of Huguenot exiles established homes in South Carolina and in the colonies of the North, where families like the Delanoes, the Devereuxs, and the Faneuils became leaders in business and in society. A somewhat lesser number of Scottish Presbyterians settled in New Jersey and New England. Welshmen—many of them Quakers—made their homes in Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and even in New England, where men like Thomas Bardin played an active and useful role in their respective communities. From Switzerland came a band of six hundred Swiss under De Graffenried, who founded New Bern, North Carolina. Other Swiss pioneers located in Pennsylvania and South Carolina. From southern and eastern Ireland came thousands of Catholic Irish in quest of religious, political, and economic freedom. Approximately 400 Swedes settled in New Sweden on the lower Delaware, while the Dutch in New Netherland numbered about 8000 when their colony was taken over by the English in 1664. Practically every colonial port town had a Jewish colony.

7. VOLUNTARY AND FORCED EMIGRATION TO THE COLONIES

THROUGHOUT the colonial period a relatively insignificant number of upper-class Europeans emigrated to the English possessions in North America. The early settlers in the Massachusetts Bay colony and in Virginia were drawn largely from the rural areas of England, and they belonged to neither the richest nor the poorest classes. Later there arrived from both England and the European continent many others of roughly the same social and economic stratum.

Nevertheless, the colonies were not peopled exclusively by members of what today would be described as the rural middle class. Many settlers were so poor they paid for passage across the Atlantic by selling their freedom for a given number of years; poverty forced others against their will to leave their native lands for the New World.

The lot of the average landless workingman in England provided him with ample reasons for wishing to emigrate to America. By law, he was in effect confined to his native parish, where he had little or no opportunity to improve his status. His wage, fixed by land-owning justices of the peace, who were interested in keeping it as low as possible, was seldom enough to furnish an adequate living for himself and his family. He was obliged to purchase his supplies at arbitrary prices, and his children at an early age were forced to contribute their bit to the support of the household. He was always close to starvation and beggary, and however much he might struggle and economize, he was usually unable to save anything for sickness or old age. The English economists of the time regarded him as a useless weight upon the community. The New World, with its opportunities for earning at least a decent living, seemed to afford him the only escape from his miserable condition. To the poorer classes on the Continent as well—particularly to the Germans—America was the land of promise.

But their very poverty stood between these people and America. To overcome this barrier tens of thousands sold themselves into servitude to ship captains, agents of planters, professional speculators, and others in return for the payment of the cost of their transportation, which varied from six to eight pounds sterling per person. These indentured servants and redemptioners * suffered on shipboard great discomfort and even extreme hardship—overcrowding and indescribably bad sanitary arrangements, starvation and barbarous punishments—and the number who died of disease and exposure was very large. Those who reached America were at once transferred to masters to work out their terms of bondage, which generally ran from two to seven years. Individuals bound to sea captains were usually advertised and auctioned off to the highest bidder, who not infrequently happened to be a “soul driver,” that is, a person who trafficked on indentured labor. Sometimes drivers bought “the whole and sometimes a parcel of them as they can agree, and then they drive them through the country like a parcel of sheep, until they can sell them to advantage.” Many who came were redeemed upon arrival by friends and relatives, but in this expectation large numbers were also disappointed. Frequently, the children of very

* Redemptioners, or free-willers as they were sometimes called, made an agreement with a merchant or ship captain that enabled them to find a master in the colonies who would pay their passage. Indentured servants, on the other hand, were auctioned off to the highest bidder when the vessel reached America. There were many more indentured servants than redemptioners.

old or sick people who were able neither to pay their passage nor to work served for their parents as well as for themselves.

Although every colony had its bondsmen, the number was exceptionally large in the proprietary colonies, where the demand for cheap labor was imperative. The Baltimores, Penns, and Carterets made every effort to secure as many indentured servants as possible. They were so successful that in all probability over half of the thousands of emigrants

This Indenture MADE the *Thirteenth* Day of *May* 1681
in the Year of our Lord one thousand, seven hundred and *eighty one* BETWEEN
Alex^r Beards of Broughsham in the County of Somerset in England of the one Part, and *John Dickey of Cullybathery*
in the said County of Limerick of the other Part,
WITNESSETH, that the said *Alex^r Beards* doth hereby covenant, promise
and grant, to and with the said *John Dickey* — *his* — Executors,
Administrators and Assigns, from the Day of the Date hereof until the first and next
Arrival at *Philadelphia* — in America, and after for and during the Term
of *Three* Years to serve in such Service and Employment as the said
John Dickey — or his Assigns shall there employ *him* according to the
Custom of the Country in the like Kind. In Consideration whereof the said *John Dickey*
doth hereby covenant and grant to and with the said *Alex^r Beards*
to pay for *his* Passage, and to find allow *him* Meat, Drink, Apparel
and Lodging, with other Necessaries, during the said Term; and at the End of the said
Term to pay unto *him* the usual Allowance, according to the Custom of the Country
in the like Kind. IN WITNESS whereof the Parties above-mentioned to these
Indentures have interchangeably put their Hands and Seals, the Day and Year first
above written.
Signed, Sealed, and Delivered,
in the Presence of
Enter Dillm
John. Wiery
Alex^r Beards
John Dickey

A TYPICAL SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY INDENTURE

who came to the Middle colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were in bondage. During the seventeenth century the number in the Southern colonies was also large, but it declined rapidly after slavery secured a foothold.

The supply of white laborers was further augmented by a considerable class of involuntary servants composed of kidnapped individuals, political and religious offenders, paupers, and vagrants. Thousands of children and adults in English cities, particularly Bristol and London, fell victims to the wiles of professional kidnappers and agents of companies and proprietors who had colonies in America. Children were lured from their homes by promises of trinkets or sweetmeats and then

forcibly seized and sold for long terms of servitude. As early as 1627 approximately fifteen hundred children had been sent across the Atlantic. Fifty years later it was estimated that at least ten thousand persons were either forcibly or fraudulently "spirited away" to America every year. In 1671 a kidnapper stated that for twelve years he had sent five hundred individuals annually to the colonies. Parents in straitened circumstances often indentured their children, and English parish authorities welcomed the opportunity of sending orphans and paupers to the New World. Many of these, separated from friends and relatives and subjected to great hardships, were early claimed by death. Those of stronger constitution, after serving their term of bondage, either became independent farmers or farm laborers or joined the growing group of artisans.

Still other involuntary white emigrants were the "criminals" or "transported prisoners." Almost all were either political and religious offenders or convicts from English prisons, and they represented some of the best and some of the worst elements of the population. In the first class were those who dared to criticize or even oppose the government—for example, the Irish transported by Cromwell during his occupation of Ireland, the Cavaliers who bitterly denounced the Puritans and championed the cause of the Stuarts, the Roundheads after the Restoration, and the Scotch and English who from time to time rebelled or plotted insurrectionary movements against the English monarchs. Sometimes these offenders were men of superior training who were employed by their masters in positions of responsibility. In the second class were many who were in a modern sense not criminals, but victims of the penal code, which listed no less than three hundred crimes punishable by death and thus put the starving poor who committed trifling offenses in the same class as highwaymen and murderers. During the seventeenth century the English courts frequently pardoned a criminal if he would leave the country. Moreover, in 1717, Parliament enacted a statute that permitted certain classes of criminals to be transported at the discretion of the court for a term of not less than seven years. Between 1717 and the outbreak of the Revolution, some forty thousand persons were in this way sent to America, some for seven years, some for fourteen, and some for life. In Maryland, which received more of them than any other colony, they formed the backbone of the servant class. Not all of these transported convicts were petty criminals, however; some were counterfeiters, robbers, and even murderers; some carried disease and were thus a menace alike to master and community. Several colonies vigorously protested against receiving these undesirables and by legislative enactment attempted to exclude them. The British government opposed these efforts, and in most instances they came to nothing.

Before the first quarter of the seventeenth century had passed, another

type of laborer, the African Negro, had been introduced. In 1619 Dutch man-of-war with 20 Negars" anchored off Jamestown, where it disposed of its human freight. For a century or more before this time Portuguese, Spanish, and, more especially, Dutch traders had developed a profitable slave traffic with southwestern Europe and, more particularly, with the West Indies. Throughout the seventeenth century, however, the supply of slave labor in the mainland colonies increased very slowly, not because the majority of the colonists had any moral scruples against human slavery, but because the Dutch monopolized the trading stations along the African coast and because the West Indies was competing for this type of labor. In Virginia in 1671 there were only two thousand Negroes, and in the colonies to the north there were even fewer. Thirty years later Virginia had only four thousand Negroes, about 8 per cent of her total population. Except, perhaps, in South Carolina, the economic system of the South throughout the seventeenth century depended, not upon Negro slaves, but upon the labor of the poor whites, both free and indentured.

Towards the end of the century, however, Negro slavery began to increase. English slavers broke the Dutch monopoly of the trade and were able to secure slave cargoes along the West African coast from native chiefs or slave drivers in exchange for cheap clothing, hardware, ammunition, and rum of an inferior quality. These cargoes, when sold in the New World, brought large profits. In 1672, Parliament chartered the Royal African Company, an English commercial corporation, and gave it an exclusive monopoly of the slave trade with the British colonies. In 1698, English merchants, who were not members of the company, and traders and shipowners of Boston, Newport, New York, and Charleston were also allowed to participate in the business. The volume of the traffic now increased so rapidly that approximately 250,000 Negroes were brought to the West Indies or to the American mainland within the next ten years. After 1713, when England and Spain signed the *Asiento*, which granted England the exclusive right for thirty years to bring African slaves into Spanish possessions, the traffic grew still more. Shippers of New England rivaled those of Old England in the number of Negroes they transported and in the profits they obtained.

DISTRIBUTION OF NEGRO POPULATION, 1760 *

<i>Total Negro population north of Maryland</i>	87,000
<i>Total Negro population in Southern colonies</i>	299,000
TOTAL (APPROXIMATELY)	<u>386,000</u>

* See Edward Channing: *History of the United States*, Vol. II: *A Century of Colonial History, 1660-1760* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908), pp. 491-2; Marcus W. Jernegan: "Slavery and Conversion in the American Colonies," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXI, p. 523, n. 123.

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN SOUTHERN COLONIES

	TOTAL	WHITES	BLACKS
Maryland	164,000	108,000	56,000
Virginia	315,000	165,000	150,000
North Carolina	130,000	110,000	20,000
South Carolina	100,000	30,000	70,000
Georgia	9,000	6,000	3,000
TOTAL	718,000	419,000	299,000


The distribution of slavery throughout the colonies was very uneven. In the North, Negroes were, for geographic and industrial reasons, of little economic consequence; some were employed on farms, but the majority were household servants, coachmen, boatmen, sailors, and porters. In some instances Northern slaveholders frankly confessed that they were financially overburdened with slaves. On the eve of the Revolution only one out of every fifty of the inhabitants of New England was a Negro; in New York, one in six; in Delaware and Pennsylvania, where there was a good deal of Quaker opposition to slavery, about one in five. Three fourths of the 400,000 Negroes in the colonies were in the South—in Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, where in some communities they equaled or exceeded the whites in number.

8. COLONIAL LAND SYSTEMS

THE VAST majority of those who emigrated to colonial America hoped to become land owners. Although a variety of motives lay behind their decision to leave the Old World, their aspirations in the New, with few exceptions, were bound up with the desire to acquire land. Land not only provided the means of subsistence, but it was also the most easily obtained and most obvious form of wealth in a new country; and in Europe the possession of wealth in the form of land was

2. COLONIAL SETTLEMENT, 1620-1760

Note that the settlements in 1660 were confined almost entirely to the Atlantic coast and the river valleys and that as yet there were none south of Virginia. By 1700 the earlier settlements had been expanded but still hugged the river valleys. Sixty years later the colonists occupied an area twice as large as at the beginning of the eighteenth century and were pushing into the Great Valley of the Blue Ridge Mountains and along the Mohawk River toward central New York.



closely related to the individual's rank in the social order. Thus the colonists were not slow to see that the vast untenanted areas of America offered them an unexampled opportunity to better themselves. For these reasons, the manner in which the land in the colonies was distributed and apportioned had a profound effect on both the settlement and subsequent development of colonial America.

Following the Old World model, both commercial companies and individual proprietors receiving grants from the English Crown planned at first to make America a land of great estates and tenant farmers; those who tilled the soil were not to own the land, and under the law of primogeniture every estate, upon the death of its owner, was to be transferred intact to the eldest son. This had been the dream of those "gentlemen adventurers," Gilbert and Raleigh, and in part it was the scheme that their successors at first attempted to establish. In the early days of Virginia the land belonged, not to the settlers, but to the Virginia Company, which attempted to exploit it for the benefit of its stockholders. Plans were made to carve the extensive territory of Carolina into feudal estates; and in Maryland, a typical seventeenth-century proprietary colony, sixty manors tilled by tenants were established before 1676, each containing on an average about three thousand acres. Even in New York the great feudal properties established under the Dutch regime were confirmed and, in some instances, even enlarged under English rule.

These various attempts to introduce into the New World an aristocratic land system in its entirety failed. Land was too cheap and too abundant. Settlers were concerned in bettering their own social and economic positions, not in piling up profits for trading companies or landed proprietors. America with its broad expanse of undeveloped territory unfettered by tradition or custom offered them a rare opportunity to obtain land, not by virtue of birth, title, and official influence, but by hard work and personal initiative. They therefore opposed strenuously all forms of feudal tenure, with the significant result that by the time of the American Revolution there had developed on this side of the Atlantic a system of landholding strikingly different from that of eighteenth-century Europe. In general, two types of ownership came to prevail: the freehold and the leasehold.

In the three New England colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, most farmers were freeholders, who held the land they tilled in fee simple. "Where there is one farm in the hands of a tenant," Thomas Hutchinson wrote, "there are fifty occupied by him who has the fee of it." The charters of these colonies gave the title to the land to the colonial legislatures,* which in turn made township

* In theory the title to land in Massachusetts belonged to the Massachusetts Bay Company, but the company's General Court was the Massachusetts legislature.

grants to groups of settlers who were called town proprietors. After a body of proprietors had received such a grant, they set apart sites for the village green and meeting house, laid out streets, and designated house lots for the settlers. The home lot assigned each settler, on which were located his dwelling, out buildings, and garden, ranged in size from a small plot to sometimes as much as thirty acres. He received in addition a share of the arable land, which, following somewhat the custom of the English manor, was divided into strips. The amount of land allotted to each individual usually depended upon his investment in the original enterprise, his ability to use the land, and the size of his family. Other things being equal, the industrious man with a large family received more than his neighbor who was less ambitious or who had a smaller family. The outlying meadows and pasture land, including woods and waste, were held in common and regulated by town ordinances. Ultimately, however, these were enclosed and disposed of to private individuals, and New England thus became a land of compact farms. Taxes were assessed by the local authorities, but there were no feudal charges such as were common in other parts of colonial America.* Subject only to the remote authority of Old World officials who seldom bothered him, to the dictates of some exacting creditor if he were unfortunate to be a debtor, and to the laws of his town and colony, nearly every New England farmer was by 1750 the master of his land. He could sell it, will it to his relatives, add to it by purchase, or do with it what he pleased.

Outside of New England most of the soil was disposed of according to some form of feudal tenure. A variety of land systems prevailed. In the royal province of New York, Long Island, and part of Westchester County the land was divided into typical New England freeholds; but along either side of the Hudson were great semifederal estates, such as the Van Rensselaer, Van Cortlandt, and Livingston manors, tilled, not by freeholders, but by tenants who paid rent to a "lord of the manor." North and west of the Hudson, extensive tracts were granted by royal Governors to favored individuals. For example, Governor Fletcher's favorite and right hand man, Captain John Evans, received a tract amounting to about 6,000 acres. One of Fletcher's successors asserted that nearly three quarters of the available land of the province had been granted to about thirty persons during Fletcher's regime. Not until 1768, when land in the Mohawk Valley was purchased from the Iroquois Indians, could a settler in that section of the colony obtain a farm in fee simple. Yet despite the existence of large estates, small farms predominated. Land distribution in the proprietary colonies of New Jersey and Pennsylvania was not markedly different from that

* Maine and New Hampshire were exceptions. In both regions, there were feudal charges known as quitrents.

of New York. Here and there were extensive manorial estates, such as those of Lewis Morris in East New Jersey and of the Penns on the Delaware. In both colonies, however, there was a notable tendency to divide large estates into small, manageable farms not unlike those of New England.

The seventeenth-century South was not a land of great plantations. Before 1640, Lord Baltimore made grants in perpetuity for estates as large as thirty thousand acres, but he soon discovered that it was much more profitable to issue grants for smaller plots. In both Maryland and Virginia the land was parceled out to thousands of freeholders, each of whom owned a farm varying from fifty to five hundred acres. Until the eighteenth century there were few large plantations. In Virginia the land was distributed during this first century according to the arrangement established by the Virginia Company after its unsuccessful attempt to make cultivation of the soil a communal enterprise. To resident shareholders it allotted one hundred acres for each share of stock held, and it provided that these individual holdings might be increased by "head right," a system that entitled any person to an additional fifty acres if he would pay the passage of a new settler from Europe to Virginia. This system of headrights was made law when the colony became a royal province in 1624. Even a freeman paying his own passage was entitled to fifty acres, and an additional fifty acres for his wife and for each of his children or other members of his household. The land system in the Carolinas and Georgia did not differ materially from that of Virginia, and the mass of the population were small yeoman farmers. In all the Southern colonies, clergymen, physicians, and government officials were rewarded with numerous grants, and personal favorites received large tracts gratuitously.

Except in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, the colonial land system was at first feudal in character, in as much as all of the land was sold or leased by an overlord who in turn had obtained his holdings from the Crown. By the end of the seventeenth century the personal service of tenant to lord had been superseded by the payment of what is generally known as a quitrent. This obligation, which varied from colony to colony, ranged from the fraction of a penny to two shillings sixpence per hundred acres. Unlike ordinary rent, the amount bore no relation to the value of the land, and as long as the tenant fulfilled his obligation to his overlord, the quitrent did not in any way limit his freedom to dispose of his acres as he saw fit. As a form of revenue, the quitrent was uniformly unsatisfactory, although some landlords, notably the Penns, Baltimores, and Fairfaxes, collected considerable sums annually. As a rule the colonial farmer not only opposed quitrents but whenever possible evaded payment, and in New York and New Jersey attempts to collect them sometimes led to violent resistance. Efforts to

enforce the feudal practices of escheat and alienation also roused animosity. By escheat, the lands of those who died without heirs or who were convicted of treason reverted to the Crown or to proprietor; by alienation, a fee sometimes as high as one year's rent was demanded on every transfer of the property.

9. THE COLONIAL FRONTIER

AS POPULATION increased, cheap land in the older settlements became less available. By the opening of the eighteenth century, therefore, farmers' sons and newcomers, as well as the less prosperous but ambitious and adventurous element of the towns, were turning toward the sparsely settled frontier. Here the young man who did not possess sufficient capital to buy a farm or plantation in the neighborhood in which he was reared could for a small sum acquire a tract in the unbroken wilderness. Here, too, those discontented souls who chafed under the social, economic, or religious restraints of the older communities could find freedom. Throughout the colonial period, the "Old West," as Frederick Jackson Turner called the untenanted lands between the Atlantic settlements and the Alleghenies, attracted many of those who for whatever reason found life unacceptable in the older communities.

Among the first to settle these newer lands were the Germans and Scotch-Irish. By 1770 approximately 225,000 Germans and 385,000 Scotch-Irish had found their way to the New World. Although they settled in considerable numbers along the hilly New England frontier and in the fertile Hudson, Mohawk, and Schoharie valleys of New York, it was to Pennsylvania that they flocked. The Germans located in the great valley still renowned as the home of the "Pennsylvania Dutch," but the first quarter of the eighteenth century had hardly passed before many of them, attracted by cheap land, began to move slowly southward. By 1750 they were not only occupying the Virginia piedmont in increasing numbers, but were streaming into the valley of the Shenandoah and out through the water gaps to the uplands of the Carolinas. At the opening of the Revolution they had a line of settlements extending from the Mohawk to the Savannah.

Paralleling this line were the settlements of the Scotch-Irish. Like the Germans, the majority of these aggressive, individualistic emigrants, took up their abode in Pennsylvania. Settling along the old Indian route from Lancaster to Bedford, they soon made their way into the valley of the Juniata and the Redstone country and by 1775 had established a powerful community around Pittsburgh. Like the Germans, they filtered

southward into the upcountry of Virginia and along the western bank of the Shenandoah and finally into the Southern uplands. Frequently their zone of settlement overlapped that of the Germans, but in general the bulk of the Scotch-Irish lived farther to the west. From Maryland southward, both Germans and Scotch-Irish were in large measure separated from the tidewater planters by the Blue Ridge Mountains and the pine barrens of the Carolinas and Georgia.

While the Germans and Scotch-Irish were moving southward, other pioneers, having made their way across Virginia by way of the James River, were advancing through the Blue Ridge Gap to the Shenandoah Valley. Frederick County, Virginia, with Winchester as its seat, was organized in 1743. Two years later Staunton, the seat of Augusta County, held its first court, and by the middle of the century Virginia and North Carolina had found it desirable to extend their common boundary to the Laurel Fork of the Holston River. No love was lost between these men of the backcountry and those who resided in the coastal plain region. The Easterners, who controlled the fluid capital and dominated the legislature and the courts of the colonies, were accused of forcing the frontiersmen to pay excessive taxes and exorbitant fees. During 1765-7 the backcountrymen of North Carolina organized what were known as the Regulators for the purpose of administering their own affairs. Open rebellion soon broke out and did not subside until 1771, when the Regulators were defeated by Governor Tryon's troops in the battle of the Alamance.

The entire colonial land system was affected by the mania for speculation. Every colony had its land speculators; individuals, companies, religious organizations, and even towns obtained large tracts of territory for the purpose of reselling at a profit. New Englanders with surplus capital and political influence saw in the unappropriated lands of their own section, as well as those of other colonies, opportunity for speculative investment. In 1720, Roger Wolcott of Windsor, Connecticut, together with others, secured an unoccupied tract seven by ten miles, for speculative purposes. In the same manner, men like Colonel Samuel Partridge, Jacob Wendell, Colonel Israel Williams, and Ezra Stiles acquired immense holdings that they resold at profits that would make a twentieth century real-estate dealer envious. In 1678 the people of Deerfield, Massachusetts, complained that nearly half the best land of the town belonged to eight or nine speculators. In the same colony the land of the town of Leicester was granted to twenty-two individuals, including Paul Dudley, the Attorney General; John Clark, a political leader; and Samuel Sewall, son of the Chief Justice. Not one of the twenty-two became inhabitants of the community. Speculators, too, secured control of the greater part of the New Hampshire grants, consisting of one hundred and thirty townships in the present state of Vermont.

Land agents and speculators were also active in the Middle and Southern colonies. In New York an extraordinary proportion of the landed wealth was in the hands of Sir William Johnson or representatives of those great aristocratic families who throughout the colonial period had extensive political and economic power in the colony. Chief Justice Allen of Pennsylvania, a close friend of the Penns, was reputed to be the greatest land speculator of his time. For years before the Revolution, Benjamin Franklin was engaged in land speculation. In 1763 he and several wealthy and influential Philadelphia merchants had under consideration a number of speculative undertakings, including the exploitation of western lands. In Virginia and the Carolinas, millions of acres of the rich fertile lands of the backcountry fell into the hands of speculators like Robert Beverly, Richard Henderson, the Washingtons, the Carters, and Lord Fairfax, who in turn disposed of them to German and Scotch-Irish immigrants. Prominent Charleston merchants like Benjamin Whitaker dealt in houses, tenements, and plantations as a side line, and by the time of the Revolution the sale of land in South Carolina had become a business in itself.

THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

- 10. AGRICULTURE
 - 11. FUR TRADE AND LUMBERING
 - 12. FISHERIES
 - 13. MANUFACTURING
 - 14. COMMERCE AND TRADE
 - 15. COLONIAL CURRENCIES
-

COLONIAL America was a land of farmers, and as late as 1760 nine tenths of an unevenly distributed population of approximately 1,500,000 derived its livelihood from the soil of the Atlantic seaboard. Towns and cities were few in number, and the largest of these—Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston—contained only a few thousand inhabitants each. In the midst of this overwhelmingly agrarian society a comparatively small number of colonists devoted their energies to trapping, fishing, lumbering, shipbuilding, manufacturing, and commerce; and most of the farmers north of Maryland spent a considerable portion of their time in some industrial enterprise other than farming. For a relatively new colonial area, English North America had a remarkably diversified economy.

10. AGRICULTURE

OF THE several influences that determined the character of colonial agriculture, topography, climate, rainfall, and fertility of soil rank first. New England, for example, separated from the St.

Lawrence basin by mountainous territory and from the valleys of the Mohawk and the Hudson by the Berkshires, was essentially an isolated coastal region. Except for the Connecticut, the rivers of New England, unlike those of other colonies, were not navigable for any considerable distance; and, although they proved later to be of great value when harnessed for waterpower, they were at best of minor importance in the settlement of this section. "In the frequent harbors and bays, in the 700 miles of coast line, in the great sound stretching across Connecticut, and in the sounds about lower Massachusetts," to quote the historian Weeden, "were the physical features, the initiatory characteristics that controlled the destiny of New England." Nature had fitted the region for commerce, not for agriculture. With the exception, in the southeastern part, of a wide strip of sandy land almost useless for agriculture, it possessed little level territory. Its broken, undulating, semimountainous area lent itself neither to the formation of plantation estates nor to the profitable employment of slave labor. Only in its central and eastern sections and in parts of the present state of Vermont was there land adapted to remunerative farming. Elsewhere the boulder-strewn, stubborn soil made cultivation exceedingly difficult. Such a topography, together with long, severe winters and short summers, tended to make agriculture in New England more difficult, less productive, and less profitable than in the Middle and Southern colonies.

The South was especially adapted to agriculture. Between the bay-indented coast and the "fall line," or head of navigation, of the numerous rivers that drained the area, lay the narrow, forest-covered lowlands. Once cleared and placed under cultivation, the rich, but in some places thin, soil of this tidewater region afforded the settler more than a comfortable living. Here and there along the coast of the Carolinas and Georgia, and especially near the river mouths, were marsh lands well suited for the production of rice. The rolling upland, or piedmont, sheltered on the west by the Alleghenies and separated from the tidewater by a belt of pine barrens, possessed soil of almost unsurpassed fertility. In comparison with New England, the South had an almost semitropical climate that made it possible to produce not only wheat, oats, barley, corn, fruit, and livestock but also the staples tobacco, rice, indigo, and cotton. The region also enjoyed abundant rainfall. Generally speaking, topography and climate more than anything else ultimately made the colonial South an agrarian section.

Characteristics of both New England and the South were exhibited in the physical features and climate of the Middle colonies. In New York the valleys of the Hudson and the Mohawk were from the first famous for their agricultural output; and the broad, sloping river valleys of Pennsylvania and New Jersey seemed to have been especially prepared by nature for the tiller of the soil. On the other hand, very con-

siderable areas, such as northeastern Pennsylvania, were, like western New England, rocky and mountainous and therefore unfitted for agricultural pursuits. Nor could the colonial farmer make profitable use of the extensive marshes and unfertile sandy tracts of eastern New Jersey. In New York and in the northern part of New Jersey and Pennsylvania the climate differed but little from that of New England. In the southern half of this region, however, climatic variation was less and the season of growth longer.

Of all the colonial farmers few, if any, labored under as many natural handicaps as those of New England. Yet despite the character of the soil and the harshness of climate, the farmers of the region managed to raise many products. Of these, Indian corn, or maize, was the most important. Its ease of cultivation, rapid growth, large yield, and general use as a food by both man and beast made it the section's staple crop throughout the colonial period. From friendly Indians the early settlers learned how to plant, fertilize, cultivate, grind, and cook it. In addition, New England farmers grew European grains, particularly barley, oats, rye, and buckwheat, but they never raised wheat with any success. Other crops—some American and some European in origin—included hay, peas, beans, turnips, pumpkins, and squash. Fruit grew in abundance in all the colonies, but apples, pears, plums, apricots, quinces, cherries, and crab apples seemed best suited for New England. Livestock also played an important role in the region's agrarian economy; and cattle, sheep, swine, horses, and poultry were raised in large numbers. Finally, every New England farm produced butter and cheese for home consumption and in some cases for export as well.

No section of colonial America was so favored by soil and climate for general farming as the region from the Hudson to the Potomac. In comparison with New England, the variety of crops was greater, and the yield was usually larger. Wheat instead of corn was the important staple crop; with only superficial tillage, the fields of New York and Pennsylvania yielded twenty to forty bushels per acre. Rye, oats, barley and other cereals were also produced in abundance, and hay was a better crop than in New England. Nor was there scarcity of fruit and vegetables in these "bread colonies." In contrast to New England, potatoes were an important article of food and were therefore extensively grown. Great quantities of melons, equal in quality to those produced in Italy and Spain, were raised in the vicinity of New York. The gardens, especially those of the Dutch and German settlers, rivaled those of the Old World. A ready market and an abundance of hay and grain and of rich pasture lands made the production of cattle, sheep, and swine profitable, particularly in the backcountry, where the cost of transporting grain to market was almost prohibitive. There livestock could be fattened at little expense and driven to the coast towns for

sale. Philadelphia early became the colonial center for the livestock business. These colonies were also noted for their splendid horses, especially the famous Conestoga type developed by Pennsylvania's German farmers. The forests, like those of New England, furnished not only a great variety of timber products but plenty of game and fur-bearing animals. The rivers, lakes, and adjacent coast waters provided clams, oysters, lobsters, and fish.

The Southern colonies raised practically the same kinds of grain, vegetables, and fruits as those produced by their northern neighbors. Corn, for instance, grew better in Maryland and Virginia than in New England, and both colonies during the eighteenth century exported wheat. For variety and quality of product the Southern gardens were rated as among the finest in the world. Nevertheless, except for the up-country regions, settled for the most part by Scotch-Irish and Germans, the South was not the home of the general farmer or the grain producers, fruit growers, or vegetable gardeners. The Southern agriculturist devoted almost his entire effort to the production of tobacco, rice, and indigo.

The colonial South—particularly Virginia, Maryland, and to a lesser degree, North Carolina—with its rich soil and favorable climate, was especially adapted for the production of tobacco, a plant of American origin grown by the natives at the time of the discovery of the New World. The practice of smoking tobacco was early introduced into Europe, but there it soon met with the decided opposition of both king and prelate, who denounced it as loathsome and dangerous both to the individual and to society. Nevertheless, the habit spread rapidly, creating, in consequence, a market for the plant. In 1612, Captain John Rolfe produced a successful tobacco crop in Virginia, and less than half a dozen years afterwards, tobacco was the staple of the colony, much to the disgust of the members of the Virginia Company of London, who were anxious to have the settlers produce flax, cotton, indigo, and other commodities that they thought would be more profitable and more useful to the mother country. Less than a quarter of a century later, tobacco was raised to the exclusion of almost everything else. In 1622, Virginia exported 60,000 pounds, or three times as much as in 1619, and in 1664, Virginia and Maryland, with a total population of about 40,000, produced 50,000 hogsheads. By the middle of the eighteenth century the two colonies were producing annually more than 100,000 hogsheads, or close to 50,000,000 pounds.

From the beginning, tobacco was commercially profitable, but its production had serious consequences. First, because tobacco was often his only crop, the planter became dependent upon the other colonies for part or all of his food supply. A few planters, it is true, early saw the advantages of planting partly exhausted tobacco-land with corn,


wheat, and other cereals, or of turning it into pasture for sheep and cattle. As the center of population moved westward during the eighteenth century, this tendency toward a system of agriculture based on grain and livestock production increased. But most farmers found it more profitable to raise tobacco than to raise food. Second, tobacco rapidly exhausted the soil. The planter was obliged either to fertilize his old land or to clear new land. In the short run, the second policy was the cheaper, and the planter, with little concern for future generations, first used up one tract and then cleared another. This method, however, had serious drawbacks, for it put a premium upon waste and extravagance, increased greediness, and, by encouraging the formation of larger estates, tended to crowd out the small yeoman-farmer. Third, tobacco production, by creating a demand for cheap labor, was an important factor in the development of the system of Negro slavery. Finally, it supplied the economic foundations for an aristocratic, land-holding class, which in the later colonial period dominated the social and political life of the entire section.

Production of the other two Southern staples—rice and indigo—led to similar results. Virginians were interested in both these crops, but Carolina planters made them commercially profitable. During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, experiments were attempted with an inferior grade of rice, but not until after the Madagascar variety had been introduced was the production of the crop a financial success. At first rice was grown on the uplands, but planters soon discovered that the unhealthy swamps along the seacoast, if drained and cleared of trees, were admirably suited for its culture, and here the great rice plantations developed. All things considered, rice production was less profitable than that of tobacco; yet by 1754, South Carolina alone exported approximately 100,000 barrels, and her rice planters were leading lives of ease and luxury.

The cultivation of indigo, not introduced until 1741, spread so rapidly that in 1747 the shipments to England totaled more than 200,000 pounds. This yield gradually increased, and before the Revolution, South Carolina was exporting 500,000 pounds a year. As in the production of rice, Negroes did the work. On an average one slave could handle two acres, which would produce approximately sixteen pounds of dye. Slaves also extracted the dye from the plants and prepared it for market. Indigo, like the other Southern staples, was profitable, and some of the best coast lands of Carolina were devoted to its cultivation. The owners of these lands formed an important part of the landed aristocracy, which set the social standards and controlled the political affairs of the South.

The colonial farmer's tools and implements were primitive and extremely wasteful of man power. The tool most used was the hoe, of

which there were several sorts. By the middle of the eighteenth century the better equipped farmers had in addition spades, mattocks, axes, rakes, forks, a scythe, a flail, a fanning mill, harrows, a wooden cart or two, and an unwieldy wooden plow. In general, these tools and implements differed very slightly from those used by the European peasant of the twelfth century or even by the Egyptian farmers in the time of Rameses II. In practically every instance they were hand made; the woodwork was fashioned at home and the iron parts, such as plow-



FARMING TOOLS OF LATER COLONIAL TIMES

The tools were either entirely homemade or were made by the local blacksmith. Note that with the exception of the plow and the A-drag, or harrow, all could be used only by hand.

shares, chains, axe heads, scythe blades, hoe blades, and fork tines, were hammered out by the village blacksmith. At best, the tools were heavy, clumsy, ill-contrived, and tiring to use.

Farm methods and farm management in colonial America were as primitive as the tools. Here and there, it is true, a few wealthy and enterprising farmers who were abreast of the latest developments in European agriculture attempted to apply scientific principles to the breeding of livestock and the production of crops. With these exceptions, however, there were practically no advances in agricultural technique until after 1750. As in Europe, farmers left their land fallow so that it might regain its fertility, and they paid little or no attention to scientific methods of cropping or cattle breeding. An abundance of cheap, fertile land discouraged the use of artificial fertilizer and the

practice of careful crop rotation. The cleared fields not infrequently were filled with roots, stumps, and stones and could therefore be cultivated only with rather primitive tools. The scarcity and high cost of labor made intensive farming relatively unprofitable, and the lack of adequate markets helped postpone the improvement not only of farm methods but of transportation facilities. Then, too, the colonial farmer was, generally speaking, isolated; he had neither time nor money for travel and observation, and no modern means of communication linked him to the outside world. Unless he was a member of the landed aristocracy, his whole time and energy were used in securing a livelihood for himself and his family; life was so hard that he had little leisure to devise or study improvements in agricultural methods.

11. FUR TRADE AND LUMBERING

THE SOIL was not the only natural resource exploited by the colonists, for the sea and forest also contributed a wide variety of valuable products to their economy. Fur trading, fishing, lumbering, and shipbuilding provided employment for a sizable part of the population and permitted a measure of diversification essential to an agrarian economy. Even the South profited from these industries, despite the fact that there soil and climate had ensured to agriculture almost unrivaled dominance.

Of these various industries, the fur trade was of outstanding importance. The forests abounded in beaver, otter, fox, mink, and other valuable fur-bearing animals, the pelts and skins of which found a ready market in the Old World. Eighteen years before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, Bartholomew Gosnold obtained furs from the savages along the coast of New England. The Pilgrims themselves engaged in the fur business. Their first cargo back to England in 1621 was composed of pelts and clapboards; and it was by means of the fur traffic that the Pilgrims bought their freedom from their merchant backers. Every early Massachusetts town had its fur-trading monopoly, which it customarily "farmed out" to various persons, and not always to the highest bidder. The trade in New England as well as elsewhere was carried on almost entirely through the Indians, who supplied the white trader, or middleman, with large quantities of furs in exchange for trinkets, blankets, liquor, and ammunition.

The fur traffic was no less important in the other English mainland colonies. Under the Dutch West India Company, which monopolized the trade of New Netherland, the industry developed rapidly in the Hudson Valley, where for the first two decades of Dutch occupation

it was almost the only business. In 1656, Fort Orange (Albany), the Dutch trading post, exported 35,000 beaver and otter skins. Even after New Netherland passed into the hands of the English, the fur traffic continued to be an important industry; 40,000 skins were exported annually to England. Toward the end of the century, however, the trade declined; only 15,000 skins were exported from the colony in 1699.

In the colonies south of New York the fur business long continued to occupy a position of importance. Pennsylvania and Virginia trappers traversed practically every valley in the eastern Alleghenies, and year after year the Potomac, the James, and the many tributaries of the Chesapeake were dotted with their fur-laden canoes. Carolina and Georgia traders did a thriving business with the Creek and Choctaw Indians. Augusta, Georgia, laid out in 1736, became from the first one of the foremost fur-trade centers in America. Pack trains employing 600 horses brought in 100,000 pounds of skins annually. It was estimated that at the same time the fur export from Charleston, South Carolina, totaled between £25,000 and £30,000 a year.

As the population of the English colonies increased and fur-bearing animals became scarcer in the older settled regions, trader and trapper turned westward in quest of unexploited territories. But as soon as they had advanced beyond the valley of the Mohawk or had pushed across the Alleghenies into the Ohio country, they came into conflict with the French, who laid claim to a vast territory stretching from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the mouth of the Mississippi and embracing the heart of the North American continent. A system of lakes and rivers afforded easy access to the entire region, which was particularly rich in valuable furs. From 1600, when the French king Henry IV awarded a monopoly of the fur trade to a group of French traders and merchants, the fur business constituted France's chief source of wealth in the New World, and she stubbornly resisted any intrusion. But much as she desired to keep her vast empire intact and maintain a monopoly of the fur trade within her boundaries, she was powerless to do so. Her empire was in many respects merely an empire on paper, for as late as 1750 its white population totaled no more than sixty or seventy thousand, a number wholly inadequate to develop its resources or to defend it. Pitted against this sparse population and covetous of the domains it claimed were more than a million inhabitants in the thirteen English mainland colonies. While the French colonists were exploring forests and rivers, their English rivals were transforming the Atlantic seaboard wilderness into farms and plantations and were pushing westward to conquer new lands, plant new settlements, and reap new profits.

With the closing years of the seventeenth century, as the Hudson's Bay Company became a powerful potential rival of the French, English

traders and speculators increasingly menaced the trade and prestige of their ancient adversary. In 1724 the colony of New York, for example, angered the French by establishing a fortified trading post at Oswego on Lake Ontario for the purpose of intercepting the Indian trade with Montreal. A few years later De Noyan, the French commandant at Detroit, complained about the intrusion of the English and their growing influence over the Indians. Hostility was further intensified when, toward the middle of the century, English traders established a post at Pickawillany on the Big Miami River, only to have it destroyed in 1752 by a force of French and Indians.

At the conclusion of the French and Indian war in 1763, the French were compelled to withdraw from North America, but this victory had little immediate effect on the colonial fur trade. Traffic in fur by this time had ceased to be an important colonial industry. Only on the frontier did it retain a semblance of its seventeenth-century character; and in 1764, England ruled that all hides and skins could be exported only to the mother country. Less than \$700,000 worth of furs and peltry were exported from all the North American colonies in 1770.

Of far greater economic value than the fur-bearing animals were the forests in which they lived. Almost all of New England was covered with magnificent forests of cedar, spruce, and white pine, the last so useful for masts and spars that the British authorities regarded it as the most valuable timber in America. Hardwoods were also plentiful, among them red and white oak with their knotless trunks of fifty to seventy feet, highly prized by every colonial shipbuilder. Here, too, thrived the sugar maple, the sap of which made sugar to supply many a colonial household. Extensive forests of spruce, hemlock, fir, balsam, and white pine covered many sections of New York; hardwoods, such as beech, birch, ash, oak, cherry, walnut, and chestnut, abounded in all the Middle colonies and even in Virginia and the colonies to the south. Vast tracts of the Carolinas and Georgia were covered with forests of long-leaf yellow pine, valuable not only for its lumber but more especially for its tar, pitch, and turpentine. Cypress and mulberry also grew extensively in the South.

Although a few colonists devoted all their time to lumbering, by far the larger number engaged in this industry, especially in the Northern colonies, were farmers who worked at it during the winter months in order to supplement the slender income derived from the summer's toil. During the eighteenth century an increasing number of land speculators, merchants, capitalists, and even professional men turned their attention to lumbering. Elisha Cooke and Mark Hunking Wentworth, the latter the "lumber king" of colonial America, were typical of this group.

The products of the colonial forest commanded a wide market, not only in Britain but in Spain and Portugal and in the West Indies. The

masts of many a British man-of-war came from some New England hillside; to England, whose forests had been exhausted to provide charcoal for the iron industry, also went spars, sawed timber, naval stores, and potash to bleach her woolens. Irish peasants packed their butter and salt provisions in buckets and tubs made of coopers' supplies from Pennsylvania; Spanish and Portuguese shipbuilders planked their vessels with timber from Maine and New Hampshire; and West Indian planters shipped their sugar and molasses in barrels and hogsheads manufactured from materials of the American forests.

The production of naval stores was of prime importance both to the colonists and to England. From the first, many Englishmen had maintained that colonies would bring economic advantage to England by providing her with the sources of supply that would render her independent of foreign nations. Among the products that she was forced to import were tar, pitch, turpentine, flax, hemp, and cordage, essential alike to merchant marine and navy. For years she had depended on the Baltic countries for these indispensable naval stores—a costly source at best and liable at any time to be cut off by war, embargo, or blockade. Accordingly, she made strenuous efforts to secure these products from the colonies. At first she expected New England to supply her; but New England shipbuilders consumed nearly all the tar, pitch, and turpentine produced by the section. From the South, however, and especially from the Carolinas, England obtained great quantities of these stores. Between 1701 and 1718, shipments of tar from America to England increased from 177 to 82,084 barrels, and of this amount South Carolina alone furnished 32,000 barrels. Indeed, in 1718, colonial tar constituted nearly 90 per cent of all the British imports from America. In 1724, South Carolina was exporting 52,000 barrels of pitch, tar, and turpentine a year; but this remarkable increase did not continue. In 1768, the total importations into Great Britain from all the colonies amounted to a little more than 135,000 barrels. Two years later it had fallen to 102,169 barrels.

12. FISHERIES

THE COLONISTS were dependent on the sea as well as the forest and the soil for their livelihood, and throughout the colonial period, fishing was a leading industry in British North America. Long before the Pilgrims set foot upon the New World, English, Dutch, Portuguese, and French navigators were exploiting the rich fishing-grounds that extended from Long Island to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. As early as 1540 the American fisheries were mentioned in

an act of the English Parliament, and fifty years later Sir Walter Raleigh declared that they were the "stay and support of the west counties of England." By the close of the sixteenth century the Newfoundland fisheries alone were employing two hundred vessels and ten thousand men and boys. Four years after the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, Captain John Smith reported that "there hath been a fishing, this year upon the coast [of New England], about fifty English ships." And in the same connection he wrote: "Let not the meanness of the word Fish distaste you, for it will afford as good gold as the mines of Guiana and Potassie with less hazard and charge, and more certainty and facility."

Although there was some fishing in all the colonies, in New England it developed into a major industry. Boston began to export fish in 1633, and in a few years the entire region began to realize the commercial importance of this seemingly inexhaustible economic resource. Soon every port had its fishing fleet, which brought in cod, mackerel, bass, herring, halibut, hake, sturgeon, and other deep-sea fish. To encourage the industry the General Court of Massachusetts in 1639 exempted vessels and other property employed in the business from all duties and public taxes for seven years; to the same end, fishermen and shipbuilders were excused from military duty. The result of this legislation was early apparent, for Governor Winthrop reported that in 1641 300,000 dried fish had been sent to market, and before the end of the century New England merchants were shipping cargoes of fish to the West Indies.

As the industry expanded, the fishermen pushed northeastward to the coast of Nova Scotia, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, where they at once came into conflict with the French. As quarrels became more frequent the New Englanders began to demand the expulsion of their rivals, who by 1680 were not only claiming all the territory east of the Kennebec but levying tribute on foreign vessels engaged in fishing on the Acadian coast, and who were inciting the Indians to attack outlying English settlements and murder crews of New England fishing boats that frequented the coast of Maine. When war broke out between England and France in 1689, the business men of New England—fishermen, shipbuilders, and merchants—welcomed the chance to send a successful expedition against Port Royal, Nova Scotia, the base of the French privateers. But the Peace of Ryswick, which concluded King William's War in 1697, left the French in possession of all the coast islands and fishing grounds north of the Penobscot River, with the exception of the eastern half of Newfoundland, which was retained by England.

King William's War was merely the opening scene of the American part of the struggle between France and England that was to continue for another hundred years. When the contest was renewed in 1702 the

New Englanders again welcomed the opportunity to expel the French from the fishing grounds of America. "It grieves me to the heart," wrote Subercase, the French Governor of Acadia, "to see Messieurs les Bas-tonnais enrich themselves in our domain; for the base of their commerce is the fish which they catch off our coasts, and send to all parts of the world." Despite his plea for support, Nova Scotia was again captured in 1710 by a combined colonial and English force. By the terms of the Peace of Utrecht, which terminated Queen Anne's War in 1713, France surrendered to England all of Newfoundland and the Hudson Bay country; and she not only confirmed England's conquest of Nova Scotia but agreed not to fish within thirty leagues of the Nova Scotia coast from Sable Island to the southwest. She retained, however, Cape Breton Island, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the islands lying within its mouth, and her fishermen were to enjoy the privilege of catching and drying fish on certain parts of the coast of Newfoundland. New Englanders rejoiced. Although their rivals had not been excluded entirely from the fisheries, their sphere of operation had been greatly curtailed. England now had exclusive possession of many of the richest grounds and an equal chance, it was thought, to compete with the French in the others. The rejoicing, however, was of short duration, for the French immediately colonized and fortified Cape Breton, and under the protection of the fortress of Louisburg their fisheries became more flourishing and prosperous than ever before.

More than thirty years elapsed before the New Englanders had another chance to rid themselves of French competition. But despite their capture of Louisburg during King George's War, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, provided for the return of Cape Breton Island to France, and the quarrel over the fisheries remained unsettled. Not until the French colonial empire crumbled in 1763 did the business interests of New England have the satisfaction of seeing France dispossessed of all her territory in the northern fishing-grounds except two small islands, Miquelon and St. Pierre.

But neither French competition nor three quarters of a century of intermittent warfare prevented the New England fisheries from making a remarkable growth. In 1731, almost exactly a hundred years after its establishment, the industry employed between 5,000 and 6,000 men; Gloucester alone had a fleet of 70 vessels, and fishing developed so rapidly in Marblehead that a fisherman's reproof to an exhorting preacher seemed literally true: "Our ancestors came not here for religion. Their main end was to catch fish." Salem, Ipswich, Yarmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham all had their cod fleets, and it is estimated that 665 vessels carrying approximately 4,400 men were annually employed in cod fishing during the ten years before the Revolution. In 1765 the

industry furnished employment to 10,000 men, yielded a product worth approximately \$2,000,000 per year, and kept 350 vessels busy carrying fish to the markets of Europe and the West Indies.

The better grades of cod were salted and dried and sold in the Catholic countries of Portugal, Spain, and Italy or exchanged for salt, lemons, raisins, and wines for the English and colonial markets. Considerable quantities of middling grades of dried codfish, easy to keep and prepare, were sold in the Portuguese islands and to colonial farmers. The lower grade of dried fish, "refuse fish" as it was sometimes called, together with pickled mackerel, bass, and alewives, were shipped to the West Indies for slave consumption.

Closely allied with the fishing business, and sometimes considered a part of it, was the whaling industry. As early as 1614, Captain John Smith had visited the New England coast "to take whales and make trials at a mine of gold and copper." Richard Mather, who came to Massachusetts in 1635, related that he had seen off the New England coast "mighty whales spewing up water in the air like the smoke of a chimney . . . of such incredible bigness that I will never wonder that the body of Jonah could be in the belly of a whale." At first those engaged in the industry depended entirely upon the occasional drift whales cast ashore by the sea; but they soon learned the art of harpooning the whales from small boats along the coast. By the close of the seventeenth century, Plymouth, Salem, Nantucket, and the fishing towns on the eastern end of Long Island were doing a profitable whaling business, and New England merchants were exporting considerable quantities of whale products. But the peak of colonial whaling came after 1715. In that year Christopher Hussey of Nantucket fitted out a vessel to pursue sperm whales and tow them ashore. Less than a dozen years later, arrangements were developed for extracting the oil on shipboard; thus the Macys, Coffins, Folgers, Husseys, and other Nantucket whalers were able to extend their cruising radius to the coast of Brazil and to the Arctic ocean. Whalers of other New England towns soon followed their example, and by 1774, 360 vessels were engaged in the industry. Of these, at least 120 belonged to Nantucket, 180 to other Massachusetts ports, and the remainder to Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York.

13. MANUFACTURING

AS IMPORTANT as the products obtained from the forest and sea were those produced in the colonial household. Despite the fact that the colonists were expected to secure their clothing and

other manufactures from England, they early engaged in the household production of textiles. In 1643 the author of *New England's First Fruits* wrote: "They are making linens, fustians, dimities, and look immediately to woolens from their own sheep." Two years later the General Court of Massachusetts appealed to the towns to increase and preserve the number of sheep. This appeal, together with certain stringent measures taken by the Massachusetts authorities, bore results, and by 1662, sheep were worth only one-fourth as much as in 1645. Connecticut also enacted legislation for increasing the supply of wool. In order that the flocks might be adequate to clothe the people at least with every-day wear, sheep were exempted from taxation in 1666 and given exclusive pasture rights on part of the land. Every male citizen, moreover, was obliged to work one day each year clearing away underbrush so that the area of sheep pasture might be extended. Somewhat later New Hampshire exempted sheep from taxation for a period of seven years and made it a crime to kill ewes. Rhode Island was also interested in the industry and before 1650 was exporting sheep to Connecticut for breeding purposes. Before 1700, New England was producing enough wool for her domestic manufactures.


In the Middle colonies the production of wool was of major importance, but there its production was not so persistently encouraged as in New England. The Dutch settlement of New York possessed sheep as early as 1625, and the wives and daughters of the Swedes on the Delaware employed "themselves in spinning wool and flax and many in weaving." Pennsylvania and New Jersey endeavored to stimulate sheep raising by bounties, and in 1701, Pennsylvania ordered every one owning forty acres of cleared land to keep at least ten sheep. As late as the middle of the eighteenth century, however, she had to import wool from neighboring provinces. In Virginia and the other Southern colonies flocks of sheep were common.

Of the raw materials used by the colonists in the manufacture of textiles, flax and hemp ranked next to wool. By the end of the seventeenth century all the colonies were producing flax in considerable quantities. The valleys of the Merrimac and Connecticut in New England, the Hudson Valley near Albany, the Delaware Valley, northern New Jersey, and the Maryland upland back of Baltimore were famous centers of production. Hemp was also produced in several of the colonies.

Once supplied with adequate raw materials, the majority of the colonists made their own textiles. At first all the processes of textile manufacture were carried on in the home. In the making of woollen fabrics, for instance, the sheep were sheared by hand, and the wool was then cleaned, carded, and combed and made into rolls. It was then spun into thread, dyed, and knit or woven. Finally the cloth was fullered or softened by wetting it with warm soap-suds and pounding it vigor-

ously with heavy oaken mallets. Indigo, the juices of various plants and flowers, and the bark of such trees as sumac, dogwood, oak, hickory, and butternut were used for dyes. The cards, spinning wheels, reels, looms, and other tools used were the products of the family work-bench or of the village cabinet-shop. There was little specialization until the middle of the eighteenth century, when mills began to be erected for the more difficult processes of dying, carding, and fulling.

One of the earliest, and in course of time most widespread, of colonial industries was the manufacture of iron. The colonies had plentiful deposits of bog iron-ore from which iron of good quality was



CHURN, SPINNING WHEEL, YARN REEL

These three utensils were found in every Northern and many Southern rural homes before the American Civil War. All butter was churned by hand, and the spinning wheel and yarn reel were indispensable in the extensive household manufacture of textiles.

readily produced. Thanks to the business sagacity of the younger John Winthrop, who secured capital and skilled laborers from England, Massachusetts Bay was able to establish a forge and a furnace at Lynn in 1643. Within a short time the capacity of this plant reached eight tons per week, a figure that compared favorably with that of some of the larger establishments of the Old World. For a quarter of a century Lynn supplied the farm tools, pots, kettles, and other domestic utensils for the growing communities of eastern Massachusetts. Furnaces and foundries were subsequently erected in other parts of the colony. Nor were the other New England colonies behind their enterprising neighbor. Joseph Jenks, an immigrant from Hammersmith and a mechanic of remarkable ability, erected an iron foundry at Pawtucket, Rhode Island. By 1658 both New London and New Haven had begun the smelting of iron, and the opening up of valuable deposits of hematite ore in the

hills of Litchfield County a few years later soon enabled Connecticut to outrank Massachusetts as an iron-producing colony. In the middle of the eighteenth century, Massachusetts had four slitting mills, Connecticut eight iron and steel mills, and New Hampshire one bar-iron plant.

Little iron appears to have been produced in New York until after the middle of the eighteenth century, when both the Livingstons and Schuylers shipped bar iron as well as copper to England. In New Jersey, on the other hand, ironworks were erected at Shrewsbury in 1675, shortly after the founding of the colony. In Pennsylvania, too, the industry early gained a firm foothold. By 1750 the center of the industry had shifted from New England to Pennsylvania, and the wealthy iron masters of the valleys of the Delaware and Susquehanna had joined hands with the merchant princes of Philadelphia in dominating the colony.

In Virginia the first ironworks were erected along the James River in 1619, the same year in which the first slave cargo arrived. But Indians destroyed these early ironworks just before their completion in 1622. Tobacco culture proved so profitable that a hundred years elapsed before the business was resurrected under the auspices of Governor Spotswood. Under his direction new furnaces were built and the industry was placed on a firm foundation. A small portion of the Virginia output was used for domestic purposes, but the greater part was shipped across the Atlantic. The same was true of the Maryland product, most of which came from the four furnaces of the Principio works, located at the head of Chesapeake Bay and owned by an English company.

Of all the specialized colonial industries, shipbuilding was in many respects the most important; for without a fleet, the colonists would have had to distribute the products of forest, farm, and sea through outsiders. Ships were built in every colony, but chiefly in New England and the Middle group. The Southern colonies endeavored from time to time to develop the industry through bounties, but without success. High freight rates induced Virginia in 1661 to offer bounties for sea-going vessels built and permanently owned in the colony. In 1711 and again in 1753, South Carolina offered similar inducements to stimulate shipbuilding and attract shipwrights to the province; but the shipwrights did not come, and in 1754 the law of the previous year was repealed.

The launching in 1631 of Governor Winthrop's little thirty-ton sloop, the *Blessing of the Bay*, New England's first seafaring vessel, marked the beginning of her shipbuilding industry. Cheapness of building materials and a ready market for the sale of the ships caused the industry to grow rapidly, and in less than thirty years the coast was dotted with shipyards. At Newburyport, Ipswich, Gloucester, Salem, Boston, New

Bedford, Newport, Providence, New London, and New Haven, shipwrights and master builders plied their trade. Villages far up navigable streams and even inland towns engaged in the business. The English Navigation Acts of the midseventeenth century, which confined colonial commerce to English and colonial vessels, further stimulated building. In 1676, Edward Randolph, an unfriendly but accurate English observer, declared that Massachusetts had up to that time built 730 vessels. But the golden age of New England shipbuilding dates from 1700 to 1735, a period in which she sold vessels to every part of the Atlantic world. In no other country were ships built so skillfully and inexpensively; timber was plentiful and easily available, and its cheapness more than offset the cost of labor, which was a little higher than in Europe. The New Englanders, however, had no monopoly of colonial shipbuilding. Early in the seventeenth century the Dutch launched a vessel at New Amsterdam, and for years the shipyard of Rip Van Dam, located on the river front back of Trinity churchyard, was the scene of bustling activity. Even after the colony passed into the hands of the English the industry did not decline, and during the eighteenth century, yards at Albany and Poughkeepsie were also active. Pennsylvania, however, most closely rivaled New England. Both Philadelphia and Wilmington had large shipyards, and their ships formed an important part of the colonial merchant marine. Many vessels were also built on the eastern shore of Maryland.

Still another industry of primary importance in the economic life of the colonists was the distillation of rum from cheap West Indian molasses. Beginning in New England before the middle of the seventeenth century, the business from the first proved profitable, the product sometimes selling as high as a dollar a gallon. Long before the Revolution this industry became the most important in New England; in 1774 the sixty-three distilleries of Massachusetts alone produced 2,700,000 gallons. In the North, rum replaced beer and cider as the favorite beverage for the rank and file of the population, and many considered it almost as much of a necessity as flour. Not only were large quantities of it consumed at home, but it soon came to be regarded as indispensable for the fishing fleets, Indian trade, and slaving business. By 1775, the foundations of many New England fortunes had long been laid from profits derived in part from this flourishing industry.

14. COMMERCE AND TRADE

THE IMPORTANCE of seafaring and trade in colonial life can scarcely be overestimated. Many colonists derived the greater part of their wealth and profits from shipping and devoted considerable

time to commercial pursuits, especially in the colonies north of Maryland, where the men of the prosperous trading centers dominated every phase of colonial life. The colonial merchant did not confine his activities to his local community or even to the narrow fringe of coast from Maine to Georgia; his interests radiated to every part of the North Atlantic and, indeed, to practically every part of the known world.

Local trade was carried on in stores, shops, markets, and fairs, and by itinerant peddlers. In the towns the shops were the main channels of distribution. As early as 1700 they had become more or less differentiated as to the goods they sold, depending somewhat upon the size of the town. Every colony had its crossroads merchant, and in many localities the innkeeper carried merchandise as a side line. In the Southern colonies where both towns and crossroads were fewer, a planter often kept the store. In Pennsylvania and the colonies to the north, provisions were distributed through markets not unlike those that had long existed in the Old World. These markets, held at designated places on certain days of the week, enabled the producer and consumer to eliminate the middleman. The fairs, held from one to four times a year, did not differ materially in either organization or purpose from those in contemporary Europe. In the country districts of the North the itinerant peddler often did a thriving business despite the fact that shopkeepers and merchandizing innkeepers waged incessant warfare against him. In some communities peddling was prohibited under penalty of heavy fine, but such laws were difficult to enforce, and the traffic continued.

Intercolonial trade, which originated when the older settlements began to furnish provisions to their newer neighbors, was carried on almost entirely by water. Roads were few and at times almost impassable; often they were little more than widened Indian trails. During the eighteenth century, as population increased and settlers pushed farther west, more attention was paid to the development of internal improvements. Inland farmers with grain and other food stuffs for the market were naturally anxious to have bridges built and roads improved, and by the eve of the Revolution the Indian trails in the upland country from New York to Georgia were gradually taking shape as passable highways. But, at best, overland transportation throughout the entire colonial period was slow, difficult, and costly; merchants and shippers were forced to make use of the sea with its many harbors and tributary waterways. The ocean, rather than the highway, linked Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and the Southern colonies.

By far the greater portion of all colonial shipping was in the hands of enterprising Northerners who with hundreds of small craft penetrated every harbor, bay, estuary, and navigable river. Because the Northern colonists produced few commodities that could be sold in England, they had to market their surplus lumber, beef, and fish

wherever they could. Many engaged in trade as a means of securing a livelihood. Then, too, fishing stimulated shipbuilding, and both industries together with local manufacturing and small farm agriculture were in no slight degree responsible for the growth of commercial towns. The South with its comparative lack of harbors and with a ready foreign market for its staples failed to develop navigation and shipping. To the Southern planter large-scale agriculture appeared vastly more profitable than commerce. South of Maryland, few cities arose, and the number of merchants and traders remained relatively small.

Although intercolonial trade enabled many a colonist to make a living, it was not as important as the ocean commerce of the colonies, which, long before the Revolution, rivaled that of European nations. For the transatlantic trade the Southern colonies furnished tobacco, rice, wheat, indigo, and naval stores and received in return cargoes of manufactured goods. Since they had no overseas shipping of their own, they depended upon English merchants and Northern carriers for the transportation of goods and produce. Each year about Christmas time, scores of English merchantmen set sail for the Chesapeake, where they delivered their manufactured goods and took in return thousands of hogsheads of tobacco. The tobacco fleet alone, in 1706, numbered three hundred sails.

With the exception of Pennsylvania all the colonies north of Maryland carried on a certain amount of trade with England. From these colonies the mother country received fur, fish, raw hides, lumber, whale fins, whale oil, naval stores, wheat, flour, hops, and iron. Supplementing these exports were tobacco, sugar, molasses, rum, cocoa, hardwoods, and dyewoods obtained in the coastwise trade. As a rule, all these products were carried in colonial ships, which brought back cargoes of manufactured goods. All the principal Northern ports carried on trade directly with England, but Salem, Newport, and New York were pre-eminent.

Because the imports and exports of the Southern colonies were more than double those of all the other colonies, it was the Southern rather than the Northern colonies that did the major share of the business with Great Britain. In 1769 about seven ninths of the exports from Virginia and Maryland, five sevenths of those from the Carolinas, and more than five sixths of those from Georgia went to the mother country. At the same time Great Britain received only one fourth of New England's total exports, and less than half of New York's and Pennsylvania's. Virginia and Maryland obtained nearly seven eighths of their imports from Great Britain, the Carolinas three fifths, and Georgia over five sixths. New England, on the other hand, secured only two fifths of her imports from the mother country, New York less than half, and Pennsylvania only a very small fraction.

Trade with the West Indies, rather than with either Great Britain or Europe, explained the commercial and industrial prosperity of the Northern colonists. This commerce, including trade with the French, Dutch, and Spanish islands, enabled the Northerners to utilize their fisheries, forests, and fertile soil, expand their manufactures, supply cargoes for their merchant marine, build up their towns, and, above all, secure the necessary money for the goods and bills of exchange with which to pay their adverse English trade balances. The sugar islands, as the West Indies were often called, afforded an excellent market. With slave labor they produced by far the larger portion of the world's sugar, but they were forced to import nearly every necessity of life. From New England they obtained horses, dairy products, oil, lumber for their houses, "refuse" fish for their slaves, and goods of both domestic and British manufacture. In return, the New Englanders received cargoes of sugar and cheap molasses for the distilleries of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia supplied practically all the grain, flour, bread, vegetables, and potatoes for these islands. Like the New Englanders, the merchants of the Middle colonies received in return sugar, molasses, and other tropical products including coffee, cotton, ginger, pimento, indigo, and often Spanish coin or bills of exchange. Even the Carolinas shipped staves of red oak for sugar hogsheads, white oak for rum casks, yellow pine for siding, and cypress for shingles. Northern vessels trading in the islands also brought quantities of mahogany and logwood from Central America for reshipment to Europe.

Important to the development of this trade with the West Indies were first, the inability of the Northern colonies to market their commodities in the mother country, and second, the dependence of Northern industries upon certain West Indian products. Of the salable commodities Great Britain at first accepted only furs, forest products, and ships; cereals, meats, and fish were not wanted, for they were supplied by English producers who were protected by tariff legislation. The Corn Law of 1689 practically prohibited the importation of grain; similar duties were levied on fish, and the importation of salted beef and pork was forbidden altogether. By contrast, the British and foreign West Indies provided an excellent market; and they supplied, furthermore, besides a variety of tropical products, rum and the molasses essential to its manufacture. Without molasses Massachusetts could not have maintained her principal manufacturing industry; and without an ample supply of rum both the fishing and shipbuilding industries would have suffered. Of the £949,656 worth of West Indian products imported to the thirteen mainland colonies in 1770, more than half was accounted for by rum; molasses ranked next, and sugar third; the three together made up four fifths of the total.

At first the colonists traded mostly with the British islands, but soon, despite mercantilist regulations, they began to sail to the French and other foreign West Indies. Because of the greater fertility of the soil, premiums on the importation of slaves, better methods of cultivation and hence larger production, a French West Indian planter was able to undersell his British rivals from 25 to 50 per cent. He also needed the food products, horses, and lumber that New England and the Middle colonies wished to market. Even more important, this trade, though carried on illegally, enabled New England and the Middle colonies to secure an adequate supply of specie with which to make good their adverse trade balances with the mother country.

The West Indian trade was inextricably bound up with the traffic in African slaves. Rum-laden vessels from New England, and other colonies as well, sailed for the Guinea Coast, where they exchanged their cargo for slaves that they in turn disposed of in the slave markets of the West Indies. The vessels were then loaded with sugar, molasses, rum, indigo, and other West Indian products which were sold in the mainland colonies or in Europe. There were many variations of this triangular trade, but the West Indies, with their slave markets and their tropical products so necessary to the Northern colonies, were essential to them all. Without this trade with the islands the rum industry would have been seriously crippled, and without rum the slave traffic, in all probability, would have been much hampered.

15. COLONIAL CURRENCIES

THROUGHOUT the colonial period both merchant and manufacturer were adversely affected by lack of capital and by the absence of a uniform system of money and of adequate credit facilities. The colonies were without gold or silver mines, and the Northern colonies' unfavorable balance of trade with Great Britain drained them of what specie they were able to acquire. Although the Southern colonies obtained specie from England, it was usually spent for additional manufactured goods or for an increased labor supply. Because credit institutions were largely wanting, merchants and others were obliged to make their payments for the most part in money or kind or bills of credit. Finally, the exportation of coin from Great Britain was forbidden by law, and the colonies had no common currency of their own.

In default of an adequate supply of coin the colonists were at first compelled to resort to barter, or payment in kind. Bead money, or wampum, redeemable in beaver skins, passed as currency in New

England and the Middle colonies until about the beginning of the eighteenth century. Staple commodities like corn, cattle, furs, and wheat were declared by law to be legal tender in payment for merchandise, labor, and taxes. For many years Harvard students paid their tuition in produce, livestock, and meat, and "occasionally with various articles raked up from the family closets of student debtors." In the Southern colonies tobacco and rice as well as other commodities were used as currency. Even as late as 1730 the Virginia assembly provided for the establishment of warehouses for the storage of tobacco and the issue to owners of transferable notes that might be used to satisfy debts in the county or district in which they were issued. Because the articles used in barter had no staple value, they varied in price from time to time, and constantly fluctuated with reference to each other. All things considered, barter, though necessary and useful, failed to meet the needs of the colonists.

Although some hard money of foreign denomination reached the colonies as a result of trade, the ratio of value between the English and non-English coin varied from colony to colony despite all attempts of the home government to establish a common rating. The Spanish "piece-of-eight"—a silver coin of eight reals—was generally rated as worth 4s. 6d. of English money, but in New York and North Carolina it was equivalent to 8s.; in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware to 7s. 6d.; in New England and Virginia to 6s., and in South Carolina and Georgia to 4s. 8d. The same variation extended to subsidiary coins. Sometimes the value of the coins was impaired by clipping or reduced in weight by "sweating," the process of removing small particles of silver or gold by shaking a number of coins together in a bag. Massachusetts was the only colony to establish a mint, which issued small pieces of silver known as pine tree shillings, but in 1684 this mint was closed by order of the Crown.

Under the circumstances the colonies were almost forced to turn to paper money. First adopted by Massachusetts in 1690 to meet the expenses of the disastrous expedition against Quebec, paper money was soon issued by the other New England colonies and by South Carolina, New York, and New Jersey. Ultimately all the colonies, with the exception of North Carolina, resorted to this means of supplying an adequate currency. Of the numerous issues, all were more or less alike in purpose and in result. Some bore interest while others did not; some were made legal tender for payments of all sorts, while others could be used for future obligations but not for past debts; some could be used for all public payments but not for business transactions between private individuals; some were made payable on demand and others were not. The source of funds pledged for their redemption varied greatly. Some were retired promptly, according to the terms of their

issue, but others were not; some were irredeemable. All depreciated and therefore tended to drive "good" money out of circulation. Silver in Massachusetts, for instance, rose to a premium of 1100 per cent between 1700 and 1750.

At first paper money had the enthusiastic support of the great majority of colonists. But as soon as it began to depreciate and commodity prices began to climb, businessmen, especially money lenders and merchants, became lukewarm in their approval and finally bitterly denounced it. The manufacturer, too, aligned himself with merchant and money lender. For a time paper inflation stimulated manufacturing enterprises, but when depreciation set in, the cost of production increased rapidly. The situation in New England was typical. In 1736 a vessel could be built more cheaply on the Thames than in Massachusetts; and the quantity of molasses distilled annually in Boston between 1735 and 1742 fell off one-third. Wage earners as well as those with fixed incomes complained about the high cost of living. Pointing out that incomes had not increased in proportion to the cost of living, a Massachusetts pamphleteer declared that "Salary Men, Ministers, School-Masters, Judges of the Circuit, President and Tutors at College, Widows and Orphans, &c., are pinchd and hurt more than any." After stabilizing her currency in 1749, Massachusetts enjoyed commercial and industrial prosperity, whereas Rhode Island, with depreciated paper, lost a large part of her West Indian trade; at the same time her distilling and manufacturing industries languished. Nevertheless, the farmers with goods to buy, as well as those who were obliged to borrow money, were staunch supporters of cheap currency, even though they too sometimes found fault with the prices they received for their produce.

CHAPTER IV

THE COLONIAL SOCIETY

16. LIFE IN TOWN AND COUNTRY
 17. RELIGION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
 18. DECLINE OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHURCH
 19. INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS
 20. ARTS AND SCIENCES
-

COLONIAL America's institutions, although European in origin were necessarily those of an isolated, essentially agrarian people whose environment compelled them to reshape their secular and religious beliefs as well as their day-to-day existence. Although many townsmen and Southern planters clung to Old World fashions and modes of thought, the small farmer in the backcountry had to develop new ways of living to cope with frontier conditions. With little opportunity for recreation, he tended to be frugal, industrious, shrewd, and tenacious; and his intellectual and religious attitudes reflected both the age and place in which he lived. By and large, he had no counterpart in Europe. He was, in short, an American.

16. LIFE IN TOWN AND COUNTRY

THROUGHOUT the colonial period most Americans were farmers whose economic and social life centered about their homes. The first settlers, faced by a bitter struggle for existence, found it impossible to construct comfortable or permanent homes, and their habitations were not unlike the humble dwellings that they had left in the Old World. Some were mere caves or half-faced camps; others

were wigwams, flimsy huts, or hovels of wattle and clay. "For our houses and churches in these times," stated the Virginia General Assembly of these early years, ". . . were so mean and poor . . . that they could not stand above one or two years."

As time went on the more prosperous colonists in the settled regions erected clapboarded frame houses, most of which at first were one story buildings, measuring about sixteen by twenty-four feet. Only the more prosperous settlers were able to have homes that rose two stories high in front and sloped down to one story in the rear. Enormous chimneys of brick and stone extended through the house, affording flues for the open fireplaces. Most of these houses were solidly built, with frames of heavy oak timbers and a double sheathing of clapboards. Writing about these frame dwellings in 1656, a contemporary observed that "although for the most part they are but one story besides the loft, and built of wood, yet contrived so delightfully that your ordinary houses in England are not so handsome, for usually the rooms are large, daubed and whitelimed, glazed and flowered, and if not glazed windows, shutters which are made very pretty and convenient." But even the frame structures were often unpainted on the outside, and the same was true of the barns and other out-buildings. The permanent home of the ordinary farmer was seldom constructed of any other material than wood.

The patroon estates of New York had luxurious, well-built houses of brick or stone; but the majority of the farm houses of the colony were small structures of wood or brick with stoops, sanded floors, and high, steep roofs. Although the early home of the Southern planter was built of undressed logs, by the opening of the eighteenth century imposing, well-constructed mansions were being erected, such as Drayton Hall on the Ashley River; Tuckahoe, the seat of the Randolphs on the James River; Westover, the beautiful residence of William Byrd; Mount Vernon, the home of Washington; and Sabin Hall on the Rapahannock. Surrounded by gardens and neatly trimmed hedges, homes like these, with their broad lawns sloping down to the banks of the stream on which they were located, equaled the residences of the average English country gentleman for room, comfort, and beauty. Clustered about these mansions with their great halls, high rooms, and graceful staircases, one found a small village of barns, Negro cabins, stables, offices, and other buildings. The homes of the lesser planters and small farmers, however, were more like those of the Northern farmer.

The Northern farmer's house was furnished with simple and almost entirely homemade articles; bedsteads, chairs, tables, bureaus, kitchen utensils, and tableware were substantial rather than ornamental. The colonial merchant might have upholstery, carved woodwork, fine

linen, and silver plate, but these were luxuries that the ordinary farmer could not afford. In his family, economy was a watchword, and furniture and utensils were used until worn out or broken beyond repair.

The country homes of the wealthy patroons and the mansions of many of the Southern planters were lavishly furnished with articles from abroad. From the cabinetmakers of London came chairs, tables, and settees of carved mahogany, upholstered in rich fabrics or the finest of Russian leather; walls were hung with expensive tapestries or were decorated with paintings and engravings. Sleeping chambers were furnished with highboys, chests, and bedsteads of finished oak and walnut. And a Southern kitchen, in contrast with that of a Northern homestead, was equipped with almost every conceivable utensil: iron pots, hard metal plates, copper kettles and pans, pewter dishes, spoons, stone bottles, crocks, jugs, and mugs.

In dress there was also a marked contrast between the poorer farmer of moderate means, or even the well-to-do farmer, and the wealthy Southern planter. With the exception of the owners of estates along the Hudson and a few "gentlemen farmers" of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, like John Dickinson, the rural population of the North dressed in plain homespun and leather, both of which were produced on the farm. During the summer months they wore garments of coarse linen and towcloth; the children and many of the men went barefoot except on the Sabbath, but even then it was not uncommon for them to carry their shoes and stockings until near the church in order to save leather and shine. In winter the men and boys wore heavy flannel shirts, woolen or buckskin trousers, and heavy, double-soled, calfskin or cowhide shoes or boots. Deerskin was frequently used for coats. Women and girls dressed in similar materials. Each member of the household had a "best suit" or a "best dress," which was worn only on Sunday and on special occasions. Whether for "every day" or "dress up," the clothes were stylish in neither cut nor color; but—of more importance—they wore well. The same cloth served one member of the family after another until even the patches were worn out. By the middle of the eighteenth century many farmers of the North could afford to dress better, and a few, anxious to imitate their wealthier neighbors, did. By far the larger number, however, either because of habit or for economic reasons, did not.

Although the small farmers of the South produced some of their own clothing and dressed in materials similar to those worn by the Northern farmer, the planters copied foreign fashions, and generally wore foreign fabrics. Well-to-do gentlemen, personally or through their agents, bought large quantities of clothing in the great textile towns of England and in the colonial commercial centers of the North. From the Old World they imported lawns, linens, duck, serge, silks, and poplins, as

well as a considerable amount of gold and silver lace. Instead of one "best suit" the planter had ten or a dozen suits of brilliant plush and broadcloth, adorned with buttons and lace. The dress of his wife and daughters was even more lavish and costly; only the families of the wealthy townsmen of the North, like the Beekmans and DeLanceys of New York, and the Boylsons and Pickmans of Massachusetts, could compare with the Southern aristocracy in elegance of apparel.

In intellectual life there was a wide gap between the small and less prosperous farmer and the wealthier planter. Burdened with the responsibility of securing a livelihood for himself and those dependent upon him, the farmer gave little attention to the arts or sciences; his life was of necessity wrapped up in material interests, and his best energies were expended in grappling with nature for an existence. Instead of writing poetry, building cathedrals, or studying anatomy he was busy conquering the forest, building a home, tilling the soil, harvesting crops, and fighting Indians. The planter, on the other hand, enjoyed a considerable amount of leisure and could devote himself to things not strictly utilitarian. He sent his children overseas or north to be educated, or obtained tutors for them from England, Scotland, or the Northern colonies. If sufficiently wealthy and interested, he had his own library, where he often spent many hours in the study of literature, history, science, politics, and law. But even among the planters there were those who could neither read nor write, and in both the North and the South there were thousands of men and women who could not sign their names. Out of 2160 jurymen in midseventeenth-century Virginia counties, only 1166 were able to sign their names in full. Similar statistics could be cited for other parts of the South. In the North, to mention a single instance, there were only six families in Westchester County, New York, who in 1704 were able "to spare their children's time more than to learn to read and write."

Although colonial America was overwhelmingly rural, it also had a number of thriving commercial centers that by the eve of the Revolution rivaled many of the leading ports of Great Britain both in population and wealth. Ranking first was Philadelphia, with about 25,000 people at the end of the colonial period. Boston stood second with a population of slightly more than 20,000, and New York—the commercial capital of the territory around the mouth of the Hudson—made a close third. Fourth was Charleston with about 10,000 inhabitants; and Newport, a prosperous manufacturing and commercial center and outranked only by Boston among the New England ports, stood fifth with a population of approximately 7,000. Baltimore, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Salem, Providence, New London, and New Haven were promising commercial towns. With the increase of population during the eighteenth century a number of inland towns also became industrially and com-

mercially important. Among these were Albany, at the junction of the Hudson and Mohawk valleys; Lynn (Massachusetts), the center of colonial shoe manufacture; Hartford (Connecticut); and the substantial Pennsylvania towns of Lancaster, York, and Germantown. A number of towns like Richmond (Virginia), Reading (Pennsylvania), and Springfield (Massachusetts), destined to become great inland urban centers, were straggling villages of a few score houses at the outbreak of the War of Independence.

Although these towns housed only one tenth of the population, they exercised a tremendous influence in colonial affairs, largely because they were centers of wealth and communication. Here lived the prosperous merchant princes, the Whartons, Pembertons, Willings, and Morris of Philadelphia; the Amorys, Faneuils, Hancocks, and Boylston of Boston; the Lows, Livingstons, Crugers, and Waltons of New York; the Redwoods, Lopezes, and Wantons of Newport; the Browns, "Nicky, Josey, John and Mosey," of Providence; and the merchant planters—Manigaults, Mazycks, Laurens, and Rutledges—of Charleston. Owners not only of stores and merchant ships but of wharves, warehouses, fishing craft, and whalers; speculators in town real estate and frontier lands; private bankers and underwriters of marine insurance; these, together with the proprietors of the estates along the Hudson; and the Southern planters, formed the backbone of the eighteenth-century colonial aristocracy, which virtually ruled colonial society and politics. In the commercial colonies petty shopkeepers, vendue-masters, rope makers, sail makers, sailors, coopers, caulkers, smiths, carpenters, and fishermen were dependent upon the merchants for a livelihood. Even the Northern farmers "felt the ebb and flow of seaborne commerce," for they looked to the merchant to market their surplus goods. "If the merchant trade be not kept on foot," wrote a contemporary historian, "they fear greatly their corn and cattle will lie in their hands."

Like the men of the great estates, the merchant aristocracy of the colonies lived well. Many owned a spacious town mansion of wood or brick and a country house as well, both of which were furnished with imported articles. In sharp contrast to the poorer families, their wives and daughters wore gowns of broadcloths, silks, and linens, modeled after the latest London fashions. Feasts and pageants, and dinners and dances at some country inn were of common occurrence. Speaking of the merchants of Boston in 1740 an English traveler declared that both "ladies and gentlemen dress and appear as gay, in common, as courtiers in England on a coronation or birthday." This statement was equally true of the rich merchants' families of the other seacoast towns. Individually and as a class the merchants jealously guarded their interests against both overzealous officials and "radical" majorities. More intent on business than politics, they nevertheless were quick to enter politics

when their interests were jeopardized or they wished to secure some particular end through legislation.

As centers of communication the commercial towns were scarcely less important than as centers of wealth. During the early years settlements were in large measure cut off from the Old World and from each other. Practically the only means of travel was by foot, horseback, or water. Every community had its inns or taverns, but many of them

RULES OF THIS TAVERN

Four pence a night for Bed

Six pence with Supper

No more than five to sleep
in one bed

No Boots to be worn in bed

Organ Grinders to sleep in
the Wash house

No dogs allowed upstairs

No Beer allowed in the
Kitchen

No Razor Grinders or Tinkers
taken in

A TAVERN SIGN IN COLONIAL TIMES

were cheerless, ill-kept places. There were few newspapers, and only with the arrival of some vessel from overseas or some coastwise trader was news of the outside world to be had. Not until 1691, when postal service between Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania was established, did the semblance of a postal system come into being. Under such conditions it was impossible to break down the barriers of provincialism or to develop a common intellectual life. By 1750, however, there was marked improvement. Although roads over which a wheeled conveyance might pass with safety were as yet comparatively few, there were many highways and postroads connecting the several colonies with each other. Regular "lines" of stagecoaches and stageboats

were beginning to operate between such places as Boston and New York, and New York and Philadelphia. Travel by water was also considerably easier because of the increased size of the vessels. The inns, too, improved decidedly. Under the direction of Benjamin Franklin and William Hunter of Virginia, who were appointed deputy Postmasters General in 1753, the postal service was reorganized and expanded.

17. RELIGION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

MOST Americans in the seventeenth century had little knowledge of—and practically no interest in—either freedom of religion or the separation of church and state. In Virginia the Anglican Church was established, and in Massachusetts, Puritanism was the state religion. In the one colony the Anglicans persecuted the Quakers, and in the other a Puritan oligarchy silenced nonconformists by social pressure, exile, and even death. Religious intolerance continued to be prominent in the colonies until well into the eighteenth century, when it began to be undermined by the influence of the frontier on the one hand and the spread of the scientific concepts of the Enlightenment on the other.

During the seventeenth century religion had great importance in colonial life. Ecclesiastical controls upon man were the same as they had been since late Roman times. The Englishman who settled along the Atlantic coast believed in God, obeyed his church, and accepted the consequences of disbelief just as had the medieval serf of the twelfth century. The hand of nature in the form of lightning or comets, untimely frosts or floods, earthquakes or destructive windstorms served merely to re-enforce religious faith and to substantiate the belief that God took an active interest in man's affairs. In moments of sorrow and misfortune the colonist invariably turned to God for solace and comfort. The death of a son or daughter was "God's will." There was everywhere unquestioned faith in a divine system of reward and punishment. In religion, colonial America was not at all unlike the England of the seventeenth century; the age of faith was very much a reality.

The religious spirit of colonial America was Protestant. When the first Englishman settled in the New World, the Reformation was by no means spent. The Anglican Church, officially established as the state church of England in the early years of Elizabeth's reign, was merely another product of the revolt that Luther had touched off in 1517. But the struggle in England did not end with the establishment; although many believed that the Reformation should stop with the Church of

England, others felt that the Anglican Church still retained too many survivals of Roman Catholicism. Opposed to what they thought were "popish" features of the Anglican Church's ceremony, liturgy, vestments, and hierarchy, they wished to "purify" the Church of England by transforming it into the primitive, apostolic church that they associated with the early Christian era. These Englishmen, known as Puritans, did not immediately secede from the Anglican Church, and originally they "no more constituted a distinct sect or denomination than the advocates of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States constitute a separate nation." But when their attempts at reform from within failed, some of them withdrew and established their own church organization. Puritanism, which was an English variant of Calvinism, was a potent and vital force on both sides of the Atlantic. In England it helped to precipitate a civil war; in America it vitally affected the thoughts and acts of the vast majority of English colonists. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that Puritanism was part of a much larger movement and that the Puritans shared many customs and beliefs with members of the other Protestant sects. In England, the bitterness of the conflict between the Puritans and their opponents often obscured—but by no means negated—this fact; and in the New World, although the gap that separated Puritans from other Protestants was widened, the area of agreement—even in matters of religion—among the early settlers was greater than the degree of difference.

Although New England and Virginia were quick to achieve separate identities, the colonists in each area were fundamentally the same kind of people and lived under similar religious controls. The Virginia planter, like the New England farmer, was expected, and on occasion compelled, to be a church-attending and God-fearing man. To fish, travel, transport or sell goods on the Sabbath was illegal and subject to punishment in most of the colonies. As late as 1699 the Virginia legislature enacted a law compelling every citizen of the colony to attend some place of worship. Inventories of seventeenth-century estates in Virginia often contained the entry of "one old Bible and the practice of piety." Moreover, in every colony the minister was a person of undoubted importance. He believed himself divinely ordained to guard the members of his flock. In both domestic and civil matters he was their adviser, and his opinions probably carried more weight than those of any other individual. He comforted them in times of misfortune and sorrow and was quick to reprove them when they fell into sin or violated the customary codes of the community. He read his long, expository sermons in tones that were convincing and unmistakable, and he never tired of exhorting his flock to avoid swearing, drunkenness, fornication, sleeping in church, and "other temptations of the Devil."

Although Calvinism in varying degrees affected all the English colonies in the seventeenth century, it was in Massachusetts—and later in Connecticut—that Puritanism became entrenched. The Puritans of Massachusetts, like other Calvinists, believed that all men were born in sin and that only those individuals who were “elected” by God obtained salvation. All others were damned. Salvation was revealed to the individual through an inner spiritual change which led him to lead a godly life. In this matter the individual was helpless, for good works could not assure election and no mortal could understand the workings of God. Although every one was compelled to regulate his life in accordance with the rules of the church and to contribute to its support, only the elect could become members of the church and take communion. In an organizational sense, each church was autonomous—for the Massachusetts Puritans were Congregationalists—and each congregation selected its own minister. To attain church membership, a person had to have had a spiritual awakening and had to be approved successively by the minister, the church officers, and the congregation. The elect as well as the minister made every effort to see that all inhabitants observed the precepts of Puritanism. Despite the numerous differences between the Puritanism of Massachusetts and the Anglicanism of England, the colony’s leaders insisted for a number of years that they were members of the Anglican Church. Realizing that any other course would undoubtedly lead to a revocation of the colony’s charter, they maintained this fiction until well into the second half of the seventeenth century.

The church played an important role in the government of the Massachusetts Bay colony. The company charter vested authority over the colony in the General Court of the company, which consisted of the stockholders, or freemen, and at first Governor Winthrop ruled the colony with the help of a deputy governor and a General Court of eight assistants, all of whom were freemen who had emigrated from England to Massachusetts. In 1630, however, 108 settlers asked to be made freemen, and Winthrop—who feared that if he refused, the petitioners would move elsewhere—agreed. But the Puritan leaders soon took care to prevent those who did not share Puritan religious views from gaining political power; by an act of 1631 only members of the colony’s Puritan churches could become freemen, and another act adopted three years later provided that no church could be established without the approval of the General Court. Not all church members, however, had political power, for only the General Court could make a man a freeman. From 1630 to 1634 the freemen were permitted to vote for the governor and council of assistants, who continued to compose the General Court. In 1634 the voters of each town obtained the right to elect two representatives to the General Court, which in 1644 be-

came a bicameral body that was made up of a court of deputies and a court of assistants. As the church members comprised a minority of the population and as church members were not necessarily freemen, Massachusetts was controlled in these years in large measure by a Puritan oligarchy.

Although Puritanism has been depicted as a drab and gloomy faith, it did not seem so to the Puritans. Convinced that they alone were true Christians, they were exalted by their efforts to create a New Zion in the midst of a wilderness. Nor were they necessarily "puritanical" in the modern sense of the word. Although they were hard workers, strict church-goers, and advocates of intolerance, they were also human beings who dressed in gay as well as somber clothes, drank wine and other alcoholic beverages, and enjoyed the company of their neighbors. Unlike some latter-day puritans, they were not particularly squeamish about sex, and John Cotton, a Puritan divine, wrote: "Women are creatures without which there is no comfortable Living for man: it is true of them what is wont to be said of Governments, *That bad ones are better than none.*"

The very authoritarianism employed by the Massachusetts leaders to enforce conformity invited nonconformity; for when no room was left for dissent, the possibilities of dissension became limitless. At the same time it was difficult for the Puritan rulers to hold their fellow colonists in line, for there was no way to prevent dissidents from migrating to those parts of the wilderness that lay beyond the jurisdiction of the theocracy. As early as 1636, Thomas Hooker, pastor of the church in Newton, moved with most of his small congregation, to the present site of Hartford, Connecticut. Hooker believed that the "foundation of all authority is laid . . . in the free consent of the people," and with the adoption of the "Fundamental Orders of Connecticut" in 1639 by the towns of Hartford, Wethersfield, and Windsor, his ideas were translated into law. This document, which served the colony as a constitution—Connecticut had no charter until 1662—provided that the religious and civil governments were to be in the hands of representative officials elected by freemen. The Fundamental Orders, which have been viewed by many as the first attempt at political democracy in America, were more democratic in theory than in practice. To become a freeman in Connecticut—that is, to secure the right to vote in elections to send representatives to the assembly—required certification from a magistrate; and the magistrates were careful to certify only church members as freemen. Connecticut, like Massachusetts, was a Bible Commonwealth.

Roger Williams, like Hooker, was a Massachusetts clergyman who objected to the theocracy's administration of religious and civil affairs. An inveterate nonconformist and a man of undoubted courage, Williams

openly attacked the fusion of church and state within the colony and the expropriation of Indian lands by the English settlers. In October, 1635, the General Court of Massachusetts convicted him of spreading "new and dangerous opinions against the authorities of magistrates," and a short time later he fled the colony to avoid arrest. In 1636 he settled at Providence and was soon joined by a few loyal followers. Under Williams's direction the Rhode Island colony established complete religious freedom, separation of church and state, and a civil government in which each head of a family had one vote. The new colony grew rapidly and attracted many settlers whose religious views had brought them into conflict with the authorities in the other colonies. Among the settlers in Rhode Island was Anne Hutchinson, who in 1638 was forced to leave Massachusetts because of her heretical views; claiming that she was directly inspired by God, she had set herself against the clergy as an interpreter of the Scriptures. Williams, for his part, continued to develop as a nonconformist. Following a short period as a Baptist, in 1639 he became a Seeker, or "one who accepted no creed, although clinging to the fundamental belief of Christianity."

Although Puritanism was in many ways the most forceful and dynamic creed in the colonies, it was not—as Williams had demonstrated—the only one; and by the first decades of the eighteenth century, colonial America was characterized by a marked degree of religious diversity. In the South the Anglicans predominated. The Baptists were established in Rhode Island, in other parts of New England, and in South Carolina. Pennsylvania became the home of Quakers, Lutherans, Moravians, and other denominations. The Dutch Reformists, who adhered to a form of Calvinism that had developed in Holland, centered in New York; the Jews were most numerous in Newport, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston; and the majority of the small group of Catholics in English America lived in Maryland. The Scotch-Irish, who settled along the entire American frontier, were almost exclusively Presbyterians—that is, Calvinists, who, in contrast to the Congregationalists, thought that church matters should be decided by groups (presbyteries) of elders rather than by congregations. Methodism did not secure a foothold until the decade preceding the Revolution.

The multiplicity of sects within the colonies was both a manifestation and a result of the growing spirit of religious toleration in English America. Roger Williams had shown the way in Rhode Island, but there were other colonies that provided at least a measure of religious freedom. The Maryland Toleration Act of 1649 granted religious freedom to all those who professed to believe in Christ; New Jersey in 1665 provided for complete liberty of conscience; and four years later the charter of South Carolina included a similar provision. Pennsylvania in 1682 assured equal liberty to all "who confess and acknowledge the

one Almighty and Eternal God to be the creator, upholder, and ruler of the world." The report in 1683 of Thomas Dongan, Roman Catholic Governor of New York, provides some indication of the increasing ability of people of different religious views to live side by side in colonial America. "Here be not many of the Church of England," he wrote, "few Roman Catholics; abundance of Quaker preachers, men and Women especially; Singing Quakers; Ranting Quakers; Sabbatarians; Antisabbatarians; some Jews; in short of all sorts of opinion there are some. . . . The most prevailing opinion is that of the Dutch Calvinists."

18. DECLINE IN THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHURCH

THE GROWTH of religious toleration was paralleled by a decline in the authority of the established churches. Rhode Island from the outset had provided for separation of church and state, and in the Middle provinces no colony with the exception of New York had a state church. In the other colonies the established churches waged what proved to be a losing battle with the frontier; for in the long run the clergy could not continue to control people who were always free to leave the immediate neighborhood. Hooker and Williams had freed themselves from the domination of the Massachusetts theocracy by migrating, and many others who never left the colony were able to get far enough away from the center of Puritan authority to escape its influence. Beyond a doubt, one of the principal causes of the decline of the Puritan theocracy was the fact that a large area of unoccupied land was available to the colony's inhabitants. Similarly, in Virginia the Anglican Church was unable to keep pace with the westward movement of its communicants. An increasing number of Virginians took religion with decreasing seriousness, and there were many who went to church only as a matter of form or for social reasons. The colony's clergy repeatedly complained—but apparently in vain—of those who desecrated the Sabbath by drinking, fighting, gambling, swearing, and dancing.

The relative decline in the power and influence of the church in colonial America can be attributed not only to the frontier but also to the relatively small number of colonists who were church members. In an effort to increase church membership, Massachusetts in 1662 adopted the Half-Way Covenant, which permitted children of the regenerate to be baptized, although still denying them the rights of communion and the power to vote until they had a religious experience. But this compromise, although it reversed the downward trend in church membership, did not measurably increase the influence of the church over

the people. In the Anglican South, the absence of a bishop seriously impeded the growth of the church, for only a bishop could ordain new clergymen and confirm new communicants.

In Massachusetts, where the Puritan leaders had fought with vehemence and determination to retain their control over the lives of the colony's inhabitants, the decline of the theocracy was climaxed by two otherwise unrelated developments in the early 1690's. The first general reaction against Puritan authority was produced by the Salem witchcraft tragedy of 1690-2. After the hysteria had subsided—and after 200 persons had been accused of being in league with the Devil, 150 had been imprisoned, and 20 had been put to death—many people began to be skeptical about the guilt of the accused and to doubt the wisdom of a religious system that was, at the very least, indirectly responsible for such a tragedy. An even more damaging blow to ecclesiastical domination was the adoption in 1691 of a new charter that undermined theocratic rule by forbidding religious tests for voting and by providing for the selection of the colony's governor by the king rather than by Puritan freemen. Although Puritanism continued to exert a marked influence on the subsequent development of the colony, Massachusetts never again was ruled by a Puritan oligarchy.

In the eighteenth century the colonial church also had to contend with the new intellectual currents that were embodied in the work of Isaac Newton and John Locke. Newtonian physics, although set in a religious framework, prepared the way for a mechanistic rather than a theological interpretation of the universe. In similar vein John Locke's concept of the "state of nature" offered a rational interpretation of the world of nature. It is, of course, impossible to determine the effect of the ideas of such men as Newton and Locke on colonial religion, but that it had an effect cannot be doubted. In both the Old and New Worlds the age of religion was giving way to the age of reason; and on both sides of the Atlantic an increasing number of individuals—particularly those among the better educated classes—altered their religious views so that they would not clash with the rationalist theories of the Enlightenment.

If some Europeans sought to merge reason and religion, others protested that too much reason had already robbed religion of much of its vitality. In the Germanies the Pietists, revolting against Lutheran scholasticism, turned to mysticism and emphasized a degree of individual judgment in spiritual matters that stood in sharp contrast to the teachings of both Luther and Calvin. Meanwhile in England, John and Charles Wesley and their friend George Whitefield launched a frontal attack against rationalism, formalism, and skepticism. Both these movements were to have a direct effect on religious developments in America. A group of Germans, known as Moravians, settled in Pennsylvania,

where they preached and practiced pietism. Whitefield, who toured the English colonies in 1739-41 and who was a man of personal magnetism, undoubted oratorical ability and obvious sincerity, preached to enormous audiences in every colony, converted countless thousands, and played the most spectacular role in the religious revival that was known as the Great Awakening.

The Great Awakening, which has been aptly described as a "tidal wave of religious fervor," swept over the colonies and left its mark on every one of them. Offering religion to the masses in terms that they both understood and appreciated, it gave a new vitality to religion in the colonies. Its technique was revivalism, and George Whitefield spoke for the other preachers in the movement as well as for himself when he said: "I love those that thunder out *THE WORD*. The Christian World is in a dead sleep. Nothing but a loud voice can awaken . . . it." In sermons that appealed to the heart rather than the head, the preachers of the Great Awakening sought to awaken people to a personal and visible repentance. They described the torments of Hell in minute detail, while at the same time they offered the delights of Heaven to those who were ready for redemption and were prepared to accept God. Free from denominational control and directed to all Protestants regardless of sect, the Great Awakening elicited its most enthusiastic response in those regions of colonial America where the hold of the established churches was weakest.

Although Whitefield was the most prominent preacher in the Great Awakening, he should be viewed as the product as well as the maker of his times. Long before Whitefield reached America, opposition to the formalism of the older denominations and the conflict between the dissenting sects in frontier regions and the established churches of the seaboard had prepared the ground for a less inhibited approach to religion. Moreover, the harvest that Whitefield reaped in 1739-41 had been sown some years earlier by others. As early as 1720, Theodore J. Frelinghuysen, a German pietistic pastor of four Dutch Reformed churches in New Jersey, was advocating an "inner religion" that was based on a mystical relationship of man to God. By 1726, Frelinghuysen's influence had spread beyond his own congregations to other Dutch Reformed churches and to several newly organized Presbyterian churches in the colony. Among the Presbyterians, Gilbert and William Tennent soon became leading revivalists, and in 1736 William founded the "Log College"—the forerunner of Princeton—to train young men for the ministry. The graduates of this institution were among the most influential preachers in the Great Awakening.*

* Jonathan Edwards, the last great expounder of Calvinism in colonial Massachusetts, has usually been considered a force behind the Great Awakening; but in fact he had little connection with the movement, although he frequently employed

There were few features of American life that were not in some measure affected by this great religious revival. In addition to stimulating a widespread interest in religion, the Great Awakening weakened the control of the formalists—or “Old Lights”—over church affairs, contributed to the growth of humanitarianism, and was partly responsible for the founding of such colleges as Princeton, Hampden-Sydney, Pennsylvania, Rutgers, and Dartmouth. As a mass movement, the Great Awakening furnished the residents of the various colonies with an inter-colonial bond that helped to make them aware of their similarities. At the same time, as a revolt against “Old Light” orthodoxy, it enabled the people of the backcountry to defy the established churches of the more settled regions. Finally, by emphasizing the personal aspects of religious experience and by permitting lay preachers—in contrast to ordained clergymen—to conduct religious services, it gave wide currency to the idea that all men were equal before God. And from the idea that all men were equal before God it was only a short step to the belief that they were equal before their fellowmen. If the Great Awakening was not a democratic movement, its democratic implications were unmistakable.

19. INTELLECTUAL INTERESTS

DURING the greater part of the seventeenth century most colonists had neither time nor money to devote to intellectual pursuits. But by the opening of the eighteenth century, conditions in all colonies were altering. The towns had emerged from the hardships of the pioneering period. Among the clergy a broader spirit was noticeable; sectarian prejudices, although still strong, were less pronounced. Contact with the main currents of western European thought was increasing; facilities for education were improving; the number of professional men was larger; and, most important of all, a wealthy merchant class with leisure and a taste for intellectual pursuits had come into existence. Under these influences the transplanted, seventeenth-century

the techniques of the revivalists. A man of undoubted genius, he was a maverick whose superficial resemblance to some of his contemporaries should not obscure his unique and paradoxical qualities. Unsurpassed in his ability to horrify his listeners with descriptions of hell fire and damnation, he distrusted the teachings of his fellow revivalists. Instead of desiring to humanize the Calvinism of his forefathers, he wished to restore it to its original implacable form and to the place that it had once occupied in the lives of the people. Although he seemed more at home in the seventeenth century than the eighteenth, he was among the first of the New England divines to read and appreciate the significance of Newton's and Locke's writings. A man who was both behind and ahead of his times, he had little influence on the Great Awakening.

culture gradually disappeared and was replaced by a distinctly colonial culture.

Of all the agencies that ultimately shaped the intellectual outlook of the colonists, probably none was more important than the press. Although the first printing press in English America was set up in Massachusetts in 1639, not a single newspaper was published in North America at the close of the seventeenth century. A three-page pamphlet entitled *Public Occurrences, both Foreign and Domestic*, published in Boston in 1690, was promptly suppressed by the authorities for uttering "reflections of a very high nature" on a current political problem. In 1704 the *Boston News-Letter*, the first regular newspaper in the colonies, appeared. By judiciously refraining from criticizing the authorities and by printing only belated news from Europe and customs house clearings and entries, this dull, tiny, four-page, two-column sheet managed to live, but fifteen years elapsed before it had a rival in any of the colonies. In 1719 the *Boston Gazette* was started, as was also *The American Weekly Mercury* in Philadelphia. Shortly afterward James Franklin, Benjamin's brother, began the *New England Courant* in spite of the advice of his friends, who assured him that America did not need another newspaper. By 1765, forty-three newspapers had been established, three of which were in German.

Some of these papers were short-lived, and all were small-sized weeklies whose make-up was much the same. Considerable space was allotted to local news, gossip, and advertisements. All ran letters, domestic and foreign, sermons, poetry, essays, and reprints of English articles. Cartoons were few, but some, like Franklin's snake cut into eight pieces and entitled "Join or Die," were very effective. With improvement in communication and manifestation of greater interest in what the other colonies were doing, items such as legislative acts, speeches of Governors, and brief notes about crimes and accidents were copied from other papers. A few were bold enough to print editorials of an independent and unbiased character; most, however, were guarded and circumspect in what they had to say. In literary quality there was much variance. The *South Carolina Gazette*, for example, excelled in the quality of its original verse, while the prose articles of the *Virginia Gazette* were quoted in all the colonies. The old tradition of the literary pre-eminence of the New England colonial press is without foundation.

In addition to the newspapers a number of magazines began to be published toward the middle of the century. The first of these was founded by Franklin in 1741 under the title *The General Magazine and Historical Chronicle for all the British Plantations in America* and contained general news, lengthy extracts from new books, and reprints of original poems and prose essays from colonial newspapers. This maga-

zine represented an effort to produce something culturally American and intercolonial. Its content was entirely American; the poems and essays instead of being copied from English journals were American productions. The "Accounts of or Extracts from New Books, Pamphlets, &c., Published in the Plantations" was, as the title implied, a department devoted exclusively to the review of publications from the colonial press. The reprints were not selected from the papers of any one colony but from the press of all the Anglo-American provinces, insular as well as continental. The catholicity and character of its content were indicative of the intellectual change that the colonies were undergoing. Of the other literary magazines two merit mention. The *American Magazine and Historical Chronicle*, a Boston monthly that ran from 1743 to 1746, published reprints of essays appearing in England and in the colonies. The other, the *American Magazine*, made a successful start under the editorship of the Reverend William Smith, provost of the University of Pennsylvania, but it suspended publication after a year when that distinguished gentleman returned temporarily to England.

Important as the press was in disseminating information and affording a medium for the expression of opinion, it was frequently subjected to censorship and restraint. Following English precedent, Massachusetts established a system of official licensing for presses that lasted until 1755. And in all the colonies any publisher who dared to criticize the government or even inadvertently printed anything displeasing to the officials was liable to arrest. On the other hand, the censors did not always have their way. In 1735, John Peter Zenger, a German immigrant and editor of the *New York Weekly Journal*, was brought to trial on the charge of criminal libel preferred against him by Governor Cosby of New York. Shortly before, Cosby had removed the Chief Justice of the province for rendering an adverse decision in a matter in which the former was personally interested. Articles that appeared in Zenger's paper sharply criticizing the Governor's action led to the editor's arrest. The new Chief Justice, a tool of the Governor, ruled that the jury had to decide only whether Zenger had published the articles or not, thus leaving to the court the decision as to their libelous character. But Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia, probably the most brilliant and distinguished lawyer in America, argued that the jury enjoyed the right to decide whether the statements in question were false and libelous. This argument and his eloquent appeal for free public discussion as a safeguard for free government won the jury, and Zenger was acquitted.

Throughout the colonial period, educational facilities remained both limited and inadequate. The widely scattered farms and plantations in the Southern colonies made it quite impossible to establish an effective school system. Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas, however, had a number of private schools of which the "Old Field Schools" of Virginia

were typical. These schools received their name because of their location in abandoned fields. They were formed by the families of a neighborhood and were taught by the wife of one of the planters, by the local clergyman or—if the families were sufficiently well off—by a more competent teacher. There were also grammar schools and endowed free elementary schools. Some plantations had their own private tutors, and the records show that there were endowed parish schools. In the Northern colonies opportunities for schooling were somewhat better. In Pennsylvania a half-hearted attempt was made to make education a function of the state, and all parents were required under penalty of a heavy fine to see that their children could read. New Jersey in 1693 authorized towns to levy taxes for the support of public schools, and a number of such appear to have been subsequently established. As late as 1756 the schools of the province of New York were described as being of “the lowest order.”

Even in New England, which has often been pictured as the cradle of the American educational system, opportunity for schooling was limited. The Puritans of Massachusetts, it is true, decreed in 1642 that, owing to “the neglect of many parents to train up their children in learning and labor, which might be profitable to the Commonwealth,” education should be compulsory. This act did not establish schools, but simply provided that children be taught either by their parents or otherwise to “read and understand the principles of religion and the capital lawes of the country.” Five years later this act was followed by another requiring every town of fifty families to provide for primary education by maintaining a teacher of reading and writing and each town of one hundred families to establish a grammar (Latin) school “with a teacher able to instruct youth so as they may be fitted for the university.” Many towns failed to comply, and in 1701 the legislature complained that the law was “shamefully neglected in divers towns.” The part of Massachusetts that is now the state of Maine did not have a single school until after the opening of the eighteenth century. Rhode Island and New Hampshire were almost entirely without schools in 1700. Connecticut, however, was somewhat better off than her northern neighbors. School attendance was not compulsory in any of the colonies, and even in those communities where school was maintained throughout the year, attendance of farmers’ children was very poor.

In some respects more notable advances were made in higher education than in secondary schooling. Harvard, the first college in the colonies, was authorized by the General Court of Massachusetts in 1636 and endowed two years later by John Harvard, a Charlestown minister. Established principally for the purpose of training men for the ministry, this institution for more than fifty years enjoyed the distinction of being the only one of its kind in North America. Not until 1693, after more

than thirty years of endeavor, was William and Mary founded in Virginia. Even after its principal sponsor, the Scottish churchman James Blair, commissary of the Bishop of London, had secured a royal charter and funds for its endowment, Attorney General Seymour declared that there was not the slightest need for such an institution. When Blair reminded him that the principal purpose of the college was to educate young men for the ministry that the souls of the colony might be saved, he replied: "Souls! Damn your souls, make tobacco." But despite opposition and many misfortunes, the college survived. In 1729 its faculty consisted of President Blair and six professors, but its work was that of an academy rather than a college. Though not as influential as Harvard, it nevertheless trained a large proportion of the men who played an important rôle in Virginia politics and in the struggle for independence. A few years after William and Mary had been founded, the third collegiate institution, Yale, was chartered (1701), in part as a protest against the growing religious liberalism of Harvard, and in part to meet the demand of the wealthier element of New Haven for a college. Endowed by Elihu Yale, a son of Massachusetts who had made a fortune in East Indian trade, it soon became the stronghold of the strictly orthodox type of Calvinism. Six other institutions of collegiate rank were established before 1775, four of which were primarily for sectarian purposes. Of these, the College of New Jersey (Princeton), founded in 1746, was Presbyterian in inspiration; King's College (Columbia), chartered in 1754, was Anglican; Brown, established in 1764, was Baptist; and Rutgers, founded in 1766, was Dutch Reformed. Of the other two, Dartmouth, chartered in 1769, was an outgrowth of Eleazar Wheelock's Indian school, and the Philadelphia Academy, forerunner of the University of Pennsylvania, was established by Benjamin Franklin in 1751 for the purpose of training young men for social and political leadership.

In many respects these colleges were more or less alike in organization, curriculum, and student body. All except the Philadelphia Academy were largely under church control, and most of the professorships were filled by clergymen. Student life in all of them was also very similar; one's position was determined by the wealth and social eminence of his family. As in the Old World, entrance was based almost entirely upon a knowledge of Latin and Greek. Thus Harvard as early as 1643 stated that "when any scholar is able to understand Tully or such like classical Latin author extempore, and make and speak true Latin in verse and prose, . . . and decline perfectly the paradigms of nouns and verbs in the Greek tongue, let him then, and not before, be capable of admission into the college." The course of instruction did not differ basically from that of the medieval university. Although arithmetic, geometry, physics, astronomy, ethics, politics, and divinity

were included in the course of study, the chief emphasis was placed upon the classics and sometimes Hebrew. At Harvard one was counted unfit to receive his degree until he was "found able to read the originals of the Old and New Testament into the Latin tongue, and to resolve them logically." Only in the Philadelphia Academy was any marked attention paid to the study of English and the sciences. Such subjects as history, literature, geography, and political economy found no place outside of this academy; and even there Franklin was forced to compromise with those who favored the traditional curriculum. The classics and the other scholastic subjects were provided for those who wished to train for law, medicine, or the church, but Franklin insisted that for the man who wanted to follow some other calling, or who desired a liberal education, there should be courses such as applied mathematics, accounting, science, physics, chemistry, agriculture, natural history, history, ethics, government, trade, international law, and modern languages.

Indicative of the cultural change after 1700 was the growing interest in books and the increasing number of private and public libraries. Many of the first settlers, especially those trained in the universities, brought their libraries with them and subsequently added to them. William Brewster at the time of his death in 1643 had nearly four hundred volumes, and Miles Standish about fifty. John Winthrop, Jr., boasted a library of more than a thousand volumes. Inventories of seventeenth-century Virginians show that many persons possessed sizable libraries. That the colonists owned more books and that more books were being read by 1750 is clearly evident from the increased number and size of private libraries, the larger production and importation of books, the increased number of booksellers, the more frequent book advertisements in the press, and the growth of the public library movement. Not only did clergymen have considerable collections, but wealthy merchants and many prominent lawyers were accumulating libraries. Charleston, South Carolina, claims the distinction of having the first library supported by public funds. Through the initiative of Franklin, a public subscription library was founded in Philadelphia in 1731; similar institutions were soon opened in Boston, Newport, New York, and Charleston. Between 1745 and 1763 seventeen subscription libraries were founded. Books were included in the endowments of the colonial colleges, notably of Harvard and Yale. The Philadelphia library, according to Franklin,

soon manifested its utility, was imitated by other towns and in other provinces, . . . reading became fashionable; and our people, having no publick amusements to divert their attention from study,

became better acquainted with books, and in a few years were observ'd by strangers to be better instructed and more intelligent than people of the same rank generally are in other countries. . . . The libraries have improved the general conversation of the Americans, made the common tradesmen and farmers as intelligent as most gentlemen from other countries, and perhaps have contributed in some degree to the stand generally made throughout the colonies in defense of their privileges.

20. ARTS AND SCIENCES

FURTHER evidence of the development of colonial intellectual life was provided by the relatively widespread interest in scientific matters. The Old World's progress in scientific studies was not unknown in America, and by the eighteenth century some colonists had both the time and inclination to pursue scientific research. The Reverend Jared Eliot of Connecticut was deeply interested in science, and his *Essays on Field Husbandry* were based on thirty years of experimentation. John Winthrop, descendant of the first Governor of Massachusetts and professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at Harvard from 1738 to 1779, was perhaps the greatest scholar and lecturer of his day. His researches in the field of science gained for him international fame. Professor Isaac Greenwood gave "astronomical lectures" in Boston in 1734, and a few years later Edward Bromfield, a Harvard graduate, was making lenses with which he was experimenting. Many of the clergy, including no less a personage than Cotton Mather, were zealous students of natural history; Governor Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts and his son Paul were especially devoted to the subject, and several papers by the latter appeared in the *Philosophical Transactions*.

In the Middle and Southern colonies much scholarly work was done in botany and zoology. James Logan of Philadelphia carried on a number of experiments on maize, his published results supporting the Linnaean theory of sex in plants. Cadwallader Colden of New York was also interested in botany and became a correspondent of Linnaeus. John Bartram, the Quaker naturalist who started his famous botanical garden in Philadelphia in 1718, won from Linnaeus the praise of being "the greatest natural botanist in the world." A considerable part of the flora and fauna of Virginia was described and catalogued by John Banister, a correspondent of the English naturalist, John Ray. Another Virginian, John Mitchell, a doctor of medicine, wrote the first American

treatise on the principles of science and also contributed a number of scientific articles to the British Royal Society, which had been founded in 1662.

But greatest of all in forwarding the cause of science was Benjamin Franklin. As he said in proposing the formation of the American Philosophical Society for the enlargement of human knowledge: "The first drudgery of settling new colonies is now pretty well over, and there are many in every province in circumstances that set them at ease, and afford leisure to cultivate the finer arts and improve the common stock of knowledge." The outgrowth of a literary-scientific club called the Junto, the new society had as its purpose the promotion of the applied sciences and practical arts and the encouragement of "all philosophical experiments that let light into the nature of things, tend to increase the power of man over matter, and multiply the conveniences and pleasures of life." Included in its membership were virtually all the principal representatives of secular learning in the colonies as well as a number of eminent Old World scientists, such as Buffon, Linnaeus, Condorcet, Raynal, and Lavoisier. Franklin's achievements soon won him membership in the Royal Society and an international reputation. "We are waiting with the greatest eagerness to hear from you," wrote Buffon and his fellow physicists from France in 1754. At home his enthusiasm inspired others to new scientific endeavor.

The day-to-day demands of existence placed severe limitations on the esthetic activities of colonial life. Inasmuch as the first settlers were practically compelled by circumstances to devote all their time and energy to the business of making a living, they enjoyed little or no leisure for music, painting, sculpture, and the like. Whatever passion they had for beauty had to be expressed in the homes they built, the tools and furnishings they made, and the other tasks they performed. Moreover, they showed little originality, either borrowing freely or imitating Old World patterns. Nowhere is this fact better demonstrated than in seventeenth-century colonial architecture. The Dutch, for example, closely followed the models familiar to them. "New Amsterdam," as Lewis Mumford points out, "was a replica of the Old World port, with its gabled brick houses and its well-banked canals and fine gardens." * The simple, square, frame house of the New Englander, with its large fireplace and single chimney, as well as the gabled structures of the South, were based on medieval designs, and the Puritan meeting-house and the Anglican church were copied after their respective English models. With increasing prosperity, however, both the colonial townsman and the well-to-do planter discarded the more informal house for a spacious Georgian mansion modified to meet local needs.

* Lewis Mumford: *Sticks and Stones* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1924), p. 20.

These homes were built of both brick and wood except in the South, where after 1720 brick was used almost exclusively. But quite irrespective of material or size, the colonial homes possessed a grace and beauty that have been seldom, if ever, equaled in the history of American architecture.

Colonial painting during the earlier period was confined to portraits. There were artists at work in nearly all the colonies, the most important of whom included the Evert family of New York, Christopher Witt of Philadelphia, and Tom Child and Joseph Allen of Boston. During the eighteenth century the number of painters multiplied, and interest in painting increased. Among those who gained considerable renown during the earlier half of the century were Jeremiah Theuss, the painter of the Ravenels, Proches, Manigaults, Izards, Allstons, and other prominent social leaders of Charleston; Gustavus Hesselius; and Robert Feke. But these were far outstripped by four others who had risen to high distinction by the eve of the Revolution: John Singleton Copley, Benjamin West, Charles Wilson Peale, and Gilbert Stuart. The first exhibition of colonial paintings was held in New York in 1757. Some of the wealthier colonists were even acquiring a growing interest in European painting.

During the last half of the eighteenth century, Americans began to take interest in the drama. Throughout the seventeenth century, New England had been openly hostile, and there had been little enthusiasm elsewhere. A theater opened at Williamsburg sometime between 1720 and 1725, but soon failed. Between 1732 and 1734, however, the *Beaux Strategem* and *The Busybody* were among the performances given in New York, and Charleston opened a theater in 1735. But not until 1750, with the arrival of the distinguished stage artists Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Hallam from London, was the success of the theater assured. Their performances enabled the colonists outside of New England to see many plays that the London stage had to offer.

All these cultural influences contributed to the development of colonial nationalism. By the middle of the eighteenth century Benjamin Franklin considered himself, not merely a Pennsylvanian, but an American; King's College enrolled students from other colonies; and Boston papers circulated in New York and Charleston. Local mores and prejudices still exerted a powerful influence, but there was also a common culture, borrowed, it is true, from Europe, but refashioned to meet the needs of the American people.

CHAPTER V

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES

- 21. POLITICAL CONTROL
 - 22. REGULATION OF TRADE
 - 23. REGULATION OF INDUSTRY
 - 24. LAND AND CURRENCY POLICIES
-

THROUGHOUT the colonial period, British authorities attempted to regulate both the governmental and economic affairs of the overseas possessions. But colonial government, which was largely a product of trial and error, did not press heavily on the inhabitants of the American colonies, and in economic matters many colonists enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom. Despite numerous mercantilist regulations that applied to the commerce and manufacturing of all the colonies, restrictive laws were not always rigorously enforced. Although Burke exaggerated when he referred to England's colonial policy before 1760 as one of "salutary neglect," there was an element of truth in his statement.

21. POLITICAL CONTROL

THE BRITISH government never put the American colonies under a systematic plan of administration. Separated from each other during the early years by almost impassable forests or by long stretches of water, each colony, within certain limits, developed

its own institutions, traditions, customs, and usages to which the home government in so far as possible adapted itself. Instead of regarding the colonies as organic parts of the English body politic, England to a great extent treated them as disconnected, autonomous political entities. As virtually self-governing units, each colony developed its own land policy, its own method of dealing with the Indians, and its own system of administration.]

Although colonial political views and institutions differed in some respects from those of England, the colonists were nevertheless Englishmen and were governed ultimately by the laws and regulations that were promulgated by the officials of the home government. The colonist was compelled to obey the laws of Parliament that specifically applied to the colonies; but at the same time he had to obey the laws that were passed by the legislature within his own colony. With the passage of time many colonists came to assume that Parliament's legislative rights were limited to a colony's external affairs, whereas strictly intracolonial matters fell within the province of the local assemblies. The English authorities, for their part, never accepted this distinction, for in their minds there could be no doubt concerning the supremacy of Parliament.

Instead of establishing a single bureau or office to formulate and co-ordinate colonial policy, the British government parceled out the control of the colonies among a number of existing agencies. Originally the most important of these from the colonial viewpoint was the Privy Council, which was made up of the king's chief advisers. The Privy Council's principal function in colonial affairs was to serve as a clearing house for policies that had been proposed by other officials of the home government. The Privy Council approved or disapproved of the instructions and commissions for the royal governors, settled bureaucratic disputes among the colonial administrators, ruled on complaints from the colonies, and heard appeals from the colonial courts. Most important of all, it had the right to disallow those acts of the colonial legislatures of which it disapproved. Although the Privy Council theoretically had considerable authority over colonial life, the steady growth of Parliamentary power in the eighteenth century resulted in a corresponding decline in the power of the king's ministers. By 1750, many of the duties of the Privy Council had become perfunctory, despite the fact that it still could disallow colonial legislation.

Virtually every important agency in the British government exercised either direct or indirect control over some aspect of colonial administration. A secretary of state, whose primary concern was with foreign affairs, selected the royal governors for the colonies. The commissioners of customs appointed the customs collectors and sought to prevent illegal commerce. The Treasury controlled royal revenues and expendi-

tures in the colonies. The Admiralty and War Office were responsible for colonial defense and also co-operated with the customs officials in suppressing illegal trade. Finally, the bishop of London exercised control over the Anglican Church in the provinces.

The Board of Trade and Plantations was the only agency in the British government that even remotely resembled a genuine colonial office. Originating in 1660—although there were precedents for it before that date—as a committee of the Privy Council, the Board of Trade was re-organized in 1696 as a powerful instrument of colonial supervision. Its principal interest was in commerce, but it was concerned with every detail of colonial affairs—social, economic, religious, political. Practically nothing escaped its scrutiny. All colonial legislation was subject to its review. It recommended that the Crown disallow any act of a colonial assembly that was contrary to the laws of England, that threatened the maintenance of the royal prerogative, or that jeopardized the property rights of any citizen of the Empire; and its recommendations were almost without exception accepted. The Board also heard complaints. Any colony could present any grievance through its agent resident in England, and any British merchant or manufacturer was equally free to lodge objections against any colonial authority and to make suggestions that he thought would prove to his advantage. Although the percentage of laws disallowed was not great, the colonists mistrusted and disliked the Board and thought of it as simply an agency created to limit their freedom of action for the benefit of grasping English businessmen.

Within a colony, authority was divided among the representatives of the colonial voters and a number of royal officials. Although each colony had its own distinctive political institutions and traditions, all were similar in that each had a governor, a representative assembly, a judicial system, and the Common Law of England, which guaranteed trial by jury, free speech, and freedom from arbitrary imprisonment. Eight out of the thirteen—Georgia, the two Carolinas, Virginia, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts—were royal colonies by 1752, each with a governor appointed by the king. In the proprietary colonies of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware executive authority was vested in the proprietor or in a governor or lieutenant governor appointed by him. Only in Connecticut and Rhode Island, the so-called “corporate” colonies, was the governor chosen by representatives of the enfranchised voters, and in both he was little more than a figurehead in functions and power.

Selected for the most part from the English middle class, the royal governors differed greatly in culture, training, and ability. Some were efficient administrators, and men of undoubted integrity and ability. Others used their office to enrich themselves and friends by means of

sinecures, patronage, land grants, and the acceptance of bribes. Nearly all gained the reputation—which in some cases was undeserved—of being overbearing.

Their office [wrote Franklin in a statement that perhaps reveals more about its author than its subject] makes them insolent; their insolence makes them odious; and being conscious that they are hated, they become malicious; their malice urges them to continual abuse of the inhabitants in their letters to Administration, representing them as disaffected and rebellious, and (to encourage the use of severity) as weak, divided, timid, and cowardly. Government believes all; thinking it necessary to support and countenance its officers. Their quarreling with the people is deemed a mark and consequence of their fidelity. They are, therefore, more highly rewarded, and this makes their conduct still more insolent and provoking.

In defense of these royal appointees it should be pointed out that bribery, corruption, and the awarding of spoils was the prevalent custom in eighteenth-century Europe; that in the colonies honesty received little or no financial reward; and that the office of colonial governor was not such as to attract men of high ideals.

With the exception of Pennsylvania, each colony had a bicameral legislature. The members of the upper house of councilors, or assistants, as they were called, were, with the exception of Connecticut and Rhode Island, chosen by the king on the recommendation of the governor, who usually named those who he had reason to believe would support his claims. The colonial assembly or lower house, however, was in every instance chosen by the qualified voters. It did not take the colonists long to discover that the colonial governor—with his sweeping power to enforce laws, to grant reprieves and pardons, to remove councilors, to summon, adjourn, and dissolve the popular assembly, to veto measures he deemed objectionable, to propose laws desired by the Crown, to levy troops for defense, and to enforce martial law in time of invasion, war, and rebellion—represented royal rights and that he was not favorable toward colonial self-government. Moreover, the favoritism shown by the governor in filling offices at his disposal and in making land grants irritated some colonists. Nor were they pleased when he granted special privileges to a select few or countenanced the wrongdoings of corrupt or overbearing officials. The landowner as a taxpayer resented what he believed to be exorbitant taxation, and at all times he was a caustic critic of those officials who, in his judgment, lavished spoils on favorites or were guilty of wasteful or unnecessary expenditures. More than anything else it was overtaxation, favoritism, special privilege and general dissatisfaction with the regime of Gov-

ernor Berkeley in Virginia that led Nathaniel Bacon and his fellow farmers to rebel in 1675-6.

Although the colonial assembly represented the colonial voter, not all colonists were voters, for the individual's influence and participation in political affairs varied with his economic status or his religious affiliation or both, depending upon the voting requirements of the colony in which he lived. In Massachusetts, until 1684, suffrage was restricted to members of the Congregational Church; and even after that date only freeholders of an estate worth at least 40s. a year or the owner of other property to the value of £40 sterling could vote. In Pennsylvania the right to vote was limited to freeholders of 50 acres or more of land well seated, 12 acres of it cleared and under cultivation, and to other persons worth at least £50 in lawful money; the prospective voter also had to believe in Christ as the Savior of the world. To vote in Virginia the colonist had to be a freeholder who owned at least 50 acres of land if there was no house on it, or 25 acres of land with a house 12 feet square. In South Carolina the franchise was limited to communicants of the Church of England who possessed 50 acres freehold or a personal estate of £10. There were similar requirements in the other colonies; suffrage was strictly limited to property holders and taxpayers, and in some cases, to communicants of some particular church. In every colony the suffrage was limited to the male sex.

Although these suffrage requirements worked greater hardship upon the nonpropertied peoples of the towns than on the farmers, they nevertheless excluded a considerable percentage of the rural population. In Pennsylvania, the tax lists show that only about 8 per cent of the country folk were qualified to enjoy the suffrage. Election districts were large, and means of communication inadequate. Moreover, the propertied interests of the older settled regions, particularly the towns, by refusing to apportion representation in elective bodies on the basis of population, often dominated the government. In Virginia throughout the colonial period, control rested with the tidewater aristocracy rather than the small farmer class. Similarly, in Pennsylvania the three eastern counties elected twenty-four of the thirty-six representatives to the colonial assembly, with the result that a Quaker merchant oligarchy usually dominated the German and Scotch-Irish farmers of the other counties.

The colonial assembly, although not representative of all the people, championed self-government and was determined to control the colonial purse strings and use that control for advancing the welfare of those whom it represented. Among other things, it succeeded in stripping the upper house of all power over money bills, in much the same manner as the British House of Lords was stripped of authority over

money measures in 1911. It stipulated that money grants be made annual, not permanent, and that they be paid out by a treasurer appointed by the assembly; and by withholding, or threatening to withhold, the Governor's salary it often succeeded in making that official amenable to its wishes. During the eighteenth century the Governors complained about "republican principles" exercised by the colonists and elaborated a scheme to reduce all the colonies to the status of royal provinces, free the royal governors from financial dependence upon the colonial assemblies by parliamentary imposition of taxes, maintain a British standing army in the colonies, and increase the use of the royal veto on colonial laws. As a result, the colonists became more bitter and vindictive toward royal authority and more determined in their insistence that their rights of self-government be respected.

In the repeated struggles between governor and assembly, both sides had effective weapons. Through its control of the purse, the assembly could block any program put forward by the governor and could even withhold the funds needed for the salaries of the royal officials within a colony. The governor, for his part, could prorogue the assembly and veto its acts. These, however, were negative powers, for they did not enable the governor to compel the assembly to do what it did not wish to do. But behind the governor was British authority; and if the assembly became openly defiant, there was always the possibility of abolishing the colony's representative government.

For instance, in 1684, when Massachusetts refused to obey the orders of the Crown and the laws of Parliament, its charter was revoked, and in the course of the next four years, the New England colonies along with New York and the two Jerseys were combined to form the Dominion of New England. Sir Edmund Andros served as royal Governor of the united colonies, none of which was permitted to have an assembly. In 1688, however, the colonists, following the lead of Parliament in the Glorious Revolution, successfully rebelled against the King's representatives in the Dominion; and with the accession of William and Mary to the throne, the colonies constituting the Dominion of New England reverted to the systems of government that had in each instance prevailed before 1684.

The events of 1684-8 revealed, but did not resolve, the problems inherent in the British system of colonial government. To the colonists, representative government was a right to which they were entitled as Englishmen. To the royal officials, the colonial assemblies constituted a privilege, which could be revoked as well as granted. The differences between the two points of view were so pronounced that there remained little room for compromise. The struggle was a fight for power that force rather than constitutional argument was to settle.

22. REGULATION OF TRADE

GREAT BRITAIN'S administration of the economy of its colonies was designed to accord with the basic tenets of mercantilism. According to this doctrine, a state to be wealthy, independent, and powerful had to possess a large and permanent stock of gold and silver. If, like England, it lacked rich deposits of precious metals, then it had to seek mines in other parts of the world or build up its stock of gold and silver by favorable trade balances. To help insure an excess of exports over imports the state had to protect and aid home agriculture; encourage the production of raw materials for home manufacture; protect and stimulate home industry; encourage native shipping in every possible way; and provide an efficient navy. Any state possessing colonies was especially blessed, for colonies would supply the mother country with necessary raw materials that it did not produce; furnish a market for home manufactures; afford home merchants and shipowners a means of additional profits; and directly or indirectly add to the wealth of the nation by increasing its specie supply.

In applying the mercantilist theory to the colonies, England first endeavored by a series of laws and ordinances to regulate colonial trade. Among the most important of these regulatory measures were the so-called Navigation Acts, the first of which was applied to the colonies soon after the importation of tobacco began. Not until the days of Cromwell, however, when England and Holland were engaged in a struggle for the commercial supremacy of the seas, was more drastic and sweeping legislation enacted. In 1650, when the bulk of the British colonial trade was in the hands of the Dutch, Parliament forbade foreign vessels "to come to, or Trade in, or Traffique with" any of the English colonies in America unless licensed by Parliament or by the Council of State. At the same time the colonies were forbidden to have "any manner of Commerce or Traffique with any people whatsoever." In short, the colonies were to carry on commercial intercourse solely with England. It mattered not if the Virginia planter could derive a greater profit by doing business with the Dutch; the interests of the empire demanded the elimination of foreign competition and an English monopoly of the empire's shipping. This measure was followed the next year by the Navigation Act of 1651, which provided that all goods grown or manufactured in Asia, Africa, or America and imported into England or its possessions must be brought in English-owned and English-manned ships; that European goods could be imported into England or its possessions only in English ships or in vessels belonging to the country where the goods were produced or whence they were

usually shipped for transportation; that, with few exceptions, no foreign goods should be brought into England except from the place of production or from the usual port of shipment; that salted fish, fish oil, or whale fins could not be imported into England unless the fish had been caught by English vessels, and that no fish should be exported from England or its possessions except in English ships; and that the English coastwise trade should be closed to foreign vessels.

The acts of 1650 and 1651, although only partially enforced, occasioned some complaint in the colonies. Virginia planters asserted that the measures worked great hardship and that their passage was due to "the Avarice of a few interested persons, who endeavor to rob us of all we sweat and labour for." Even Governor Berkeley declared that those who sponsored the legislation "would faine bring us to the same poverty wherein the Dutch found and relieved us; would take away the liberty of our consciences and tongues, and our right of giving and selling our goods to whom we please." In 1655 the legislature of the colony resolved that "all freedom of trade shall be maintained, and all merchants and traders shall be cherished." Massachusetts condemned the seizure of a Dutch vessel in its waters, and the legislature of Rhode Island went so far as to declare that in times of peace, commerce with the Dutch was lawful.

In 1660 the Restoration government passed an "Act for the Encouraging and Increasing of Shipping and Navigation." This law stipulated that goods imported into or exported from any British colony must be carried in ships owned and manned by Englishmen. Englishmen were defined as "only his Majesty's subjects of England, Ireland, and the plantations [colonies]." This policy was intended not only to give English shippers a monopoly of the carrying trade of the Empire but also to encourage shipbuilding both in Great Britain and in the colonies. Secondly, the act ruled that certain "enumerated" articles—sugar, tobacco, cotton, wool, ginger, indigo, fustic, and other dye woods—grown or manufactured in the colonies could not be sold directly to foreigners, but must first be sent to England or to some other part of the British domain. This list was subsequently extended: rice, molasses, and the naval stores—tar, pitch, turpentine, hemp, masts, and yards—were added in 1706; copper, ore, beaver, and other skins in 1722; whale fins, raw silks, hides, pot and pearl ashes, pig- and bar-iron, lumber, coffee, pimento, and cocoanuts in 1764. Up to 1766, nonenumerated articles, including a number of the more important colonial commodities such as fish, grain, and rum, could be disposed of directly to any part of the world, unless, of course, their sale in this way was prevented by foreign restrictions. In 1766, however, England, hoping to keep the colonists from purchasing manufactured products from her European competitors, forbade the shipment of colonial goods of every description to any

foreign country north of Cape Finisterre. By requiring the colonists to sell enumerated commodities only within the Empire, England sought to supply her manufacturers with needed raw materials; to enable the home merchants to obtain a profit as middlemen or distributors; to increase her revenue, since all goods imported from the colonies were, as a rule, like goods from foreign countries, subject to heavy duties; and to provide more business for the English merchant marine.

The act of 1660 did not prevent the colonist from evading the English tariff by importing staples directly from foreign countries. Articles manufactured in Holland or in France, for instance, might be brought directly to Virginia or Massachusetts in English ships and there disposed of at a lower price than like goods of English manufacture. Moreover, English merchants, unless they owned the ship, derived no profit from such transactions. For the purpose of remedying this situation and keeping the colonies "in a firmer dependence upon it [England] and rendering them yet more beneficial and advantageous unto it," Parliament in 1663 provided that all European goods bound for the colonies must first be sent to England and from there reshipped in English ships to colonial ports. The only exceptions to this rule were salt from Spain for the New England fisheries, wines from Madeira and the Azores, and a few commodities from Ireland and Scotland. This act enabled the English merchants to collect profitable commissions on all European goods consumed in the colonies. At the same time, by bringing the colonies within the English tariff system, it provided a means for increasing the revenue of the home government.

Like their predecessors, the acts of 1660 and 1663 roused considerable opposition in the colonies, and before 1673 colonial merchants sent enumerated articles direct to Europe without landing them in England, under the pretense that they were destined for some other part of the empire. In that year, however, Parliament endeavored to put an end to this practice by providing that every outbound vessel carrying enumerated articles must give a bond that it would land the articles in England or else pay specific export duties equal in amount to the import tax levied on such articles by the home country. It also authorized the appointment of colonial customs collectors to supervise and enforce the act. But these officials made little headway, for evasions continued at an increasing rate, and some of the colonists even went so far as to dispatch their commodities directly to Europe through privateers and pirates.

Businessmen in England understandably objected to these infractions and repeatedly demanded that the Navigation Acts be more strictly enforced. In 1695, merchants of Bristol, Liverpool, and London petitioned the House of Commons for action. The result was the passage the following year of the "Act for preventing Frauds and regulating

Abuses in the Plantation Trade." This act affirmed the earlier navigation laws, and in addition it provided that all English vessels, whether owned in England or in the colonies, must be registered; that all colonial laws at variance with the Acts of Trade were null and void, and that all colonial governors must take an oath to enforce the Navigation Acts or suffer penalty of fine and loss of office. It also authorized collectors and inspectors to visit and search ships, wharves, and warehouses, and to seize unlawful merchandise. Furthermore, cases involving penalties could be brought before colonial admiralty courts. Up to this time it had been almost impossible to secure convictions in revenue cases from colonial juries. For a few years after its passage the act of 1696 was fairly effective, and by 1701 the balance of trade, long in favor of the mainland colonies, stood in favor of England.

Of the various trade regulations few, if any, proved more objectionable to the colonists than the Molasses Act of 1733. The Northern colonies, unable for the most part to sell their surplus products in England, turned to other markets—particularly to the West Indies, where they readily exchanged their provisions, horses, cattle, timber products, and cargoes of African slaves for rum, sugar, molasses, and money or bills of exchange. By far the greater part of this West Indian trade was carried on with the French, who were able to undersell the British from 25 to 50 per cent. In addition to this competition, the English West Indian planters were injured by the "enumeration" of sugar, for the home country was unable to consume the entire British West Indian output or to market the surplus profitably. The planters sought relief; in 1730 and again the following year they petitioned the Privy Council to prohibit trade with the foreign islands. Failing to gain assistance, they carried their petition to Parliament, where it was debated at length. Spokesmen for the Northern colonies pointed out that any interference with the West Indian trade would paralyze the commercial provinces, for this trade enabled them to utilize their fisheries, forests, and fertile soil, and above all, to secure the necessary money with which to satisfy their English creditors. On the other hand, absentee planters, who were members of Parliament and were backed by a powerful lobby, relentlessly pressed their case. Many persons both in and out of Parliament asserted that, although the dispute grew out of a clash of interests within the Empire, it was in reality part of the greater contest between France and England for commercial supremacy. They argued also that the Northern colonists, though promoting their own interests, were violating one of the main tenets of mercantilism by enriching foreign sugar colonies and impoverishing those of their own empire. It was on this broader ground that the matter was in large measure decided. In its final form the act was restrictive rather than prohibitory. It imposed a duty of 9*d.* a gallon on rum, 6*d.* a gallon

on molasses, and 5s. a hundredweight on sugar imported from the non-English West Indies.

The argument that the act was aimed primarily at France failed to impress the commercial provinces. In both New England and the Middle colonies, merchants and distillers regarded the act as a piece of class legislation that would enable "a few pamper'd Creolians" to "roll in their gilded equipages through the streets" of London at the expense of two million American subjects. But England was without adequate customs service to enforce the law, and, as many had anticipated, it was frequently ignored. Even though it was evaded, however, the law was not without effect. Because it failed to take account of what the colonists regarded as their right to develop the natural resources of their country and to utilize them as they saw fit, it constituted a perpetual grievance against England. Moreover, it irritated the colonists to have their interests subordinated to those of a small coterie of West Indian sugar planters.

The extent of colonial smuggling should not, however, be exaggerated, for the colonists who evaded the law comprised only a small percentage of the population. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that merchants who carried on a legitimate trade within the Empire often could accumulate large fortunes. Finally, recent studies indicate that the legitimate traders outnumbered the smugglers.

23. REGULATION OF INDUSTRY

MERCANTILIST doctrine required the regulation of colonial manufacturing as well as commerce. During the seventeenth century and the earlier part of the eighteenth, conditions in the colonies were far from favorable for industrial enterprises. Land was plentiful and cheap, and agriculture was profitable; and the person who essayed to engage in manufacturing on any considerable scale was handicapped by lack of capital, an unstable currency, and an inadequate labor supply. In spite of these obstacles many lines of manufacture were undertaken in the New England and Middle colonies. Because the development of rival industries in the colonies curtailed the market for English manufactures, the English merchant and the manufacturer turned to Parliament for protection.

The passage of the Woolens Act in 1699 marked the first important step in the direction of restraint on colonial manufacture. At the time it was passed, all the Northern colonies were producing considerable quantities of woolen goods on a small scale, and Massachusetts not only supplied a large part of its own needs but even exported woolen goods

to other colonies. The English woolen manufacturer naturally opposed this colonial enterprise, for every skein of woolen yarn and every yard of woolen cloth produced in America lessened his market. Moreover, the landed classes that produced the raw material, the persons who fabricated it, and the merchants who handled the finished product all supported the manufacturers in their contention that an industry affecting over a million of England's population and accounting for nearly half of her exports should not be endangered by some other part of the empire. The act of 1699, passed by Parliament in response to the protests of these groups, provided under heavy penalty that no woolen goods of any description could be sent from one colony to another or from any colony to a foreign country. This act, which was directed primarily against Ireland, was far from prohibitory, for any colony could still manufacture for consumption within its borders.

A second law restricting colonial manufacture was enacted in 1732. Favored by an abundance of beaver and unhampered by government regulations, New Yorkers and New Englanders had for several years been manufacturing beaver hats in increasing quantities. Because of their peculiar advantages they were often able to undersell the British manufacturer not only in the colonies but in foreign lands, particularly Spain and the West Indies. The home interests complained about this competition and in 1731 asked the Board of Trade to suppress the manufacture of hats in the colonies. A parliamentary inquiry, disclosing the fact that New York and New England were turning out ten thousand hats annually, resulted in legislation. The Hat Act of 1732 provided that no American-made hat could be exported from one colony to another, or from the colonies to England and Europe; that no master could have more than two apprentices and that each must serve for not less than seven years; and that no one should engage in the manufacture of felt hats unless he had served a seven-year apprenticeship. It also forbade the employment of Negroes in this industry.

A third restrictive law applied to the iron industry. England was anxious to obtain from the colonists additional bar- and pig-iron, but she wished to monopolize the manufacture of finished iron-products. As early as 1719 a bill was introduced in Parliament prohibiting the manufacture in America of hollow ware and castings, and the erection of forges for refining iron. Twenty years later the project was renewed, but not until 1750 was the desired legislation enacted. In that year a law was passed providing that bar- and pig-iron should be admitted to Great Britain duty free, but absolutely prohibiting under penalty of £200 the erection in the colonies of slitting or rolling mills, plating forges, or steel furnaces. Such establishments already in operation were allowed to continue. The British iron interests, who were chiefly responsible for the passage of this law, intended, in accordance with the

mercantilistic theory, that the colonial ironmasters should furnish them with raw material, but should not compete with them by manufacturing bar- and pig-iron into tools, implements, and hardware.

Although these restrictions on colonial manufacturing did not entail any serious economic loss for most colonists, they nevertheless caused friction, and some colonists entertained the notion that the colonies were being exploited for the benefit of a little group of home manufacturers. Benjamin Franklin, in discussing the causes of American discontent, said:

The hatters of England have prevailed to obtain an Act in their own favor restraining that manufacture in America, in order to oblige the Americans to send their beaver to England to be manufactured, and purchase back the hats, loaded with the charges of a double transportation. In the same manner have a few nail-makers, and a still smaller body of steel-makers (perhaps there are not half a dozen of these in England), prevailed totally to forbid by an Act of Parliament the erection of slitting-mills, or steel furnaces, in America; that the Americans may be obliged to take all their nails for their buildings, and steel for their tools, from these artificers, under the same disadvantages.

Closely connected with the laws on colonial trade and manufactures were the restrictions on the lumber industry. From the outset England had depended upon the forests of the Northern colonies, particularly New England, for masts for the royal navy, and at an early date it had taken steps to reserve the larger trees for that purpose. The last clause of the new charter granted Massachusetts in 1691 reserved for the Crown all trees, not growing on private lands, that were not less than twenty-four inches in diameter at the base. About a decade later a parliamentary statute provided a penalty of £15 for the felling of such trees anywhere in the colonies of New York, New Jersey, and New England. In 1711 the penalty was raised to £100, and surveyors of the "King's Woods" were appointed to mark suitable trees with a broad arrow to signify that they were reserved for the use of the navy. Still later Parliament ruled that no white pine trees outside the bounds of a township should be cut without a royal license. Evasion of this statute led Parliament to enact that no white pine trees might be felled unless they were on the property of private persons.

Because lumbering was one of the most important of the colonial industries, these restrictive measures and the unpopular officials who endeavored to enforce them were a source of perennial friction. Colonial lumber interests constantly broke the laws by cutting forest giants reserved for masts and sawing them into planks or splitting them into shingles. Arrests were made, but convictions were impossible, for judge

and jury alike were on the side of the lawbreakers. In 1720 the Massachusetts assembly advanced the claim that the timber described as belonging to the Crown was royal property only while standing and that as soon as it was cut it belonged to the colony. The Lords of Trade labeled this fantastic doctrine a "scandalous evasion" of the law. Colonial land speculators joined lumbermen in defying the restraints, and some even declared that Parliament had no right to infringe the economic liberties of the colonists.

24. LAND AND CURRENCY POLICIES

FREQUENT controversy over land titles and quitrents constituted another source of friction between the colonies and England. Opportunity to acquire free land was of prime importance in attracting settlers to America, and they and their descendants vigorously resisted every move that threatened their absolute ownership. In New England popular feeling was aroused when, during the administration of Governor Andros, the home authorities questioned the validity of all land titles on the ground that the original companies had had no power to make grants to the towns, which in turn had thus been powerless to grant land to individuals. Moreover, Andros was instructed to grant all lands "yet undisposed of" in return for a quitrent of not less than 2½s. for every hundred acres. Although the quitrent was small and Andros was cautioned not to molest any man's "Freehold or Goods," this move was bitterly resented by the colonists as unjust and uncalled-for meddling and interference. Outside of New England, attempts to alter land titles in favor of home interests or to levy and collect quitrents also met with opposition.

England's economic program also provided for the regulation of colonial currency and credit. During the first quarter of the eighteenth century, British merchants repeatedly informed Parliament that many colonies had enacted laws that favored colonial creditors but seriously impeded British creditors in the collection of debts lawfully due them. In asking for redress they characterized the discriminatory legislation as "bare-faced fraud." As a result, Parliament in 1732 provided that the affidavit of a resident in Great Britain should have the same weight as evidence given in open court in the colonies. Lands, tenements, and slaves owned by the colonists were made liable for debts in much the same way as was real estate in England. Spokesmen for the unthrifty and less fortunate colonists upon whom this regulation weighed most heavily condemned it on the ground that Parliament was interfering with the internal affairs of the colonies.

Hard pressed for a circulating medium, all the colonies with the exception of North Carolina, resorted to paper money. During the decade 1730-40 not only did several colonial governments, particularly those of New England, add large quantities of paper currency to the amount already in circulation, but they formed "banks." As early as 1722, Pennsylvania had established a loan office that issued and loaned bills not exceeding twenty shillings secured by land of double the value. "The poor middling people who had any land or houses to pledge," observed Sir William Keith, "borrowed from the loan-office and paid off their usurious creditors. The few rich men who had before this given over all trade, except that of usury, were obliged to build ships and launch out again into trade." In 1732 the New London Society United for Trade and Commerce was started in Connecticut. It had a short and stormy career but in many respects served as the model for the more famous Land Bank of Massachusetts, founded in 1740. Organized in response to a resolution of the Massachusetts assembly that requested the submission of proposals for supplying the colony with "more money" and "an additional medium of trade," this so-called bank, which had no capital stock, planned to issue £150,000 in paper money notes to be secured by land. Artificers and traders not owning land were to be allowed to secure loans of not more than £100 on personal security, provided that they had proper sureties. The notes, which were not to be redeemed for twenty years, might be paid off in commodities.

This scheme and others like it, as well as the demand for paper money, had the almost solid backing of the debtor class among farmers, frontiersmen, mechanics, and laborers, who believed that land banks and cheap money would remedy their economic ills. The creditors, for the most part moneylenders, merchants, manufacturers, and their lawyer-allies, opposed the issue of paper money (when such issues enabled debtors to scale down the value of their debts) and fought the debtor banks at every turn. For them, rival banks and increasing issues of paper currency meant competition, inflation, and possible ruin. In Massachusetts they endeavored to counter the Land Bank by setting up a bank of their own, known as the Silver Bank, which undertook to issue notes based on silver; they took similar action in Rhode Island and New Hampshire. They also tried to induce the Massachusetts assembly to veto the Land Bank plan, but that body, being dominated by the debtors, refused. The Governor then issued a proclamation cautioning all persons not to use the Land Bank notes, on the ground that they tended "to defraud men, to disturb the peace, and to injure trade." Shortly afterward an address signed by 130 prominent merchants of the colony warned the public to have nothing to do with the scheme.

But entreaties and warnings had no effect, and the Privy Council

was forced to intervene. All persons were forbidden to pass Land Bank bills; certain classes of officials found guilty of doing so were threatened with removal; military officers were forced to ascertain whether their subordinates had passed the bills; and registrars of deeds were ordered to return all Land Bank mortgages. Despite these edicts the Land Bank bills continued to circulate. Finally, in 1741, Parliament, at the solicitation of the creditors, suppressed the institution. Following the destruction of the Land Bank, Parliament, responding to complaints of the English merchants "that many fair creditors and other persons not in debt lost half or three-fourths of what was due to them, and of their personal estate" on account of the issues of paper money by New England, passed an act in 1751 forbidding the New England governments to issue any additional legal-tender bills of credit. In 1764, Parliament forbade the use of legal-tender paper money in all the colonies on the theory that it was "false in its principles, unjust in its foundations, and manifestly fraudulent in its operations."

Generally speaking, the colonial business interests approved the action of the home government, but the more numerous debtors condemned it. The Land Bank had had the support of nearly two thirds of the Massachusetts assembly, and John Adams, writing in 1774, thought that its suppression was more important than the Stamp Act in "creating ferment" and rousing opposition in Massachusetts to British authority. Franklin in 1766 informed British leaders that one of the principal reasons for American ill-feeling toward England was the prohibition of paper money.

The colonists objected to all restrictive enactments and repeatedly asserted that it was their "natural right" to engage in any sort of industry and to trade with whom they wished; but in evaluating this legislation it should be remembered that the mother country also did much to promote the well-being of the colonies. In the first place, she gave them preferential customs rates. The rates on colonial tobacco, for example, were much less than those on Spanish tobacco. Similarly, the rates on colonial indigo, iron, whale oil, hemp, lumber, silk, ginger, pot and pearl ashes, and molasses were less than those on foreign commodities. England, it may be argued, adopted this preferential system because she needed these products; nevertheless, these particular commodities enjoyed an especial advantage in the British market. Secondly, the duty on many commodities exported to the colonies by way of England was refunded in part or entirely, so that the colonists could buy some goods—Dutch linens, for instance—more cheaply than such goods could be purchased in England. These refunds, or drawbacks, were not, however, granted to iron and steel products, cordage, sail-cloth, or paper of foreign manufacture. Thirdly, the mother country sought by means of bounties and other financial inducements to en-

courage the production of certain commodities. Parliament in 1705 passed a measure granting bounties on naval stores imported from the colonies—£4 a ton on pitch and tar, £6 a ton on hemp, £3 a ton on rosin and turpentine, £1 a ton on masts, yards, and bowsprits. Increased production and a rapid decline in the price of these commodities, however, led to a considerable reduction of the bounties during the reign of George II. To free England from dependence on French indigo, a bounty of 6*d.* a pound on indigo imported directly into England from her overseas possessions was provided in 1748. Furthermore, colonial tobacco-growers were aided by the parliamentary prohibition of tobacco growing in England and Ireland. In the fourth place, the colonies as part of the British Empire enjoyed military and naval protection, free or privileged trade with other parts of the Empire, and the benefit of Great Britain's commercial treaties. Finally, in assessing the effect of British regulatory measures on the colonies, it should not be forgotten that evasion at times made the system somewhat more rigid and restrictive in theory than it was in actuality.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

- 25. THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES
 - 26. PLANS FOR REFORM
 - 27. THE CRISIS IN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION
 - 28. THE GRENVILLE PROGRAM
 - 29. THE COLONIAL PROTEST
 - 30. THE TOWNSHEND ACTS
 - 31. SOUTHERN GRIEVANCES
 - 32. RADICALS AND CONSERVATIVES
 - 33. COERCION
 - 34. THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
 - 35. INDEPENDENCE
-

DESPITE maladministration, inefficiency, and neglect, the British Empire for more than a century demonstrated its ability both to survive and to expand; but in 1776, with the outbreak of the American Revolution, the trend was reversed and the inadequacies of the British colonial system were fully revealed. The events that led up to this crisis within the Empire can be subjected to a variety of interpretations, and it is often easier to state what did not cause the American Revolution than to ascertain what did. It was not caused by a "wicked, stubborn, German king," George III; by "taxation without representation"; or by the righteousness of the colonists and the wickedness of their rulers. Its origins were both more prosaic and more deep-seated

than any of these. Basically, it was the outgrowth of ignorance and misunderstanding, of opposing ideals and conflicting interests within the Empire.

25. THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES

BY 1750 the British colonists in North America had developed a way of life that differed in many essential respects from that of Great Britain. Separated from England by three thousand miles and conditioned by an environment that was foreign to the experiences of Englishmen at home, they had been forced by circumstances to modify the religious, economic, political, and cultural institutions of the Old World. The colonists were Englishmen, but they were Englishmen whose attitudes and patterns of behavior often bore little resemblance to those of their countrymen on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. In the words of St. Jean de Crèvecoeur, a Frenchman who had settled in the colonies, the American was a "new man." Writing during the American Revolution, Crèvecoeur asked: "What, then, is the American, this new man?" And his answer was:

He is an American, who leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced. . . . Americans are the western pilgrims. . . . The American is a new man, who acts upon new principles; he must therefore entertain new ideas, and form new opinions. From involuntary idleness, servile dependence, penury, and useless labor, he has passed to toils of a very different nature, rewarded by ample subsistence.—This is an American.

Many Britishers regarded the colonists as socially inferior and treated them accordingly. Not only did they frequently snub them, but they often referred to them in harsh language. A London pamphleteer wrote that the English ministry might well dub the Americans "a race of dastardly cowards, sprung from our bastards, our swindlers, and our convicts." Bostonians were characterized as "people of coarse, insolent manners" and New Englanders in general as little short of slaves, the only difference being "that they were not bought and sold." General Wolfe, the hero of Quebec, declared that the Americans "are in general the dirtiest, most contemptible, cowardly dogs that you can conceive." Some Englishmen seemed to gain a peculiar satisfaction from constantly stressing the poverty of the colonists and ridiculing their dress, manners, speech, and customs.

But the British by no means monopolized such tactics. Many colo-

nists, unacquainted with the English countryside, thought and spoke of Great Britain as a den of iniquity given over to every species of luxury and dissipation. Henry Laurens and other Americans who had visited eighteenth-century England were astonished at the frivolity and immorality of the ruling class. "Chastity," wrote Laurens in 1772, "is certainly out of fashion in England." Such characterizations did not tend to knit the Empire more closely together. Loose talk and flippant generalizations about their heritage and their mode of life, whether true or not, embittered the colonists and roused within them a rebellious spirit. Those familiar with conditions in the English capital wondered whether the colonists ought to render obedience to a government controlled by "licentious and unprincipled men."

No less important as a source of friction was the great intellectual gulf between colonies and mother country. Intellectually, eighteenth-century even more than seventeenth-century America was a pioneer community. Its population was provincial in outlook, and many of the colonists had little contact with the Old World. In contrast to England America supported few men of leisure, and it produced no magnificent specimens of architecture, painting, or other forms of art such as abounded in England. No great cathedrals, art galleries, or museums graced its landscape. It had no rivals to Gainsborough, Romney, or Reynolds. In the appreciation of music and literary attainment it also trailed far behind England. Only in acquaintance with political literature were the colonists on a par with the English, and this disparity in intellectual attainment, like the social differences, was constantly emphasized.

The numerous differences between the colonists and Great Britain were aggravated by the repeated misunderstandings and conflicts that arose over the government and administration of the colonies. By the middle of the eighteenth century, each colonial assembly was a miniature House of Commons, claiming and exercising the right to levy and collect taxes, borrow money, raise troops, regulate trade with the Indians, issue currency, fix the salaries of government officials, and appoint agents to represent the colony in its dealings with England. These assemblies were not interested in promoting the interests of the ruling classes in Great Britain or of the colonial officials appointed by her; rather their efforts centered on their own ends and ambitions, and the interests of those who elected them. The executive official, on the other hand, was not chiefly concerned with the social and economic welfare of the colonists. Schooled in the tenets of mercantilism, anxious to enlarge his own private fortune or to secure a lucrative post for some dependent relative or friend, he regarded the colonial assembly as a troublesome barrier.

In their attempts to check or limit royal authority, the colonists but-

tressed their position with constitutional theories borrowed from England and reshaped to meet their particular needs. The example of the House of Commons was always before them, and on frequent occasions royal governors had to listen to the same arguments that had once been used by parliamentary leaders in their conflicts with the king. The Americans stood upon the doctrine of natural rights that had been widely used by Englishmen in their struggle with the Stuarts. Andrew C. McLaughlin, the eminent constitutional historian, has stated that there is considerable evidence to support the conclusion that with the colonial protests "the England of the seventeenth century arose to combat the England of the eighteenth; . . . and that America separated from Britain in the seventeenth century rather than in the second half" of the eighteenth century.* The Englishmen of the mother country, having attained their major objectives in their contest with the monarchy, were in a position where they could afford to forget—or, at least, to ignore—the principles that they had championed at an earlier period; but to Americans these same principles seemed altogether relevant to their own situation. The colonists felt that they were asking officials in England to be nothing more than consistent—to apply to Americans those rules that they had once applied to themselves.

John Locke, in his *Two Treatises concerning Government* (1690), had written an explanation—perhaps rationalization is more apt—of Parliament's behavior in the Glorious Revolution of 1688–9. But his work, like that of many other English political philosophers of his day, had unintentionally provided the colonists with a theory of government that seemed to them both to describe and to resolve their problems. Maintaining that every human being possessed certain natural—and therefore, inalienable—rights (among which were life, liberty, and property), Locke declared that people created governments to safeguard these rights. But if a government failed to preserve such rights—or to put it another way, if the rulers failed to abide by the social compact made between ruler and people when the government was created—then the people had the right to supplant the government with one that would protect these rights and observe the compact. In advancing these theories Locke could lay little claim to originality, for he was merely putting down in systematic form ideas with which every educated Englishman had become acquainted during the seventeenth century. Moreover, to the colonists, Locke was writing, not about theories, but about facts. He was stating, not what should be, but what was. When Americans quoted Locke before the Revolution, they viewed him primarily as an authority who had codified certain obvious and eternal political truths.

* Andrew C. McLaughlin: *A Constitutional History of the United States* (New York: D. Appleton Century Company, Inc., 1935), p. 91.

The concept of natural rights and the theory of government by compact were widely disseminated in colonial America in the eighteenth century. Locke's writings could be found in the personal libraries of many educated Americans, and the ideas that he championed were discussed not only in legislative chambers but also in churches, drawing rooms, and taverns. When James Otis in 1760 defended the Boston merchants against the writs of assistance, he did not maintain that his clients were innocent, but that the law violated certain fundamental rights that all Englishmen enjoyed. Patrick Henry employed the same reasoning in a case concerning the disallowance of a Virginia statute by the Privy Council. Arguing that with the disallowance the Privy Council had broken the compact that bound colony and mother country, he concluded that this was an act of tyranny that deprived Virginians of their basic rights as Englishmen. To Henry, government was "a conditional compact between king and people," and "a violation of the covenant by either party discharges the other from obligation." It would be a mistake to assume that Otis, Henry, or a host of others used Locke's ideas only as a device for concealing and dignifying their ulterior motives. If Locke had never existed, the colonists would have been compelled to create him.

Religious as well as political differences widened the gulf that separated the colonies from Great Britain in the eighteenth century. John Adams asserted that the religious question served "as much as any other cause to arouse the attention, not only of the inquiring mind, but of the common people, and urge them to close thinking on the constitutional authority of parliament over the colonies." Apprehension was aroused by the repeated attempt to spread the Anglican faith in the colonies at the expense of the Presbyterians, Quakers, and other groups, and by the scheme to establish an Anglican episcopate in America. In the South and in three New York counties Anglicanism had legal establishment. Naturally Anglican leaders dreamed of the time when it would be the dominant faith in all the colonies. The dissenting groups were well aware of this hope, and in 1763 the famous Massachusetts divine Jonathan Mayhew launched a bitter attack against the Anglican Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, on the ground that it was trying to "root out Presbyterianism." This opinion, widespread among the Dissenters in the North, was strengthened by recurrent rumors that an episcopate was to be founded in the colonies. After 1750, opposition to the plan was universal outside the Anglican Church. New England Congregationalists declared that with its establishment the colonies would be deluged in a flood of episcopacy and victimized by "right reverend and holy tyrants." An American bishopric, they warned, would mean additional taxes, priest-controlled courts, and the assumption of secular functions by episcopal authorities. Dis-

cord and apprehension were bound to develop where Dissenters labeled all officials appointed by the British government as "ruffle-shirted Episcopalians" and tools and allies of "tyrannical monarchialism," and where Anglicans retorted in turn that all Dissenters were steeped in "republican principles."

The dissenting clergy exerted a tremendous influence upon the political ideals of the rank and file. Year after year, especially at election time, Presbyterian and Congregational preachers directly or indirectly taught the ideas of Locke. In the course of their sermons they not only dwelt upon the origin and nature of government but even asserted that people had a right to rebel against a government that took their money or property without their consent. A Presbyterian minister taught the young Patrick Henry that the British Constitution was "but the voluntary compact of sovereign and subject." Preachers like him were typical of every Calvinistic community. Their sermons, usually printed in pamphlet form, were virtually political textbooks. At the meetings called to protest against various British measures, the preacher, mingling freely with lawyer and mechanic, had real influence in helping to mold sentiments adverse to the British authorities.

26. PLANS FOR REFORM

THE BASIC differences in the British and American cultures were aggravated, although not caused, by the failure of the officials in England to devise and put into effect a systematic plan for the administration of the overseas dominions. For more than a century, they had allowed the colonies to drift. They had not enforced laws affecting the colonies; through overlapping agencies they had worked at cross purposes; and they had never looked at the colonial problem as a whole. By 1750 a number of English statesmen who were critical of this inefficient system were proposing a series of administrative reforms for British North America. The plan that they advanced and that eventually became the official policy of the British government called for centralized control of the trans-Allegheny region, a closer association of the colonies for administrative purposes, the imposition of a greater share of the expenses of colonial defense and administration upon the colonists, and the enforcement of the mercantilist system.

The proposal for centralized control of the western country was advanced for two major reasons. In the first place, the home authorities were alarmed at growing Indian hostility. Under the regime of the

several colonies unscrupulous traders and eager landgrabbers repeatedly cheated the natives. The lands of the Indians had been stolen, their children kidnapped, and their hunting grounds destroyed. Time after time their spokesmen had pleaded in vain with the individual colonies for just treatment. Failing to secure redress, the Indians were daily becoming more embittered against the English. Because of the possibility of Indian warfare and of the foreseen continuation of the life-and-death struggle with France, the friendship and support of the Indians, and especially of the Iroquois tribes, was of vital importance to Britain. She could no longer afford to entrust relations with the natives to the jurisdiction of the colonies. A centralized system of administration that would effectively defend the rights of the Indians and retain their allegiance was therefore planned to replace thirteen separate, selfish and oftentimes conflicting Indian policies.

The second major reason for centralized control of the West was intimately bound up with the first. Both the home authorities and many of the colonists desired to substitute for the chaotic colonial control of the frontier domain a uniform policy that would eliminate, or at least minimize, the numerous squabbles and hard feelings arising out of the disposition of frontier lands. To frame such a policy, however, was not easy, for both in the colonies and in England there were two distinct economic groups whose interests in the problem were diametrically opposed. Included in the first group were all those who opposed the opening up of the West to settlement; those who maintained that the colonies were chiefly valuable as sources of raw materials for home manufacture; men of fortune in both America and Great Britain who had invested heavily in lands east of the Alleghenies and who therefore wished to prevent transmontane competition; and the Indians and their supporters, who wished to preserve the native hunting grounds from further encroachments. This group desired to keep the trans-Allegheny country an untenanted wilderness in which the fur-bearing animal and the Indian hunter might continue to thrive and from which England might continue to receive furs. Opposed to this group in interest and in principle was another group consisting of those who viewed the colonies, not as sources of raw materials, but as markets for British manufactured goods; those who saw opportunities for speculation in land beyond the Alleghenies; and those who regarded the colonies as a dumping ground for surplus population. The second group wanted the land in the trans-Allegheny region settled as rapidly as possible. The manufacturers would then have more consumers for their products and the speculators more buyers for their land.

The task of devising a land policy that would satisfy these two conflicting groups was probably impossible. The problem was aggravated by the fact that several of the colonies, including Massachusetts, Con-

necticut, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, claimed extensive tracts of land beyond the mountains. Many citizens of these colonies, particularly of Virginia, were aware of the great wealth to be gained from these western lands and were reluctant to accept any plan that would curtail or impede the exploitation of these domains. On the other hand, the less fortunate colonies pointed out that if the colonies having western territory were allowed to retain it, they would soon overshadow the others in wealth and power. Many English leaders felt that the home government should ignore the original charter grants, carve the western tracts into new colonies, and control the sale of the land so as to provide additional revenue for the imperial treasury.

The motives that prompted British statesmen to advocate a more unified administration of the colonies were many. All, however, sprang from the conviction that the colonies were in reality no longer isolated units, each with its own peculiar problems, but one continuous settlement confronted with common problems and dangers. The seventeenth-century wilderness barriers that separated one colony from another had in large measure disappeared. Although the colonists still thought of themselves as Virginians or New Yorkers, their problems were strikingly similar. Virginia had an Indian problem, a military problem, a financial problem; but so had each of the other colonies, and often the action of one respecting these problems affected all. Many spokesmen on both sides of the Atlantic therefore believed that divided control should be abandoned for concerted action. With the renewal of the struggle with France impending, the argument for this policy gained ground. "The French," wrote Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia, "too justly observe the want of connection in the colonies and from them conclude (as they declare without Reserve) that although we are vastly superior to them in Numbers, yet they can take & secure the Country before we can agree to hinder them."

The agitation for closer association of the colonies culminated in the Albany Congress of 1754, which was attended by twenty-five delegates representing the New England colonies, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. An alliance with the Indians was the primary subject before the Congress, but this problem was inextricably bound up with the more fundamental question of permanent colonial union. After lengthy discussion the delegates reached the unanimous conclusion that some form of union was "absolutely necessary for their preservation" and that it could be established only by parliamentary action. There were numerous difficulties, however, and only after extended debate was a plan advanced by Benjamin Franklin adopted. In brief outline it provided for a chief executive (president-general) to be appointed and supported by the Crown and a legislature (grand council) of forty-eight members to be chosen by the several colonial assemblies largely

on the basis of population and wealth. The legislature was to exercise general control over Indian affairs, raise and equip a colonial army and navy, erect forts, and make laws and levy taxes necessary for the execution of its policies. All acts of the legislature, however, were to be subject to the veto, first of the executive and then of the Crown.

Because none of the delegates, with the exception of those from Massachusetts, was empowered to enter into any form of union, the plan was submitted to the respective assemblies. If approved by them it was to be transmitted to Parliament. But the plan met with a cool reception; the colonial assemblies in every instance either rejected it outright or failed to ratify it. Although disappointed, Franklin was not surprised.

All the Assemblies in the Colonies [he wrote] have, I suppose, had the Union Plan laid before them, but it is not likely, in my Opinion, that any of them will act upon it so far as to agree to it, or to propose any Amendments to it. Every Body cries, a union is absolutely necessary, but when they come to the Manner and Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are perfectly distracted.

The rejection of the Albany plan revealed that the colonists were still psychologically particularistic and provincial. Despite the fact that they formed one continuous settlement along the Atlantic seaboard and were faced with common problems, they were narrow in outlook and jealous of their prerogatives. Local pride and local patriotism were strong, and no colony was willing to surrender any part of its power or authority to any other colony or to any central government. Furthermore, the colonists knew that England was anxious to have them bear a greater portion of the cost of colonial defense, and they feared that the Albany plan would mean not only additional taxation but taxation by an authority other than the local legislature. Besides, many of them were convinced that if they took no steps to assume a greater share of the expense, England would have to continue the task of defending them. Finally, the colonial assemblies in rejecting the Albany plan were undoubtedly influenced by western-land speculators. The records, for example, clearly indicate that the official action of Connecticut was influenced by the stockholders of one of the great land organizations, the Susquehanna Company, which did all within its power to block the plan for union.

Closely bound up with the question of colonial union was the problem of imperial defense. From the outset the burden of protecting the Empire had been borne primarily by the mother country. The navy was financed entirely by the British taxpayer, and during the four years from 1708 to 1711 nearly £2,000,000 was added to England's debt for naval protection for the colonies. Theoretically, each colony was supposed to provide for its own military defense except when war dis-

turbed Europe or when the Empire as a whole was endangered. In reality, the mother country was frequently called upon to erect forts and to send arms, ammunition, and even troops. Thus the refusal of the colonies to co-operate for defense against the Indians compelled the home authorities to station garrisons in the two most exposed colonies, New York and North Carolina. Moreover, England was obliged to spend large sums annually for presents for the Indians in an effort to retain their friendship. By 1750 the national debt stood at approximately £72,500,000 and the English landowner was paying 6½s. per pound, or about 30 per cent of his income, not including tithes and poor rates; something had to be done to lighten what the British taxpayer considered, and not without reason, an excessively high tax burden. The logical answer was to require that the colonists contribute more to the cost of imperial defense. Before this there had been various proposals for a direct parliamentary tax upon the colonists, apart from the impositions levied in connection with the trade regulations. Sir William Keith, for example, had suggested a stamp tax as early as 1728, but the proposal had been rejected on the ground that the colonies would oppose it. By the middle of the century, however, relief of the English taxpayer by a tax upon the colonies was being widely discussed in both press and pamphlet.

27. THE CRISIS IN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

THE VARIOUS proposals for colonial reform advanced by British officials coincided with the culmination of the long struggle between France and England for commercial and colonial supremacy. King William's War (1689-97), Queen Anne's War (1701-13), King George's War (1744-8), and the French and Indian War (1754-63) were the colonial parts of a world-wide conflict between the two powers, but they were also struggles for the American fur trade and fisheries, and for the Ohio-Mississippi region. At the conclusion of the French and Indian War—or the Seven Years' War—the French were finally driven from North America. After the Treaty of Paris in 1763 the British flag floated triumphantly over Canada and the territory east of the Mississippi with the exception of New Orleans. This city, together with Louisiana, France transferred to her ally Spain. Of her former extensive territories in North America she retained only two small, rocky islands off the coast of Newfoundland. The French colonial empire on the American continent was at end. Even Spain was forced to cede Florida to England in exchange for Cuba, which the British had seized during the war.

Although the French and Indian War to a large extent delayed the

inauguration of changes in colonial policy, it also emphasized the need for reform. Because the colonies had refused to accept the Albany plan of union and had also failed to take any concerted action for their common defense, England was forced to rely during the war on the old decentralized requisition system. During the first two years of the conflict the total military expense of the colonies was estimated at £170,000, an amount that Parliament voted to refund "as an Encouragement to exert themselves for the future in their mutual and common Defense." In 1757, England required the colonies to levy, clothe, and pay the provincial soldiers, but the home government was to furnish provisions and equipment. The British authorities also suggested that the colonists might be reimbursed for their expenses if they showed the proper vigor in raising troops.

Despite these inducements the results were far from satisfactory. Only three colonies, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, made anything like the expected contribution. Although these three colonies contained only about one third of the colonial white population, they furnished seven tenths of all the colonial troops. Georgia, New Hampshire, and North Carolina were too poor to do much; but Maryland and Pennsylvania, both wealthy and populous, contributed almost nothing. Loudoun, the commander in chief during 1756-7, declared that Rhode Island was unwilling to do its share and that Virginia had failed to furnish its quota. The Maryland assembly refused to let what few troops it did raise serve under Loudoun, who declared that it was "the constant study of every Province here to throw every expence on the Crown, and bear no part of the expence of this War themselves." Often the colonial levies were so late in arriving at the place of assembly that they seriously delayed military operations. General Amherst complained in 1760 that "the Sloth of the Colonies in raising their troops and sending them to their Rendezvous made it impracticable for me to move the Troops on as soon as I could have wished." All in all, the war strengthened the growing conviction of the home authorities that the colonies could not be relied upon to defend themselves, that the system of requisition was inefficient, and that some system of centralized colonial control for purposes of defense was imperative.

The need for reform was further demonstrated by the colonial wartime trade with the French. According to British law, all trade between any part of the Empire and the enemy was prohibited in wartime. But this principle, which had been violated by the colonies during the earlier struggles between England and France, was again ignored during the French and Indian War. The French forces in Canada were supplied with beef, pork, and other provisions from Pennsylvania, New York, and New England. At the same time the colonies traded either directly or indirectly with the French West Indies. Northern shippers,

especially Rhode Islanders and Pennsylvanians, operating openly or under thinly veiled disguises, did a flourishing business. As a general rule their vessels were protected from seizure by licenses granted by French officials, who welcomed the illicit intercourse, or by flag-of-truce passes issued by colonial governors, theoretically for facilitating the exchange of prisoners of war. The flag-of-truce passes were from the outset in great demand. Governor Denny of Pennsylvania sold them at first in small numbers at high prices. Later, as the number issued increased and their value declined, he resorted to selling blank ones for £20 each. Speculation in flag-of-truce passes became common in port towns. Exactly what portion of the trade with the French was carried on by way of neutral Spanish and Dutch ports is unknown. The records, however, indicate that it was large.

As the war progressed, it became increasingly evident that this illegal trade seriously thwarted the efforts of the British military and naval authorities. By furnishing the French islands with an ample supply of provisions and a market for their produce, the colonial merchants enabled these islands to hold out longer than they otherwise could have; and by draining the colonies of provisions they forced the British government to send supplies from England to the English armies operating in America. General Crump in his communications with Pitt bitterly denounced this trade. Admiral Cotes called it "iniquitous," and Commodore Moore called those engaged in it "traitors to their country." Pitt himself, in ordering the colonial governors to suppress it, declared that through it the enemy was "principally, if not alone, enabled to sustain and protract this long and expensive war."

The end of the war brought to a head all the important questions of colonial administration. After protracted debate between those who saw the colonies as sources of raw materials and those who saw them as markets for English manufactures, the British government adopted the second position. In the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Britain retained Canada and the West, and East and West Florida, in preference to the French sugar-planting island of Guadeloupe and the Spanish island of Puerto Rico. This decision was in part the result of opposition from the British West Indian planters, who feared that additional sugar-producing territory would destroy their monopoly of the home market; but it was also the result of changes taking place in the English economy. England was becoming less and less an agricultural and more and more a manufacturing nation, and the temperate zone colonies with their rapidly expanding population afforded a better market for manufactured goods than the tropical islands with their limited population. Finally, the British decision was affected by the desire to end the French menace to the English colonies in North America.

The decision to retain Canada and the West brought with it a number of perplexing administrative problems. What, for instance, should be done with the immense territory beyond the Alleghenies? Should the half dozen seaboard colonies that claimed the region be allowed to administer it as they pleased, or should it be administered by the mother country? Should it be left as a hunting ground for the Indians, as advocated by the influential Hudson's Bay Company and others interested in the development of the fur trade, or should it be opened up to settlement? If it were opened for settlement, should the colonists be left free to derive all the profits from land sales, or should the disposition of the territory be regulated so as to give land speculators in every part of the Empire an opportunity? How should Canada, with its eighty thousand French inhabitants, and Florida, with its Spanish population, be governed? Now that the French had been driven out of Canada, what steps would be necessary to keep the colonies loyal and prevent them from seeking complete independence? William Burke, kinsman of the famous statesman, in opposing the retention of Canada, declared that while it remained in French hands, it bound the North American colonies to Great Britain. "A neighbor," said he, "that keeps us in some awe," is not always the worst of neighbors. Great Britain had no adequate colonial machinery to grapple with these problems. To solve them she needed new methods and new policies.

The enormous expense occasioned by the Seven Years' War also emphasized the need for overhauling the British colonial system. The conflict cost England more than £82,000,000, of which £60,000,000 were added to the already existing national debt of about £70,000,000. Moreover, she was convinced that a standing army of ten thousand men was needed in America to protect both the old and the recently acquired parts of the Empire. It was estimated that such a force would cost about £300,000 annually, an increase of approximately £220,000 over the prewar period. In addition about £1,500,000 had to be raised annually for the navy. For England to bear the whole burden of this expense was out of the question. The British landowner was already weighted down with taxes, and the government considered it unwise to shift the added expense to the shoulders of the laboring classes. It therefore turned to the colonies for revenue. The war, it reasoned, had been fought partly for the colonies; the standing army was to protect them against possible French and Indian attacks; and the navy was to be used in part to safeguard their commerce. And many British leaders felt that under the existing system of colonial administration the colonies had demonstrated both their inability and their unwillingness to bear their share of the military burden. Reform was the only alternative.

28. THE GRENVILLE PROGRAM

REFORM was rendered difficult, however, by the confused situation in Parliament. Instead of two major parties, Whig and Tory, there were some half dozen factions, nearly all of Whig origin and composed of individuals motivated almost entirely by personal ambitions and interests. Of these the Old Whigs, made up for the most part of the representatives of some of the former great Whig families, opposed royal prerogative and stood for mild reform. Lord Hardwicke, the Duke of Newcastle, and the Marquis of Rockingham were prominent figures in the group, but its outstanding leader was Edmund Burke. Closely allied to the Old Whigs were the followers of the Duke of Cumberland. Including the former coterie of Robert Walpole and the adherents of George II, this faction perhaps more than any other was without constructive policy and lacked coherence and solidarity. The strongest faction numerically was that of the Bedfordites. Led by the Duke of Bedford and known as the "Bloomsbury Gang," this group was interested only in obtaining office. Still another faction was composed of the followers of William Pitt. In this group were Lord Camden, the Duke of Grafton, and the Earl of Shelburne, who, as President of the Board of Trade and Secretary of State, was in close touch with colonial affairs. Although they constituted a faction themselves, Pitt and his followers disliked partisanship and opposed government by faction. More than any other group, they formulated definite principles and lived up to them. The Pittites and the Old Whigs were on the whole the factions most sympathetic toward America. In 1761 the Grenvillites split off from the Pittites; they refused to follow Pitt's example in resigning office and rallied round George Grenville, his brother-in-law. Finally there was the Court faction, composed of four rather sharply defined groups: the "King's Friends," who were without political principles except that of the predominance of the king; the Independents, or unattached Whigs, who were mainly interested in obtaining office; the Scotch representatives in Parliament, who, like the Independents, supported the Crown largely because they were liberally rewarded with jobs; the adherents of the old Tory party, who were supported by landed interests and who with few exceptions were loyal to the Crown. In general the Earl of Bute and Lord North served as the spokesmen for the Court faction.

George III, who came to the throne in 1760, was primarily concerned with increasing his own prerogatives. He had no use for either parties or factions, which he believed were interested in purely selfish ends at variance with his own ambitions and the welfare of the people. On this point the Pittites and the Grenvillites more or less agreed with him, but

the feud between the two made it difficult for the King to unite both of them with the Court faction and thus command a safe majority in Parliament. Consequently, throughout this period, weak coalition ministries, made up of representatives from at least three of the warring factions, were necessary. From the close of the Seven Years' War to the close of the American Revolution, England had four ministries: the Grenville ministry, 1763-5; the Rockingham ministry, 1765-6; the Grafton-Pitt ministry, 1766-70; and the North ministry, 1770-82. All four had to work with a Parliament that represented almost exclusively landed and moneyed interests and that thought of the colonies as sources of profit, raw materials, markets, and national strength.

When the Grenville ministry came to office in 1763, it set to work to establish unified and efficient control over Britain's newly conquered territory, to readjust and tighten the British trade laws, and to lighten the financial strain on the English taxpayer by raising revenue in the colonies. Even before Grenville became Prime Minister, the problem of the West had become acute. Canada and the Floridas, with their alien populations, had to be provided for. Furthermore, pioneers from the older, settled colonial regions were staking out claims in the valleys of the Ohio country; and speculative land companies and colony promoters, who before the war had turned their attention to the trans-Allegheny country, were renewing their attempts to obtain grants. In 1763, George Washington and other Virginian soldiers, to whom Governor Dinwiddie promised 200,000 acres "of His Majesty the King of Great Britain's lands on the east side of the River Ohio" in part compensation for their services, pressed their claims in a petition to the King. In the same year the Ohio Company, which as early as 1747 had petitioned for 500,000 acres on the upper Ohio, sent a special agent to London to protect its interests; and a new concern, the Mississippi Company—composed of fifty prominent Virginians and Marylanders, including George Washington, the Lees, and the Fitzhughs—memorialized the King for a grant of 2,500,000 acres on the east bank of the Mississippi. In New York, Pennsylvania, and other colonies, there were also speculators who hoped to obtain grants in the great valley territory.

Coupled with the problem of settlement was the problem of Indian policy. The colonies' administration of the natives and their trade had resulted in dismal failure. By 1761 the situation had become so chaotic that the home government took complete charge and appointed two English commissioners to control and supervise all Indian affairs; but their task was so great that they had made little headway when the Grenville ministry came into power. English settlers and land speculators continued to steal the Indian's lands and to defraud him of his furs. To make matters worse, the British military authorities had abandoned the practice of giving the natives presents of guns and clothing. General

Amherst attempted to prevent the Indians from receiving ammunition and rum, but at the same time he approved a plan to supply them with blankets that had been used by smallpox patients. Furthermore, the French fur traders led the Indians to believe that France was about to regain control of the Mississippi Valley. Aroused by these tales, tribes of the Old Northwest, under the leadership of Pontiac and other chiefs, organized a confederacy. By May, 1763, they were on the warpath, and within a few weeks they had captured or destroyed every British post west of Niagara except Detroit. Months of warfare followed, and not until the spring of 1764 was a semblance of peace restored.

Fortunately for the Grenville ministry, Lord Shelburne, President of the Board of Trade, had already formulated a policy for the West. This policy with certain modifications constituted the Proclamation of 1763. By its terms, boundaries were established for three new mainland Crown colonies—Quebec, East Florida, and West Florida. All other lands “lying to the westward of the sources of the rivers which fall into the sea from the west or the northwest” and not yet acquired from the natives by the British government either by cession or purchase, were “for the present” reserved for Indians. All territory between the crest of the Alleghenies and the Mississippi, from Florida to 50° north latitude, was closed to settlers and land speculators. Moreover, the sale of Indian lands, except to the Crown, was prohibited, and all those who had inadvertently settled within the reserved region were ordered to withdraw. No person could carry on trade with the Indians unless he was licensed by the governor or commander in chief of some colony. To obtain this license the trader had to give bond to observe such regulations as “we shall at any time think fit to . . . direct for the benefit of the said trade.” Fugitives from justice taking refuge in the reserved territory were to be apprehended and returned.

As soon as the Proclamation of 1763 was announced, it created conflict. The colonists, not understanding that its framers regarded it as a temporary expedient to allay the fears of the Indians, looked upon the Proclamation as an arbitrary and unnecessary obstacle to their westward expansion. Ambitious pioneers, colony promoters, and speculators were especially vexed. Six of the older colonies questioned the legality of the measure on the ground that it conflicted with their claims to western territory.

The proposals to tighten the British mercantilistic regulations and to raise revenue in America were closely intertwined. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Grenville calculated that the colonists ought to be responsible for at least one half of the £300,000 estimated as necessary annually for the defense of Britain’s American possessions. In part to raise about one third of the £150,000 and in part to render the colonies more useful to England commercially, he suggested that immediate

steps be taken for the strict enforcement of the old regulations. The Navigation Acts, particularly the Molasses Act of 1733, had been notoriously evaded. Many customs officials in the colonies either turned smugglers themselves or were bribed by smuggling merchants and carriers. The few who conscientiously attempted to perform their duties were either hampered or completely blocked. "If conniving at foreign sugar and molasses, and Portugal wines and fruit," wrote Governor Bernard of Massachusetts in 1764, "is to be reckoned corruption, there was never, I believe, an incorrupt Custom House official in America till within twelve months." The various acts were so laxly enforced that according to the Board of Trade the collection of £1,900 a year was costing £7,600. In the majority of the colonies smuggling had become eminently respectable.

Parliament received Grenville's proposals favorably and took immediate action. It authorized sending additional revenue cutters to American waters, permitted naval commanders to act as customs officials, enlarged the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in revenue cases, made colonial governors responsible for the strict enforcement of all trade laws, and allowed the use of "writs of assistance," or general search warrants. Moreover, it passed a modified version of the Molasses Act, which was about to expire, and in 1764 it supplemented this with a new measure, the Sugar Act. Imposed for the express purpose of "defraying the necessary expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the British colonies and plantations in America," this new legislation lowered the duty on foreign molasses brought into the colonies from six to three cents a gallon, raised the duty on refined sugars, forbade the importation of foreign rum, and placed a heavy tax on Oriental and French textiles, Portugese and Spanish wines, coffee, and pimientos, unless these were shipped by way of England. It also provided that, with few exceptions, no drawbacks should be allowed.

Inasmuch as the prosperity of the Northern, or commercial, colonies depended on the foreign molasses trade, the Grenville measures drew bitter protest from colonial businessmen. Massachusetts merchants asserted that enforcement of the Molasses Act would end the rum distilleries, fisheries, and slave trade. John Hancock wrote that "the times are very bad," and "will be worse here, in short such is the situation of things here that we do not know who is and who [is] not safe." Rhode Island and Connecticut merchants were equally discouraged and apprehensive. Leading citizens of New York complained about the restrictions and the dwindling trade. Clement Biddle of Philadelphia, writing to Samuel Galloway on June 13, 1764, declared that "the restrictions we are lay'd under by the Parliament puts us at a stand how to employ our vessels to any advantage, as we have no prospects of markets at our own islands and cannot send elsewhere to have anything that will

answer in return." Merchant organizations in nearly all the commercial provinces drafted formal protests. The Rhode Island assembly, in a remonstrance to the Board of Trade, stated that the colony could not exist without the foreign West Indian trade. As attempts were made to enforce the legislation the complaints became more insistent and more frequent. Even some English merchants, whose trade with the colonies began to decline as a result of the new legislation, joined the opposition.

But Grenville, paying little attention to the protests, proceeded to carry out the remainder of his program. All duties and forfeitures under the Sugar Act, he declared, had to be paid in gold or silver. The colonists were in a quandary; they had no mines of precious metals, and their principal source of specie supply, the foreign West Indies, was at least partially cut off by enforcement of the Trade Acts. To make matters worse, Grenville, at the solicitation of British creditors, induced Parliament in 1764 to pass the Colonial Currency Act, which forbade further issue of paper money as legal tender in the colonies and prevented colonial debtors from settling their accounts in depreciated currency.

Grenville's third measure was the Stamp Act. To raise the remaining two thirds of the £150,000 that he hoped to obtain from the colonies, he suggested a direct tax in the form of "certain stamp duties." Far from acting in a tyrannical manner, he informed the colonists a year in advance that if they did not like this method of raising the necessary funds, he would be glad to have them "signify" a more satisfactory means. Since the only replies proposed the old requisition system or denied the right of Parliament to tax the colonies at all, Grenville pushed the stamp bill through Parliament in March, 1765. By its terms revenue stamps, ranging from a half-penny to ten pounds, were required for commercial and legal documents, liquor licenses, pamphlets, newspapers, almanacs, advertisements, playing cards, and dice. Infractions of the law were to be punished by heavy fines and forfeitures that, at the option of the informer or prosecutor, might be collected through the vice-admiralty courts. Forgery and counterfeiting were punishable by death.

Less than a month later Grenville, still intent on cutting down expenses, induced Parliament to pass the Quartering Act. It provided that where the colonial barracks were insufficient to house the proposed army of ten thousand men, public hostelrys were to be used. If more room was needed, vacant houses, barns, and other buildings were to be rented. The act also directed the colonists to furnish the troops with fuel, candles, vinegar, salt, bedding, cooking utensils, and small quantities of beer, cider, and rum. Persons furnishing quarters and supplies were to be reimbursed by the province in which the troops were stationed. Rates for transporting troops or supplies from one colonial point

to another were fixed in the act. Any excess of these rates had to be borne by the colonies.

29. THE COLONIAL PROTEST

THE OPPOSITION to the Sugar and Currency Acts was mild in comparison with the storm that followed the passage of the Stamp Act and the Quartering Act. Newspaper publishers, pamphleteers, lawyers, bankers, and merchants, on whom the Stamp Act fell most heavily, were especially outspoken. Northerners like James Otis of Massachusetts and Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island declared that such legislation was tyrannical and asserted that the mother country had no right to tax the colonies without their consent. The Virginia House of Burgesses, led by Patrick Henry, passed a series of resolutions stating that the inhabitants of the colony could not be bound by any law or ordinance imposing any tax upon them unless the law had been passed by the Virginia legislature. A Stamp Act Congress composed of delegates representing nine colonies met in New York in October, 1765, and issued a declaration of rights and grievances drafted by John Dickinson of Pennsylvania. This document stated that the colonists were entitled to the inherent rights and liberties of native-born Englishmen—petition, trial by jury, and self-taxation. The Congress also drafted petitions to the King and to each of the two houses of Parliament, requesting repeal of the Stamp Act and of other obnoxious legislation.

Had the colonists been content with congresses, constitutional discussions, protests, remonstrances, and memorials, the Grenville legislation might have remained unchanged. But opposition of a more formidable character began to appear even before the Stamp Act went into effect. This opposition marked the beginning of a ten-year struggle between the mother country and the mainland colonies and culminated in the Revolution; it was characterized by boycotts against England and violent resistance. The first use of the boycott was almost accidental. The depression following the French and Indian War plus the Grenville legislation forced the colonies to economize. They stopped eating certain articles of food, replaced imported tea with domestic sage, sassafras, and other herbs, and substituted homespun for British textiles. British imports began to decline and the colonists soon perceived that in nonimportation and nonconsumption they possessed weapons that could be used to effect the repeal of the measures. Accordingly, four days before the Stamp Act went into force, two hundred New York merchants agreed not to purchase British goods until the Sugar Act had been modified and the Stamp Act repealed. A week later, more than

four hundred Philadelphia merchants agreed to make all their orders for British merchandise contingent upon the repeal of the Stamp Act. Less than a month later, Boston merchants made a similar agreement, and smaller New England towns followed suit.

The effect of these agreements was soon felt in the mother country. English exportations to the commercial colonies declined from £1,410,372 in 1764 to £1,197,010 in 1765; exports to the tobacco colonies fell from £515,192 to £383,224 during the same period. Moreover, the mainland colonists owed British businessmen between £4,000,000 and £6,000,000. British merchants, manufacturers, and workingmen flooded Parliament with petitions demanding the immediate repeal of the Stamp Act. Benjamin Franklin, who was in England at the time, was summoned to appear before the House of Commons to be questioned about the attitude of the Americans. He declared that "the restraints lately laid on their trade, by which the bringing of foreign gold and silver into the colonies was prevented; the prohibition of making paper money among themselves; and then demanding a new and heavy tax by stamps; taking away at the same time trials by jury, and refusing to receive and hear their humble petitions," accounted for their action. The colonists, he asserted, would never submit to the Stamp Act unless compelled to do so, and compulsion might mean revolution.

Meanwhile the radical element in the colonies—the unenfranchised and the poorer—who enjoyed little in common with the privileged merchants and planters, organized societies known as "Sons of Liberty." Led by men from their own ranks or sometimes by men from the upper classes, these people expressed opposition to the Grenville legislation by a series of popular demonstrations. They held parades; they intimidated stamp collectors, burned them in effigy, and forced them to resign; and they destroyed stamps and the property of the stamp collectors and of others who favored the Grenville measures. In Boston, a mob led by a shoemaker named Mackintosh and incited by those who were most seriously affected by the Sugar and Stamp Acts burned the stamp collector Oliver in effigy, tore down a new building of Oliver's that they thought he intended to use as a stamp office, partially destroyed the Oliver home, attacked the houses of the registrar of the admiralty and the comptroller of the customs, and destroyed the records of the admiralty courts. Oliver resigned, and merchants forced the sheriff who arrested Mackintosh to release him.

While disturbances of this nature were occurring in both the mainland and West Indian colonies, the King and Parliament, vexed by the troubled state of American affairs, forced the Grenville ministry out of office. The new ministry, led by the young and inexperienced Marquis of Rockingham, did not know which way to turn. On the one hand, it was bombarded with petitions and remonstrances asking for the im-

mediate repeal of the Stamp Act and modification of the other Grenville measures. On the other, the majority of those who wanted to avoid high taxes at home, who supported a narrow mercantilistic colonial policy, and who were angered by the action of the American radicals were just as firmly opposed to repeal or modification. The merchant-manufacturing interests, however, finally triumphed. Parliament repealed the Stamp Act and reduced the tariff on molasses to one pence per gallon, and lowered other customs duties. But to appease the opposition and to safeguard itself, it issued a Declaratory Act that asserted its right to tax the colonies at any time.

The passage of the remedial legislation occasioned great rejoicing in America. The nonimportation movement quickly collapsed, local manufacturing declined, British goods again began to flow into the colonies, and toasts were drunk to King George.

30. THE TOWNSHEND ACTS

IT DID not take British taxpayers long to discover that the modification of the Grenville legislation did not lighten their financial burdens. Accordingly, the Rockingham ministry was ousted in July, 1766, and was succeeded by the Pitt-Grafton coalition. The central figure in the new cabinet was Charles Townshend, who, like Grenville, maintained that the colonies were, and ought to be, subordinate to the mother country and that they should contribute to the support of the Empire. As Chancellor of the Exchequer he had little difficulty in inducing Parliament in 1767 to pass the series of acts that bear his name. Of these the most important was a new revenue bill that imposed duties on glass, lead, painters' colors, tea, and paper and provided for the collection of these duties by British commissioners stationed in American ports. It authorized the use of writs of assistance and the trial of smugglers in courts without juries. The revenue derived from the act was to be used not only for the upkeep of the military establishment but for "defraying the charge of the administration of justice, and the support of civil government in such provinces where it shall be found necessary." Another act suspended the New York assembly for refusing to comply fully with the provisions of the Quartering Act.

The passage of the Townshend Acts was the signal for renewed colonial opposition. Still suffering from the postwar business depression and from the effects of the Currency Act of 1764, the colonists complained of "high taxes," the "unfavorable balance of trade," the "deluge of bankruptcies," the "alarming scarcity of money," the "stagnation of trade," and the "load of restrictions." Many regarded the Townshend

legislation as a plan to embarrass them further. Few understood Britain's financial dilemma. The vast majority thought that the mother country was determined not only to ruin their economy but to curtail what they had long regarded as their right of self-government.

The opposition took many forms. Lawyers and pamphleteers who had opposed the Grenville legislation on constitutional grounds were again outspoken. James Otis declared that the colonies "must instantly, vigorously and unanimously unite themselves . . . to maintain the Liberty with which Heaven itself hath made us free." John Dickinson of Pennsylvania in his *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies*, although urging the colonists to refrain from the use of force, asserted that the Townshend measures were unjust, un-English, and dangerous for the future well-being of the colonies. "Let us," he said, "consider ourselves as . . . freemen . . . firmly bound together by the same rights, interests, and dangers. . . . What have these colonies to ask, while they continue free; Or what have they to dread, but insidious attempts to subvert their freedom? . . . They form one political body, of which each colony is a member." Samuel Adams induced the Massachusetts assembly to send a circular letter to the other colonial assemblies urging them to co-operate in defending their natural and constitutional rights. Several colonies passed sympathetic resolutions in reply, and Virginia issued a circular letter calling upon the other colonies to support Massachusetts.

But colonial pamphlets and resolutions were not so effective in securing the repeal of the Townshend Acts as were the renewal and extension of the commercial boycott. In 1767, leading Bostonians agreed not to purchase certain imported articles; interest in home manufacture revived; and the newspapers carried reports describing the increase and perfection of local manufacturing. Harvard graduates wore homespun and printed their theses on paper manufactured in a nearby town. In 1770 the *Boston Gazette* declared that the "very impoverishing custom of wearing deep mourning at Funerals is now almost entirely laid aside in the Province." By 1769, New York, Philadelphia, and the lesser commercial centers were following a similar custom. Even the Virginia planters, headed by George Washington, formed a nonimportation association. Although some of the colonists, including many of the merchants, failed to live up to these agreements, English merchants and manufacturers felt the effects of nonimportation, and in a single year imports from Great Britain fell off by more than £740,000.

Violent expressions of opposition not only disturbed the British leaders but alarmed the more conservative colonists as well. In Boston the radical element became so menacing that the new customs commissioners asked for a warship and a regiment of soldiers to protect them. After repeated requests the British authorities in 1768 sent the man-of-

war *Romney*. Soon after its arrival the sloop *Liberty*, one of John Hancock's vessels, sailed into Boston harbor with a cargo composed in part of Madeira wine on which there was a heavy tax of seven pounds sterling per tun. When the customs official went on board he was "hoved down" into the cabin, the wine was taken ashore, and a false entry made. A few days later the *Liberty* was seized by the customs officers and moored under the guns of the *Romney*. Infuriated by this action, a mob soon terrorized the town; it assaulted a customs official, burned a small boat belonging to the service, and damaged the homes of the comptroller and collector. The commissioners, fearing for their lives, took refuge on the *Romney* and later in Castle William. A short time afterward, when the Inspector-General, who had been away from Boston, returned, he was roughly handled by a small mob. In the other commercial colonies there were similar disturbances. In Providence a customs official was tarred and feathered, and at Newport a revenue cutter was destroyed. In Philadelphia, a mob stole smuggled wine that the customs officers had seized, and assaulted a protesting official.

British mercantilists and imperialists maintained that colonial radicalism should be suppressed and that the colonies should be compelled, by force if necessary, to accept any law or policy that the mother country might see fit to devise. Accordingly, the ministry decided to station a military force in Boston. Despite the fact that regular garrisons were already maintained in more than a score of places in Britain's colonial possessions in America, rumors that troops were to be sent caused great excitement. The various acts of the British officials were denounced in the *Boston Gazette*, and a Boston town meeting summoned a convention of delegates from all the towns of the colony to take steps for safeguarding the colony's interests. Governor Bernard, however, refused to call the Assembly, which he had prorogued, or to receive petitions prepared by the convention reciting the colony's grievances.

When the first contingent of soldiers arrived from Halifax on September 28, 1768, the Boston selectmen, in defiance of the Quartering Act, refused to provide food and shelter for them within the limits of the town. During the next few months the radicals—urged on by Samuel Adams, a graduate of Harvard, a member of the Massachusetts legislature, and a consistently outspoken critic of British rule—did all they could to stir up trouble between the citizenry and the soldiers. Both officers and privates were dubbed "Red Coats," "Lobsters," and "Bloody Backs" and on several occasions were pelted with oyster shells, snowballs, and the like. Many conservative Bostonians—property owners and businessmen—hated and feared the mobs more than they did the soldiery, but they were powerless to prevent trouble. Late in February, 1770, an informing customs official, while being dragged from his home by a mob, fired into the crowd and killed an eleven-year-old

boy named Seider. It is difficult to imagine how any event could have better served the purposes of the radicals. Not only was the unfortunate official arrested and, in spite of the order of the court, found guilty of murder by a local jury, but Seider was pictured as a martyr to the cause of liberty. Feeling ran high, and soon there were stories that the soldiers were insulting civilians. Finally on March 5, a sentry on guard at the customhouse, who had been repeatedly bullied and snowballed by a crowd, called for assistance. When a sergeant and six men were sent to his relief, the crowd began to assault them with sticks and stones, daring them to fire. The soldiers, however, refrained from action until one of them was knocked down with a club; the guard then opened fire, killing three outright and wounding several others. This was the celebrated "Boston Massacre." Captain Preston, the commander of the guard, immediately surrendered to the civilian authorities, and the other members of the squad were arrested. Although a Boston town meeting promptly labeled them "murderers," all but two of the accused, after a trial in which they were defended by John Adams and Josiah Quincy, Jr., were found not guilty.

31. SOUTHERN GRIEVANCES


ALTHOUGH the British trade regulations aroused the most hostility in the Northern commercial colonies, the Southern planters—particularly those in Virginia—also had reason for complaint after 1763. Wasteful methods of cultivation and the rapid increase in population resulted in a fairly sharp advance in the price of meadowlands in the tidewater and piedmont sections between 1750 and 1775. As early as 1759, Governor Dinwiddie had informed the Board of Trade that the best lands of the colony had already been pre-empted, and by 1774 the available supply east of the Proclamation Line of 1763 had practically all been taken. To colonial planters and speculators, who coveted the fertile expanses beyond the Alleghenies, the Proclamation of 1763 seemed a selfish policy designed to promote the interests of British Court favorites, politicians, and speculators. The proposal of the home government to hand over the Kentucky and Ohio country to the Walpole Company—an English organization that included Lord Camden and the Earl of Hertford and sponsored by George Grenville—instead of granting it to Virginia land companies, alarmed the Virginians. They were also angered by England's refusal to permit the survey of certain trans-Allegheny bounty lands that George Washington and other Virginians had purchased.

Less important perhaps than the land question in alienating the



TOBACCO CULTURE

These pictures show the principal stages in the production and marketing of tobacco in the eighteenth century. The leaf was hung in a tobacco house to dry. It was then stripped from the stalk, compressed, and packed into barrels (upper left). It was stored in public warehouses until inspectors had examined it (lower left), and was carried to market by boat or wagon (right). From William Tatham: An Historical and Practical Essay on the Culture and Commerce of Tobacco (London: 1800).



SAVANNAH IN 1734

This engraving from a contemporary drawing shows the beginnings of one of the South's principal port towns.

The Bettmann Archive



planters was the system of public finances. Virginia secured its revenue from three principal sources: quitrents, customs duties, and poll taxes. The total public income from these sources varied from year to year, but there was usually a substantial balance after current expenses, including the salaries of royal officials, had been paid. All balances, however, instead of being at the disposal of the colonial assembly, went into the royal treasury. Since the cost of local government was mounting annually, it was necessary for the assembly to increase the poll tax. Naturally, the planter felt again that he was being victimized for the benefit of the mother country. And the rapid curtailment of the currency during the ten years preceding the Revolution greatly added to his discontent and unrest.

Furthermore, the vast majority of the great landed proprietors of the tidewater were heavily in debt to British merchants, primarily because of their wasteful system of marketing. Jefferson estimated that the Virginia planters owed at least £2,000,000 and that "these debts had become hereditary from father to son, for many generations, so that the planters were a species of property annexed to certain mercantile houses in London." In 1791 a group of British merchants submitted a statement to their government listing the debts due them from American customers in 1775. The total principal and interest amounted to £4,930,656, and of this, £4,137,944—more than five sixths—was due from states south of Pennsylvania; Virginians alone owed £2,305,408. John Randolph's father, for example, owed the London firm of Capel and Osgood Hanbury £11,000 and was also a heavy debtor to Jones and Farrell. Archibald Cary owed the Hanburys more than £7,000 and Archibald Lidderdale and Company nearly £3,000. Jones and Farrell of London and Kippen and Company of Glasgow held bonds against Thomas Jefferson for approximately £10,000. Benjamin Harrison, Edmund Pendleton, the Lees, Flemings, Marshalls, and others, were also heavy debtors. With their plantations, slaves, and sometimes their furniture and ungrown crops mortgaged well beyond their value, it seemed that nothing less than repudiation could save them. Between 1750 and 1775 the provincial assemblies passed a series of lax bankruptcy acts as well as other measures detrimental to nonresident creditors. Although these laws were nearly always killed by royal veto, they nevertheless indicate the ends to which the planter was willing to go in order to extricate himself from a precarious financial state. Some years before the complete break with England, Jefferson and Patrick Henry, in an extralegal meeting of the Virginia Assembly, proposed that all payments on British debts be stopped.

32. RADICALS AND CONSERVATIVES

THE IMPOSITION of new British regulations after 1763 produced a struggle not only between the colonies and England but also between two fairly distinct social and economic classes within colonial America. One, the conservatives, composed of the rich and the well-born—merchants, large landholders, and moneylenders—dominated every phase of colonial life. It owned or controlled the economic resources of the colonies—the bulk of the land, forests, fishing grounds, the agencies of commerce, and the fluid capital. By property qualifications for voting and office holding, and by wirepulling, logrolling, and techniques of the political boss, it was able to limit greatly the political power of the rank and file. Socially, its members considered themselves superior to the common people. Unless one had money or was a member of an “old respectable” family or was well educated or had served the state in some prominent capacity, he was regarded as socially inferior.

In sharp contrast to the conservatives were the radicals. Recruited for the most part from the ranks of the poorer people—small farmers, mechanics, shopkeepers, and frontiersmen—this class was conscious of the barrier that separated it from the advantages of wealth, education, and social position. Partly because of this fact and partly because it aspired to substitute “the rule of the many for the rule of the few,” it waged unrelenting warfare against privilege—against primogeniture and entail, quitrents, tax systems favoring the rich, an established church, unequal representation, restricted suffrage, and economic monopoly. Neither the privileged classes in the colonies nor royal officials nor Old World profiteers were spared.

For understandable reasons the conservatives did not sympathize with the desire of the radicals for change. They staunchly defended the existing order, belittled radical assertions, and repeatedly attempted to check the radical demands. On occasion these antagonistic groups co-operated against Great Britain, but at no time did the conservatives have any intention of releasing their grip on colonial affairs or of removing the barrier separating the two classes. From 1763 to 1767 both radicals and conservatives were united in their opposition to British regulations, but with the adoption of the Townshend Acts a marked cleavage became apparent. Colonists of all classes had been adversely affected by the provisions of the Stamp Act. The Townshend Acts, however, were aimed in large part at those merchants who were violating Britain’s mercantilist regulations. Under the circumstances, merchants who observed the law had little reason to object to the new measures,

and the members of this group moved steadily toward the conservative position. The burden of the protest thus fell on the illegal traders, who in turn enlisted the support of the town mechanics and workers to stage demonstrations similar to those that had been made against the Stamp Act. But in making this move, they let loose forces that they could not always readily control. The merchants' talk of the rights and liberties of all Englishmen taught the poorer people of the towns, who had little or no voice in their own government, to feel that they were being deprived of their "natural rights" not only by British officials but also by the upper classes within their own colonies. As a result, they were often as critical of the colonial conservatives as they were of the British officials. This opposition of the radicals to both the British and provincial systems of government converted the original protest movement into a double struggle. In the words of Carl Becker, to the issue of "home rule" within the Empire had been added the question: "Who shall rule at home?"

As the radical spirit in the colonies increased, the conservative opposition to British mercantilist policy declined. Merchants who had once sought and gained the support of what they termed the "mob" began to realize that in winning their battles with England they might conceivably lose all that they had in America. If the price of the repeal of British trade regulations was majority rule in the colonies, many merchants preferred the British regulations. But they soon discovered that they were not free to choose, for the once despised mob was getting out of hand. In the demonstrations against the Townshend Acts, the radicals for the first time directed their antagonism against the conservative merchants as well as against the representatives of the Crown. What had once seemed a clear-cut conflict between two vested interests within the Empire had been converted into a revolutionary movement that was striking at the very foundations of British rule.

Despite the sharp cleavage between radicals and conservatives, there was a temporary lull in the struggle within the Empire and within the colonies from 1770 to 1773. The Townshend Acts, with the exception of the duty on tea, were repealed, partly because of the colonial boycott on British goods, partly because the acts, while yielding little revenue, had increased the military establishment in America and had brought the colonies to the brink of rebellion, and partly because Lord North, who became Prime Minister in 1770, maintained that the taxation of British goods was contrary to the principles of mercantilism. The tax on tea was retained in order to keep the colonies aware of British authority. "The properest time to exert our right of taxation," said North, "is when the right is refused." At the same time, the merchants' fears that the nonmercantile, nonpropertied masses might become too powerful if the agitation against England continued tended to check the dis-

content. "All men of property," said Cadwallader Colden, Governor of New York, "are so sensible of their danger from riots and tumults that they will not rashly be induced to enter into combinations which may promote disorder for the future, but will endeavor to promote due subordination to legal authority." In the mind of the merchant, the doctrine of individual rights, so stressed in the controversy with England, was never intended to apply to the rank and file. A social and political revolution, which would in all probability greatly curtail or minimize their own social and political power, was the last thing in the world that the merchants desired.

For three years comparative calm prevailed, and men of property seemed to have things well in hand. Extreme radicals, it is true, were unwilling to let sleeping dogs lie. Spurred on by restless leaders like Samuel Adams, they did their best to keep opposition alive by repeating the old cries about British oppression and colonial rights. Adams, hoping for complete independence, declared that the rank and file of the people were not dependent upon "merchants or any particular class of men"; and William Lee advised his brother in Virginia not to "trust anything to the merchants for, in general, gain is their God; but force them to cooperate with the wishes of the people." The alliance between the merchants and masses was for the time being clearly at an end.

Although the radicals did not make as much headway as they wished during these years, one event—the so-called *Gaspée* affair—played directly into their hands. For some time before 1770 the English East India Company had been running behind financially, and to make up for its losses it had advanced the price of tea on the London market. This policy led to widespread smuggling by American merchants, who could buy tea in Holland much more cheaply than in England and at the same time avoid paying duty. England resolved to enforce the law, and her revenue cutters and customs officials became extremely active. Riotous scenes occurred in Falmouth and in Philadelphia in 1771; but it was in Rhode Island, with its numerous inlets and islands, that the chief trouble occurred. Among the revenue boats sent to apprehend the illicit traders was the *Gaspée*, commanded by Lieutenant Dudingston. In the eyes of the colonists, Dudingston was more than overzealous. He stopped and searched ships under the flimsiest pretext, seized goods illegally, and fired on market boats as they entered Newport harbor; he antagonized the farmers living on the islands by cutting down their trees for fuel and seizing their sheep for meat. The chance for revenge came when on June 9, 1772, the *Gaspée* ran aground seven miles below Providence. At midnight, men and boys headed by John Brown, the richest merchant of Providence, attacked the boat. Dudingston was wounded, he and his crew were put ashore, and the vessel was burned. English officialdom condemned the act as treasonable and directed that

those responsible for it should be apprehended and sent to England for trial.

The *Gaspée* affair, together with the report in 1772 that judges' salaries would be paid by England out of revenue derived from colonial customs, furnished Adams and his fellow radicals with new fuel. They urged the people to consider whether they wanted to be "freemen or slaves," whether they wanted to submit everything "dear and sacred" to the decisions of "pensioned hirelings." Adams, fully realizing the changed attitude of the merchants and wishing to keep the people roused, was especially active. Whether in town meeting, on the street corner, or in tavern or grogshop, he constantly advocated the need for union and common action. Finally he moved in the Boston town meeting of November, 1772, that a committee of twenty-one be appointed "to state the Rights of the Colonists and of this province in particular, as men, as Christians, and as Subjects; with the Infringements and Violations thereof that have been or from time to time may be made"; and to communicate and publish the same to the several towns of Massachusetts and to the world as the sense of Boston, requesting of each town "a free communication of their Sentiment on this Subject." This resolution, passed without a dissenting vote, in reality provided for the establishment of a radical agency that was to be used to stir up popular sentiment in favor of revolution and to resist the will and authority of the British government. By January, 1773, more than eighty Massachusetts towns had similar committees. Two months later the Virginia assembly appointed a standing committee of correspondence, and the majority of the other colonies followed suit. The radicals now had both an issue and the beginning at least of an organization divorced from control of the merchant class.

33. COERCION

AT THE beginning of the year 1773, however, the conservatives in America—whether they were moderates or extremists—still dominated the situation. With few exceptions they flatly opposed independence and they supported a policy of expediency and passive resistance. At this stage, just as the outlook for more peaceful relations between England and the colonies seemed encouraging, Lord North and his colleagues decided to intervene. The advance in the price of tea in England had not materially aided the East India Company, and at the beginning of 1773 the company found itself on the verge of bankruptcy with seventeen million pounds of tea in its warehouses in England and its dividends cut in half. In an effort to aid the company and

at the same time increase the revenue of the government, North induced Parliament in May, 1773, to enact a measure that gave the company a virtual monopoly of the tea trade in America. By the terms of this act the company was to all intents and purposes permitted to send its tea directly to the colonies in its own ships and to dispose of it to retailers through its own agencies. The British and colonial importer—both middlemen—were thus eliminated. Although the company had to pay the three-penny customs tax in the colonies, it was able to reduce the price by 25 per cent and to undersell both the honest merchant and the dealer who trafficked in smuggled tea.

Angered by the grant of a monopoly to what seemed to them a powerful, grasping corporation and by the prospect of the loss of profits from a lucrative trade, and fearful lest other articles should be similarly monopolized by the East India Company or like concerns, the merchants again joined with the radicals. In so doing they had no intention of supporting the radical demand for complete independence; they wished only to avoid the ruin of their trade. As one of their number said, if American commerce were to be controlled by great monopolies, the colonists might find themselves in the power of a monster that could "destroy every branch of our commerce, drain us of all our property, and wantonly leave us to perish by thousands." To protect their trade the merchants were willing to enter into almost any sort of an alliance. Besides, they apparently expected to control the radicals as they had on previous occasions.

Long before the East India Company's ships arrived at the colonial ports, the question of steps to "safeguard" colonial interests was discussed. The more conservative merchants and the moderates as well were inclined to resort to the old method of economic boycott and to bring pressure to force the company's consignees to resign. The radicals, on the other hand, determined to make the most of the opportunity, advocated sterner measures. In Boston, where they soon gained the upper hand, tarring and feathering and other forms of violence were frequent occurrences. The company's consignees, among whom were the two sons and the nephew of Governor Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts, were labeled "Traitors to their Country, Butchers," who were "doing everything to Murder and destroy all that shall stand in the way of their private Interests." Hutchinson's refusal to allow the tea ships to leave the harbor, and the consignees' refusal to resign at the repeated request of the merchant-controlled town meeting, opened the way for Samuel Adams to summon a great mass meeting. This body, in which the rank and file greatly outnumbered the merchants and conservatives, not only refused to obey the Governor's order to disperse but unanimously adopted a resolution stating that the tea should not

be landed and that the duty on it should not be paid. The Governor, however, was equally determined that the tea should not leave the harbor until it had first been landed and the duty on it paid. As a result, on the night of December 16, 1773, a band of men disguised as Indians boarded the company's vessels and dumped £18,000 worth of tea into the harbor while a great crowd on shore looked on. The deed was performed quietly and there was no other damage. Among the "Indians" at this "tea party" were merchants who toiled "side by side with carpenters, masons, farmers, blacksmiths, and barbers."

In the other colonies the East India Company also met with opposition. In Philadelphia, eight thousand citizens adopted resolutions directing Captain Ayers, commander of the company's tea ship, not to enter his cargo at the customhouse and to resail at once for England. Ayers wisely obeyed. In New York, as in Philadelphia, all classes were opposed to the company's tea shipments, and a document entitled "The Association of the Sons of Liberty" denounced as enemies, and declared a boycott against, all persons who in any way should aid in bringing dutied tea into port. Furthermore, the radicals of the city held a meeting and appointed a committee of correspondence to communicate with the other colonies. Many conservative merchants, thoroughly alarmed, attempted to hold the radicals in check, but soon found themselves powerless. Fortunately for the company, its consignees, realizing the strength of public opposition and having no desire for another Boston Tea Party, not only resigned but advised the Captain of the company's tea ship to return to sea "for the safety of your cargo, your vessels, and your person. . . ." In Charleston, where the radicals, composed mostly of planters and mechanics, found it more difficult to secure the co-operation of the merchants in opposing entry of the tea, resistance was less marked than in the Northern ports. Here the tea was unloaded and placed in the government warehouses, where it remained until it was auctioned off three years later for the benefit of the new Revolutionary government.

Conservatives denounced the Boston Tea Party as a "diabolical" act, contrary to the best interests of the country. Even liberal-minded men like Franklin and Dickinson disapproved of it, the former labeling it "an act of violent Injustice" for which the East India Company ought to be fully compensated. Only the extremists approved of it, and throughout the colonies, for the moment at least, it injured their cause. In the eyes of the British ministry and British leaders generally, the refusal of the colonists to accept the East India Company's tea and the lawless assaults on the company's property, coupled with the refusal of the radicals to obey Crown officials, was nothing short of open defiance. Only Pitt and Burke and a few others thought otherwise, and

in the spring of 1774, Parliament at the request of Lord North passed the so-called Intolerable Acts.

The first of these, the Boston Port Bill, closed the port of Boston until such time as the British authorities were satisfied "that the trade of Great Britain may safely be carried on there, and His Majesty's customs duly collected." It also stipulated that the port should not be opened until the inhabitants of Boston had made restitution to the East India Company for the destruction of its property. The Massachusetts Government Act practically reduced that province to the status of a Crown colony, and the Administration of Justice Act ordered that all persons indicted for murder or other capital crimes be sent to England or to some other colony for trial if the governor or his lieutenant thought that such persons could not obtain an unbiased trial in Massachusetts. A fourth measure, a new Quartering Act, provided that if ample barracks were not ready for troops within twenty-four hours after they had been ordered, the local authorities must find suitable quarters for them. Finally, the Quebec Act, though not a punitive measure, was extremely irritating to the colonists. It added to the Province of Quebec the great stretch of territory west of the Alleghenies and north of the Ohio to which several of the colonies laid claim, and provided that the whole province should be governed by Crown officials. In accordance with the previous practice among the French, there was to be no elected assembly, and therefore no privilege of self-taxation, and trials were to be without jury. Moreover, all Catholics were to enjoy complete religious toleration. As a further means of asserting Britain's authority and of "putting the rebels in their places," General Gage, commander in chief of the armed forces in America, was appointed Governor of Massachusetts, and four additional regiments were despatched to the disaffected New England area. It was generally believed in England that the colonists would not and could not resist. Hutchinson and some of the more conservative colonists entertained this opinion, and Gage himself informed George III that the Americans "will be Lyons whilst we are lambs but if we take the resolute part they will undoubtedly prove very meek."

The passage of the Intolerable Acts and the administrative measures taken for their enforcement widened and deepened the chasm of misunderstanding and hard feeling between the colonies and England. The North ministry, instead of adopting a conciliatory policy and sending a commission of inquiry to America to ascertain the exact state of affairs, chose to treat the colonies as dependencies whose citizens should be punished for disobeying the edicts of the mother country and for resorting to violence. The colonists, who had enjoyed a large degree of home rule for a hundred and fifty years, bitterly resented the North measures.

34. THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

ALTHOUGH the majority of the colonists condemned the passage of the^aIntolerable Acts, there was sharp division of opinion among them as to what course of action they should pursue. The more extreme radicals, bent on obtaining colonial self-government or even independence, advocated a strong retaliatory policy. Not only did they oppose any restitution to the East India Company, but they wanted the colonies to suspend all commercial intercourse with Great Britain and with the British and foreign West Indies. The conservatives, on the other hand, anxious to reach a peaceful understanding with the mother country and to avoid any move that would strengthen the radicals, hesitated to endorse the radical program.

In the midst of the heated discussion between the two factions a movement more or less spontaneously developed for an intercolonial congress to discuss the situation. On May 17, 1774, a Providence town meeting proposed such a congress and a few days later a similar suggestion came from the New York and Philadelphia committees of correspondence and from the Virginia House of Burgesses. Finally, on June 17, the Massachusetts assembly, at the instigation of Samuel Adams, invited the other colonies to send delegates to a Continental Congress to be held at Philadelphia the next September. The delegates, the invitation ran, were

to consult upon the present state of the colonies, and the miseries to which they are and must be reduced by the operation of certain acts of Parliament respecting America, and to deliberate and determine upon wise and proper measures to be by them recommended to all the colonies, for the recovery and establishment of their just rights and liberties, civil and religious, and the restoration of union and harmony between Great Britain and the colonies, most ardently desired by all good men.

The delegates, it was suggested, might be chosen by the colonial assemblies, by popularly elected conventions, or by committees of correspondence.

Realizing that the issue dividing them would in all probability be decided by the Congress, both radicals and conservatives sought to control its membership. Bitter contests therefore followed in each province. When the irregularly elected Congress assembled on September 5, all the colonies were represented except Georgia, where the royal Governor had prevented the selection of delegates. Of the fifty-six delegates who eventually appeared, only eleven were merchants. More than

two thirds were lawyers, but many of these derived a large part of their income from agriculture. Many, especially those from the Southern colonies, were among the ablest men in America. Most important of all, although every shade of opinion in the colonies was represented, the radicals were in control.

The first test of strength between the antagonistic groups came on the opening day; the Congress declined the invitation of Joseph Galloway, a wealthy Pennsylvanian and leader of the conservatives, to meet in the state house and voted to hold its sessions in Carpenter's Hall, to the great satisfaction of "the mechanics and citizens in general." The radicals scored a second victory by securing the election of Charles Thomson as secretary despite the fact that Galloway deemed him "one of the most violent Sons of Liberty (so-called) in America."

These radical victories were of minor consequence in comparison with the endorsement of the Suffolk Resolves, obtained by the radicals on September 17. Adopted a few days before by Suffolk County, Massachusetts, the Resolves declared in bold language that the Intolerable Acts were unconstitutional and void and that the government of Massachusetts, as then established, was illegal. The people of the province were advised to organize their own civil government to which they should pay all taxes, to raise troops for defense, and to suspend all commercial intercourse with Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies. Alarmed at this action, which they asserted was nothing short of a "complete declaration of war," the conservatives submitted a plan prepared by Galloway for a new form of union between the colonies and the mother country. This plan, which became the platform of the conservatives, provided for a Crown-appointed president-general and a council of deputies chosen every three years by the colonial legislatures. Parliament might veto acts of the council, and acts of Parliament relating to the colonies might, in turn, be vetoed by the council. Although the plan was supported by John Jay and James Duane of New York and by other conservatives, the radicals just managed to defeat it. "Measures of independence and sedition," Galloway said long afterward, "were . . . preferred to those of harmony and liberty."

The rejection by the radicals of the conciliatory conservative plan did not prevent the two factions from agreeing to the Declaration of American Rights. Adopted on October 14, this manifesto declared that Parliament had imposed unjust taxes on the colonies, had burdened them with standing armies in times of peace, had dissolved their assemblies, and had treated their petitions for redress with contempt. The Intolerable Acts were characterized as "impolitic, unjust, and cruel, as well as unconstitutional." The colonists, the Congress asserted, were "entitled to life, liberty, and property and . . . had never ceded to any foreign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without their

consent." Inasmuch as they were not represented in the British Parliament, they were "entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures where their right of representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal policy. . . ." These ideas were embodied in addresses to the King, the British people, and the inhabitants of the Province of Quebec.

But the radicals wanted something more than declarations and petitions. Accordingly, they succeeded after a hard struggle in pushing through a scheme known as the Association—a nonimportation, nonconsumption, nonexportation agreement. Beginning December 1, 1774, no goods of any description were to be imported from the British Isles, directly or indirectly; if this failed to bring redress, then all exportation of colonial goods to Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies was to cease September 10, 1775. "Utmost endeavors" were to be made to meet the economic difficulties that were bound to follow. Agriculture, particularly the breeding of sheep, was to be stimulated. Local arts and manufactures were to be encouraged and profiteering forbidden. Extravagance and dissipation, "especially all horseracing, and all kinds of gaming, cockfighting, exhibitions of shows, plays, and other expensive diversions and entertainments," were to be discouraged. Even the luxury of mourning was to be curtailed as in the days of 1765–6.

Because the Congress had been chosen in a highly irregular manner, it was an extralegal body that could not give legal sanction to its acts. Nevertheless, the radicals decreed that the Association covenant applied, not just to its signers, but to all the colonists, and it provided for committees of "safety and inspection" in every county, city, and town, to be chosen by those qualified to vote for representatives in the colonial legislatures. The committees were to enforce the Association covenant by boycotting and branding as an enemy of American liberties any one who dared violate its provisions. They were to seize, and either store or sell, all imported goods. If necessary, an entire province might be boycotted.

The conservatives fully realized the revolutionary character of the Association. Merchants asked why they should be compelled to sacrifice their trade for the benefit of farmers and mechanics and "designing" men of the stamp of Samuel Adams. Not a few declared that the conservative members of the Congress had been outwitted and outmaneuvered by the radicals. "You had all the honors," wrote one, "you had all the leading cards in every suit in your own hands, and yet, astonishing as it may appear to by-standers, you suffered sharpers to get the odd trick." In New York and Connecticut, the conservatives held protest meetings and adopted resolutions derogatory to both Congress and the Association.

But protest was useless, for the radical movement was too strong to

check. Between November, 1774, and the following June one after another of the colonies approved the work of the Congress; some ratified the Association unanimously. Enforcement machinery was quickly set up in every colony but Georgia, and most of the committees were composed of radicals. According to the conservatives the New York, Philadelphia, and Boston committees were made up of "nobodies" and "unimportant persons," and Governor Wright of South Carolina declared that the Savannah committee was merely "a Parcel of the Lowest People, Chiefly Carpenters, Shoemakers, Blacksmiths, &c." But the committees, even though composed of the rank and file, functioned well, and the Association was vigorously enforced. English imports fell from £562,476 in 1774 to £71,625 in 1775 in the New England colonies; from £437,937 to £1,228 in New York; from £625,652 to £1,366 in Pennsylvania; from £528,738 to £1,921 in Maryland and Virginia; and from £378,116 to £6,245 in the Carolinas. In all the colonies, import trade from England in 1775 declined almost 97 per cent in comparison with the preceding year. English businessmen with financial interests in America bombarded Parliament and the British ministry with petitions demanding the repeal of the legislation of 1774.

But Lord North and his followers were in no mood to listen to petitions and declarations. The colonists, they asserted, by refusing to obey the laws of Parliament and by creating revolutionary agencies such as the Association, had openly rebelled. And open rebellion must be suppressed, even though it worked hardship for the time being on the British merchant and manufacturer. "An enemy in the bowels of a Kingdom," said Solicitor General Wedderburn to the House of Commons, "is surely to be resisted, opposed, and conquered; notwithstanding the trade that may suffer, and the fabrics that may be ruined." Even the eloquence and arguments of Pitt and Burke, both of whom urged the repeal of the Intolerable Acts and the adoption of a conciliatory policy, were largely in vain. Pitt warned the House of Lords:

Every motive of justice and of policy, of dignity and of prudence urges you to allay the ferment in America; by the removal of your troops from Boston, by a repeal of your Acts of Parliament, and by a display of amicable disposition towards your colonies. On the other hand, every danger and every hazard impend to deter you from perseverance in your present ruinous course. Foreign war hanging over your head—by a slight and brittle thread; France and Spain watching your conduct and waiting for the maturity of your errors, with a vigilant eye to America and the temper of your colonies.

But the British conservatives refused to heed this advice. Lord North, it is true, sponsored a set of "conciliatory resolutions" (February 27,

1775) that offered to relieve from Parliamentary taxation any colony that would assume its share of imperial defense and make provision for the support of local officers of the Crown. This plan, however, was nullified by an address to the King assuring him of support in suppressing the rebellion and by the Restraining Act of March 30, 1775, which was designed to destroy the commerce of New England. By the terms of this act the people of New England were cut off from the northern fisheries, and their trade was confined to Great Britain, Ireland, and the British West Indies until "the trade and commerce of His Majesty's subjects may be carried on without interruption." Less than a month later the act was extended to New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina. Thus, wittingly or unwittingly, British conservatives co-operated with colonial radicals in closing the door against conciliation.

While Parliament was listening to the entreaties of Pitt and Burke and adding to its coercive measures, the radicals were busy strengthening their organization, enforcing the Association, stirring up a spirit of resistance among the people, drilling troops, gathering military supplies, and gaining a firmer foothold in the existing provincial governments or setting up governments of their own. The conservatives, defeated and bewildered, were on the defensive, and the moderates, without organization or program, did not know which way to turn. With extremists in control on both sides of the Atlantic, each determined to coerce the other, armed warfare seemed inevitable.

35. INDEPENDENCE

THE FIRST blow was struck on April 19, 1775, when General Gage, military Governor of Massachusetts, attempted to arrest two of the radical leaders, Samuel Adams and John Hancock, and to destroy military supplies that the radicals had collected at Concord. Paul Revere and William Dawes warned the countryside of Gage's intended action, and the colonial "minutemen" exchanged shots with the British regulars at Lexington and Concord. The British conservatives now became more resolute, and the radicals welcomed the additional fuel for propaganda. In every hamlet and town from Maine to Georgia, Gage and his British redcoats were represented as "massacrers of innocent people," "butcherers," and the agents of "tyrannous despoilers of liberty."

While these reports were being circulated, thousands of New England troops, collected for the most part by the radical committees appointed to enforce the Association, began to gather in Cambridge, just outside


of Boston. It was now evident that the extremists, especially those of New England, were determined to supplement peaceful coercion with military force and that they would make every effort to gain support from the Second Continental Congress, which was to assemble at Philadelphia on May 10, 1775.

Similar to its predecessor in the irregularity of its election and in the fact that it included all shades of opinion, the new Congress was nevertheless much more radical in membership. There were a few out-and-out conservatives, but these had no leader of the caliber of Joseph Galloway. Nearly all the delegates had had some political experience, either in their local communities or in their colonial legislatures. Among them were a large majority of those destined to be the outstanding leaders of the Revolution. With the election of John Hancock as president it was evident at the outset that the radicals were in control. But the more extreme leaders were compelled to proceed slowly, for the conservatives, though outnumbered, strenuously opposed every move away from conciliation and in the direction of independence. "Every important step," wrote John Adams, "was opposed and carried by bare majorities." It was largely because the conservatives were convinced that pressure of public opinion together with commercial coercion would force the British authorities to yield that the Congress shortly after convening again petitioned the King for a redress of grievances. But the move was in vain, and the Congress moved steadily in the direction of civil war and independence. Lord North's offer of peace was rejected on the grounds that the Intolerable Acts had not been repealed and that Parliament had not renounced its right to tax the colonies. Steps were taken to raise and equip an army, Washington was appointed commander in chief, and plans were made to encourage privateering, to establish a fleet, to protect the frontiers, to secure alliances with the Indians, to enforce more strictly the Association, to secure assistance of outsiders, particularly England's European rivals, and to establish a system of currency and credit and a national postal system.

Outside the Congress the idea of absolute independence spread rapidly. Strengthened by the course of events in both Great Britain and America and impatient of halfway measures, the radicals employed every means at their disposal to advance the scheme of complete separation. Conservative apologists, who never tired of emphasizing the necessity for loyalty to the mother country, were smothered by radical pamphleteers.

Most effective of these pamphleteers—more influential, even, than Samuel Adams—was Thomas Paine. Born in England of Quaker parentage, Paine was in his thirty-seventh year when he first set foot on American soil in December, 1774. Already branded a social misfit and an enemy of all things aristocratic and monarchical, he threw himself

wholeheartedly into the colonial dispute. In January, 1776—thirteen months after his arrival—he published his famous pamphlet *Common Sense*, in which he set forth the economic and political arguments for complete independence. Sweeping aside legal questions, he based his principal argument on economic considerations. Government, he asserted, was merely a means to an end, and governmental policies always rested squarely on economic foundations. Whether the colonies ought to remain a part of the British Empire or not should be determined, not on the basis of legal or constitutional precedents, but on the ground of its economic advantage or disadvantage. He maintained, with some



JOIN or DIE

JOIN OR DIE

The snake device shown here was the invention of Benjamin Franklin at the time of the Albany Congress (1754), when he urged the colonies to form a union for their common defense. It was a common newspaper heading during 1776.

disregard for fact, that the colonies had from the first suffered economically and that whatever prosperity they enjoyed had been won in spite of English hostility and English exploitation. England had never shown generosity in its dealings with the colonies and instead of helping them had hampered their development by restrictions. "As Europe is our market for trade, we ought to form no partial connection with any part of it," he said. "It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European connections, which she never can do while by her dependence on Britain she is made the makeweight in the scale of British politics." It was nonsense to assume that England was the mother of the colonies: "Europe and not England is the parent country of America. This new world hath been the Asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of Europe. Hither they have fled, not from the tender embraces of the mother but from the cruelty of the monster." It was absurd that an island three thousand miles away should

control a continent. The Crown and all that it symbolized he also criticized; the king could only make war and give away places. "A pretty business, indeed, for a man to be allowed eight hundred thousand sterling a year for, and worshipped into the bargain! Of more worth is one honest man to society, and in the sight of God, than all the crowned ruffians that ever lived." The colonies, he concluded, should abandon their petitions and their expressions of loyalty and formally declare their independence.

That the work of Paine and other radical pamphleteers, the news of the Restraining Act, and the numerous military encounters between the British and the colonists were aiding the radical cause was soon made evident by the pronounced drift of public opinion in favor of independence during the early months of 1776. Nowhere, perhaps, was this tendency more apparent than in the action of the provincial assemblies. As early as 1774, all the colonies except New York and Georgia, where the conservatives were strongly entrenched, had laid the foundations for complete revolutionary governments in the form of provincial congresses, conventions, or conferences. By the autumn of 1775 the old colonial governments had in large measure disappeared, and revolutionary governments had come to power. Though usually controlled by the radicals, these new governments did not immediately decide for complete independence. The five Middle colonies specifically instructed their delegates to the Second Continental Congress to oppose any move in the direction of independence, and as late as January, 1776, not more than a third of the members of the Congress were willing to vote for a definite break with England. By the spring of 1776, however, the tide was flowing strongly in the opposite direction. Massachusetts led the way by informing her delegates at Philadelphia that she was in favor of independence. In April, North Carolina explicitly approved such a step, and a month later Virginia instructed her representatives in the Congress to propose it. One after another the several colonies fell into line until by the end of June even the more reluctant had given their consent.

Only a semblance of the old governmental regime remained, and sentiment in favor of separation was strong and daily growing stronger. Radicals both in and out of Congress declared that the hour had come to break completely with Britain, and on June 7, Richard Henry Lee moved on behalf of the Virginia delegation that "these united colonies are, and of right ought to be free and independent states," that a plan of confederation be prepared, and that effectual measures be taken to secure foreign alliances. John Adams, in seconding the motion, argued for an immediate declaration. But the conservatives and even some of the moderates held back. The people, they asserted, had not yet demanded such a measure, and the Middle colonies "were not yet ripe

for bidding adieu to British connection." After considerable debate final decision on the question was postponed for three weeks, and a committee consisting of four radicals, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Roger Sherman, and one moderate, Robert R. Livingston, was appointed to prepare a formal declaration. When the motion was again brought before the Congress on July 1, nine colonies voted for it; Pennsylvania and South Carolina opposed it, the Delaware delegation was tied, and New York was excused from voting. On the following day, however, when the final vote was taken, all except New York cast their ballots in the affirmative. On July 4, the final draft of the declaration was formally adopted, although it was not signed until some weeks later.

Written under high emotional pressure and designed to win the support of liberals on both sides of the Atlantic, the Declaration of Independence consists of two principal parts: a preamble and a list of grievances. The preamble, an eloquent statement of the Lockian philosophy of natural rights, held as "self-evident truths" that

all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Of the list of grievances, the majority of which concerned George III, some were overstated, and others were difficult to prove. "The history of the present King of Great Britain," so ran the indictment, "is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states." By refusing to give his assent to laws passed by the colonial legislatures, by repeatedly dissolving representative bodies, and by obstructing the administration of justice, he had done all in his power to destroy local self-government. Moreover, he was charged with having "erected a multitude" of new offices in the colonies and of filling them with his henchmen, of quartering troops on the colonists, cutting off their commerce, arbitrarily imposing taxes on them, plundering and burning their towns, and murdering their people. Against such acts warnings, petitions, and remonstrances had been in vain and had been "answered only by repeated injury." "A prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people."

Three or four days after its formal adoption, the Declaration was publicly read in Philadelphia, and copies of it soon appeared in every community. Its publication marked the triumph of the radicals; and it put an end to any immediate prospect of adjustment and conciliation. In England those who favored the American cause were powerless to effect any change in the policy of the Administration; and in America the radicals wanted no conciliation. To the moderates, who had desired some sort of a compromise, the adoption and publication of the Declaration was tragic, for it forced them to choose between the radicals and the conservatives—between those who would establish a new order, and those who would remain within the fold of the British Empire. Outwardly at least one had to be either a Patriot or a Loyalist—and each was a traitor in the eyes of the other.

CHAPTER VII

REVOLUTION

- 36. CIVIL WAR
 - 37. WAR FINANCES
 - 38. PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS
 - 39. VICTORY AND PEACE
 - 40. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN WARTIME
 - 41. INTERNAL REVOLUTION
-

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION was a double struggle. On the one hand, it was a rebellion against imperial authority; on the other, it was a conflict between two parties or groups—Patriots and Loyalists. Although the issues in both struggles were never altogether clear to all the participants, the importance of these issues in the perspective of history cannot be exaggerated. The Revolution not only ended British sovereignty over the thirteen colonies, but it was also attended by a series of fundamental and far-reaching changes in American social, economic, and political life.

36. CIVIL WAR

COLONIAL America on the eve of the Revolution was composed of three diverse geographical areas: the commercial North, extending from the port towns of Maine to the Chesapeake; the tide-water region from Maryland to Georgia; and the rather indefinite frontier stretching from Canada southward, bounded on the east by the older settled districts and on the west by the Alleghenies. In the commercial North, by far the greater part of the population was com-

posed of small tradesmen, mechanics, and yeoman farmers. Socially, economically, and politically they ranked beneath the ruling merchant class. They were individualistic, ignorant, and narrow-minded. Franchise qualifications limited their participation in governmental affairs. In comparison with the great landholders and the merchants to whom they were usually in debt, they owned little property. Toward them, both the English official and the wealthy colonist assumed a snobbish attitude. Cadwallader Colden of New York was not far wrong when in 1765 he declared that they were "the most useful and the most moral, but allwise . . . the dupes" of the wealthier classes. Yet they more or less enthusiastically supported the Revolution in the hope that they might destroy the social, economic, and political grip both of England and of the ruling colonial group.

For the wealthy and conservative merchants, who had long dominated the commercial provinces, the question of supporting the Revolution was both perplexing and crucial. On the one hand, they feared that independence might lead to the establishment of a radical regime that would undermine their position and that complete separation from the Empire might seriously interfere with their customary trade operations. On the other hand, pressures of environment and a large measure of economic freedom had developed in them a spirit of home rule that had been severely jolted by the British policy in effect since 1763. Moreover, many of them undoubtedly realized that opposition to the Revolution might mean business failure, ostracism, imprisonment, confiscation of their wealth, and even banishment. Finally, the radical propaganda that independence would materially benefit the merchant as well as other men of means was not without its effect. One writer declared that independence would probably mean "a free and unlimited trade; a great accession of wealth; and a proportionate rise in the value of land; the establishment, gradual improvement, and perfection of manufactures and science; a vast influx of foreigners . . . ; an astonishing increase of our people from the present stock." Another wrote:

Some think they say everything against a state of independence by crying out that in a state of independence we enjoyed the protection of Great Britain. . . . But do we not pay dearly for this protection? The restriction of our trade alone is worth ten times the protection, besides the sums we pay in customs and other duties to the amount of more than a million annually. The customs of the port of London alone are worth £2,000,000 per annum. Let us for once suppose an independency, that we may observe the consequence. We should then trade with every nation that would trade with us. . . . Suppose we were attacked by some foreign power in

this State of independency, for this is bugbear: what then? The nation that would be fool enough to do it would raise a hornet's nest about its ears. Every nation which enjoyed a share of our trade would be guarantee for the peaceable behaviour and good conduct of its neighbors. . . . To ask what we should do for fleets to protect our trade, is as absurd as to ask if timber grows in America. . . . Our trade will protect itself. It will never be the interest of any nation to disturb our trade while we trade freely with it, and it will ever be our interest to trade freely with all nations. As long as the wide Atlantic Ocean rolls between us and Europe, so long will we be free from foreign subjection were we once clear of Great Britain.

In the tidewater region, long controlled by the aristocratic planters, the question of complete independence led to sharp divisions. In Georgia a majority opposed the movement, for the colony was little affected by the new imperial policy of the mother country and was still dependent on the home government for subsidies and protection against the Indians. In South Carolina more than half the people were opposed to creating an untried and, as they thought, radical democracy. Virginia, on the other hand, socially and religiously more akin to England than any of the other colonies, was, like New England, a Patriot stronghold. The Lees and Washingtons and other Virginians like them, who imitated the manners and tastes of the English nobility and who educated their sons in English universities and supported the Anglican Church, nevertheless joined with the radicals of the commercial provinces and the frontiersmen in the revolt against England. In debt to the merchants of England, prevented from taking up new land beyond the Proclamation Line of 1763, and opposed to English financial policies in the colonies, most tidewater planters saw little economic advantage in remaining within the Empire. Furthermore, they could look back on a long and acrimonious political struggle with the royal representatives in their own colony. Although with a few notable exceptions the planters had little use for democracy, they had already proved their awareness of their interests as colonists and their willingness to defend these interests.

The merchant class in the tidewater region, small in comparison with that of the commercial provinces and composed for the most part of factors and agents for British trading houses, opposed the Revolution. This class had nothing in common with the Northern radicals; the Continental Association was injurious to its business, and England's commercial policy, which the Northern provinces had attempted to break down, was beneficial to it. Consequently, the radicals made no effort

to win its support, but concentrated instead upon convincing the planters that complete independence would free them from the financial grip of the factors and the British mercantile houses.

Many—but not all—frontiersmen not only favored the American cause but gave it impetus. By training and environment they were democratic. Nearly all were Dissenters, and no social or economic tie bound them to England. Like the voteless mechanics and artisans of the older settled regions, they resented the social, economic, and political domination of the seaboard aristocracy, whether merchants, clergy, or professional men of New England, the Quaker oligarchy of Philadelphia, holders of manors on the Hudson, or tobacco and rice planters of tidewater Virginia.

Despite widespread opposition to English policies, the majority of the colonists did not consistently support the Revolution. In John Adams' opinion not more than one third of the people opposed it at any time. On the other hand, Joseph Galloway, Tory exile from Pennsylvania, in testifying before a parliamentary committee in 1779 declared that at the beginning of the struggle less than one fifth of the entire colonial population favored independence and that even after three years more than four fifths of the colonists favored union with Great Britain "upon constitutional principles," rather than independence. Both Adams and Galloway probably exaggerated, for both were biased. Moreover, they failed to take into account that opinion was easily swayed by the fortunes of war. Lecky, the English historian, was probably much nearer the truth when he stated that "the American Revolution, like most others, was the work of an energetic minority who succeeded in committing an undecided and fluctuating majority to courses for which they had little love, and leading them step by step to a position from which it was impossible to recede."

If the actual number of active supporters of the movement at any particular time was not large, it was not the fault of the more radical Patriots. From first to last they worked almost incessantly for the American cause. From pen and printing press came hundreds of pamphlets, letters, newspaper articles, and cartoons, all calculated to inform, encourage, and inspire. Even the pulpit played its part, for Patriot preachers denounced "British oppression" and sought to advance the cause of independence.

The few that pretend to preach [complained the Tory diarist, Nicholas Cresswell] are mere retailers of politics, sowers of sedition and rebellion, who serve to blow the coal of discord and excite the people to arms. The Presbyterian clergy are particularly active in supporting the measures of Congress from the rostrum, gaining proselytes, persecuting the unbelievers, preaching up the righteous-

ness of their cause, and persuading the unthinking populace of the infallibility of success!

But many colonists could not be persuaded, either by propaganda or threats, to forsake their loyalty to Great Britain. Included in the Tory or Loyalist ranks were great landowners such as the Van Cortlandts, Crugers, De Lanceys, De Peysters, Jessups, and Philipses of New York; rich merchants like the Whartons, Penningtons, and Pembertons of Philadelphia, and the Higginsons, Chandlers, and Hutchinsons of Boston; large numbers of professional men—lawyers, physicians, and college authorities; many prosperous farmers; the majority of Crown officials; almost all of the Anglican clergymen; those who aped the English aristocracy and who for one reason or another hated radicalism; and from the lower ranks of society some of those who depended on Loyalist merchants or landowners for a livelihood. In all probability the Loyalists comprised at least one third of the entire population of the thirteen colonies; in three—New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—they were in the majority. Many Loyalists suffered from the arbitrary acts of Parliament and were as anxious for reform as the most ardent Patriot, but they insisted that whatever the wrongs, they should be righted by petition and compromise, not by violence and mob rule. In the opinion of the Loyalists the Revolution was a conspiracy and the conspirators, in the words of one of the Loyalist leaders, “an infernal, dark-designing group of men . . . obscure, pettifogging attorneys, bankrupt shopkeepers, outlawed smugglers, . . . wretched banditti, . . . the refuse and dregs of mankind.”

Against the Loyalists, who lacked both the organization and aggressiveness of the Revolutionists, the Patriots waged warfare that was even more bitter and relentless than that carried on against Great Britain. During the conflict, great numbers of Loyalists enlisted in the royal forces or organized militia companies of their own under commissions from the Crown. New York alone furnished fifteen thousand men. Much to the disappointment of the British authorities, however, their military service was not commensurate with their numerical strength; their only outstanding exploits were the expedition against the coast towns of Connecticut that burned Fairfield and Norwalk and their cooperation with the Indians in the Wyoming and Cherry Valley massacres. In addition, many Loyalist privateers attacked Patriot shipping.

Those Loyalists not under the immediate protection of the British armies suffered considerable hardship. Even before the Declaration of Independence was signed, revolutionary committees in every colony were warning the Loyalists to be quiet, depriving them of their arms, and compelling them to adhere to the Association. As the struggle progressed and it became evident that some of the Loyalists could not



be intimidated or coerced into supporting the Patriot cause, the Revolutionists resorted to more drastic measures. All who refused to take an oath of allegiance were denied the rights of citizenship; they could neither vote, hold office, nor enjoy court protection. In many cases they were forbidden to pursue their professions or to acquire or dispose of property. Free speech was denied them, and they were forbidden to travel or to trade with the British armies. When many of these laws failed to accomplish their purpose, the more ardent Loyalists were jailed, sent to detention camps, banished, tarred and feathered, or even put to death.

37. WAR FINANCES

FACED with the opposition of both the Loyalists and the imperial government and without an army or navy, a national treasury, or even a well-organized central government, the Patriots at the outset were confronted with overwhelming obstacles. Each of the thirteen states not only regarded itself as absolutely independent, but was jealous both of its sister states and of the Continental Congress. Each was more concerned with its own civil and military problems than with those growing out of the common cause. Within each there was often lack of unanimity, even among the Patriots.

Of all the troubles with which the inexperienced Continental Congress had to contend, none perhaps was more perplexing than the raising of money. Created in an emergency and regarded merely as the instrument of thirteen sovereign states, the Continental Congress did not have the power to tax. Consequently, it was compelled to resort to other sources to secure the revenue necessary for carrying on the many activities connected with the war. By far the most productive of these expedients was paper money. Less than a week after the battle of Bunker Hill Congress authorized an issue of \$2,000,000 in paper money. Before the end of 1779, when Congress voted to limit the amount of bills in circulation to not more than \$200,000,000, forty issues totaling \$241,552,780 had been authorized. To the Continental issues the several states added \$209,524,776 in paper notes, making a total of more than \$450,000,000. Nearly all the paper put out by the states was issued by Virginia and the Carolinas. Both the state and Continental notes were frequently counterfeited by the English and Americans, although the Congress and the states repeatedly took steps to suppress counterfeiting.

As Congress did not have the power to tax, it could neither redeem the Continental notes nor declare them legal tender. Accordingly, it recommended that they be redeemed by the states on a basis of popu-



CONTINENTAL MONEY

To meet the shortage of currency with which to finance the Revolution, the Continental Congress issued bills of credit—the famous Continental currency shown here. Because of the failure to redeem these bills at the times fixed, they depreciated, and by 1780 they were worth only one fortieth of their face value. Within a year Continental money ceased to pass as currency; “not worth a Continental” became a by-word to mean that a person or thing was worthless. Only a limited number of coins were minted.

lation and that the several states enact the necessary legislation to make them legal tender for all debts. It did, however, go so far as to resolve that if any person should “be so lost to all virtue and regard for his country” as to refuse to accept the notes, he should be “deemed an enemy of his country.” The states made the notes legal tender but paid little attention to the proposals for redemption. In 1780, Congress rec-

ommended that the Continental paper money already issued be exchanged for new, five year, interest-bearing notes redeemable in specie. Under this law a repudiation of 80 per cent of the value of the paper money issued was effected. Under the Funding Act of 1790, the old notes were accepted in payment for government bonds at the rate of one hundred to one. Only \$6,000,000 of the estimated \$78,000,000 outstanding was received; the rest were probably lost or destroyed.

Since the value of the unsecured notes rested wholly upon the success of the Patriot cause and the willingness of the states to redeem them, it inevitably depreciated. By January, 1781, it took \$100 in paper to acquire \$1 in silver; less than six months later the paper was practically worthless and had all but ceased to pass as currency. Prices rose, and many persons were unable to pay their debts. In 1781 a pair of shoes cost \$100 in paper money, a bushel of corn \$40, a pound of tea \$90, and a barrel of flour \$1,575. Speculators attempted to control the market by purchase of the available supply or else by buying up the goods before they reached the market. "One great reason," resolved a Boston town meeting in 1778, "of the present Excessive Price of Provisions in this Town arises from the Avarice, Injustice, and Inhumanity of certain Persons within Twenty Miles of it, who purchase great Part of the same as Farmers living at a greater Distance and put an exorbitant Advance upon it." In some states monopolizers and engrossers were not only denounced but fined and imprisoned. At the suggestion of Congress attempts were made to fix the price of both labor and commodities, but generally speaking they were ineffectual.

In its desperate effort to secure funds, Congress also resorted to requisitions. This method, however, was little more successful than when employed by Great Britain in earlier times. The four requisitions between November, 1777, and October, 1779, for a total of \$95,000,000 in paper money yielded only \$54,667,000, which in specie was equivalent to \$1,856,000. The three specie requisitions of August, 1780, November, 1780, and March, 1781, for a total of about \$10,643,000 brought returns of only \$1,592,222. The net revenue obtained from all the requests upon the states for money up to January 1, 1784, was only \$5,795,000 in specie. Each state, ignorant or indifferent to the facts, insisted that it had paid more than its share, or at least was afraid that it might do so. Congress also resorted in 1780 to requisitioning commodities and called upon the states for corn, flour, beef, pork, hay, and other supplies. In return for these the army quartermasters issued certificates. It has been estimated that the value of these certificates in gold specie totaled \$16,708,000. Although considerable quantities of supplies were obtained by this means, the system was both wasteful and inefficient. Grain and flour, for example, spoiled for lack of money to transport them. Often when horses and wagons were requisitioned, the owners

would hide their horses and render their wagons useless by removing a wheel or some other indispensable part. The method of requisitioning supplies, Washington informed Congress, was the "most uncertain, expensive, and injurious that could be devised."

The floating of domestic and foreign loans constituted still another device used by Congress to secure funds. Indented certificates, similar to modern coupon bonds, in denominations ranging from \$300 to \$1,000 and bearing from 4 to 6 per cent interest were disposed of in each of the states through loan offices. Between \$60,000,000 and \$70,000,000 in paper was subscribed, which in specie was worth approximately \$7,500,000. In addition to the loan office certificates, certificates were issued by quartermasters and other military officers and agents for food, clothing, horses, wagons, and other necessities for the army. Alexander Hamilton, first Secretary of the Treasury, estimated that these obligations outstanding in 1790 totaled \$16,708,000. Short-term loans for small amounts were also obtained during the closing years of the war from the new Bank of North America. The foreign loans, though less in face value than the domestic, were in all probability more than equal in specie value to all the coupon-bearing certificates sold at home. During the first years of the war small government subsidies were secured from France and Spain. Beginning in 1777, these were supplemented by government loans. Private Dutch bankers were also induced to lend more than \$1,000,000 during the last years of the struggle, when victory for the Patriot cause was assured. Most of the money obtained from the foreign loans was used to purchase supplies in the Old World. Some of it, however, reached this side of the Atlantic; one installment from France was used to pay interest on the domestic loans, and another, to furnish the specie necessary for the founding of the Bank of North America.

The fiscal machinery set up by Congress during the Revolution invited chaos. Persistent jealousies in the Congress and among the states and fear of centralized authority prevented the establishment of an independent treasury until the Revolution was almost over. At the outset, Congress experimented with two treasurers, both appointed by majority vote, one to receive and the other to pay out the public funds. This arrangement soon gave way to a financial committee of thirteen congressional delegates, which in turn was supplemented in 1776 by a treasury board of five members. Three years later this treasury board was supplanted by a new one of five members, three of whom could not be congressional delegates. Finally, early in 1781, Congress abolished this board and provided for a superintendent of finance. For this position it chose Robert Morris, an experienced Philadelphia merchant and financier.

On paper, Morris was given wide powers, but state pride, jealousy,

and bickering made his job exceedingly difficult. For three years he endeavored to increase the requisitions from the states, to put new life into the loan policy, both domestic and foreign, to create a national revenue, and to place the currency of the country on a specie basis. Discouraged with the results of his labors and by the many charges that he was using his office to further his private interest, Morris resigned in 1783. Whether he was guilty of irregularities in his accounts and of speculating with public funds—two of the most serious charges leveled against him—is still a matter of dispute. Morris himself denied the accusations, which he answered in detail. His friends also asserted his innocence. Others, including those who have investigated the matter, believe that he knowingly allowed his private interests to become entangled with public affairs and that he was not impartially devoted to the welfare of the public. Be that as it may, one thing seems certain: Morris did vastly more than had previously been done to bring order out of chaos.

38. PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS

THE MANNER in which the Second Continental Congress handled the finances of the Revolution was characteristic of the way it dealt with every other phase of the struggle. From first to last its evident lack of experience, authority, and ability to get things done was manifest. During the first years of the conflict the Congress underrated British strength and assumed that Great Britain would yield rather than engage in a fight to a finish. But Britain had no intention of yielding. At the outset her military leaders reasoned that, since New England was the center of rebellion, they would isolate it by sending expeditions up from New York along the Hudson and down from Canada by way of Lake Champlain and then crush it with an army operating from Boston. But this plan was given up as impossible of execution and was succeeded by another; British naval forces were to occupy and bottle up all the principal colonial ports and use them as centers from which to destroy colonial shipping. But this plan was in turn abandoned in favor of a scheme for occupying colonies like New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, where the Loyalists were numerically strong.

The colonists were almost completely unprepared to meet these plans. Without a seasoned army or the means of supporting one and fearful lest a powerful armed force might mean military dictatorship, they were nevertheless virtually compelled by circumstances to transform the motley array that had rushed to besiege the British in Boston into the Continental army with Washington as commander in chief. A

few months later the Continental Congress advised the states to enroll in the militia all able-bodied men between sixteen and fifty. The enormous size of Washington's task can hardly be imagined. The supply of arms and ammunition was scarce, and the men were undisciplined and inclined to desert. "Such a dearth of public spirit, and want of virtue, such stock-jobbing, and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind and another, . . . I never saw before, and pray God I may never be witness to again," wrote Washington. "Such a dirty, mercenary spirit pervades the whole I should not be at all surprised at any disaster that may happen." In February, 1776, when he found that instead of 20,000 troops he had less than half that number, he urged Congress to abandon the militia and to create a national army, a step which that body took eight months later when it voted to raise 88 battalions totaling 63,000 men. Even then it was unable to secure recruits—despite the fact that it offered a bounty of £20 and 100 acres of land—and was obliged to "advise" the states to fill their quotas by draft. At no time did the army have ready for service more than a small part of its paper enrollment. And what was true of men was equally true of necessary equipment and supplies. Furthermore, by listening to Horatio Gates, Thomas Conway, Thomas Mifflin, and Charles Lee—all of whom wished to curb Washington's authority and perhaps oust him from command—and by establishing a military board of control, the Congress undoubtedly handicapped and embarrassed Washington in his movements.

The weakness of the Patriot army and the dilatoriness of Congress were reflected in the operations of 1776–7. General William Howe, after abandoning Boston, withdrew to Nova Scotia, where he organized and strengthened his forces for an attack on New York. But Washington, who anticipated Howe's strategy, moved his troops in April, 1776, to Brooklyn Heights on the western tip of Long Island. Three months later, Howe with approximately 33,000 soldiers—8,000 of whom were Hessians—occupied Staten Island. The British then crossed over to Long Island and defeated the Americans at the battle of Brooklyn Heights (August 27, 1776), and the Continentals were forced to withdraw to Harlem Heights in northern Manhattan.

Washington's success in averting a complete disaster after the defeat at Brooklyn Heights can be attributed in part to the British desire to achieve peace through negotiation rather than by military victory. Lord Richard Howe, General Howe's brother and in command of the British fleet in New York, had been sent to America with authority to conclude a generous settlement with the Patriots if they would abandon the fight. But when he offered these terms to John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Rutledge—who had been selected by Congress to confer with him—they rejected the proposal on the ground that they

could accept nothing less than complete independence. As the American demand went beyond Lord Howe's instructions, he refused it and the negotiations were concluded.

When Howe occupied New York City in September, 1776, Washington was compelled to withdraw across the Hudson River to New Jersey. The British soon followed and undoubtedly could have captured the Americans before they reached the Delaware if Howe had been willing to abandon his leisurely tactics for a more aggressive campaign. During the retreat across New Jersey, Washington repeatedly asked General Charles Lee for re-enforcements; but Lee, who had been given an independent command by Congress and hoped to supplant Washington, refused to co-operate. On December 13, Lee was captured by the British. A week earlier, Washington had ferried his troops safely across the Delaware, and within a month he was able to inflict two severe defeats on the British. On December 25, 1776, the Americans captured a thousand Hessians at Trenton, and on January 3, 1777, they achieved an even more brilliant victory at Princeton. Following the Trenton-Princeton campaign, the British returned to New York, and Washington's troops went into winter quarters at Morristown, New Jersey.

The operations in New York City and New Jersey were paralleled by equally significant campaigns in Canada. As early as May, 1775, an expedition of Connecticut and Massachusetts troops under Ethan Allen had opened up the invasion route to Canada with the conquest of Forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point. In November of the same year a force of Continentals under Richard Montgomery occupied Montreal, and Benedict Arnold led still another expedition across Maine to Quebec. But Arnold could not take Quebec, and even after he had been joined by Montgomery's troops, the combined forces were unable to capture it. In June, 1776, after repeated failures and the death of Montgomery, the Americans withdrew and the British began to formulate a plan for a counteroffensive that would crush resistance in the Northern states. This plan, which was drawn up in London by Lord George Germain, called for the junction of three British forces in the vicinity of Albany. General John Burgoyne was to lead one army southward from Canada, Lieutenant-Colonel Barry St. Leger was to attack with another through the Mohawk Valley, and Howe was to send part of his troops up the Hudson from New York while using the remainder to conquer Philadelphia.

From the outset the British plan was mismanaged. Howe, instead of co-operating with Burgoyne, set sail for Philadelphia. Howe's decision to go by sea rather than land gave Washington ample opportunity to place himself between Philadelphia and the British, who had disembarked at Elkton, Maryland. On September 11, 1777, the Americans,

who were hopelessly outnumbered, were able to check—but not halt—the British advance at the battle of Brandywine. Two weeks later Howe occupied Philadelphia. Following an American defeat at Germantown, the war entered a stalemate as Washington took up winter quarters at Valley Forge and Howe remained in Philadelphia. While the Continentals suffered untold hardships at Valley Forge, the British lived in luxury on the supplies that were sold to them by Americans in the vicinity.

The British campaigns in New York state, which were disrupted by Howe's removal to Philadelphia, were completely upset by the successful resistance of the American Patriots. St. Leger, after a severe defeat at Oriskany (August 3, 1777) by a band of German-Americans under General Nicholas Herkimer, withdrew to Canada when he heard that Benedict Arnold was advancing with re-enforcements. Only Burgoyne's force of 7,000 remained to threaten the American position in the North. After capturing Ticonderoga on July 6, 1777, Burgoyne reached Fort Edward on the Hudson at the end of the month. But a shortage of supplies delayed his advance, and it was not until early September that he was able to resume his march to the south. Meanwhile, the decisive defeat of a British foraging expedition by a band of Scotch-Irish militiamen under Colonel John Stark at Bennington, Vermont, had raised American hopes and enlistments; and when Burgoyne reached Saratoga, he was confronted by a formidable force of Patriots under General Horatio Gates. After two bloody battles (September 19 and October 7, 1777) at Freeman's farm, Burgoyne's army surrendered on October 17, 1777. The battle of Saratoga was an important turning point in the war, for it not only was a major setback for the British, but it also proved of immeasurable assistance to the Americans in their efforts to secure military and financial assistance from Britain's enemies in Europe.

39. VICTORY AND PEACE


LONG before the beginning of the war, men like Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, John Jay, and Thomas Jefferson, versed in the history of contemporary Europe, were fully aware of the old rivalry between Great Britain and the continental powers, particularly France, for the commercial and imperial supremacy of the world. They knew, for example, that France, remembering her defeat in the Seven Years' War and the loss of her American empire, was watching every opportunity for revenge. They knew too that Holland, France, and Spain

had long carried on a lucrative trade with the colonists and that these states would undoubtedly welcome any chance of increasing that trade at the expense of Britain. A few of the more far-sighted British leaders like Chatham also had these facts in mind and repeatedly warned their countrymen to take the Bourbon powers into consideration in their plans for coercing the colonies.


At the outset of the revolt, Congress created a secret committee to correspond and negotiate with foreign powers. Early in 1776 it despatched Silas Deane of Connecticut to Paris and a few months later sent Franklin and Arthur Lee to be his collaborators at the French Court. Subsequently it sent John Jay to Spain, John Adams to Holland, and other agents to the other leading European capitals. No aid was secured from Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, but the Bourbon states from the first co-operated with the American envoys. American ships were sheltered in their ports, where their cargoes were disposed of and the vessels reloaded with manufactured goods. In a single year the Spanish firm of Gardoqui and Sons shipped to the Americans at the expense of its government 11,000 pairs of shoes, 18,000 blankets, 41,000 pairs of stockings, and great quantities of shirting, tent cloth, and medicines. In France, Beaumarchais—author, publisher, courtier, musician, ship-owner, manufacturer, and financier—acted as go-between for the struggling rebels and his government; and under his direction an almost steady stream of supplies destined for America poured out of French ports in spite of British protests.

The American representatives desired something more than funds and supplies, however; they wanted an alliance that would bring armed assistance. France was their one likely prospect, and on France Americans centered their efforts. For a time the French government, despite the efforts of Franklin and the pressure of French sentimentalists like Beaumarchais, was unwilling to support the revolutionists openly. France was not in sympathy with the philosophy back of the American revolt; her finances were sadly disordered; and she knew that open recognition would mean war with England. Besides, the progress of American arms was far from promising. The surrender of Burgoyne, however, radically altered French opinion, and on February 6, 1778, treaties of alliance and commerce were signed; France recognized the independence of the United States and openly declared war on Great Britain. Spain, fearing that the revolution of the English provinces would set a bad example for her own colonies, refused to ally with the Americans. But her desire to strike a blow at England in retaliation for despoiling her treasure ships, violating her commercial codes, and taking Gibraltar caused her to enter the struggle on the side of France in 1779. In 1780 the Dutch became a party to the conflict. Motivated by the desire to increase their trade at England's expense, they had from

A PAGE FROM THE
MOLASSES ACT, 1733

ILLUSTRATIONS FROM *The New York Public Library*

THE TITLE PAGE OF
THOMAS PAINE'S *Common Sense*



THE TITLE PAGE OF THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

The New York Public Library

the outset been friendly to the Americans, furnishing them ammunition and other supplies on credit or in exchange for tobacco. Great Britain accordingly declared war on Holland in 1780.

The French signalized their entry into the American war by dispatching several regiments and a fleet under the Comte D'Estaing, and the British, realizing that the conflict was rapidly developing into a general European war, quickly readjusted their policies. Commissioners were sent to America with still another peace proposal; but when the Americans, who recognized the significance of the French alliance as fully as did the English, rejected the offer, the British attempted decisive military steps. Howe was replaced by Sir Henry Clinton, who was instructed to evacuate Philadelphia, attack the French in the West Indies, devastate the coast of New England, and center his operations at New York. When Clinton withdrew from Philadelphia, Washington pursued him across New Jersey. Americans under Charles Lee (who had been exchanged by the British) fought an indecisive engagement with the British at Monmouth (June 28, 1778), but Lee was not able to prevent them from returning to New York. The French fleet refused to attack Clinton, and after an abortive attempt to capture Newport, Rhode Island, it sailed for the West Indies. Although Washington was able to limit British activity to a series of largely ineffectual raids, the task of confining Clinton to New York deprived the American forces of any freedom of action. Neither side could obtain a decided advantage. Despite the British failure to gain military control, Benedict Arnold's treason came perilously close to wrecking the American cause. After playing a major rôle in the American victory at Saratoga, Arnold had gone first to Valley Forge and then to Philadelphia following the British evacuation of that city. When it was rumored that he was fraternizing with the British, he demanded a court martial so that he could exonerate himself. Although the court found him guilty of some of the charges brought against him, Washington nevertheless granted Arnold's request that he be placed in command of West Point, the key fort in the American defenses of the Hudson. Even before Arnold received this position, he was passing military information to the British, and he was now planning to turn his new command over to them. The plot, however, was discovered in 1780, when Major John André, the go-between in Arnold's negotiations with the British, was captured while carrying incriminating papers. André was executed as a spy, and Arnold escaped to the British lines.

Although neither side could achieve a decisive victory in the East, in the West the British were no match for the American frontiersmen. During the first two years of the war, the British, who had their principal base at Detroit and could rely on the support of the Indians, had dominated the region beyond the Alleghenies. But they lost their posi-

tion to the Americans after George Rogers Clark, a frontier farmer and surveyor from Virginia, took over the command of the American forces in 1778. Commissioned a major by Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia, Clark with only 175 volunteers captured Kaskaskia on July 4, 1778, and then seized Cahokia and Vincennes. When the British retook Vincennes, Clark marched a band of frontiersmen through the wilderness in the middle of winter to capture it a second time (February 25, 1779). For the remainder of the war he continued to attack along the entire frontier, and almost entirely because of his efforts the Americans were able to control all of the Northwest except Detroit.

Despite American successes in the West, it was in the South rather than on the frontier that the outcome of the war was finally decided. By the end of 1778 the British were shifting their attention from the Northern states to the South, which, except for the British attack on Charleston in 1776, had witnessed no major fighting since the outbreak of the war. In December, 1778, the British occupied Savannah, only to lose it to the Americans in October of the following year. This setback proved only temporary, however, and by the summer of 1780 the British controlled all of Georgia and South Carolina. Although Clinton, who had been commanding the British forces in the South, had to return to New York to prevent the city's capture by Washington, his departure had no appreciable effect on the war in the South. Lord Cornwallis, Clinton's successor, inflicted an ignominious defeat on the Americans at Camden, North Carolina (August, 1780). General Horatio Gates, who was in charge of the American troops at Camden, was relieved of his command, and American spirits were somewhat revived by a victory at King's Mountain, North Carolina (October, 1780).

General Nathaniel Greene assumed command of the Patriot troops in the South after Gates' dismissal. After placing General Daniel Morgan in control of the American forces in the backcountry, Greene assumed command over the troops on the east of Cornwallis' line of march. In January, 1781, Morgan defeated the British and Loyalists under Sir Guy Tarleton at Cowpens, North Carolina, but in May of the same year Greene's army was beaten by Cornwallis at Guilford Court House. Cornwallis then withdrew to Wilmington, North Carolina, and Greene with the aid of backcountry Patriots led by Francis Marion, Andrew Pickens, and Thomas Sumter forced the British out of Charleston.

Although the French alliance, the entrance of the Bourbon powers into the conflict, and the shifting of British plans undoubtedly brightened the prospects of the Revolutionary cause, the situation at the opening of the year 1781 was still precarious. Patriot finances were desperate, Washington's army showed no improvement, and many who formerly had supported the American leaders were becoming apathetic

and indifferent. More assistance was necessary if the revolutionists were to triumph. No one in America sensed this fact more than the young French nobleman, Marquis de Lafayette, who at an early age tendered his services to the Patriots. He, along with Baron de Kalb, Baron von Steuben and a few others, stood out from the dozens of European officers who joined the American forces and who, as Washington wrote, had

nothing more than a little plausibility, unbounded pride and ambition, and a perseverance in application not to be resisted but by uncommon firmness, to support their pretensions; men who in the first instance, tell you they wish for nothing more than the honor of serving so glorious a cause as volunteers, the next day solicit rank without pay, the day following want money advanced to them, and in the course of a week want further promotion, and are not satisfied with anything you can do for them.

In the winter of 1779–80, Lafayette returned to France to induce the French government to send an army to continental America. He procured for America 5,500 of the finest French troops, commanded by the experienced soldier Comte de Rochambeau.

The military and naval assistance provided by the French made possible the final defeat of the British. In April, 1881, Cornwallis moved from North Carolina to Virginia and was followed at a respectful distance by a smaller force of Americans commanded by Lafayette. In August, Cornwallis' troops, along with those sent south from New York by Clinton, established their camp at Yorktown on the York River. The French fleet, commanded by the Comte de Grasse, arrived in Chesapeake Bay during the summer and defeated the British in a naval engagement on September 5. When the British fleet withdrew to New York, Cornwallis lost his last chance to obtain relief from the sea. Meanwhile, re-enforcements were rushed to Lafayette by land. Rochambeau, who had been at Newport for a year following the town's evacuation by the British, marched his troops south. Washington, after hoodwinking Clinton into believing that the Americans were about to attack New York, also turned south and met Rochambeau at Elkton, Maryland. Both armies then joined Lafayette before the British army at Yorktown. Cornwallis, who was surrounded by the French fleet and by an army that was three times as large as his own, was in a hopeless position, and on October 19, 1781, he surrendered. The capitulation of Cornwallis' army at Yorktown marked the end of the military phase of the Revolution.

The American victory in the Revolution can be attributed as much to

the British as to the Patriots. Fighting three thousand miles from home over virtually unknown terrain, the British entrusted their troops to inferior commanders, repeatedly altered their overall strategy, and failed to co-ordinate the efforts of armies that were operating at great distances from one another. At the same time the British masses had little enthusiasm for a war against their fellow countrymen, and political leaders who were out of power hoped that an American victory would discredit the King's party in Parliament and in the country. By contrast, although several American officers were inept—and one was an open traitor—in George Washington the Patriots possessed an inestimable asset. Although not a brilliant commander, he was a man of undoubted integrity who commanded unlimited respect. Above all, he had an extraordinary tenacity that made him ideally suited for the type of war that he was forced to conduct.

In addition to Britain's other disadvantages was the fact that she gained relatively little from her naval supremacy. British naval operations were continually hampered by the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland and by American war vessels under the command of such able leaders as John Paul Jones and James Nicholson. The Americans, moreover, were able to inflict considerable damage on British shipping. "The success of the American cruisers has given a prodigious wound to the British Trade," ran one account. "It is computed in England that £1,500,000 sterling has been taken in the West Indian trade alone. The consequence has been several capital houses in England have failed for large sums, and more are expected to share the same fate." Finally, and most important of all, Great Britain was defeated because of the extensive aid that the Americans received from their European allies. The results of this assistance were dramatically illustrated at Yorktown; but throughout the war—and especially after 1778—it was the single most important factor contributing to the American victory.

For some time before the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown it was evident that Britain was losing the struggle with her former colonies. Her merchants and manufacturers, finding it difficult to market their goods, began to increase their protests. In spite of mounting taxes, the government's income decreased, and expenditures during the war exceeded those of peaceful days by more than £120,000,000. Government loans could be floated only at ruinous rates. At the same time the Administration had to meet the growing opposition, headed by Edmund Burke, which advocated the termination of the conflict with the Americans. Those who had preached coercion of the colonies still hoped that by some means the allies might be defeated and the Empire saved, and were reluctant to yield; but in the spring of 1782 the British emissaries began to put out peace feelers. A year was to elapse, however, before Great Britain signed the Treaty of Paris, by which she acknowledged

the triumph of the Patriots and the political independence of her former colonies.*

The American commissioners Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and John Adams, fully aware that neither France nor Spain had entered the contest for the sake of establishing a powerful republic in the New World, conveniently ignored for the time being their instructions to include America's allies in any treaty negotiation and agreed upon a preliminary treaty of peace with the British agent, Richard Oswald, without consulting either of the Bourbon powers. The French, deeply concerned about the unsatisfied desires of Spain for territory west of the Appalachians, took Franklin to task; but he proved more than equal to the occasion. The American envoys, he said, had been guilty of bad manners, but they hoped that all that had been accomplished as a result of the struggle with Great Britain would not be undone by "a single indiscretion." Franklin not only appeased the French, but within a few weeks he induced them to grant another loan of 6,000,000 livres to the United States.

By the terms of the final draft of the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain acknowledged the independence of the United States and her claim to the territory west to the Mississippi, north to Canada, and south to the Floridas. She also agreed that the people of the new republic should continue to enjoy unmolested the right to fish on the banks of Newfoundland and in the inshore waters of all the British dominions in America as well as "to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador so long as the same shall remain unsettled." Furthermore, she agreed to evacuate the territory of the United States without carrying off American property. The United States, on the other hand, promised that no lawful impediment should be thrown in the way of British creditors in recovering their debts from American debtors, that there should be no further persecution of the Loyalists, and that Congress should recommend to the legislatures of the states that they take steps to restore the rights of the Loyalists. The navigation of the Mississippi from its source to its mouth was to remain forever "free and open to the subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States." Efforts of the American negotiators to secure Canada and Nova Scotia and to induce Great Britain to agree to a commercial treaty failed. If the terms of the treaty were liberal to the Americans, as many Englishmen at the time asserted, it was undoubtedly because Great Britain desired to weaken as much as possible the existing relationship between her Bourbon rivals and the young American republic.

* Britain's defeat in the colonies was matched by victories in other parts of the world. The British were victorious in the West Indies, Hudson Bay, Africa, and India; and she repulsed an attack on Gibraltar.

40. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN WARTIME

THROUGHOUT the Revolution the civilian population suffered much less from privation and want than did the men in the army. Because the majority of the people were farmers, they were to a large extent self-sustaining. They raised their own food, made their own clothing, and manufactured their own tools. With the exception of certain manufactured articles, some luxuries, and a few articles of food such as sugar and tea, the rural population managed to produce the needed essentials. On the other hand, in many towns food was at times scarce and costly. "Food is getting scarce and money scarcer," wrote a New Englander early in 1777; two years later the same writer declared that the seaboard towns of Massachusetts "will soon have nothing to eat." Rhode Island and Connecticut towns also suffered. "Nearly one-quarter of the best plow-land is now in possession of the enemy," Governor Greene of Rhode Island wrote in 1779, "and other considerable tracts are so exposed that the occupiers have not dared, nor been able, to plant them for two years past." The situation was similar in the Middle states. In the South, however, where there were few towns, the war was only slightly felt until 1780. Although the war, by drawing upon the farm population for soldiers, may have lessened food production slightly, the principal difficulty was undoubtedly caused by lack of adequate means for getting the food from the producer to the consumer.

Perhaps more important than the scarcity of food was the increase in prices. Salt, for example, which sold for eighteen cents a bushel in 1774, cost six dollars a bushel in specie in 1781, and a similar change took place in the cost of practically every other commodity. This advance in prices, although the result in part of decreased production and increased demand, was in large measure due to speculation, the increased cost of doing business, and the depreciation of paper money. In a letter to her husband Mrs. John Adams wrote:

I blush whilst I give you a price current. All butcher's meat from a dollar to eight shillings per pound; corn twenty-five dollars, rye thirty per bushel, flour fifty pounds per hundred, potatoes ten dollars a bushel, . . . labor six and eight dollars a day; . . . a common cow from sixty to seventy pounds; and all English goods in proportion. . . . I have studied, and do study, every method of economy in my power; otherwise a mint of money would not support a family.

During the Revolution, luxury and extravagance existed side by side with hardship. Private letters, ship records, and merchants' advertise-

ments in newspapers abound in evidences of luxurious and extravagant living. Servants, lavish dinners, and parties multiplied; sales of laces, silks, velvets, and the like increased prodigiously. "I am weary to death of this dreadful war," Dr. Orne, Salem physician, wrote to Colonel Pickering. "It is attended with such irregular distribution of property, such evasion of order, such decay of morals, so much public distress and private extravagance." "You can scarcely form an Idea of the increase and growth of extravagance of the People in their demands for labour and every article for sale," said a letter to John Adams in 1778. "Dissipation has no bounds at present; when or where it will stop, or if a reform will take place, I dare not predict." Samuel Adams complained about the "Superfluity of Dress and Ornament" of the people at a time when the army was half-starved and seminaked. Nor was the extravagance confined to New England. Newspapers, diaries, and travelers' accounts are replete with stories of dancing, horse racing, and gay living in the Middle and Southern states.

There was a marked increase in class fluidity during the Revolution. Many old families, whose fortunes had been derived from and were being maintained by the fisheries or by trade, suddenly found themselves reduced nearly to bankruptcy. Others at the top of the social ladder, whose incomes came from fixed investments, were not much better off. Many from the lower ranks of society, on the other hand, improved their social and economic position. Former laborers, shopkeepers, peddlers, and small farmers were numbered among the *nouveaux riches* who rose to the top to the dismay of the established families.

How many persons accumulated fortunes as army contractors is unknown, but the number was sufficiently large to cause Congress to complain in 1777 that in every state there were profiteers, "instigated by the lust of avarice," who were endeavoring to enrich themselves at the expense of the public.

The war [wrote one observer] has thrown property into channels where before it never was and has increased little streams to overflowing rivers; and what is worse, in some respects by a method that has drained the sources of some as much as it has replenished others. Rich and numerous prizes, and the putting six or seven hundred per cent on goods bought in peace times, are the grand engines.

Profiteering was not confined to the newcomers. Old mercantile establishments—Otis and Andrews of Boston, for example—were obtaining profits of 50 to 200 per cent on army clothing at the very time when Washington's ragged troops were stationed at Valley Forge.

The economic upheaval occasioned by the war had little effect upon agriculture. The tools and methods remained unchanged. Newcomers,

it is true, spread considerable information about European improvements, but apparently with little immediate effect. The derangement of trade just before and during the first years of the war stimulated the production of wool and cotton. Mutton disappeared from butcher shops and from the tables of Patriots in order that the wool supply might be increased. At an early date the legislatures of Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina urged that more cotton be grown. Production of the two leading staples of the South, tobacco and rice, went on as usual, and the first water mill for the cleaning of rice was erected on the Santee River in 1778. The indigo industry, however, which had developed rapidly after 1750, declined during the war because of the removal of the British bounty. The farmers, like others who had goods to dispose of, were accused of being extortioners.

The effect of the war upon manufacturing was much more apparent than upon agriculture. The sudden stoppage of English goods and the urgent demand for war supplies stimulated manufacturing enterprise. In many instances a Patriot's home produced not only enough home-spun for his family but a surplus for sale. Southern planters and wealthy merchants in New England and Middle states, who had once dressed in imported fabrics, now wore garments that came from the home spinning-wheel and loom. Many states offered bounties and prizes and encouraged the formation of societies that in turn would encourage manufacturing and the mechanic arts. Not until the privateers began to place their cargoes on the market and foreign goods began to come in through new channels, was there a decline in the household output. Even before the Revolution small manufacturing establishments had developed outside the home in many Northern towns—as early as 1767, Haverhill, Massachusetts had forty-four workshops and nineteen mills—and during the war, paper mills, potteries, and like establishments were set up with capital contributed mainly by the mercantile class.

Great interest centered in the manufacture of munitions and other war supplies. Gun factories were founded at Sutton (Massachusetts), Waterbury (Connecticut), and North Providence (Rhode Island) to supplement the small gun factories already in existence in such places as Lancaster (Pennsylvania). At Springfield (Massachusetts), Congress in 1778 established a munitions plant where cannon were cast. Powder mills were established at Andover, Stoughton, Bradford, Morristown, and other points. Some lead was obtained from Connecticut and Virginia, but by far the greater amount needed for military purposes came from abroad or was obtained by melting down such home commodities as roofs and window weights. Several of the states offered bounties for the manufacture of guns and other materials needed for war, and also for the manufacture of textiles.

The war seriously handicapped the internal trade of the struggling

states. There was no adequate means of transportation, no uniform and stable monetary system, and no central authority with power to regulate interstate commerce. Trading with the enemy was forbidden, but the records indicate that many Patriot farmers and shopkeepers carried on business with the British armies. The coasting trade was practically ruined by the depredations of the British privateers. Foreign trade, however, fared better. No longer restricted by mercantilist regulations, the rebellious provinces at the outset threw open their ports to all traders except the British, and even this exception was subsequently waived. The colonial warehouses were almost bare of foreign goods, and the merchants of France, Holland, and Spain welcomed the opportunity of securing a profitable market at the expense of their hated rival. Soon many ships laden with continental goods destined for America were on their way across the Atlantic. Not all reached their destination, however, for the British admiralty reported the capture of 570 vessels between 1776 and 1779. But despite the vigilance of the British naval authorities and the activities of enemy privateers, an increasing number of foreign cargoes made their way to American ports, and by 1778 there was little or no lack of foreign merchandise. In return for their goods the foreign merchants received tobacco, rice, flour, and other commodities. Indirect trade with Britain, although forbidden until 1780, was also carried on. Commerce with the British West Indies, on the other hand, was seriously impaired by the war, for a new British navigation law excluded the Americans from trade with these islands.

41. INTERNAL REVOLUTION

IN ITS consequences the Revolution was far more than a successful fight for political independence; it touched virtually all phases of American life, and in almost every instance it accelerated political, social, and economic trends that had been developing for many years before the outbreak of hostilities.

The years 1774-7 witnessed the elimination of the British ruling class, the destruction of the old colonial governments, and the emergence of popular government. Although complete political democracy was not realized and the extent of popular control varied greatly from state to state, the "leveling" spirit of the Revolution was so great that many conservative planters, merchants, and large landholders within the Patriot ranks were filled with alarm. "Every one who has the least pretensions to be a gentleman," Samuel Johnston of North Carolina complained, "is borne down *per ignobile vulgus*—a set of men without reading, experience, or principles to govern them." The suffrage, another conservative

said, was being extended "to every bi-ped of the forest." By emphasizing the doctrine of equality, several state constitutions, especially those of Virginia and Pennsylvania, seriously undermined the grip of the old order and paved the way for the democratic reforms of a generation later. Moreover, the Revolution, by effecting British withdrawal from the arena of American domestic politics, narrowed the struggle for political control and left the Americans free to institute such changes and reforms as they saw fit.

The way in which the new state governments were organized revealed the deep-seated faith of the Americans in Locke's contract theory of government. In practice, the contract became the written constitution. Even before July, 1776, four colonies—New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina and Virginia—had drafted constitutions. During the war seven others followed suit. The two remaining states—Rhode Island and Connecticut—retained their colonial charters, merely deleting from them all references to royal authority. In ten states, the provincial congresses drafted the new constitutions. Because these bodies also served as legislatures, no distinction was made between the source of constitutional and statute law. Massachusetts voters were the first to select delegates for the express purpose of writing a constitution when they chose the constitutional convention of 1779–80. In addition, Massachusetts was the first state to submit its constitution to the voters for ratification.

Although each of the new constitutions provided for representative government, there was no uniformity in the degree of popular rule that prevailed in the various states. The governments of Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania were more democratic than those of the other states. In Pennsylvania, for example, a unicameral legislature elected annually by the taxpayers, was supreme. The legislature controlled the state's judiciary, and the governor and an executive council of thirteen were little more than figureheads. In contrast to Pennsylvania was New York, where the governor and the senate, both of which were selected by a small proportion of the taxpayers, dominated the lower house and every other branch of the state's government. In New York only 10 per cent of the adult male population could vote for governor.

Despite differences in both the letter and spirit of the new constitutions, most of the state governments had certain common features. The preambles of all the constitutions contained a summary of the Lockian philosophy of government. Eight states, moreover, adopted bills of rights; and the Virginia Bill of Rights, which antedated the Declaration of Independence, rested on the same philosophical foundation as its more illustrious successor. Finally, in a majority of the states—and this

was to be expected from a people who among other things were protesting against royal rule—there was a marked tendency to reduce the authority of the executive while enhancing the power of the popularly elected legislature.

Equally significant transformations occurred in the land system. All the vacant lands within the boundaries of the United States were now free from British control. Henceforth no royal edicts such as the Proclamation of 1763 could keep furtrader, settler, or land speculator out of the region beyond the Alleghenies. No longer would surveyors or other royal agents set aside trees for the British navy. The quitrent system, under which farmers and planters paid annually hundreds of thousands of dollars to the king and to the Penns and Baltimores, was abolished. In short, all restrictive British land legislation was swept aside, and the Crown and proprietary lands were vested in the hands of the state legislatures. Furthermore, the sale in small parcels of the confiscated estates of the Tories tended to break up the system of large landed properties. Roger Morris's 5,000 acres in Putnam County, New York, went to 250 persons; and 275 farms were carved from the estate of James De Lancey.

Closely related to the changes in landholding was the abolition of the system of entail and primogeniture. For a long time pillars of aristocracy, these Old World institutions had become deeply rooted in American soil, particularly in the South, where the founders of the great families desired to perpetuate their name and influence. Just before the Revolution, Maryland abolished primogeniture, and South Carolina did away with entail; elsewhere, however, both institutions flourished, though in some states in somewhat modified form. Pennsylvania and Delaware and the four New England states, for example, allowed the eldest son a double share. The offensive against both institutions was led by Thomas Jefferson, who, less than three months after writing the Declaration of Independence, introduced a bill in the Virginia legislature for the abolition of entail within the bounds of the Old Dominion. It is estimated that the new law "released from entail at least half, and possibly three-quarters, of the entire 'seated' area of Virginia." A few years later primogeniture was also swept away. Within ten years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, every state except two had abolished entail, and five years later every state had wiped out primogeniture and provided in some form for equality of inheritance. All save two—New Jersey and North Carolina—placed daughters on an absolute equality with sons in the inheritance of landed property.

If the Revolution profoundly affected land ownership and property inheritance, it no less profoundly affected industry and commerce. From the outset the thirteen provinces, as parts of the British Empire, had been forbidden to emit bills of credit, to make paper money, to en-

gage in certain manufacturing pursuits, or to carry on trade with whom they pleased. The Revolution swept away these restrictions, and the former colonists were at liberty to organize and develop their industry and commerce as they saw fit, subject only to internal limitations, such as the lack of capital, and to external circumstances over which they had little or no control.

Church as well as state felt the leveling hand of the Revolution. When the Revolution broke out, nine colonies had established churches. In New England, outside of Rhode Island, the Congregational Church was established by law and supported by general taxation, and the same was true of the Anglican Church in Virginia, Maryland, New York, the Carolinas, and Georgia. Only in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island did complete religious freedom prevail. In the former, Quakers, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Baptists, Moravians, Dunkards, Mennonites, and Catholics lived in peace; and in the latter, Baptists, Quakers, Anglicans, Congregationalists, and a few Jews and Catholics flourished undisturbed. Taking all the colonies together there appear to have been no less than 2936 religious organizations; of these 658 were Congregational, 543 Presbyterian, 498 Baptist, 480 Anglican, 295 Quaker, 261 German and Dutch Reformed, 151 Lutheran, and 50 Catholic. Although the Revolution did not greatly reduce the number, and not at all the variety, of religious organizations, it enormously strengthened the tendency toward equality of religious sects and freedom of conscience. In all the states except Virginia the Anglicans were soon deprived of their privileges and immunities and placed on an equal legal basis with the Baptists, Quakers, and other nonestablished groups. In Virginia, where the Anglicans were most firmly entrenched, it was not until 1786 that the legislature passed Jefferson's long cherished and much debated "Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom," which divorced church and state. In New England, where the Congregationalists enjoyed supremacy, the fight for disestablishment was even more bitter and long-drawn-out, and not until the nineteenth century was this last stronghold of church privilege forced to yield. Disestablishment took place in New Hampshire in 1817, in Connecticut in 1818, and in Massachusetts in 1833.

Separation of church and state did not, however, produce complete religious freedom. Religious backbiting and mudslinging still continued, for many people felt that their religion, and theirs alone, afforded the only channel to eternal salvation. Furthermore, the opinion still prevailed that the state could not live without the aid of religion. At the close of the war no man could take any office in Massachusetts or Maryland without subscribing to a declaration that he believed in Christianity. In Pennsylvania he had to declare in addition that he believed the Scriptures to be divinely inspired; and in Delaware he had to believe in the Trinity. In New Jersey and the Carolinas he had to be a Protestant.

No person [the constitution of North Carolina stated] who shall deny the being of God, or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom or safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State.

The various religious organizations suffered many hardships during the Revolution. Decrease in income, depreciation of paper money, and destruction of property created serious difficulties for many clergymen and their congregations. In some instances congregations broke up or were abandoned by their ministers. Several preachers became war chaplains, leaving no one at home to fill their places. In Hampshire and Berkshire counties in western Massachusetts thirty-three towns had ministers, but thirty-nine had none. Lack of large public buildings forced the military authorities, both British and American, to convert churches into hospitals, barracks, prisons, and storehouses. More than fifty churches were destroyed by the enemy during the conflict, and several Anglican churches suffered a similar fate at the hands of the Patriots, who regarded them as strongholds of toryism.

Immediately following the Revolution practically all religious groups attempted to improve both their spiritual and material fortunes. Several reorganized their forms of government. The Anglicans, feeling that they could no longer continue to be a part of the diocese of the bishop of London, established an American episcopate with Bishop Seabury at its head. The Catholic clergy, who had been under the control of the vicar apostolic of London, in 1784 erected the Catholic Church in the United States as a distinct body with Father John Carroll at its head. The Methodists also found it increasingly difficult to remain under Old World control, and in 1784 Francis Asbury, on the authority of John Wesley, was ordained as superintendent of the American Methodists, a title that was shortly changed to "bishop." Other religious groups, with the exception of the Congregationalists, also developed more independent and comprehensive organizations. In 1789 the first general assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States convened at Philadelphia. The Dutch Reformed church held its first general synod in 1792, and the Universalists their first general convention in 1786.

The Revolution, with its emphasis on liberty and equality, could not help but affect man's treatment of man. When the Declaration of Independence was issued, the penal codes of the several colonies were according to modern standards both barbarous and illiberal. In New York sixteen crimes were punishable by death on the first offense, and for many second offense felonies there was a similar punishment. Delaware listed twenty crimes for which death was the penalty. Connecticut had

fifteen and Rhode Island somewhat less. At the instigation of Jefferson, who was familiar with the efforts of Beccaria to improve the criminal laws of Europe, Virginia led the movement for reform, but not until 1796 did it adopt a new code that made only treason and murder capital offenses. Two years earlier Pennsylvania had completed the revision of her criminal code, which reserved the death penalty for deliberate homicide. Reform in the criminal law of the other states was more dilatory, and in one—Massachusetts—it was made more severe in 1785, when robbery, rape, burglary, and sodomy were made punishable by death, arson by life imprisonment, and manslaughter by imprisonment and branding.

Imprisonment for debt was another Old World institution that had been brought to America; and when the Revolution broke out, men of all ages were lodged behind prison walls for inability to pay even trifling sums. There was considerable agitation in all the states for reform, but little was accomplished before the nineteenth century. In New York the Society for the Relief of Distressed Debtors furnished food, blankets, and fuel to many imprisoned debtors, and even succeeded in securing the release of some. Maryland in 1787 enacted a one-year law that enabled an insolvent debtor to secure his freedom through bankruptcy proceedings, but the measure failed to be re-enacted. Sometimes debtors had recourse to advertising as a means of securing aid. The following from the *Pennsylvania Packet* is typical:

OLD GAOL, FEB. 28 (1783)

Now confined for debts, about £40, one who can make over, on security, a house which rents for £20 per annum, exclusive of ground rent. Whoever shall be so humane as to lend the above sum, will not only relieve me from a cold gaol and unmerciful creditors' cost of suits (as I paid last summer near £4, now have the same sum to pay for the same debt) but likewise save my property, and enable me to follow my trade, to help support myself in my old age, being now sixty-three.

Intimately associated with penal law and debtors' reform was the agitation for prison reform. At the time of the Revolution prison conditions throughout the world were almost unspeakable. The ragged, half-starved inmates were forced to live in dark, ill-ventilated, vermin-ridden, unheated rooms or cells. Little or no attempt was made to segregate the sexes or to weed out the petty offender from the hardened criminal. The jailers were frequently brutish individuals who cared nothing about the difficulties or the reformation of those they supervised, robbed every newcomer of what he had, trafficked in liquor, and profiteered on the food supply. The following description of a Philadelphia prison in 1786 gives an accurate picture of the conditions that prevailed:

No separation was made of the most flagrant offender and convict, from the prisoner who might perhaps be falsely suspected of some trifling misdemeanor; none of the old, hardened culprits from the youthful, trembling novice in crime; none even of the fraudulent swindler from the unfortunate and possibly the most estimable debtor; and intermingled with all these, in one corrupt and corrupting assemblage, were to be found the disgusting object of popular contempt, besmeared with filth from the pillory; the unhappy victim of the lash, streaming with blood from the whipping post, the half-naked vagrant; the loathesome drunkard; the sick, suffering from various bodily pains, and too often the unaneled malefactor, whose precious hours of probation had been numbered by his earthly judge.

The first attempt at reform was made in 1776 with the founding of the Philadelphia Society for Assisting Distressed Prisoners. The British entry into the city forced its disbandment, but in 1787 a similar organization, the Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons, came into being. Tench Coxe and Benjamin Rush were among its early members. This society memorialized the legislature for reform and on request of the Executive Council of the state prepared in 1788 a detailed report of the existing abuses. As a result, an act was passed in 1790 that provided, among other things, for the classification of prisoners; the prohibition of drink; abolition of thievery and extortion on the part of jailers; removal from public view of prisoners at hard labor; the furnishing of adequate food and clothing; and religious instruction. This act attracted widespread attention, but few of the states followed Pennsylvania's lead until the next century. New England was the slowest; the famous Newgate dungeon near Granby, Connecticut, was used during the entire Revolutionary period.

The Revolution had a double effect on education. On the one hand, it diverted people from cultural pursuits and tended to drain the existing educational institutions of both teachers and funds. Common schools, both public and private, as well as some of the institutions of higher learning, were forced to close or to curtail their activities. On the other hand, the schools that disappeared were primarily religious in character and were conducted after Old World models rather than designed to fit American conditions. The new schools that rose on the ruins of the old after the Revolution were intended to train men for citizenship; men like Jefferson, Madison, and John Adams were imbued with the idea that education rather than religion was essential to liberty and to the preservation of the state. "Above all things," wrote Jefferson, "I hope the education of the common people will be attended to; convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the most security for

the preservation of a due degree of liberty." In 1776, John Adams wrote: "Laws for the liberal education of youth, especially of the lower class of people, are so extremely wise and useful that, to a humane and generous mind, no expense for this purpose would be thought extravagant."

Despite the concern of Jefferson, Adams, and the others, only four of the first state constitutions, those of Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, mentioned either schools or education. The first constitution of Vermont, which did not join the Union until 1790, also made provision for an educational system from town to university. Before 1789 little legislation affecting the common school was enacted by any state. On the other hand, during this period several academies were established, of which Phillips Andover (1778) in Massachusetts and Phillips Exeter (1781) in New Hampshire were perhaps the most outstanding. Before 1790, eight new collegiate institutions were founded, and the last decade of the century saw the addition of more than a half-dozen others. Meanwhile a medical department had been added to Harvard in 1783, and the first law school in America had been opened at Litchfield, Connecticut in 1784 by Judge Tappan Reeve. Finally, the Revolutionary period ushered in a new era in the production of American textbooks. Of these the two most notable were Noah Webster's spelling book, published in 1783, of which ultimately fifty million copies were sold, and Jedidiah Morse's geography, which appeared the following year.

During the Revolutionary era opposition to slavery increased markedly. Of all American institutions slavery was most obviously contrary to the current doctrines of liberty and equality; and Jefferson in his original draft of the Declaration of Independence condemned George III for supporting the slave trade and violating the "most sacred rights of life and liberty of a distant people, who never offended him, captivating them into slavery in another hemisphere or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither." Although the paragraph containing this clause was struck out in deference to the wishes of the planters of the Carolinas and Georgia and the slave traders of the North, it represented a growing spirit both in the North and in the South. Memorials advocating anti-slavery legislation increased in number. Patrick Henry stigmatized slavery as an "abominable practice" and a "species of violence and tyranny," repugnant to humanity, inconsistent with religion, and destructive of liberty. Jefferson in his *Notes on Virginia*, published in 1781, asked:

Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be

violated but with His wrath? Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that His justice cannot sleep forever.

Even south of Virginia where condemnation of slavery was rare, a few protested. Henry Laurens, wealthy and influential South Carolinian, writing in 1776, said:

You know, my dear son, I abhor slavery. . . . The day, I hope, is approaching when from principles of gratitude as well as justice every man will strive to be foremost in showing his readiness to comply with the golden rule. . . . I am not one of those . . . who dare to trust in Providence for defence and security of their own liberty while they enslave and wish to continue in slavery thousands who are as well entitled to freedom as themselves.

In Pennsylvania the Quakers, Mennonites, and other sects carried on an energetic campaign against the system. The Methodists in conference resolved that "slave-keeping was hurtful to society, and contrary to the laws of God and nature." Abolition and manumission societies headed by such prominent men as Benjamin Franklin and Tench Coxe of Pennsylvania, and Melancthon Smith of New York, also condemned the institutions as morally iniquitous.

Although those opposed to slavery in the South constituted a distinct minority of the white population, every state in the region except South Carolina abolished the slave trade. In the North in the years immediately following the Revolution several states adopted legislation abolishing slavery. Vermont, though not a member of the Continental Congress, abolished the institution by constitutional provision in 1777. In the same year Pennsylvania made provision for gradual emancipation. New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island soon followed these pioneers. But not until 1799 did New York provide that all children born of slaves should be freed when they had reached a certain age; and emancipation for all slaves was not completed until 1827. New Jersey was even more dilatory, for it was 1804 before the legislature took the first step to put an end to slavery, and 1846 before the last slaves in the state were converted into apprentices. In Massachusetts, slavery seems to have disappeared before 1800 by custom rather than by statute.

Of all the consequences of the Revolution, perhaps the most important was the strength it gave the growing spirit of independence and liberalism that had been consciously or unconsciously developing from the day the English planted their first permanent settlements on American soil. In the future, the former colonists, though some might copy Old World customs and manners, would think and feel more strongly than

ever before in terms American. And the America of 1783 was psychologically vastly different from the America of 1775. The radical triumph was now doubly complete, and it seemed clear that America was to be neither a playground for a colonial aristocracy nor a field to be exploited by British businessmen. The destinies of America had passed into the hands of farmers and middle-class people whose outlook and way of life were markedly different from those of the colonial aristocracy and the royal officialdom. Although many citizens of the new republic were still extremely provincial, the spirit of nationalism, long manifest, was fast undermining the old strongholds of particularism and foreshadowing the day when the dozen or more independent commonwealths would be knit together into a federal union.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION

- 42. CONFEDERATION
 - 43. FRONTIER PROBLEMS
 - 44. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 - 45. CRITICAL YEARS
 - 46. RADICAL PROTESTS
 - 47. MOVEMENT FOR A STRONGER UNION
 - 48. DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION
 - 49. RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION
-

INDEPENDENCE entailed responsibilities as well as privileges; and as soon as the Patriots had severed the ties that had bound the colonies to England, they were faced with the necessity of finding a substitute for the centralized authority that they were seeking to overthrow. The task was not easy, for any attempt to create an effective union among the new states was contrary to the political, economic, and social views of a large segment of the population. Despite these difficulties, the Americans in little more than a decade were able to solve the problem that had plagued the British for almost two centuries, and the Constitution still stands as a monument to the political genius of the Founding Fathers of the United States.

42. CONFEDERATION

THE PROBLEM of union was not a new one in America in 1776, for it was a question to which the royal authorities and their overseas subjects had been forced to give considerable thought

throughout the colonial period. At times—particularly when the Empire was threatened by France—officials in England had done all within their power to promote a spirit of unity and co-operation among the colonists. At other times the British had not hesitated to apply the formula of divide and conquer to their unruly subjects in the New World. To the colonists, union had been a two-edged sword. On the one hand, they had looked on it as a device that would enable Great Britain to increase its authority over the provincial economies and governments. On the other hand, they had frequently united in the years immediately preceding the Revolution to protest against British acts that they considered oppressive. The conflicting and often shifting views of union on both sides of the Atlantic explain in large part both the origins of the Albany plan of union and the failure of either the British or the Americans to accept such a proposal.

Demands for union both before and during the Revolution raised psychological as well as administrative problems. The average American tended to be loyal to a locality rather than to a government. Living in small communities or on isolated farms, the eighteenth-century Americans were inclined to view anyone outside their immediate neighborhoods as a foreigner. Moreover, the marked contrasts in the physical conditions in the various sections produced decidedly different customs, traditions, and economies. New Englanders had little in common with Virginians; a wide gulf separated farmers from city dwellers; and the frontiersmen and the inhabitants of the coastal regions had developed two distinct—and often diametrically opposed—ways of living.

The outbreak of the Revolution subordinated, but did not eliminate, the powerful spirit of localism in every section of America. In many instances the rivalries that had divided the colonies were carried over to the states. Each state was convinced that it was contributing more to the cause than the others, and each state felt that the others were not altogether trustworthy. At the same time boundary disputes continued to provide a dangerous source of conflict among the states. New York and New Hampshire both sought to annex Vermont; Maryland viewed Virginia's imperialistic moves with understandable alarm; and those states without western lands resented the claims of the others to territory beyond the Alleghenies. Finally, we should remember that any union of the states would necessitate the creation of a central government and that in many respects the Revolution itself was a protest against centralized political authority.

Despite the strength of the particularist tradition in revolutionary America, the struggle for independence made some form of union imperative. A common enemy gave the various states common problems and a common objective. Above all, the exigencies of war made clear to the Patriot leaders the need for a unified policy. The alternative to

union was defeat, and the difficulties faced by the Continental Congress—with its lack of authority and divided responsibility—were an indication of both the necessity for co-operation in a period of crisis and the reluctance of the American people to relinquish their cherished local rights. In addition to the demands imposed by the war, there were other forces that impelled many Americans to realize that they had some points in common with their fellow citizens in other sections of the country. Members of the same religious denomination had a sense of oneness regardless of where they lived. Class lines, which cut across political borders, undoubtedly helped to produce a spirit of solidarity at least among the upper income groups. Finally, trade tended to bind together Americans who lived in widely scattered regions of the new nation.

The Declaration of Independence was the turning point in the movement for the establishment of an American union. Before 1776 all plans for union had of necessity to make some provision for British control. But with the removal of British authority the character of the problem changed. The desirability of union was no longer in question, but rather the nature of the new union that circumstances had forced the Americans to create. Essentially the same question had perplexed British officials throughout the colonial period; and like their former rulers, the Americans now had to decide how much authority should be granted to the parts (that is, the states) and how much should be granted to the whole (that is, the central government). Regardless of how the issue was resolved, large numbers of Americans were bound to be dissatisfied with the manner in which these pressing questions were answered.

In the ensuing struggle over the formation of the new government two fairly distinct groups emerged. On the one hand were the radicals, who were drawn from the small farmers in both the backcountry and the more settled regions and who received some support from the Southern planters. On the other hand, there were the conservatives, who usually were either businessmen from the seaboard or large landowners. The conservatives favored a highly centralized government in which the states would have little authority. The radicals desired a loose confederation—or perhaps “alliance” is a better word—of virtually autonomous states.

The radicals viewed the Revolution as essentially a war against central authority. They were determined, therefore, that the disruption of the British Empire would not be followed by the reimposition of a type of government that they had fought to destroy. To the radicals the Revolution was more than a war for independence, for they looked on it as the first step toward the creation of a new society. They were convinced that the more remote a government was from those that it governed, the more likely it was to become tyrannical. As a conse-

quence, they wished to exchange British centralization for a series of autonomous state units that would provide the people with the greatest possible opportunity to govern themselves. In this sense the radicals were democrats, and to the extent that they considered independence a means rather than an end in itself, they were revolutionists. The radicals believed that the parts were more important than the whole and that the states should be given authority over taxation, coinage, trade, property rights, military forces and foreign affairs. In advancing this program they were not altogether disinterested, for they were fairly confident that they would be able to control the governmental machinery of the states of the proposed federation.

In contrast to the radicals, the conservatives desired a powerful central government that would retain many of the features of the British regime. Although opposed to certain features of British rule, they had objected even more to the relatively subordinate position that they had occupied in the hierarchy of imperial authority; and their principal aim was to take over the power that before 1776 had been exercised by British officials, without changing the existing class and political structure in other ways. If they could carry out this policy, they would then be in a position to check any radical movements in the states and thus prevent the movement for independence from becoming a revolutionary upheaval.

The conservative plan of union called for a central government with the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, set up a national currency, maintain an army and navy, and both formulate and conduct a foreign policy for the entire nation. The acts of the national legislature would take precedence over those of the several states, and a national judiciary would serve as the final court of appeal in the entire land. Under this arrangement the states would be reduced to administrative units of the national government. To the conservatives there was never any doubt that the whole was more important than the parts and that the upper classes were best fitted to rule the new nation.

The first round in the struggle over the form of the new government ended with the adoption of the Articles of Confederation and a victory for the radicals. As early as July 21, 1775, Benjamin Franklin had submitted a revised version of his Albany plan of union to the Congress for its consideration. When almost a year later (June 7, 1776) the Congress adopted Richard Henry Lee's resolution for independence, it also approved a motion to appoint a committee to draw up a plan of confederation for the states. John Dickinson, who served as the committee's chairman, dominated the proceedings, and the document that was submitted to the Congress on July 12, 1776, was largely his work. Because Dickinson's plan contained a number of features that were objectionable to the radicals, the entire subject of union was thrashed

out in the committee of the whole; and when the Articles of Confederation were approved by the Congress on November 15, 1777, they contained most of the radical program. The Articles were not put into operation immediately, for an acrimonious controversy over western land claims delayed their acceptance by all the states. It was not until 1781, when Maryland finally granted its approval, that the Articles of Confederation went into effect.

Under the Articles of Confederation the United States was a league of sovereign commonwealths. The Federal government consisted of a Congress in which each state enjoyed equal power. The Congress, composed of delegates chosen annually by the states, was empowered to declare war, make peace, send and receive diplomatic representatives, make treaties, regulate the value of coin both of the United States and of the several states, borrow money and emit bills of credit, raise armies, build a navy, control Indian affairs, fix weights and measures, and establish post offices. It had, however, no power to levy taxes or to regulate commerce. No amendment could be added to the Articles unless it was first approved by the Congress and then ratified by every state. To secure adoption practically every important measure had to have the assent of nine states.

The Articles of Confederation were the products of neither ignorance nor inexperience, but of the conscious desire of the radicals to devise a system of government that would promote their own interests and conform to their principles. As a consequence, the Articles of Confederation differed in every important essential from the British administration that they supplanted. The central government under the Articles could not control commerce, trade, banking, and currency; it could not tax the people directly; it had neither executive nor judicial branches; and it did not have an agency like the Privy Council that could disallow the laws passed by the state legislatures.

To the radical Patriots the two most objectionable features of royal government had been king and Parliament. When they set up their own government, they made no attempt to create a position equivalent to that held by the king, and the closest approach to an executive office in the Confederation was a committee of thirteen (one representative from each state) that was selected by Congress to act as that body's *alter ego* when it was not in session. In place of Parliament, the radicals established a Congress that had practically none of Parliament's powers. Accordingly, the most significant feature of the Confederation Congress was what it could not do. It could make commercial treaties, but it could not make the states live up to the treaty terms. It could pass laws, but it could not make the states obey them. It was the most important branch of the new government, but it had no way of coercing states that were recalcitrant. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states

were free to work out their own destinies without the threat of outside interference or domination.


The obvious weakness of the Confederation Congress should not obscure the fact that it possessed numerous powers on paper. But the one power that it lacked either in theory or in reality was the power to coerce. The extent of its authority was therefore always dependent on the willingness of the states to accept its measures. And in the years after the Articles went into effect the states displayed a practically infinite capacity for either ignoring or defying the government of the Confederation. The Congress, therefore, lacked the *sine qua non* of every effective government—the power to govern; it could suggest, but it could not command.

The adoption of the Articles of Confederation stands as the high water mark of the Revolutionary movement in America. In the Declaration of Independence the radicals announced their philosophy of government; but the Declaration was a statement of views and intentions rather than a framework of government, and not until the Articles of Confederation went into effect did the Americans seek to apply the political philosophy enunciated by Jefferson. Although subsequent events were to demonstrate that the Articles failed to provide the kind of government needed by a new and divided nation, nevertheless they accurately reflected the radical spirit of the American Revolution.

43. FRONTIER PROBLEMS

THROUGHOUT its brief but turbulent history the government of the Confederation was affected by, and itself affected, developments in the frontier regions beyond the Alleghenies. Problems presented by the West were primarily responsible for the four-year delay in the ratification of the Articles. One of the outstanding achievements of the new government, furthermore, was its system for the disposal of the public domain and its effective and statesmanlike method for the political organization of the territories of the United States. Finally, most of the diplomatic problems confronting Congress in the 1780's arose from the conflict between American interests and those of the British and Spanish in the West.

The interval between Congress' approval of the Articles of Confederation in 1777 and the completion of their ratification in 1781 was due to Maryland's refusal to ratify any plan of government that sanctioned existing land titles west of the Alleghenies. At the outbreak of the Revolution, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, the two Carolinas and Virginia claimed extensive tracts of the western domain that they had



3. THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE TREATY OF 1783

The territory of the United States extended from the Atlantic to the Mississippi and, with the exception of Florida, which was still owned by Spain, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. The Maine boundary was as yet undetermined. Seven of the thirteen original states laid claim to areas beyond the Alleghenies. The claims of Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut partially overlapped. These various claims were extinguished with the organization of the Northwest Territory in 1787, the admission to the Union as states of Kentucky (1792) and Tennessee (1796), and the formation of Mississippi Territory in 1798-1804.

obtained from the British government during the colonial period. At the same time New York possessed a claim based on a treaty that the colony had concluded with the Indians. The remaining states had no

title to any western lands. Although the other twelve states had approved the Articles of Confederation by 1779, Maryland refused on the ground that lands that "had been secured by the blood and treasure of all, ought, in reason, justice, and policy, to be considered a common stock, to be parcelled out by Congress into free, convenient, and independent Governments." Since neither side showed any willingness to give way, there seemed a strong likelihood that the Articles of Confederation would never go into effect. Finally, in January, 1781, Virginia, which had the largest claim, offered to relinquish its territory north of the Ohio River. Maryland immediately ratified the Articles, and on March 1, 1781, they officially became the law of the new nation.

Virginia's agreement to cede its western lands contained certain stipulations that were not acceptable to Congress, and it was not until 1784 that the Old Dominion turned over most of its territory north of the Ohio to the government of the Confederation. Meanwhile New York in 1782 had surrendered its title to its western lands, and the other Northern states soon followed suit. In 1785-6, Massachusetts transferred its western lands to the Confederation, and in the same year Connecticut gave up all its western territory except the Western Reserve, which was not ceded to the United States until 1800. The Southern states were much more reluctant than those of the North to abandon their claims. But South Carolina ceded its western lands in 1787, and North Carolina (which had made and retracted an earlier cession) did the same in 1790, and Georgia in 1802. Virginia's claim to the region south of the Ohio was erased in 1792 with the admission of Kentucky to the Union as a state.

While Congress was negotiating with the states—all of which were on the coast—over the western-land claims, settlers in the interior were attempting to establish new commonwealths in the wilderness. Vermont, the first state to be added to the original thirteen, was settled more than a decade before the Revolution. Its affairs were largely controlled, even before the Revolution, by Ethan Allen and his brothers, Ira and Levi. The Green Mountain Boys contributed to the Patriot cause with notable victories at Ticonderoga and Bennington; but the Allens were always more interested in land speculation than in American independence. Controlling a land company that claimed 300,000 Vermont acres, Ethan and his brothers were past masters of business chicanery and international intrigue.

When Vermont, which was claimed by both New York and New Hampshire, asked to be admitted to the union, the Continental Congress rejected the request on the ground that New York had been granted the region by the Crown. Refused as a state, Vermont became

an independent republic; and its constitution, which was adopted in 1777, provided its citizens with the most democratic government in America. In the republic of Vermont all adult males could vote, slavery was prohibited, and religious freedom was granted to all. But the Allens were still worried about their land claims, and in the closing years of the Revolution they sought to have their titles validated, first by promising General Frederick Haldimand of Canada that Vermont would become a neutral and then by assuring officials in London that it would side with the British. These negotiations, however, were cut short by the end of the war. Throughout the 1780's Vermont remained an independent nation, and it was not until 1791—or two years after the Constitution had gone into effect—that it became the fourteenth American state.

Kentucky, like Vermont, was opened to settlement by both speculators and pioneers. In 1775, the Transylvania Company, which was under the direction of Richard Henderson of North Carolina, purchased the territory between the Kentucky and Cumberland rivers from the Cherokee Indians. In the same year, Henderson and Daniel Boone founded Boonesborough on the Cumberland River, while a short time before some Pennsylvanians had established a community at nearby Harrodsburg. After organizing the Transylvania Company, Henderson hoped that he could validate his land claims by having the Continental Congress recognize his settlements. But Congress refused to grant his request, and Virginia in 1776 organized the lands in Kentucky into a county. Henderson's efforts, however, were not altogether fruitless, for the Transylvania Company was given 200,000 acres in the new county. In 1792, after Virginia had abandoned its claim to the territory south of the Ohio, Kentucky became the fifteenth state to enter the union.

As early as 1769 a band of Virginia frontiersmen, led by James Robertson and John Sevier, had settled near the Watauga River in Tennessee. The Watauga pioneers were soon joined by backcountry farmers from North Carolina. In 1772 the inhabitants of the region organized a government and negotiated a treaty with the Cherokee Indians. The new government, which operated under a constitution known as the Watauga Association, lasted until North Carolina reasserted its claim to the region in 1776 and converted it into a county. Eight years later, when North Carolina ceded its western territory to the Confederation and stopped its annual payments to the Cherokees, the Wataugans again had to fend for themselves. At two conventions they drew up a constitution, elected John Sevier as Governor, and named their territory the state of Franklin. The new state had a short, perilous, and chaotic history. Torn by internal dissension and menaced by hostile Indians, it also had to contend with North Carolina, which had can-

celled its 1784 cession and attempted to regain control over its former western lands. In 1790, however, North Carolina again relinquished its western claims; and in 1796 the former state of Franklin merged with the settlements around Nashborough (which had been established in 1780 by James Robertson) to form the state of Tennessee.

While pioneers were transforming the wilderness south of the Ohio into a series of new commonwealths, only a comparatively small number of settlers were moving into the Old Northwest. In 1784 there were less than four thousand white inhabitants in the entire region, and most of these were in communities that had been established by the French. At the same time between thirty and forty thousand Indians lived north of the Ohio. Because the land could not be settled until the Indian titles had been extinguished, treaties were negotiated in 1784 with the Iroquois and in 1785 with the Chippewa, Delaware, Ottawa and Wyandot. These agreements extinguished the Indian claims to virtually all of Ohio.

Although the states did not relinquish their claims to the Northwest until 1786, Congress began to take steps to organize this immense colonial domain soon after the Articles of Confederation went into effect. After considering two other proposals, Congress in 1784 adopted an ordinance drafted by Jefferson that provided that the territory should forever remain a part of the United States; that it should be subject to the Congress and the Articles of Confederation; that it should be divided into ten states; that their constitutions be modeled after those of the original states; that a permanent government be formed and a delegate elected to Congress when the population numbered twenty thousand; that each state be admitted to the union when the number of inhabitants equaled "the least numerous of the thirteen original states"; and that each state formed from it should pay its share of the Revolutionary debts. An article forbidding slavery in any of the national territories after 1800 was rejected by a single vote, and Congress refused to approve Jefferson's proposal that the new states be given such names as Assenisippia, Pelisippia, Cherronesus, Metropotamia and Polypotamia.

The Confederation Congress, which was always hard pressed for funds, was more interested in the revenue that could be produced from land sales in the Northwest than in the territory's political organization. Accordingly, in 1785 Congress passed a Land Ordinance that stated that as soon as the Indian title to the lands north of the Ohio had been acquired by the government the territory should be surveyed into a series of townships 6 miles square. Each of the townships, in turn, was to be divided into 36 lots or "sections" of 640 acres each.

After reserving to the national government one seventh of every

township to satisfy the claims of the soldiers of the Continental Army, and one third of any mineral ore that might be found, the measure directed that the land be distributed among the states and auctioned off alternately by townships or by lots at a minimum cash price of \$1 per acre plus \$36 per township to cover the cost of survey. The Ordinance further provided that the sixteenth section of each township be set aside for the support of education, and that each purchaser receive with his deed a definite description of his holding.

In the months immediately after the adoption of the Land Ordinance of 1785, the Northwest proved more attractive to speculators than to settlers. Because Congress made no move to carry out the provisions of the Ordinance of 1784, individuals were reluctant to take up land at a relatively high price in a region where Indians were a constant menace and where no government existed to protect property rights. But none of these considerations stopped the land speculators, and within a short time a plan for pre-empting large tracts in the Northwest had been drawn up by the Ohio Company of Associates. Organized at the Bunch of Grapes Tavern in Boston on March 1, 1786, by a group of Revolutionary officers, the Ohio Associates hoped that Congress would give them an enormous land grant in exchange for the almost worthless Continental certificates that they had been paid for their military service. In addition, they wanted Congress to organize the territory so that settlers to whom they wished to sell their land would be assured of adequate protection.

To achieve their objectives the Ohio Associates were compelled to undertake delicate—if not illegal—negotiations with Congress. After General Samuel Parsons had tried his hand at this work and failed, the task was entrusted to Manasseh Cutler. A Massachusetts clergyman, botanist, philosopher, and businessman, Cutler also proved to be an adept lobbyist. When Congress refused to listen to his original proposals, he included the Scioto Company of New York in the arrangements, and the deal was consummated. According to Cutler, the transaction involved “a private speculation in which many of the principal characters of America” were concerned. In any event, both companies were given charters by Congress, the Ohio Associates received 1,500,000 acres of land at approximately nine cents an acre, and the Scioto Company obtained an option—which it never took up—on 3,500,000 acres.

Two weeks before Cutler had concluded his negotiations, Congress adopted the Northwest Ordinance (July 12, 1787) for the organization of the territory. Under the terms of the Ordinance the territory was to be divided into not less than three nor more than five states. Until the area had a population of five thousand free males, it would be administered by a governor, three judges, and a secretary, all of whom were

to be appointed by Congress. In the second stage of its administration, the territory was to have a representative assembly with power to make laws subject to the governor's veto, a council selected from a list of names submitted by the territorial legislature, and a nonvoting delegate in Congress. When any of the proposed states within the territory had a population of sixty thousand free inhabitants, it could be admitted to the Union "on an equal footing with the original states." Finally, six "articles of compact" in the ordinance provided for personal liberty, religious freedom, the introduction of a system of free public education, and the exclusion of slavery.

The Northwest Ordinance was a radical departure from the colonial policies of the major powers of the Old World. In the past, colonists had been viewed as fit subjects for exploitation, but the Northwest Ordinance not only granted certain fundamental rights to all the inhabitants of the territory, but it also assured them that their political status would soon be the same as that enjoyed by the residents of the established states. In this fashion the traditional rivalry between colony and mother country was largely eliminated before it had an opportunity to develop, and a plan was devised for the orderly incorporation of new areas into the United States. The Northwest Ordinance demonstrated both the determination of the new nation to avoid the British mistakes of the colonial period and the ability of its people to translate the theories of democracy into the reality of self-government.

In July, 1788, General Arthur St. Clair arrived in the Northwest to take up his duties as the territory's first Governor. A month earlier a small band of New Englanders led by Rufus Putnum had founded the town of Marietta at the mouth of the Muskingum River. In the same year Cincinnati was established on a part of the million acres that Judge John Cleves Symmes of New Jersey had contracted to purchase on terms similar to those obtained by the Ohio Associates. Meanwhile, the Scioto Company, which was little more than a paper organization, sent Joel Barlow, the poet, to France to sell some of the land that it did not possess in the Northwest. Barlow did his job so well that within a short time almost six hundred Frenchmen had migrated to America to settle these lands. After their arrival they learned that they had been swindled, and only a few of the original company proceeded to the Northwest. Settling at Gallipolis (1790) on the banks of the Ohio opposite the mouth of the Great Kanawha, the French pioneers suffered innumerable hardships and extreme privation. To their other troubles was added the threat of eviction, for they had taken up land granted to the Ohio Company. It was not until Congress allotted them a suitable tract of land in 1795 that they were able to cope with the problems of life in the wilderness.

44. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AMERICAN pioneers in the Northwest were constantly menaced by the British and their Indian allies. In the Treaty of Paris the British had agreed to abandon their military and fur-trading posts in the Northwest as rapidly as possible. But at a secret meeting in the British Colonial Office on April 8, 1784—the day before the treaty went into effect—the British decided to retain these posts. Control of the posts would enable the British to enlist the aid of friendly Indians in checking the advance of American settlement and to protect the lucrative Scotch-Canadian fur trade in the Northwest, which was completely dependent on British military and economic protection for its successful operation. Furthermore, if the new nation did not survive—and many officials in London were predicting that its collapse was only a matter of time—these posts would enable the British to obtain the Northwest by default. The British therefore not only ignored Congress' repeated requests to evacuate the posts but also forbade the use of the Great Lakes to Americans and posted a customs officer at Oswego.

Great Britain's refusal to withdraw from the Northwest was matched by the United States' violation of the Treaty of Paris' provision for the payment of the debts that individual Americans had owed the British since 1776. Under the terms of the peace treaty, it was "agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all *bona fide* debts heretofore contracted." But Congress was unable to prevent the states from passing bills that placed "lawful impediments" in the way of British creditors seeking to collect the money owed them. If the dispute over the Northwest posts made manifest Congress' inability to achieve its aims in international affairs, the debts controversy just as fully demonstrated that Congress was powerless to coerce the American states.

The disagreements with Great Britain over treatment of the Loyalists and compensation for stolen slaves also revealed Congress' impotence in both foreign and domestic affairs. The Treaty of Paris provided that persecution of the Loyalists "be discontinued" and "that Congress . . . also recommend to the several states, that the estates, rights and properties . . . [of the Loyalists] be restored to them." There was practically no persecution of the Loyalists after the war; but all the states refused to abide by the compensation clause. Congress lived up to the letter of the treaty by making repeated recommendations to the states, but there the matter ended. To many Americans, their failure to compensate the Loyalists was balanced by Great Britain's refusal to abide

by the treaty provision that required her to pay for the three thousand slaves stolen by her soldiers during the war. In a short time, however, these questions were pushed into the background by more important matters.

The United States' relations with Spain were no more satisfactory than those with Britain. Moreover, the Spanish in the Southwest were pursuing a policy in many respects similar to that of the British in the Northwest. Although the Treaty of Paris granted the United States all the territory north of Florida and gave the Americans the right to navigate the Mississippi, the Spanish ignored both provisions. Maintaining that the southern border of the United States was at $32^{\circ} 28'$ instead of 31° , as claimed by the Americans, the Spanish made every effort to occupy the disputed territory. Like the English in the Northwest, they refused to relinquish their posts in the region and enlisted the aid of powerful Indian tribes—in this instance, the Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw—to check the westward advance of American settlers. In addition, the Spanish purchased with gold the temporary allegiance of a number of American frontier leaders. Many Westerners—among them were James Robertson, George Rogers Clark and John Sevier—negotiated with the Spanish, but no other American went as far as James Wilkinson. In 1787, Wilkinson, who had fought in the Revolution, moved from Kentucky to New Orleans, where he swore allegiance to the Spanish Crown and accepted an annual payment in return for his efforts to create a secessionist movement in the Southwest.

Far more important than either Spanish gold or hostile Indians in the conflict between the United States and Spain in the Southwest was the control of the Mississippi River. Because farmers beyond the Alleghenies had to export to live and because the cost of sending goods overland to the East was prohibitive, the West's entire economy was dependent on the Mississippi and its tributaries. Pioneers in the region were forced to use the Mississippi as a highway on which they shipped their surplus produce to New Orleans, where they could transfer it to ocean-going vessels. Consequently, when the Spanish in 1784 closed the river to Americans, the economic life of all the Southwest was jeopardized. The Westerners immediately appealed to Congress for assistance, and in 1785, John Jay, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, sought to work out a compromise with Diego de Gardoqui, the Spanish minister to the United States. Although the two diplomats also discussed the boundary dispute, Indian problems, and a possible commercial treaty, the Mississippi remained the most important item on the agenda throughout the negotiations. At one point Jay, who was closely affiliated with Northeastern business interests, declared that the United States would renounce its right to navigate the Mississippi for twenty-five to thirty years in return for a favorable trade agreement. But this proposal

was not acceptable to either the South or West, and in 1787 the negotiations ended with nothing accomplished.

Great Britain, as well as Spain, refused to conclude a commercial treaty with the United States. At the end of the war the Americans were anxious to resume their trade with England, but the British quickly revealed that they were determined to make their former colonies pay dearly for independence. In 1783 Parliament adopted a Navigation Act that restricted all trade with the British West Indies to British built and British owned ships and imposed heavy tonnage duties on American vessels in English ports. Another Navigation Act, adopted in 1787, prohibited the importation of American goods into England by way of foreign lands. Furthermore, the British refused to send a diplomatic representative to the United States before 1791; and John Adams, the first American minister to the Court of St. James, was treated with "dry decency and cold civility" until he returned home in 1788.

The weakness of the Confederation government prevented it from either retaliating against Great Britain or negotiating commercial treaties with other important maritime nations. During the Confederation period, the United States had commercial treaties only with France (1778), Holland (1782), Sweden (1783), Prussia (1785), and Morocco (1787). Moreover, throughout these years the Barbary pirates from Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis seized American sailors and ships in the Mediterranean; and Congress possessed neither the power to prevent these seizures nor the money to ransom the American sailors who had been captured.

45. CRITICAL YEARS

THROUGHOUT most of the Confederation period, the Americans had to contend not only with hostile European powers but also with a severe depression that affected every phase of economic activity in the new nation. The short business boom immediately following the war soon collapsed; and the new republic found itself in the midst of a depression that lasted until 1787. Even before the treaty of peace was signed, there were indications that economic activity was slackening. Army contracts and privateering came to an end, demand for goods decreased, debts remained unpaid, and by the opening of 1784 many businessmen found themselves in financial straits. Others also felt the pinch. Farmers, unable to market their surplus products, had difficulty in meeting their taxes and interest charges. Soldiers returning from the army were obliged to sell their wage certificates at one eighth of their face value. Thousands of artisans and laborers were unable to obtain employment.

Congress' inability to carry out either its domestic or foreign policies aggravated the impact of the depression on every branch of American business. Manufacturing, which had enjoyed an unprecedented boom during the war, came to a virtual standstill after the peace. Since the Confederation could not establish import duties and Great Britain was determined to regain its pre-Revolutionary markets at all costs, the American manufacturer could not withstand the British competition. During the months immediately following the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain glutted the former colonies with cheap manufactured goods. In desperation the home producer petitioned Congress, but Congress was unable to help. His pressure upon the state governments met with more success, for between 1783 and 1788 all the states with the exception of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware levied tonnage dues upon British vessels or discriminatory tariffs upon British goods. But the effect of this action was minimized or completely neutralized by the fact that the duties were not uniform, and the British vessels therefore used the free or cheapest ports.

Scarcely less desperate was the situation of the American shipper. At the time peace was concluded, Great Britain persistently refused to negotiate a commercial treaty with the United States. While continuing to encourage the former colonists to send her needed commodities, England closed her doors to American fish-oil, whale fins, blubber, and spermaceti. She also forbade the United States to participate in the carrying trade of her West Indian possessions, or to send salt meats or fish to them even in British vessels. The interruption of the West Indian trade seriously interfered with the coastwise trade and the slave traffic; made it impossible for the Americans to secure much-needed specie and bills of exchange with which to pay for foreign goods; and severely handicapped such domestic manufactures as the rum industry and ship-building.

During these lean years American merchants were also hard hit. Like the manufacturers they had to compete with the British, who, not content with flooding the country with their goods, also undertook to distribute them. As a consequence every town of any importance had its British agents or factors. In April, 1785, Boston merchants, following prewar precedent, held a meeting in Faneuil Hall, where they voted to petition Congress "for laws putting our commerce on an equality," made arrangements to communicate with committees in other colonies, and pledged themselves not only to boycott the British factors but to prevent so far as possible others from doing business with them. They agreed not to lease warehouses to the British and not to employ any person who helped the British. This anti-English feeling was widespread in the Northern states. The British refusal to vacate the trading posts in the Northwest, contrary to the provisions of the peace treaty,

deprived the Americans of a large share of the profits of the fur trade, and added to the feeling against Great Britain.

Lack of a uniform national currency and governmental machinery for facilitating interstate trade also worked great hardships on the domestic merchant. The heavy importation of foreign goods in 1783-4 drained the country of most of its specie, and what was left was debased in value by clippers and counterfeiters. Paper currency with its constant fluctuations was hated by most businessmen, for they could never be quite certain of its value. New Jersey paper money, for instance, was practically worthless in New York. Furthermore, there were numerous and conflicting state tariffs on goods that originated abroad. On the other hand, recent researches have demonstrated that such tariffs seldom applied to commodities originating in other states and that interstate trade was not as much hampered by restrictive regulations as historians had once supposed.

The moneylender and speculator likewise felt the effects of depression. At the beginning of 1784 the indebtedness of the several states was approximately \$21,000,000, and that of the national government totaled close to \$40,000,000. Although the national debt was slightly reduced during the next few years by the receipts from the sale of public lands, the interest on it remained unpaid. Furthermore, the national treasury expended in the neighborhood of \$4,500,000 from 1784 to 1789, of which about half came from foreign loans and the remainder from requisitions on the states. In 1786 the national financial system broke down completely. Loans, either domestic or foreign, could be obtained only with the greatest difficulty; requisitions were of slight avail, and efforts to secure funds by means of a national tax failed. Holders of government bonds, whether original subscribers or speculators who had acquired them at greatly reduced figures, had ample reason to be alarmed. Moreover, the moneylenders were injured by the widespread use of paper money and by the enactment of stay laws closing the courts to creditors.

Since sovereignty was vested in the states, the central government, even if so disposed, was powerless to aid the nation's business groups. It could not, for example, raise funds with which to pay the interest or principal on public securities, for under the Articles, Congress was forced to rely on a requisition system similar to that employed by England in colonial days. During the years 1782-3, Congress asked the states for \$10,000,000 but received less than \$1,500,000. As early as 1781 the weakness of the central government was revealed when Congress, acting on the suggestion of "divers inhabitants of the state of Pennsylvania," proposed that the Articles be amended so as to authorize the levy by the Confederation of a 5 per cent duty on imports. But this and similar proposals were blocked by the dissenting voice of Rhode Island

and New York. And what was true of the attempts to secure revenue was also true of Congress' efforts to prevent the several states from enacting conflicting and oftentimes prohibitory tariffs against non-American articles.

46. RADICAL PROTESTS

TO THE conservatives, who had opposed the new government since its inception, the Articles of Confederation had proved to be—just as they had predicted—a disastrous experiment. Congress not only had failed miserably in its dealings with foreign nations, but it had also demonstrated that it was totally incapable of preventing the various state legislatures from putting extremely radical programs into effect. During the ten-year period 1775–85 the radicals gained either full or partial political control, or constituted a powerful minority, in North Carolina and Georgia and in all the Northern states except Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware. Consequently, they were instrumental in shaping much of the legislation enacted by these commonwealths—legislation that was not always to the liking of the conservatives. During the dark years of 1785–6, farmers, small retailers, laboring men, and debtors in general often found themselves unable to meet their obligations; their possessions passed into the hands of tax gatherers and creditors by means of foreclosure and seizure, and they themselves were thrown into prison. They resorted to drastic measures. Stay laws, impairment of contracts, legal tender acts, increased issues of paper money, and the closing of the courts to suits for debt were among the more important legislative steps taken to ward off harassing sheriffs. These attempts were sometimes supplemented by acts of violence; mobs in Windsor and Rutland counties, Vermont, tried to prevent the courts from holding sessions, and the courthouse at Plymouth, New Hampshire, was burned.

In Rhode Island the struggle over paper money produced a memorable and significant judicial decision. In an effort to enforce the state's paper money regulations, the legislature adopted a law providing for the trial before a juryless court of three judges of anyone who would not accept paper money. In 1786, John Weeden, a Newport butcher, refused to sell meat for paper money to one John Trevett. When the case came to trial, James M. Varnum, who was Weeden's counsel, maintained that the law in question was unconstitutional. In his argument to the court Varnum said: "The legislative have the uncontrollable power of making laws not repugnant to the constitution. The judiciary have the sole power of judging those laws and are bound to execute

them; but cannot admit any act of the legislative as law, which is against the constitution." Varnum then applied this principal to the statute in question and concluded that the court was "under the solemn obligations to execute the laws of the land, and therefore cannot, will not consider this act as law of the land." The judges accepted this line of reasoning and unanimously declared the law unconstitutional. In the next election, two of the judges were defeated, and all three were re-proved by the assembly. But in sustaining the principle of judicial review in *Trevett vs. Weeden*, the judges were relying on a doctrine that was to become one of the distinguishing characteristics of the subsequent constitutional history of the United States.

Throughout the Confederation period Massachusetts suffered more from internal dissension and unrest than any other state. From the seventeenth century on the cleavage between the propertied and poorer classes had become increasingly pronounced. The former, moreover, was outspoken in its opposition to the participation of the common people in government. Only the well-born and the well-to-do were in its opinion qualified to rule, and it discountenanced every effort of the rank and file to attain some political influence. It was fear of the nonpropertied element with its demands for equality and for increased participation in the affairs of Massachusetts that had caused the conservatives to draft a state constitution in 1780 that doubled the property qualification for voting. The situation in Massachusetts was already tense when in 1786 the legislature, acting on the suggestion of the new Governor, James Bowdoin, voted a tax of £311,000, an average of about \$20 for every household of five. The proceeds of this tax, which fell more heavily on farmer than on merchant and moneylender, were to be used in part to pay off the state's Revolutionary debts, which had passed largely into the hands of speculators. But this tax, together with the indebtedness incurred during the boom period, was more than the poorer families of the state could pay. Local retailers and moneylenders, however, pressed by Boston merchants, who in turn were being crowded by British creditors, had to have money. Thousands of debtors lost everything, and the jails overflowed with prisoners confined for debt.

The debtors, particularly in the central and western portions of the state, hurriedly called town and county conventions, which demanded that the legislature redress their grievances. Their petitions criticized the continued existence of the state senate and some of the higher courts (notably the Court of Common Pleas), the system of representation, exorbitant fees, the method of paying the state debt, unequal taxation, and the lack of currency. Above all, they wanted the state debt scaled down, the special privileges enjoyed by property eliminated from the Constitution, additional paper currency issued, and the lot of the debtor, whether farmer or townsman, made easier.

Their creed [wrote General Knox to Washington] is that the property of the United States has been protected from the confiscation of Britain by the joint exertions of all; and, therefore, ought to be the common property of all; and he that attempts opposition to this creed is an enemy of equality and justice, and ought to be swept from the face of the earth. In a word, they are determined to annihilate all debts, public and private, and have agrarian laws, which are easily effected by the means of unfunded paper money, which shall be a tender in all cases whatsoever. . . . We shall have a formidable rebellion against reason, the principle of all government, and against the very name of liberty.

“Instead of cheerfully paying as far as they are able their own private debts, retrenching their idle, unnecessary expenses, and contributing their portion to support a government of their own making,” a member of the creditor class wrote, “we see them assembling conventions to do acts treasonable to the State.” Their leaders, he continued, were “destitute of property, without reputation, hardy and factious in their tempers, and eminent only for their vices and depravity.” Still another conservative labeled them “bankrupts and sots who have gambled or slept away their estates” and a “multitude of tavern-haunting politicians.”

Condemned by those higher up and unable to secure redress from the legislature, the debtors rebelled. In August, 1786, insurgents seized the courthouse in Northampton and forcibly prevented the court from sitting. Less than a week later another insurgent band took possession of the courthouse in Worcester and compelled the court to adjourn. A little later a mob not only prevented the court from sitting at Great Barrington but released all the imprisoned debtors. Similar disturbances occurred in other disaffected areas. Alarmed at the turn of events, Governor Bowdoin summoned a special session of the legislature; but since several of its members were more or less in sympathy with the insurgents, the legislature failed to get at the heart of the difficulties, although it promised to redress grievances and took steps to protect the courts. Meanwhile an insurgent force led by Daniel Shays, who had fought at Lexington, Bunker Hill, Saratoga, and Stony Point, forced an adjournment of the court at Springfield. Late in 1786, General Benjamin Lincoln was despatched with a force of four thousand troops to suppress Shays' Rebellion, and during the winter of 1787 he succeeded in quashing it. Despite the desire of certain conservatives that the rebels be severely punished, the legislature, sensing majority opinion, granted amnesty to all—even to Shays. Law and order had triumphed, but so deep-seated was the feeling on the part of the poorer classes that Governor Bowdoin was decisively defeated when he stood for re-election.

47. MOVEMENT FOR A STRONGER UNION

BY 1786 it was evident to all but the most prejudiced contemporaries that the government of the United States was a government in name only. The radicals had had their day, and now the conservatives were to have the opportunity to become the receivers of the politically bankrupt Confederation. To most of the conservatives the ills suffered by the young republic could be attributed to too much agrarianism and democracy. They felt—and the record seemed to bear them out—that as long as small farmers were allowed to control some of the states and the states were permitted to dominate or ignore the central government, there was little chance for the country to be prosperous and its citizens happy and contented. Rhode Island was held up to the country as a commonwealth poisoned by democracy and popular rule. And Shays' Rebellion with its armed attack upon lawyers and courts, its intimidation of legislators, its appeal for the repudiation of debts, was cited as certain evidence that the rank and file were not fit to govern. In place of a central government at the beck and call of sovereign states, the conservatives wished to establish a centralized government that would itself exercise sovereign powers. Such a government would pay the debts of the country past and present, establish a sound currency, regulate commerce, protect manufactures, properly distribute the western lands, carry out treaty agreements, and protest against aggressions of foreign nations.

The movement for a stronger central government had its beginning even before the close of the war. As early as 1780, Alexander Hamilton, then only twenty-three years of age, had written: "The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty in each state . . . will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious. . . . Congress should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance." During the next two years Hamilton in a series of papers enlarged upon what seemed to him to be the shortcomings of the Articles and urged that the Federal government be given the powers of taxation, regulation of commerce, and disposal of ungranted land. In 1783, Pelatiah Webster, a Yale graduate and a merchant and economist of some note, published *A Dissertation on the Political Union and Constitution of the Thirteen United States of North-America*, in which he elaborated a scheme of centralized government that he considered to be a vast improvement over that existing under the Articles of Confederation. In 1785, Noah Webster, author of the famous spelling book and dictionary, wrote a tract entitled *Plan of Policy for Improving the Ad-*

vantages and Perpetuating the Union of the American States, in which he made an earnest appeal that the Federal government be modeled after the pattern of the state governments. In the same year Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts, aware of the discontent in his own state, suggested the necessity of a stronger union, and the legislature of the Commonwealth adopted a resolution declaring the Articles of Confederation inadequate and recommending that a convention be called to revise them.

As early as 1784 the Virginia legislature had adopted a resolution framed by James Madison appointing commissioners to meet with those of Maryland for the purpose of discussing proposals for improving the navigation of the Potomac. Washington, who had large holdings in western lands, was understandably interested in this project, and at his suggestion the delegates met at Mount Vernon in 1785. After the spokesmen for the two states had agreed on plans for the Potomac, the Maryland legislature proposed that representatives from Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia meet to examine their common commercial problems. The Virginia legislature, after seconding this proposal, issued a call to all the states for a convention to meet at Annapolis on the first Monday in September, 1786. In its invitation, the Virginia legislature stated that the states would "consider how a uniform system in their commercial regulations may be necessary to their common interests and their permanent harmony."

Although nine states appointed delegates to the Annapolis Convention, only five—Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia—were actually represented. Instead of carrying out the express purpose for which it had been called, the convention adopted a report by Hamilton that pointed to the critical situation in the states and advised them to send delegates to another convention to meet in Philadelphia in May, 1787. Hamilton recommended that the delegates to this convention "devise such further provisions as shall appear . . . necessary as to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the union." To allay the suspicions of the radicals he added that any amendment that the Philadelphia Convention might agree to must, in accordance with the Articles, be submitted to the states for their approval.

Hamilton's proposal was at once forwarded to the state legislatures and to the Congress, and on February 21, 1787, Congress issued a call for the convention. It was even more explicit than Hamilton in stating that the sole purpose of the convention was the revision of the Articles. Neither the Annapolis gathering nor the Congress specified the manner in which the delegates were to be chosen, and in no instance were they chosen by popular vote. By May, 1787, all the states except New Hampshire and Rhode Island, acting through their legislatures, had chosen

delegates. New Hampshire subsequently sent two delegates, after John Langdon, a wealthy Portsmouth merchant, offered to defray the expenses of its delegation. Rhode Island, where the conservatives had lost control of the legislature and the government had repudiated its financial obligations to the Confederation, refused to participate in the convention.

The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 was strikingly different from the First or even the Second Continental Congress. Of the sixty-two delegates appointed, fifty-five attended the sessions with more or less regularity, and thirty-nine put their names to the final draft of the new Constitution. Though not an "assembly of semi-gods," as Jefferson once said, the convention nevertheless contained a good number of the outstanding men of America. On the other hand there were no radicals like Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, or Thomas Paine; and small farmers, mechanics, and laborers were in reality not represented. The majority were lawyers with experience in public life; seven, for example, had been state governors; nearly thirty had served in Congress, and eight had signed the Declaration of Independence. Washington, certainly one of the most respected men in America, was unanimously chosen president of the convention. Those who sat under him—among whom were Robert Morris, Luther Martin, John Dickinson, Charles C. Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, James Wilson, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Roger Sherman, Elbridge Gerry, Edmund Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham, John Langdon, John Rutledge, and George Wythe—were men of affairs who believed that they could save the country from ruin and possible civil war by establishing a centralized system of government.

In the course of the debates in the convention, the delegates repeatedly demonstrated that they were not interested in fine-spun political theories but in the hard realities of the problems with which they had to contend. Madison, Hamilton, Martin, and others were versed in the history of government and political theory, but such excursions as were made into these fields were, as Professor Robert L. Schuyler has said, "purple patches"—embellishments as it were—rather than integral parts of the proceedings. Uppermost in their minds at all times was the desire to provide the kind of government that would function best for the ends they had in view. This desire was responsible for the numerous utterances in the convention about the dangers of democracy. Gerry of Massachusetts, for instance, opposed the election of the House of Representatives by popular vote. "The evils we experience," he said, "flow from the excess of democracy," and he decried "the danger of the levelling spirit." William Livingston of New Jersey declared that "the people ever have been and ever will be unfit to retain the exercise of power in their own hands." Charles Pinckney of South Carolina so dis-

trusted the common people that he proposed high property qualifications for Federal office holders. Edmund Randolph of Virginia, who was even more skeptical of the political wisdom of the untutored and propertyless, attributed all the distress suffered by property owners during the post-Revolutionary years to "the turbulence and follies of democracy." In like manner, Roger Sherman of Connecticut advocated reducing popular influence in the new government to a minimum. Alexander Hamilton of New York elaborated upon the "imprudence of democracy." "All communities," he said, "divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well-born, the other the mass of the people," who "seldom judge or determine right."

48. DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION

ALTHOUGH the convention was scheduled to open on May 14, 1787, the first meeting, which was attended by twenty-nine delegates, was not held until May 25. In the ensuing months, the delegates deliberated behind closed doors, maintained the strictest secrecy, kept no account of their debates, and recorded only propositions before the convention and the votes for and against them. Soon after the opening session the delegates decided to draw up a new constitution rather than to attempt to revise the Articles of Confederation. By a vote of six states to one with one state divided, the convention resolved that "a national government ought to be established consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary." Although the word "national" was subsequently eliminated from the resolution, the separation of powers with its implied system of checks and balances formed the basic framework around which the governmental machinery was built.

The central question confronting the delegates was how much authority to grant to the parts and how much to give the whole—a problem that neither the British rulers of the colonial period nor the authors of the Articles of Confederation had been able to solve. The first answer was suggested by the delegates from Virginia, who had arrived at Philadelphia before the delegates from the other states and who had used the time at their disposal to draw up a plan for a new central government. What came to be known as the Virginia Plan provided for a two-house legislature composed of members apportioned among the states on the basis of free white population; the members of the lower house were to be elected by the people of the several states and those of the upper house were to be chosen by the lower house from persons nominated by the state legislatures. An executive—either an individual or a group of men—was to be selected by the legislature and to be ineligible

for a second term. The judiciary was to consist of a supreme court and inferior courts. The acts of the legislature, which was authorized to pass on the constitutionality of state laws, were subject to review by a council of revision consisting of the executive and part of the judiciary. The Virginia Plan accurately reflected the interests of the larger states and clearly revealed that its framers believed in a far greater degree of centralization than prevailed under the Articles of Confederation.

Four days after the opening of the convention, Edmund Randolph presented the Virginia Plan to the delegates. In the ensuing debate, which lasted for two weeks, it became apparent that the smaller states—in this instance, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey and New York—were opposed to many features of the Virginia Plan. The “small-state men,” in the words of Andrew C. McLaughlin (in *The Confederation and Constitution, 1783-1789*):

*were controlled by various motives. Some were determined to maintain the principle of the Confederation. . . . They wished rather to patch up the old than to create a new system. And yet even these men were willing to grant additional authority to Congress, and even to bestow the right to coerce a delinquent state, for all men of sense had learned that mere promises were futile. Others, although not averse to a national government, were fearful, with the old-time fear, that the larger states would devour the small. In part their contention was not for principle but for power.**

On June 14, William Paterson of New Jersey laid before the delegates the small states' program. Known as the New Jersey Plan, it called for the revision instead of the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation. Federal rather than national in spirit, the New Jersey Plan provided for a single-chambered congress in which each state was to have one vote, a plural executive chosen by Congress, and a Federal judicial system. Congress was to have the authority to admit new states, to obtain funds through requisitions on the states, to impose tariffs on imports, and to regulate trade.

After a week of debate, the convention failed to take any action on the New Jersey Plan. But the small states were still unwilling to accept the Virginia Plan, and a committee was appointed to devise a formula that would be acceptable to both factions. On July 16, the committee's report was approved, and the way was cleared for the resolution of this most vexing problem. Under the plan that was finally adopted, provision was made for a two-house legislature; members in the House of Representatives, or lower house, were to be apportioned among the states

* Andrew C. McLaughlin: *The Confederation and the Constitution* (*The American Nation Series*, edited by Albert Bushnell Hart, Vol. X; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1905), pp. 208-09.

largely on the basis of population, elected biennially by popular vote, and paid from the national treasury. In the Senate, or upper house, each state was allotted two members to be elected for a six year term by its legislature. Unlike the members of the Congress of the Confederation, each senator could vote individually, and he received his compensation from the national treasury.

Slavery, as well as the dispute between the large and small states, was a troublesome question that split the convention into two clearly defined groups. Although the delegates made a conscious effort to avoid the subject and although the word "slave" does not appear in the Constitution, the problem could not be ignored. The Northern delegates accepted the Southern view that the slaves were property but wanted them taxed as such. The South, on the other hand, wished to consider slaves as men in apportioning representatives in Congress. After much jockeying this issue was settled by the so-called "federal ratio" compromise, which counted five slaves as three whites for both taxation and representation.

The slave trade presented another problem, which was closely related to another issue that divided North and South—the regulation of commerce. Northern commercial interests, anxious to promote their special advantages, thought that Congress should have full power to enact navigation acts, levy duties on imports and exports, and regulate the foreign slave trade. The South was opposed to export taxes and to any step that would sacrifice its interests as a staple-exporting section. Although the slave trade was denounced in the convention by prominent Southerners like George Mason of Virginia and Luther Martin of Maryland, the delegation from South Carolina and Georgia threatened to oppose the Constitution if Congress was given power to interfere with the slave traffic. But the North fully realized that unlimited importation of slaves, coupled with the "federal ratio" compromise, might give the South a preponderance of political power that it might use to the detriment of the North. Another bargain adjusted this difficulty: Congress was authorized to regulate commerce, but was forbidden to prohibit the foreign slave trade before 1808; Congress was given the power, however, to levy an import duty upon slaves of not more than ten dollars each.

When the convention turned to the problem of creating an executive branch for the new government, the delegates had to choose from a number of possibilities. Those who feared the dangers of what they called mob rule thought that the president should serve for life; those who feared autocracy favored a relatively short term. Some delegates believed that the executive should be granted extensive powers; others felt that he should be a figurehead. Finally, there was a sharp cleavage between those who advocated that the president be selected by Con-

gress and those who proposed that he be elected by the people. The problem was solved by putting the selection of the president in the hands of electors who in turn were designated by each state in such manner as its legislature might direct. Each state was entitled to as many electors as it had senators and representatives in Congress. In case the electors failed to give a majority to any one person, the choice of a president then devolved upon the House of Representatives, where each state would have one vote. The president could be removed from office after the House had instituted impeachment proceedings and the Senate, sitting as a court, had by a two-thirds majority voted for his conviction. His term was four years, and he was eligible for re-election.

The president was given extensive authority by the convention. He was directed to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"; he had the right to call Congress into extraordinary sessions; and he could veto acts of Congress (although a two-thirds vote in both houses could override his veto). In addition Section 2 of Article 1 of the Constitution provided:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States. . . .

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.

The judicial system of the new government was one of the few major subjects that produced practically no disagreement in the convention. Both the New Jersey and Virginia Plans called for a Federal judicial system, for the delegates were fully aware of the unsatisfactory results of the Confederation's delegation of all judicial authority to the state courts. Consequently, the convention created an independent Federal judiciary headed by a Supreme Court, the members of which were appointed by the president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for life or during good behavior. Provision was also made for such in-

ferior courts as might from time to time be deemed necessary. The Federal courts were given jurisdiction over

all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;—to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;—to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;—to controversies between two or more states;—between a state and citizens of another state;—between citizens of different states;—between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

In cases “affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party,” the Supreme Court was granted original jurisdiction. In all other cases it had appellate jurisdiction.

The delegates’ fear of democracy accounted in large part for the system of checks and balances that they devised for the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government. When after prolonged debate it became obvious that proposals for restricting the suffrage entailed serious administrative problems, they decided that popular rule could be just as effectively thwarted by an ingenious division of power and responsibility among the three branches of the government. The legislature was checked by its division into two houses, by the president’s veto, and by the power of the judiciary to declare its acts null and void. Even if the majority should control the lower house, as Madison feared it would,* there seemed little likelihood that it could put upon the statute books legislation detrimental to the minority. The executive, removed from the passions of the populace by the method of selection, was checked by the Senate in the matter of treaties and appointments. The Supreme Court, the members of which were appointed for life by the president with the approval of the Senate, was far removed from the people. Finally, the several states were forbidden

* Madison expressed his view on this point as follows: “The landed interest, at present, is prevalent, but in process of time . . . when the number of landholders shall be comparatively small . . . will not the landed interests be overbalanced in future elections? and, unless wisely provided against, what will become of our government? In England, at this day, if elections were open to all classes of people, the property of landed proprietors would be insecure. An Agrarian law would take place. If these observations be just, our government ought to secure the permanent interests of the country against innovation. Landholders ought to have a share in the government, to support these invaluable interests, and to balance and check the other. They ought to be so constituted as to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority.” Jonathan Elliot: *Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution*, Vol. I (Washington, D. C.: printed by the editor, 1836), pp. 449–50.

to enact legislation detrimental to the propertied-business interests, and the president was empowered, upon call from the state authorities, to send troops to suppress domestic insurrection.

The system of checks and balances was not the only way by which the delegates sought to prevent the growth of majority rule. Although the Constitution provided for popular participation in the government, the people were permitted to vote directly only for members of the House of Representatives. The president was chosen by electors; the Supreme Court was appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate; and senators were selected in whatever way the state legislatures might decide. Equally significant was the undemocratic method devised for amending the Constitution. Although the Constitution was far easier to alter than the Articles of Confederation, it nevertheless could not be changed by a simple majority. Before a proposed amendment could go into effect, it had to be approved by a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress and to be ratified by the legislatures or conventions of three fourths of the states.

It is frequently asserted that the Constitution is a "bundle of compromises," but it should also be noted that there were certain major issues on which the delegates were in substantial agreement. They did not disagree on the dangers of democracy, and they did not disagree on the desirability of having the Federal government assume many of the powers that had been granted to the states under the Articles of Confederation. There was therefore general unanimity in the convention on practically all the economic and protective provisions in the final draft of the Constitution. With the small farmer and nonpropertied classes to all intents and purposes not represented in the convention, the delegates did not hesitate to grant Congress the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, and to coin and borrow money, regulate interstate and foreign commerce, fix the standard of weights and measures, provide for patents and copyrights, establish post offices, raise and support armies, maintain a navy, and pay all debts contracted by the United States before the adoption of the Constitution. To safeguard against the passage of radical economic legislation by the states, they were forbidden to coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin legal tender in payment of debts, make any law impairing the obligation of contracts, or lay imposts or duties on imports or exports or on tonnage.

Although it is difficult to ascertain the precise nature of any individual's motives, it seems reasonable to conclude that many of the delegates at the Philadelphia convention were motivated at least in part by economic considerations. Their experiences under the Confederation, their remarks both before and during the convention, and the fashion in which they assigned the major economic powers to the Federal gov-

ernment rather than to the states all tend to support this conclusion. On the other hand, this point should not obscure all others concerning the Constitution and its framers. Various delegates repeatedly referred to the inefficiency of the Confederation government and its weakness in foreign affairs, and there is no reason why the student should not take them at their word. Furthermore, the improvement of their individual economic positions and the strengthening of the central government were not mutually exclusive, and it seems reasonable to assume that most delegates were swayed by both, rather than by only one, of these considerations. Finally—and most important of all—any estimate of the motivation of the Founding Fathers becomes relatively insignificant when compared to their accomplishments.

The lasting and unique achievement of the framers of the Constitution was their discovery of a way to strengthen the central government without destroying the individual states. By granting certain specific powers to the national government and by permitting the states to retain the residue, they hit upon a plan that permitted the Federal and state governments to operate in two distinct spheres rather than to compete for authority in a single sphere. At the same time, they were able to overcome the principal deficiency of the Confederation by circumventing—and to a large extent eliminating—the question of how to make a state obey the Federal government. Under the Constitution the national government operates directly on the individual rather than indirectly through the states. In this fashion the Confederation Congress' inability to coerce a state was supplanted by the national government's power to coerce individuals. Federal control over the states was further assured by requiring state officials to take an oath to uphold the Constitution. Finally, by making the Constitution the "supreme law of the land" the Founding Fathers made it impossible for the states to adopt an act contrary to the Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution succeeded where all others before them had failed. By devising new methods to reconcile the parts and the whole, they established an effective federal government and made a notable and far-reaching contribution to the development of constitutional theory and practice.

49. RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION

AS SOON as the final draft of the Constitution had been completed, its framers set to work to secure its ratification. Fearing that the state legislatures might be unwilling to accept the new instrument of government with its numerous restraints on state activity, its authors

sent it to the existing Confederation Congress with the advice that that body transmit it in turn to the state legislatures to be submitted by them to special state conventions. As a further aid to the success of their undertaking, they cast aside the old provision in the Articles of Confederation that the fundamental law of the land could not be altered or amended without the unanimous consent of the states and inserted in the new Constitution a provision that it should go into effect as soon as it received the approval of nine states.

The submission of the Constitution to the several states for ratification led at once to an intensive campaign between those who favored its adoption and those who opposed it. The former, styling themselves Federalists, were, with few exceptions, the same individuals who had labored so indefatigably for a central government. At the time David Humphreys of New Haven wrote to Washington that "all the different classes in the liberal professions will be in favor of the proposed Constitution. The Clergy, Lawyers, Physicians & Merchants will have considerable influence on Society. Nor will the Officers of the late Army be backward in expressing their approbation." General Knox, another correspondent of Washington's, declared in October, 1787, that the new Constitution was "received with great joy by all the commercial part of the community." Shortly afterward Madison wrote Jefferson that in New England "the men of letters, the principal Officers of Government, the judges and lawyers and clergy and men of property furnished only here and there an adversary." And Hamilton, surveying the situation at the close of the Philadelphia Convention, felt certain that the new Constitution had

the good will of the commercial interests throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a government capable of regulating, protecting and extending the commerce of the Union, . . . the good will of most men of property in the several states who wish a government of the Union able to protect them against domestic violence and the depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on property;—and who are besides anxious for the respectability of the nation—the hopes of the creditors of the United States that a general government possessing the means of doing it will pay the debt of the Union.

The Anti-Federalists, as the opponents of the Constitution were called, were on the other hand generally recruited from the small-farmer nonpropertied group. The Anti-Federalists distrusted men of superior education and property. "An apprehension that the liberties of the people are in danger, and a distrust of men of property or Education," Rufus King wrote to Madison in January, 1788, "have a more powerful Effect upon the minds of our Opponents than any Specific Objections

against the Constitution." Shortly afterward he asserted that the opposition arose chiefly "from an opinion that is immovable that some injury is plotted against them—that the system is the production of the rich and ambitious, that they discover its operations and that the consequences will be the establishment of two orders in the Society, one comprehending the opulent and the great, the other the poor and illiterate." The opposition in New Hampshire, a citizen of that state informed Washington, "was composed of men who were involved in debt, and in consequence would be averse to any government which was likely to abolish their tender Laws and cut off every hope of accomplishing their favorite plan of introducing a paper currency." In like manner Hamilton pointed out that among those who opposed the adoption of the Constitution were "*inconsiderable* men in possession of considerable offices under the state governments who will fear a diminution of their consequence, power, and emolument by the establishment of the general government and who can hope for nothing there." He added that "some considerable men in office possessed of talents and popularity who partly from the same motives and partly from a desire of *playing a part* in a convulsion for their own aggrandisement will oppose the quiet adoption of the new government." To these causes there should be added, he said:

the disinclination of the people to taxes and of course to a strong government—the opposition of all men much in debt who will not wish to see a government established one object of which is to restrain the means of cheating Creditors—the democratical jealousy of the people which may be alarmed at the appearance of institutions that may seem calculated to place the power of the community in few hands and to raise a few individuals to stations of great prominence.

Between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were many middle-grounders who did not know which party to support. It was this group that Richard Henry Lee had in mind when he wrote:

One party is composed of little insurgents, men in debt, who want no law, and who want a share of the property of others; these are called levellers, Shaysites, etc. The other party is composed of a few, but more dangerous men, with their servile dependents; these avariciously grasp at all power and property; you may discover in all the actions of these men, an evident dislike to free and equal government, and they go systematically to work to change, essentially, the forms of government in this country; these are called aristocrats, moneyites, etc. Between these two parties is the weight of the community; the men of middling property, men not in debt

on the one hand, and men, on the other, content with republican governments, and not aiming at immense fortunes, offices and power. In 1786 the little insurgents, the levellers, came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted to establish governments according to their wills. Their movements evidently gave encouragement to the other party, which in 1787 has taken the political field and with its fashionable dependents, and the tongue and the pen, is endeavoring to establish in a great haste, a politic kind of government. These two parties are really insignificant, compared with the solid, free and independent part of the community.

Though inferior in numbers, the Federalists enjoyed marked advantages over their opponents. The very fact that they were property holders and businessmen and had as allies the professional classes and the majority of the more influential newspaper proprietors enabled them to exercise greater influence than would otherwise have been possible. They were the inheritors of the long-established tradition that property-tied rather than nonproperty-tied interests should rule. They were better organized, had by far the greater number of the leaders of public opinion on their side, and possessed the financial resources necessary for waging a strenuous campaign. Moreover, they had the powerful backing of Washington and the Order of Cincinnati, which had been established by Revolutionary officers. Finally, they were on the whole better educated and better informed than were the Anti-Federalists.

During the campaign the country was flooded with oratory and pamphlet literature. On every hand there were acrimonious attacks and counterattacks. But for sagacity and insight into the stuff of government and politics, two documents among the many produced during the struggle for ratification are unequalled: the *Federalist*, a collection of eighty-five essays, most of which were written by Hamilton and Madison and a few by Jay, and *Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican* by Richard Henry Lee. The former, considered by the Federalists as an unanswerable defense of the Constitution, is remarkable for its comprehensiveness, cogency, and simplicity of statement. Of the *Federalist* essays, number ten, written by Madison, admirably summarizes the Federalist theory of political science.

The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate [was, according to Madison] an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective

proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

"The most common and durable source of factions" or parties, Madison went on to say, had always been the

various and unequal distribution of property. . . . Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests of society. Those who are creditors and those who are debtors fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

While far more restrained than many of his Anti-Federalist compatriots, Lee in his *Letters from the Federal Farmer* stated the principal objections of the opponents to the Constitution. He argued that it was undemocratic, that it was planned to serve the interests of a propertied minority, and that it did not represent the judgment and wishes of the rank and file of the country's population. "Every man of reflection," Lee said, "must see that the change now proposed is a transfer of power from the many to the few." Lee also took exception to what he thought was unseemly haste on the part of Hamilton and others in urging the adoption of the Constitution. The people, he maintained should have time to examine the Constitution fully and to deliberate about its several provisions before being called upon for their final decision. Lee did not attack the Constitution for its omission of a bill of rights, but many opposed it on this ground also.


Four of the smaller and less powerful states—Delaware, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Georgia—promptly ratified the new form of government. In Pennsylvania the opponents of the Constitution in the legislature sought to postpone a decision by absenting themselves so that a ratifying convention could not be summoned for lack of a quorum; but the Federalists dragged two of the absentees back into the assembly room in order to form the quorum, and the legislature at once made provision for the election of delegates to the convention. The convention, in which the Federalists outnumbered the Anti-Federalists two to one, approved the new government on December 12, 1787, less than a week after Delaware, the first state to ratify, had registered its approval. In Massachusetts, where the opponents of a stronger federal government were powerfully represented in the convention, the Federalists delayed an early vote; as it was, the margin of victory for the

Federalists was uncomfortably close, the final vote being 187 to 168. In Maryland and South Carolina those in favor of ratification won sweeping victories. In Virginia, on the other hand, they were successful by the narrow margin of ten votes, 89 delegates voting "yes" and 79 "no." Two states, New Hampshire and New York, returned majorities against ratification. When the New Hampshire convention met on February 13, 1788, it was apparent that a large proportion of the delegates had been instructed to vote against the adoption of the new Constitution.

So confident were we, [wrote one of the Federalist spokesmen] of the prevailing voice in favor of the Constitution that no pains were taken to counteract the intrigues of a few notoriously vile characters, who were too successful in the dark and dirty business of seducing a great number of the interior towns by false representation to fetter their delegates with positive instructions to vote in all events against the Constitution.


Alarmed, the friends of the Constitution managed to secure an adjournment of the convention to the following June, when they were finally successful by a vote of 57 to 47. In New York's ratifying convention, which met in June, 1788, the opponents of the new system had a two-thirds majority, and it was only after a month of negotiation and bickering that the Federalists won by a vote of 30 to 27. So strong was the opposition in North Carolina and Rhode Island that neither state accepted the Constitution until after Washington's inauguration.

Despite the issues at stake, the vast amount of propaganda circulated, and the sharpness of the debate, many failed to express an opinion at the polls. The scanty data available seem to indicate that not more than a third of those entitled to vote participated in the selection of the ratifying conventions. Of the people who went to the polls in New England, those of the seaboard sections, dominated by wealthy merchants, manufacturers, public and private creditors, and professional men, favored the adoption of the new system; those of the backcountry, where debtors and small farmers were in the majority, opposed it. The Massachusetts vote was typical; in the eastern section 73 per cent of the vote favored adoption; in the western, 42 per cent; and in the middle—the scene of Shays' Rebellion—only 14 per cent. In like manner, the strength of the Federalists in the Middle states lay in the seacoast towns. In Virginia the new Constitution was adopted through the efforts of the tidewater planters and the German and Scotch-Irish of the Shenandoah Valley; the piedmont section, whose interests were almost entirely agrarian, was strongly Anti-Federalist. In South Carolina the friends of the Constitution lived in Charleston and along the coast; the backcountry, settled mainly by small farmers, was overwhelmingly opposed to ratification.



4. DATE OF APPROVAL AND DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN

Two facts of importance stand out: (1) Ratification followed neither a sectional nor a large versus small state pattern. The first six states to ratify chronologically were Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts; the last two were North Carolina and Rhode Island. (2) The areas that favored ratification were, with a few exceptions—notably western Virginia—those where there was a concentration of creditors, busi-



THE RATIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

nessmen, and others interested in a stable money market. The areas opposed to ratification were the frontier, debtor, and small farmer regions. To what extent votes were cast for or against ratification on the grounds that the Constitution was too aristocratic or too democratic, that it was too much concerned with rights of property and not enough with human rights, this map does not indicate.

THE FEDERALISTS IN POWER

- 50. ORGANIZING THE NEW GOVERNMENT
 - 51. LAUNCHING THE CONSTITUTION
 - 52. HAMILTON'S FINANCIAL POLICIES
 - 53. ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL CREDIT
 - 54. FOREIGN PROBLEMS
 - 55. THE JAY AND PINCKNEY TREATIES
 - 56. JOHN ADAMS'S ADMINISTRATION
 - 57. THE REPUBLICAN TRIUMPH
-

THE FEDERALIST party occupies a unique position in American history. Composed of many of the ablest men in the United States, it had an outstanding record and a relatively short life. During the twelve years that the Federalists were in power, they organized the new government, set a number of precedents that have never been broken, established a sound financial system, obtained the withdrawal of the British from the Northwest, eliminated the Spanish threat to the Southwest, and prevented the United States from becoming involved in a general European war. Despite these achievements, the Federalists were defeated in the election of 1800, and they never regained control of the executive and legislative branches of the national government. Possessing every requisite of political success except the ability to gauge the popular will, they lost the support of an electorate that preferred self-government to paternalism.

50. ORGANIZING THE NEW GOVERNMENT

WITH the adoption of the Constitution the Federalists won a battle rather than a war. To achieve the objectives of its authors, the Constitution had to be implemented, and this task the Federalists were unwilling to entrust to their opponents. In the interval between the ratification of the Constitution and the first presidential election, Washington wrote:

As the period is now rapidly approaching which must decide the fate of the new Constitution, as to the manner of its being carried into execution and probably as to its usefulness, it is not wonderful that we should all feel an unusual degree of anxiety on the occasion. I must acknowledge that my fears have been greatly alarmed, but still I am not without hopes. . . . There will, however, be no room for the advocates of the Constitution to relax in their exertions; for if they should be lulled into security, appointments of Anti-Federal men may probably take place; and the consequences which you so justly dread be realized.

Many other Federalists shared Washington's apprehensions.

Like the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists were aware of the importance of securing control of the new government.

These lawyers, and men of learning, and moneyed men that talk so finely, and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make us poor illiterate people swallow down the pill [wrote a rural delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying convention] expect to get into Congress themselves; they expect to be the managers of this Constitution, and get all the power and all the money into their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little folks, like the great leviathan, Mr. President; yea, just as the whale swallowed up Jonah. This is what I am afraid of.

The debates in the Virginia ratifying convention also indicated that the opponents of the new government feared that the Constitution might become an instrument for the promotion of the interests of those who had drawn up the plans for the new government.

With each side distrustful of the other and with each hoping to secure control of the new government, there followed a bitter campaign to fill the offices under the new system. "The agitation [over ratification]," John Marshall wrote, "had been too great to be suddenly calmed; and for the active opponents of the system to become suddenly its friends, or even indifferent to its fate, would have been a victory of

reason over passion, or a surrender of individual judgment to the decision of the majority, examples of which are rarely given in the progress of human affairs." In some states, he went on, some people were inclined to acquiesce in the decision that had been made and to await the issues of a fair experiment of the Constitution; in others, the chagrin of defeat seemed to increase the original hostility to the instrument, and in "all those states where the opposition was sufficiently formidable to inspire a hope of success, the effort was made to fill the legislature with the declared enemies of the government, and thus commit it in its infancy to the custody of its foes." In every state, except Georgia, the Anti-Federalists put up congressional candidates, and in many communities the fight was as spirited as that over ratification.

The election was an overwhelming victory for the Federalists, for Washington's elevation to the presidency—he received the vote of every elector—assured them of control of the executive branch of the government. While Washington was not the demigod subsequently pictured by Parson Weems in his eulogistic *Life of Washington*, he was nevertheless a man of enormous ability and unparalleled prestige. Fifty-seven years old when he became President on April 30, 1789, Washington had been a surveyor, plantation owner, western-land speculator, member of Virginia House of Burgesses, and commander of the American forces in the Revolution. At the end of the war he was respected as a military leader both at home and abroad.

Washington had been critical of the Articles of Confederation and had served as head of the Philadelphia Convention; he now consented to become the first President of the United States. Although his reputation in 1789 rested on his military exploits, he proved to be equally skillful in organizing and administering the new government. Firm, patient, and far more disinterested than most of his contemporaries, he was able both to take advice and to make up his own mind. Moreover, like every good executive, he surrounded himself with able subordinates to whom he did not hesitate to delegate authority. It was the extraordinary good fortune of the United States to have a Washington; the Federalists were equally fortunate in that they could claim him for their side.

In filling the administrative posts at his disposal, Washington was careful to select those who had supported the Constitution.* For the important post of secretary of the treasury he turned first to Robert Morris, staunch Federalist and a member of the Philadelphia Conven-

* In the section listing the president's powers, the Constitution refers to the "principal officer in each of the executive departments." Soon after its organization, Congress established the Department of Foreign Affairs (which was soon changed to the Department of State), the Department of War, and the Department of the Treasury. Provision was also made for the appointment of an attorney general and a postmaster general.

tion, and when Morris declined, to Alexander Hamilton, the "giant of Federalism." General Henry Knox of Massachusetts, another ardent Federalist, was made Secretary of War, and Edmund Randolph of Virginia, a Federalist convert, Attorney General. Thomas Jefferson, who was named Secretary of State, was the only person not overly enthusiastic about the Constitution to receive an appointment, and even he had favored its adoption and was not at this time identified with anti-federalism.* Federalists, moreover, occupied the minor as well as the major offices of the new government, and the diplomatic, consular, and customs services were manned exclusively by friends of the Constitution. In Rhode Island, a state that had refused to adopt the Constitution, all Federal offices were held by individuals who had urged ratification.

The judicial branch of the new government was also staffed by those who had helped draft the Constitution or had worked for its ratification. Under the terms of the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, provision was made for the organization of the Supreme Court and the establishment of thirteen district and three circuit courts, all of which were distinct from the state courts. The first Chief Justice was John Jay, who, along with Alexander Hamilton, had done the most to secure the ratification of the Constitution in New York. Of the remaining five members of the Court, all had worked for ratification in the conventions of their respective states, and three had been members of the Philadelphia Convention. All the posts in the lower courts were also awarded to Federalists.

Although the opposition groups were represented in Congress, the Federalists were prominent in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Eleven out of twenty-six senators and nine out of fifty-five members of the first House of Representatives had been members of the Philadelphia Convention. Forty-four members of the first Congress had been members of this convention or of the state ratifying conventions; all but seven had supported the new system.

51. LAUNCHING THE CONSTITUTION

THE OVERWHELMINGLY Federalist character of the government aroused both the hostility and fears of the Anti-Federalists, many of whom were convinced that it would only be a matter of time before their opponents sought to establish a monarchy in America.

* Jefferson, who was the American minister to France during the Confederation period, was not a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, and he did not participate in the contest over the ratification. Despite some reservations, he favored the Constitution.

Washington was suspected of desiring to emulate European royalty; Federalist senators were criticized for insisting that the upper house adopt the forms and rules of Parliament; and Vice-President John Adams was ridiculed for his lengthy and pompous discourses to the Senate on the desirability of suitable titles for public officials. To William Maclay, a crusty democratic senator from rural Pennsylvania, the real or suspected desire of the Federalists to make the Old World a model for the New was intolerable, and in 1790 he wrote in his journal: "Strange indeed, that in the very country [America] where the flame of freedom had been kindled, an attempt should be made to introduce these humiliating distinctions." On another occasion, Maclay, who was disgusted with Adams's behavior as the Senate's presiding officer, wrote:

The Senate met. The Vice-President rose in the most solemn manner. This son of Adam seemed impressed with deeper gravity, yet what shall I think of him? He often, in the midst of his most important airs—I believe when he is at loss for expressions (and this he often is, wrapped up, I suppose, in the contemplation of his own importance)—suffers an unmeaning kind of vacant laugh to escape him. This was the case to-day, and really to me bore the air of ridiculing the farce he was acting. "Gentlemen, I wish for the direction of the Senate. The President will, I suppose, address the Congress. How shall I behave? How shall we receive it? Shall it be standing or sitting?"

In addition to the questions asked by Adams, there were many others to which the Constitution provided no specific answers. Under the circumstances, the officers of the various branches of the government had no alternative but to establish their own precedents. For example, when Washington, interpreting literally the provision in the Constitution stating that the president should make treaties "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," appeared in person before that body to discuss a proposed Indian treaty, the senators were visibly offended. Washington never again asked the Senate's "advice" on a treaty, and most of his successors have followed this precedent. In similar fashion, the cabinet was a product both of Washington's personality and of the necessity for working out a set of rules for the day-to-day conduct of the government. Although the Constitution makes no mention of a cabinet, it does state that the president "may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments." From the outset Washington repeatedly sought the opinions of his department heads, and before the end of his first administration he was meeting more or less regularly with all of them at his home. Although the word "cabinet" does not appear in a Federal statute until 1907, both the word and the institution were accepted parts of the American governmental system in the 1790's.

One of the most unusual features of the new government was the almost universal acclaim accorded the new Constitution as soon as it was put into effect. Anti-Federalists, who had criticized almost every feature of the Constitution during the struggle over ratification, now vied with the Federalists in extolling its virtues. Before Washington had left the presidency, the Anti-Federalists were posing as the true defenders of the Constitution while they accused the Administration of sabotaging the work of the Founding Fathers. Since both parties agreed that the Constitution was always right, the debates over its application were invariably confined to the interpretation of its contents. In short, the constitutional arguments of the 1790's rested on the same hypothesis as those of the 1950's.

The transformation of the Constitution from a major political issue into a universally venerated symbol was caused in part by the effectiveness of the Federalists' campaign for ratification. By calling themselves Federalists, a name that more accurately described their opponents, they implied that the framework of government that they were sponsoring would further the interests of the states. By identifying the Constitution with progress, they implied that its opponents were reactionaries. Finally, by emphasizing—although with little or no justification—that the Constitution was an expression of the popular will, they were able to appeal to the nascent democratic spirit in America. In this vein, James Wilson, a Pennsylvania Federalist, in a speech to his state's ratifying convention, said: "Government . . . has hitherto been the result of force, fraud or accident. . . . America now presents the first instance of a free people assembled to weigh . . . calmly, and to decide leisurely and peaceably, upon the form of government by which they will bind themselves and their posterity."

This acceptance can also be attributed to the fact that the Constitution did not create religious dissension. The multiplicity of sects in America made it impolitic, if not impossible, to create a state religion; and with no official church, there was no basis for a charge that the Constitution discriminated against certain religious denominations. Instead, the Federalists could maintain that the new framework of government was a political expression of the tenets of Christianity. Thus, a New Haven minister wondered

whether men can be serious in regard to the Christian religion, who can object to a government . . . calculated to promote the glory of God by establishing peace, order and justice in our country—and whether it would not be better for such men to renounce the Christian name, to enter into society with the Shawnee or Mohawk Indians than to attempt to retain the blessings of religion and civilization with their licentious ideas of government.

And even Benjamin Franklin, who had little use for formal religion, wrote:

I must avow that I have so much faith in the general government of the world by Providence, that I can hardly conceive [that] a transaction of such momentous importance [as the Constitution] to the welfare of millions now existing . . . should be suffered to pass without being in some degree influenced, guided and governed by that omnipotent, omnipresent and beneficial Ruler, in whom all inferior spirits live, and move and have their being.

The prestige of the Constitution, as well as that of the Federalists and the Washington Administration, was enormously enhanced when the economic uncertainty of the 1780's gave way to more prosperous conditions in 1790. Although the adoption of the Constitution did not create this prosperity except in so far as it tended to increase the confidence of business groups, Federalists were quick to attribute the upswing in the business cycle to the new form of government. William Maclay might complain that the Federalists "paint the state of the country under the old . . . congress, as if neither wood grew nor water ran in America before the happy adoption of the new Constitution"; but beyond a doubt most Americans were inclined to accept the Federalist interpretation of the change in their economic fortunes.

Still another—and perhaps the most important—factor contributing to the popularity of the Constitution was the adoption of the first ten Amendments, or Bill of Rights. Several states had ratified the Constitution with the understanding that it would be amended to include specific guarantees of personal liberty, and North Carolina withheld its approval until such action was taken. Such guarantees, which were not necessarily opposed by the Federalists, had been omitted from the Constitution only because it was believed that they were adequately provided for in common law. But as soon as it became obvious that the new government could both enhance its prestige and remove an important source of opposition by making the desired constitutional amendments, the Federalists did not hesitate to sponsor them. Accordingly, in June, 1789, Madison submitted to Congress several of the amendments that had been proposed by the states. Of these, the House approved seventeen, the Senate voted for twelve, and ten were ratified by the states. On December 15, 1791, the first ten Amendments, guaranteeing all Americans such rights as trial by jury and freedom of speech, religion, and press became part of the Constitution. Many Americans who had previously distrusted the new form of government were now prepared to give it their support.

52. HAMILTON'S FINANCIAL POLICIES

ONE of the people most responsible for the success of the new government was Alexander Hamilton. Born in the West Indies, trained at King's College (Columbia), and equipped with a scintillating mind and a charming personality, he was a great lawyer, a skillful orator, a master organizer, a brilliant pamphleteer, and a statesman of the first rank. By temperament he loved and respected aristocracy and throughout his life despised democracy and republicanism. His ideal of government was rule by landed gentlemen, wealthy merchants, and prosperous professional men backed, if necessary, with standing armies. He never knew the small farmer and the villager who were obliged to earn their living by hard labor, and he did not want to know them. Practical to the last degree, he hated theorists and idealists and based his political philosophy on economic realities. "That power," he said, "which holds the purse-strings absolutely must rule."

Before assuming office Hamilton had clearly in mind those economic measures that he believed were absolutely necessary for the success of the new government. They included the funding of the entire national debt—principal and interest—at face value irrespective of whether the old bond and stock certificates were held by the original subscribers or had been acquired by speculators and others at a discount; the assumption at face value of the debts of the several states by the national government; the establishment of a national bank and a mint; the levying of customs duties for the purpose of protecting and encouraging American manufactures and commerce; the disposal of the public lands, the proceeds to go toward liquidation of the national debt; and the establishment of a sinking fund for the purchase of public securities in the open market from time to time. This program was in keeping with Hamilton's belief that no government could long endure without the confidence and support of property owners and businessmen.

Hamilton's *Report on the Public Credit*, the first of the documents in which he elaborated his program, was submitted to Congress in January, 1790. A detailed plan for funding the debt and increasing the fluid capital of the country, it proposed that the old bonds and certificates, the principal and interest of which at face value totaled approximately \$50,000,000, should be called in and replaced with new securities. Some of the new bonds were to draw 6 per cent, others 3 per cent, and the remainder no interest until ten years had elapsed, after which they would draw 6 per cent. Furthermore, Hamilton recommended that the national government assume at face value the debts of the several states,

incurred for the most part during the Revolution. These amounted to about \$20,000,000, and he reasoned that their assumption would make for orderliness and stability and bind the Union more closely together; that it would compensate the states in part for their surrender to the Federal government of the right to levy import duties; and that it would force all public creditors to depend upon the Federal government rather than upon the states for the sums due them.

Hamilton also advocated a sinking fund that the secretary of the treasury could use to buy securities in the market when in his judgment it was to the best interests of the government and the holders of public securities to do so. He planned that the money for this sinking fund, as well as for interest on the new securities and for their ultimate retirement, should be obtained from import duties and the proceeds of the sale of public lands in the West.

Closely associated with the funding and assumption plans was the scheme for a central banking agency, which Hamilton outlined in his *Report on the National Bank*. A national bank, he argued, would augment the productive capital of the country by increasing the number of notes in circulation, by putting them to greater use, and by gathering up what otherwise might well be idle funds. Furthermore, it would enable the government to obtain loans more easily; and finally, by increasing the circulation of money and expanding the facilities for borrowing, it would make easier the collection of taxes. Of the capital stock of \$10,000,000, one fifth was to be subscribed by the government and the remainder by the public—one fourth in specie and three fourths in new 6 per cent Federal bonds.

In still another report Hamilton dealt with the vexatious and much debated subject of the coinage. Although he expressed a preference for gold, he nevertheless recommended that both gold and silver should be minted in the ratio of 1 to 15—a proportion corresponding to the bullion values of the time. He also advocated the use of the decimal system of coinage, and proposed that the dollar, the monetary unit, should consist of $24\frac{3}{4}$ grains of pure gold or $37\frac{1}{4}$ grains of pure silver. He further recommended the coinage of \$10 gold pieces, silver dimes, and copper pennies and half-pennies.

Hamilton's reasons for demanding a protective tariff were set forth in 1791 in his *Report on Manufactures*. He maintained that a high tariff would help to make the United States economically independent, would cheapen prices, and would protect infant industries against foreign competition. His principal argument centered on the desirability of promoting manufacturing in the United States, and the bulk of the report is devoted to an extended and brilliant discussion of the advantages of a factory system. Manufactures, Hamilton contended, would promote a greater division of labor than agriculture; would increase

production by adding the "artificial force" of machinery to the "natural force of man"; would give employment to "classes of the community not originally engaged in the particular business"; would help to enrich the country by encouraging the immigration of foreign workers; would furnish "greater scope for the diversity of talents and dispositions which discriminate men from each other"; would "cherish and stimulate the activity of the human mind by multiplying the objects of enterprise"; and would furnish a home market for the surplus products of the soil.

Hamilton argued that his program would benefit all classes in the United States. Maintaining that business expansion was the only effective means for adding to the nation's wealth and promoting general prosperity, he sought to convince the agrarians that they too would profit from his proposals. But Hamilton's program was essentially capitalistic, and individuals who had their wealth in land rather than securities could see little advantage in a system that was designed to increase the liquid assets of the nation's business groups. In the struggle that developed over Hamilton's policies the conflict was not so much between the rich and poor as between landed and capitalistic interests. Because the South and West were overwhelmingly agrarian, these sections generally opposed Hamilton, whereas most of his support came from the Northeastern seaboard.

53. ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL CREDIT

THE AGRARIANS first leveled their guns at Hamilton's funding proposals. A large part of the old bonds—both state and Continental—had been acquired by speculators at low prices. Soldiers, farmers, and crossroads merchants—ignorant of the significance of the adoption of the Federal Constitution and unaware of the Hamiltonian funding scheme—had fallen easy prey to agents who scoured the country in quest of depreciated paper. When the funding measure came before Congress, some of the opposition leaders, contending that the debt represented goods bought at greatly inflated prices, services rendered at exorbitant rates, or loans of depreciated paper, proposed that it be scaled down to market value. Another congressional group headed by Madison was especially anxious to do justice to both the original investor and the speculator. Accordingly, Madison advanced a plan that in reality was a compromise between those who wanted the debt refunded at face value and those who would refund it at market value. It provided that the speculator be paid the highest price that had prevailed on the market and the original holder the difference between the face value and the market price. Although aware that this plan had

certain defects, Madison felt certain that it was far superior to the other two. "The original sufferers," he said, "will not be fully indemnified; but they will receive from their country a tribute due to their merits, which if it does not entirely heal their wounds, will assuage the pain of them." But on February 22, 1790, the Congress rejected Madison's proposal by a vote of almost three to one. A few months later Hamilton's plan was adopted. Of the sixty-four members of the House of Representatives, twenty-nine held these securities.

Opposition to the assumption of the debts of the several states by the national government was bitter and uncompromising. Representatives of the agrarian South thought the proposal merely another move in Hamilton's plan to enrich the capitalists of the North at the expense of the rest of the country. The opposition of the South was intensified because its debts in proportion to the population were much less than those of the North. Moreover, some Southern states had already taken care of their debts, and their citizens could see no reason why they should be taxed to help pay the debts of the North. The Hamiltonians worked assiduously to overcome this opposition, but when the vote on the measure was taken in the House of Representatives on April 12, 1790, they were defeated by two votes. Following a favorable motion to reconsider, Hamilton and his supporters redoubled their efforts. Finally, after weeks of negotiations and diplomacy, Hamilton seized upon the idea of bargaining with the South over the site of the permanent capital. Fortunately for Hamilton, Jefferson, who had just returned from France to take up his new duties as Secretary of State and who was soon to become Hamilton's chief antagonist, listened to his plea for assistance. At a dinner party arranged by Jefferson it was agreed that two members who had previously voted against assumption should change their minds and that the friends of assumption in return should see to it that the national capital was located on the banks of the Potomac in territory set off from Virginia and Maryland. To pacify Pennsylvania which also wanted the capital, Philadelphia was to be the seat of the national government for ten years. "And so," Jefferson wrote long afterwards, "the Assumption was passed, and twenty millions of stock divided among favored states and thrown in as a pabulum to the stock-jobbing herd."

Hamilton's recommendations for a mint and a national bank were also translated into law by Congress. The Mint Act, which closely followed the Secretary of the Treasury's suggestions, was passed with little difficulty in 1792, but the bank measure was vigorously opposed by the agrarians. "This plan of a national bank," said James Jackson of Georgia, "is calculated to benefit a small part of the United States, the mercantile interests only; the farmers, the yeomanry, will derive no advantage from it." The measure, he went on to say, sought to create a monopoly and

was contrary to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. Even Madison, who had worked so indefatigably for the establishment of a strong federal government, opposed the bank as unconstitutional. The opposition, however, was not strong enough to prevent the passage of this measure. Of the twenty votes cast against the bill, in the House, nineteen were of Southern members. The bank was chartered for twenty years and capitalized at \$10,000,000, four fifths of which was to be subscribed by individuals and the remaining fifth by the government. Authorized to serve as a depository of government funds, it could also issue notes that were receivable for government dues. In December, 1791, the bank began its notably successful career in Philadelphia; branch offices were subsequently established in Boston, New York, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans.

The bank bill raised constitutional as well as financial issues, and before signing the measure Washington sought the advice of the members of his cabinet. Jefferson and Randolph maintained that the bank law was unconstitutional; Hamilton and Knox took the opposite view. Jefferson, whose constitutional theories were undoubtedly colored in this instance by his economic and political opinions, took a narrow view of the Constitution and argued that that document contained no provision granting Congress authority to establish a bank. Hamilton, fully as prejudiced as Jefferson, rested his case on a broad interpretation of the Constitution. Reasoning that the Constitution gave the government general powers without necessarily specifying the means by which they might be implemented, he concluded: "This criterion is the *end* to which the measure relates as a *mean*. If the *end* is clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the measure have an obvious relation to that *end*, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of the national authority." Washington accepted Hamilton's concept of implied powers and signed the bill. Even more important from the standpoint of constitutional history, the broad and strict interpretations advanced by Hamilton and Jefferson respectively set a pattern to which all subsequent constitutional arguments have conformed.

Because Hamilton did not wish to alienate his principal supporters by taxing them directly, he proposed that the government rely on a tariff and excise taxes as sources of revenue. To the agrarians the tariff was just one more burden that they would have to assume for the benefit of the capitalists.

The policy of protecting duties to force manufacturing [wrote John Taylor of Virginia, philosopher and statesman of agrarianism] is of the same nature and will produce the same consequences as that of enriching a noble interest, a church interest, or a paper interest;

because bounties to capital are taxes upon industry and a distribution of property by law. And it is the worst mode of encouraging aristocracy, because to the evil of distributing wealth at home by law, is to be added the national loss arising from foreign retaliation upon our own exports. An exclusion by us of foreign articles of commerce will beget an exclusion by foreigners of our articles of commerce, or at least corresponding duties; and the wealth of the majority will be as certainly diminished to enrich capital, as it should be obliged to export a million of guineas to bring back a million of dollars or to bestow a portion of its guineas upon this special interest.

No amount of argument, however, could eliminate the government's need for revenue, and even before Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures* Congress had adopted a modest tariff bill (July 4, 1789). On the other hand, no attempt was made to implement Hamilton's elaborate program for the stimulation of American manufactures.

Hamilton's proposal for an excise tax on spirituous liquors aroused far more hostility than the tariff. Despite this fact, Congress in 1791 enacted an excise law that followed most of Hamilton's suggestions. Although Eastern distillers were affected by this measure, their business was of such a character that they easily shifted the burden of the tax to the consumer. Frontier farmers, who on account of bad roads and high transportation costs were transforming their grain into whisky, were less fortunately situated. Much of their liquor was for domestic use, and the excise duty fell on them as a direct tax; and unlike the Eastern distillers, even those who sent part of their manufactured product to market were unable to shift the tax. News of the passage of the excise measure aroused widespread dissatisfaction on the frontier. Alarmed by the extent of the opposition, Congress in 1792 put through supplementary legislation abolishing the tax on the smaller stills; but even this modification of the law failed to placate the frontier farmers of Pennsylvania. Meetings, resolutions, and protests soon gave way to more drastic action: men refused to pay the tax, intimidated government collectors, and dealt summary justice to persons who gave information or other aid to revenue officers. Finally in 1794, when a United States marshal attempted to serve warrants on those who had been indicted for refusal to pay the tax, an open insurrection known as the Whisky Rebellion broke out. Hamilton, anxious to strengthen the hand of government and to teach respect for law and order, advised Washington to treat the rebels severely. Milder counsel, however, prevailed, and with the approach of a considerable military force led by Washington and Hamilton the revolt melted away. Several of the ringleaders were ar-

rested and marched to Philadelphia where they were jailed; only two were subsequently convicted, and they were pardoned by the President. Conservatives rejoiced over the triumph of the government. Yet few of them apparently realized that both the excise law and the revolt that had followed had weakened their cause and strengthened the opposition. Only a few years were to elapse before the reins of the Federal government were to pass into the hands of the very men whom the Hamiltonians labeled as pernicious, malignant, contemptible, and vile.

Although Hamilton's financial policies were designed among other things to unite the nation behind the Federalists, they tended to produce just the opposite effect. The agrarians could see little to commend in the new system, and they did not hesitate to point out the reasons for their refusal to support the Federalist program. John Taylor in his pamphlet *An Enquiry into the Principles and Tendency of Certain Public Measures*, which appeared in 1794, attacked the Hamiltonian program as a capitalist device to enrich the wealthy and impoverish the poor. A year earlier "A Farmer" in an anonymous tract entitled *Five Letters Addressed to the Yeomanry of the United States* declared that the lawbooks of the Union were stained with mercantile regulations highly injurious to the agricultural interest of the country; funding systems by which the property and rights of poor but meritorious citizens were sacrificed to wealthy gamblers and speculators; the establishment of banks "authorizing a few men to create fictitious money, by which they may acquire rapid fortunes without industry"; and excise laws that disturbed domestic tranquillity and prevented the farmer from enjoying the fruits of his industry. Somewhat later J. T. Callender, another agrarian pamphleteer, expressed much the same opinion in his *Sedgwick & Co., or a Key to the Six Per Cent Cabinet*. Pamphlets of lesser importance and newspaper articles also reflected the opposition of the landed interests to the existing order.

The controversial nature of Hamilton's financial policies did not prevent a Federalist victory in the election of 1792. Once again the Anti-Federalists—who now called themselves either Democratic-Republicans or Republicans—realized the futility of opposing a man they had no chance of defeating, and for the second time Washington received every electoral vote. But no aura of sanctity surrounded the person of the vice-president, and the Republicans selected George Clinton of New York to run against John Adams. Although Adams received 77 electoral votes to 50 for Clinton, the Republicans carried Georgia, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia and won a single electoral vote in Pennsylvania. Party lines were beginning to take definite shape, and even before the end of Washington's second term the two contending groups

were conducting their partisan warfare in much the same fashion as modern political organizations.

The acrimonious debates over the Federalist financial policies should not obscure Hamilton's very real contribution to the success of the new government. More than anyone else he was responsible for placing Federal finances on a sound basis, enhancing the prestige of the United States government both at home and abroad, and making the states realize that they could never regain the powers that they had enjoyed under the Confederation. An aristocrat who despised democracy, he did as much as any individual in Washington's Administration to insure the survival of the world's most democratic nation.

54. FOREIGN PROBLEMS

WASHINGTON'S conduct of American foreign policy in many respects constitutes as notable an achievement as Hamilton's administration of the new nation's finances. As the head of a new government, he had neither guides nor precedents to lessen the burden of his responsibility. As President of a weak nation in the midst of a world at war, he was continually faced by the seemingly impossible task of maintaining American neutrality. Realizing that war could wreck the American experiment before it had had an opportunity to demonstrate its worth, he made peace his sole objective; and despite the criticisms of his political opponents, he successfully steered the United States through some of the most trying years in its history.

The outbreak of the French Revolution was greeted by American Anti-Federalists with unrestrained enthusiasm. From Maine to Georgia the news that in France the old order had been overturned and that the aristocracy of Europe under the leadership of the Duke of Brunswick had been turned back at the French frontier was applauded by those Americans who felt that the Old World upheaval was a replica of their own revolutionary struggle. French ideas, French modes of speaking, and French fashions became the order of the day. Liberty poles were erected and liberty caps worn. Titles such as "Sir," "The Honorable," and "His Excellency" were discarded as too aristocratic, and "Citizen" and "Citizeness" replaced "Mr.," "Mrs.," and "Miss." Even the theaters caught the spirit, and Shakespeare and Sheridan gave way to *Tyranny Suppressed*, and the *Demolition of the Bastille*. Streets whose names were associated with aristocracy were renamed: Royal Exchange Alley in Boston became Equality Lane, and Kings Street in New York was renamed Liberty Street. Thomas Paine re-enforced this enthusiasm in his *Rights of Man*, a reply to Burke's *Reflections*.

Every age and generation [he wrote] must be free to act for itself in all cases as the ages and generations which preceded it. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. . . . Every generation is, and must be, competent to all the purposes which its occasions require. It is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated.

Paine's eloquent defense of the French Revolution stimulated the formation in the United States of secret democratic societies modeled after the Jacobin clubs of Paris. These societies passed resolutions embodying democratic and equalitarian sentiments, endorsing the work of the French radicals, and condemning the efforts of the Old World reactionaries to stamp out the Revolution. The activities of these organizations, moreover, were not confined to agitation over events in Europe. From the outset an increasing number were interested in local politics; and many explicitly stated that their avowed purpose was to discuss and disseminate information about domestic affairs.

To the Federalists the French Revolution with its defiance of tradition and constituted authority, its challenge of privilege, and its emphasis on democracy was a shocking example of the dangers of mob rule. As the movement in France gathered headway and control passed from the moderates into the hands of the radicals, the Federalist leaders became almost hysterical lest the "rabble" and "Jacobins" in America should also overturn the government. Every sympathizer of the French Revolution, a New England clergyman said, was guilty of spreading "atheistical, anarchial and, in other respects, immoral principles. . . . The editors, patrons, and abettors of these vehicles of slander ought to be considered and treated as enemies to their country. . . . Of all traitors they are the most aggravatedly criminal; of all villains they are the most infamous and detestable." And William Cobbett, a Federalist editor, wrote: "I say, beware, ye understrapping cut-throats, who walk in rags and sleep amidst filth and vermin; for if once the halter gets around your flea bitten necks, howling and confessing will come too late."

In the midst of the campaigns of abuse waged by Federalists and Republicans, "Citizen" Edmund Charles Genêt arrived in the city of Charleston as the representative of Revolutionary France to the United States. Young, handsome, elegant in manner, eloquent and entertaining in conversation, and friendly in bearing, he was received with great acclaim by Republicans, and his month's journey northward to Philadelphia was a continuous ovation. He was greeted as a conquering hero by the multitudes who paid tribute to France and the principles of the Revolutionists, but when he presented his credentials to Washington he was received with stern formality. Believing that the Administration did

not represent the people and that the people would support him in a conflict with the government, Genêt soon adopted a policy that not only led to his downfall but also strengthened the hand of the Federalists.

Before Genêt's arrival, Washington, fully aware that the new minister was determined to drag the United States into the European war on the side of France, asked his cabinet for advice and suggestions. Hamilton unhesitatingly argued that the treaties of 1778 between France and the United States were obsolete because they had been negotiated with the Bourbon monarchy, which the Revolutionists had overthrown. Even if the treaties were in force, he contended, there would be no obligation on the part of the American republic to come to the assistance of France, for they stipulated American aid only if France were fighting a defensive war. Jefferson, on the other hand, maintained that, since treaties are negotiated between nations rather than between governments, the pacts of 1778 were still binding. Washington inclined toward Hamilton, and in 1793 he issued a proclamation of neutrality announcing that the United States was not a party to the conflict and that all American citizens were to refrain from any act that might be considered hostile by the warring nations.

The proclamation of neutrality meant nothing, however, to Genêt. Even before he had presented his credentials, he had planned to organize expeditions in the United States against Louisiana and Florida. He attempted to use American ports as bases of operation for French privateers and commissioned American vessels to prey on British commerce. When Jefferson, as Secretary of State, endeavored to check him, he denounced the Administration as cowardly and unrepresentative. Finally the government, unable to tolerate longer his abuse and interference, asked for his recall. Genêt, knowing that his return to France would probably mean his execution, decided to remain in America. Accordingly, he went to New York, married a daughter of George Clinton, and lived quietly in the United States until his death in 1835.

Genêt's presence in America and his highhanded methods served to weaken the Republicans and correspondingly strengthen the Federalists. Jefferson, well aware of this fact, was much relieved when the obnoxious minister was removed from office. Even the democratic clubs agreed with Madison in characterizing Genêt's conduct as that of a madman. Nor did Genêt's actions help the cause of the French Revolution, for many Americans who had been inclined to be sympathetic now became either indifferent or openly hostile to the Revolutionary cause.

With the removal of Genêt, Great Britain rather than France became the principal antagonist of the United States. The British not only retained their posts in the Northwest, but they continued to employ their Indian allies to menace American settlers in the region. And for some years Washington's Administration was no more successful in solving

these problems than the Congress of the Confederation had been. The Indians refused to abide by the treaties that they had signed in the 1780's, and their scalping parties repeatedly menaced the settlements in the Northwest. Britain made possible the Indian attacks on the American "Long Knives" by supplying tribes with whisky and ammunition and by permitting them to use the disputed posts as bases for their operations. Britain hoped to create an Indian buffer state that would stand as a permanent barrier to American expansion in the Northwest.

Although any sustained offensive against the Indians in the Northwest necessarily created a risk of war with Great Britain, Washington decided that it was a risk that he would have to take. Accordingly, in 1790 he sent General Josiah Harmar to attack the Indians on the Maumee. Harmar was able to destroy some undefended Indian settlements; but when his troops were ambushed, they were forced to retreat. A year later, a much larger expedition under Governor St. Clair was overwhelmingly defeated by the Indians. Washington now turned to "Mad Anthony" Wayne, who had distinguished himself at the battle of Stony Point in 1779. After drilling his recruits intensively for more than a year, Wayne advanced into the wilderness and took up winter quarters at Fort Greenville during 1793-4. The British meanwhile were making every effort to rouse their Indian allies, and in February, 1794, Lord Dorchester, the Governor of Canada, as much as told the Indians that they could count on British assistance in their efforts to repulse the Americans. Wayne replied by offering peace to the Indians; but after they had repeatedly refused his proposals, he resumed his advance and completely routed them at the battle of Fallen Timbers (August 20, 1794). Despite this defeat, the Indians refused to agree to peace as long as the British retained the posts, and it was not until June, 1795, that they accepted the Treaty of Greenville. This treaty, in which the Indians agreed to cede their lands in Ohio and to abandon the warpath, led to fifteen years of comparative tranquillity in the Northwest.

In the same years that the United States was seeking to establish its sovereignty in the Northwest, it was also compelled to deal with an equally serious British threat to its commercial rights. In 1793, Great Britain declared war on France and quickly destroyed most of her merchant marine. France, cut off from her West Indian islands, with whom she had carried on approximately two thirds of her overseas trade, was compelled to lift her mercantilistic barriers and open her commerce to the neutrals of the world. Americans rejoiced, for here was an opportunity to revive their lucrative West Indian trade. But their rejoicing was of short duration, for the British, who were determined both to starve France into submission and to prevent the development of a rival merchant marine, ruled that all ships of neutrals were liable to capture if engaged in carrying enemy-owned goods. Even more damaging to the

Americans was, British revival of the "rule of 1756" (which stated that a trade closed in time of peace could not be opened in time of war), and the issue of an order in June, 1793, that authorized the seizure of all vessels carrying grain and flour.

The British commanders proceeded to carry out these orders even before the United States had learned of their existence, and within a short time they had seized approximately three hundred American ships. The British, however, did not stop with ships; they also impressed American sailors. When British commanders discovered on an American ship British seamen who had escaped from the Royal Navy to the American merchant marine, they forcibly removed them. But often the men impressed in this fashion were citizens of the United States, and beyond a doubt countless American sailors were forced to serve in the British navy against their will.

The effect of the British policies on the United States was far-reaching. Shipbuilding decreased; farmers, who had looked hopefully to the West Indies as a market for their surplus grain and meat, complained that they were unable to get rid of their produce; and sympathizers of France, overlooking the fact that French men-of-war and privateers were also harassing American vessels, were outspoken in their hatred for Britain. Federalist leaders, though detesting France, were placed in an embarrassing position, for the large Southern planting interests, who up to this time had been loyal Federalists, now welcomed trouble with Great Britain in the hope that debts still due to British creditors might be extinguished. Moreover, the planters remembered that the British had failed to compensate them for the thousands of slaves that they asserted the British had carried off at the conclusion of the Revolution. Hoping to gain advantage from this split within the Federalists, the Republicans demanded that drastic measures be taken against Great Britain, and made proposals ranging from sequestration of British debts to a declaration of war.

55. THE JAY AND PINCKNEY TREATIES

DESPITE the attitude of the Southern planters and the great hardship put upon the commercial interests of the country by the British policy, the Federalists did not want war with Great Britain. The Federal government was still in the experimental stage and in no position to embark upon a costly and hazardous war. Because most of the national income came from the tariff and because goods from Great Britain accounted for almost 90 per cent of American imports, war would have impaired the public credit and would probably have de-

stroyed the fiscal edifice that Hamilton had so arduously constructed. Moreover, war would have meant irreparable loss to the American producer and merchant and would have closed the door to the English investor, who not only advanced credit for trade and money for land speculation and industrial enterprise but who was also a heavy purchaser of government bonds and bank stock. Finally, they had no desire to declare war against any country engaged in curbing "Jacobinical" France.

In an effort to exact concessions from the British and to give the Administration time to devise a satisfactory settlement, Congress on March 26, 1794, adopted a thirty-day embargo that was subsequently extended a month. Steps were also taken to prepare for the unwelcome possibility of war. Congress approved a measure for the construction of harbor fortifications, authorized additional military stores, passed a bill for increasing the strength of the artillery, and made provision for calling out eighty thousand militiamen. At the same time an effort was made to settle the controversy by negotiation, and in May, 1794, John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was sent to England to conclude a treaty with the British. At the time Washington wrote: "If he succeeds, well; if he does not, why, knowing the worst, we must take measures accordingly."

Jay's instructions directed him to reject any treaty that did not secure the British evacuation of the Northwest posts, indemnification for American shipping losses, and the removal of conditions impeding the peaceful commercial relations of the two countries. But the military weakness of the United States and Hamilton's desire to maintain peace at any cost made Jay's position extremely difficult. Determined to prevent a breakdown of the negotiations, Hamilton informed George Hammond, the British minister in Philadelphia, that Washington's cabinet in a secret meeting had agreed not to join the League of Armed Neutrality, which was being organized by some of the European powers to resist British maritime practices. When Hammond relayed this information to his superiors in London, Jay was deprived of his principal bargaining point, and the British were able to reject a number of the American demands.

Under the terms of the Jay Treaty, the New England boundary line and indemnities for shipping seized by the British were to be adjusted by joint commissions; the Northwest posts were to be evacuated by June 1, 1796, and in return the Mississippi was to be opened to British trade. No mention was made of compensation for the slaves carried off by the British army; yet the Federal government was to assume the old pre-Revolutionary British debts and pay principal and interest in specie. Furthermore, the principle that "free goods make free ships" was abandoned, and the contraband list was extended. Nothing was said about

the impressment of American seamen; and the all-important West Indian trade, which Jay was specifically instructed to secure, was opened to American ships of seventy-tons burden only, and on the express condition that American vessels should not carry molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton, no matter where produced, to any other ports in the world except their own. The East Indian trade was opened to Americans subject to certain conditions. Finally, British trade with the United States was placed on a most-favored-nation basis, thus precluding such retaliatory and discriminatory measures as the Anti-Federalists had been proposing.

When the terms of the treaty were made public, Jay was burned in effigy, the British minister was openly insulted, and Hamilton, trying to defend the treaty, was hissed and stoned. Opponents of the Washington Administration denounced the treaty as a Federalist surrender to British power. "His Excellency, John Jay, . . . may he and his treason be forever politically damned" was a typical toast. "Damn John Jay! Damn every one who won't damn John Jay! Damn every one who won't put out lights in his windows and sit up all night damning John Jay" expressed the feeling of the rank and file. Even Federalists like John Rutledge and John Langdon denounced the treaty.

Alarmed at the public protest, Hamilton, writing under the pen name of "Camillus," came to the rescue of the treaty. In a series of thirty-eight essays he not only emphasized its more favorable provisions but showed with remarkable clarity that the controversy was merely another phase of the conflict between capitalism and agrarianism. The agrarians, he said, had merely seized upon the treaty in order to discredit the Federalists and their work. He alienated, however, the large landed interests of the South by asserting that the Southern claim of compensation for slaves taken by the British was "a very doubtful one," and by arguing that the debts owing to British creditors ought to be paid. Other Federalist leaders, among them Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, also vigorously supported the treaty. Ames, in denouncing those merchants who sided with the Republicans on this issue, said that he could not disguise his "contempt for the blindness and gullibility of the rich men who so readily lend their strength to the party which is thirsting for the contents of their iron chests." To the great relief of the Federalists the Senate in June, 1795, ratified the treaty minus the article dealing with the West Indian trade. Six months later the House of Representatives, despite the opposition of the Republicans, authorized the funds that were needed to implement the treaty.

The importance of the Jay Treaty cannot be overemphasized. Far more important than the Republican criticisms of Jay were the very real benefits that he secured for the United States. The Jay Treaty made a reality of American sovereignty in the Northwest, assured the United

States of commercial prosperity, and, by forestalling war, prevented the destruction of Hamilton's financial system. In return, the Americans were compelled to acknowledge British domination of the seas. The Republicans complained that the price exacted by the British for a settlement was exorbitant, but it was a price that the Federalists were willing to pay to insure the survival of the American nation. In the perspective of history the Jay Treaty seems—just as the Federalists at the time maintained it was—the only alternative to the destruction of the United States.

The Jay Treaty also paved the way for the settlement of the disputes between the United States and Spain in the Southwest. Spain, having entered the war against France in 1793, withdrew from the conflict two years later to side with France against Great Britain. Under the circumstances, the Jay Treaty, which to the Spanish looked like the first step toward the creation of a formal alliance between the two nations, convinced Spain that she could no longer retain her position in the American Southwest in the face of the combined opposition of the United States and Great Britain. Accordingly, Count Manuel Godoy, who until this time had rejected all American overtures for a settlement, indicated to Thomas Pinckney, the United States diplomatic representative in Madrid, that Spain was now prepared to negotiate a treaty. The Pinckney Treaty—or Treaty of San Lorenzo—which was concluded on October 27, 1795, and unanimously ratified by the Senate on March 3, 1796, met all the American demands of the preceding twelve years. The United States was granted free navigation of the Mississippi and the right of deposit at New Orleans; the boundary between Florida and the United States was placed at the thirty-first parallel; and Spain promised to restrain the Indians along the frontier. The Pinckney Treaty, which was enthusiastically received by all groups in the United States, was a signal triumph of American diplomacy. In contrast to the Jay Treaty, it required that the United States make no concessions. At the same time, it satisfied the demands of the Westerners, guaranteed the territorial integrity of the United States in the Southwest, and opened the way for American expansion into Louisiana.

Some months before the conclusion of his second term as President, Washington in his "Farewell Address" (September 19, 1796) sought to warn the American people against what he felt were the principal dangers to the new republic. He cautioned his countrymen to avoid sectional jealousies and partisan strife; and he also said: "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. . . . We may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Ignoring the times in which these words were uttered, successive generations of isolationists have used Washington's valedictory to justify their own version of American foreign policy. But

placed in the context of the period, Washington's statement stands as the plea of a man who had faced and withstood both the menace of foreign intrigue at home and the threat of war abroad.

56. JOHN ADAMS'S ADMINISTRATION

THE STRENGTH of the Federalists was seriously impaired by Washington's decision to retire at the end of his second presidential term. For a dozen years or more he had been an invaluable prop to the Federalist party. He had thrown all his weight and influence into the movement for the Constitution. Moreover, during his presidency he had done everything in his power to promote the welfare of the group of which he himself was a member. His great name and the respect in which he was held by the overwhelming majority of his countrymen undoubtedly made it easier for Hamilton and the other Federalist leaders to accomplish all that they did. On more than one occasion unpopular Federalist measures had been saved by recourse to the appeal "Stand by Washington." His retirement, therefore, opened wide the door to the opposition; men who up to this time had hesitated to say what they thought now gave widest expression to their feelings. "If ever there was a period for rejoicing," wrote a grandson of Benjamin Franklin in referring to Washington's retirement, "this is the moment—every heart, in unison with the freedom and happiness of the people, ought to beat high with exultation that the name of Washington from this day ceases to give a currency to political iniquity and to legalize corruption."

After his withdrawal from the cabinet in 1794, Jefferson had effectively organized the Republican groups among the nation's dissatisfied agrarians, and in 1796 he was the party's obvious candidate for the presidency. In an effort to form an alliance between the Southern planters and Northern voters, the Republicans selected as Jefferson's running mate Aaron Burr, the head of New York's Sons of Tammany. The Federalists had more difficulty in drawing up a ticket. After rejecting Hamilton (who had resigned as Secretary of the Treasury in 1795) on the ground that his conservative views would lose more votes than they would win, the party settled on John Adams for the presidency and Thomas Pinckney for the vice-presidency.

Hamilton, bitter over his rejection by the party to which he had contributed so much, supported Thomas Pinckney against Adams. But the effect on the voters of the split in the Federalist high command was probably more than offset by France's attempt to determine the outcome of the election. Pierre A. Adet, the French minister to the United States, who had been withdrawn from his post by his government in protest

against the Jay Treaty, remained in the United States to campaign for a Republican victory. Although Jefferson did not solicit this assistance, it undoubtedly alienated many voters who resented foreign intervention in American domestic affairs. In the electoral count, Adams received 71 votes to 68 for Jefferson. Because of the rivalry between the Adams and Hamilton groups, many Federalist electors gave their second votes to Jefferson rather than to the choice of the other faction. As a result, they came close to making Jefferson President, and without their votes he could not have become Vice-President.

John Adams was a pragmatic, unimaginative realist of undoubted intellectual ability. As a young man he had staunchly defended human rights, but with maturing years he became an even more ardent defender of property rights. Society, he maintained, consisted of economic classes—the rich and the poor—which were always contending with each other for control. Warfare between these diametrically opposed classes, he held, could be prevented only by a government that both safeguarded the poor against exploitation by the rich and protected the rich against the leveling attacks of the poor. Although he advocated rule by the well-born and the educated, he did not believe that government should be controlled completely either by agrarians or capitalists. His refusal to be a victim of mob psychology, his vanity, and his tactlessness did not make him a popular figure. On the other hand, no other American President has possessed more integrity than John Adams, and ensuing events were to demonstrate that it was fortunate that the American people had elected a man who never hesitated to subordinate political considerations to principle.

Adams on assuming office at once found himself face to face with many of the same problems that had vexed Washington. During the last years of Washington's administration, James Monroe, who sympathized with the French radicals, had been recalled as minister to France and Charles Coatsworth Pinckney, a thorough-going Federalist, had been named to take his place. This action, together with the Jay Treaty and Washington's treatment of Genêt, angered the Directory at Paris. The Washington government was labeled pro-British; and Pinckney, instead of being received, was first placed under surveillance as a suspicious character and then ordered out of the country; the American alliance of 1778 was declared at an end; French vessels were authorized to seize and confiscate all American vessels bound to or from British ports or engaged in carrying British goods; and Adet, the French minister to the United States, was recalled. Most Federalists demanded war; but Adams announced to a special session of Congress that he would attempt to settle the difficulty by negotiation. Accordingly, a committee of three—C. C. Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry—were sent to France to restore friendly relations.

When the three commissioners arrived in Paris, Talleyrand, in charge of foreign affairs for the French government, refused to receive them officially. Negotiations were carried on informally through agents designated by Talleyrand. As a price for peace these agents demanded, first, that the United States apologize for its past conduct—in other words, for what the French called its pro-British policy; secondly, that it extend to the French government a large loan; and, finally, that the “Prince of Liars”—a title that Talleyrand deserved—and his fellow plunderers receive a *douceur* of \$240,000. Bribery was an accepted method of conducting diplomacy in Europe at the time, but the American commissioners had no guarantee that Talleyrand would draw up a treaty after they had paid him. After months of haggling, Pinckney and Marshall returned to the United States; Gerry remained in Paris until he was recalled. When at one point in the negotiations a French agent told the commissioners that they were expected to “offer money,” Pinckney had replied, “No, no; not a sixpence.” In America, Pinckney’s words were transformed into “Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute.” The fact that at the time the United States was paying tribute to the Barbary pirates had no apparent effect on this slogan’s popularity among the American people.

The report of the negotiations (referring to the French agents as Mr. X, Mr. Y, and Mr. Z) that Adams made to Congress in March, 1798, aroused the country to such an extent that many Americans urged a declaration of war. The Federalists, anxious to discredit the French Revolution and to embarrass their political opponents, sought to make the most of the opportunity presented to them by Talleyrand. Homes and offices of Republican editors were attacked; Benjamin Franklin, dead only a half-dozen years, was denounced as a democrat; and Republicans were condemned as infidels by Federalist preachers, who urged their congregations to hate the word “revolution.” Hamilton and William Cobbett filled the Federalist press with propaganda: French troops, the public was informed, had already landed at Charleston and were destroying farmhouses; Negro slaves were being armed and incited to insurrection by French revolutionary agents.

The Federalists did not stop with propaganda, for they were soon preparing for war. The army was increased and Washington, Hamilton, and Knox were summoned to take command. A Navy Department was also organized, and there was soon fighting on the high seas, although no formal declaration of war had been made either by France or the United States. In the naval war that followed, the United States *Constitution* defeated *L’Insurgente* on one occasion and the *Vengeance* on another, and the *Boston* forced *Le Berceau* to surrender. In all, the French lost more than eighty vessels during the two years of fighting. American enthusiasm for the victories at sea was not diminished by



The Ridgway Library, Library Company of Philadelphia

THE PROVIDENTIAL DETECTION

This anonymous cartoon, which appeared probably about 1800, was inspired by the XYZ affair. Upon Jefferson as head of the party friendly to France all the venom of his opponents is vented. He is caricatured as kneeling before the snake-encircled "Altar of Gallic Despotism" upon which the works of Godwin, Paine, Voltaire, and Rousseau are already burning. He is about to cast the Constitution into the flames but is halted by the American eagle. With the other hand he is dropping the letter written to his Italian friend Philip Mazzei in which he stated that while the mass of the American people were democratic, the government was reactionary and unfriendly to "republican principles." He was identified, as the caricature shows, with the worst features of the French Revolution and attacked as an advocate of social disorder and "leveling" tendencies.

either the comparatively large number of American ships captured by the French or by the realization that France had to fight the British as well as the United States Navy.

Throughout the undeclared naval war, preparations were also made to create an American army. Although Washington agreed to serve as commander in chief, his age prevented him from taking an active part in military operations, and the question of who was to be second in command soon threatened to split the Federalist party. Despite Adams's opposition, his own cabinet—which he had inherited from Washington—induced Washington to indicate his preference for Hamilton, and the President was compelled to give the post to his most formidable opponent within the party. Hamilton immediately began to draw up plans for an attack against Spanish America, which he hoped to capture with the aid of the British Navy and the co-operation of Latin American rebels led by Don Francisco de Miranda. But the size of the army did not keep pace with Hamilton's grandiose schemes, and it was not until 1799 that an active campaign for recruits was undertaken. Moreover, Adams was soon to demonstrate that he, not Hamilton, was President of the United States.

Adams never succumbed to the war fever engendered by his fellow Federalists and in February, 1799, he nominated William Vans Murray as minister to France. When members of the Hamilton wing of the party in the Senate objected to this apparent reversal of policy, the President relented to the extent of appointing a three-man commission instead of an envoy. He selected Oliver Ellsworth, W. R. Davie, and Murray as commissioners; and after the President had received assurances from Talleyrand that they would be received, the commissioners left for France. When they reached Paris, they found Napoleon Bonaparte rather than the corrupt Directory in control. The French, moreover, proved unusually co-operative and on September 30, 1800, the treaty negotiations were concluded. The so-called Convention of 1800 abrogated the treaties of 1778—thus ending the United States's only entangling alliance—and affirmed the principle that free ships make free goods. On the other hand, no provision was made for indemnifying property of ships illegally seized.

57. THE REPUBLICAN TRIUMPH

TO THE dismay of the extremists in his own party John Adams had almost singlehandedly prevented the United States from being dragged into war. But he had also ruined his own political career. By placing his country before his party, he made one of the most

courageous decisions in the history of the American presidency. Fifteen years later, Adams wrote:

I will defend my missions to France, as long as I have an eye to direct my hand, or a finger to hold my pen. They were the most disinterested and meritorious actions of my life. I reflect upon them with so much satisfaction, that I desire no other inscription over my gravestone than: "Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of the peace with France in the year 1800."

In the course of the excitement occasioned by the dispute with France, a few outstanding Republicans insisted that the break with France was in large measure due to Federalist dislike of the French Revolution and of democracy in general. Prominent among these was Philip Freneau, who at the instigation of Madison and other Virginians had established the *National Gazette* in Philadelphia in the early 1790's. No Federalist escaped Freneau's vitriolic pen, and his editorials and articles were widely copied in the Republican press. Freneau's attacks along with those of other Republicans convinced the more radical Federalists that the time had come to silence the critics of the existing order, and in 1798 they pushed through Congress four drastic measures known as the Alien and Sedition Acts. The first of these, a new naturalization law, raised the minimum residence requirement from five to fourteen years. The second, the Alien Act, authorized the president to banish at any time aliens that he judged "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States" or that he had "reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government." This measure was supplemented by the Alien Enemies Act, which empowered the president, in the event of war to restrain, imprison, or remove all alien enemies whose continued presence might endanger the public safety. The fourth law, the Sedition Act, was aimed at the Republican press and prescribed a fine not exceeding \$5,000 and imprisonment of not less than six months nor more than five years for any persons who might unlawfully combine or conspire to oppose any measures "of the government of the United States . . . or to impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any person holding a place or office . . . from undertaking, performing, or executing his trust or duty." Persons who counseled, advised, or attempted "to procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or combination" were to be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor and, if convicted, were liable to the same severe punishment. Moreover, any person who should "write, print, utter, or publish . . . any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States" or against any of its officers was liable to a fine not exceeding \$2,000 and to a maximum imprisonment of two years.

The Alien Acts, though not enforced, caused bitter resentment, and many persons fearing Federalist persecutions left the country. Under the vigorous enforcement of the Sedition Act twenty-four Republican editors were arrested soon after the bill's adoption. Among these were Thomas Adams of the *Independent Chronicle* of Boston, David Frothingham of the *Argus* of New York, Benjamin Franklin Bache of the *Philadelphia Aurora*, and James Thompson Callender of the *Richmond Examiner*—four of the ablest journalists in America. Of the dozens of others who fell victims to the law, Matthew Lyons, congressman from Vermont, was perhaps the most prominent. He was sentenced to four months in jail and fined a thousand dollars for asserting that President Adams had turned men out of office for party reasons and for referring to the President's "continual grasp for power" and his "unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice." Jedidiah Peck, an eccentric surveyor-preacher, was dragged from his bed in Otsego, New York, placed in manacles and marched two hundred miles to New York, where he was tried for sedition for having circulated a powerful and somewhat vituperative petition for the repeal of the Sedition Act. Similar was the case of David Brown, an illiterate and irresponsible Revolutionary soldier of Dedham, Massachusetts. Brown was in part responsible for the erection of a liberty pole bearing the inscription: "No Stamp Act, no Sedition, no Alien Bills, no Land Tax; downfall to the Tyrants of America, peace and retirement to the President; long live the Vice-President, and the minority; may moral virtue be the basis of civil government." Fisher Ames, Federalist guardian of the existing order, at once took steps to apprehend this trumpeter of sedition. After a farcical trial, Brown was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment and a fine of \$400. Unable to secure the money, he remained in prison for two years until pardoned by Jefferson.

The Alien and Sedition laws proved a boomerang to the Federalists, for Americans in all walks of life vigorously protested against what they maintained were outrageous departures from the fundamental law of the land and from the tradition of liberty. They felt that these laws not only violated the spirit of the Federal Constitution but that they openly transgressed the First Amendment, which forbade Congress to make any law restricting freedom of speech and press. Of the numerous protests the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were the most famous. The Kentucky Resolutions, drafted by Jefferson and slightly modified by John Breckinridge, were presented to the Kentucky legislature in November, 1798. They declared that government exists by compact and that certain definite powers are reserved to each state. Any act contrary to the Constitution, such as the Alien and Sedition laws, was therefore null and void and of no force. Similar resolutions drawn up by Madison condemned the laws in somewhat briefer and milder form. The passage

of these resolutions served to center public attention on the acts. The Republicans made the resolutions the occasion for denouncing the acts, and the Federalists made them a pretext not only for justifying the acts but for defending the Constitution and their administration of the national government.

The individual most responsible for the formulation of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions and the subsequent defeat of the Federalists in the election of 1800 was Thomas Jefferson. A perceptive and penetrating political philosopher with a deep-seated belief in democracy and agrarianism, Jefferson was also a practical politician who realized that elections could only be won by well-organized parties. Starting with the dissatisfied planters and farmers in his native state of Virginia, Jefferson eventually made contacts with important Republicans in every state in the Union. Jefferson's Republican party drew its principal support from Southern agrarians, the nonbusiness interests of the Northeast, and frontiersmen. Although these groups had little in common, they all had reason to dislike the Federalists, and they all shared a debtor philosophy. They were bound together, not by similar ideals, but by the belief that their grievances could be attributed to Federalist control of the central government. Jefferson did not create this opposition, but more than anyone else he was responsible for giving it national organization.

Jefferson could make no overt move to rally his supporters as long as Washington remained President, for nothing could be gained—and much could be lost—by opposing the nation's leading hero and citizen. But when John Adams succeeded Washington in 1797, the opposition forces were able to carry on their political activities in the open and to become a national party in name as well as in fact. Despite this advantage, the Jeffersonians were soon on the defensive, for as Francophiles they could not avoid being discredited by the XYZ affair and the undeclared naval war with France. During this period they were probably saved from extinction only by the conflict between Adams and Hamilton within the Federalist party. When the Federalists sought to press their advantage with the Alien and Sedition Acts, however, Jefferson was able once again to rouse his followers against Federalist rule. Furthermore, Adams's decision to make peace with France deprived the Federalists of one of their most effective issues.

In the campaign of 1800 the Federalists nominated John Adams and C. C. Pinckney; the Republicans again selected Jefferson and Burr. The outcome of the election indicates both the effectiveness of Jefferson's organizational work and the extent of the popular dissatisfaction with the Federalists. The Republicans carried New York, and most of the South; Federalist strength centered in New England. Jefferson received 73 electoral votes and Adams 65. In what for the time was a remarkable

display of party regularity, all the Republican electors cast their second votes for Burr, who was therefore tied with Jefferson for the presidency. Under the terms of the Constitution, it was now up to the House of Representatives, where the Federalists had a clear majority, to decide between Jefferson and Burr. Although a number of Federalists preferred Burr, Hamilton, who opposed Jefferson's policies, but knew that Burr was altogether untrustworthy, eventually prevailed on them to change their votes; and on the thirty-sixth ballot Jefferson was chosen the third President of the United States.*

The election of 1800 marked the end of Federalist rule in the national capital. In a little more than a decade, the Federalists had transformed a collection of autonomous states into a firm and enduring union. Their agrarian opponents had criticized their methods and even their objectives, but nothing could rob them of their accomplishments. They had created a nation.

* To prevent a repetition of the events of 1800 the Twelfth Amendment was adopted in 1804. This amendment provided that electors cast separate ballots for president and vice-president. The Eleventh Amendment, which became a part of the Constitution in 1798, provided: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."

CHAPTER X

THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

- 58. THE SOCIAL ORDER
 - 59. RELIGION
 - 60. LITERATURE
 - 61. JOURNALISM
 - 62. THE ARTS
 - 63. EDUCATION
-

IN THE opening years of the nineteenth century the United States was still a frontier community. Two thirds of its total population of approximately four and a half million whites and nearly a million Negroes clung to the Atlantic seaboard. As in all frontier communities the business of making a living took precedence over most other considerations. The average American had little time for recreation and little interest in intellectual pursuits; he devoted his major energies to the accumulation of worldly goods. Although he would have been the last to admit it, his country—in an intellectual sense—was seldom able to compete with the leading nations of Europe.

58. THE SOCIAL ORDER

IN 1800 the greater portion of the republic's population was of native birth, although of various stocks—English, Dutch, German, French, Irish, Scotch, Swedish, Swiss, Welsh and African Negro. The white inhabitants of New England and the South were largely of English extraction. One fourth of the population of Pennsylvania were

Germans, and there were also many in New Jersey, Virginia, and New York. Descendants of French Huguenots were to be found in New York and South Carolina. There were Dutch in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; Irish and Scotch-Irish in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Kentucky; a few Scotch in New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina; Swedes in Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania; and Swiss and French in the Indiana Territory. English was the universal language, although the Germans in Pennsylvania spoke their own tongue. Almost all the Negroes lived in the South, for slavery was fast dying out in the North. Immigration was at a low point, and from 1790 to 1800 probably not more than four or five thousand newcomers arrived annually. Old World industrial and military needs, fear of British impressment, heavy emigration fees, and the wide-spread circulation in Europe of false reports concerning American climatic conditions and economic opportunity tended to discourage the migration of those who might otherwise have come. Of those who did migrate, the English, Irish, and Germans were most numerous.

The population of the new republic was overwhelmingly rural, for the number of persons who lived in towns of 8,000 or over totaled only 200,000. The most populous state in the Union was Virginia, with 880,200 people; Pennsylvania ranked second with 602,365, and New York was third with 589,051. North Carolina had 478,103 and Massachusetts 422,845. There were few large cities. Philadelphia, long the metropolis of America, was about to yield leadership to New York; both had less than 75,000 persons each. Boston, Baltimore, Charleston, Salem, Providence, and Newport were the other leading cities.

The American economy of 1800 differed little from that of colonial days. The vast majority of people still gained their livelihood from agriculture, and neither the farmer's mode of life, nor his tools, methods and habits had changed. He lived in the same type of house, wore the same sort of clothes, and ate the same kind of food as his father did before him. The wooden plow, hoe, sickle, cradle, and flail were still in general use. With few exceptions stock was unimproved and neglected. Drainage, fertilization, and crop rotation were uncommon. Only in Pennsylvania and a few other localities, such as the Connecticut and Shenandoah valleys, was there evidence of agricultural progress.

Nor had the life of the townsman undergone any fundamental change since pre-Revolutionary days. Although towns had increased in number and population, they were for the most part without improvements. Only Philadelphia had well-paved and well-lighted streets, good drainage, and a water system. New York in 1800 covered only the lower tip of Manhattan Island. Its streets, lined with open sewers and piled high with filth and refuse, were overrun with hogs that acted as scavengers.

Roadways were dusty in dry weather and quagmires in every rain. The privately owned reservoir that supplied the city with water was frequently polluted by bathers and laundry women. Sanitary ordinances were few and for the most part unheeded. Zoning was unheard of, and slaughter houses stood in the midst of residential sections. The homes of the poorer people in the northern part of the city were wretched habitations. Police and fire-fighting forces were inadequate. Conditions in Boston, Baltimore, and the lesser towns were only slightly better, and in some instances they were worse.

Although the Revolution had been accompanied by marked changes in American society, it had not fundamentally altered the young nation's class structure. Social classes based on birth, wealth, and official position, though not as sharply differentiated as in the Old World, continued to exist much as they had in 1750 or even earlier. At the top of the ladder stood the planters and the other great landholders. The wealthy merchant-bankers, who earned profits from land speculation and domestic and foreign trade, were also influential members of this group. Like its colonial predecessors, this group lived in some luxury, exercised great political influence, and enjoyed social and cultural advantages denied to the rank and file. Standing next in the social order were those engaged in the professions. Intelligent and industrious, the professional men allied themselves as a rule with the landed-mercantile class. Occupying a lower rung in the ladder were the small farmers, artisans, and laborers—carpenters, cordwainers, typesetters, hodcarriers, draymen, sailors, ditch diggers. Hampered by ignorance, without political power, often exploited by their employers, and liable to imprisonment for debt, they occupied a far from enviable place in society.

In America, however, there was considerably more class fluidity than in Europe. Sparseness of population, enormous expanses of cheap land, abundant natural resources, the growing prevalence of the notion that one person was as good as another, and the absence of rigid class barriers made it possible for an individual to climb higher. This movement from one social stratum to another, which dated from earliest colonial times, was very much in evidence in 1800. Some of those who dwelt in "Quality Row," as the mansions overlooking New York Bay were called, or in the stately structures in Derby and Chestnut Streets in Boston, had started at the bottom.

59. RELIGION

ON THE surface the religious scene in America in 1800 was much the same as at the beginning of the Revolution. The overwhelming majority believed in the divine origin of the Bible, the

miraculous creation of the world, and the existence of Heaven and Hell. The belief that all things, animate and inanimate, were the handiwork of the Almighty and that from the beginning they had remained substantially unchanged was almost universal. New England was still a Congregational stronghold, though the Unitarians had gained a firm foothold. Dutch Reformists, Episcopalians, Baptists, and Methodists were the dominant groups in New York; Lutherans, Quakers, Moravians, and Episcopalians dominated in Pennsylvania and New Jersey; and Baptists, Methodists, and Episcopalians in the South. Maryland had many Catholics; and the Methodists, Baptists, and Presbyterians were strong in the West. The Jews, although less powerful numerically than any of the Christian groups, were gaining a foothold in such seaboard cities as Newport, Providence, New York, Philadelphia, Charleston, and Savannah.

In theology most of the denominations had seemingly undergone little or no change from earlier times. With one or two exceptions they held rigorously to the doctrine that God is omnipotent, absolute, unchanging; that because of the fall of Adam and Eve man is stained with sin and, unless cleansed, is doomed on a judgment day to suffer eternal punishment in Hell; that man should at all costs deny himself the pleasures of this world that are sinful or that might lead him into sin; and that he should at all times do everything in his power to honor and glorify God so that at death he might enter Paradise. Although they differed somewhat in regard to methods by which man could be saved, nearly all the traditional sects were in agreement on these fundamental principles of orthodoxy.

As in colonial days, the denominational groups regarded themselves as the makers and conservers of both private and public standards of conduct. Moreover, many people, convinced that there could be no virtue without religion, felt that religion should be supported by the state. Since the first amendment to the Federal Constitution explicitly forbade Congress to make any law "respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," the national government, even if inclined to do so, was powerless either to establish an official religion or to assist financially any religious sect. Several of the states, however, were not bound by such constitutional restraints. The constitution of Massachusetts, after expressly declaring that the happiness of any people and the preservation of government essentially depend "upon piety, religion, and morality, and [that] these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the institution of the public worship of God and of public instruction in piety, religion, and morality," directed the legislature to require the people of the state to make suitable provision for public worship and for the "support of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality." In similar vein, New

Hampshire asserted that morality and piety, "grounded on evangelical principles," were the foundations of good government. Connecticut allowed taxation for religious purposes. The Maryland Declaration of Rights empowered the legislature at any time "to lay a general and equal tax for the support of the Christian religion." New Jersey made "belief in the faith of any Protestant sect" a requirement for eligibility to office. In North Carolina no person could hold office who "should deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion or the divine authority either of the Old or New Testament." And in Delaware and Pennsylvania a person had to believe in God, a future life, and the inspiration of the Scriptures to qualify as a legislator.

Nevertheless, Old World intellectual currents were undermining religious orthodoxy. The new science—the fruit in large measure of the Copernican and Cartesian revolutions—with its emphasis upon scientific method and the study of nature, challenged authority in every field. Traditional religious beliefs and practices were now subjected to rigid scrutiny from the standpoint of human standards of right and reasonableness. The multitudes were scarcely affected by this new rationalistic spirit, but the middle class became its ardent champions. The more radical, known as the Deists, skeptical of the theories of divine sovereignty, infinite punishment, the atonement, and supernatural grace, rejected revelation entirely and held that natural religion with its insistence on good citizenship and rational morality met the moral and spiritual needs of man more satisfactorily than did the traditional religious structure. In the *Age of Reason*, Thomas Paine summarized his beliefs as a Deist when he wrote:

I believe in one God, and no more; and I hope for happiness beyond this life. I believe in the equality of man, and I believe that religious duties consist in doing justice, loving mercy, and endeavoring to make our fellow creatures happy. I do not believe in the creed professed . . . by any church that I know of. My own mind is my own church. . . . All national institutions of churches . . . appear to me no other than human inventions set up to terrify and enslave mankind and monopolize power and profit. I do not mean . . . to condemn those who believe otherwise. They have the same right to their belief as I have to mine. But it is necessary to the happiness of man that he be faithful to himself.

Making rapid headway in England, where it numbered among its apologists Lord Herbert of Cherbury, John Locke, David Hume, and Matthew Tindal, Deism spread to the Continent and to America. By the outbreak of the American Revolution, Franklin, Jefferson, Madison, Ethan Allen, Paine, and Washington, as well as many persons of lesser prominence, had come under the influence of the Deists, although some

of them, notably Franklin and Washington, conformed sufficiently to keep on good terms with their orthodox neighbors. Converts to Deism were most numerous in the Middle and Southern states.

Against the Deists the orthodox clergy leveled their heaviest guns. Ethan Allen, Revolutionary patriot, whose *Reason, the Only Oracle of Man* appeared in 1784, became the target of a most vitriolic attack. When a fire, said to have been caused by lightning, destroyed all but about thirty copies of the entire edition of his book, the orthodox construed it as a judgment from Heaven. Even more savage were the attacks on Thomas Paine and his *Age of Reason*, which began to appear in America in 1794. Prominent clergymen such as Jedidiah Morse and Timothy Dwight bitterly denounced it. Orthodox laymen expressed their horror that such a scandalous and irreligious publication should be permitted to circulate. College authorities lamented the unsettling influence that Paine and his writings would have on the youth of the land, and to counteract it every Harvard undergraduate was presented with a copy of Bishop Watson's *Apology for the Bible*.

Although the struggle between orthodox religion and the rising forces of rationalism extended to all parts of the young republic, the battle was fought most fiercely in Calvinist New England. Here during the middle of the eighteenth century a number of young preachers, of whom Jonathan Mayhew, Charles Chauncey, and Lemuel Briant were outstanding, began to modify strict Calvinist doctrines. They proved to be the forerunners of the Unitarian revolt, which by the end of the century threatened to split the Congregational churches into two opposing groups. Reversing the thought processes of the Calvinists, the Unitarians regarded man, not as a depraved, helpless creature, subject to God's wrath, but as God's child, made in His image, and the object of His love. They rejected the doctrines of original sin and unconditional predestination as unworthy of a just God and made man's reason and conscience the divine witnesses to truth and light. Like the sixteenth-century Socinians, the Unitarians thought of Jesus as the "Son of God" but not as God himself, and they tried to prove this by the Scriptures. At the same time they attacked the orthodox theory of atonement and emphasized the benevolence of God and the ultimate salvation of all men.

Most popular among the wealthier business interests, the politicians, and the lawyers of eastern New England, the new creed spread rapidly. As early as 1785, King's Chapel, Boston, formerly in the hands of the Episcopalians, became Unitarian. Congregational churches in Worcester, Portland, and Plymouth followed suit, and by 1800 the ministerial ranks of the trinitarian Calvinists in Boston were almost deserted. By 1803, when William Ellery Channing, guiding spirit of the movement, took charge of the Federal Street Church in Boston, it was a fore-

gone conclusion that the breach with the orthodox camp could not be healed. In 1805, David Tappan, Hollis Professor of Divinity at Harvard, was succeeded by Henry Ware, a Unitarian. The Calvinists retaliated by establishing a theological school of their own at Andover in 1808. But the orthodox theologians could not check the spread of milder doctrines, and before a quarter of a century had passed, the Unitarians had their own divinity school at Harvard, a publication society, and a nationwide association.

While Unitarianism was changing the religious attitudes of some of the more educated inhabitants in the coastal regions of New England, a revival was sweeping through the backcountry from Maine to Georgia. Gaining its greatest momentum at the turn of the century, the Great Revival revealed the preference of many for a religion that emphasized the supernatural rather than the rational. Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, and even Congregational preachers conducted a spirited crusade against infidelity along the entire frontier; thousands of enthusiastic frontiersmen attended camp meetings; and there were numerous conversions after every sermon preached by a revivalist. Many people were so carried away by the preacher's words that they were seized by spasms, and the proceedings were frequently interrupted by shrieks, sobs, and shouts.

The Baptists played a major role in the Great Revival. Although the Baptists trace their origins in America to Roger Williams, the sect grew slowly during most of the colonial period, and it was not until the Great Awakening that it attracted a sizable number of adherents. Because the Baptists thought that conversion should precede baptism, they insisted on the baptism of mature individuals rather than of infants. Some believed in salvation by faith and good works, but others accepted predestination. All considered religion a personal matter between man and his God; all organized their churches on a congregational basis; and all advocated complete separation of church and state. Although there were Baptists in every state in 1800, they were most numerous in the South and frontier regions. The Baptists, together with the Presbyterians and the Methodists, led the Great Revival; a man at a revival meeting in Kentucky wrote: "I attended with 18 Presbyterian ministers; and Baptist and Methodist preachers I do not know how many; all being either preaching or exhorting the distressed with more harmony than could be expected." Some indication of the effect of the revival on the Baptists in the West can be gained from the fact that from 1800 to 1803 they established 111 churches in Kentucky alone.

Of all the revivalists none were more important than the Methodists. Methodism, which had appeared in the New World in the decade before the Revolution, owed its beginning in large measure to the brothers Charles and John Wesley. Charles, mystic and poet, wrote its songs:

"Jesus, Lover of My Soul," "Hark, The Herald Angels Sing," "Come, Thou Almighty King," and hundreds of others; John made its laws and rules and formulated its characteristic teachings. He rejected in its entirety the conception of natural religion; Biblical revelation was to him the very foundation of Christianity. He accepted in general the theological position of the Anglican Church, with its traditional doctrines of original sin and Christ's redemption and atonement (and like the Anglicans he rejected the doctrine of predestination); but he emphasized the divine power of grace through faith in Jesus Christ and the necessity of personal communion with Him as the only means of salvation. He tried to spread his ideas, not by theological argument, but by arousing in his listeners the intense personal devotion to Christ that he felt himself. Unlike the Anglicans (and even the Puritans), the Methodists were evangelical and ascetic; they had little sympathy with secular pleasures, and they tended to be especially antagonistic toward learning, believing it dangerous to religion and destructive of the intense religious experience that was the sign of salvation.

Under the energetic guidance of Francis Asbury, the leading spirit in founding the Methodist Episcopal Church in America, Methodism spread rapidly. In the single year of 1805 it gained six thousand adherents; and when in 1816 Asbury died after forty-four years of effort on American soil, he had, in the words of Charles and Mary Beard, traveled "more than two hundred and fifty thousand miles through villages and towns, through thickly settled country districts and dark frontier forests, claiming finally three hundred thousand converts and four thousand ordained clergymen." * Writing in his journal near the close of his life, he recorded that he had crossed the Allegheny Mountains sixty times. Asbury was a master in the art of arousing human emotions, and his vivid portrayals of the love of Christ, the torments of Hell, and the joys of Heaven stirred his listeners deeply.

Because of its emotionalism, its emphasis on supernaturalism and Biblical literalism, and its lack of sympathy with science and secular culture in general, Methodism did not attract the educated. It reaped its harvest on the frontier and among the common people of the older settled regions where many persons were growing lax religiously. The simplicity and sentimentality of Methodism, compared with Catholicism, Anglicanism, or even Calvinism, appealed to the common man. Its ministers preached in words that the lowly and untutored could understand. By encouraging oratory, mass enthusiasm, and religious conviction among the people, it perhaps more than any other creed contributed to the growth of the crude but confident democracy that Andrew Jackson was to epitomize.

* Charles Austin and Mary R. Beard: *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), Vol. I, p. 450.

60. LITERATURE

DURING the early decades of the new republic, American authors were hampered by the absence of a literary tradition, by a frontier environment in which material progress took precedence over intellectual endeavors, and by a lack of wealthy patrons to subsidize them. Despite these obstacles, there were a number of creative writers during this period, and most of them reflected the time and place in which they lived. As members of a nation that had only recently gained its independence, they tended to emphasize patriotic themes and to extol customs and traits that they considered peculiarly American. Several dramatists, novelists, and poets, moreover, openly resented the influence of English culture on American life, and Philip Freneau spoke for many others when he wrote:

*Can we ever be thought to have a learning or grace,
Unless it be sent from that damnable place?*

The first important dramatist in America was Royall Tyler (1757-1826), whose comedy *The Contrast* was produced in New York in 1787. Contrasting the simple and homely manners and customs of the American agrarian with the frivolous and luxurious standards of the city dweller who aped Old World fashions and ways, *The Contrast* stressed both patriotism and nationalism as well as the virtues of republican simplicity. Historically, Tyler's dramatic work is significant for the insight it affords of American life at the time. Moreover, Tyler deserves much of the credit for a change in the public's attitude toward the theater. Many Americans who had formerly thought the theater immoral now began to see that it was an institution that could be used to reflect and perpetuate national traits and genius.

William Dunlap (1766-1839) was the first American to make the writing of plays a profession. A seemingly untiring worker, he wrote more than sixty plays including tragedy, comedy, melodrama, farce, and opera. More than half were originals, the others being translations or adaptations of French and German works. For fourteen years, from 1796 to 1805 and from 1806 to 1811, he was a theatrical manager as well as a writer. In 1832, seven years before his death, he published his *History of the American Theater*, which is still an invaluable source. Contemporary with Dunlap were a number of lesser playwrights who dramatized almost every great event from the Boston Tea Party to the War of 1812.

The economic, social, religious, and political conditions at the turn of the century furnished the novelist as well as the dramatist with abun-

ANDRÉ;

A TRAGEDY, IN FIVE ACTS:

AS PERFORMED BY THE OLD AMERICAN COMPANY,

NEW-YORK, MARCH 30, 1798.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS

RESPECTING

MAJOR ANDRÉ;

CONSISTING OF

LETTERS TO MISS SEWARD,

THE

COW CHACE,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT MARTIAL, &c.

COPY RIGHT SECURED.

NEW-YORK:

Printed by T. & J. SWORDS, No. 99 Pearl-street.

— 1798. —

TITLE PAGE OF WILLIAM DUNLAP'S *André*

dant material. Although many Americans appear to have acquired the fiction-reading habit before the Revolution, the novel continued to face formidable opposition. Moralists contended that it lied, softened the mind of the reader, crowded out better books, made adventure too romantic and love too vehement, and tended to confuse and dissatisfy the young. Despite such rigorous censure native novelists soon made their

appearance. In 1789 Mrs. Sarah Wentworth Morton of Boston produced the *Power of Sympathy*, America's first novel. Three years later Mrs. Susannah H. Rowson brought out her *Charlotte Temple*; designed as a warning to inexperienced girls, it proved to be one of the most popular novels ever published in America. *The Coquette* by Mrs. Hannah Webster Foster, based upon a New England scandal, appeared in 1797, and within a short time it had gone through several editions.

The early writers of fiction accurately reflected the various social and economic views of their age. As a representative of the Federalist school of thought, Royall Tyler in such novels as *The Algerine Captive* (1797) satirized much of American social life, ranging from education at Harvard and the state of the medical profession to paper money and the shortcomings of the clergy and the Jeffersonian gentry. Equally satirical, but more favorably inclined toward democracy than Tyler, was Hugh H. Brackenridge (1748-1816). A western Pennsylvanian of Scotch birth, graduate of Princeton in the class with James Madison, lawyer, and free-lance democrat, Brackenridge in his novel *Modern Chivalry*, poked fun at what seemed to him to be the shortcomings and absurdities of the young republic. Vigorously individualistic and a firm believer that the hope of republican government rested upon intelligence and education, he attacked both "monocrats" and "levelers" and criticized lawyers, city speculators, slaveholders, republican demagogues, and office seekers.

More radical than Brackenridge was Charles Brockden Brown (1771-1810), perhaps the outstanding novelist of his time in the English-speaking portion of the New World. Profoundly influenced at first by Rousseau and later by Voltaire and the English radicals, he wanted the United States to serve nobler social ends than did the nations of Europe, which he thought had been debased by greed. Agreeing with the French philosophers that the ills of society were traceable to social and political maladjustments and to human nature, he demanded a state where reason and justice would at all times prevail. In *Alcuin: A Dialogue* (1797), Brown argued that women should enjoy full equality with men socially, industrially, and politically. Pleading her own case, one of his characters condemns the existing social order for denying woman the advantages of a college education, subjecting her to the discipline of the common law, and excluding her from many professions and pursuits. Of Brown's works, *Arthur Mervyn* (1799-1800) best displays his idea of what America should be. Throughout, the hero emphasizes the ideal of justice and criticizes, by implication, if not directly, all that is mean and sordid. In his *Wieland: or The Transformation* (1798), Brown advocated rationalism as a cure for all the ills growing out of superstition and credulity. In addition to fiction, Brown published several brief memorial sketches and many political pamphlets setting forth his social

ideals. He was also a magazine editor of some repute. His books, highly recommended in the English reviews, found many overseas readers, including Scott, Godwin, and Shelley.

Although American verse in general imitated English poetry in style, its themes were similar to those of the early American drama and fiction. The great future of the United States, the bitter and absorbing contest between Federalist and Republican provided poets with ample material for their couplets.

Practically every poet between 1775 and 1810 composed at least one patriotic composition in which some phase of the Revolution was featured. *Patriot's Appeal*; *Liberty's Call*; *Columbia's Glory, or British Pride Humbled*; and *McFingal*—the last mentioned by John Trumbull (1750–1831), classmate of Timothy Dwight at Yale—are typical. *McFingal*, a 3800-line political satire, is a glorification of the Patriot cause:

*Forthwith the crowd proceed to deck
With halter'd noose M'Fingal's neck, . . .
Then lifting high th' pond'rous jar,
Pour'd o'er his head the smocking tar . . .
And spreads him o'er with feathers missive,
And down upon the tar adhesive; . . .
Then on the two-wheel'd car of state,
They raised our grand Duumvirate . . .
And hail'd great Liberty in chorus,
Or bawl'd, Confusion to the Tories.*

In the struggle for control following the Revolution both Federalists and Anti-Federalists had poetic spokesmen. Standing above all others in the ranks of Federalism were the Hartford Wits. Provincial in outlook and representative of the New England oligarchical upper class, this group, which included John Trumbull, Timothy Dwight, Lemuel Hopkins, David Humphreys, Richard Alsop, and Theodore Dwight, opposed every form of equalitarianism.

They were [to quote Vernon L. Parrington] the literary old guard of the expiring eighteenth century, suspicious of all innovation, contemptuous of every idealistic program. They stood stoutly by the customary and familiar. The nineteenth century was knocking at their door, but they would not open to it. And as they saw that new century coming in the guise of revolution, exciting to unheard of innovations in the fields of politics and economics, and religion and letters, giving rise to Jacobin Clubs and Jeffersonian democracy, they set their own little world. They conveniently associated the economic unrest of postwar days, that gave birth to a strange progeny in Rhode Island and New Hampshire and Massachusetts, with

*the contamination of French atheism, charged all unrest to the account of democracy, and hastened to put it down in the name of law and righteousness. They hated new ways with the virtuous hatred of the well-to-do, and dreamed of a future America as like the past as one generation of oysters is like another.**

Of the Republican poets, Philip Freneau (1752-1832) was outstanding. His poems, aggregating twelve hundred pages, cover many themes. Nearly all of them, like his prose writings, defend democracy and oppose tyranny in any form. In his opinion an ambitious and moneyed domestic aristocracy was as dangerous as George III and his Tory supporters. No word or phrase was too stinging or too scurrilous for his crusade. To Washington he was "that rascal Freneau"; Washington Irving called him "a barking cur"; and Timothy Dwight thought that he was "a mere incendiary, or rather . . . a despicable tool of bigger incendiaries [Jefferson in particular], and his paper [*National Gazette*] . . . a public nuisance."

Of the other Jeffersonian verse makers, Joel Barlow probably deserves to rank next to Freneau. In 1787 he published a philosophic poem *The Vision of Columbus*. Twenty years later this was reworked, enlarged, and published as *The Columbiad*. From a literary point of view the result was unhappy, for the poem is merely a "geographical, historical, political, and philosophical disquisition." But throughout, Barlow's sensitive social conscience is apparent; he denounces war, slavery, monarchy, and what to him appear to be a host of other social and political evils. In the concluding lines he envisions a golden age of international good will when all nations shall draw together and

*cloth'd majestic in the robes of state,
Moved by one voice, in general congress meet
The legates of all empires.*

61. JOURNALISM

NEWSPAPERS, magazines, tracts, and pamphlets as well as "polite" literature mirrored the changing scene at the turn of the century. There was scarcely a town of any size in any part of the country that did not have its printing press and its newspaper. By 1810 the list of American newspapers had grown from 40 at the close of the Revolution to more than 350. Magazines also multiplied from 5 in 1794

* Vernon L. Parrington: *Main Currents of American Thought*, Vol. I: *The Colonial Mind, 1640-1850* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1927), p. 358. Copyright by and reprinted with the permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

to 12 in 1800, and to about 40 in 1810; by 1825 the number had reached almost 100.

Newspapers varied greatly in character and in circulation. The majority were weeklies, but some came out semiweekly and a few tri-weekly. The first daily, *The Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser*, began its career in Philadelphia in 1784, and a number of other dailies soon made their appearance; by 1809 there were almost thirty. Few had any considerable circulation outside of their immediate locality. By far the larger number were party organs. Statutes, the proceedings of Congress and state legislatures (including important speeches), poetry, advertisements, letters, notices of auctions, long political communications over assumed names such as "Cato," "Junius," or "Camillus," and (in the port towns) entrances and clearances of vessels made up the content of most of the papers. Though the majority were principally vehicles of political opinion, some were primarily advertising media and agencies for the dissemination of commercial information. They scarcely mentioned crime and made little attempt to print news that would appeal to the poor and uneducated. Moreover, papers were expensive; the dailies cost eight dollars per year and the weeklies from three to five.

Though paying little attention to news, *The Evening Post* of New York, established by Alexander Hamilton and a group of Federalist associates in 1801, was representative of the best of the early nineteenth-century newspapers. Under the editorship of the energetic and courageous William Coleman, it soon became the outstanding Federalist paper. Coleman, nicknamed the "Field Marshal of the Federal Editors," stood squarely behind the Hamiltonian program and from him other Federalist sheets took their cue. "The people of America derive their political information chiefly from newspapers," wrote J. T. Callender, one of the leading democratic editors, in 1802. "Duane upon one side and Coleman upon the other, dictate at this moment the sentiments of perhaps fifty thousand American citizens." William Duane, Philip Freneau, and Benjamin Franklin Bache, Franklin's grandson, were also outstanding among Republican editors. The picturesque William Cobbett, alias Peter Porcupine, founder of *Porcupine's Gazette* and *United States Advertiser*, although perhaps more able than Coleman in his attack upon the Democrats, lacked Coleman's poise and breadth of vision. But the effectiveness of Cobbett's vitriolic pen is evident from the following letter written to him by Matthew Carey, Philadelphia liberal:

Wretch as you are, accursed by God and hated by men, the most tremendous scourge that hell ever vomited forth to curse a people by sowing discord among them, I desire not the honor or credit of being villified by you. . . . To send a challenge to a blasted, posted,

loathsome coward . . . would sink me almost to a level with yourself.

The magazines, though less numerous than the newspapers, were nevertheless influential agencies in shaping public opinion. The majority were very nationalistic and extremely sensitive to criticism of the United States or its institutions. Only a few had an able and dependable staff of contributors, and fortunate indeed was the editor who could count on regular contributions from his friends or from some literary club of which he might be a member. Payment for articles was unknown in America until 1819, when the *Christian Spectator*, a new magazine, proposed to compensate its contributors at the rate of one dollar per page. At first many contributors refused to accept any payment, and most of the earlier editors were also unpaid. Some magazines ran illustrations, notably those published in Philadelphia, where lived David Edwin and James Barton Longacre, the two ablest engravers of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Magazine advertising was as yet negligible. Many magazines were short-lived and all had a limited circulation.

Undoubtedly the most important magazine in the first two decades of the new century was the *Philadelphia Port Folio*, established in 1801 by Joseph Dennie, Harvard graduate and staunch admirer of English literature, politics, and culture. Personally magnetic and a writer of ability, Dennie attracted such talent as Joseph Hopkinson, Richard Rush, John Quincy Adams, Charles Brockden Brown, and Gouverneur Morris. The magazine was strongly Federalist and was founded in part "to combat revolutionary doctrines" and to be a torch in "this dark night of Jacobinism." It ran departments of "Literary Intelligence," "Law Intelligence," drama, politics, poetry, music, art, fashion, and occasionally foreign and domestic occurrences and translations of foreign essays. Until the end of Jefferson's second administration, however, politics overshadowed all else, and during these years even the editor of *Port Folio* could not find words adequate to express his hatred of democracy. The extent of his hatred is clear from this paragraph, which appeared in 1803:

A democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of national history. Its omens are always sinister, and its powers are unpropitious. With all the lights of experience blazing before our eyes, it is impossible not to discern the futility of this form of government. It was weak and wicked in Athens. It was bad in Sparta, and worse in Rome. It has been tried in France, and has terminated in despotism. It was tried in England, and rejected with the utmost loathing and abhorrence. It is on trial here, and the issue will be civil war, desolation and anarchy. No wise man but discerns its imperfections, no

good man but shudders at its miseries, no honest man but proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his sword against its force. The institution of a scheme of polity so radically contemptible and vicious is a memorable example of what the villainy of some men can devise, the folly of others receive, and both establish, in despite of reason, reflection and sensation.

62. THE ARTS

AT THE turn of the century the fine arts were still struggling in an uncongenial environment. Most Americans, little traveled and concerned primarily with gaining a livelihood, had little time or inclination for the arts. Unlike the Old World, America in 1800 had no art tradition of its own aside from that of the Indians, which the white man ignored. Cheap amusements rather than art treasures satisfied the common people; merchant princes and well-to-do planters, who composed the American aristocracy, were prone to favor foreign artists and to decorate their homes with foreign art. Since the Federal and state governments were too immersed in advancing the material development of the country to be interested in promoting art, the artist was often obliged to turn his hand to other things in order to eke out an existence. Thus the painter Charles Willson Peale stuffed birds, practiced dentistry, ran a museum, and mended harnesses and clocks in order to keep himself alive. Moreover, many of the clergy and laity continued to regard the fine arts as inventions of the Devil, which, like other sinful temptations, ought to be avoided and resisted.

The four leading painters of the age were Benjamin West (1738-1820), John Singleton Copley (1737-1815), Charles Willson Peale (1741-1827), and Gilbert Stuart (1755-1828). West, born near Philadelphia of Quaker parents, left America at the age of twenty-two to study abroad. Here he chose to remain, settling in London, where he was a great success as a painter of mythological and historical figures. From 1792 to his death he served as president of the Royal Academy. Copley, aristocratic Bostonian and portrait painter of many colonial New England notables and by sympathy a Loyalist, left the New World just before the outbreak of the Revolution. He spent the rest of his life in England, where he gained an enviable reputation for his historical pictures. Stuart, a Rhode Islander by birth, shared the aristocratic leanings of West and Copley. Son of a Tory family, he left for London to study with West soon after the first shots at Lexington. He became famous in fashionable circles as a portrait painter and numbered among his works portraits of George III and the Prince of Wales. Anxious to

make a portrait of Washington, for whom he had great admiration, Stuart returned to America in 1792 with a letter of introduction from John Jay. Between this date and his death he gave to posterity canvas impressions of many great Americans, among them Washington, General Knox, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and John Jacob Astor.

Peale stands in sharp contrast to his three contemporaries. Less versatile than either Copley or Stuart, and lacking their ability to portray elegance, his work is distinguished by its simplicity and sincerity. His fourteen intimate portraits of Washington, as well as his portraits of many other famous men, are extremely valuable to both artist and historian. Of all the painters of the period none was so representative of republican tendencies as Peale. Furthermore, he was intensely concerned with promoting interest in art and science among his countrymen. In 1784 he founded a Museum of Natural History in Philadelphia, the first of its kind in America. He also arranged for the first exhibition of paintings in the New World and endeavored to establish a school of fine arts. He was one of the leading founders of the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts in 1805, and of the Society of Artists of the United States in 1810.

Other organizations to encourage the arts now began to develop. An association started in New York in 1801 languished for several years, but was revived in 1816 as the American Academy of Fine Arts. The short-lived New York Academy of Fine Arts, incorporated in 1808 under the auspices of John Trumbull, was superseded in 1826 by the National Academy of Design, the first American art society under professional control.

Contemporary with Peale and sharing his affection for republicanism was the painter John Trumbull (1756-1843), son of a colonial governor of Connecticut and a graduate of Harvard. "I am fully sensible," he wrote, "that the profession [of painting], as it is generally practiced, is frivolous, little useful to society, and unworthy of a man who has talents for more serious pursuits. But to preserve and diffuse the memory of the noblest series of actions which have ever presented themselves in the history of man, is sufficient warrant for it." Trumbull's brilliant pictures of the Revolution together with his extraordinary gallery of small portraits in oil are extremely valuable historically and constitute his chief claim to fame.

Nationalism and the existence of opposing social-economic-political groups, as well as Old World influence, were reflected in striking degree in the architecture of the early republic. When building was resumed, after it had been almost completely suspended during the Revolution, a few architectural craftsmen continued work along the old colonial and Georgian lines. The leaders, however, inspired by the same patriotic ideals that motivated poet, painter and dramatist, and feeling

that the colonial style, whatever its merits, was provincial and lacking in dignity, sought an architecture worthy of the new nation. Although the introduction of the ornate renaissance Gothic fostered by king and established church on the other side of the Atlantic, would undoubtedly have been pleasing to some members of New World aristocracy, to the majority it appeared wholly unfitted for America's frontier environment and dedicated in theory at least to republican and humanitarian ideals. Passing over, therefore, the architectural styles then popular in Europe, Americans turned to the Greeks and Romans with whom they believed they had much in common. The leader in this classical movement was Thomas Jefferson. Architect and master builder, he was the designer of the capitol of Virginia, Monticello, a number of houses for the neighboring gentry—Shadwell, Edgehill, Farrington—and the University of Virginia. The classical style introduced by Jefferson gained quick popularity. The George Washington Parke Custis home at Arlington, Virginia, and Andalusia, the country seat of Nicholas Biddle on the Delaware, with their great porticos supported by columns covering the entire façade and extending above the second story, are typical of the private dwellings modeled after those of the ancients. Of the public buildings of the period employing classical architectural lines, the capitol at Columbia, South Carolina, designed by James Hoban, the Philadelphia Library by William Thornton, the Bank of the United States by Samuel Blodget, the Bank of Pennsylvania by Henry Latrobe, and the Washington Monument in Baltimore by Robert Mills, a pupil of Latrobe, are outstanding examples.

Paralleling the fine arts in development were the graphic arts. The story of etching in the early United States is hardly more than a record of attempts by amateurs to achieve success, and little effort was made to use etching as a reproductive art until the 1820's. Engraving, on the other hand, developed rapidly. During the colonial period the need for paper money, maps, bookplates, business cards, and certificates of various kinds served to encourage the art of engraving. With the advent of the Revolution the engraver as well as the poet and painter expressed his sentiments in his work. "The Boston Massacre," a hand-colored engraving by the patriot and silversmith Paul Revere, and the "Surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown," by J. F. Renault are typical. The spirit of patriotism and nationalism to which the Revolution gave rise found expression at the turn of the century in a number of portrait engravings of contemporary leaders, particularly Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, and Lafayette. The use of caricature in the struggle between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, the increased demand for book and magazine illustrations, the desire that the leading events of the War of 1812 be pictured, and the growing need for well-executed bank-

notes and other business forms all helped to stimulate the engraver's art.

American work in the industrial arts was frequently superior to that in the fine arts. By 1800, American glassware, silverware, pewter, brassware, furniture, needlework, and pottery showed unmistakable evidence that their makers were beginning to find pleasure in self-expression and were striving to turn out articles that were beautiful as well as useful. Stiegel glass, famed for its rich coloring, and named for Henry William Stiegel, the most noted of early glass manufacturers, was for many years the best glass produced in America. Paul Revere and John Coburn of Boston, Thomas Hamersly of New York, and John Bailey of Philadelphia turned out dozens of beautiful pieces of silver. Pewter, an alloy of tin, lead, and copper, although not appearing in as large quantities as in colonial days, was still manufactured, but its popularity declined rapidly after 1820. Most of the brassware used in the colonies was imported from the Old World. By the turn of the century, however, an abundance of knockers, doorknobs, candlesticks, warming pans, and other articles were produced in the young republic. Duncan Phyfe, the best of the early cabinetmakers, not only made beautiful furniture for rich New Yorkers but did more than any other person of his time to educate American taste for the delicate classical style. Needlework was as popular as in colonial days. Samplers, patchwork, quilting, and embroidery were made in all parts of the country. Several American potteries were in existence by 1800, but with very few exceptions their product was inferior to that of their European competitors.

63. EDUCATION

FRONTIER conditions, the existence of fairly definite social-economic classes, the traditional notion that an aristocracy of breeding and wealth should monopolize the benefits of education, the prevalence of state sovereignty and sectional animosity, the desire to strengthen nationalistic ideals, and—above all—eighteenth-century liberalism with its emphasis on democracy and human perfectibility were the principal and often conflicting forces that shaped educational ideas in the young republic.

The Federalists were primarily concerned with educating leaders for the masses rather than in educating the masses. As champions of a highly centralized national system, they were essentially interested in training competent administrators, legislators, and judges. It was largely for this reason that Washington advocated the establishment under

Federal auspices of a national university at the seat of the general government. Such an institution, he urged, would enable young men from all parts of the country to secure training not only in the arts and sciences but in practical politics. Nor did he lose sight of the nationalizing influences of such an institution.

It is of the highest importance, in my opinion, [he wrote] that during the juvenile period of life, when friendships are formed and habits established that stick by one, the youth or young men from different parts of the United States would be assembled together, and would by degrees discover that there was not that cause for those jealousies and prejudices which one part of the Union had imbibed against another part—of course sentiments of more liberality would result from it.

Although Washington's proposal for a national university had the support of such outstanding men as Charles Pinckney, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, it did not win sufficient public favor to induce Congress to take concrete action. The Military Academy founded at West Point in 1802 and the Naval Academy established at Annapolis some fifty years later were the only educational institutions supported directly by Federal funds at the middle of the nineteenth century that performed in a small way such a nationalizing function.

The proposals of the Republicans were heavily laden with eighteenth-century liberal concepts. Jefferson, who in this as in other matters was a leading Republican spokesman, believed that men and institutions were capable of indefinite improvement; that education was the chief means by which this improvement could be accelerated and guided; that institutions, instead of remaining fixed and unchanging, should be flexible and evolutionary; that the primary purpose of the state was to further human progress; and that this progress could best be encouraged through a national system of education that would not only provide uniformity of instruction, texts, and supervision but would be conducted on a scientific, experimental, open-minded basis. The youth of the land were to be taught, not merely to obey laws imposed from above, but to take responsibility for the nation's policies and welfare. Women, long circumscribed educationally and politically, were to be educated in the principles of democracy and the laws of national citizenship.

This type of educational program was advanced by Dr. Benjamin Rush in his *Thoughts upon the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic* (1786). Starting with the double premise that American should always be preferred to foreign education and that any system of education adopted should inculcate a "supreme regard for country" he pro-

posed a series of schools for both sexes culminating in a postgraduate university. These schools from lowest to highest would inspire the youth of the land "with republican principles." Every student was to be taught to cultivate a spirit of inquiry and to realize that institutions of every description are subject to change or modification. Teachers were to be carefully trained and adequately paid. Rush's proposed curriculum reveals his desire that America divorce itself from Old World institutions. Among the subjects of instruction were ancient and modern history—to enable the youth of the country to appreciate "the progress of liberty and tyranny in the different states of Europe"; the principles and forms of democratic government and international relations; the history and principles of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures; applied mathematics, especially those parts which were useful in business and war—"for there is too much reason to fear that war will continue, for some time to come, to be the unchristian mode of deciding disputes between Christian nations"; natural philosophy and chemistry in so far as they served utilitarian ends; natural history, including the history of animals, vegetables, and fossils; philology, rhetoric, criticism, and lectures upon the construction and pronunciation of the English language; German and French—which he maintained should be acquired only through the ear; and athletics and manly exercises, which "are calculated to impart health, strength, and elegance to the human body." He ruled out Greek and Latin as unsuited to American needs.

To assist the work of the university, Rush proposed that four trained specialists be sent abroad at public expense in quest of "the improvements that are daily made in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and in the art of war and practical government." Two others should be similarly employed "in exploring the vegetable, mineral, and animal productions of our country [and] in procuring histories and samples of each of them." The professors of the university were to be liberally compensated and drawn from the best intellectual talent of the nation. The chief business of the head of the institution, who was to be a man "of extensive education, liberal manners, and dignified deportment," was to inspire the students "by his conversation and by occasional public discourses, with federal and patriotic sentiments." The degrees conferred by the university were to indicate that its principal purpose was to educate youth for "civil and public life." Rush felt certain that if his educational scheme, including his plan for a Federal university, were adopted it would mark the beginning of a golden age in the United States by removing ignorance and prejudice and disseminating enlightenment to every corner of the country. But neither Rush's plan nor proposals by others for a national system of education gained acceptance. Not only was each state left in control of its own education, but

for a generation or more there was lacking anything that might be described as a carefully integrated educational system, national, state or municipal.

During the first decades of the republic, the college continued to be the outstanding educational institution. Between 1783 and 1800, twenty-one colleges—most of which were colleges in name only—came into existence, and by 1820 this number had approximately doubled. Among these were a few state universities, but they were relatively unimportant during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Nearly all the newer institutions, like the older ones, were founded and managed by the churches, and the trustees, president, and faculty of each college were often of the denomination responsible for its birth or continuance. Nine out of ten of the college executives and many of the faculty were drawn from the clergy. Student bodies were in proportion to population, very small. In 1815, for example, only twenty-three students graduated from Williams, sixty-six from Harvard, sixty-nine from Yale, forty from Princeton, fifteen from the University of Pennsylvania, and thirty-seven from the University of South Carolina.

Instead of the broad liberal program suggested by Rush, the college student of 1800 was offered four years of Latin, Greek, rhetoric, mathematics, logic, moral philosophy, and sometimes a little history, geography, economics, and natural science, and occasionally a smattering of political science. Every student studied Greek and Latin for three years; he studied rhetoric and mathematics in the first two years, natural philosophy in the third, and philosophical studies—logic, metaphysics, ethics, and lectures on the evidences of Christianity—in the fourth. The classics were regarded as the backbone of the entire course. "With the study or neglect of the Greek and Latin languages," wrote the Reverend John Mason, provost of Columbia, "sound learning flourishes or declines. It is now too late for ignorance, indolence, eccentricity, or infidelity to dispute what has been ratified by the seal of ages." Advancing the familiar argument that the classics were molders of mental discipline, their supporters looked upon scientific and social studies as trivial time-wasters.

In a few institutions, however, there was unmistakable evidence at the turn of the century that eighteenth-century liberalism had taken root. The College of William and Mary, at Jefferson's instigation, revolutionized its course of study by the introduction of law, history, political economy, and modern languages. Highly encouraged by this success, Jefferson planned to make William and Mary the capstone of a comprehensive educational edifice for Virginia, but when sectarian and other obstacles arose he turned to the thought of a new state-controlled university. The University of Virginia, founded in 1825, with its wide variety of subjects, lack of uniform entrance requirements, and insist-

ence on achievement rather than on form and method, was not only a challenge to the old order but an enduring monument to its founder. In a few other institutions there were also indications that scientific and social studies were making headway. Physics, chemistry, agriculture, astronomy, history, government, law, commerce, and the modern languages continued to be taught in Franklin's college of Philadelphia. Both Williams College, chartered in 1793, and the Union College, chartered the following year, departed from the old standards by permitting the substitution of French for Greek and by introducing other courses that were not in the traditional curriculum.

Not only higher education but secondary and elementary education were shaped by European influences. The system of apprenticeship, the dame, parochial, and pauper schools, and the Latin grammar schools of colonial times were all importations from England. Even the colonial textbooks were English. Nor did the patriotic reaction against English ideas, customs, and institutions, which grew out of the movement for independence, greatly modify the situation, for the new nation continued to draw many of its educational notions directly from England. From the Continent, furthermore, where the philosophy of Rousseau and the teachings of Pestalozzi had given rise to a rich and varied literature on the training of the young and their relation to society, came new concepts emphasizing the importance of experimentation and the cultivation of social sympathies.

At the turn of the century only the children of those well up the social-economic ladder could afford more than an elementary schooling. For the middle class, especially, the old Latin grammar school with its limited curriculum and its emphasis on preparation for college seemed wholly inadequate. Socially and economically ambitious and yet anxious to maintain certain standards of respectability, it wanted an institution more utilitarian in character. The private academy, an English importation and the forerunner of the present-day high school filled the need, and by 1800, private academies had been established in every state: Massachusetts had seventeen, New York nineteen, and North Carolina thirty. Fifty years later the number had increased to more than six thousand. Attended by the sons and daughters of merchants, lawyers, doctors, and well-to-do farmers, the academies were the chief agencies of secondary education in America until the middle of the nineteenth century. Though an occasional boy or girl from the lower strata of society managed to gain admittance, the academy was primarily a middle class institution that sometimes tended to be somewhat snobbish and undemocratic.

For the children of artisans, mechanics, fishermen, and poorer farmers, the opportunities for even elementary schooling left much to be desired. Though Jefferson, Rush, and others who believed that the

ideals and interests of the republic would be best served by a literate and well-informed citizenry worked unceasingly for universal, state-supported education, there was little progress until the republic was almost a half century old. The prevalence of agriculture, the relative isolation and independence of urban communities, the unwillingness of property owners to bear additional taxation in order to provide better educational facilities for the masses, the traditional notion that education for the rank and file was a matter of benevolence, the lack of full manhood suffrage in several states, and the widespread indifference of the populace were principally responsible for postponing for a generation or more a grade-school education for all children at public expense. Elementary education in the larger centers of population remained mostly in the hands of the parochial and pauper schools until the later establishment of state-wide school systems.

Supplementing the sectarian and charity schools were the Sunday school, the monitorial or Lancastrian school, and the infant school, all of which were imported from England. Founded primarily for the purpose of giving working children opportunity for instruction "in reading and the Church catechism" the Sunday school idea gained ground so rapidly that in 1785, The Society for Promoting Sunday Schools throughout the British Dominions was organized. The idea soon spread to the United States. In 1791, The First Day or Sunday School Society was organized at Philadelphia to give instruction to the poor. Sunday schools also appeared in other centers, although they were less needed on this side of the Atlantic because of the absence of a submerged mass of paupers. These schools soon came under sectarian control, and the churches, objecting to secular instruction on Sundays, quickly transformed the Sunday schools into social-religious organizations.

The monitorial system of instruction, the essential feature of which was the transmission by the more clever or competent pupils to the other pupils of knowledge that they themselves had learned by rote from a teacher, appears to have antedated the discovery of America. It was popularized in England at the turn of the century by Joseph Lancaster, an English Quaker philanthropist, and quickly gained a place in the United States. In 1818 Lancaster came to America, where he spent the remaining twenty years of his life organizing and directing schools and expounding the merits of his system. Its cheapness together with its emphasis on discipline and uniformity appealed to those interested in mass education at a time when money was scarce and when private schools had a reputation for idleness, inattention, and disorder. Lancastrian schools for training teachers—precursors of the modern normal schools—were established in 1818.

Like the Sunday school, the infant school, which originated with Robert Owen, a New Lanark, Scotland, manufacturer and reformer,

was designed for poor children. It reached the United States soon after the War of 1812 and was adopted by some of the larger cities where children were denied admittance to the monitorial schools unless they could read and write.

Country boys and girls received their elementary education in the ungraded district school. Originating in New England shortly after the Revolutionary War as an outgrowth of the old parish school, the district system eventually spread over nearly all of the United States. Each district, which was merely a subdivision of a town or county, elected school trustees, levied district school taxes, and selected a teacher and sometimes the textbooks. In many districts, too, the trustees determined the length of the school term and designated the subjects to be taught. Instruction in these schools was confined largely to the three R's and good manners. Bible reading was an everyday occurrence. Discipline was severe, and there were sometimes rough and tumble fights between teacher and older pupils. The terms were short; in the majority of districts there was only one. The men teachers received from six to twenty dollars a month and the women from four to ten. Both were "boarded round" by the families of the district.

For many years *The New Primer, or an Easy and Pleasant Guide to the Art of Reading to which is added the Catechism*—the catechism being a score or more selections from the *Westminster Assembly Shorter Catechism*—was the principal textbook, and it continued to be used extensively in rural districts until near the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. In the cities and larger towns, however, it was supplanted by texts that placed less emphasis on religious and more on secular material. Among these mention should be made of Dilworth's *A New Guide to the English Tongue*, an English importation; the *Columbian Primer* (1802), a modernized and secularized imitation of the *New England Primer*; the *Franklin Primer* (1802) "containing a new and useful selection of Moral Lessons adorned with a great variety of elegant cuts calculated to strike a lasting impression on the Tender Minds of Children"; Caleb Bingham's *American Preceptor* (1794), which soon displaced the Bible as an advanced reading book; and the *Columbian Orator* (1806), containing selections from poetry and prose for reading and declamation. Like poetry and drama, the American textbook reflected the spirit of the times. The readers contained numerous patriotic orations of Revolutionary leaders, and such speeches as Patrick Henry's "Give me Liberty or give me Death" were declaimed in schoolhouses all over the land.

Standing at the head of the textbook list in influence and popularity was Noah Webster's "blue-backed" *American Spelling Book* (1783), a combined speller and reader, which sold fifty million copies. During the twenty years (1807-27) that Webster devoted to his *Dictionary of*

the *English Language*, he and his family lived entirely upon the royalties from the speller. Ranking with Webster's speller was Warren Colburn's *First Lessons in Arithmetic on the Plan of Pestalozzi* (1821). The Reverend Jedidiah Morse's *Geography* (1784) and his *Elements of Geography* (1795) were also popular, as was Lindley Murray's *Grammar* (1795). The first textbook on United States history did not appear until 1821, although the readers and earlier geographies contained some historical material. Most of the scientific texts used in the colleges were translations or adaptations of French textbooks.

Education for girls and young women, which up to the close of the Revolution was rudimentary in character, began to improve at the turn of the century. Largely as a result of the efforts of Benjamin Rush, DeWitt Clinton, Emma Willard, and many other equally enthusiastic advocates of more liberal and substantial education for women, a number of female academies and seminaries were founded. Some were established soon after the Revolution, and during the early nineteenth century their numbers and influence grew. Among the more important were The Female Academy opened by the Moravians at Salem, North Carolina, in 1802; the Catherine Fiske School established at Keene, New Hampshire, in 1814; Joseph Emerson's Ladies Seminary at Byfield, Massachusetts, begun in 1818, and later removed to Wethersfield, Connecticut; and the Troy (New York) Seminary, started by Emma Willard in 1821. English, grammar, arithmetic, geography, some history, and a modern language usually made up the curriculum. Religious and domestic training—and occasionally drawing and music—were also stressed.

Libraries, both public and private, not only increased in number but reflected the influence of the changing era. In 1820, it was officially reported that the country had fourteen college, nine public, and five semi-public libraries. Many of the well-to-do possessed libraries of considerable size. The library of John Quincy Adams contained five thousand volumes in 1809, and Jefferson's an even larger number, but these two were exceptional. Although there were books of almost every description, those concerned with the classics and religion were the most numerous. By 1820, biography, history, poetry, science, fiction, and travel books were increasing at the expense of books of a religious nature. Although a leisured class with time for reading was growing larger, the majority of the population was still primarily interested in things material. The labor of the hand, as Henry Adams has said, enjoyed precedence over that of the mind.

CHAPTER XI

REPUBLICAN RULE IN PEACE AND WAR

- 64. THEORY OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY
 - 65. PRACTICE OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY
 - 66. EXPANSION AND CONSPIRACY IN THE WEST
 - 67. TRIALS OF A NEUTRAL
 - 68. MADISON AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS
 - 69. WAR OF 1812
 - 70. PEACE
-

THE ADMINISTRATIONS of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison revealed that the Republicans were far more adept at criticizing the Federalists than at putting their own program into effect. While Jefferson was able to add a vast area in the West to the United States, he was not able to alter the fundamental pattern of government established by his predecessors. Moreover, neither Jefferson nor Madison succeeded in devising a foreign policy that effectively safeguarded American neutral rights, and in 1812 the Republicans were forced to embark on a war that they had opposed for years and for which they had made no preparations.

64. THEORY OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY

THOMAS JEFFERSON was a planter-aristocrat who was also America's first outstanding exponent of democracy. Born in 1743 in Albemarle County in the Virginia backcountry, he attended

William and Mary College and became a lawyer. After serving in the Continental Congress, where he drafted the Declaration of Independence, he resigned first to become a member of the Virginia legislature and then Governor of the state. During the Confederation period he helped to organize the Northwest Territory and was the United States minister to France. Although he had little sympathy with Federalist principles, he remained a member of Washington's cabinet until 1794, when he resigned to take over the leadership of the Democratic-Republicans. Throughout his career his opposition to royal rule, entail, primogeniture, slavery, and the alliance between church and state had made him America's leading liberal statesman. At the same time he was probably the most versatile man in the United States. In addition to being a politician, Jefferson was a botanist, linguist, political philosopher, amateur architect, practical inventor, and a student of almost every subject known to man.

When Jefferson became President of the United States on March 4, 1801, he had made clear his ideas on virtually all the important issues of the day. More than any other notable American of his day he had an abiding faith in democracy. "Man," he held, "was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights and with an innate sense of justice; and . . . he could be restrained from wrong and protected in right, by moderate powers, confided to persons of his own choice and held to their duties by dependence on his own will." At the very time when Hamilton and his fellow Federalists were most vehement in expressing contempt for popular government, Jefferson was contending that men "habituated to think for themselves and to follow their reason as their guide would be more easily and safely governed than with minds nourished in error and vitiated and debased . . . by ignorance, indigence, and oppression."

Jefferson wanted America to be a land of small land-owning farmers. Schooled in the philosophy of Quesnay and the Physiocrats, he was an outspoken opponent of capitalistic economy and the capitalistic edifice designed and erected by Hamilton. Instead of envisioning great urban communities with their captains of industry and their proletariat, he wished to keep America agrarian. In his *Notes on Virginia*, he wrote:

The political economists of Europe have established it as a principle that every State should endeavor to manufacture for itself; and this principle like many others we transfer to America. . . . But we have an immensity of land courting the industry of the husbandman. Is it best then that all our citizens should be employed in its improvement, or that one half should be called off from that to exercise manufactures and handicraft arts for the other? Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever He

had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made His peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example. It is the mark set on those, who not looking up to heaven, to their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for their subsistence, depend for it on casualties and caprice of customers. Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition. . . . Generally speaking the proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any State to that of its husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption. While we have land to labor then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a workbench, or twirling a distaff. . . . For the general operations of manufacture, let our workshops remain in Europe. It is better to carry provisions and materials to workmen there, than bring them to the provisions and materials, and with them their manners and principles. . . . The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body. It is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic in vigor. A degeneracy in these is a canker which soon eats to the heart of its laws and constitution.

His opposition to industrialism and his distrust of an urban proletariat was even more explicitly set forth in a letter to John Jay written in the summer of 1785:

We have now lands enough to employ an infinite number of people in their cultivation. Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds. As long, therefore, as they can find employment in this line, I would not convert them into mariners, artisans or anything else. But our citizens will find employment in this line till their numbers, and of course their productions, become too great for the demand both internal and foreign. This is not the case as yet, and probably will not be for a considerable time. As soon as it is, the surplus of hands must be turned to something else. I should then, perhaps, wish to turn them to the sea in preference to manufactures, because comparing the character of the two classes I find the former the most valuable citizens. I consider the class of artificers as panders of vice and the

instruments by which the liberties of a country are generally overturned.

Jefferson had a deep-seated dislike of everything that smacked of oppression and tended to deprave humanity. "I have sworn upon the altar of God," he wrote in 1800, "eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man." He advocated a system of universal secular education, rejected orthodox Christianity in favor of Deism, championed freedom of press and speech, and urged all to criticize the existing order with a view to its improvement. He declared that the University of Virginia, founded under his leadership, would be based "on the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow the truth wheresoever it may lead or to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it."

Almost all of Jefferson's views on government stemmed from his agrarian philosophy. He was opposed to war not only because it seemed to him an irrational way to settle disputes but also because he believed that all wars were fought to protect or enlarge the interests of a nation's commercial classes. In Jefferson's mind, only a war to repel an invader could be justified, for in such a conflict every citizen had an equal stake. More than that, a defensive war could be fought at relatively little cost by soldier-citizens; it would not require a large navy, and the nation's farmers would not be taxed in peacetime to support a military establishment that could be used for the benefit of other classes. In similar vein Jefferson opposed almost every governmental policy involving unusual expenditures, for he believed that government spending invariably aided the nation's business classes at the expense of farmers who were compelled to pay higher taxes. To Jefferson the ideal government was that which governed least. Because he also felt that local governments could be more readily controlled by the voters, he did not think that the authority of the Federal government should ever be permitted to overshadow that of the states. Against the relatively high degree of centralization advocated by the Federalists, Jefferson set a philosophy of states' rights that accorded with the doctrines set forth in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.

65. PRACTICE OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY

DESPITE Jefferson's opposition to the views of his predecessors, he made remarkably few changes in the policies of the government during his two terms as President of the United States. Although he referred to his election as the "revolution of 1800," there was

little in his inaugural address to substantiate such a view. Stating that "we are all Republicans, we are all Federalists," he pledged his Administration to the "honest payment of our debts and the sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture and of commerce its handmaid." The inaugural was so conciliatory in tone that Hamilton thought it "virtually a candid retraction of past misapprehensions, and a pledge to the community that the new President will not lend himself to dangerous innovations, but in essential points tread in the steps" of the Federalists.

Jefferson's appointment policy was as conciliatory as his inaugural. Despite the fears of his opponents and the pressure of his followers, Jefferson refused to drive the Federalists from their posts in the civil service. Although he removed a few Federalists for political reasons and filled all vacancies that occurred with Republicans, he made no attempt to emulate the partisan system of appointments that had been used by his predecessors. Jefferson did not enjoy depriving Republicans of jobs that they thought they deserved, and on one occasion he complained that few officeholders died and none resigned. The make-up of Jefferson's cabinet also revealed his desire to win the support of the opposition. Although—or, perhaps, because—he had received no New England electoral votes, he appointed Percy Granger of Connecticut Postmaster General; and Secretary of War Henry Dearborn and Attorney General Levi Lincoln were both from Massachusetts. The other cabinet appointments more accurately reflected the sectional character of the Republican party. Secretary of Navy Robert Smith, who accepted the position after it had been refused by several others, came from Maryland, and Secretary of State James Madison had for some years played a prominent rôle in Virginia as well as national politics. To head the Treasury Department, Jefferson selected Albert Gallatin, a Swiss aristocrat who had migrated to America during the Revolution and had become an outspoken champion of democracy. A resident of western Pennsylvania and a former member of the House of Representatives, he owed his appointment to his ability and to Jefferson's desire to have his Administration include a spokesman for the frontier groups in the Republican party.

Many of the innovations introduced by Jefferson altered the surface aspects of administration without fundamentally changing the governmental structure that had been erected by the Federalists. In contrast to the pomp that attended many public ceremonies under the Federalists, Jefferson's inauguration was notable for its simplicity. At the same time he abandoned Washington's and Adams's practice of delivering messages to Congress in person on the ground that such speeches were similar to pronouncements from the Throne in a monarchy. Jefferson also sought to emphasize the republican tone of the new government by

ignoring diplomatic rank at White House dinners, refusing to hold formal levees, and promulgating a series of rules for republican behavior at governmental functions. When Anthony Merry, the British minister to the United States, made his first call on the President, he was insulted when he was received by Jefferson in slippers "down at the heels." At a presidential dinner in honor of the Merrys, Jefferson compounded the insult by escorting Dolly Madison rather than Mrs. Merry to the table. Merry refused to attend any other functions at the White House, and Jefferson had the satisfaction of feeling that even the manners of the new Administration were republican.

Jefferson and his fellow Republicans also sought to rid the country of what they considered the most glaring abuses of Federalist rule. Congress repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which had been passed three weeks before Jefferson took office and which provided for an expansion of the Federal court system. Jefferson pardoned those imprisoned under the Alien and Sedition Acts—both of which had expired—and Congress rescinded the Nationalization Law. Jefferson also made an attempt to live up to his earlier pledges to reduce both taxes and the national debt. Federal expenses were cut; and Congress repealed the whisky tax and at Gallatin's instigation passed itemized rather than general appropriation bills. Gallatin's efforts to scale down the government's debt were immeasurably aided by a marked increase in tariff revenues. Throughout Jefferson's administration imports steadily mounted, and the income from duties rose proportionately. At the same time a British admiralty court in the case of the *Polly* (1800) ruled that American shippers could carry goods from the French West Indies to France if such cargoes were shipped through the United States. This decision not only opened up a profitable trade to Americans, but it also assured the government of still larger tariff receipts. Largely because of these developments, the Republicans reduced the national debt from approximately \$80,000,000 in 1801 to about \$47,000,000 in 1809.

One of the principal victims of Jefferson's and Gallatin's economy drive was the navy. Convinced that a fleet of war vessels could serve no other purpose than to drag the United States into a war for the benefit of the nation's commercial classes, Jefferson proposed that the seven American frigates be kept in the Potomac where they "would require but one set of plunderers to look after them." To guard the country at minimum cost against the dangers of invasion, he advocated the construction of several small gunboats which could be hauled up on shore when not in use. Congress appropriated \$50,000 for Jefferson's program; the gunboats were built; and Jefferson's "mosquito fleet"—as his opponents called it—soon proved its impracticability. One gunboat was washed some eight miles inland by a storm. All jeopardized the lives of the "naval militia" whenever they put to sea. Jefferson's gunboats

provided wits among the Federalists with an opportunity to ridicule the Administration, but they did not measurably improve the defenses of the United States.

Although Jefferson could argue that his naval program accorded with republican principles, he was soon compelled by the pressure of events in the Mediterranean to revise his theories to fit the exigencies of a practical problem. Both Washington and Adams had agreed to pay tribute to Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco to prevent the pirates from these countries from interfering with American commerce. But soon after Jefferson took office, the Pasha of Tripoli, enraged because he felt that he was not receiving his share of the money from the United States, had the flag on the American consulate cut down. Jefferson responded by dispatching warships to the Mediterranean, and after considerable fighting the United States obtained a satisfactory treaty from Tripoli in 1805.* In taking action against the Barbary pirates, Jefferson was compelled to overlook his earlier aversion to commercial wars, the navy, and government spending.

Jefferson's efforts to put his republican theories into effect were hampered by the Federal judiciary as well as by developments abroad. When the Republicans gained control of the executive and legislative branches of the government in 1801, the nation's judicial system was staffed entirely by Federalists. Moreover, in the midnight hours of his final day in office Adams had filled the posts created by the Judiciary Act of 1801 with members of his own party. The Republicans had retaliated by repealing the Judiciary Act and postponing the next session of the Supreme Court until 1803; but neither move had had any appreciable effect on Federalist domination of the courts. In addition, in the person of John Marshall the Federalists had a champion who repeatedly proved himself capable of upholding the ideals of Washington and Hamilton. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835, he handed down a long list of notable decisions that emphasized his Federalist view of the Constitution. Marshall fought the agrarians at every turn and did all in his power to magnify and strengthen the sovereignty of the national state and to safeguard the interests of private property. Opposed to democracy and its leveling influences, Marshall in the eyes of the Jeffersonians was a thorough-going reactionary. He also, as they were to learn to their distress, was one of the most powerful men in the Federal government.

Marshall first demonstrated both his own ability as a jurist and the powers of the judiciary under the Constitution in the case of *Marbury vs. Madison*. In 1803, William Marbury, a "midnight appointment" as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia, asked the Supreme

* The war against the other Barbary states, which was interrupted by the War of 1812, was not concluded until 1816.

Court for a mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to grant him his commission. In support of his petition Marbury cited section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated that the Court could issue such a writ. Marbury's action placed Marshall in what appeared to be a highly embarrassing predicament. If the Court granted Marbury's request, Marshall knew that Secretary of State James Madison would ignore the mandamus. On the other hand, if the Court refused the petition, he knew that the decision would be interpreted as a major victory for the Republicans.

To resolve this dilemma, Marshall took neither course. The principal issue confronting him was one of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, according to the Constitution, has original jurisdiction "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party." In all other cases the Court was granted appellate jurisdiction. Since *Marbury vs. Madison* was instituted as an original proceeding, the Court had no constitutional jurisdiction over it. Under the circumstances Marshall might well have referred Marbury to a lower court. Instead, he declared that Marbury deserved the writ but that the Constitution did not permit the Court to grant it. He thus neatly sidestepped his political problem; but he did not stop here. Because the Constitution and section 13 of the 1789 law were in conflict, he declared the latter unconstitutional and therefore void. Constitutional historians have argued for years over whether or not the Constitution provided for judicial review of congressional acts; but regardless of how this question is answered, the fact remains that John Marshall in *Marbury vs. Madison* was the first Supreme Court Justice to disallow a law passed by Congress. And in doing so he thwarted and enraged Jefferson and his followers.

Jefferson complained that Marshall's decision made the Constitution "a mere thing of wax," which the judges "may twist and shape into any form they please." But there was little that he or his followers could do about it. They did, however, institute impeachment proceedings against John Pickering, a Federal judge in New Hampshire, and against Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. Pickering, in addition to being a drunkard and an incompetent, was notoriously anti-Republican in his views. In a trial involving a violation of the revenue laws, he refused to grant the government an appeal and said to the Federal prosecutor: "You may bring forty thousand government witnesses, they will not alter the decree." Pickering did not appear for his own trial before the Senate, and he was removed from office after his counsel had pleaded insanity.

This minor success was insignificant, however, when placed against the failure to impeach Supreme Court Justice Chase. Chase had played a prominent—and to the Republicans an indefensible—part in the sedi-

tion trials, and on more than one occasion he had used his position on the bench as a pretense for delivering political harangues against the Jeffersonians. In a charge to a jury in Baltimore, he stated that any extension of the suffrage would mean that "our republican Constitution will sink into a mobocracy" and that "the modern doctrines by our late reformers, that all men in a state of society are entitled to enjoy equal liberty and . . . rights, have brought this . . . mischief upon us." Despite these and similar remarks, the Republicans were unable to make an effective case against Chase, and he remained on the Supreme Court. With the failure of these proceedings, the Republicans made no further move to change the judiciary. John Marshall had made a reality of the Founding Fathers' plan for a government of checks and balances; and, although Jefferson could predict that the Federalists would use the judiciary to "batter down all the bulwarks of republicanism," there was no way for him to prevent his prediction from being fulfilled.

At the end of his first term in office Jefferson could look back on four years of unfulfilled promises. He had changed some of the superficial aspects of the government, but the administrative system that he had inherited from the Federalists remained largely intact. He had not altered any of Hamilton's basic financial policies; he had violated his own theories on the rôle of the navy in the nation's foreign policy; and he had been unable to break the Federalists' hold on the judiciary. If it had not been for his notable—and, to a certain extent, fortuitous—accomplishments in the West, he might well have considered his first Administration a failure.

66. EXPANSION AND CONSPIRACY IN THE WEST

WHEN Jefferson became President in 1801, the United States had a population of approximately 5,300,000, and of this number nearly a million were beyond the line of settlement established by the British in 1763. The frontier line ran from Maine across northern Vermont and New Hampshire to Lake Champlain, and then in winding fashion southward to just below the mouth of the Savannah River. There were three marked bulges or protuberances westward: one in New York along the Mohawk, another around Pittsburgh, and the third in the upland country of Kentucky, in the valleys of east Tennessee, and in the Cumberland district of central Tennessee. Trans-Allegheny towns were as yet small and few in number; Lexington had 1,797 inhabitants; Frankfort, 628; Nashville, 355; Cincinnati, 500; and Pittsburgh, 1,565.

Despite the growth of population in the West, few settlers were satisfied with the provisions of the Land Ordinance of 1785, and many felt

that the law retarded rather than accelerated the occupation of frontier regions. In 1796, Congress therefore directed that the surveyed lands be sold at auction at Cincinnati and Pittsburgh in 640-acre lots on a year's credit and at a minimum price of \$2 per acre. But the sales were disappointing; only 50,000 acres were disposed of in the course of four years. In 1800 the Harrison Land Act further modified the system and extended the credit scheme. Henceforth the settler could purchase his land in quantities of not less than half-sections of 320 acres at land offices near the frontier; for it he paid \$2 an acre, \$.50 per acre at the time of purchase and the balance in installments extending over a period of four years. In 1804 the minimum acreage that could be sold was reduced to a quarter-section, or 160 acres. By 1820 the government had deeded 18,117,860 acres to purchasers under the act of 1800. In some instances the better lands sold for more than the minimum price.

Soon after settlers began to take up lands in the trans-Allegheny region under the terms of the Harrison Land Act, Jefferson was able to more than double the western domain of the United States with the purchase of Louisiana. Although Louisiana had originally been claimed by France through exploration, it had been transferred to Spain in 1763 in compensation for Spanish losses to Great Britain in the Seven Years' War. Spain was able to hold Louisiana for almost forty years; but in 1800, Napoleon, hoping to re-establish in the heart of the North American continent the vast colonial empire that France had lost a generation before, forced Spain to restore Louisiana to France. The nation that controlled Louisiana could threaten the economy as well as the territorial security of the United States. Spain had demonstrated this fact repeatedly in the decade before the adoption of the Pinckney Treaty in 1795, and in July, 1802, she demonstrated it again when Morales, the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans, arbitrarily withdrew the right of deposit. This action was interpreted by the Westerners as a forerunner of what they might expect from France, for it was now known that the rumors of cession were true. Expeditions were organized for the immediate seizure of the coveted territory. Jefferson was sent protests and memorials demanding aid. Even the New England Federalists, anxious for any move that would embarrass or discredit Jefferson and his party, did all they could to drive the country into war with France.

The President, though greatly worried, refused to be stampeded, and instead of yielding to the call for war, he set himself to the task of settling the whole question by peaceful negotiation. To this end he induced Congress to vote an appropriation of two million dollars "for any expenses . . . in relation to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations." At the same time he sent James Monroe to France to aid the regular minister, Robert Livingston, in "enlarging and more effectually securing our rights and interests in the river Missis-

issippi and in the territories eastward thereof." Livingston had already been instructed to sound out Napoleon on the possibility of selling these regions to the United States.

Fortunately for the American negotiators, a number of events played into their hands. Unexpected opposition in Spain had delayed the transfer of Louisiana; the French armies sent to conquer Santo Domingo preliminary to their transfer to Louisiana had been decimated by incessant warfare against the Negroes and by yellow fever; European hostilities, temporarily stopped by the Peace of Amiens in 1802, had been resumed, and Napoleon was therefore in no position for either the conquest or defense of overseas possessions. He knew that if war broke out, he could not hold Louisiana against a United States army or the British fleet. Furthermore, the immediate sale of Louisiana might perhaps net him fifty million francs at a time when he was short of money. On April 11, 1803, he instructed his Minister of Foreign Affairs to open negotiations for the disposal not merely of New Orleans and West Florida, which Livingston for weeks had sought to buy, but all of the vast Louisiana tract. Bewildered momentarily by Napoleon's decision and by his lack of instructions to acquire an empire. Livingston nevertheless accepted the proposal. Monroe assented quickly, and for two weeks the negotiators haggled over the terms. Finally on May 2, 1803, the treaty transferring the entire province to the United States was signed; Livingston and Monroe committed the United States to the payment of \$11,250,000 in 6 per cent bonds, and to the assumption of claims held by American citizens against France estimated at \$3,750,000.

The purchase delighted the people of the West and Republicans of the Middle and Southern states; but the Federalists, representing the financial and commercial strongholds, bitterly condemned it as unconstitutional and prejudicial to the best interests of the Union. New England shippers and Middle-states manufacturers saw no reason for supporting a policy of westward expansion. They had no desire to see the East depopulated and business paralyzed for the sake of strengthening the party of Thomas Jefferson, a party that had vigorously opposed Hamilton's program of assumption, the United States Bank, and the tariff. Their interests centered on the Atlantic seaboard; trade and association tied them to Europe rather than to the West. Above all, men of property and social standing would never submit to the rule of a "hotch-potch of wild men from the Far West."

Of these numerous objections, Jefferson, in the past an advocate of strict construction, was concerned only with the accusation that the purchase was not constitutional. The Administration, he frankly admitted, had exceeded its powers, and he therefore proposed an amendment to the Constitution that would confirm the purchase and provide for its government. The President's friends, however, less concerned

with the constitutional question than with the acquisition of the territory, unblushingly adopted the Federalist interpretation of "implied powers." The right to acquire foreign territory, they argued, existed as a result of the right to make treaties and the power to make war and peace. In the midst of the debate came the rumor that Napoleon might change his mind, and accordingly Jefferson pressed the Senate for ratification. The Constitution, he still maintained, did not authorize the purchase but if "our friends shall think differently, certainly I shall acquiesce with satisfaction, confident that the good sense of our country will correct the evil of construction when it shall produce ill effects." Thus circumstances and expediency forced Jefferson to modify his interpretation of the fundamental law of the land. And on October 17, 1803, the treaty was ratified 24 to 7.

Jefferson had to overcome more than his constitutional scruples to sanction the acquisition of Louisiana, for the addition of this vast territory also ran counter to his notions of governmental economy and his belief that no move should be made to strengthen the power of the central government at the expense of the states. But Jefferson was motivated by other—and to his mind, much more important—considerations. He believed that the purchase of Louisiana would not only eliminate the possibility of war but that it also would ensure the supremacy of the American farmer in the nation's political and economic life for centuries to come. If Louisiana were part of the United States, Jefferson had no doubt that America would always be an agrarian country.

The acquisition of Louisiana, which was undoubtedly the outstanding achievement of Jefferson's first Administration, explains in large part his overwhelming victory in the election of 1804. The Federalists, moreover, were hard pressed to find a suitable issue, for Jefferson had done little to upset the program that they had inaugurated in the 1790's. For a time the Federalists considered nominating Burr, who had alienated Jefferson by his willingness to accept the presidency after the tie vote in the electoral college in 1800; but when Hamilton revealed that Burr's backers were attempting to organize a secession movement in New England and New York,* they were discredited, and the nomination went to C. C. Pinckney. Jefferson's majority was unexpectedly large. With 162 electoral votes to 14 for Pinckney, he won every New England state except Connecticut, carried New York with the help of his running mate George Clinton, and made a stronger showing than in 1800 in Pennsylvania and the South. The election also reduced Federalist strength in the Senate to seven and in the House to twenty-five.

Jefferson continued to maintain his interest in the West throughout his second administration, and it was at his instigation that the territory


* Burr immediately challenged Hamilton, and in a duel on July 11, 1804, at Weehawken, New Jersey, killed him.

acquired from France was first explored. As early as 1783 he had written George Rogers Clark:

I find they have subscribed a very large sum of money in England for exploring the country from the Mississippi to California. They pretend it is only to promote knowledge. I am afraid they have thoughts of [colonizing] . . . that quarter. Some of us have been talking here in a feeble way of making the attempt to search that country, but I doubt whether we have enough of that kind of spirit to raise the money. How would you like to lead such a party? though I am afraid our prospect is not worth asking the question.

The acquisition of the territory enabled Jefferson to fulfill his long-cherished wish. In a confidential message to Congress in January, 1803, he asked for an appropriation of \$2500 to equip an expedition that would explore the Western country and lay out an overland route to the Pacific. Congress complied with his request, and Captain Meriwether Lewis, Jefferson's private secretary and a man of exceptional courage, vigor, and intelligence, was chosen to head the undertaking. Associated with him was another army officer, William Clark, younger brother of George Rogers Clark. The explorers and their party of less than fifty men left St. Louis in May, 1804. Going up the Missouri, they spent the winter near the site of the present town of Bismarck, North Dakota, and early in April, 1805, proceeded westward. Many members of the party were almost exhausted in making their way over the Rockies, but finally, late in September, the expedition came to the headwaters of the Columbia and two months later reached the Pacific. Wintering on the Oregon coast, the men turned eastward in the spring of 1806, and by September 23 they were safely back in St. Louis. In accordance with instructions, Lewis and Clark carefully recorded their observations, and their journals contained valuable information concerning the geography and resources of the western country and the opportunities for trade. Many Easterners perceived for the first time the possibilities of the vast region that the explorers had penetrated, and fur merchants immediately prepared to tap the rich resources of the upper Missouri. Officially, the door to the Far West had been opened and the United States's claims to the Oregon country were strengthened.

Jefferson's continuing interest in the West was further revealed by his willingness to spend Federal funds to improve its communications with the seaboard. When Western agrarians complained of the difficulty of shipping their products to market, Republican legislators in Washington appropriated funds for the construction of a national highway to the West. Moreover, Gallatin, as Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, urged internal improvements that would benefit the West as well as the East. In addition to recommending a line of canals paralleling the coast



5. THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE LEWIS AND CLARK EXPEDITION

The acquisition of this vast domain from France virtually doubled the territorial area of the United States. Note that this purchase made possible a free outlet to the sea for the entire Mississippi basin and gave the United States a great variety of resources: agricultural and grazing lands, minerals, forests, and water power. The Lewis and Clark expedition not only brought back a vast amount of information about the geography, climate, and resources of the region but stimulated westward emigration and gave the United States further basis for its subsequent claim to the Oregon country.

and a turnpike from Maine to Georgia, Gallatin proposed that the government construct in the West an extensive and integrated network of roads and canals. Gallatin estimated that these improvements would cost \$20,000,000, a sum that might be obtained from the sale of public lands

or from the treasury at the rate of \$2,000,000 a year for ten years. Jefferson, who had declared in 1805 that the surplus revenue in the treasury could well "be applied in time of peace to rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufactures, education, and other great objects within each state," enthusiastically supported the Gallatin proposals. The Republican President was always willing to forget his objections to government spending whenever the interests of the West could be furthered by Federal assistance.

Although Jefferson derived undoubted and understandable satisfaction from his accomplishments in the West, this region was also the cause of some of the most difficult and controversial problems of his entire administration. In the Southwest, Jefferson inherited a dispute that went back to the Confederation period and that had plagued the Federalists throughout the 1790's. Georgia, which did not abandon its western land claims until after Jefferson had taken office, in 1789 granted an extensive tract in the present states of Mississippi and Alabama to four land companies. The purchasers, however, did not live up to their part of the agreement, and in 1795 the Georgia legislature approved the sale of an even larger area at approximately \$.015 per acre to the four Yazoo land companies. In the following year, after it had been discovered that all but one of the legislators voting for the measure had an interest in the companies in question, the state revoked the grant. The stockholders, many of whom were prominent Northerners, appealed to the Federal government; and when Georgia relinquished its western lands in 1802, they increased their pressure on Jefferson.

Despite the speculative and fraudulent character of the Yazoo grants, the Republican Administration supported the claims of the Yazoo interests. Jefferson presumably wished to gain the confidence of the Northern business groups that had invested in the companies; and in 1803 a committee, appointed by the President and consisting of Secretaries Gallatin, Lincoln, and Madison, recommended to Congress that the stockholders be paid out of the receipts from the land sales in the Yazoo tract. This proposal, however, was defeated by a group of congressmen led by John Randolph of Roanoke, a Virginia planter who was disgusted both with Jefferson's overtures to the North and with the corrupt acts of the Yazoo companies. In 1805, when the Yazoo claims were again presented to Congress—Postmaster General Gideon Granger served as the stockholders' representative—Randolph once more was able to prevent approval.* Randolph, an extreme advocate of states' rights, accused Jefferson of going over to the opposition and broke with the Administration. As the head of a small group of congressmen known as the Quids, Randolph indiscriminately attacked both Republican and Federalist policies.

* In 1814, Congress finally awarded the claimants \$48,000,000.

The West offered opportunities for international intrigue as well as speculative profit. Jefferson was employing threats and cajolery to obtain West Florida from Spain; no one knew the exact boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase; hostile Indians and brigands in the Floridas were raiding settlements in the United States; and James Wilkinson, always willing to sell his services to the highest bidder, was in command of American troops in Louisiana. Even before the completion of his term as Vice-President, Burr had decided to fish in the troubled waters of the West. Within a short time he was corresponding with Wilkinson, asking Anthony Merry, the British minister, for British financial and naval assistance in setting up an independent republic in Louisiana, urging the Spanish minister to help him establish a buffer state between Mexico and Louisiana, and telling still others that he planned to lead an expedition against the Spanish possessions in America. Burr's ability to alter his stories as the occasion demanded has confused historians to the present day, and it is still not known just what he hoped to accomplish. All agree that he was a scoundrel, but no one can be certain that he was also a traitor.

Soon after the expiration of his term as Vice-President, Burr began a leisurely trip down the Ohio. Following a short visit with Herman Blennerhasset, an Irishman who lived like a feudal lord on an island in the Ohio near Parkersburg, Burr resumed his journey. He visited Andrew Jackson at Nashville, met Wilkinson at the mouth of the Ohio, and proceeded to New Orleans. Burr, who had been enthusiastically received by Westerners in all walks of life, then returned to the East. A man of undoubted charm, he had an unusual faculty for making his dreams of riches and glory seem both real and noble to his listeners.

Although rumors that Burr was plotting treason were common throughout the winter of 1805-06, Jefferson appeared to ignore them, and he made no move to prevent Burr's return to the West the following summer. After gathering supplies at Blennerhasset's Island, Burr started down the Ohio with a flotilla of thirteen flatboats and sixty men. Meanwhile, Wilkinson, who could not even be honest with a fellow conspirator, wrote a lurid account of Burr's activities and plans to the President. On November 29, 1806, Jefferson ordered Burr's arrest. Burr, who did not learn of Jefferson's decision until the following January, deserted his followers and headed for the Spanish border. Captured at Fort Stoddard, he was sent to Richmond, Virginia, to stand trial for treason.

Jefferson, who was now convinced of Burr's guilt, made no attempt to conceal his belief that he should be convicted of treason. But once again Marshall, who presided over the circuit court that heard the case, thwarted the President by giving the jury no other alternative than to declare Burr innocent. Although Jefferson thought differently, the Constitution gave Marshall little choice in the matter, for it defines treason

as the actual waging of war against the United States or the aiding of its enemies. At the most, the government, whose principal witness was Wilkinson, could prove that Burr had contemplated, but had not performed, such acts. The Constitution further provides that no individual can be accused of treason "unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." The required two witnesses did not appear, and Burr did not confess. Although Marshall's ruling made unsubstantiated reports insufficient to prove a man guilty of treason, Jefferson was nevertheless upset by the judiciary's failure to curb the activities of a man he distrusted and disliked. In the words of Andrew C. McLaughlin: "Jefferson, the foe of tyranny, and the apostle of freedom and individual rights, was angry because the Chief Justice, an advocate of strong and effective government, had so interpreted the Constitution as to protect a prisoner alleged to be guilty of treason against the nation. Marshall's decision partook of the character of Jeffersonian liberalism and modernism; and Jefferson lamented." *

67. TRIALS OF A NEUTRAL

JEFFERSON, like Washington and Adams before him, found it impossible to keep developments in Europe from affecting the conduct of domestic affairs. The Federalists, despite the undeclared war with France during Adams's administration, had demonstrated remarkable skill in keeping the republic out of Europe's wars. But the Jeffersonian Republicans, although as fully determined as the Federalists to avoid being drawn into the European conflict, faced a far more difficult problem than had their predecessors. When war between Great Britain and Napoleonic France was resumed in 1803, the two countries entered upon an all-out struggle for world supremacy. The contest was not many months old before it became evident first, that, since both nations were converting farmers into soldiers, both would be compelled to rely upon the United States for large exports of food; second, that for the time being both nations would have to abandon their cherished mercantilistic notions, throw open their colonies to trade, and depend in great measure on the merchant marine of the United States to bring them needed supplies; and third, that both would ignore the rights of neutrals and subject the United States, like every other noncombatant nation, to all sorts of indignity and inconvenience.

The very nature of the Old World struggle made interference with American commerce inevitable. Napoleon resolved to break Britain by

* Andrew C. McLaughlin: *A Constitutional History of the United States* (New York: D. Appleton Century Company, Inc., 1935), p. 330.

destroying her commercial leadership and despoiling her of part of her colonial empire. Great Britain was frightened by Napoleon's success in bringing the greater part of the continent of Europe to his feet; and, since she had failed to crush him on land, she determined to starve him into submission. Accordingly, in May, 1806, less than a year after Nelson had annihilated the French fleet at Trafalgar, Great Britain declared a blockade of the coast of the Continent from the River Elbe to Brest. Napoleon's answer to this policy came in November of the same year; his famous Berlin Decree proclaimed a blockade of the British Isles, even though he had no navy to enforce it, and announced that any vessel stopping at an English port would not be admitted to a French port. The British government retaliated with a series of Orders in Council that extended the continental blockade, closed the whole French coasting trade to neutrals, and required all neutral vessels bound for the barred zone to clear from a British port, secure a license, and pay certain "transit duties." Not to be outdone, Napoleon in December, 1807, issued the Milan Decree, which declared that the French would seize and confiscate any ship submitting to search by British officers, paying any tax or duty to the British government, or even coming from or bound to a British port.

Although these orders and decrees were not inspired by special hostility to the United States, they worked great hardship on American commerce. If a ship sailed directly for the Continent, it was liable to seizure by the British; if, on the other hand, it put in at a British port, it might be captured and confiscated by the French. Every American shipper was faced with conflicting rules not of his making. His risks were enormous, but so were the rewards of those who escaped the meshwork of retaliatory measures. Between 1803 and 1812 approximately fifteen hundred American ships were seized by the European belligerents, and most of these were confiscated for ignoring the rules imposed upon them. Nevertheless, for the first four years of this period American profits were greater than American losses.

To their numerous other restraints on American commerce the British added one more when they virtually excluded American ships from the trade between the French West Indies and France. In 1800 in the *Polly* case the British had permitted this trade if the goods from the West Indies were first landed at a port in the United States. Many American shippers had taken advantage of this British policy by merely calling at an American port without bothering to unload their cargoes. In addition, the United States government paid drawbacks on the duties on commodities that had been imported from the French islands and were then exported to France. Through these devices the Americans had transformed the broken voyage into the continuous voyage, and in 1805 the British moved to stop this practice. In a case involving the *Essex*,

a ship that had been paid a drawback, a British admiralty court ruled that French West Indian cargoes could not be sent to France by way of an American port unless their owner could demonstrate that he originally intended to send them to the United States rather than to France. As it was almost impossible to demonstrate such an intention, the British were able to shut off still another source of profit to the American shipper.

If England's interference with their trade angered Americans, the British practice of impressing seamen caused even more resentment. England realized that her hope of conquering France depended on her navy. Yet its efficiency was always threatened by desertions. Long hours, low wages, filthy and often insufficient food, wretched sleeping quarters, severe punishment for trivial offenses, and the opportunity to escape the European war caused thousands of British seamen to flee to American merchantmen. Unable to spare these men, the British government applied the rule "once an Englishman, always an Englishman;" it refused them the right of expatriation and directed its naval officers to stop American vessels, search them, and remove, by force if necessary, any man whose service might be lawfully claimed. In carrying out their instructions, the searching parties more often than not did their work in high-handed fashion, and were not always careful to distinguish between Britishers and Yankees; many a sailor born under the American flag was dragged away in chains.

All effort—diplomatic and otherwise—on the part of the United States to induce the belligerents to respect the rights of neutrals came to nothing. American notes of protest to England were either ignored or answered in sarcastic and insolent vein. Napoleon's attitude was similar and in some respects more unbearable. He accused Jefferson of being a tool of Great Britain, issued false statements to lure American merchantmen to French waters where he knew they would be seized and confiscated, and made promises that he had no intention of fulfilling.

Confronted by many of the same problems that had faced the Federalists before the Jay Treaty, the Republicans decided to try the same policies that Washington had employed with marked success in the 1790's. Accordingly, in 1806 Congress passed a nonimportation act closing American ports to certain British goods, and Jefferson sent William Pinckney to England to help James Monroe, the United States minister at the Court of St. James, draw up a satisfactory commercial treaty with Great Britain. In the ensuing negotiations the British agreed to exercise greater care in their impressment policy and to relax their restrictions on the French West Indian trade; and a treaty containing both these provisions was signed by Monroe and Pinckney. But Jefferson, who had expressly forbidden the American representatives to conclude any agreement that did not contain a British renunciation of the

right of impressment, refused to submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification. In taking this stand Jefferson proved himself less of a realist than Washington, for the British had to continue to impress to survive; and as long as the United States refused to recognize this necessity, the two countries would be unable to settle their other disputes. The Jay Treaty had been made possible by Federalist recognition of Britain's supremacy on the seas; Jefferson's refusal to do the same left him just where he was before Pinckney and Monroe had begun their negotiations with the British.

British naval supremacy was brought home to every American in the summer of 1807, when the British warship *Leopard* halted the American frigate *Chesapeake* off the Virginia capes to search her for deserters. The British had never maintained that they had the right to impress men from American war vessels, and the commander of the American ship refused to permit the search. The *Leopard* immediately opened fire, killing three and wounding eighteen others. Unprepared for action, the *Chesapeake* was forced to yield, and four men—three of whom were Americans who had escaped from the British navy after being impressed—were taken as alleged deserters.

The *Chesapeake* affair did more to arouse public opinion in the United States than any other single incident in the years preceding the outbreak of the War of 1812. War in the summer of 1807 would have been far more popular than war was when it came in 1812. Americans of every political persuasion and section felt that their nation's disgrace could only be removed by a declaration of hostilities against Great Britain. Jefferson did not want war; but he knew that some action was necessary to allay popular feeling, and in an effort to prevent a repetition of the *Chesapeake* affair he issued a proclamation excluding British warships from American waters. To avoid an open rupture he put off convening Congress until the war fever had diminished. The British, who were no more desirous of war than Jefferson, disavowed the action of the *Leopard*, recalled the ship's commander, agreed to indemnify the wounded and the families of the dead, announced their willingness to return the impressed seamen, and admitted that the Royal Navy had no right to search ships of war. But these concessions were not enough to satisfy Jefferson, and he instructed the American representatives to demand that the British abandon impressments on merchant as well as war ships. To the British this issue seemed irrelevant, for the impressment of merchant seamen had nothing to do with the *Chesapeake* affair. Consequently, they flatly rejected the American proposal and charged that Jefferson's failure to exclude French as well as British ships from American waters constituted an unneutral act. Once again, Jefferson's insistence that the British give up impressments prevented a settlement.

There remained, furthermore, the problem of forcing both belliger-



The New York Public Library

OGRABME, OR THE AMERICAN SNAPPING TURTLE

"Ograbme" (embargo spelled backwards) is the name given to the snapping turtle, or terrapin. The cartoon refers to the Embargo Act of 1807 and an unsuccessful attempt to smuggle American-grown tobacco to a British merchantman.

ents to recognize American commercial rights. The Nonimportation Act had proved wholly inadequate, but the Republicans were still committed to a policy of economic coercion, and in December, 1807, Congress adopted the Embargo Act. This measure forbade all American vessels to sail from an American port to European ports and required every coasting vessel to give bond double the value of the vessel and cargo that it would land its cargo only in an American port. Instead of protecting American overseas commerce, the embargo tended to destroy it. The value of exports fell from \$108,000,000 in 1807 to \$22,000,000 the following year, an enormous decline for a country so dependent on foreign markets. Soon every port was crowded with idle ships; warehouses bulged with decaying goods; the shipbuilding industry languished; merchants went bankrupt; farmers lost their markets; prices of manufactured goods doubled; and the national revenue decreased approximately 50 per cent. Even those shippers who dared to evade the law by slipping out of port or by smuggling goods across Canadian and Florida borders were always in danger of being apprehended by Federal

agents. Massachusetts, the principal shipowning state in America, was especially hard hit, for the embargo not only suspended at least half her commerce but greatly curtailed her fishing and whaling industries.

Before the end of 1808 the temper of the country, particularly the commercial Northeast, was worse than before the passage of the embargo measure. Federalist politicians accused Jefferson of ruining the country. A newspaper poet in Newburyport, Massachusetts, spoke for the coastal residents of New England when he wrote:

*Our ships all in motion once whitened the ocean,
They sailed and returned with a cargo;
Now doomed to decay, they have fallen a prey
To Jefferson—worms—and Embargo.*

Another New England critic of the embargo wrote Jefferson: "You infernal villain, how much longer are you going to keep this damned Embargo on to starve us poor people[?] One of my children has already starved to death, of which I [am so] ashamed . . . [that I] declared it died of apoplexy."

68. MADISON AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS

AS JEFFERSON'S second term drew to a close, the Republicans had nothing to show for their efforts to safeguard American rights on the high seas. Jefferson had believed that economic pressure would force the belligerents to accede to American demands. Instead, it had split the United States and driven the New Englanders to the point of secession. At the same time he had done nothing to prepare the country for war, the only alternative to either continued humiliation or an effective program of economic coercion. The extent of Jefferson's failure was revealed in part by the ability of the Federalists—who at times were little better than political bankrupts—to make a respectable showing in the election of 1808. James Madison, selected by Jefferson as his successor, received 122 electoral votes; but 46 electors cast their ballots for C. C. Pinckney, the Federalist candidate, and six others voted for George Clinton, Jefferson's Vice-President. In addition, the Federalists made sizable gains in Congress, and every New England state except Vermont gave majorities to Pinckney.

Madison, like Jefferson, was a Virginia planter who considered himself a spokesman for the nation's agrarian classes. Before becoming Jefferson's Secretary of State, he had been a member of Virginia's first constitutional convention, the Continental Congress, the Virginia legislature, the Philadelphia Convention, and the House of Representatives.

Although he played a notable rôle in both the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, he was one of the few Founding Fathers to break with the Federalists after the Constitution had gone into effect. A scholarly and erudite man, he had repeatedly demonstrated that he was also at home in the world of affairs. But, when he became President, he had lived in Jefferson's shadow for eight years, and his critics—with some justification—complained that he was incapable of charting a course of his own.

In the interval between the election of 1808 and Madison's inaugural, Jefferson turned over most of the tasks of the presidency to his successor. It was therefore with Madison's approval that Jefferson signed the repeal of the Embargo Act on March 1, 1809. But having been forced by popular pressure to abandon the embargo, the Republicans were immediately faced by the problem of finding a substitute. War was out of the question, for the country was unprepared, and yet the thought of submission to France and Great Britain was intolerable. All that remained was a variation of the old policy, and the embargo was supplanted by a nonintercourse act that permitted American shippers to trade with any part of the world except England and France. In what proved to be a vain effort to play one belligerent off against the other, the Republicans added to the bill the provision that commercial intercourse would be resumed with whichever nation would first remove its restrictions on American commerce.

Soon after the adoption of the Nonintercourse Act, George Canning, the British foreign minister, instructed David Erskine, the British minister in Washington, to open negotiations with the Madison Administration for a commercial treaty. Throughout the conferences, Erskine proved remarkably co-operative, and soon both parties were able to agree to a treaty that provided for a mutually satisfactory settlement of the *Chesapeake* affair and the repeal of each country's restrictions on the other's commerce. Madison announced that the British would now withdraw the Orders in Council and that the United States would resume its commercial relations with Great Britain. But his action proved premature, for Erskine had exceeded his instructions, and Canning rejected the treaty. As if to remove any doubt concerning his attitude, Canning replaced Erskine with Francis James Jackson, who made no attempt to conceal his hostility toward the United States and who felt that it was "charity" to call Erskine a "fool."

While the British refused to accede to the demands of the United States, Napoleon made a mockery of American policy. Soon after the embargo went into effect, he issued the Bayonne Decree (April 17, 1808) ordering the seizure of all American ships in French ports. In justification of this extraordinary move, he argued that, since no ships could leave the United States, those in French ports must have been

British vessels that were seeking to conceal their identity with the American colors. Armed with the Bayonne Decree, the French confiscated approximately \$10,000,000 worth of American ships and cargoes in a single year. When the embargo was supplanted by the Nonintercourse Act, Napoleon countered with the Rambouillet Decree (March 23, 1810) authorizing the seizure and sale of all American ships that had entered French ports after the date on which the United States had severed commercial relations with France. The United States could protest against Napoleon's policies, but it could not compel him to alter them.

By 1810 the United States had ample justification for a declaration of war against either Great Britain or France. But a nation needs more than justification to declare war, and the United States lacked both the will to fight and adequate military resources. Under the circumstances all that remained was the opportunity to try still another version of economic coercion. Accordingly, Nathaniel Macon, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, drew up a bill requiring that all imports from France and England be carried in American ships. Although this measure was passed by the House, it was defeated in the Senate. Congress then adopted an "inside-out" nonintercourse act that was known as Macon's Bill No. 2 (May 1, 1810). While permitting American trade with every nation of the world, Macon's Bill No. 2 provided that if either Great Britain or France revoked or modified its commercial decrees and the other should not, the president should revive the Nonintercourse Act against the offending country. Once more the United States was offering itself to the highest bidder; and once more both Britain and France spurned the offer. Like its predecessors, Macon's Bill No. 2 failed to remove a single restriction from American commerce.

Although Napoleon had no intention of complying with the conditions laid down in Macon's Bill No. 2, he perceived that by pretending to do so he could add one more complication to the already strained relations between Great Britain and the United States. On August 5, 1810, the French foreign minister, the Duc de Cadore, wrote the American minister to France that the Berlin and Milan Decrees would be revoked on November 1. But the Cadore letter did not say all that it seemed to say, for the French foreign minister added that the revocation would go into effect only if England repealed its Orders in Council "or . . . the United States . . . shall cause their [the United States's] rights to be respected by the English." Madison, falling into the trap set by Napoleon, announced on November 2, 1810, that the Nonintercourse Act would be applied to the British unless Great Britain repealed its Orders in Council within three months. Napoleon, having achieved his objective, again authorized the seizure of American ships; the Brit-

ish ignored Madison's threat; and on March 2, 1811, Congress adopted a bill reinstituting nonintercourse against Great Britain. The Cadore letter had fulfilled Napoleon's most sanguine expectations.

In the dark days of 1811, when the prestige of the United States had reached one of the all-time lows in the nation's history, American spirits were temporarily revived by an unexpected naval victory. On May 11, 1811, the American frigate *President*, while patrolling the waters off Sandy Hook, New Jersey, encountered the British war vessel *Little Belt*. When the British ship was hailed and refused to come about, a battle followed in which thirty-two Englishmen were either killed or wounded. American losses were slight, and the *President* was the undisputed victor. To the American people the defeat of the *Little Belt* served as a tonic, and many felt that the British at last had been forced to pay for the *Chesapeake* affair. Once again there were demands for war, and a Philadelphia newspaper wrote that the *President's* victory recalled the good old days of '76, when with "our hay forks, pitch forks and grubbing hoes . . . we knocked down his teeth and scoured his blackhell throat."

Despite the enthusiasm for the *President's* victory in the coastal regions, the demand for war came not from Northeast shippers, but from nationally minded frontier expansionists and Southern planters. Despite affronts and inconveniences, the shipping interests were making money, and did not want war. But the frontier West, with an eye on Canada, and the planting South, with its heart set on Florida, was now demanding war. Ever since pre-Revolutionary days frontiersmen from New Hampshire to Kentucky had been intermittently outspoken in their demand that the Indian tribes of the Northwest be ousted and that Canada be acquired by the United States. The Westerners' land hunger, a desire to obtain control of the British fur trade, and above all, the wish to destroy forever the alliance between the British and the Indians were principally responsible for this double demand.

Throughout Jefferson's administration there had been sporadic fighting and repeated misunderstandings between the Indians and the American settlers in the Northwest. Frontiersmen, ignoring the guarantees granted the Indians by treaties, overran Indian lands and advanced through northwestern Ohio and the Indiana territory into the Wabash country. Wholly in sympathy with the pioneer in his policy of excluding the Indians by any means whatsoever was William Henry Harrison, who had been named Governor of Indiana Territory by President Jefferson. By treating with certain irresponsible local chiefs he succeeded in 1804 and 1805 in despoiling whole tribes of some of their most valuable hunting grounds. This action was bitterly resented by more intelligent and foresighted Indian leaders like Tecumseh and his brother, the Prophet, sons of a Shawnee warrior. To prevent its repe-

tition they proposed that all the frontier tribes from the Great Lakes to the Gulf should form a confederacy that would confer upon a congress of warriors sole authority to dispose of Indian lands. Scarcely had Prophetstown, the capital of this Indian confederacy, been founded (in 1808) before Governor Harrison, again dealing with the same irresponsible sachems, secured title to the rich valley of the Wabash. Three years later the plans of Tecumseh and the Prophet were shattered when Harrison, invading unceded Indian lands, defeated the Indians in the battle of Tippecanoe and destroyed the seat of their confederacy.

In his report of the battle, Harrison stated that the Indians had fought with guns and powder supplied by the British. To the frontiersmen, the problem seemed similar to one that had confronted Washington and they felt that it could only be solved by destroying the British bases in Canada.

The Westerners' desire for Canada was matched by the Southerners' demand for Florida. As long as East and West Florida remained in alien hands, their swamps and marshlands afforded a refuge for runaway slaves, and their Indian population could be used in ways detrimental to the United States. Most important of all, perhaps, the people of eastern Tennessee and of the neighboring territory of Mississippi could reach the sea only by rivers that passed through the Floridas. Then, too, there was always the danger that the Floridas might be used as a base by some hostile power, particularly England.

Both Livingston and Monroe asserted that the Louisiana Purchase included West Florida—that is, the strip of Gulf coast between the Iberville or eastern branch of the Mississippi and the Apalachicola—but Spain claimed this territory as part of the Floridas. During the years immediately following the acquisition of Louisiana, while the United States was unsuccessfully endeavoring to induce Spain to recognize its claim, West Florida gradually filled up with Americans. In 1810 they revolted against the Spanish authorities, and with the connivance of the American government they declared their independence of Spain and asked to be annexed to the United States. They had not long to wait, for in October, 1810, President Madison, heeding the wishes of the frontier expansionists, issued a proclamation declaring that by the Louisiana Purchase the United States extended as far east as the Perdido and that West Florida was therefore American soil. The fact that Spain was heavily indebted to American citizens for damages done to their trade afforded sufficient excuse to claim East Florida also, and early in 1811, Congress tentatively authorized the seizure of the region. Southern expansionists now urged that the United States resort to war if necessary to acquire East Florida from Spain.

The Westerners and Southerners were nationalists as well as expansionists, and they deeply resented the injustices heaped on the United

States by both belligerents. They were equally disgusted with the New Englanders' refusal to put patriotism above profits and the Northeasterners' reluctance to turn against their nation's oppressors. But they reserved their most intense hatred for Great Britain, for in their opinion she had been even more insulting than France. Moreover, Great Britain and her ally, Spain, controlled the regions that the American expansionists wished to possess. In 1810, Henry Clay, a young Kentuckian and one of the leading spokesmen for the War Hawks—as the Western advocates of war in Congress were called—said:

No man in the nation wants peace more than I, but I prefer the troubled ocean of war, demanded by the honor and independence of this country, with all its calamities and desolation, to the tranquil and putrescent pool of ignominious peace. If we can accommodate our differences with one of the belligerents only, I should prefer that one to be Britain; but if with neither, and we are forced into a selection of our enemy, then I am for war with Britain, because I believe her prior in aggression, and her injuries and insults to us more atrocious in character. . . . It is said, however, that no object is obtainable by war with Great Britain. In its fortunes we are to estimate not only the benefit to be derived to ourselves, but the injury to . . . the enemy. The conquest of Canada is in your power. I trust I shall not be deemed presumptuous when I state that I verily believe that the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet.

That Clay spoke for both the frontier and the South was evident when the question of relations with England came up for debate in the Twelfth Congress the following year. Those who were outspoken for war and annexation were in control; they came for the most part from Western and Southern constituencies that if connected would form a great crescent stretching from New Hampshire to Savannah, Georgia.

*From end to end [as Julius Pratt has pointed out in his *Expansionists of 1812*] the crescent traversed frontier territory, bordering foreign soil, British or Spanish, or confronting dangerous Indian tribes among whom foreign influence was suspected and feared Nothing could better demonstrate the frontier character of the war spirit than to observe its progressive decline as we pass from the rim of the crescent to its center at the national capital.**

During the early months of 1812 the demand for war became more insistent than ever. Madison, whose sole objective had been the preservation of peace, on June 1, 1812, asked Congress to declare war on

* Julius W. Pratt: *Expansionists of 1812* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), pp. 126-7.

Great Britain. On June 4, the House of Representatives by a vote of 79 to 49 approved a war resolution, and the Senate in a 19 to 13 vote followed suit on June 17. On the next day, the declaration went into effect. From every point of view the vote to take up arms against England for a second time was sectional; the commercial Northeast lined up against the agrarian West and South. The attitude of the former is admirably summed up by Pratt:

*The Federalist party, grounded chiefly in the mercantile and financial interests of the coast towns, the college-bred professional men, the more solid and "respectable" elements in society, was fairly homogeneous in its creeds of both foreign and domestic politics. Abroad, it looked upon Napoleon as Anti-Christ and endorsed Pickering's famous toast, "The world's last hope—Britain's fast-anchored Isle." In home affairs, it was convinced, not without cause, . . . that the Republican administration had deliberately resolved to ruin its commerce and dissipate its prosperity. Holding these views, it could see no worse national crime than a war against England which would render indirect aid to Napoleon, and no worse disaster to its own interests than a form of expansion which would mean new states to increase the Republican strength in Congress.**

The British, like the Federalists, wished to avoid war. France was still the principal enemy, and Britain had no desire to be diverted from the war in Europe by armed conflict in North America. Moreover, a series of political shifts had produced a new English ministry that favored a more conciliatory policy toward the United States. On June 16—two days before the American declaration of war went into effect—the British government announced the repeal of all the Orders in Council affecting American commerce. The British decision, by providing an unexampled opportunity for peace, converted the American election of 1812 into a referendum on the desirability of war. Madison, who was running for a second term, was definitely committed to the program of the War Hawks. He was opposed by George Clinton of New York, who had been nominated by dissident Republicans, and who as a peace candidate was also supported by the Federalists. Madison received 128 electoral votes to 89 for Clinton, and the election followed closely the sectional pattern that had been set in the vote on the war resolution in Congress. Madison carried all the South and every Western state; Clinton won every Northern state except Pennsylvania and Vermont. The election reaffirmed the decision of the majority to fight, but it also revealed that a powerful minority was opposed to war.

* Julius W. Pratt: *Expansionists of 1812* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), p. 131. Copyright, 1925, by and reprinted with the permission of The Macmillan Company.

69. WAR OF 1812

THE WAR of 1812 was fought on both land and sea. On land, the United States suffered a series of almost uninterrupted defeats. At sea, American warships—among which were the *Constitution*, *United States*, *Essex* and *Hornet*—won a number of notable victories under the brilliant command of David Porter, William Bainbridge, Stephen Decatur, and James Lawrence. In addition, American privateers took more than 1,300 prizes and the United States Navy captured 165 more. Despite these accomplishments, the United States lost the war at sea. By 1814 the British navy had practically destroyed the American merchant marine and navy, and the blockade had seriously impaired the effectiveness of the American economy.

In the first stages of the war on land the initiative lay with the United States. As long as the British had to devote their major efforts to the war in Europe, they were forced to limit their military activity in North America to holding operations. At the outset of the war Great Britain had only 5,000 soldiers in Canada, and until Napoleon was defeated there was no way by which she could re-enforce them. Moreover, in contrast to the United States's population of almost 8,000,000 there were only 500,000 Canadians, many of whom were French-Canadians who had no desire to risk their lives defending the British Empire. Despite the favorable conditions under which the United States began its land operations in the War of 1812, its armies were unable to make any appreciable gains in Canada.

The American failure to drive the British out of Canada during the first phase of the war can be attributed in large measure to New England's attitude toward both the war and the government of the United States. New England merchants and shippers stubbornly refused to support a conflict that, as they insisted, was not of their making. Their spokesmen in Congress condemned the invasion of Canada, fought conscription, and tried by every means to defeat the Administration's loan bills and tax projects. Outside the halls of Congress they were no less vehement in their opposition. Individuals, the press, and official bodies ranging from town meetings to state legislatures contemptuously referred to "Mr. Madison's War" and described it as an "unjust," "ruinous," and "unconstitutional" war. Federalist bankers even went so far as to try to prevent the sale of government bonds. To quote Henry Adams: "Probably New England lent to the British Government during the war more money than she lent to her own." Moreover, New England furnished the British fleet operating off the coast and the British armies in Canada with large quantities of foodstuffs and other supplies. The Brit-

ish, for their part, were careful not to alienate their allies in New England, and throughout the war no part of this region was blockaded by the British navy.

No other section was as opposed to the war as New England was, but there was little agreement about either the conduct or objectives of the war in the South and the West. Although the War Hawks were a unit in demanding war, they were sharply divided over aims and methods. The Southern wing of the party was far from enthusiastic about annexing Canada. The frontiersmen of the Northwest, on the other hand, wanted Canada and frowned upon the possibility of adding territory to the planting South. Even before the outbreak of war, John Randolph had repeatedly warned the South that the conquest and annexation of Canada would make the North preponderant.

If you go to war, [he warned] it will not be for the protection of or defense of your maritime rights. Gentlemen from the North have been taken up into some high mountain and shown all the kingdoms of the earth; and Canada seems tempting in their sight. That rich vein of Genesee land . . . is said to be even better on the other side of the lake than on this. Agrarian cupidity, not maritime right, urges the war . . . It is to acquire a preponderating northern influence that you are to launch into war.

Northerners were equally outspoken in opposing the addition of the Floridas. After the war had started, the efforts of the expansionists, North and South, to patch up their differences and agree to an annexation program satisfactory to both failed to allay a sectional animosity that was manifest at every turn—in cabinet meetings, in the making of plans for financing the war, in the raising and equipping of troops, and in their conduct on the field of battle. Some indication of the effect of these disagreements on the American war effort is revealed by the fact that, although Madison was authorized by Congress to appeal for fifty thousand volunteers, he was unable to raise more than ten thousand.

The succession of American disasters in the War of 1812 can also be attributed to the Administration in Washington. After undermining the national economy, rejecting all demands for military preparedness, and bringing the United States to the point of disunion, the Republican leaders finally consented to a war that they had opposed for almost a decade. Moreover, Madison possessed none of the qualifications needed by a successful leader of a nation at war, and Secretary of War William Eustis and Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton were political hacks and incompetents.* Finally, in their conduct of the war, Madison and his colleagues adopted a strategy that at best could produce only lim-

* Albert Gallatin was Madison's Secretary of the Treasury, and in 1811 James Monroe succeeded Robert Smith as Secretary of State.

ited victories. Instead of concentrating all their energies on an offensive against the heart of British North America—either Quebec or Montreal—the Americans dissipated their strength by attacking Canada's extremities in the West. A campaign against Quebec was rendered impractical because of its distance from the American lines and the strength of its fortifications but Montreal was both accessible and poorly defended. Furthermore, Montreal served as the key link between Lower and Upper Canada, and its capture in all likelihood would have enabled the Americans to conquer the entire region to the west with relatively little fighting. But American military planners felt that the United States should attack in the West, where the inhabitants were expected to rally to the support of an invading army. At most, this strategy could result in the acquisition of only relatively small areas of British territory rather than in the conquest of Canada.

Whatever merits the American strategy may have possessed were largely nullified by mismanagement, a lack of adequately trained administrators, and poor leadership. The American campaign plans for 1812 called for twin offensives against Canada through Detroit and Niagara. On July 12, William Hull, the Governor of Michigan Territory, marched an American force out of Detroit and began the invasion of Upper Canada. But he soon became alarmed by rumors of British troop concentrations in the area, and after advancing only a few miles, he retreated to Detroit, where he was surrounded by a British army of regulars, militiamen, and Indians led by Major-General Isaac Brock. On August 12, Hull surrendered without a fight. Brock then rushed his troops to Niagara and defeated another American force under Stephen Van Rensselaer at Queenstown Heights (October 13, 1812). Meanwhile Major-General Henry Dearborn, who was stationed at Plattsburg, was preparing an expedition against Montreal. He did not set out, however, until late November; and when he reached the Canadian border after a twenty-mile march, he halted and then returned to Plattsburg. The refusal of American militiamen to fight on foreign soil and Dearborn's fear of a reportedly larger British force in the region were the principal reasons for the failure of the projected offensive against Montreal. By the end of 1812 the Americans not only had nothing to show for their efforts, but they had also been forced to relinquish some land to the British in the West.

Although the American campaigns in 1813 were somewhat more successful than those of the preceding year, they had little effect on the over-all course of the war. On September 10, 1813, a small fleet on Lake Erie under the command of Captain Oliver Hazard Perry defeated the English at Put-in-Bay. Perry's exploit and his colorful announcement of the victory ("We have met the enemy, and they are ours, two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop") were enthusiastically received by

the American people, but they did not prove to be a prelude to the successful invasion of Canada. Less than a month after the battle of Put-in-Bay, Americans under William Henry Harrison defeated the British at the Thames River (October 5, 1813). Harrison was able to regain Hull's losses, but his army only nibbled at the fringes of Canada. At the same time the British managed to fight off the American attacks in the vicinity of Niagara. After taking York (Toronto) in April, 1813, an American force led by Dearborn was compelled to withdraw, and at the end of December the British captured Fort Niagara. The projected campaign against Montreal turned out to be as much of a fiasco as that of the preceding year.

In 1814 the entire character of the war in America was changed by Napoleon's defeat in Europe. The British, who were able for the first time to bring their full power to bear on the struggle in the New World, now planned to attack the United States at four crucial points—Plattsburg, Washington, New Orleans, and Maine. The campaign against Plattsburg was entrusted to Sir George Prevost and an army of 14,000. After reaching the fort, which was held by approximately 4,000 Americans, Prevost decided to delay his attack until the arrival of a supporting fleet on Lake Champlain. But when the British ships were defeated in a battle off Plattsburg Bay by an American flotilla under Captain Thomas Macdonough, Prevost marched his troops back to Canada without risking a battle that he probably could have won easily. The failure of the Plattsburg campaign deprived the British of an unparalleled opportunity to cut off New England from the rest of the United States.

Because of their control of the seas the British were able to capture, but not hold, the capitol of the United States. The British marched into Washington on August 24, 1814, a few hours after it had been evacuated by the officials of the government. As the attack on Washington was designed to demoralize the American people rather than to prepare the way for a full-scale invasion, the British, after burning the city's public buildings, retired to their ships on the Patuxent. A similar raid on Baltimore proved less successful, for the British were repulsed by Fort McHenry's guns and by recruits gathered to defend the city.

The New Orleans campaign, like that against Washington, was undertaken, not to conquer territory, but to teach the Americans a lesson. The British hoped that by taking New Orleans they could create discontent among Southwestern frontiersmen, who would no longer be able to use the Mississippi for the export of their surplus commodities. The British plan, however, miscarried. Two weeks after peace had been concluded at Ghent—but before news of it had reached America—the British were overwhelmingly defeated at the battle of New Orleans (January 8, 1815). American militiamen led by Andrew Jackson, who had already distinguished himself as an Indian fighter, barricaded them-

selves behind bales of cotton and mowed down the British regulars. A battle that modern means of communication could have prevented, the victory at New Orleans was the most notable American success of the entire war. In addition, the battle of New Orleans made Jackson the outstanding American hero of a war that was memorable for the lack of heroism displayed by most Americans.

The British won their most important victory in America in Maine. After landing on September 1, 1814, at the mouth of the Penobscot River, they captured the town of Castine and advanced without opposition up the Penobscot Valley to Bangor. The inhabitants in the northeastern section of Maine took an oath of allegiance to the King, and the entire region was placed under British control. Inhabitants of the coastal regions, instead of trying to drive out the invaders, appeared to welcome the arrival of the British. New England ships that had previously traded with the British at Halifax now sailed for Castine with goods for their country's enemies. In the relatively short period from September, 1814, to the end of the war, American ships calling at Castine paid out £13,000 in duties to the royal customs officials at the Maine port.

70. PEACE

NEW ENGLAND'S reaction to the British invasion of Maine accurately reflected the section's aversion to both the war and the Madison Administration. In September, 1814, Massachusetts and Connecticut withdrew their militia from Federal service, and in the following month the General Court of Massachusetts issued an invitation to her neighboring commonwealths to send delegates to a convention "for the purpose of devising proper measures to procure the united efforts of the commercial states, to secure such amendments and explanations of the Constitution as will secure them from further evils." Five states—Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont—responded, and the delegates assembled at Hartford on December 15, 1814.

What action the convention would take was problematical. For ten years and more states' rights and secession had been freely discussed in New England. Less than a week before the Hartford Convention assembled, Daniel Webster, speaking in the House of Representatives against a proposed Federal conscription law, stated:

No law professedly passed for the purpose of compelling a service in the regular army, not for the emergencies mentioned in the Constitution, but for long periods, and for the general objects of war

can be carried into effect. The principles of the bill are not warranted by any provision of the Constitution, . . . not connected with any power which the Constitution has conferred on Congress. . . . The Constitution is libelled, foully libelled. . . . Where is it written in the Constitution, in what article or section is it contained, that you may take children from their parents and parents from their children and compel them to fight the battles of any war in which the folly or the wickedness of government may engage it? . . . An attempt to maintain this doctrine upon the provisions of the Constitution is an exercise of perverse ingenuity to extract slavery from the substance of a free government.

Webster's exposition reflected the spirit of commercial New England. In the Hartford Convention the more radical members were eager for secession. They were outnumbered, however, by the more moderate faction, whose opinion prevailed. After scolding the Administration and threatening nullification if conscription were applied, the convention recommended seven amendments to the Constitution. Collectively these amendments, if adopted, would have excluded the slaves from the count in determining state membership in the House of Representatives, made the admission of new states impossible without a two-thirds majority of Congress, prohibited all embargoes of longer than sixty days, prevented a declaration of war without a two-thirds majority, except in case of invasion, and put an end to the monopoly of the presidency by Virginians.

In both the West and South, press and platform denounced the Hartford Convention.

No man, no association of men, no state or set of states [the Richmond Enquirer wrote] has a right to withdraw itself from this Union of its own accord. . . . The majority of the states which form the Union must consent to the withdrawal of any one branch of it. Until that consent has been obtained, any attempt to dissolve the Union or to obstruct the efficacy of its constitutional laws is Treason—Treason to all intents and purposes.

Apparently the *Enquirer* had, for the time being at least, forgotten the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Nor did it foresee the events whose occurrence less than a generation later virtually compelled it to stand forth once more as the champion of states' rights.

Any possibility that the New England states might secede from the Union was removed early in 1815 with the announcement of the conclusion of peace between the United States and Britain. The Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812, was the culmination of a series of negotiations that went back to the first months of the war. Soon

after the outbreak of hostilities, negotiations were undertaken for ending the war. As early as September 13, 1812, the Tsar had proposed to John Quincy Adams, the American representative at St. Petersburg, that Russia serve as a mediator between Great Britain and the United States. In making this move the Tsar was not altogether disinterested, for the end of the war in America would permit Britain, which was now Russia's ally, to concentrate all its energies on the defeat of Napoleon. On March 11, 1813, Madison accepted the Russian offer and nominated John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, and Albert Gallatin to serve as the American representatives at the peace talks. The British, however, balked at the idea of Russian mediation. But when the Tsar renewed his proposal, officials in London indicated that they were willing to deal directly with the American negotiators. Madison agreed to the British plan and appointed two additional commissioners, Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell, the American minister to Sweden. Because of the numerous proposals and counterproposals and the relative slowness of trans-Atlantic communications, the American and British delegates did not convene at Ghent until August 8, 1814. Both sides had spent almost as much time trying to end the war as to win it.

After prolonged negotiation the representatives of both countries at Ghent were forced to realize that they would have to settle for a peace without victory, for neither nation was in a position to press its demands. The British wished to concentrate on developments in Europe, while the Americans saw no point in continuing what in reality was a losing war. As a consequence, the best that either belligerent could expect was the *status quo ante bellum*. The Treaty of Ghent, therefore, merely made provision for the cessation of hostilities, the release of prisoners, the restoration of conquests by both sides, and the termination of Indian hostilities. No allusion was made to neutral rights, to the impressment of American seamen, or to the effect on American commerce of blockades, seizures, and confiscations. Nor was mention made of the control of the Great Lakes, Indian territories, the fisheries, or the navigation of the Mississippi. From the point of view of the expansionists the document was, as Clay labeled it, "a damned bad treaty," but news of its negotiation was joyously received by an exhausted Administration and by the people of the nation.

Although the Treaty of Ghent removed none of the causes of the war, it nevertheless marked a turning point in the United States's relations with Europe. In the years after 1815 the United States was able to settle most of its outstanding differences with Great Britain, force the Spanish out of Florida, and formulate an over-all policy to govern the relations between the nations of the Western hemisphere and those of the Old World. The American Revolution had severed America's political ties with Great Britain, but it was not until the conclusion of the

War of 1812 that the United States's independence was fully secured. Following the Treaty of Ghent the American people were able for the first time since their nation's establishment to devote their major energies to domestic rather than foreign problems. To contemporaries the War of 1812 was viewed as a series of blunders and misfortunes; to students of American history it stands as a second war of independence.

CHAPTER XII

AMERICA MOVES WEST

- 71. SETTLEMENT OF THE OLD WEST
 - 72. PROBLEMS OF THE TRANS-ALLEGHENY SETTLER
 - 73. FUR TRADE IN THE FAR WEST
 - 74. THE MIDDLE BORDER MOVES WESTWARD
 - 75. THE FRONTIER AND AMERICAN CIVILIZATION
-


DURING the twenty-five years after the War of 1812 the West played an increasingly important rôle in the history of the American people. By 1840 the Indians had been forced to relinquish their lands east of the Mississippi, millions of acres of land on either side of the Ohio were producing unsurpassed crops of corn and grain, the Old Southwest had been converted into the leading cotton-growing region of the world, the Far West had witnessed the rise and fall of the fur industry, and a whole tier of new states had been established west of the Mississippi. Throughout this period the vast territory stretching from the Appalachians to the Rockies held an undeniable attraction for countless Easterners and Europeans. Some of these went west because of their love of adventure and the unknown. Others, not unlike the sixteenth-century European fortune-hunters, went in quest of easy wealth. Still others went to escape the social, political, and religious restrictions and injustices of a crystallized and conforming Eastern or Old World society, and a few went with the hope of achieving political fame. But most numerous of all were those who turned to the West in search of economic opportunity. To the struggling Eastern farmer, dissatisfied tradesman, religious dissenter, or ambitious young lawyer, the West was often a "promised land."

71. SETTLEMENT OF THE OLD WEST

THE WESTERN population of more than 1,000,000 in 1810 increased to 2,217,474 in 1820 and to nearly 3,700,000 in 1830. In less than ten years six new Western states were admitted to the Union: Louisiana (1812), Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), and Missouri (1821). Even more significant was the percentage of increase in population in the trans-Appalachian states between 1820 and 1830. Of the four older commonwealths, Kentucky gained 22 per cent, Louisiana 41 per cent, and Tennessee and Ohio 61 per cent each. But the rate of increase in the younger states was phenomenal: Mississippi gained 81 per cent, Missouri 109 per cent, Indiana 133 per cent, Alabama 142 per cent, and Illinois 185 per cent. Between 1810 and 1830 this never-ending stream to the westward had taken more than two million people out of the seaboard states. By 1840, the West had a population of 6,376,972.

Geographically, people generally moved westward in parallel lines. Tennessee and Kentucky, for instance, were settled by the German and Scotch-Irish element of the piedmont regions of Virginia and the Carolinas. With the invention of the cotton gin and the tremendous demand for cotton, the coast planters pushed into the interior counties of the old Southern states. Unable to compete, the free farmers were practically forced either to buy slaves and adopt the plantation system or sell their land and migrate. The supply of cheap land in Kentucky and Tennessee, however, was quickly exhausted, and the younger generation, together with the new arrivals from the Eastern communities, settled in southern Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri and the Gulf states.

The population of the Gulf states came almost entirely from the Old South. Many of the independent upcountry yeomanry went to this section, but it was even more alluring to the planters of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. Excessive cultivation of tobacco and failure to employ scientific methods of rotation and fertilization had exhausted the soil in the coastal regions. The competition of Kentucky-grown tobacco, the embargo and the War of 1812, droughts, ravages of insect pests, and the burden of old debts added to their distress. The Southwest with its abundance of virgin land seemed to afford their only salvation, and there they went in great numbers. The region also attracted thousands of Carolina and Georgia planters in search of additional cotton lands. Before 1840, cotton culture had spread from Georgia to Texas, and a new South had been created. Like the farmers of the Northwest, the Gulf-state planters with few exceptions were ultra-nationalists and expansionists, and, as aggressive exploiters, they reduced slavery to a purely commercial system.



6. THE OHIO COUNTRY


Settlement in the Ohio country began soon after the Revolution, but, as this map indicates, speculators obtained control of a considerable portion of the land. Until 1781 Virginia laid claim to the whole area and made grants—military bounties—to her soldiers in the lands between the Scioto and Little Miami rivers, grants that were largely bought up by land speculators. In 1787 the Ohio Company of Associates and in 1788 the Symmes Company obtained millions of acres from Congress. Speculators also acquired most of the Seven Ranges—seven “ranges,” or rows, of townships surveyed by the Federal government in 1786–7. New Englanders settled some of the richest soil: the Western Reserve (claimed and not relinquished by Connecticut until 1800) and the Marietta country in the Ohio Company grant. Large-scale settlement could not take place, however, until the Indians had been defeated by “Mad Anthony” Wayne in 1795 at the battle of Fallen Timbers, and the territory south of the Greenville Treaty line, negotiated by Wayne and shown here, had been established as an area open to occupation by whites. It was not long before the pressure of white settlement had made the treaty line obsolete.

While Southern planters and backcountrymen were occupying the lower Mississippi valley, Middle staters and New Englanders, supplemented by German immigrants, were pushing westward. Central Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were in large measure colonized by people from New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. From Massachusetts and Connecticut an almost endless procession of Yankees moved northward into Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, and then westward. By 1812 they had occupied the western shore of Lake Champlain, the St. Lawrence Valley, the greater part of central, western, and southern New York, northeastern and northwestern Pennsylvania, and northeastern Ohio. In addition they had planted colonies in New Jersey, eastern Pennsylvania, and southern Ohio. After the War of 1812, many New Englanders settled in southern Michigan and Wisconsin. Between 1830 and 1840, thousands of immigrants from southwestern Germany occupied the more sparsely populated sections of the states north of the Ohio. Among them were a large number of able, intelligent men who exerted a powerful influence upon intellectual life in the Old Northwest.

From whatever section the emigrant came, his journey west was not an easy one. Before the opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 the majority of settlers went overland. Some traveled by stagecoach or wagon, others on horseback, and not a few on foot. It was the picture of this overland migration that Morris Birkbeck depicted as he journeyed along the National Road through Pennsylvania in 1817.

We are seldom out of sight [he observed] as we travel on this grand track, towards the Ohio, of family groups, behind and before us. . . . A small waggon (so light that you might almost carry it, yet strong enough to bear a good load of bedding, utensils and provisions, and a swarm of young citizens,—and to sustain marvellous shocks in its passage over these rocky heights) with two small horses, sometimes a cow or two, comprises their all; excepting a little store of hard-earned cash for the land office of the district; where they may obtain a title for as many acres as they possess half-dollars, being one-fourth of the purchase money. The waggon has a tilt, or cover, made of a sheet, or perhaps a blanket. The family are seen before, behind, or within the vehicle, according to the road or the weather, or perhaps the spirits of the party. . . . A cart and single horse frequently affords the means of transfer, sometimes a horse and a pack-saddle. Often the back of the poor pilgrim bears all his effects, and his wife follows, naked-footed, bending under the hopes of the family.

Fortunately for the emigrant, there was more than one route to the western country. Before the opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 the majority of New Englanders either pushed over the Berkshires to Albany



7. ROUTES TO THE WEST, 1760-1840

The routes to the West during these years followed river courses and mountain valleys when possible. Many New Englanders, instead of making the difficult journey across Massachusetts to Albany, went by sea to New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. The routes from Albany to Buffalo to Lake Erie and from Charleston to central Alabama avoided mountains.

and then along the valley of the Mohawk and the Genesee Turnpike to Lake Erie, or crossed the Hudson farther to the south and moved over the Catskill Turnpike through southern New York to the upper waters of the Allegheny. From this point many floated down to Pittsburgh on lumber rafts. A considerable number also made their way overland or by boat to New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, whence they went by a more southerly route. Most of the emigrants from the Middle

states went by way of the old Philadelphia-Lancaster-Bedford-Pittsburgh road, built by General Forbes during the French and Indian War. By 1830 the greater portion of these 350 miles of highway had been turnpiked. In many respects the most important route extended from Baltimore and Washington up the valley of the Potomac to Cumberland and then over the National Road to Wheeling on the Ohio. This route, following in part Braddock's line of march to Redstone on the Monongahela, also connected with Pittsburgh; over it passed great numbers of Virginians from the uplands and the Shenandoah Valley to the Ohio country. Emigrants from southern Virginia and North Carolina generally proceeded up the Roanoke to the Great Divide, where they either turned to the northwest into the valley of the Kanawha River or to the southwest along the Holston and then through the Cumberland Gap and along the wilderness road into Kentucky or into the valley of the Tennessee. From South Carolina the principal route extended through the Saluda Gap into eastern Tennessee. Two main routes converging at Fort Mitchell stretched from central Georgia into southern Alabama and Mississippi.

Supplementing the overland highways were the numerous natural waterways. The settler, once he reached the Ohio or its tributaries, usually completed his journey by water; he might embark on a raft, flatboat, ark, or keelboat. With the introduction of the steamboat on the rivers of the West after 1811 and the completion of the Erie Canal, the older methods of emigrant travel were to a considerable extent superseded. With the exception of Lake Erie, the Great Lakes were little used as emigrant highways before 1840. The first Lake Erie steamer was not built until 1818, and the first steamboat did not reach Chicago until 1832. After the War of 1812 an increasing number of Easterners went to the West by way of New Orleans and thence up the Mississippi and its branches by steamer.

72. PROBLEMS OF THE TRANS-ALLEGHENY SETTLER

PEACEABLE Indian relations, title to his land, ready money, a system of credit, and an adequate market for his produce were among the more important needs of the pioneer who settled beyond the Alleghenies. In each instance, Westerners first tried to solve their problems by appealing to the Federal government for assistance. But if the authorities in Washington failed to provide the kind of help that was desired, the Westerners were prepared to take the law in their own hands. To the frontiersman, the end justified the means, and frequently force seemed to him necessary to achieve his objectives.

Between 1815 and 1840 Indian title in practically all the territory east of the Mississippi was extinguished. For a time the ancient practice of driving the tribes toward the west prevailed. Finally, in 1825, John C. Calhoun, President Monroe's Secretary of War, worked out a different, if not entirely satisfactory, policy. "One of the greatest evils to which they are subject," he said, "is the incessant pressure of our population which forces them from seat to seat." As a remedy Calhoun urged that the Indians be given permanent homes in the Great Plains beyond Missouri. His recommendation was accepted, and during the next fifteen years the tribes were transferred to their new home, west of the new frontier.

This removal created new problems. In the Old Northwest in 1832 an attempt by the Sac and Fox tribes, under their chief Black Hawk, to regain ceded land in western Illinois and southwestern Wisconsin led to a frontier war in which the Indians were decisively defeated. In the Southwest, however, the Indians, who were protected by constitutional guarantees, were dislodged only after a strenuous contest. Here the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws had ceded large tracts of territory between 1814 and 1830, but they still retained control of 33,571,176 acres in Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Mississippi. That 50,000 "inferior" people should monopolize such extensive territory seemed preposterous to the landseeker and to the states—particularly Georgia—in which the Indians resided. For forty years the presence of these independent Indian nations within her boundaries had been considered by Georgia as a menace and an obstacle to her development. She therefore repeatedly urged that the Federal government acquire title to these lands so that they might be opened up for settlement.

A treaty, which ceded all Creek lands in Georgia, had been approved by a few Creek chiefs in 1825; but it was subsequently repudiated by the majority of the tribe as fraudulent and unrepresentative of the will of the Creek nation. After careful investigation President John Quincy Adams concluded that the Creeks were right and directed that a new treaty be negotiated. Meanwhile Georgia, in spite of the threats and remonstrances of the Federal government, insisted upon its right to survey the lands ceded under the original treaty. The ensuing controversy, in the course of which Georgia threatened to resist the authority of the national government, was adjusted when in 1826 and 1827 the Creeks signed treaties extinguishing their claims to their Georgian territory.

The contest between the state of Georgia and the Cherokees resulted in still another defeat for the Indians. By a revision of their tribal constitution in 1827 the Cherokees revealed their determination to remain a sovereign community within the boundaries of Georgia. Late in 1828 the state legislature, without treaty action or consent of the Federal government, annexed the Cherokee lands to five adjacent counties. The

statute further directed that after June 1, 1830, all laws of the Cherokee nation should be null and void and its citizens subject to the jurisdiction of the state. The tribal leaders protested to Washington, but President Adams took no action.

When Andrew Jackson became President (1829), he at once took steps to settle the difficulty. Through Secretary of War John H. Eaton the Cherokee representatives were informed that they must either "yield to the operation of those laws which Georgia claims, and has a right to extend throughout her own limits," or else settle beyond the Mississippi. This policy was substantially reiterated by Jackson in his annual messages of 1829, 1830, and 1833. Justice and humanity, he said, required that the Southwestern tribes be saved from destruction, a fate that surely awaited them if they remained islands in a white population or if they were sent "from river to river and mountain to mountain." He therefore proposed that they move west of the Mississippi, where ample territory would be set apart for them. If they chose to remain, however, they had to submit to the laws of the state in which they lived.

The Indians, however, refused to accept either of Jackson's alternatives. Moreover, in *Worcester vs. Georgia* (1832), a test case before the United States Supreme Court, Justice Marshall held that the Cherokees were still a nation within whose territory "the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with the Acts of Congress." But Georgia ignored the ruling of the Court, and Jackson is reported to have said: "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." Finally in 1835 the Cherokees yielded, and the majority moved to the West and joined their fellow tribesmen who were already settling in the territory set apart for them by Congress. From 1827 to 1837 more than a hundred Indian treaties, most of them treaties of cession, were concluded.

Of no less concern to the Westerner than the Indian question was the problem of acquiring valid title to his land. Although the Harrison Land Act of 1800 had been designed to meet the needs of all the settlers in the region, it clearly benefited those least in the need of government assistance. Taking advantage of the measure's deferred payment plan, thousands of *bona fide* settlers purchased large holdings, expecting to sell part to incoming emigrants at a profit and to keep the remainder for themselves. Speculators bought on credit immense tracts that they in turn disposed of on a credit basis. But in 1817 the government announced that it would accept payment in specie only. By 1820 more than \$21,000,000 was due the government for unpaid installments. Even before the Panic of 1819 many settlers and speculators fell behind in their payments, and in desperation they appealed to the government for relief. For a time Congress arranged time extensions, but in 1821 it passed a

general act enabling those who had not completed their payments within the prescribed time to surrender their unpaid-for land and apply any payments already made toward the cost of the land that they retained. The government also remitted all interest arrears on unpaid accounts.

While Congress was engaged in relieving the overburdened land debtor, it proceeded to abolish the credit system. By the Land Act of 1820 the public domain was to be sold in 80-acre tracts, for cash, and at a minimum price of \$1.25 per acre. Many Eastern businessmen denounced the act. Only higher land values in the West, they maintained, would keep taxes low, check the drain of population westward, and prevent higher wages in the East. Speculators, against whom the change of policy was largely directed, also objected to the new system. The settler, however, was aided by the act, for he was no longer tempted by a credit system to purchase beyond his available capital.

Many a pioneer at first bought no land at all, but simply became an unauthorized dweller, or squatter, upon government domain, hoping that Congress would at some future time legalize his action and allow him to pay for his tract at the minimum price. Nor was he disappointed, for in spite of the opposition of Eastern congressmen, seventeen special pre-emption acts were passed before 1840. The following year Congress, at the instigation of Thomas Hart Benton, enacted a general pre-emption law. By its terms the head of a family, a man over twenty-one years of age, or a widow had the right to settle on a piece of land 160 acres in extent, and to purchase it subsequently, free from competitive bids, at the minimum government price.

Like his colonial ancestor, the Western pioneer was always confronted by the problem of inadequate currency and credit. He needed money to cover the cost of the trip to the West, to make payments on his land, and to provide for himself and his family until his farm had become self-supporting. The first pioneers had little or no money except what they had borrowed from well-to-do individuals in the East or from some Eastern bank to make the initial payment on their land. They used barter or rude mediums of exchange, such as a given weight of furs, grain, or tobacco. As population increased and trade developed with the Spanish at New Orleans, some Spanish silver began to circulate on the frontier. But because of its unfavorable balance of trade with the East, the West was unable to accumulate an adequate supply of hard money. Moreover, with the outbreak of the War of 1812, trade relations with Europe were interrupted, and the West was forced to depend exclusively upon the East for manufactured goods. As a consequence, what little currency the region did possess was drained to the East to pay for these products. Western banks were forced to suspend specie payments and to issue unsecured paper currency to meet the demand for money.

When peace came in 1815, there was an unprecedented wave of

prosperity in the West. Farmers, in their eagerness for more land, mortgaged their property; prices rose steadily; and manufactured goods were imported in increasing quantities. To satisfy the demand for ready money, banks—both state and private—multiplied, and the country was flooded with paper currency unprotected by specie reserves. There was scarcely a Western state legislature that did not charter a crop of new banks; by 1818, Kentucky had fifty-nine such institutions and Ohio twenty-eight. In Janesville, Ohio, thirty kinds of paper money were circulating in 1817, not to mention the “shinplasters,” ranging in face value from three cents to two dollars, that were issued by city and village authorities, internal improvement and manufacturing companies, merchants, and tavern keepers.

In 1818 the directors of the second Bank of the United States—an institution chartered by the Federal government in 1816 and in control of most of the specie of the country—issued instructions virtually compelling state banks to redeem their notes in specie or close their doors. Western bankers, in turn, pressed their debtors. Mortgages were foreclosed, produce prices fell, and land values declined. Western farmers and merchants attributed the hard times to the second Bank of the United States. “All the flourishing cities of the West,” Thomas Hart Benton said, “are mortgaged to this money power. They may be devoured by it at any moment. They are in the jaws of the monster!” From its inception the bank had been regarded by Westerners as an undemocratic, monopolistic institution, the creature of the moneyed East. In 1816, Indiana by constitutional provision attempted to prevent the establishment within its limits of any bank not chartered by the state; two years later this example was followed by Illinois.

More vexatious to the Western settler than Indian hostility or the question of land titles or even the shortage of money and credit was the problem of an adequate market for his surplus products. As late as 1825, Western population was more than 95 per cent agricultural, and it was widely scattered. Western cities, as yet small and few in number, consumed only a small portion of the surplus grain and livestock of the Western farm. Before the opening of the Erie Canal and the era of railroading, lack of cheap transportation facilities over the Appalachians made it difficult for the Westerner to ship his surplus products to the markets of the Eastern seaboard. Although many turnpikes were built before the first quarter of the nineteenth century had passed, most of them were located in the East. Freight charges over the Cumberland Road and other improved Eastern highways were prohibitive for bulky and heavy commodities like flour and grain. The maximum price for Western wheat before 1825 appears to have been \$.75 a bushel, while the cost of transporting it overland from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia was approximately \$1.50 a bushel. Even Virginia farmers residing less than

a hundred miles from the tidewater complained in 1818 that it took "one bushel of wheat to pay the expense of carrying two to a seaport town." What was true of wheat also applied to corn and other agricultural commodities.

In an effort to overcome this handicap the farmers of western New York and northern Ohio sent their produce by water to Quebec and Montreal. Others, not so fortunately located, turned their crops into whisky or raised livestock, both of which were less expensive to market. Until about 1820 the main highways leading from the West to the East were crowded with droves of cattle and hogs on the way to market from the Ohio Valley. Kentucky, it was estimated, annually transported to the East over 100,000 hogs in this manner; other thousands were driven from the same state to the plantations of Virginia and the Carolinas. From the valley of the Ohio, too, came droves of mules and horses for the Southern planter. In the decade from 1820 to 1830, livestock valued at more than \$2,000,000 per year passed through the Saluda and Cumberland gaps to the old South.

Under such circumstances the Western farmer became an outspoken advocate of internal improvements. Through his spokesmen, both in and out of Congress, he urged the Federal government to link up the West with the East with turnpikes, canals, and railroads. Henry Clay spoke for the Westerner when in 1824 he complained that Congress had done "everything on the margin of the ocean but nothing for domestic trade; nothing for the great interior of the country."

Before 1825 the bulk of the surplus products of the West reached the markets of the East and of Europe by way of the Mississippi. Down it and its tributaries floated all kinds of craft loaded with furs, hay, flour, grain, hemp, livestock, tobacco, whisky, and lumber. In 1822, three years before the opening of the Erie Canal, it was estimated that more than \$3,000,000 worth of agricultural produce reached New Orleans from the Ohio Valley alone. Even in 1830, after the Erie Canal had been opened, approximately \$28,000,000 worth of produce from the Mississippi basin was reshipped from New Orleans to the markets of the East and the Old World.

73. FUR TRADE IN THE FAR WEST

FOR almost forty years after the purchase of Louisiana, the fur trade was the most important business west of the Mississippi. The pioneer farmer could still find an abundance of good land east of the river, whereas the mineral treasures of the distant mountains were as yet undisclosed. What population the region possessed made its living from

the forest or the plain. It was, moreover, the trader and trapper, more often than the official explorer, who first found and established the principal avenues over which commerce and migration subsequently moved. Even Lewis and Clark in their journey up the Missouri sometimes met the descending pirogues of trappers and hunters loaded with furs.

St. Louis was the center of the fur trade. Situated on the Mississippi just below the mouth of the Missouri, it stood midway between the hunting grounds of the West and the markets of the East. Its warehouses and mercantile establishments equipped traders and trappers for their journeys into the wilderness. In spring and fall its wharves were crowded with all manner of craft engaged in the fur industry: the keelboat of the licensed trader, laden with gewgaws and other articles for traffic with the Indians; the mackinaw, or flatbottom scow, freighted with beaver and buffalo skins; and the dugout canoe of the free trapper who had paddled in with his season's accumulation of furs, tallow, and buffalo meat. From this market the valuable packs were sent down the Mississippi to the fur merchants at New Orleans, and then by sea to the East or Europe.

Before the close of the first quarter of the nineteenth century the bulk of the fur trade was controlled by a few powerful companies. As early as 1670 the Hudson's Bay Company secured a monopoly of the trade of the Hudson Bay region. Following the French and Indian War the old French trade of the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and beyond fell into the hands of a small group of Scotch merchants of Montreal, who in 1783 organized the Northwest Company. A third concern, the Mackinaw Company operated mainly in what are now the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin.

In the United States the appearance of such companies was somewhat delayed, and it was not until 1809 that a group of St. Louis traders headed by William Clark and Manuel Lisa organized the St. Louis Missouri Fur Company. From the first it suffered from undercapitalization, mismanagement, and the hostility of both the Indians and the rival Northwest Company. After several reorganizations, it went bankrupt and ceased to exist.

In the meantime John Jacob Astor had taken active steps to obtain control of the entire fur trade of the continent. Born in 1763 of poor parents in the village of Waldorf, near Heidelberg, Germany, Astor worked in his father's butchershop until he was sixteen. Then he ran away to London and four years later came to America. Here he exchanged his small store of merchandise for furs; and returning at once to London, he disposed of them at a profit. With this success he entered the fur business, and by the end of the century he had amassed about a

quarter of a million dollars and was regarded as America's leading entrepreneur. As soon as Astor realized that the Louisiana territory was rich in furs, he formulated plans for a gigantic commercial undertaking that was to include the monopolization of the fur trade. The key to this scheme was the creation of a transcontinental trans-Pacific trade route. A chain of posts, built at strategic points, was to extend from St. Louis to the Pacific, with its western terminus at the mouth of the Columbia. Goods for the Indian trade were to be sent from New York to St. Louis and Mackinaw, or around Cape Horn to the post on the Columbia. Furs collected at the latter point were to be conveyed in Astor's ships to Chinese ports, where they were to be traded for tea, spices, and silks and other textiles that would bring large profits in the New York market. Astor also planned to develop a coastwise trade on the Pacific. Posts east of the Rockies were to be supplied from St. Louis and were in turn to send their furs there.

To execute this plan, Astor incorporated the American Fur Company, a \$1,000,000 company chartered by the state of New York, and the Pacific Fur Company, a \$400,000 subsidiary of the American Fur Company. He then organized two expeditions to the Columbia, one by sea and the other by land. The *Tonquin*, a small vessel of some 290 tons, sailed from New York in 1810. After considerable delay it reached the mouth of the Columbia, and there in 1811 a trading post called Astoria was established. The overland expedition, headed by W. P. Hunt, left St. Louis in March, 1811, along the old Lewis and Clark route and arrived at Astoria early in 1812. During the winter of 1812 Astor's men enlarged and improved the post; launched a small schooner, christened the *Dolly* in honor of Astor's wife; and made preparations to open up the rich fur country. In May another ship, the *Beaver*, arrived from New York with clerks and other employees and an ample cargo. For almost two years the Astorians spread their trade over an area bounded by the Continental Divide on the east, the headwaters of the Willamette on the south, and Thompson River (in British Columbia) on the north. Meanwhile the War of 1812 had broken out, and the fur trade, which had been one of the chief spoils of the colonial wars, was again an issue. Astor, knowing that the Northwest Company would try to capture Astoria, asked the American government for protection for the post. In response the government prepared to send a warship to the mouth of the Columbia, but at the last moment it canceled the order. News of the war between England and America reached Astoria in January, 1813. On October 23 Duncan McDougall, temporarily in charge, sold the post and property to the Northwest Company for a fraction of their value. A week later a British naval vessel arrived, and on December 12 its captain took possession of all the territory and rechrist-

tened the post Fort George. Although Great Britain restored the post to the United States in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Ghent, Astor did not renew his enterprise on the Pacific coast.

Forced out of the Oregon country, Astor concentrated his efforts on the trade east of the Rockies. He first induced Congress to pass an act of 1816 by which foreigners were excluded from participating in the fur trade of the United States, except in subordinate capacities under American traders. As a result of this act, the Northwest Company was compelled to dispose of its interests in the United States to the American Fur Company. Then, by inducing Congress to abolish the United States's agencies in the area for trading with the Indians, Astor was able to eliminate government competition. Finally, in 1822 he established the western department of the American Fur Company, with headquarters in St. Louis. This department supervised all operations on the Missouri and the lower parts of the Mississippi and the Illinois, while a northern department had charge of the region of the Great Lakes and upper Mississippi.

Even within this more restricted area the American Fur Company was not without competition. Foremost among its rivals was the Rocky Mountain Fur Company, organized in 1822 by a group of St. Louis traders under the leadership of two former Easterners, General W. H. Ashley and Andrew Henry. In 1823, one of the younger members of this company, Jedediah S. Smith, headed an expedition that opened up the valley of the Green River and the country around Great Salt Lake. The valuable beaver catches and the prosperity of the new organization aroused the interest of Astor's company, which at once sent its agents and traders to compete for the wealth of the territory. Cutthroat competition resulted, but the company with the greater financial resources eventually triumphed. Ashley withdrew from the Rocky Mountain Fur Company in 1826, and eight years later it dissolved. It is estimated that during its short career it shipped approximately half a million dollars' worth of beaver packs to St. Louis.

It was in the field of exploration that the men of the Rocky Mountain Company achieved permanent success and contributed to the history of the West. They opened up the country drained by the sources of the Platte, Green, Yellowstone, and Snake rivers; they discovered the Great Salt, Utah, and Sevier lakes; they named the Sweetwater River, Independence Rock, Jackson Hole, and the streams flowing into the Green River and Great Salt Lake; they discovered South Pass and other routes over the mountains. "They were," in the words of H. M. Chittenden, "the first to travel from Great Salt Lake southwestwardly to southern California, the first to cross the Sierras and the deserts of Utah and Nevada between California and the Great Salt Lake, and the first, as far as is known, to travel by land up the Pacific coast from San Fran-

cisco to the Columbia.”* When the government undertook to explore the Far West, it sought the services of such men as Kit Carson and Jim Bridger, who, like the other members of the Rocky Mountain Company, knew the land and who had been instrumental in blazing new trails to the Pacific.

At the same time that the Astor interests were attempting to destroy the Rocky Mountain Company, they were successfully monopolizing the fur business in the territory between the Great Lakes and the Missouri. Here their principal opponent was the Columbia Fur Company, a young concern composed for the most part of men of French descent. Although this company was capitalized at only \$16,000, it was estimated that this competition meant an annual loss of at least \$10,000 to the American Fur Company. Finally, after considerable negotiation the Columbia Fur Company was persuaded to unite with the older concern. Lesser rivals in the field were bought off or eliminated by trickery or violence.

By 1830 the American Fur Company controlled practically all of the American trade, but large profits in fur were disappearing. Men like Astor realized that the fur yields of \$500,000 a year that were typical of the early thirties could not long be maintained. The beaver meadows were nearing exhaustion, and Astor, while on a visit to London in 1834, noted that silk was fast displacing beaver in the manufacture of hats. A few months later he retired from the fur business; the great company that he had been so instrumental in creating survived for several years, but its business steadily declined.

74. THE MIDDLE BORDER MOVES WESTWARD

WHILE fur traders were opening up the lands of the Far West, planters, farmers, ranchers, and miners were pushing the frontier line of settlement beyond the Mississippi. In the territory of Orleans—the name given by Congress in 1804 to that part of the Louisiana Purchase that lay to the south of the thirty-third parallel—planters from the older states added thousands of acres of rich cotton and sugar lands to those already held by French and Spanish settlers. Some of the newcomers also produced wheat, corn, sweet potatoes, and melons and other fruits. By 1810 the territory had more than 76,000 people, and two years later it was admitted into the Union as the state of Louisiana. Although two thirds of the new state was swamp and pine barren, its population more than doubled during the next decade.

* H. M. Chittenden: *The American Fur Trade of the Far West* (New York: J. P. Harper, 1902), Vol. I, p. 306.

To the north, immigrants from the older settled regions and from Europe flocked into Missouri. The west bank of the Mississippi and both sides of the Missouri were soon dotted with the plantations of pioneers from the Old South, Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Gulf states. Mingled with the slaveholders were hundreds of small farmers, many of whom were also Southerners. Others from the Northeastern states and western Virginia came by way of the Ohio. Germans from Pennsylvania and the valley of the Rhine also entered the region.

The mineral resources of the territory attracted a considerable number of immigrants. In the vicinity of the sources of the Big and St. Francis rivers lay a valuable mineral region three thousand square miles in extent, rich in lead and containing in addition silver, zinc, iron, black manganese, alum, and saltpeter. By 1820, more than a thousand men were employed in the lead mining industry, which in many respects rivaled the fur trade in importance. Numerous salt works also did a profitable business and furnished many persons with employment.

The population of the territory increased during the eight years preceding 1818 from twenty thousand to more than sixty thousand. St. Louis was no longer a frontier post, but an important commercial center of nearly four thousand people; smaller towns on either bank of the Missouri were growing rapidly. Already ambitious leaders like General W. H. Ashley had organized a movement for statehood, and in 1818, Congress was asked to divide the territory into two parts, the upper to be admitted as the state of Missouri and the lower to be organized as Arkansas Territory. This petition resulted in the famous Missouri Compromise, by which Maine was admitted as a free state and Missouri as a slave state.*

Arkansas, to the south of Missouri, long remained a frontier region. Settlement of the territory was retarded by the malarial swamps fringing the west bank of the Mississippi and by the uncertainty of title to the soil, occasioned by Spanish grants that had not yet been passed upon by the government of the United States. According to the census of 1810 its population numbered only 1,062. During the next ten years, however, the number of inhabitants multiplied to more than 14,000, an increase of more than 12,000 persons for the decade. New settlers continued to arrive, and between 1830 and 1835 the region's population more than doubled. To the rich alluvial valleys of the White, Washita, Arkansas rivers, and to the bottom lands of the Red River—all well adapted to the cultivation of tobacco, corn, and cotton—came slaveholding planters from the east. A lesser number of small farmers and grazers pushed into the hill country only to be crowded out by the planters; for a semi-tropical climate, abundant rainfall, a comparatively inexhaustible soil, and navigable rivers predestined the territory to be part of the planting

* See below pp. 355-6.

kingdom. From the outset representatives of the planting class dominated the government, and largely through their efforts the territory was admitted as a slave state in 1836.

Though lying east of the Mississippi, the broad expanse later included in the states of Michigan and Wisconsin was in reality an integral part of the Middle Border. Before 1805, when the lower peninsula of Michigan was cut off from Indiana and organized as a separate territory, practically the only white men in Michigan were French-Canadians who occupied the trading post of Detroit and the surrounding country. For a time the hostile attitude of the Indians and the War of 1812 effectually checked all efforts at settlement. By 1818, however, the war was over and the Federal government had concluded the first of a series of treaties extinguishing all Indian land titles in the Lower Peninsula. Many Easterners—particularly New Englanders and New Yorkers—seized the opportunity to obtain cheap and fertile government land and moved into the territory. By 1819 the population was sufficiently large to enable the territory to send a delegate to Congress. In less than half a dozen years the southern tier of counties was transformed into a miniature New England with its township system and its social and religious institutions. The opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 further stimulated settlement, and when the census of 1830 was taken, important settlements had already been planted in the Saginaw Valley. Even the Indian outbreaks, the cholera epidemics, and the activities of land speculators in the early 1830's failed to retard the movement into the territory. Settlers returning to the East for business or personal reasons praised the territory as a place for settlement. Letters from Michigan pioneers, which were often published in Eastern newspapers, attracted many home-seekers. The excellent soil, abundant timber, good mill sites, and easy means of transportation were advertised widely in the thousands of handbills circulated by land speculators. After 1830 English, Irish, Scotch, and German immigrants also settled in Michigan.

Michigan's rapid growth soon led to a movement for statehood. Accustomed to self-government in the localities from which they came, the majority of the people saw no reason why they should continue to be ruled by Washington. To farmers and businessmen alike, statehood also meant the opportunity to obtain canals and other internal improvements. In 1832 the question of forming a state government was submitted to popular referendum and carried by a large majority. Three years later a state constitution was drafted and approved; but a boundary dispute with Ohio caused Congress to postpone admission, and for two years Michigan occupied the anomalous position of not being in the Union but of exercising sovereign powers within the limits of Federal jurisdiction. After months of dickering, Congress agreed to admit the state if it would accept the region known as the Upper Peninsula in

lieu of the territory in dispute with Ohio. Ignorant of the fact that the Upper Peninsula contained rich copper and iron deposits, the state, through a convention at Ann Arbor in September, 1836, rejected the proposal. After the delegates had returned home, a small unauthorized group of men convened at Ann Arbor in December, 1836, and voted to accept the terms of Congress. Congress, without examining the credentials of the committee, admitted Michigan on January 26, 1837.

The territory of Wisconsin grew even more rapidly than Michigan. For nearly two centuries French explorers, missionaries, and trappers were the only white men in the region. During the French and Indian War, Wisconsin *habitants* and *voyageurs* with their Indian allies willingly sacrificed themselves for a losing cause. Even after the Union Jack had been raised over the territory, the Indians, led by Pontiac, struggled to overthrow British dominion. When in 1816 American troops took possession of Wisconsin, the country was still French in form and in spirit. The first Americans to migrate to the territory were fur traders, who competed with the British for the control of the fur industry. They were followed by emigrants from Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, who were attracted to the territory by its mining possibilities. As early as 1811 it was reported that the Indians in what is now southwestern Wisconsin had "mostly abandoned the chase, except to furnish themselves with meat, and turned their attention to the manufacture of lead." In 1810 the Indians in this region smelted 400,000 pounds of metal, exchanging most of it for goods from American and Canadian traders. Twelve years later, accounts of the richness of the lead mines along the upper Mississippi appeared in St. Louis papers. Men came on foot, by boat, and on horseback, and by 1827 some Easterners and a few Europeans began to arrive. Soon southwestern Wisconsin had a population of more than 10,000, and despite the fact that most of the miners followed the crude and wasteful methods of the Indians, more than 1,000,000 pounds of lead were produced in 1828. Old Indian trails were converted into highways over which long caravans of ox-hauled ore wagons carried the product to the nearest river port for shipment to St. Louis and New Orleans, or to the lake front for shipment to Eastern markets. The industry grew so rapidly that it soon overshadowed the fur trade, and for a time Wisconsin ranked as one of the leading mining sections of the country. The rush to the Pacific coast gold fields in 1849, however, coupled with unfavorable tariff legislation and with inadequate transportation facilities, led to its decline.

The white settlers ruthlessly swept aside the Indian miners. Squatters often ignored Indian titles and enriched themselves at the natives' expense. These acts and other irritating incidents angered the Indians and led to frequent disorders that culminated in the Black Hawk War. Black

Hawk, a Sac and Fox leader, opposed the treaties that ceded the tribal lands, and he refused to move from his home near the cemetery of his tribe. But in 1832, American troops almost annihilated a band of his warriors at Bad Axe and made Black Hawk a prisoner. Few patriot leaders of any nation have voiced their sentiments more eloquently than did Black Hawk when he said: "I loved my village, my cornfields, and my people. I fought for them."

The Black Hawk War advertised the broad valleys and the fertile prairies of Wisconsin and extinguished the old impression that it was a second Dismal Swamp. Farmers' sons, numerous among the volunteers who fought against the Indians, mentally staked out claims along the line of march. In the East, publishers sold thousands of guidebooks and pamphlets purporting to describe the natural attractions of the territory. Emigrants from New England and New York soon moved into the region. Thousands came from the Middle states by way of the Ohio, while others, dissatisfied with their locations in the older communities of the Northwest, came by the Mississippi or overland by prairie schooner. Nearly a decade later streams of Old World immigrants began to pour in; chief among these were thousands of discontented Germans. Some had gained a knowledge of the territory through books, pamphlets, and newspaper accounts published in their homeland; others were advised in America to make it their objective. "In New York," wrote a German settler of 1848, "every hotel-keeper and railroad agent, every one who was approached for advice, directed men to Wisconsin." Scandinavians, Dutch, Swiss, Irish, Poles, and Belgians soon followed in the footsteps of the Germans, and by 1848, when the territory came into the Union as a state, it had a population of well over 200,000. Even before its admission its leading towns were commercial centers; every community had its school and church, and a bill for the establishment of the University of Wisconsin was passed by the first territorial legislature in 1836.

Southwest of Wisconsin were the rolling, grass-covered prairies of Iowa, with their groves of rosewood, dogwood, wild cherry, and wild plum. Only a handful of whites had settled in the territory when the Black Hawk War occurred. But in 1832 the so-called Black Hawk purchase by the government of almost six million acres lying west of the Mississippi and north of the Des Moines precipitated the entry into that region of thousands of emigrants who had impatiently waited for the removal of the Indians. Canal boats, lake and river steamers, and long lines of prairie schooners bore New Englanders, New Yorkers, and Ohioans to the trans-Mississippi country. The vanguard rushed for the leadmining district about Dubuque, but the later arrivals soon discovered that the rich alluvial soil of the prairies was more productive of wealth.

Four years after the Black Hawk purchase the population of Iowa numbered more than 10,000. In 1838, when the population was nearly 23,000, a territorial government was organized. Emigrants continued to come, and by 1840 more than 43,000 persons had settled in the territory. When in 1846 the territory became a state, Fort Madison, Keokuk, West Point, Montrose, and Franklin were prosperous centers. Iowa City, a hundred miles west of the Mississippi, had seven general stores, twelve lawyers, and two weekly newspapers, and was the seat of the recently founded state university, Iowa City College, and a "female academy." Of all the Middle Border communities perhaps none was more characteristic of New England than Iowa, for its social, religious, and intellectual institutions resembled closely that culture with which the majority of its pioneers were acquainted.

The only other state in this region to enter the Union before the Civil War was Minnesota. The home of the Chippewa and the Sioux, Minnesota remained a wilderness throughout most of the prewar period. Like other sections of the Great Lakes country, it had been explored by French traders and missionaries, but aside from a few French posts, there were no settlements in the region until the nineteenth century. Both the Northwest Company and the American Fur Company had agents in Minnesota, but neither company was primarily interested in making permanent settlements. As late as 1837, when the native tribes ceded the large strip of territory between the St. Croix and the Mississippi, the number of whites and half-breeds living apart from the Indians was probably not more than five or six hundred, and it was not until the early 1850's that settlers—most of whom were drawn from the Middle Atlantic states—entered the region in appreciable numbers. Organized as a territory in 1849, Minnesota became a member of the Union in 1857.

75. THE FRONTIER AND AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

THE EXISTENCE of a large area of relatively cheap land to the West undoubtedly had a profound effect on the development of American civilization, but few historians have been able to agree on the exact nature of this influence. The problem was first given serious consideration in 1893, when Frederick Jackson Turner addressed the annual meeting of the American Historical Association on "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." In subsequent years, Turner attracted a large number of disciples who produced a series of monographs on the West and the interplay between the frontier and the Atlantic seaboard cultures. At the same time the work of countless other

students of the American past revealed in varying measure the influence of what has come to be known as the Turner thesis.

Turner believed that the "existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward explain American development." He argued that the Easterner or immigrant settling in the West was so shaped by his environment as to become the first truly American individual—a man almost uniquely individualistic, opportunistic, nationalistic, and democratic. Furthermore, the frontier, with its undeniable economic opportunities, functioned as a "safety valve" by providing an escape for underprivileged Easterners. It also weakened America's ties with Europe, created a distinct American nationality, spawned American democracy, furthered the territorial expansion of the United States, and served as the seedbed of American radicalism.

The enormous scope of the Turner thesis is both its most appealing feature and its most serious defect. Turner seldom backed up his general statements with adequate factual material, and he frequently neglected to define key words. He never made exactly clear what he meant by frontier, and his failure to specify to which of the numerous American frontiers he was referring often weakened his analysis. For example, in his discussion of the frontier and democracy, he could hardly have been alluding to the Southern frontier's devotion to the slave system. Nor did he ever define democracy, which at times seemed to him to mean little more than a kind of devil-take-the-hindmost squatter sovereignty. Moreover, in all his references to democracy, Turner overlooked the numerous democratic advances that originated in the East and the important European contributions to the American democratic tradition. In his discussion of the development of American nationality, he again ignored the effect of European culture on American civilization. Furthermore, it is possible to question whether the occupant of an isolated shack in Ohio in 1800 was any more American than a Rhode Island farmer or a Philadelphia mechanic in the same year. Similar criticisms apply to Turner's contention that radical movements originated in the West. Many of the major reforms of the pre-Civil War period were first espoused by Easterners who in turn were heavily indebted to the experiences of various European countries.

Turner was probably at his weakest in his discussions of the frontier origins of American individualism. It undoubtedly required individualism of a high order to establish a home in the wilderness, but in many respects it was equally individualistic for an Easterner—or an Englishman, for that matter—to risk his wealth on a new business enterprise, to espouse an unpopular reform, or to invent and apply a labor-saving device. Americans, East and West, were individualistic—a fact that can probably best be explained by the nation's expanding economy.

Turner's insistence on frontier individualism conflicted with his theory that the Westerners strengthened the power of the central government by their insistent—and often successful—demands for cheap land, improved transportation facilities, elimination of the Indians, and favorable currency policies. If the Westerners ran to Washington with their most pressing problems—as they most certainly did—it seems reasonable to conclude that they were individualists only when it suited their convenience. In this respect they were not unlike Eastern manufacturers lobbying for higher tariffs or Eastern shippers seeking subsidies for the American merchant marine.

Turner's theories about the influence of the frontier upon expansion, isolation, and discontent in the East have been modified, but not disproved, by subsequent historical research. Abundant evidence exists of the Westerner's desire for continental expansion and of his ability to create incidents that helped to make expansion a possibility.* There is also little doubt that the farther a pioneer lived from the seaboard, the less was his dependence on Europe. Before the development of a national network of railroads, inadequate transportation facilities often weakened, if they did not entirely eliminate, Europe's influence on the daily life and thoughts of the frontiersman. And finally, although the theory that the frontier was a safety valve for discontent in the East has undergone frequent revisions since 1893, its main point still appears valid. Some of Turner's earlier students, it is true, argued that the West drew off underprivileged urban workers, but further research has demonstrated that the city poor were prevented from moving West by the cost of the trip and that most emigrants were farmers. Nevertheless, the farmers who went West did not go to the city to increase economic pressures on those who were already there, and to this extent the frontier was of real importance as a safety valve.

Perhaps the most serious deficiency of Turner's approach was his failure to emphasize the numerous ways in which the West resembled the East. Interested only in contrasts, he ignored the many points that the two sections had in common. The Southern frontier corresponded to the Old South in several essentials, and the institutions of many communities in the Great Lakes region closely approximated those of the New England towns from which most of their settlers had been drawn. A review of Western cultural facilities often gives the impression that the pioneers wished above all else to emulate the Eastern settlements that they had recently left.

In the number and excellence of its schools, for instance, the West

* It would probably be impossible to prove any connection between the existence of the frontier and overseas expansion, although many historians have seen a relationship between the passing of the frontier and the overseas imperialism of the 1890's.

trailed the East in its accomplishments, but not in its aspirations. The Western commonwealths had a definite ideal of statewide democratic education. Ohio's first constitution in 1802 forbade the passage of any law depriving the poor of equal rights in any educational institution endowed in whole or in part by funds derived from government land grants, and Indiana's first constitution required the legislature to provide for "a general system of education, ascending in a regular gradation from township schools to a state university, where tuition shall be gratis and equally open to all." In Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee bitter struggles extending over a quarter of a century were waged between the advocates and opponents of tax-supported common schools.

Although a shortage of funds made it impossible for frontier communities to provide educational opportunities equal to those of the East, the West as early as 1825 had numerous academies, seminaries, colleges, and embryonic universities. Of the sixty-odd institutions of higher learning in the entire country in 1830, twenty-eight were west of the Alleghenies. They had a total student enrollment of approximately fourteen hundred. Many were planted by religious denominations and nearly all were handicapped by lack of money and proper equipment. Transylvania University at Lexington, Kentucky, was extremely influential in shaping the culture of the frontier. It was founded as a seminary in 1783 and became nominally a university in 1798-9, but for another two decades it was not much more than a grammar school. In 1818, however, Horace Holley, a Boston Unitarian clergyman and a graduate of Yale, came to Kentucky to make Transylvania the leading center of higher education in the West. His ambition was fully realized, and when he resigned in 1827, the university had a college of liberal arts and schools of law and medicine, a student body of more than four hundred, and numbered among its staff some of the most eminent teachers and scholars of America. Miami University at Oxford, Ohio, was probably the second most influential institution of higher learning west of the Alleghenies before 1840.

Despite limited opportunities, Westerners also displayed a remarkable interest in the printed word. By 1840, 385 printing establishments were in operation beyond the Alleghenies. Many of the presses turned out pamphlets and books as well as newspapers, and by 1840 they had printed probably half a million bound volumes. Most of the pamphlets and newspapers dealt in political or religious controversy. With the exception of newspapers, however, schoolbooks outnumbered all other Western publications. For a time the West depended upon the East for its texts, but by 1825 it was supplying a large part of its own spellers, primers, geographies, and grammars.

The first Western newspaper, *The Kentucky Gazette*, founded in 1787, was, like many of the other pioneer newspapers, a very meager

sheet. By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, however, the trans-Allegheny newspapers had both multiplied in number and improved in quality. Of the 598 newspapers published in the United States in 1824, the Postmaster General credited Ohio with 48, Kentucky with 18, Tennessee with 15, Indiana with 12, and Illinois with 5. Western periodicals and magazines, though numerous, were frequently short-lived. Nearly all were religious or literary in character, although a few journals of law, medicine, and agriculture were printed in limited numbers.

The West also had several novelists. One of the outstanding Western writers of short narratives was James Hall. In his *Legends of the West* and *Tales of the Border*, he, perhaps more than any other Western author, gave an accurate portrayal of Western life and civilization. Timothy Flint, famous for his contributions to the literature of travel and observation, was perhaps the leading novelist of the West before 1830. Neither his *Francis Berrian* nor his later novels, however, compare with his *Recollections* or his *Geography* as sources of information concerning Western life.

Even the drama was not neglected by the West. Before the end of the eighteenth century, amateur theatricals were being presented in Kentucky. Cincinnati opened its first theater in 1801, and the frontier towns of Louisville, St. Louis, and Detroit soon followed suit. Before 1830, professional companies were touring the Western towns, and, although most of the actors who appeared in the Western companies were obscure, many prominent professionals from the East and from England visited the West.

Religion played a very pervasive role in Western as well as Eastern society. Long before the voice of the political spellbinder was heard beyond the mountains, pioneer preachers had penetrated into the wilderness, where in rude log churches or camp meetings they moved souls to new endeavor by their warnings of the eternal damnation and everlasting hell fire that awaited the ungodly. Travelers journeying to the West during the first quarter of the nineteenth century were impressed with the number of religious sects with which they came in contact. Timothy Flint, for example, observed in 1814 that "a circulating phalanx of Methodists, Baptists, and Cumberland Presbyterians, of Atlantic missionaries, and of young élèves of the Catholic theological seminaries, from the redundant mass of unoccupied ministers, both in the Protestant and Catholic countries, pervades this great valley." Of the religious organizations in the West the Methodists, Baptists, and to some extent the Disciples of Christ and the Presbyterians were most active.

A survey of trans-Allegheny civilization during the early years of the nineteenth century indicates that the West lagged behind the East; this difference is one of degree rather than of kind. Of course, as various

new areas were settled, regional differences emerged, but these could not necessarily be attributed to the frontier. On the other hand, it would be foolish to maintain that there was no difference between the frontier and the seaboard, for one was an essentially primitive society, whereas the other was relatively civilized. Still, with the passing years the West came more and more to resemble the East; and, since every part of the United States was at one time in its history a frontier, there seems little ground for assuming that this experience left a deeper impress upon one section than upon another.

In all likelihood the most important effects of the West upon the course of American history were economic and political. A vast region of farms and plantations, the West made agriculture along the seaboard unprofitable, provided industry with raw materials, gave businessmen a larger market for their manufactured goods and surplus capital, increased the amount of American exports, and stimulated the construction of new transportation facilities. At the same time, the addition of Western states to the Union upset the old sectional alliances and was more responsible than any other factor for the emergence of new political parties.

CHAPTER XIII

NATIONALISM AND SECTIONALISM

- 76. A NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY
 - 77. JOHN MARSHALL, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE AMERICAN UNION
 - 78. ERA OF GOOD AND BAD FEELINGS
 - 79. THE TARIFF ISSUE
 - 80. EMERGENCE OF NEW PARTIES
-

THE HISTORY of the United States from the end of the War of 1812 to Andrew Jackson's election to the presidency in 1828 provides a study in contrasts. On the one hand, the conduct of American foreign policy, the judicial decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall, and many of the proposals put forward by Presidents James Monroe (1817-25) and John Quincy Adams (1825-9) indicate a highly developed spirit of nationalism. On the other hand, Congress's attitude toward the tariff, internal improvements, and the admission of new states to the Union reveals the remarkable strength of sectional loyalties in the United States. For a brief period after the war nationalism appeared to have carried the day, but its triumph was more apparent than real, and by the 1820's sectional interests were everywhere in the ascendancy. These developments, in turn, were largely responsible for the destruction of the Federalist and Republican parties and the emergence of new political organizations that more accurately reflected the temper of the times.

76. A NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

THE AFTERMATH of the War of 1812 provided the United States with the opportunity to liquidate most of its outstanding disputes with the nations of the Old World. Europe needed time to recover from more than two decades of revolution and war, and its people had no desire to embark on new adventures in America. Consequently, within a short time American diplomats had succeeded in settling their differences with the British on the Canadian-American border, in forcing Spain to relinquish control over East Florida, and in formulating a doctrine that warned Europe against attempting to interfere in the affairs of the Western hemisphere. Before the war, American foreign policy had been forced to conform to the dictates of European power politics; after the war the United States was able to pursue a course that was conditioned as much by events in America as by developments abroad.

In the period that immediately followed the Treaty of Ghent, the United States and Great Britain were able to resolve a number of potentially dangerous diplomatic disputes to the satisfaction of both nations. When the war ended, each country had rather sizable naval forces on the Great Lakes, and there was always the possibility that an incident between the two fleets might lead to a major conflict. To prevent such a development both countries in 1817 accepted the Rush-Bagot Agreement, which provided for the demilitarization of the Great Lakes. The Rush-Bagot Agreement was followed by the Convention of 1818, which settled the fisheries and boundary questions. Under the terms of this convention, American fishing rights in Canadian waters were restricted, but not altogether prohibited. At the same time the northern boundary of the Louisiana Purchase was fixed to run along the forty-ninth parallel from the Lake of the Woods to the Rocky Mountains. The Oregon country, to which both nations laid claim was placed under joint occupation for a ten-year period.

While American diplomats were successfully concluding their negotiations with the British, expansionists were demanding that the United States take advantage of Spain's misfortunes in both the New and Old Worlds by seizing East Florida. Between 1814 and 1819 there were renewed American complaints concerning Indian raids, smuggling, and the escape of Negro slaves; but Spain, rocked by disturbances at home and open rebellion in South America, was unable to control the inhabitants of Florida. Matters came to a head late in 1817, when, as a result of fresh Indian raids, a punitive expedition under General Andrew


Jackson entered Florida. Jackson captured St. Marks and Pensacola, hung two British subjects, Alexander Arbuthnot and Robert Ambrister, who were charged with complicity in the Indian attacks, and virtually established American sovereignty over the entire northern part of the Spanish province.

Jackson's invasion of Florida threatened to disrupt the United States's relations with both Great Britain and Spain. The British, however, withdrew their protests after it had been made clear that Arbuthnot and Ambrister had been engaged in illegal activities in Florida; but the dispute with Spain was not settled until 1819. Jackson returned in triumph to Tennessee, and in every section Americans greeted the news of his exploits with unrestrained enthusiasm. But Jackson had numerous enemies in the Monroe Administration, and for some time it seemed likely that the government would disavow him. It was only after a prolonged debate that Congress rejected resolutions condemning Jackson. Moreover, every member of Monroe's cabinet except Secretary of State John Quincy Adams favored the payment of reparations to Spain, and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun thought that Jackson should be censured for insubordination. But Adams, who was supported in his stand by an overwhelming majority of the American people, eventually won over his colleagues, and the United States refused either to indemnify Spain or to apologize for Jackson's foray. Instead, Adams assumed the diplomatic offensive in a note that condemned Spain for its inability to maintain law and order in Florida and demanded that Spain punish the Spanish officials in Florida and pay the United States the costs of Jackson's expedition. Adams' note was a thinly disguised ultimatum warning the Spanish that if they did not give up Florida, the United States would take it from them. With more than enough troubles both at home and in Latin America, the Spanish government had no alternative but to yield.

After some delay Spain accepted the inevitable, and in 1819 the Spanish minister at Washington signed a treaty ceding the Floridas to the United States in exchange for \$5,000,000, the sum due American citizens for damages to their commerce by Spanish authorities during the Napoleonic wars. At the same time the two powers agreed that a line extending from the mouth of the Sabine River to the thirty-second parallel, north to the Red River and along it to the 100th meridian, then north to the Arkansas River and the forty-second parallel, and from there westward to the Pacific should constitute the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase.

The years that witnessed the settlement of America's outstanding disputes with Great Britain and Spain also provided the United States with both the opportunity and necessity for working out a series of principles for the conduct of its relations with the major powers of the

Old World. These principles were set forth by President James Monroe in his annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. Known as the Monroe Doctrine, the statements on foreign policy consisted of two separate passages in the presidential message. In one part of his address Monroe expressed his opposition to further European colonization in the New World; in the other he took a stand against interference of the major powers of Europe in the recently established Latin American republics.



8. THE ACQUISITION OF FLORIDA

The Spanish territory of Florida was acquired piecemeal. It not only rounded out the territory of the United States to the Gulf of Mexico but eliminated a source of almost continual international friction.

The passage opposing colonization was directed against Russia, which at the time claimed the Northwestern coast north of the fifty-first parallel. In 1821, the Tsar had issued a ukase forbidding foreign vessels from coming within a hundred miles of Russian America. He had not only claimed authority over the high seas, but he had also revealed that Russia was intent on extending its territorial holdings in North America. Although most Americans at that time had little or no interest in the Pacific Northwest, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams was a confirmed nationalist, who was not prepared to stand by while Russia threatened what he considered American interests and rights. Accordingly, Adams protested to the Russian minister in Washington. "I told him . . . [Adams later wrote] that we should contest the right of Russia

to *any* territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume . . . the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for *any* new European colonial establishments." In his annual message of 1823, Monroe merely rephrased Adams's remarks when he said: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

Although this passage in the Monroe Doctrine was to play a significant role in the subsequent history of the United States, there is no reason to believe that it had an appreciable effect on Russian-American relations in the 1820's. In the negotiations between the United States and Russia in 1824, Russia agreed to fix its southern boundary in North America at 54°40'. But the Russian decision to withdraw above the fifty-first parallel cannot be ascribed to the warning of the American President. Harassed by domestic troubles and possessed of enough territory in Europe, Asia, and North America to take care of all its needs in the foreseeable future, the Tsar's government saw no reason for antagonizing the United States in the Pacific Northwest. Nor were the policies of other nations affected by Monroe's statement. Without exception, the European powers either ignored it or indicated that they would not abide by it if their interests otherwise dictated. The European reaction to Monroe's pronouncement on noncolonization was summed up by a French newspaper that wrote:

Mr. Monroe, who is not a sovereign, has assumed in his message the tone of a powerful monarch, whose armies and fleets are ready to march at the first signal. . . . He has prescribed to the potentates of Europe the conduct which they will observe under certain circumstances, if they do not wish to incur their own disgrace. . . . Mr. Monroe is the temporary President of a Republic situated on the east coast of North America. This republic is bounded on the south by the possessions of the King of Spain and on the North by those of the King of England. . . . By what right then would the two Americas be under its immediate sway from Hudson's Bay to Cape Horn?

The section of the Monroe Doctrine dealing with the possibility of European intervention in established American governments grew out of the United States's fear that the nations of the Old World were planning to restore to Spain her former American colonies. Following Napoleon's downfall, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France had formed a series of alliances that were designed to prevent revolution and to insure the preservation of the *status quo*. In 1821, Austrian troops suppressed uprisings in Italy; two years later French troops restored Ferdi-

nand to the throne of Spain; and there were repeated reports that the powers would soon dispatch an expeditionary force to Spanish America to reconquer Spain's lost provinces. Of the European nations, only Great Britain opposed the policies of the Quadruple and Holy Alliances; for now that the leading nations of the Continent were allied, it was impossible for England to pursue her traditional balance-of-power policy. Equally important, if Spain regained her New World territories, English merchants would lose the profitable trade that they had already built up with the new Latin American republics. To the United States the plans of the Holy Alliance appeared particularly menacing. The return of Spain to the Western hemisphere was viewed as a threat not only to American democracy but also to the territorial integrity of the United States.

In August, 1823, Robert Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, suggested to Richard Rush, the American minister in London, that Great Britain and the United States act jointly to prevent intervention by the Holy Alliance in Latin America. When Rush relayed this proposal to his government in Washington, Monroe enthusiastically endorsed it. Of the President's advisers, only Adams opposed the British plan. Feeling that there was no actual danger of European intervention in the New World, Adams thought that the United States should pursue an independent policy. Moreover, since he recognized that the British fleet would prevent the reconquest of Spanish America, he saw no reason why the United States should not make a unilateral statement. The United States could then take all the credit, while the British navy could be counted upon to do whatever work was needed to uphold the American position. Convinced by the force of Adams's logic, Monroe, in his annual message, warned the Holy Alliance to stay out of Latin America.

The political system of the allied powers [he said] is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . Therefore . . . we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have . . . acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. . . .

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the

globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers. . . .

It is not difficult to demonstrate that the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine had little or no effect on the foreign policies of the Continental powers. The members of the Holy Alliance did not intervene in Latin America; but their decision can be attributed, not to Monroe's announcement, but to their weakened condition following the Napoleonic wars and—as Adams suspected—to the power of the British fleet. Nevertheless, the Monroe Doctrine symbolized an important change in America's relationship with the Old World. Washington, John Adams, and Jefferson had voiced similar sentiments long before 1823, but it was Monroe alone who had been able to make them an accepted part of American policy. For almost a century after Monroe's declaration the United States was to concentrate on domestic and New World events and largely ignore developments in Europe. Although the Monroe Doctrine did not cause this change in policy, it signified its inception. If the War of 1812 was the second War of Independence, the Monroe Doctrine in a very real sense was a second Declaration of Independence.

77. JOHN MARSHALL, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE AMERICAN UNION

THE VIGOROUS foreign policy pursued by John Quincy Adams and James Monroe during Monroe's two terms as President was paralleled in domestic affairs by Chief Justice John Marshall's numerous decisions emphasizing the supremacy of the nation over either the states or the sections. Born on the frontier and educated at William and Mary, Marshall's early life was not unlike that of Thomas Jefferson. But there the similarity between the two men stopped. After serving as a soldier during the Revolution—he took part in the siege of Norfolk and the battles of Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, and Stony Point—Marshall opened a law practice in Richmond, Virginia, and was a member of the state legislature. Appalled by the weakness of both the Continental Congress and the Congress of the Confederation, he became an outspoken and enthusiastic Federalist. He worked for the ratification of the Constitution, voted with his fellow Federalists as a member of Congress, was one of the three American commissioners who conferred with the XYZ delegates in France, and in 1800 was appointed Secretary of State by John Adams. In February, 1801, he became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a position that he

held until his death in 1835. Long after the Federalist party had passed out of existence, Marshall continued to hand down decisions that conformed to the political and economic views of Washington and Hamilton, and he proved as determined in his opposition to Andrew Jackson in the 1830's as he had to Thomas Jefferson in the 1800's.

John Marshall without a doubt contributed more to the constitutional development of the United States than did any other individual. A forceful man with a domineering personality, he was able to influence the views of a majority of his colleagues on the Court throughout his entire term as Chief Justice. Taking a broad view of the Constitution, he made it an exceedingly flexible instrument of government that could be used to cover any development. By establishing the precedent for judicial review in *Marbury vs. Madison* and by upholding the rights of the Court whenever he felt that the occasion demanded it, Marshall almost singlehandedly made the Supreme Court a coequal branch of the government. Perhaps even more important, his rulings constantly reflected his belief that the United States was a nation rather than a collection of states and that the Federal government had certain clearly defined powers that could neither be impaired nor abrogated. Finally, Marshall's decisions are significant because they repeatedly reaffirmed the property rights of the individual. He had learned his economic theories from the founders of the Federalist party, and his rulings in a number of cases indicate that he was an exceptionally able student.

All of Marshall's decisions have an air of finality that reveal both the strength of his convictions and his deep-seated belief that he fully understood the intentions of the authors of the Constitution. Once he had made up his mind about any question, he was able to substantiate his conclusions with an argument in which each point seemed to lead logically—and even inevitably—to the next and in which his opponents were shown to have based their arguments on false hypotheses. Professor Edward Corwin has written:

His invariable quest . . . was for the axiomatic, for absolute principles, and in this inquiry he met the intellectual demands of a period whose first minds still owned the sway of the syllogism and still loved what Bacon called the "spacious liberty of generalities." In Marshall's method—as in the older syllogistic logic, whose phraseology begins to sound somewhat strange to twentieth century ears—the essential operation consisted in eliminating the "accidental" or "irrelevant" elements from the "significant" facts of a case, and then recognizing that this particular case had been foreseen and provided for in a general rule of law. Proceeding in this way Marshall was able to build up a body of thought the internal consistency of which, even when it did not convince, yet baffled the

*only sort of criticism which contemporaries were disposed to apply. Listen, for instance, to the despairing cry of John Randolph of Roanoke: "All wrong," said he of one of Marshall's opinions, "all wrong, but no man in the United States can tell why or wherein." **

Marshall made what is generally considered his most brilliant exposition of his theories on the nature of both the Constitution and the supremacy of the national government in *McCulloch vs. Maryland* (1819). The state of Maryland had taxed the notes of a branch of the second Bank of the United States. The Court had to decide whether the act of 1816 creating the bank was constitutional, and if it was, whether Maryland had the right to pass a law taxing the bank's notes. Maryland based its case on the doctrine that the Constitution was "an act of sovereign and independent states." But to Marshall nothing could be further from the truth. "The government of the Union . . .," he said in his decision, "is emphatically . . . a government of the people. In form and substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised on them, and for their benefit." They moreover, had in "express terms decided" that the "Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Nor did Marshall have any doubt that Congress under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution had the right to establish a bank. Following closely Hamilton's reasoning on the constitutionality of the first Bank of the United States, Marshall declared:

We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional. . . .

After the most deliberate consideration, it is the unanimous and decided opinion of this court, that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law made in pursuance of the Constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land. . . .

* From *John Marshall and the Constitution*, by Edward S. Corwin, Volume 16, pp. 123-4, *The Chronicles of America*. Copyright Yale University Press.

Having established the right of the Federal government to create a bank, Marshall then turned to the question of the constitutionality of the Maryland statute. After pointing out that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy" and that "the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create," Marshall concluded:

The question is, in truth, a question of supremacy; and if the right of the States to tax the means employed by the general government be conceded, the declaration that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, is empty and unmeaning declamation. . . .

The people of all the States have created the general government, and have conferred upon it the general power of taxation. The people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax their constituents; and these taxes must be uniform. But when a State taxes the operations of the government of the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures of a government created by others as well as by themselves. The difference is that which exists, and always must exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole—between the laws of a government declared to be supreme, and those of a government, which, when in opposition to those laws is not supreme. . . .

The Court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The result is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the Constitution has declared. We are unanimously of the opinion that the law passed by the legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is unconstitutional and void. . . .

Marshall's decision in *McCulloch vs. Maryland* contains his most comprehensive statement on the supremacy of the Federal government, but he emphasized the same point in a number of other rulings. In *Cohens vs. Virginia* (1821), a case that concerned the attempt of Virginia to prevent the sale of tickets for a lottery established by Congress, the Chief Justice again made clear that under the Constitution the United States was far more than a federation of states.

That the United States [he said] form for many, and for most important purposes, a single nation has yet not been denied. . . . The constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. The States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire—for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.

Four years later, in *Gibbons vs. Ogden* Marshall's broad interpretation of the Constitution's commerce clause measurably strengthened the power of the Federal government over the states. The case dealt with a grant to a syndicate by New York State of a steamship monopoly on New York waters, including trade on the Hudson between New York and New Jersey. Marshall declared the monopoly illegal on the ground that Congress's "power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several States" was "complete in itself." It was, moreover, "vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of power as are found in the Constitution of the United States." Marshall insisted, furthermore, that this transcends state lines and "may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New York and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition under consideration applies." He concluded his decision by summarizing and criticizing the constitutional views of his opponents:

*Powerful and ingenious minds, taking as postulates that the powers expressly granted to the Government of the Union are to be contracted by construction into the narrowest possible compass and that the original powers of the States are to be retained if any possible construction will retain them, may by a course of refined and metaphysical reasoning . . . explain away the Constitution of our country and leave it a magnificent structure indeed to look at, but . . . unfit for use. They may so entangle and perplex the understanding as to obscure principles which were thought quite plain, and induce doubts where, if the mind were to pursue its own course, none would be perceived. In such a case, it is peculiarly necessary to recur to safe and fundamental principles.**

Marshall was as anxious to safeguard the property rights of individuals against state action as he was to prevent the states from assuming

* Joseph Story, who was a Supreme Court justice from 1811 to 1845 and who shared Marshall's nationalist views, handed down two decisions on the supremacy of the Federal government that deserve to rank with those of Marshall. In *Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee* (1816), Story affirmed the Court's authority to reverse state court decisions in cases that involved rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In *Martin vs. Mott* (1827), Story ruled that a state had to transfer its authority over its militia to the national government when it was ordered to do so by the president.

the powers of the Federal government. The Constitution was at least in part a product of the Federalists' fear of the radical economic policies of the states, and Marshall was determined to see that the framers of the document had not done their work in vain. In *Fletcher vs. Peck* (1810) and *Dartmouth College vs. Woodward* (1819), Marshall upheld the sanctity of contract by refusing to permit states to withdraw grants that had been made to groups of individuals. In *Fletcher vs. Peck* the issue before the Court was Georgia's repeal of its land grant to the Yazoo companies. Despite the corruption that attended the grant and despite the fact that Georgia's claim to the lands in question was at best tenuous, Marshall ruled that the repeal by the Georgia legislature of its original act was contrary either to the "general principles which are common to our free institutions" or to the "particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States." In the *Dartmouth College* case, which involved New Hampshire's rescinding of a charter that had been granted to the college before the Revolution by the royal government, Marshall declared that the state had exceeded its authority, for the Constitution provides that the "Legislature of a State shall pass no act 'impairing the obligation of contracts.'"

John Marshall remained a Federalist until the day he died. His decisions on the sanctity of contracts revealed the Federalist disposition to place property rights above majority rights, and perhaps it was not accidental that the head of the least representative branch of the government should espouse these views. At the same time, he continued to uphold the Federalist concept of the Union long after the death of the party and most of its members, and his great contribution to his and our times was his insistence that the Constitution was a product of the people rather than of the states and that the powers of the Federal government were clearly superior to those of the states. The most significant feature of John Marshall's long term as Chief Justice was not that he was a nationalist, but that he was a nationalist in an age of increasing sectionalism.

78. ERA OF GOOD AND BAD FEELINGS

IN THE years immediately after the Treaty of Ghent, John Marshall's nationalist views were shared by many prominent Americans both in and out of the government. In 1815 the United States entered the so-called Era of Good Feeling, in which the old issues seemed to be dead and the party rivalries of an earlier generation disappeared completely. The Republicans took over the once-despised Hamiltonian program, and the Federalists, deprived of even their poli-

cies, sank into oblivion. In the election of 1816, the Federalists did not even bother to nominate a candidate. James Monroe, Madison's Secretary of State and the third Virginia planter in succession selected by the Republicans as their party's standard bearer, received the votes of 183 electors, while Rufus King with 34 votes was supported only by Connecticut, Massachusetts and Delaware. Four years later, in the election of 1820, all but one electoral vote was cast for Monroe.

The extent to which the Jeffersonians had been Federalized was revealed in 1816 with the adoption of bills establishing the second Bank of the United States and increasing the existing tariff rates. The bill chartering the bank was a Federalist measure in all essentials. It provided that one fifth of the new bank's \$35,000,000 capital was to be subscribed by the government and that five of its twenty-five directors were to be appointed by the president of the United States. The other twenty directors were to be elected by stockholders resident in the United States, and foreign stockholders were not allowed to vote either in person or by proxy. In the hope of forcing the state banks to resume specie payment or of driving them out of business, provision was made that all notes and deposits had to be paid in specie. The bank was prohibited from issuing notes smaller than five dollars in denomination, and the notes circulated by the bank were receivable for payments due the United States. All government receipts were to be kept in the bank or in any of the branches that it had authority to establish, unless the secretary of the treasury would at any time otherwise order. If the receipts were withdrawn, the secretary had to state his reasons to Congress at the first opportunity. Although the government subscription was payable in specie or in 5-per-cent-bearing obligations, the bank was forbidden to purchase any of the public debt. In return for an exclusive twenty-year charter the bank was to transfer, free of charge, government funds from place to place in the United States and to pay into the Federal treasury \$1,500,000. Congress was also given the power to inspect the books of the bank, and if violations were found, to compel the bank to show cause why its charter should not be forfeited.

Despite the Federalist character of the bank bill it was not passed by either a party or sectional vote. Of the seventy-one House members opposing the measure thirty-eight were Federalists and thirty-one Republicans. Henry Clay—excusing his opposition to the first bank on the ground that he had had doubts about its constitutionality, that the bank had been interested in politics, and that his state legislature had instructed him to oppose its recharter—strongly favored the new bank. John C. Calhoun, no less nationalistic at this time than Clay and still under the influence of the war psychology, also championed the bank. Daniel Webster, spokesman for Federalist New England, opposed it,

and so did John Randolph. Randolph asserted that "every man present in the House or out of it with some rare exceptions" was "either a stockholder, president, cashier, clerk or doorkeeper, runner, engraver, paper-maker or mechanic in some other way to a bank." The whole banking business, he concluded, was little more than a swindle.

The vote on the tariff of 1816, which raised the existing rates on cotton cloth, woolens, bar iron, and other commodities, also failed to reveal any clear-cut sectional or party cleavages. Although it was opposed in large measure by Eastern commercial and shipping interests, the bill received the support of representatives from all sections of the country. The new tariff was criticized by John Randolph on the ground that it would be injurious to the South; but it had been recommended to Congress in the first place by President Madison, a Virginian. Moreover, John C. Calhoun, a product of the small-farmer, backcountry region of South Carolina and an ardent nationalist, supported the manufacturers. A tariff, he argued, would "form a new and most powerful cement, far outweighing any political objections that might be urged against the system." The indomitable Southern leader, not yet converted by the plantation interests, entertained the belief, along with many of his colleagues, that the South, too, would become a manufacturing section.

The Era of Good Feeling and nationalism that was ushered in by the adoption of the bank and tariff acts was in reality an era of political confusion. The source of this confusion was in the shifting geographic bases of American politics. Party alignments in the Federalist and Jeffersonian periods had grown out of sectional and economic conflicts that were largely confined to the Eastern seaboard. But by 1816, enough states in the Old Northwest and the Old Southwest had been added to the Union to upset the original party system and to confuse the issues in the minds of both politicians and voters. The addition of these new Western states for a time upset the old balances, and until new political alliances could be worked out, American politics remained in a state of flux. The Era of Good Feeling, if viewed in this light, might better be termed a period of transition in which the original sectional pattern of politics had disappeared, but a new one had not yet been fully developed to take its place. The new element was the West, and in the years after 1816 many issues produced an East-West division of votes. Others produced a North-South division in which the Northwest joined the Northeast and the Southwest united with the Old South. Still others led parts of sections to co-operate with parts of other sections and compounded the apparent confusion.

Although the second Bank of the United States had had congressional supporters from all sections in 1816, it was not long before the rural regions of the South and West were protesting against the policies of an

institution they considered to be a grasping financial monopoly. Between 1816 and 1819, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, North Carolina, and Georgia followed the example already set by Indiana and Illinois in imposing by statute heavy taxes upon branches of the national bank. Ohio and Tennessee imposed a tax of \$50,000, and Kentucky \$60,000. In 1819, however, Chief Justice Marshall in *McCulloch vs. Maryland* held that the act chartering the bank was constitutional, and emphatically asserted that the states had no constitutional power to tax the bank's branches. This ruling was bitterly resented in the West, and in 1821 the legislature of Ohio, after reaffirming the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, passed an act practically outlawing the Bank of the United States. Kentucky was equally hostile toward the institution of the "moneyed aristocrats."

But neither Kentucky nor the other states west of the Alleghenies contented themselves with measures of opposition toward the bank. Practically every Western state took steps to relieve its debtor class; Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois, and Missouri, for instance, enacted replevin and stay laws that granted the debtor an extension of time in satisfying executions of foreclosure. "People's banks" were chartered, and the sale of land under execution to pay debts was forbidden unless it brought three fourths of the value set upon it by a board of appraisers, who were usually neighbors and themselves debtors.

The question of Federally financed internal improvements produced a set of sectional alignments different from those created by the bank issue. When President Madison recommended a number of internal improvements to Congress in 1816, his proposals were enthusiastically endorsed by nationalists, manufacturers, importers, Western farmers, speculators in Western lands and those interested in internal improvement companies. Madison's suggestions, however, were overshadowed by John C. Calhoun's proposal that the \$1,500,000 exacted from the second Bank of the United States as the price of its charter, together with the dividends on the \$7,000,000 of the bank's stock owned by the United States, should be set apart as a fund for building roads and canals. In making this proposal Calhoun said:

What can add more to the wealth, strength, and political prosperity of our country than cheapness of intercourse? It gives to the interior the advantages of the seaboard. It makes the country price, whether in the sale of raw product or in the purchase of the article to be consumed, come near to the price of the commercial town, and it benefits the seaboard by enlarging the sphere of demand. Were the pecuniary gains of the farmer or the merchant the only consideration, it might well be doubted whether a system of good

roads and canals should not be left to individual enterprise. But there are far higher motives. The strength and political prosperity of the republic are concerned. . . . Let it not . . . be forgotten . . . [that] vastness exposes us . . . to the worst of all calamities—dissension. . . . Yet good roads and canals will do much to unite us. Those who know the human heart know well how powerfully distance tends to break the sympathies of our nature. Nothing, not even differences of language, so estranges man from man. Let us bind the republic together with roads and canals.

After protracted debate the so-called Bonus Bill embodying Calhoun's ideas on the subject passed both houses of Congress by a narrow margin, but it was vetoed by Madison on the ground that it was uncon-

VOTE ON "BONUS BILL" IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FEBRUARY 8, 1817

	FOR	AGAINST
<i>New England</i>	6	34
<i>Middle States</i>	47	19
<i>South</i>	22	23
<i>West</i>	11	8
TOTAL	<u>86</u>	<u>84</u>

stitutional. The vote in both houses was sectional. New England, fearing that the West was depopulating the East and that the admission of additional agrarian states would further undermine the economic and political power of the commercial Northeast, was overwhelmingly opposed. The Middle and Western states were in favor of the measure, while the South was divided.

Further evidence of the effect of the West on sectional hostility in politics was provided by Missouri's application for admission to the Union in 1818. When the bill for statehood was reported to the House of Representatives, James Tallmadge of New York offered an amendment that forbade the further introduction of slavery into the new state and provided that all children of slaves born in the state after its admission should become free at the age of twenty-five. If the amendment carried, it would mean that most of the Louisiana Purchase territory would be closed to slavery and that slavery would be confined within the states where it already existed. It would mean, furthermore, that the South would almost at once be deprived of its equality with the North in the Senate. In the North the amendment was supported by hundreds of resolutions adopted by mass meetings and state legislatures. In the larger cities committees of correspondence were appointed to carry on a campaign against the admission of new slave states. Citing

the clause in the Constitution that reads "New states may be admitted by Congress into the Union" as proof that Congress had authority to prescribe the terms of a state's admission, Senator Rufus King of New York pointed to Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois as having been admitted under restrictions regarding slavery imposed by the Ordinance of 1787. The South declared that the amendment was a violation of the constitutional rights of the states. In reply to King, Senator William Pinkney of Maryland asserted that the Union was composed of equal states and that Congress consequently had no power to restrict Missouri's freedom of action. Thomas W. Cobb of Georgia warned that passage of the amendment would mean dissolution of the Union, and Jefferson likened the debate on the measure to a fire bell in the night. "In the gloomiest hour of the Revolutionary War," he stated, "I never had any apprehensions equal to those which I feel from this source."

Although the Missouri bill passed the House by a vote that closely followed sectional lines, it was defeated in the Senate. The question was brought up again in the new Congress of 1819-21, and a way out of the dilemma was now presented: the eastern counties of Massachusetts—now known as Maine—applied for separate statehood, with the approval of the parent state; and the Senate then proposed that both Maine and Missouri be admitted concurrently and that each be free to determine the status of slavery within its borders. Practically speaking, this solution meant that Maine was to be admitted as a free state, whereas Missouri would be slave. Since there were eleven slave and eleven nonslave states, such an arrangement would preserve the political balance. For a time the anti-slavery forces in the House were unyielding, but after six weeks of debate they agreed to a compromise proposed by Senator J. B. Thomas of Illinois. By its terms both Maine and Missouri were to be admitted without any restriction as to slavery; the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase north of the parallel 36°30', the southern boundary of Missouri, was to be forever free.

Although those who in and out of Congress debated the Missouri question emphasized slavery and constitutional questions, neither was the basic issue. Slavery at the time was neither heatedly defended nor attacked, and constitutional arguments were used as means to an end rather than as an end in themselves. The heart of the matter was the sectional struggle between the North and the South for control of the West. Political leaders from both the older sections realized that the West held the key to political power in the national government. If the Louisiana Purchase were opened to slavery, the South's chances for dominating the Federal government would be immeasurably increased. But, as it turned out, the South suffered a major defeat, for the area under the Missouri Compromise reserved for free farming was many times greater than that open to the planters.

79. THE TARIFF ISSUE

OF ALL the issues that revealed the sectional interests and divisions within the United States after 1816, none occupied a more important position than the tariff. In the Northeast, opinion was divided. The tariff was opposed by the section's shippers and merchants, but it found its most enthusiastic supporters among the rising but still small class of manufacturers. In their repeated requests for higher duties, the manufacturers were generally supported by the farmers of the Middle states and the West. Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, these agrarians had no longer been able to count on a foreign market for their grain and other products, and they hoped that the development of American industry would expand their home market. In the South, opposition to the tariff soon became almost universal. As the region turned increasingly to the production of staples, it was compelled to export to the other sections and to Europe much of what it grew and to import much of what it consumed. Under the circumstances, the Southerners could only conclude that a tariff could have no other effect than to increase the prices of practically everything that it bought either abroad or in the North.

Two years after the adoption of the tariff of 1816, the duty on all forms of manufactured iron was increased, and the duty of 25 per cent on cotton and woollens was extended to 1826 instead of being reduced to 20 per cent in 1819, as provided in the act of 1816. But Congress, not stopping with these temporary expedients, proceeded to draft a new bill containing higher rates. This bill, known as the tariff of 1820, passed the House but failed in the Senate by the margin of one vote.

VOTE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON PROPOSED TARIFF OF 1820

	FOR	AGAINST
<i>New England</i>	18	17
<i>Middle States</i>	55	1
<i>South</i>	5	49
<i>West</i>	12	10
TOTAL	90	77

Again Eastern commercial and shipping interests, believing that a high tariff would diminish their trade, refused to support the measure. Daniel Webster was their principal spokesman, and in the course of a speech in Faneuil Hall he declared:

I feel no desire to push capital into extensive manufactures faster than the general progress of our wealth and population propels it.

I am not in haste to see Sheffield and Birminghams in America. It is the true policy of government to suffer the different pursuits of society to take their own course and not to give excessive bounties or encouragements to one over another.


This time the commercial East had the backing of an almost solid South, for Southern leaders like Calhoun, who had favored protection in 1816, now opposed it. With the increased demand for their plantation products, their visions of Southern factories and Southern industrial centers had quickly vanished. Agriculture, thanks largely to the spinning jenny and the cotton gin, was too profitable to be abandoned, and to it they devoted their capital and their energy. Since two thirds of their staple products were shipped to Europe, they saw no reason why they should support a policy that was aimed at their principal customer, Great Britain, and that forced them to pay higher prices for food and clothing for their slaves. To the Southern planter the tariff question by 1820 had come to mean, as John Randolph had said, "whether you, as a planter, will consent to be taxed in order to hire another man . . . to set up a spinning jenny."

Despite the defeat of the tariff of 1820, the manufacturers and Middle states agrarians continued their campaign both in and out of Congress. With corn selling as low as 8 cents a bushel, wheat 25 cents a bushel, and flour \$1.25 a barrel, Western farmers joined forces with the Eastern protective interests, and together they flooded Congress with memorials and petitions. Henry Clay, stressing the "home market" argument, declared that Europe could not continue to consume the surplus of the American farm and that the time had therefore come to exclude European manufactures in order to strengthen the buying power of the home manufacturer. Nevertheless, bills for higher rates, introduced in the House in 1821 and 1823, were not adopted. It was not until 1824, on the eve of a presidential election, that a tariff carrying higher duties was squeezed through Congress.


VOTE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON TARIFF OF 1824

	FOR	AGAINST
<i>New England</i>	15	23
<i>Middle States</i>	60	15
<i>South</i>	1	57
<i>West</i>	31	7
TOTAL	107	102


This tariff provided increased protection for manufacturers of wool, iron, hemp, lead, glass, and cotton bagging. The duty on silk, linens, cutlery, spices, and other articles was also increased. The 25 per cent




THOMAS JEFFERSON




JOHN ADAMS




ALBERT GALLATIN



ALEXANDER HAMILTON



JAMES MADISON



JOHN MARSHALL



A FOOT RACE

Adams, Crawford, and Jackson are lined up for the presidential campaign of 1824. Clay at the right, scratching his head, is still in doubt whether or not to enter the contest.

minimum duty on cotton and woolens was increased to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent (but the increase in rates for woolens was largely nullified by a 15 per cent advance in the rates for raw wool). Hemp products, formerly on the free list, were taxed 25 per cent; and the rate on hammered iron, which was used extensively by shipbuilders, fixed at 45 cents per hundredweight in 1816 and subsequently advanced to 75 cents by special act in 1818, was now raised to 90 cents.

In the debate on the bill the same alignment of sectional forces appeared as before. New England commercial and shipping interests struggled desperately against New England manufacturers, Pennsylvania ironmasters, and Kentucky hemp growers. The South labeled the measure as specious and outrageous, "a combination of the few against the many," "of the wealthy against the poor," in reality a tax on Southern planters to protect Northern manufacturers. In reply Henry Clay, then Speaker of the House and spokesman of the protectionists, declared that "Dame Commerce" was "a flirting, flippant, noisy jade," and if the United States were governed by her fantasies it would "never put off the muslins of India and the cloths of Europe."

The tariff of 1824 soon proved unsatisfactory to the woolen manufacturers, who objected to the duty on raw wool. In 1826 the New England woolen manufacturers met in Boston and drew up a memorial to Congress setting forth their grievances and petitioning for relief. At the same time a circular, sent to every woolen manufacturer in the United States, reviewed the distressed condition of the woolen industry, suggested higher protection as a remedy, and outlined a campaign of action to be followed in order to secure such protection. This co-operative effort resulted in the passage in the House of a bill incorporating all the demands of the woolen interests. In the Senate, however, the measure was defeated by the deciding vote of a representative of the South's landed interests, John C. Calhoun, then Vice-President.

The protectionists now redoubled their efforts. In response to an invitation of the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Manufactures and Mechanic Arts, representatives of manufacturing concerns and interested politicians met at Harrisburg in the summer of 1827. This convention, attended by one hundred delegates from thirteen of the twenty-four states, outlined a plan for increased protection. High duties were recommended not only for wool and woolens but for such articles as iron, flax, hemp, cotton, and glass. On woolens, in which the delegates to the convention were particularly interested, they proposed an *ad valorem* rate of 40 per cent to be gradually increased to 50 per cent with a scale of minimum valuations ranging from \$.50 to \$6 a yard. Imported raw wool costing less than 8 cents, they suggested, should be admitted free, but wool costing more should be taxed at \$.20 a pound, with an annual addition of \$.02 a pound until the tax reached \$.50 a pound.

These recommendations were embodied in a memorial to Congress and in an address to the people.

Meanwhile ecstasy in the South turned to fear and anxiety.

We thought it hard enough [said Dr. Thomas Cooper, President of the College of South Carolina] to have to combat the tariff in favor of the cotton manufacturer, the woolen manufacturer, the iron manufacturer; but now there is not a petty manufacturer in the Union, from the owner of a spinning factory to the maker of a hob-nail, who is not pressing forward to the plunder; who may not be expected to worry Congress for permission to put his hand into the planter's pocket. . . . This is a combined attack of the whole manufacturing interest. The avowed object is to tax us for their own emolument; to force us to cease to buy of our most valuable customers; to force on us a system which will sacrifice the South to the North, which will convert us into colonies and tributaries.

In various sections of South Carolina resolutions were passed denying the constitutional right of Congress to enact a protective tariff. The landed interest of the South was becoming more bitter and more determined. In the North the once powerful voice of the commercial and shipping aristocracy was already growing weaker; the capital and energy of the East had steadily, and from 1824 to 1827 even rapidly, shifted from ship to factory. On the South, therefore, fell the brunt of the battle in the struggle against the "new rich."

80. EMERGENCE OF NEW PARTIES

THE SHIFTING pattern of sectional interests was directly responsible for the disintegration of the old parties and the establishment of new ones. Because no single section could by itself control the central government, parties had to be worked out on the basis of intersectional alliances; but such alliances presented difficulties because no two sections were in agreement on all the major issues of the day. Nevertheless, by the midtwenties, a number of political leaders had worked out plans for the establishment of a successful party. John C. Calhoun, as the leader of the Old South, hoped to unite the voters of his region with those of the Southwest. Henry Clay was seeking to form an alliance between the more prosperous farmers of the West and the industrial elements of the Northeast. Martin Van Buren of New York, the most important politician of the Middle Atlantic states, thought that a Northeast-Southeast combination would prove successful. Only Daniel Webster, a throwback to Federalism, could find no section with which to ally his New England supporters.

The new parties that eventually emerged with the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 were built on the wrecks of their predecessors. The first of the old parties to disappear was the Federalist. The Federalists were particularly hardhit by the rise of the West to political prominence, for not one of its planks had ever been designed to appeal to the voters of the backcountry regions. In addition, the Federalists faced certain other insurmountable obstacles. The party was identified with the New England opposition to the War of 1812 and the disastrous Hartford Convention. Most important of all, as the Republicans had adopted virtually every part of their program, the Federalists were deprived of even a platform on which they could base their opposition. Although small pockets of Federalist voters remained in various sections of the country, the party had ceased to influence national politics by 1820.

The Republican party was equally affected by the development of new sectional alignments. Despite the Republican landslide of 1820, the party in reality was little more than a collection of factions, each of which drew its strength from a particular section. Although this factionalism was largely submerged during the Era of Good Feeling, it came to the surface in the election of 1824. As in the past, the congressional caucus of the Republican party nominated the party's candidate for the presidency. But because William Crawford, the choice of the caucus, was a Southerner, he satisfied neither the ambitions nor the interests of the voters in the other sections of the country. To overcome this difficulty the Northeast and West put forward their favorite candidates through the resolutions passed by the various state legislatures. In this fashion the Tennessee legislature nominated Andrew Jackson; Kentucky selected Henry Clay; and Massachusetts named John Quincy Adams. Although all four candidates were nominally Republicans, in actuality they represented sectional rather than party interests. Because no candidate had been able to pick up a sufficient number of votes outside his own section, none received the necessary majority in the Electoral College. Jackson, high man with ninety-nine votes, had drawn his strength from both the West and the South. Adams's eighty-four votes came largely from the Northeast, while Crawford with forty-one votes was a candidate of the Old South. Clay, who ran a poor fourth, had lost out all along the line because of his attempt to cut across sectional lines. Although Clay received considerable support in the Ohio Valley, he trailed each of the other candidates in their respective sections.

The failure of any candidate to achieve a majority threw the election into the House, where Clay directed his followers to vote for Adams. The union of the Clay and Adams forces insured the New Englander's election; and when Adams made Clay Secretary of State, the Jacksonians immediately accused the two men of a "corrupt bargain." Although they were unable to substantiate their charge, the followers of Jackson

nevertheless insisted that Clay had supported Adams in the House in return for a promise that he would be given the top cabinet post.

John Quincy Adams, the son of John Adams, devoted most of his life to the service of his country. At fourteen he was secretary to the United States minister to Russia and at twenty-seven he was a diplomat in his own right. In 1808, after serving five years in the Senate, he resigned because of the Massachusetts legislature's opposition to the embargo. In 1809, having shifted from the Federalist to Republican party, he was named minister to Russia. Five years later he was a member of the American peace commission at Ghent, and in 1815 he was made the United States representative in London. From 1817 to 1825, he compiled an outstanding record as Secretary of State. A widely read, scholarly man, Adams, like his father, possessed a rock-ribbed conscience and a cold demeanor. Although a more skillful politician than the first Adams, he was still no match for his opponents during his term as President.

With Adams's accession to the presidency, the new party alignments began to take definite shape. Adams, a man of undoubted integrity, made no move during his administration to win over the voters in those sections that had supported his rivals in the election of 1824. Instead he preached and sought to practice a policy of nationalism that had little appeal to the mass of Southerners and Westerners. In his first annual message Adams advocated that the Federal government encourage manufacturing and agriculture, construct additional highways and canals, improve the nation's harbors, strengthen the militia and navy, and establish a national university, military schools, and an observatory. Adams' policies represented the wishes of most New Englanders and of those voters in the Ohio Valley who supported Henry Clay. Although Adams's personality was altogether unlike that of Clay, who was a warm-hearted, friendly extrovert, the two men shared a common political program. Clay, who had served in the House since 1811, and who despite repeated efforts was destined to be a president-maker rather than a president, based his hopes for political success on his so-called American System. Calling for internal improvements and a high tariff, the American System was designed to appeal to the interests of the Middle West and Northeast. When Adams joined forces with Clay and to a large extent made the American System the Administration's program, he was in effect laying the groundwork for an all-Northern political organization that soon became known as the National Republican party. Despite its sectional character, the National Republican party was opposed by many Northerners who felt that its principal objective was to benefit the region's upper classes.

To Southerners, Adams's policies meant only an increase in taxes to provide funds that would be spent to benefit other sections. At the same

time most Westerners viewed Adams's program as a device for aiding the already powerful business interests of the Northeast. Although these opposition groups represented a majority of the nation's voters, they were powerless as long as they remained unorganized; but Andrew Jackson's supporters now conducted a vigorous campaign to place their leader at the head of these anti-Adams forces. Their numbers were increased by the addition of Calhoun's backers when Calhoun was promised the vice-presidency on the Jackson ticket for 1828. The system of intersectional alliances was finally completed when Martin Van Buren's followers joined the Jackson camp. It was these three groups—Western Jacksonians, Southern supporters of Calhoun, and Van Buren's New York State machine (which was known as the Albany Regency) that formed the nucleus of what was soon to be known as the Democratic party.

Although Adams's reputation rested largely on his proven ability in diplomacy, his most important venture in foreign policy as President redounded to the benefit of his opponents. In 1825 the United States was invited to send delegates to Panama to attend a Latin-American congress organized by Simón Bolívar to discuss ways to force Spain to recognize her former colonies in the New World. Adams opposed the idea on the ground that it might involve the United States in attempts to secure the independence of Puerto Rico and Cuba; but Clay, who considered himself an authority on Latin-American affairs, thought otherwise, and he eventually convinced the President. On December 26, 1825, Adams asked the Senate to confirm the nominations of two delegates to attend the Panama conference. The critics of the Administration immediately turned the question into a partisan issue and made it an excuse for attacking the President's conduct of American foreign policy. In addition, the confirmation of the appointments was so delayed that the American delegates did not arrive in Panama until after the congress had ended. What was even more important, the opposition groups had succeeded in embarrassing the President over what otherwise would have been a routine matter.

Throughout Adams's entire administration the "corrupt bargain" provided the friends of Jackson with their most effective campaign weapon. By harping on this theme, they were able to convey the impression that Jackson, the choice of the majority, had been cheated out of the presidency by a minority candidate of upper-class background. It was then only a short step to the assertion that Jackson was a man of the masses who was responsive to the popular will, whereas Adams was pictured as the representative of a small but powerful moneyed group. Although Jackson in many respects was as much of an aristocrat as Adams, he was viewed in the popular mind as the champion of the rising spirit of democracy. By making Jackson's name virtually identical

with majority rule, his supporters were able to make a particularly effective appeal to the relatively large number of recently enfranchised voters in both the new and old states.

Because the groups supporting Jackson represented such diverse economic and sectional interests, there was no single issue on which they could all agree. They were united in their opposition to Adams, but otherwise they had little in common. To win, Jackson had to capture the votes of both the West and the South. The Southerners distrusted Jackson's apparent democratic radicalism and would support him only because he was running against Adams, but the Westerners approved of Jackson for the very reasons that the planters distrusted him. As the champion of the less privileged groups and the opponent of aristocracy, he was viewed by many Westerners as their section's ideal candidate.

The Jacksonian supporters completed their preparations for the election with the tariff of 1828—a tariff measure that they hoped would fail to be adopted and that John Randolph accurately described as referring “to manufactures of no sort or kind, but the manufacture of a President of the United States.” An excessively high tariff on raw materials as well as on manufactured goods, so ran the scheme, would appeal strongly to protectionists both in the Middle states and in the West and would have their support.* It was confidently expected, on the other hand, that New England manufacturers, consumers of large quantities of raw material, would oppose such a tariff and join with the South in defeating it. Thus the South would be relieved, Adams and Clay would be discredited, Northern Democrats, under the leadership of Martin Van Buren and Silas Wright, could triumphantly pose as the champions of the American System, and the election of Jackson would be practically assured. Much to the chagrin and disappointment of its authors, this ingenious plan miscarried. Distasteful as this odious measure was, all New England did not reject it. Even Webster, who for years had been the eloquent spokesman of maritime and commercial New England and who had opposed the tariff of 1824, voted for the 1828 measure. In the course of four years the economic winds of that region had shifted, and the Massachusetts leader trimmed his sails accordingly. Manufacturing New England apparently reasoned that a tariff with objectionable features was better than no tariff at all.

The so-called Tariff of Abominations greatly increased the South's

* Woolens were subjected to the principle of minimum valuation and to an *ad valorem* tax of 45 per cent; a mixed duty of 50 per cent *ad valorem* and \$.04 per pound specific was levied on raw wool. The duty on pig iron was raised from \$.56 to \$.625 per hundredweight; on hammered bar-iron from \$.90 to \$1.12 per hundred weight; and on rolled bar-iron from \$30.00 to \$37.00 a ton. Although hemp suitable for the manufacture of cordage and sailcloth was not produced in the United States, the duty on hemp was increased from \$35.00 to \$45.00 a ton. Higher rates were likewise provided for flax, molasses, and other articles.

opposition to the Administration in Washington. From Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Mississippi "Northern despotism" was assailed. Flags flew at half-mast, protest meetings passed resolutions, and newspapers, editors, preachers, college professors, and public officials, contrasting the prosperity of industrialized New England with the depressed economy in the agrarian South, openly urged retaliation and nullification. John C. Calhoun, now divining more clearly than ever before that the interests of the South faced the opposition of the industrial capitalists and democratic equalitarians of the North, prepared and presented to the legislature of South Carolina his famous *Exposition and Protest*, in which he asserted that the Tariff of Abominations was unconstitutional, sectional, and destructive to the liberty, prosperity, and happiness of the South, and must therefore be destroyed. The states, he maintained, had created the national government and were therefore ultimate judges of its power and authority. If any state deemed a Federal act to be unconstitutional, it might forbid its execution within the limits of the commonwealth; and if supported in its action by three fourths, or more, of the states of the Union, the law in question would become null and void. But this interpretation of the Constitution was not the product of a disinterested political philosopher; it was freighted with a purpose, and that purpose was to afford the free-trade South an avenue of escape from the "abominable" tariff burdens imposed by "despicable" Northern manufacturers.

Despite the failure of the Democrats' tariff strategy, Jackson won an overwhelming victory in the election of 1828. Adams and Clay, the two candidates who headed the National Republican ticket, gained majorities in almost all of New England; those counties in New York state where New Englanders predominated; the Western Reserve in Ohio; Kentucky and the southern portions of Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio where there was a strong demand for internal improvements; and some remaining strongholds of Federalism in southern New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. Against this alignment Jackson carried the South, most of the West, and the Middle Atlantic states. In winning by 178 electoral votes to 83 for his opponents, Jackson had successfully combined sectional and socio-economic appeals. He won the South largely because the policies of his opponents were identified with the North. The West voted for him because he was both a Westerner and a "democrat." In the Middle Atlantic states he had received the votes of the large "middling" class that opposed the control of the government by an aristocratic minority. By managing to be many things to many people, Jackson did more than win an election, for the pattern of national party leadership that he inaugurated in 1828 has survived basically unchanged to the present day.

CHAPTER XIV

JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

- 81. NATURE OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY
 - 82. JACKSON AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
 - 83. NATIONALISM AT HOME AND ABROAD
 - 84. WAR ON THE BANK
 - 85. VAN BUREN'S ADMINISTRATION
 - 86. BREAK-UP OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY
-

ANDREW JACKSON was a colorful, strong-willed, astute, dynamic individual who profoundly influenced the course of American civilization. But Jackson's powerful personality should not obscure the fact that he was the product as well as the maker of his times. A large part of his political genius—and he was an astonishingly skillful politician—lay in his ability to sense the direction in which public opinion was moving even before the people themselves were aware of where they were heading. He had few, if any, superiors in gauging the popular will, and his well-merited reputation for leadership lay, not in his ability to institute new movements, but in the skill with which he placed himself at the head of existing ones and gave them both direction and verve. As the successful ruler of a democracy he neither formulated nor followed the national will; instead he was its most influential and accurate spokesman.

81. NATURE OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

ANDREW JACKSON, who was born in the backcountry of North Carolina in 1767, fought in the American Revolution when he was little more than a boy. At twenty he began the practice of law

in the North Carolina frontier and a year later he moved to Nashville, Tennessee, where he became successively public prosecutor, a member of the United States Senate, and a judge of the state's supreme court. On numerous occasions, Jackson interrupted his political career and law practice to take up arms against the enemies of his country. In March, 1814, at the head of a band of Tennessee frontiersmen he decisively defeated the Creeks at Horseshoe Bend; in January, 1815, he won his great victory at New Orleans; and in 1818 he led his famous expedition into East Florida. In 1823, when he was again elected to the Senate, he seemed to many Americans in all sections to be a typical product of the nation's frontier. A self-made man, Indian fighter, and an individualist who believed in action instead of words, he possessed all the qualifications of a Western folk hero.

In the years before he became President, Jackson gave little indication that he was to become the champion of the majority in an "age of the common man." Although his Eastern opponents considered him crude and uncouth, the fact remains that he was a member of the upper class in Tennessee and he shared the views of the well-to-do in his community. In discussing this phase of Jackson's career, Professor Wilfred E. Binkley has written:

In the 1790's . . . [Jackson] had been engaged in business and his interests were developing . . . the capitalistic outlook that a generation later was to characterize his Whig antagonists. His intimate Nashville associates were men sometimes stigmatized as "Federalists." Certainly no one then could have foreseen the future champion of the debtor masses in this aristocratic-minded judge, this anti-inflationist with his pronounced creditor complex. He was a land speculator and dealer in horses, slaves, and general merchandise when the panic of the early nineties nearly wiped him out. Turning to cotton-planting, he prospered and gradually came to see public affairs through the eyes of an agrarian. Falling into the tradition of Thomas Jefferson and John Taylor, he developed a hatred of monopolies of every description, banks among them, and above all the Bank of the United States.

*It was with the eyes of the great and not the petty planter that Jackson had come to view public issues. The Hermitage was one of the finest mansions of the West and as the domicile of a Democrat it was to amuse the Whigs of the 1830's no less than did Hyde Park the Republicans of the 1930's.**

Although Jackson's name is invariably associated with democracy, he was responsible for none of the major advances in popular government

* Wilfred E. Binkley: *American Political Parties, Their Natural History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945), pp. 133-4.

during the first third of the nineteenth century. The undemocratic caucus system for presidential nominations gave way to party conventions; but it was the Anti-Masons, a short-lived minority party, who held the first convention in 1830, to be followed a year later by that of the National Republicans; and it was not until 1832 that the Jacksonian Democrats called their first convention.* When the selection of presidential electors by state legislatures was abandoned for a system of direct election, the states, not Jackson's Administration, were responsible for the change. In similar fashion the tremendous expansion of the suffrage was the direct result of state action. The new Western states entered the Union with provisions for universal manhood suffrage and the Eastern states followed their example. Connecticut in 1818, New York in 1821, and Virginia in 1830 by constitutional enactment liberalized the suffrage and provided for the popular election of most state and local officials.

Thanks chiefly to the influence of the West and the social-economic revolutions sweeping over western Europe and America, the old religious and property barriers to manhood suffrage had largely disappeared in the East by 1827. In spite of the fears and protests of the landed and commercial interests and their spokesmen, Fisher Ames, Chancellor Kent, and Daniel Webster, the suffrage had been extended to all white males over twenty-one. Between 1828 and 1848 the number of voters trebled; the unpropertied mechanic and factory worker could now cast his vote alongside the dignified clergyman and conservative capitalist. That they did so is evident from Kent's comment in 1835:

There never was such misrule. Our Tory rich men are becoming startled and alarmed at our downhill course. My opinion is that the admission of universal suffrage and a licentious press are incompatible with government and security to property, and that the govern-

* The Anti-Masonic party was the product of an otherwise unimportant incident in up-state New York. In 1826, a certain William Morgan of Batavia, New York, who had published a pamphlet that purported to reveal the secrets of the Masonic order, disappeared and was never seen again. Many people—particularly those in the rural districts—assumed that he had been kidnapped by Masons who objected to his pamphlet. Because many Masons held prominent positions in the government and because the Masons were a secret society, the protest against Morgan's disappearance developed into a political movement that was opposed to the control of the government by Masonic leaders in particular and secret organizations in general. True to their own principles, the Anti-Masons held a national convention in 1830, and in the following year at another convention they nominated candidates for the campaign of 1832. The Anti-Masonic party, which was a haven for every variety of dissatisfied political leader, was strongest in western New York and Pennsylvania and in the rural sections of New England. Its principal leaders were Thurlow Weed and William H. Seward of New York and Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania. In the midthirties, it was swallowed up by the Whigs.

ment and character of this country are going to ruin. This suffrage is too great an excitement for any political machine. It racks it to pieces, and morals go with it. It is probable England is going the same way. We are becoming selfish, profligate, crazy. . . .

Although Jackson deserves no credit for the various steps that were taken to democratize American government, he more than any other individual symbolized the importance of these developments. In like manner, he was quick to recognize the significance of economic change within the United States. America was entering a period of unrestrained economic individualism; just as the people believed that the aristocracy should give way to popular rule in government, they also thought that economic privilege should give way, not to economic equality, but to equality of opportunity. The opening of the West, development of the nation's transportation system, growth of industry, and expansion of agriculture provided almost limitless chances for profits, which the Jacksonians thought should be available to all who had the initiative and ability to get them. Jackson, for example, did not attack the Bank of the United States because he was opposed to financial institutions as such, but because he was opposed to a privileged financial institution that was thwarting economic individualism.

The key doctrines of Jacksonian democracy are majority rule and economic individualism. These concepts were not peculiar to the West, as some historians have stated. Their appeal was nation-wide, and it was directed toward a group or class rather than to a section. Nor, as some students have contended, was Jacksonian democracy the exclusive product of Eastern working class radicalism, for the working class was relatively small and comparatively unorganized when Jackson was President. His principal supporters came from the middle class of every section—small farmers, small businessmen, and artisans. They had already been given the vote, and they had used it to place the man they considered their representative in the White House. They now asked only that he act in their interest and that they be permitted to get ahead without interference from others. If Jackson was their political hero, Adam Smith was their economic idol.

Jacksonian democracy, moreover, was nationalist in both theory and practice. Jackson's military experience—among other things—had made him a thoroughgoing patriot, and in domestic affairs he tended to view the nation as a single unit rather than as an alliance of states or a combination of sections. In his conduct of American foreign policy he guarded American rights as jealously as had any of his predecessors, and in his defense of the Union against the attacks of the states he was as much of a nationalist as any Federalist.

82. JACKSON AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

WHEN Jackson assumed the presidency on March 4, 1829, the Democratic party consisted of three major sectional blocs—the Northeastern Democrats led by Van Buren, the Southern supporters of Vice-President Calhoun, and Jackson's Western followers whose principal spokesman in Congress was Senator Thomas Hart Benton. These diverse and often conflicting groups had been brought together in the campaign of 1828 by a series of ingenious alliances. But as soon as they had achieved their immediate objective with the election of Jackson, they began to fight over the spoils of victory. Each faction hoped to dominate the Administration, and each in turn learned that Jackson could not be dominated. Despite the fact that he was the head of what amounted to a coalition government, Jackson repeatedly demonstrated that he would smash the coalition rather than let any part of it take over the control of his Administration.

Jackson's use of the spoils system was one of the few measures of his Administration that was approved by all the factions within the party. Although Jackson did not invent the spoils system—it went back to Washington and was used in many states, and in England as well—and although he never made the wholesale removals of which the opposition accused him,* his handling of the patronage nevertheless clearly indicated that he thought that no individual had a peculiar or special right to hold public office. Other Presidents had on occasion dismissed their political opponents from the government service; but Jackson both institutionalized this practice and declared it a positive good. It was the contention of the Jacksonian Democrats that Federal positions in the past had been monopolized by an unrepresentative minority. To break this hold of the aristocracy on the government, they therefore proposed that office holding be placed on a rotating basis. Their opponents could complain that every time that an office rotated, it was filled by a Democrat who had worked for the election of Jackson. To this the Democrats could reply: Why not? If majority rule meant filling elective offices with the representatives of the majority, should not appointive positions be filled in the same way? To answer this question by stating that the spoils system produced administrative inefficiency and even corruption while aiding the party in power—and it most certainly did so—is to miss the point. To the Americans of the 1830's, the spoils system was just one more method by which the majority increased its control over the nation's governmental machinery.

* During Jackson's two terms, he removed only 228 out of more than 600 presidential officers in the government.

The results of the spoils system were as important as its manifestations. By holding out to loyal party workers the prospect of a steady income, it provided a new incentive for party loyalty. As a consequence, each party developed a group of professional politicians whose only job was to work for the party's victory. Under the circumstances, political parties tended to become permanent institutions, for they now contained vested interests whose livelihood depended on the party's success. The spoils system was more responsible than any other factor for the creation of the modern American political party; and, despite civil service reforms, it still provides much of the cement that holds together the two major parties of the 1950's.

Jackson's cabinet appointments, as well as his distribution of the lesser offices in the government, revealed his desire to reward the various groups that had supported him in the election of 1828. The Northeast was represented in the cabinet by Secretary of State Martin Van Buren of New York; the Calhoun wing by Secretary of the Treasury Samuel D. Ingham, Secretary of the Navy John Branch, and Attorney General John M. Berrien; and the West by Postmaster General William T. Barry and Secretary of War John W. Eaton, both from Kentucky. While the cabinet accurately reflected the sectional bases of the party, its members with the exception of Van Buren were mediocrities. Although Jackson described the cabinet as "one of the strongest . . . that has ever been in the United States," he seldom consulted its members. Instead, he relied almost exclusively for advice on a small group of friends that were known collectively as the kitchen cabinet. Consisting of William B. Lewis, Amos Kendall, Duff Green, and Isaac Hill, the kitchen cabinet helped Jackson formulate policy, kept him informed on trends in public opinion, and assumed most of the responsibility for the distribution of the patronage. All four members of the kitchen cabinet had worked for Jackson's election in 1828; three of them were newspaper editors. All, moreover, were in some way associated with the government; two held posts in the Treasury Department, a third was awarded the government printing contract, and the fourth became a member of the Senate in 1831.

The cabinet not only provided Jackson with little assistance, it soon became a source of considerable embarrassment. Two months before Jackson's inauguration, John W. Eaton married Margaret O'Neill, the attractive widow of a Navy paymaster and the daughter of a Washington tavern keeper. The cabinet wives, led by Mrs. Calhoun, disapproved of the match, and Peggy, whose charms were conceded by even her enemies, found herself ostracized by Washington society. Jackson, whose own wife had been slandered on more than one occasion before her death in 1828, rushed to Peggy's defense and at a special cabinet meeting called to discuss the "Eaton trouble" he described her as

"chaste as a virgin." But the female rulers of Washington society thought differently and continued to refuse to accept her socially. The Administration was soon split into two factions, the anti-Eaton forces led by Calhoun and the pro-Eaton group headed by Van Buren, a widower.

The Eaton tempest in the Administration teapot was more serious than it appeared on the surface, for it revealed a sharp sectional cleavage within both the party and the government. While Mrs. Calhoun may have objected only to the Secretary of War's choice of a wife, her husband also objected to an Administration that made no move to take care of the needs of the South. Calhoun was well aware that Jackson and Van Buren agreed on many other points beside Mrs. Eaton's morals. Moreover, the Tariff of Abominations was still on the statute books, and Calhoun made no effort to conceal his belief that the time was fast approaching when the Southern states would be forced to put into practice the principles that he had advanced in his *Exposition and Protest*. At the same time, the West had reason to be dissatisfied with the President's attitude toward internal improvements, for when Congress in May, 1830, authorized the Federal subscription to the stock of the Maysville road in Kentucky, Jackson vetoed the measure on the ground that the project was local in character. To both Westerners and Southerners it appeared that Jackson had sold out to the East and that Van Buren had taken over the management of the government.

That conflicting sectional interests divided Congress as well as the executive branch of the government was revealed in the famous Webster-Hayne debate in 1831. The debate was set off by Senator Augustus Foote of Connecticut, who, as a spokesman for a section that feared that it would soon be depopulated by emigration westward, proposed a resolution calling for restrictions on government land sales in the West. After Benton on January 13, 1830, had attacked the resolution as inimical to Western interests, Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina and Daniel Webster began a debate that was to last more than a week. As the debate progressed, the Foote resolution was lost in a discussion of the nature of the Union. To Hayne, who followed closely Calhoun's reasoning in the *Exposition and Protest*, the Union was a league of sovereign states, a league that the states had created and that they therefore could dissolve. Webster, whose views were similar to those of John Marshall, attacked Hayne's position on practical, constitutional, historical, and patriotic grounds. Neither man convinced the other; but Webster had the last word in a peroration that has since been recited by countless members of every generation of American school children:

While the Union lasts we have high, exciting, gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children. Beyond that I seek

not to penetrate the veil. God grant that in my day, at least, that curtain may not rise! God grant that on my vision never may be opened what lies behind! When my eyes shall be turned to behold for the last time the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious Union; on States dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, not a single star obscured, bearing for its motto, no such miserable interrogatory as "What is all this worth?" nor those other words of delusion and folly, "Liberty first and Union afterwards"; but everywhere, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart, —Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!

Although the two men had little else in common, Jackson shared Webster's views on the Union, and soon after the debate had ended, he publicly challenged the stand of the Southern states'-rights spokesmen. At a party dinner held on April 13, 1830, to commemorate Jefferson's birthday the President replied to a series of speeches by Southerners on state sovereignty with the toast: "Our Federal Union—it must be preserved!" Calhoun answered immediately with: "The Union—next to our liberty, the most dear! May we all remember that it can only be preserved by respecting the rights of the states and distributing equally the benefits and burdens of the Union." These remarks fully revealed the irreconcilable nature of the conflict within the Administration, and in May, 1830, the President precipitated an open break: he demanded to know why Calhoun as a member of Monroe's cabinet had urged that Jackson be censured for his Florida expedition. When Jackson refused to accept Calhoun's explanation, the rupture was complete. Within a year Calhoun had resigned the vice-presidency and had entered the Senate to lead the dissident Southerners against the Administration program.

Soon after the break with Calhoun, Jackson was able to clear up the Peggy Eaton affair and to rid the cabinet of Calhoun's supporters. When Van Buren and Eaton, in an attempt to relieve the President of further embarrassment, withdrew from the cabinet, Ingham, Branch, and Berrien were forced to follow suit. To fill these vacancies Jackson made Edward Livingston of Louisiana Secretary of State, Lewis Cass of Michigan Secretary of War, Roger B. Taney of Maryland Attorney

General, Louis McLane of Delaware Secretary of the Treasury, and Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire Secretary of the Navy. Both Eaton and Van Buren were rewarded for their loyalty; the former was named Governor of Florida and the latter was appointed minister to England. But the Senate by a single vote cast by Vice-President Calhoun refused to confirm Van Buren's nomination. The opposition's victory, however was shortlived, for events were soon to demonstrate that Benton was correct when he stated that the Senate had "broken a minister and elected a Vice-President."

By 1831, Jackson had fundamentally altered the character of the party that had taken over the control of the government two years earlier. He had driven the Southerners from the Administration, and at the same time he had maintained a delicate balance between the West and the Northeast. The West could count on the President's support for its campaigns against the Indians, its demands for internal improvements (as long as they were not local in character), and its requests for a reduction in the sales price of the public lands. Jackson, however, was not a prisoner of the West, for he had also vetoed the Maysville Road bill, maintained the Northeast's strength in his cabinet, and made Martin Van Buren the crown prince of the Administration. Jackson, of course, was a Westerner who had a deep affection for the region where he had lived and prospered. But he was also a politician who knew that he had to have the support of the Northeast as well as the West to stay in power. Even more important, he was a nationalist who refused to permit the interests of any section to take precedence over those of the nation.

83. NATIONALISM AT HOME AND ABROAD

ALTHOUGH Jackson entered the presidency as a firm believer in states' rights, during his administration he established himself as one of the country's staunchest supporters of the Union. When South Carolina openly defied the Federal government in 1832-3, he called its bluff and let it be known that he was willing to resort to force to uphold his principles. Then, confounding those who had repeatedly criticized him for his hot-headed impetuosity, he accepted a compromise that left the situation much as it had been before South Carolina had acted. Thus, by skillfully blending threats and diplomacy, Jackson was able both to preserve the Union and to assert the right of the majority to govern the minority.

The conflict between the Administration and South Carolina had its origins in the tariff of 1828. As part of a section that exported what it produced and imported what it consumed, South Carolina was in-

evitably penalized by any increase in duties. But many New Englanders, including woolen manufacturers and consumers of molasses, also objected to the tariff of abominations. Several woolen manufacturers declared that they could manufacture to better advantage under the tariff of 1816 than under that of 1828. Not a few Northerners and Westerners, too, believed that some concession was due the South. Moreover, the revenues of the government were piling up beyond all expectation, and this was sufficient evidence to many that tariff reduction was necessary. It was not surprising, therefore, that memorials and petitions, the majority begging for the elimination of the more objectionable features of the 1828 tariff, flooded the desks of congressmen. Little, however, was done, and efforts to reduce the duties on iron, hemp, flax, cotton, woolens, and indigo met with failure. Some slight progress was made when in 1830 the ten-cent duty on molasses was reduced to the former rate of five cents and the drawback on exported rum was restored. As a partial cure for the surplus revenue, the duties on tea, coffee, and cocoa were also reduced.

Meanwhile in the South the declining price of cotton convinced the planters that they were more than ever under the heel of the manufacturers. South Carolinians felt that the time had arrived for state action, but Calhoun counseled delay in the hope that the new Congress, which was to assemble in December, 1831, would give relief. In preparation for the renewal of the struggle, both protectionists and anti-protectionists held national conventions in the summer of that year. As soon as Congress met, a number of opinions and proposals were advanced. Clay, restating the principles of the American System, stood adamant for the continuation of high protection. McDuffie of South Carolina advocated a general *ad valorem* duty of 12½ per cent on all goods subject to import tax, and the abolition of specific duties. McLane, Secretary of the Treasury and spokesman for Jackson, recommended a reduction of the average rate of duty from 44 per cent to 27 per cent, reduction of the duty on raw wool to 5 per cent and on manufactured woolens to 20 per cent, and the abolition of the system of minimum duties, low-quality woolens excepted. John Quincy Adams, now in the House, reported a measure from the Committee on Manufactures that, with a few changes, became the tariff of 1832. In a word, it virtually removed the features of the tariff of 1828 that were objectionable to the manufacturers and the commercial East. It abolished the minimum system of valuation, increased the duty on manufactured woolens and placed a tax on woolen yarn. Wool costing less than eight cents a pound and flax were admitted free; duties on hemp and iron were reduced.

In the opinion of the more radically discontented Southerners the tariff of 1832 added insult to injury. The planters had waged another

battle against the "new rich" and again had lost; they now turned to what they believed to be their only recourse—nullification. Accordingly, in November, the month of Jackson's second election, Calhoun, Hayne, and their followers called a special convention in South Carolina and there, despite the strenuous efforts of a nationalist minority, passed a nullification ordinance that stated "that the tariff law of 1828, and the amendment to the same of 1832, are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers, or citizens," and that they were not enforceable after February 1, 1833, unless modified to relieve the aggrieved party. If the Federal government should attempt to enforce its authority within the boundaries of the state, such action would result in immediate war. State officers were to be required by oath to support the ordinance, and no case arising under it was to be appealed from a South Carolina court to the courts of the United States. But the rest of the South, aggrieved though it was, hesitated to follow, and the radical South Carolinians stood alone.

When Jackson heard the news of South Carolina's action, he declared that he would meet it "at the threshold and have the leaders arrested and arraigned for treason." Probably with Calhoun in mind, Jackson added that he was ready to "hang every leader . . . of that infatuated people . . . by martial law, irrespective of his name or political or social position." A warship and a fleet of revenue cutters were sent to Charleston Harbor; the Federal forts in the harbor were reinforced; and Jackson in a proclamation issued on December 10, 1832, called South Carolina's plan of nullification "incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed." But at the same time he urged South Carolina to reconsider its stand. Moreover, in January, 1833, when he asked Congress to enact a "Force Bill" that would grant him full power to use the army and navy to enforce collection of revenue duties in the nullifying state, he frankly stated that in his opinion the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were unjust and should be lowered.

This policy of moderation was followed shortly afterward by the introduction of the Verplanck bill, an Administration measure that proposed a sweeping tariff reduction of 25 per cent. Manufacturers in great alarm hastened to protest; Webster and John Quincy Adams professed to see in it the utter ruin of the industrial East.* Clay at heart probably

* In his diary Adams said that Jackson had "cast away all the neutrality which he had heretofore maintained upon the conflicting interests and opinions of the different sections of the country, and surrenders the whole Union to nullifiers of the South and the land-robbers of the West." See Allan Nevins (ed.): *The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845* (New York: Longmans Green & Company, 1928), page 433.

shared a similar opinion, but the picture of his veteran political enemy, Jackson, at the head of troops coercing South Carolina was too much for him. After a conference at Philadelphia with the industrial leaders of the East, at which he was apparently told to use his own judgment, he hurried to Washington, where he entered into negotiations with Calhoun. The result was the Compromise Tariff of 1833. In its final form it provided for a general reduction of all duties exceeding 20 per cent; all such duties were to be gradually reduced over a nine-year period by subtracting one tenth on January 1, 1834, one tenth in 1836, one tenth in 1838, and one tenth in 1840. Of the remaining six tenths excess, one half was to be subtracted on January 1, 1842, and the other half on July 1, 1842. The measure applied to specific as well as to *ad valorem* duties. Other provisions included the enlargement of the free

VOTE OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON TARIFF OF 1833

	FOR	AGAINST
<i>New England</i>	10	28
<i>Middle States</i>	24	47
<i>South and Southwest</i>	75	2
<i>West</i>	10	8
TOTAL	119	85

list, and after 1842, the valuation of all goods at the port of entry and the abolishment of the credit system for payment of duties. On March 1, 1833, Congress passed both the Force Bill and the Compromise Tariff. Ten days later South Carolina's convention withdrew the ordinance of nullification and in a final gesture of defiance voted to nullify the Force Bill. And there matters stood. The South had a lower tariff and the Unionists had blocked secession; still the issue remained, for the problems raised by South Carolina's stand had been postponed rather than solved.

In one sense the struggle between South Carolina and the Federal government was a conflict between sectionalism and nationalism in which Jackson championed the Union. But even more basically it was a contest between majority and minority rule. South Carolina and Calhoun had demanded not only that the minority be guaranteed certain basic rights but also that it be permitted to call the tune for the majority. Faced with this problem, Jackson did not hesitate to take his stand at the head of the majority. In doing so he placed principle above party loyalty. His action antagonized a large bloc of Southern voters, many of whom withdrew from the Democratic party. Jackson, in alienating an important segment of his party, had adhered to his principles, reaffirmed his right to popular leadership, and had piloted the Union with a firm hand through one of its most trying crises.

Jackson, a nationalist in foreign as well as domestic affairs, demonstrated that the technique of threat and compromise that he had used in the tariff dispute could be employed as effectively against European nations as against American nullificationists. The first President since John Adams who had not previously served as secretary of state, Jackson made up for lack of experience by the vigor, tact, and adroitness with which he defended American rights abroad. His forthright approach to the nation's foreign problems has been called "shirt-sleeve" diplomacy; but regardless of what it is called, the fact remains that it was successful. Moreover, Jackson's conception of American foreign policy was based on national rather than sectional considerations, and the East rather than the West was the principal beneficiary of his ventures in diplomacy.

→ Jackson's most notable accomplishment in foreign affairs was the solution of a problem that had vexed all of his predecessors. Since the Revolution, American vessels had been either partially or completely excluded from the British West Indian trade. On taking office, Jackson informed the British that the change in administration in the United States was sufficient cause for a removal of the restrictions on the trade; and in his annual message of December, 1829, he referred to Great Britain as "alike distinguished in peace and war" and as a country with which the United States could "look forward to years of peaceful, honorable, and elevated competition." He then induced Congress to grant him the authority to open the ports of the United States to the British as soon as Americans were given access to the British ports in the West Indies. At the same time he had Van Buren prepare "a communication . . . for Congress recommending a non-intercourse law between the United States and Canada, and a sufficient number of cutters commanded by our naval officers and our midshipmen made revenue officers, and a double set on every vessel." Jackson had used every conceivable weapon in his diplomatic offensive, and in October, 1830, the British gave way. In the future, American ships were permitted to participate in every phase of the West Indian trade except that between the islands and Great Britain.

In his efforts to settle the French "spoilation claims," Jackson used much the same techniques that had proved so successful in his negotiations with the British. These claims, which grew out of French attacks on American commerce during the Napoleonic Wars, had never been paid despite repeated American demands. The issue was further complicated by the French contention that the United States had failed to live up to the "most favored nation" provision in the 1803 treaty for the Louisiana Purchase. In his message of December, 1829, Jackson stated that the spoilation claims might lead to a "collision" between the two countries; but a year later, after Louis Philippe had become King of

France, he substituted flattery for veiled threats and congratulated the new ruler on the fashion in which his accession to power had reflected the "paramount authority of the public will." Largely because of Jackson's efforts, the French on July 4, 1831, accepted a treaty in which they agreed to pay American citizens 25,000,000 francs in six annual installments. The treaty also provided that the United States would pay 25,000,000 francs to cover the claims against American damage to French shipping, that France would drop its protests concerning the treaty of 1803, and that the United States would reduce its duties on French wines.

Although the treaty went into effect in February, 1832, the French failed to pay their first installment on the agreed date. Jackson, in an address to Congress in 1834, accused the French of a breach of faith and proposed reprisals against French property in the United States. The French replied by severing diplomatic relations with the United States and demanding that the President apologize. Although Jackson insisted that the "honor of my country shall never be stained by an apology from me for the statement of truth and the performance of duty," he did go so far as to say that "any intention to menace or insult the Government of France" was "unfounded." The French were satisfied, and in 1836 they paid the United States the first four installments of the spoliation claims.

The record reveals that Jackson was a nationalist both at home and abroad. His defense of the Union in the conflict with South Carolina was worthy of a John Marshall, and his conduct of American foreign policy was as spirited and skillful as that of John Quincy Adams during Monroe's administration.

84. WAR ON THE BANK

OF THE major events during Jackson's administration, none better illustrates his adherence to the concepts of both majority rule and economic individualism than the struggle over the second Bank of the United States. Long before Jackson became President and throughout most of the bank's history, its policies had been vigorously opposed in both the South and the West. Less than three years after its establishment, the bank was held responsible by many—and with considerable justification—for the Panic of 1819 and the ensuing depression. Although agricultural distress, the inability of American manufacturers to compete against the heavy importation of European goods, the lax and fraudulent methods of the state banks, and overspeculation in Western lands all were in some measure responsible for the advent of

hard times, the bank's loan policy also contributed to the disaster. From 1818 to 1820 the second Bank of the United States not only reduced its loans from \$41,000,000 to \$31,000,000 but also curtailed its note circulation from about \$8,400,000 to about \$3,500,000. By this procedure it virtually forced the state banks to reduce their issues from \$1,000,000,000 in 1817 to \$45,000,000 in 1819. Partial suspension of specie payments followed, accompanied by widespread failures. The Federal government, despite retrenchment, found it necessary to contract loans to cover deficits in both 1820 and 1821.

The South and West, where the effects of the bank's contraction policy were especially felt, were extremely antagonistic, and only the action of Chief Justice Marshall in *McCulloch vs. Maryland* (1819) and *Osborn et al. vs. The Bank of the United States* (1824), which declared attempts by states to tax the bank out of existence to be unconstitutional, saved the institution from the wrath of these sections. Even so, it might have gone to the wall as a result of its own practices had not Langdon Cheves, a conservative South Carolina businessman, been put in charge in March, 1819. Although Cheves in a number of instances was an inept executive, he undoubtedly enabled the bank to weather the storm. Under the presidency of Nicholas Biddle, a Philadelphia financier who was Cheves' successor, the second Bank of the United States not only prospered, but it also expanded its operations. Improved means for controlling the numerous branches of the bank were devised; balances due from the state banks were collected; discounts were increased; and a surplus was accumulated. From 1816 to 1831 the dividends averaged 5 per cent. Of the \$14,700,000 cash in the bank's vaults in 1829, nearly half was specie.

But neither conservative management nor expansion of the bank's operations had any effect on the opposition of Southern and Western farmers; and even before the close of the 1820's, Eastern mechanics were coming to believe that the bank was a tyrannical monopoly controlled by the rich and the well-born. The continued opposition of the South and West was in large measure caused by the fact that the notes of the Bank of the United States drove from circulation the notes of the shaky state banks of both sections. Politicians, farmers, and speculators—inflationists all—therefore denounced the bank. Moreover, many were fully aware that, although the greater part of the bank's stock was owned in the East, most of its profits came from the West and the South. Of the bank's shares outstanding in 1828, New England held 20,853, New York 46,638, Pennsylvania 70,763, Maryland 34,262, and South Carolina 35,495. Only 19,815 were held in the remaining Southern states, and 1,804 in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee combined. The foreign holdings totaled 40,412 shares. The distribution of the bank's notes, on the other hand, indicates that their circulation

was largest in the dissatisfied sections. In the Northeast, where their circulation was small and where the notes of the state banks were generally well secured, the local banks experienced little competition from the national bank. The people of the West and South, however, felt that they were compelled to pay tribute to Eastern and foreign capitalists for the money they needed to buy land, make internal improvements, and engage in speculative enterprises.

More damaging to the bank, perhaps, than the claim that it worked economic hardship on the agrarian sections of the country was the accusation that it discriminated against the followers of President Jackson and that certain of its branches had used their influence to defeat him in the election of 1828. There were also open charges that the bank had subsidized members of Congress and that under the leadership of Biddle the supporters and beneficiaries of the bank were engaged in a nation-wide campaign to discredit its enemies. These allegations were partly true and partly false. Daniel Webster, for example, was apparently on the payroll of the bank, for on at least one occasion he wrote Biddle: "If it be wished that my relation to the Bank should be continued, it may be well to send me the usual retainer." Biddle, knowing that Jackson was unsympathetic toward the bank, went out of his way at first to win Jackson's favor. Only after failing in this effort did he seek to break the backbone of the political opposition by sharply contracting the bank's loans. Before Jackson declared open warfare on the bank, there is practically no evidence that the institution deliberately discriminated against his followers.

In his first message to Congress, Jackson attacked the bank on the ground that it was both unconstitutional and monopolistic. Against Biddle's judgment the question of rechartering the bank was dragged into the campaign of 1832; the National Republicans referred to it as a "great beneficent and necessary institution." To make doubly certain that this issue would not be overlooked in the campaign, Biddle was induced to petition Congress for a renewal of the bank's charter. Congress acted favorably on the request, but on July 10, the eve of the presidential campaign, Jackson vetoed the measure. In the message that accompanied the veto he pointed out that the capitalists of the Northeastern states were growing rich at the expense of the people of the West and South. "Many of our rich men," he said, "have besought us to make them richer by act of Congress. By attempting to gratify their desires, we have in the results of our legislation arrayed section against section, interest against interest, and man against man, in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake the foundations of our Union." To those who cited Supreme Court decisions in defense of the bank, Jackson replied that the Court was only one branch of the government and that the "authority of the Supreme Court must not . . .

be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when they are acting in their legislative capacities." Although Biddle might declare that Jackson's statement was "really a manifesto of anarchy such as Marat or Robespierre might have issued to the mob," events were to demonstrate that Jackson was speaking for a majority of his countrymen.

The political and constitutional implications of Jackson's stand were fully as significant as his economic views. In defying both Congress and the Court, he championed the people and became the first President of the United States to exercise authority over the legislative branch of the government. Before Jackson's time, presidents had tended to be administrators rather than leaders. Jackson's veto message built a bridge between the executive and the masses that gave him a degree of authority enjoyed by none of his predecessors. Jackson had discovered that a president backed by a majority of the voters possessed power far greater than that granted to him by the Constitution. The majority was virtually unrepresented on the Supreme Court, and in Congress its effectiveness was often dissipated by sectional rivalries; but in a president like Jackson it had a leader who could transform its latent strength into an effective force for shaping the government's policies. Although Jackson's discovery was ignored by many of his successors in the White House, others—notably Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt—adopted it as a guiding principle in their conduct of the nation's affairs.

→ Because the National Republicans had made the bank virtually the only issue of the campaign of 1832, the voters were given an unexampled opportunity either to approve or reject the Administration's policy. The first candidate in the field was William Wirt, who was chosen by the Anti-Masons in September, 1831, at the first nominating convention in the nation's history. The National Republicans, following the precedent set by the Anti-Masons, selected delegates who convened at Baltimore and nominated Henry Clay. Although Jackson's nomination was a foregone conclusion, the Democrats, too, held a convention, which went through the formality of choosing Jackson and then named Van Buren as his running mate. Because Jackson wished to create the impression that Van Buren was the overwhelming choice of the party, he had the convention adopt a rule that no candidate could be nominated unless he received two thirds of the votes of the delegates. With Jackson's support Van Buren more than met this requirement, and the two-thirds rule remained a feature of every Democratic convention until it was repealed a century later at the instigation of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The outcome of the election revealed that Jackson had not misinterpreted the temper of the voters. With 219 electoral votes, Jackson carried 17 states and lost only Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,

Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, and Kentucky. Vermont gave its 7 votes to Wirt, South Carolina cast its 11 votes for John Floyd of Virginia, while Clay received the 49 electoral votes of the other anti-Jackson states. The popular vote was 687,502 for Jackson to 530,189 for Clay and Wirt.

Jackson interpreted the results of the election of 1832 as a mandate for the continuation of his anti-Bank program. The institution had worked for his defeat, and the President was therefore more convinced than ever that it should be destroyed. "I long for . . . repose on the Hermitage," he wrote in 1833. "But until I can strangle this hydra of corruption [the Bank], I will not shrink from my duty." To perform what he considered his duty, Jackson decided to take advantage of a provision in the Bank Act that authorized the secretary of the treasury to withdraw the government's deposits whenever he felt such action was warranted by the condition of the bank. But at this point the President encountered an unexpected difficulty. Secretary of the Treasury McLane refused to order the removal of the deposits. Jackson thereupon made McLane Secretary of State and named William J. Duane of Philadelphia his successor. But Duane also refused to co-operate, and in September, 1833, he was supplanted by Roger Taney, who immediately put the President's policy into effect. The government's funds were placed in state banks, or "pet banks," as they were called by Jackson's opponents. The opposition complained bitterly that Jackson's action was both unconstitutional and inexpedient, and the Senate at Clay's instigation adopted a resolution censuring the President. But Jackson ignored these complaints, and Benton was able to induce the Senate to remove the motion of censure from the record of its proceedings.

In 1836 the second United States Bank came to an end as a national institution. Biddle, however, at enormous cost, secured a charter from Pennsylvania. Greatly restricted in its activities and hard hit by the lean years from 1837 on, the bank went to the wall in 1841. Fifteen years were spent in liquidating its affairs; creditors were paid in full, but the shareholders lost everything. Biddle was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the other shareholders, but the indictment was quashed. In 1844 he died, poverty-stricken and broken-hearted.

Closely associated with the dispute over the bank was the contest that developed during Jackson's second administration between the advocates of a "hard" currency and those who favored "soft"—or, in this instance, paper—money. Although Jackson had enjoyed the support of the West in his attack on the Bank of the United States, the same section, which was overwhelmingly inflationist, was opposed to his demand for hard money. It was the firm conviction of Jackson and his

principal advisers that unrestricted paper issues by banks produced a speculative upswing in the business cycle that was inevitably followed by panic, depression, and hard times for the great majority of the people. Moreover, in line with the general distrust of economic privilege that characterized the times, the Jacksonians objected to the power that the right to issue notes gave the banks over the nation's economic system. In an effort to curb the steady flow of paper emanating from the banks, Congress, at the instigation of the Administration, passed a series of laws in 1834-6 to increase the supply of gold coins in circulation and to ban notes of small denomination.

Because of the refusal of the states to follow the lead of the Federal government, the Administration's attempts to check the speculative boom that developed after 1834 had little success. As soon as the restraining hand of the second Bank of the United States was removed, a new crop of state banks sprang up, many with little capital or specie. Between 1829 and 1837 their number multiplied from 329 to 788, their note circulation increased from \$48,000,000 to \$149,000,000, and their loans rose from \$137,000,000 to \$525,000,000. With easy credit, a mania for internal improvements and speculation in Western land set in. Never, contemporaries declared, had the country been so prosperous. Even the treasury was filling up, and in 1835, upon the extinction of the entire national debt, Congress voted to distribute the mounting surplus in the treasury among the states, nominally in the form of a loan, but in reality as an outright gift. With lower tariff rates American import trade greatly increased. Into the midst of this prosperity, however, intruded a number of disturbing events: the destruction of the Bank of the United States, the disastrous New York City fire of 1835, and bad harvests in the same year. The bubble burst in July, 1836, when Jackson issued his famous "Specie Circular" requiring that all public lands be paid for in specie or in notes of specie-paying banks. On top of this step came pressure from English creditors, more bad harvests, credit contraction, and a money stringency. On May 10, 1837, the New York banks suspended specie payment. In a few days the banks in every important city in the country did likewise.

Jackson's second term had ended before the crash, and he left the presidency convinced of the wisdom of his policies. In his farewell address he reviewed and reaffirmed his stand on the preservation of the Union, sound money, internal improvements, foreign policy, the destruction of the Bank of the United States, and the preservation of the Union. To the end he held to his faith in majority rule and his fears of the effect of the concentration of economic control on American democracy and individualism. Soon after he retired to the Hermitage, he wrote to a friend: "It is now plain that the war is to be carried on by the monied aristocracy of the few against the Democracy of numbers;

it is the plan of the prosperous to make the honest laborers hewers of wood and drawers of water to the monied aristocracy. . . .”

85. VAN BUREN'S ADMINISTRATION

JACKSON'S forthright policies had alienated as well as attracted large blocs of voters. Many Westerners had been antagonized by the Maysville Road veto and the Administration's hard money policies, and those Southerners who subscribed to Calhoun's views on states' rights had withdrawn from the Democratic party because of the tariff dispute with South Carolina. In addition, there were Americans in every section of the country who had no use for the more radical and democratic features of the Jackson Administration. As the leader of the opposition, Henry Clay hoped to weld these disparate groups into a majority party that would put his American System into effect. In 1834 Clay's party had changed its name from National Republican to Whig in an effort to symbolize opposition to what its members professed to think was the "reign of King Andrew." At the same time the party had assumed the character that it was to retain until its demise in the 1850's. In the South the Whigs could count on the support of the large planters; in the Northeast the party was backed by the business interests and many farmers; and in the West it tended to attract the more well-to-do agrarians, who hoped that Clay's program of internal improvements would better their economic status. The Whigs were strongest in the cotton belt of the Deep South, in New England, and in the Ohio Valley. They were an upper-class party, and in this respect, at least, they were the direct descendants of the Federalists.

Opposed to the Whigs was the Democratic party, which drew its principal strength from the "middling" classes of the Northeast, the small farmers in the South, and those corn and hog farmers of the West who had not been alienated by Jackson's program. Jackson had ruled over these groups with a firm hand, and through his control of the party machinery he was able to have Van Buren selected as his successor. On the surface Van Buren seemed everything that Jackson was not. Known as "the Little Magician" because of his prowess as a politician, he was something of a dandy who never would have been mistaken for a frontiersman or Indian fighter. He owed his rise to national power to the Albany Regency's control over the Democratic party in New York State, his ability as a political organizer, his loyalty to Jackson, and his faith in democracy in a democratic age. A fastidious dresser who liked good food and good wine, he was accused by his opponents of being nothing more than a wily politician who was not

above using unscrupulous methods to achieve his objectives. Actually he was neither more nor less of a politician than the other party leaders of the day. Van Buren, in short, was a good Jacksonian Democrat, who looked like a Whig.

Van Buren's victory in the election of 1836 can be attributed to the willingness of many voters to support a candidate endorsed by Jackson and to the disorganized state of the opposition. The Whigs were so riddled by factionalism that they did not even bother to hold a convention. Instead, by nominating a number of local candidates, they tried to have the election thrown into the House where it was thought that Van Buren could be beaten. But this strategy failed, for Van Buren with 170 electoral votes had a clear majority over William Henry Harrison's 73, Hugh L. White's 26, Daniel Webster's 14, and the 11 votes cast by South Carolina's nullificationists for Willie B. Mangum. An unusual feature of the election was that no vice-presidential candidate received a majority, and for the only time in the nation's history the choice was made by the Senate, which selected Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky.

It was Van Buren's misfortune that he took office two months before the onset of a severe and protracted depression. By September, 1837, nine tenths of the nation's factories had closed. Real estate values tumbled, and internal-improvement projects came to a standstill or were abandoned. Banknote circulation fell from \$149,000,000 in 1837 to \$59,000,000 in 1843, and loans from over \$525,000,000 to less than \$255,000,000. Bank failures were an everyday occurrence; New York City alone had 250 business failures in two months. Even banks organized and run by states, as in Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Arkansas, and Florida, were forced to close. Almshouses and poorhouses were filled to overflowing. The winter of 1838 was exceptionally bitter, and many suffered from starvation and exposure.

Although he had no responsibility for the events leading up to the Panic of 1837, Van Buren was held responsible by many Americans for the ensuing hard times. Nor was there much that Van Buren could do to alleviate the impact of the depression. Any attempt by the government to check the downward swing of the business cycle would have required some aid to the nation's business classes, and to Van Buren, a good Jacksonian, such a policy was out of the question. Moreover, the President was convinced that the principal task facing his Administration was to prevent private groups from controlling the nation's finances. Jackson had had no constructive alternative to offer for the Bank of the United States, and it remained for his successor to devise a method both to safeguard the government's funds and to prevent the recurrence of an inflationary spiral generated by unrestricted issues of paper money. Van Buren, accordingly, proposed an independent-treasury system that would consist of a series of subtreasuries or vaults for

the storage of Federal funds. Such an arrangement would enable the government to handle all its monies through its own officials. In addition, since the subtreasuries would issue only specie and secured treasury notes, this system would tend to limit the expansion of paper currency.

The Whigs, who were able to agree on little else, were united in their opposition to Van Buren's proposal for an independent treasury. Henry Clay predicted that the plan would reduce all property values by two thirds, and John Quincy Adams said: "As to the sub-treasury—Bedlam seems to me the only place where it could have originated. . . . A Divorce of Bank and State! Why a divorce of Trade and Shipping would be as wise. . . ." Philip Hone, a New York Whig, thought the idea the "most mischievous in its tendency that had ever been presented to the American people," and the *Boston Atlas* stated that it "aimed at the interests of the country a blow, which if it do not recoil upon the aggressor, must be productive to the country of lasting mischief, perhaps of irretrievable anarchy." Many conservative Democrats shared these views, and in Van Buren's own state of New York, the Albany Regency was split over the issue.

The vehemence with which the Whigs attacked the subtreasury proposal was matched by the enthusiasm with which it was received by many of the more radical groups in the Northeast. Throughout Jackson's administration, his financial policies had been wholeheartedly supported by a number of so-called Workingmen's parties, many of whose members were upper- or middle-class. The most prominent of these parties was a branch of the New York State Democratic organization known as the Loco-Focos.* Within a short time Loco-Focoism had become synonymous with radicalism in general and the demands of the pro-Jackson enthusiasts in the Northeast in particular. Because Van Buren's insistence on hard money and on the separation of banking and government seemed the logical conclusion to the program inaugurated by Jackson, both friends and foes of the Administration identified his subtreasury proposal with Loco-Focoism. And they were right, for Van Buren more than any other president before the Civil War was a representative of the more radical elements in the Northeast.

The Subtreasury bill did not become law until the last year of Van Buren's administration. Although it was passed by the Senate in 1837 and in 1838, it was defeated on both occasions by the House of Representatives, and it was not until 1840 that it was approved by both branches of Congress. Regardless of what one thinks of the economics

* The party got its name in 1835, when the conservative Democrats in New York tried to break up a convention by turning off the lights in the meeting hall. The radicals were prepared for such an emergency; when the lights went out, they continued the meeting with candles that they lit with matches called loco-focos.

of the independent-treasury system, its political significance is unmistakable: the government rather than private groups would now regulate the nation's finances and—in the words of Frederick Jackson Turner—the “so-called ‘money power’ [would have] . . . to operate more or less *sub rosa* instead of being an integral part of the government.” *

On only one other occasion during his administration was Van Buren able to put his Loco-Foco theories into effect. By issuing a proclamation authorizing a ten-hour day for laborers on Federal projects, he became the first President in the nation's history to adopt a policy that was designed specifically to aid the workingman.

86. BREAK-UP OF JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

THROUGHOUT Van Buren's four years in the presidency, the Whigs waged a relentless campaign against him and his Administration. He was blamed for the Panic of 1837, accused of appointing corrupt officials, and charged with turning the government over to a small group of unrepresentative radicals. Northern audiences were told that he was too friendly to the South, and Southerners were told that he had blocked Southern expansion by refusing to annex Texas.† In the West he was pictured as an effete, pleasure-loving Easterner, and in the East he was described to conservatives as more of a Jacksonian Democrat than Jackson. Many voters apparently accepted these criticisms at face value, for in 1838 the Democrats lost control of both branches of Congress.

In the campaign of 1840 the Whigs paid the Jacksonian Democrats the high compliment of emulation. Nominating William Henry Harrison, they proclaimed him a man of the people and a rough and ready defender of popular rights. Harrison, who had little in common with Jackson except his record as an Indian fighter, was put forward as a typical Westerner, and shortly before the election he predicted that most people would vote for him “on the same grounds as they supported General Jackson.” In an effort to capitalize on the South's dissatisfaction with the Democratic program, the Whigs gave second place on their ticket to John Tyler, a Virginian and a firm believer in states' rights. The Democratic convention renominated Van Buren, announced that the party would stand on its record in office, and left the selection of a vice-presidential candidate to “their Republican fellow-citizens in the several states.”

* Frederick Jackson Turner: *The United States, 1830–1850: The Nation and its Sections* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1935), p. 464.

† See Chapter XX, pp. 537–42.

During the campaign the Whigs succeeded in obscuring all the issues and in creating the impression that the "hero of Tippecanoe" was a Jackson-like figure who lived in a log cabin and preferred hard cider to any other drink.* In innumerable campaign parades, the Whig marchers shouted "Tippecanoe and Tyler, too," and carried banners inscribed with

*Farewell, dear Van,
You're not our man,
To guide the ship,
We'll try old Tip.*

Whig campaigners wore coon-skin caps, and no Whig rally was complete without a log cabin, barrels of cider, and pictures showing Harrison in a rustic setting. While all the homey and simple virtues of the frontier were attributed to Harrison, Van Buren was depicted as wallowing in urban luxury; and a famous campaign song contrasted Van Buren lounging on "his cushioned settee" drinking wine from "his coolers of silver" to Harrison on his "buckeye bench" sipping some of the apparently inexhaustible supply of hard cider. The outcome of the election revealed the success of the Whigs' tactics, for Harrison defeated Van Buren by an electoral vote of 234 to 60 and a popular vote of 1,275,017 to 1,128,702.

The Whigs had only a brief time in which to enjoy their triumph, for after a month in office Harrison died. Clay, who had expected to dominate Harrison, now had to contend with Tyler, who immediately demonstrated that he was more a Southerner than a Whig. An opponent of a high tariff, a third Bank of the United States, and internal improvements, and a defender of states' rights and nullification, Tyler had no use for any part of Clay's American System. The result was a virtual stalemate, for, although Clay controlled majorities in both houses of Congress, he could not command enough votes to override the President's veto.

Despite the conflict between the executive and legislature, the Whigs were able to abolish the independent treasury and to raise the tariff. Both Clay and Tyler were opposed to Van Buren's financial program, and in August, 1841, Congress, with the President's approval, repealed the Subtreasury Act. But the two men were unable to agree on a satisfactory substitute for the measure, and Tyler vetoed two bank bills enacted by Congress. Despite his principles, however, Tyler was compelled by the treasury's need for additional revenue to accept Clay's proposal for an increase in tariff duties, and in August, 1842, he signed a new tariff act. Under the terms of this bill, rates were raised to ap-

* Actually Harrison lived in a large and comfortable house in Ohio and never showed any particular preference for hard cider.

proximately the same level as in the tariff of 1832. But Tyler would accept no other part of the Whig program, and the only other significant measures adopted during his administration were the Pre-emption Act of 1841 and a bankruptcy act that was subsequently repealed. Even before the end of Tyler's first year in office the breach between the President and his party was complete. After Tyler's veto of the second bank bill, every member of his cabinet except Secretary of State Daniel Webster resigned, and a caucus of Whig congressmen issued a statement announcing that "those who brought the President into power can no longer, in any manner or degree, be justly held responsible or blamed for the administration of the executive branch of the government." Even this act was not enough for Clay, and he resigned from the Senate in protest—and also no doubt in the hope that he would be drafted for the presidency in 1844.

The deadlock in the Whig party did not interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs, and before Webster resigned as Secretary of State in 1843, he and Lord Ashburton, the British minister to the United States, were able to settle a number of disputes that had threatened the friendly relations of the two countries. Both men were ideally suited for their task. Webster, who on a visit to England in 1839 had met Ashburton and had been enthusiastically received by English leaders, wished at all costs to prevent an open break with England. Ashburton, a personable businessman and politician, had visited America on numerous occasions, was married to an American, and had as much respect for the United States as Webster had for England. Finally, the negotiations were facilitated by Tyler's co-operation and the determination with which he supported Webster's position.

One of the most vexing problems confronting Webster and Ashburton concerned an incident that grew out of the attempt of some Americans in the northern part of the country to aid the rebels in the Canadian insurrection of 1837. On December 29, 1837, a small group of Canadian volunteers retaliated against the interventionists by crossing the Niagara River and sinking the *Caroline*, an American steamship that had been used to supply the rebels. The United States immediately demanded reparations, but Lord Palmerston, the British foreign minister, refused to consider the American claim. The dispute was further complicated in 1840, when a Canadian named McLeod boasted in a New York City tavern that he had killed an American during the attack on the *Caroline*. When McLeod was arrested and placed on trial for murder in a New York State court, Palmerston threatened war and demanded the Canadian's release on the ground that a soldier performing his military duties could not be charged with murder. Just when it appeared that both sides would be compelled to resort to force to resolve their difficulties, developments on both sides of the Atlantic made



DESPOTISM

This cartoon, inspired by the doctrine of nullification and the South Carolina Ordinance of Secession, shows Calhoun and his followers in the act of disrupting the Union.

a peaceful settlement possible. Palmerston was succeeded as Foreign Secretary by the more conciliatory Lord Aberdeen; McLeod was acquitted by a New York jury; and Webster accepted Ashburton's apologies for the *Caroline* affair.

By concluding a mutually satisfactory agreement on the location of the boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, Webster and Ashburton were able to liquidate a controversy that had plagued Anglo-American relations for more than half a century. Commissions appointed under the terms of both the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent had done little to clarify the dispute, and a boundary proposed by the King of the Netherlands had been rejected in 1831 by the United States. By 1838, people on both sides of the border were prepared to take matters in their own hands. Maine and New Brunswick called out their militia, and Congress appropriated \$10,000,000 for the defense of American rights and authorized the President to issue a call for 50,000 volunteers. But no lives were lost in the so-called Aroostook War, for General Winfield Scott, serving as Van Buren's special representative, was able to arrange a truce in March, 1839. Neither side, however, abandoned its claim, and both Webster and Ashburton realized that the matter had to be settled once and for all. Under the settlement that they devised, the United States received a little more than half the 12,000 square miles in dispute. This division gave the Americans less than they thought they deserved, and it was partly to assuage their feelings that Ashburton agreed to the United States's claim to approximately 200 square miles at the source of the Connecticut River and accepted a minor adjustment of the boundary in the vicinity of Lake Champlain. For a time it seemed likely that both Parliament and the Senate would refuse to approve the proposed boundary line between Maine and New Brunswick. But a 1782 map in the British foreign office convinced Parliament of the validity of the American claim, whereas a different map of the same year, which was in Webster's possession and which tended to substantiate the British position, had a similar effect on the Senate.

The Webster-Ashburton negotiations almost broke down over the problem of suppressing the slave trade. The British, who had freed the slaves in their colonies in 1833, were making a strenuous effort to eliminate this trade and therefore wished to stop and search suspected slave ships; but the Americans, fearing that the right to search would quickly be converted into the right to impress, refused to grant the British this privilege. Because of the American stand every slaver, regardless of nationality, flew the American flag to prevent interference by the British. In 1841, additional fuel was added to the controversy when the ship *Creole* which was transporting slaves from Virginia to New Orleans, put in at the British Bahamas after the slaves on board

had mutinied and killed a white passenger. The British officials at Nassau had executed the murderers but had set the other slaves free. Despite the strained relations caused by the *Creole* affair, the matter was amicably settled by an exchange of notes in which it was agreed to turn the question over to a mixed claims commission. Meanwhile the larger problem of the control of the slave trade was resolved by a provision in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty that called for the armed patrol of the African coast by British and American vessels. The treaty went into effect in 1842; it was the single most important development in Anglo-American relations in the three decades preceding the Civil War and a notable accomplishment of an otherwise undistinguished Administration.

By the early 1840's Jacksonian democracy had ceased to be an influential force in national politics. The control of the Democratic party was soon to be taken over by the Southern followers of Calhoun, and within a few years Americans were to turn their attention from the economic issues of the 1830's to the question of the territorial expansion of the United States and the sectional dispute engendered in large part by the slavery controversy.

CHAPTER XV

THE NORTHERN FARMER

- 87. MOVEMENT FOR AGRARIAN IMPROVEMENT
 - 88. IMPROVED TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
 - 89. EXPANSION AND REORGANIZATION
 - 90. AGRICULTURAL SPECIALIZATION IN THE NORTH
 - 91. PROBLEMS OF THE NORTHERN FARMER
-

DURING the half century preceding the Civil War a large majority of the people in the free states were farmers. As the frontier moved westward, farmers and their families occupied the lands opened up for settlement. Although the growth of the agricultural West and the rise of industry deprived the Northeast of many of its most enterprising farmers, the New England and Middle Atlantic states still had a large and influential agrarian population. Both East and West, farmers adopted new techniques, increased production, and played an important rôle in formulating their sections' mores and ethical codes.

87. MOVEMENT FOR AGRARIAN IMPROVEMENT

AT THE close of the War of 1812 the status of the Northern farmer was little different from that of his pre-Revolutionary grandfather. Accustomed to the traditional ways of his forebears, often insufficiently supplied with capital, and almost totally ignorant of the principles of scientific agriculture, the farmer continued to till his soil, plant and harvest his crops, and handle his livestock as in colonial times. Moreover, an abundance of cheap land, a scarcity of labor, in-

adequate transportation facilities, and limited facilities for credit tended to discourage those who were inclined to adopt new techniques.

During the thirty years 1810-40, the position of the Northern farmer in the American economy was fundamentally altered by the development of industry, growth of cities, and improvement in transportation facilities. Farmers who previously had been compelled to depend upon unstable foreign markets were now able to dispose of their produce in the rapidly expanding markets of the Northeast. In 1790 this region had only three urban communities of more than 8,000 people, but in 1840 there were thirty-three with a combined population of nearly 1,000,000. In southern New England, where the rural population declined between 1810 and 1840, the population of the commercial and manufacturing towns increased by more than 300,000. There was a similar development in southern New York and eastern Pennsylvania. These growing urban centers not only furnished the farmer with a market for his products but also stimulated him to increase his output by improved methods.

The spirit of improvement engendered by an expanding domestic market was fostered and turned into effective channels by the numerous agricultural societies that came into existence during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Societies for the promotion of agriculture had appeared in America soon after the close of the Revolution, but their membership had been composed in large part of men who were only indirectly concerned with farming and whose interest in agriculture was largely literary and philosophical. As a consequence, their work had had little effect upon those who farmed for a livelihood. With the organization under the leadership of Elkanah Watson of the Berkshire Agricultural Society in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, in 1811, however, the character of the majority of these agricultural organizations gradually changed. Their membership began to include more practical farmers and fewer lawyers, merchants, ministers, and doctors. "The great object with us . . .," Watson wrote, "is to contemplate society in its actual state of existence, not as we could wish it. . . ." The new societies in many instances were able to catch the interest of the farmer and to improve his methods by holding annual exhibitions of livestock and agricultural tools and machinery, by sponsoring plowing matches and other practical demonstrations, and by distributing pamphlets.

The influence of the agricultural societies as agencies for agrarian improvement during the fifty years preceding 1860 varied greatly. County organizations multiplied rapidly between 1815 and 1825. According to Elkanah Watson, more than one hundred had been organized by 1820. There were county societies throughout all New England (except Rhode Island), in fifty-two of the fifty-eight counties of

New York, in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, and even in some of the states beyond the Alleghenies. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, these county societies were encouraged by a policy of state aid. Between 1825 and 1835, however, the movement rapidly declined. The award of prizes and premiums to gentlemen farmers with whom the working farmer could not compete, the failure of many farmers to obtain all that they had confidently expected from the organizations, hard times, and the withdrawal of state aid in large part explain the decline. But after 1835—and more especially with the return of higher prices in 1847—many of the older societies that had become inactive or had passed out of existence were revived and reorganized. New societies were also formed and state aid again extended. Between 1841 and 1857, state agricultural societies and boards of agriculture were formed in twenty-five states, of which only six were in the South. In the 1850's, the agricultural fair, sponsored annually by nearly all of these organizations, constituted one of the foremost agencies for the improvement of agriculture.

Northern farmers were also aided by agricultural papers and periodicals. In 1819, John S. Skinner, postmaster at Baltimore, established the *American Farmer*, the first notable agricultural journal in the United States. In its first issue the editor declared that his chief aim would be "to collect information from every source, on every branch of husbandry, thus to enable the reader to study the various systems which experience has proved to be the best, under given circumstances." Two months after the appearance of the *American Farmer*, Solomon Southwick started the *Plough Boy* at Albany. Agricultural journals multiplied rapidly during the next forty years. Of these, the more important were the *New England Farmer* (Boston, 1822), edited by the brilliant Thomas Green Fessenden; the *Genesee Farmer* (Rochester, 1831), begun by Luther Tucker; the *Cultivator* (Albany, 1834), established by the New York State Agricultural Society and edited by Jesse Buel; the *Western Farmer and Gardener* (Cincinnati, 1839), edited by Edward J. Hooper; and the *American Agriculturist* (New York, 1842), founded by A. B. and R. L. Allen. In 1853, Luther Tucker, who had united the *Cultivator* and the *Genesee Farmer*, established the *Country Gentleman* as a weekly. The *Cultivator* continued as a monthly until 1865, when it was merged with the *Country Gentleman*, which today claims to be "the oldest agricultural journal in the world."

Supplementing the periodicals were an increasing number of books dealing with agriculture. Some of these, like Henry L. Ellsworth's *Valley of the Wabash, Indiana* (1838), were little more than descriptive accounts of Western localities. Others, like Jesse Buel's *The Farmer's Companion* and *The Farmer's Instructor*, both published in 1839, stressed the advantages of scientific agriculture—drainage, deep plow-

ing, destruction of weeds, maintenance of livestock, application of manure, plowing-under of green crops for fertilizer, and crop rotation. Many volumes, dealing with agriculture, that appeared in the United States prior to 1850, were reprints of English works. Of all such books of foreign origin in America, none perhaps was as influential as Liebig's *Chemistry in Its Application to Agriculture and Physiology* (1841), which traced the relation between the nutrition of plants and the composition of the soil. Many farmers in their enthusiasm for "chemical agriculture" erroneously thought that if the soil, no matter how depleted, was enriched with chemical fertilizers, almost any crop could be grown. Farm papers were filled with advertisements of "chemists" and "professors" who for a fee of five or ten dollars would analyze the soil and advise as to its treatment.

Both Federal and state governments aided in the diffusion of agricultural information during the period from 1840 to 1860. Although President Washington in his last message to Congress suggested the establishment of a Federal board of agriculture, the Federal authorities did almost nothing in this direction for a half-century or more. It was not until 1839 that Congress, heeding the advice of Henry L. Ellsworth, Commissioner of Patents, appropriated \$1000 for the "collection of agricultural statistics, investigations for promoting agriculture and rural economy, and the procurement of cuttings and seeds for gratuitous distribution among the farmers." The appropriation increased each year until in 1856 it reached \$105,000. Meanwhile the United States Agricultural Society, organized in 1852, conducted a campaign for the establishment of a department of agriculture independent of the Patent Office, and in 1862 Congress enacted the necessary legislation. During its infancy, however, the new department did little more than collect agricultural statistics and distribute seeds and plants. In addition to these efforts of the Federal government, many states established boards or departments of agriculture; and a great step forward was taken when in 1857 Michigan opened an agricultural college, the first institution of its kind in America.

88. IMPROVED TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

AS IN the past, the Northern farmer was faced with the difficult problem of securing labor. Vast areas of cheap land discouraged the development in the North of a landless class that could be relied upon for agricultural labor. Consequently, the Northern farmer was frequently forced to rely upon the members of his family. His problem became increasingly acute when, with the rise of the fac-

tory system, his sons and daughters, attracted by what seemed to them a more remunerative and socially desirable existence, began to desert the farm for the mill town or larger urban center. Such New England boys as cared to pursue farming tended to go West. Immigration afforded little relief. Whenever the farmer could secure help from outside his family he was obliged to pay high wages.

The scarcity of farm workers made it imperative for the farmer both to supplement human labor by means of new and improved devices and to discover ways of making both labor and devices more effective. To this end, hand tools such as shovels, hoes, and forks were replaced by lighter and better-designed implements. The cradle, which gradually took the place of the sickle, was refashioned so as to require less strength and dexterity for its use. The horse-drawn four-wheeled vehicle or lumber wagon was for many purposes a great advance over the two-wheeled ox-cart. Plows were improved in design and form; and iron, and later steel, replaced wood in the moldboard, share, and land-side. Although the old triangular, or "A," harrow continued to be used on fields obstructed with stumps and stones, the rectangular hinged harrow came into use on clear land. The cultivator, introduced about 1820, revolutionized the tillage of such crops as corn. Horse-drawn, wheelless hayrakes, which could do as much work in a given amount of time as six to ten men could with hand rakes, were widely employed after 1820, although New England farmers were slow to adopt them. In the more important grain-growing sections, like western New York, threshing machines gradually supplanted the flail and the tramping horses and cattle, whose hooves had separated the grain from the straw. Patents for mowers and reapers were taken out early in the nineteenth century, but neither type of machine was widely used until 1840. Although many of the new devices were made on the farm or at the local blacksmith shop, factory-made tools were available as early as 1820. Whether factory- or home-made, however, their use practically doubled the efficiency of farm labor.

The introduction of new and better tools and machines was not the only measure taken by many farmers to increase the efficiency of their labor and the productivity of their soil. After the War of 1812, many farmers in the older settled communities of the East began to give more attention to fertilizing their land with barnyard manure. Although guano, rockweed, fish, and slaughterhouse offal were used in small quantities as fertilizers before 1840, commercial fertilizers did not have a wide market until later. Farmers made increasing use of wood ashes, however, and also of gypsum, lime, and marl. Few realized that these last were chiefly beneficial as correctors of soil acidity; most farmers, because the use of these minerals led to increased crop yields, erroneously labeled them fertilizers. Before 1815, gypsum, which came from

Nova Scotia, was costly. By the close of the War of 1812, however, new quarries had been opened up in both eastern and western New York, and by 1835 the price at the mills was as low as two and three dollars per ton; but the cost of getting it from the mills to the farm was still high. Lime was easily obtainable, and its use became general after 1820.

The improvement [wrote a contributor to The Cultivator, forerunner of the Country Gentleman] which has been effected within the last twenty years in several of the eastern counties of Pennsylvania (and especially in Chester) is almost incredible. And the whole is mainly attributed to a regular and judicious use of lime as a manure. . . . Some idea may be formed of the estimation in which lime is held here as a manure, by the fact that farmers come from 25 to 30 miles . . . to my lime-kiln and others in the neighborhood: The lime costing those farmers twenty-five cents per bushel when delivered. To the farmers in that quarter (Chester county), lime is the "anchor of hope"; there it has already made the barren and desert glad, and is fast putting a new and improved face upon the country.

Marl was used extensively in New Jersey, where a rich deposit from ten to twenty miles wide extends across the state from Sandy Hook to the Delaware River.

From 1810 to 1840 considerable progress was also made in livestock improvement. With the growth of urban population the market for wool, hides, meat, and dairy products expanded rapidly. This increased demand in turn stimulated the farmer not only to improve his stock by more careful breeding but to pay more attention to its food and shelter. Some of the most noteworthy advances in stock improvement during these years should be credited to the efforts of a few wealthy men who made progressive farming a hobby.

Up to the close of the eighteenth century most of the sheep raised in America were, in comparison with those of the Old World, undersized and unproductive both of meat and of wool. After 1800 an effort was made to improve the native stock by importing merino rams and ewes from Spain. As the price of woollens rose rapidly after the Embargo and Nonintercourse Acts and the War of 1812, the demand for merino wool also increased. In little over a year twenty thousand merino sheep were landed in American ports. When the bottom temporarily dropped out of the market for American woollen manufactures at the close of the war, the "merino mania" collapsed. With the recovery of the industry in the early 1820's another boom set in—this time not in merino, but in fine-wooled Saxony sheep. Bakewell or New Leicester rams were also imported, and these were crossed with native ewes for the purpose of developing better mutton types. Wool growing in the

East reached its height during the 1830's. According to the Federal census, the United States had 19,300,000 sheep in 1840, of which nearly 6 per cent were in the New England and Middle Atlantic states.

Native cows in the United States in 1810 differed little from those of colonial times. Except for attempts by a few wealthy men, practically nothing had been done up to this time to breed better specimens, either by selecting the most promising offspring or by crossing with improved strains. Housing conditions were uniformly bad; cows were often quartered in cold, filthy stables. Few farmers cared what their cattle had for food; many fed the animals only hay and cornstalks—and often only hay. As a result, the native cows, as one observer remarked, “were not very celebrated for anything.”

Few pure breeds were imported until after 1820. Between 1820 and 1840, Jerseys, Herefords, Guernseys, and Improved Durhams (or Short-horns), as well as representatives of others of the more important English breeds, were introduced; but little was done to blend the pure breeds with native stock. Instead, their wealthy owners built up herds of pure-blood stock that frequently were the center of attraction at the annual fairs and cattle shows, where they won many prizes. There was some improvement in native stock through selective breeding and more suitable food and shelter, but the average farmer did little to better his cattle during this period. A committee of award at the New York State Fair in 1841 regretted “that a matter so important as the improvement of our native cows does not excite more attention.” Nevertheless, reliable data indicate that there was considerable increase in the productivity of dairy cows between 1800 and 1840.

Hogs were raised on almost every Northern farm but were more numerous in the dairy and corn-growing regions. Even before the end of the eighteenth century, selective swine-breeding had begun, and by 1840 the old race of native swine had all but disappeared. Most of the more important breeds were importations from England, China, and Spain, and their handsome appearance and good qualities were in striking contrast to the rawboned, lank-sided, long-bristled, ugly-looking native swine. Of the 26,301,000 hogs in the country in 1840, more than 50 per cent were west of the Alleghenies. Hog raising in the East, particularly in New England, was rapidly declining.

By 1840, oxen, long the prevailing type of draft animal on Eastern farms, were being displaced by horses and mules. Many New Englanders, it is true, continued to use oxen for plowing and teaming; but Vermont and New Hampshire were noted for their excellent horses, particularly the Morgan breed. Pennsylvania had a reputation for producing fine draft horses; and in both Pennsylvania and New York, horses and mules were found to be much more efficient than oxen in operating hayrakes, cultivators, and other agricultural implements. In the West,

horses were used much more extensively than any other type of draft animal. Here farmers bred for both local use and the market; some kept a stallion and eight or ten brood mares. In the East most farmers gave little attention to breeding better draft horses.

Paralleling these efforts at livestock improvement were experiments to secure better varieties of seed. Wheat growers, long troubled by the ravages of the Hessian fly, the grain worm, and rust, introduced harder varieties from the islands of the eastern Mediterranean and from Egypt, Italy, and the Balkans. As a result, yields were greatly increased, particularly in the wheat-growing areas of Pennsylvania and western New York. Corn, of which there were dozens of varieties in 1840, was markedly improved by seed selection. Many farmers turned their attention to the improvement of the minor grains, notably rye, oats, barley, and buckwheat. After 1820, potato yields were enlarged through the use of more carefully selected seed. From the beginning of the century gentlemen farmers had been experimenting with mangels, turnips, and other root crops, but these crops did not attract more general interest until the 1830's.

Orchard fruits were generally neglected except on farms near urban markets. Grape culture on a very small scale had existed in colonial America, but the foreign vines with which the early acreage was invariably planted did not flourish in the New World, and it was not until native varieties—including the now famous Catawba—were developed that grape culture gained a secure foothold in the United States. German immigrants from the valley of the Rhine were undoubtedly the most skilled viticulturists in America.

During the years 1810-40 the transition from a self-sufficient agrarian economy to commercial agriculture began. Specialization and intensive farming first developed on a considerable scale in the vicinity of the larger centers of population. In these districts general farming gave way to market gardening and fruit growing. With the profits from his produce the specialized farmer not only increased and improved his acreage but supplied himself and his family with many commodities that under a self-sufficient economy he would have produced by his own industry. Specialization and commercialization boosted land values. Land in West Cambridge, Massachusetts, devoted to the production of garden truck for the Boston market, increased from \$37 an acre in 1830 to \$300 an acre in 1840.

Nevertheless, progress in the direction of specialized and commercialized agriculture was exceedingly slow during the first four decades of the nineteenth century. Conservative by tradition and habit, without business experience, and hampered by imperfect credit and marketing facilities, the average farmer was hesitant to abandon the familiar paths of self-sufficiency. Furthermore, his hesitancy was re-enforced by argu-

ments from the agricultural societies and farm papers in favor of self-sufficiency.

In regard to economy [run the Memoirs of the New York Board of Agriculture for 1821] the general committee would remark, that the farmer who understands and practices his own business in the right way, is a true economist: his farm should produce everything necessary to sustain life in a comfortable and respectable manner; and he should surround himself with everything that he wants, by his own industry.

Twenty years later Henry Colman, prominent New Englander, asserted:

It must be considered as an established principle in domestic economy that every farmer should look to his farm for all his farm can furnish him. Though it may seem better to sell his wool and buy his bread, yet in all such cases he pays a double commission to the purchaser of the wool and the seller of the bread, who must both get their living out of the operation.

89. EXPANSION AND REORGANIZATION

FROM 1840 to 1860 the area of land under cultivation in the free states was considerably enlarged by the settlement of comparatively large numbers of farmers in the West. As early as 1830, pioneers had converted into tillable acreage much of the forest-covered region that at the beginning of the century had extended from the Appalachians westward to the far end of Lake Erie on the north and beyond the mouth of the Ohio on the south. By 1840 they had reached the eastern fringe of the prairie. Many of them hesitated to push beyond this point, for the prairie country, though extremely fertile, was unwooded. The plains afforded no protection from wind and storms, and aside from rivers and occasional springs, the prairie settler had to rely upon wells for his water supply. Well-drilling machinery had not yet been perfected, and well digging with pick and shovel was at best an extremely laborious task. Furthermore, the region had little stone, believed essential by the Easterner for building, and the prairie sod was so tough that it was difficult to turn it with any kind of plow. Finally, the prairie at this time was without means of cheap transportation.

But the occupation of this region was only temporarily halted by these obstacles. As the number of immigrants rapidly increased and the better lands in western New York, eastern Ohio, Kentucky, and southern Indiana and Illinois were taken up, settlers began to move into the timberless area. By 1850 they had occupied practically all the prairie

lands east of the Mississippi that were not in the hands of speculators. Several additional developments encouraged this expansion; during the 1840's prices for Western wheat, corn, beef, and pork tended to rise; better farm implements enabled the farmer to sow and harvest more extensive fields of grain and therefore put a premium on the level, treeless prairie; and railroads that connected the grass country with the East opened up profitable markets for its farmers and enabled them to bring fuel and materials for fencing and building from the timbered regions.

The addition of a vastly increased farm acreage during the twenty years preceding the Civil War greatly aggravated the farm labor problem both East and West. Young men from Eastern farms went in ever larger numbers to the West. "A great proportion of our young men on arriving at the age of manhood," a New England farmer complained, "push their fortunes in the West, and take their farms on the rich bottom lands of the Mississippi, and its tributaries, leaving the agricultural portions of New England, with help scarcely sufficient to cultivate their lands in the ordinary way." Then, too, the Mexican War, the California gold rush, and the increasing demand of manufacturers and railroad contractors and operators for labor, drew large numbers from agriculture. At the same time, the farmer was unable to offer as high wages as the industrialist. In 1849, farm laborers in Rhode Island were receiving from \$12 to \$15 a month, whereas workers in the neighboring mill towns were paid from \$1 to \$2 a day throughout the year; and this discrepancy was typical of the entire North. In the West many acres of grain annually went to waste because of the scarcity of labor at harvest time.

Undoubtedly, the agrarian labor problem would have been even more keenly felt during these years had it not been for the continued development and introduction of improved tools and machinery for every stage of agricultural production. In 1837, John Deere, an Illinois blacksmith, turned out his first steel plow. Ten years later, in partnership with others, he set up a small factory at Moline, Illinois, which by 1858 had reached an annual output of over 13,000 steel plows. Although steel plows did not entirely supersede cast iron plows until after the Civil War, they proved extremely valuable to Mississippi Valley farmers because of the sticky nature of their soil. During the late 1850's several unsuccessful attempts were made to plow with steam. In many farm communities double harrows with finer teeth set closer together had taken the place of smaller and more primitive implements by 1860. Grain drills and seeders, reapers, mowers, hayrakes, and threshers were either invented or improved during this period and were widely adopted by American farmers. All these implements were partially responsible for the rapid growth of Northern farm production in the two decades preceding the Civil War.

Of the new machines, the reaper was probably the most important, for it revolutionized the production of wheat and other small grains. It was no longer necessary for the farmer to consider his acreage in terms of sickle and cradle.

The farmer [William H. Seward wrote] now plunges boldly with his reaper into the field, whether it is a field of ten acres, or twenty acres, or one hundred acres, or one thousand acres, and gathers the harvest within a period almost as short as that in which he formerly stood, with cradle in hand, studying the phases of the moon for auspices of the weather. . . .

While the amount of labor saved varied with the type of machine used and the condition of the grain, the reaper on the average enabled nine men to do in a day what before had required fourteen or fifteen. The reaper, moreover, insured against waste by enabling the farmer to cut his grain before it became overripe and shelled. In many instances it permitted him to enlarge his farm and get out of debt. In larger perspective, the reaper was to the North what the cotton gin was to the South.

Next to the reaper, no machine was of such importance to the grain grower as the thresher. Before its introduction, grain was flailed out by hand or trodden out by horses and cattle.

One of the most slow, laborious, expensive and wasteful operations performed on a farm [declared the editor of the New York Farmer and Horticultural Repository in 1829] is that of threshing grain by the flail. If the laborers are hired by the day, week, or month, they will not generally, if they do the work well, average more than five or six bushels per day. If they are allowed one-tenth they will indeed often thresh out ten bushels; but the attendance and inspection of the owner is necessary to check the preponderating influence of self interest in slighting work. Even in ordinary careful management on the barn floor, it is thought a quantity is thrown away with the straw equal to the seed.*

With good grains, seven or eight bushels a day could be flailed and cleaned. From twenty to thirty bushels a day for three horses, a man, and a boy was the usual performance where treading was employed. With a team of horses and a threshing machine four men could thresh twenty-five bushels of wheat an hour, and with larger machines much more.

The efficiency of the new harvesting machines depended in large

* One tenth of the grain threshed was the customary wage where the work was not paid for on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.

measure upon the power applied to them. As long as the plow, the harrow, and the two-wheeled cart were the only implements requiring other than human power, oxen were the principal draft animals. Strong, able to withstand exposure, and easy to maintain, they were by all odds the cheapest source of power. Moreover, they could be used for beef, and their yokes and chains were less expensive than harness; but their slow gait was ill-adapted to the new machines, and by 1860 they had been displaced by the horse and the mule except on the farms of more backward districts, where machinery was as yet little used. In 1839, Edward Harris of New Jersey imported Diligence, one of the first Percherons to be brought to the United States, and by the midcentury this famous breed of draft horse was firmly established in America.

While new techniques and improved implements helped emancipate the farmer and his sons from many exhausting labors, little or nothing had been done to relieve the drudgery of women on the farm. The houses were large and not always built with a view to saving steps for the women. With few exceptions they were without the most helpful of all kitchen improvements—running water. Few had cisterns. The women either lugged the water from a nearby spring or lifted it from a well by means of a rope or pole or a windlass. Occasionally a farmer would install a hand pump, but it was left to the women to operate. Wood fires and tallow candles afforded poor light at best. Seed drills, mowers, reapers, and threshers had helped emancipate the farmer and his sons from many exhausting labors, but invention had as yet done little for farm women. Modern plumbing and heating arrangements were unknown. Instead of septic tanks for the disposal of sewage there was the open privy, located largely by chance and forming an excellent breeding place for disease-carrying flies. The long hours of toil, the strenuous task of bearing and rearing large families, and the burden of performing multifarious duties under almost primitive conditions sent many farm women to an early grave.

Even the men, who were much more contented on the farm than the women, were not oblivious of the hardships of rural life. Hamlin Garland's description of Middle Border life after the Civil War applies to these earlier times as well:

Most authors in writing of "the merry, merry farmer" . . . omit the mud and the dust and the grime, they forget the army worm, the flies, the heat, as well as the smells and drudgery of the barns. Milking the cows is spoken of in the traditional fashion as a lovely pastoral recreation, when as a matter of fact it is a tedious job. We all hated it. We hated it in summer when the mosquitoes bit and the cows slashed us with their tails, and we hated it still more in the winter time when they stood in crowded malodorous stalls.

In summer when the flies were particularly savage we had a way of jamming our heads into the cows' flanks to prevent them from kicking into the pail, and sometimes we tied their tails to their legs so that they could not lash our ears. . . . We liked teaming and pitching hay and harvesting and making fence, and we did not greatly resent plowing or husking corn, but we did hate the smell, the filth of the cowyard. Even hostling [tending horses] had its "outs," especially in spring when the horses were shedding their hair. I never fully enjoyed the taste of equine dandruff and the eternal smell of manure irked me, especially at the table. . . .

90. AGRICULTURAL SPECIALIZATION IN THE NORTH

IN THE two decades preceding the Civil War there was almost no change in the variety of crops grown. Owing largely to westward expansion and increasing markets, wheat, corn, oats, rye, barley, hay, flax, hemp, potatoes, fruit and garden truck were produced more abundantly than ever before. The wheat crop of the United States in 1860 totaled 173,105,000 bushels as against 84,823,000 bushels for 1840. In 1840, four states, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia, produced 61.5 per cent of the total crop. Twenty years later, leadership had passed to Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michigan in the order named. The center of corn production also shifted westward, and in 1860 the leading states were Illinois, Ohio, and Missouri. By 1860 the West had greatly increased its acreage of oats, hay, and potatoes, although the East still led in the production of these crops.

The Western farmer was heedless in his exploitation of the soil. Cheap fertile land, lack of capital, the development of harvesting machinery, and better transportation facilities and markets were conducive to extensive rather than intensive agriculture. With some exceptions, little or nothing was done to prevent soil exhaustion or to increase productivity of the land. The Western farmer long believed that his soil was inexhaustible and did not need replenishment. Year after year he plowed his quarter-section and seeded it to wheat, unaware that each succeeding crop further deteriorated his soil. When yields at last began to decline, he blamed the weather, poor seed, and wrong sowing time. Even those who had barnyard manure at their disposal and knew that its application to the land would add to its available plant food often failed to apply it. Handling manure was not fashionable. When barnyards became so filled with it that they could no longer be conveniently used, the farmer moved his stables. Occasionally he carted the dungheaps off to a marsh or creek where they would "no longer offend the eyes and

nostrils of the aesthetic farmer." He seldom used commercial fertilizers, and he paid little attention to the rotation of his crops.

As with wheat and corn, the center of livestock production shifted from the East to the West. In 1840, New York and southwestern Pennsylvania were the leading cattle districts of the country, although northern New Jersey, New England, parts of Maryland and Delaware, southeastern Pennsylvania, and Ohio and Kentucky were scarcely less important. By 1850, the shift westward was evident, and Chicago was rapidly becoming a beefpacking center. As early as 1845, the *Chicago Tribune* was "inclined to believe that Chicago was destined to become the greatest beef market in the United States, if not in the world." On the eve of the Civil War, Texas, Missouri, and Iowa were the great cattle-grazing states, and Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana were the leading cattle-fattening centers. Sheep raising also increased in the West at the expense of the East. Even before 1840, many Eastern wool growers were aware that wool could be produced more cheaply beyond the Appalachians, and many migrated to the West with their flocks. By 1850, Ohio had displaced New York as the leading wool-producing state. Ten years later Ohio was still leading, but sheep raising was declining in the Middle West, as well as in the East.

Swine raising in the East decreased markedly during the twenty years preceding 1860. In New England the decline was more than 50 per cent during the 1840's. On the other hand, hog raising in the Western states increased, particularly in the corn belt. No less important were the improvements in Western breeds. Before 1840 nearly all the hogs raised in the West were long-legged, long-snouted, sharp-backed animals that were expensive to fatten; but by 1860 this type, variously known as "Razorback," "Alligator," "Landpike," "Prairie Rooter," "Seven Mile," and "Hazelnut Splitter," had been crossed with better breeds. Cincinnati, the "Porkopolis" of the West, did a thriving business. In 1849, it was estimated that sixteen million pounds of pork would be transformed into lard oil that year. Farmers at a distance from the market often found it more profitable to raise hogs than wheat. In 1860, 400,000 hogs were slaughtered at Cincinnati and 230,000 at Chicago. Western farmers had already learned that it was more profitable to market their corn in the form of hogs than as grain.

Agricultural expansion in the West brought hardship to the Eastern farmer. For a generation before 1840 he had faced increasing competition from the West, especially since the opening of the Erie Canal and the beginning of steamboat transportation. As early as 1828, Mohawk Valley farmers complained that they could no longer advantageously make pork for the Albany and New York markets because "the farmers to the West, where Indian corn is cheap, can now, assisted by the canal, afford to undersell us." The Westerner could undersell the Easterner not

only in pork but also in wheat, flour, wool, beef, butter, cheese, and potatoes. The establishment of through railroads between the East and the West during the 1840's and 1850's served to sharpen the competition, and Eastern farmers faced economic disaster. New England was especially hard hit; its wool growers and cattle raisers were virtually forced out of business. In 1854 it was estimated that Massachusetts obtained more than half of its beef supply from the West. New York and Pennsylvania, which raised six bushels of wheat per capita in 1840, produced only three bushels a person in 1860. Shipments of Western wheat to New England increased nearly 50 per cent during the 1840's. Similarly cheese production, for which Massachusetts and Connecticut had once been famous, declined rapidly.

In many sections of the East the competition of the West aroused resentment. On the other hand, there were those who clearly foresaw that the East could not hope to compete in the production of commodities that could be successfully transported from the West. William Buckminster of Massachusetts spoke prophetically when he wrote in 1838:

If more fertile regions can supply our cities with grain at a cheaper rate than we can, let us not lament. We shall find full employment in furnishing what cannot so well be transported from a distance. Fresh meats, butter, hay and the small market vegetables must be supplied by the farmers of N. England . . . ; if we fail to supply all the wants of our own markets we can furnish those that are most to our advantage. It is believed that the raising of grain of any kind and fitting it for market is the most laborious and the least profitable employment we engage in; and we should bear in mind that grain is the greatest exhaustor of the soil. The times are changed and we must change with them. We cannot now, as formerly, raise much grain for the market. The virgin soils of the West and the increasing facilities of intercourse with that region render it probable that much of our grain will be imported thence; and when no obstacles are thrown in the way of commerce, this is no evil. We purchase, not because we cannot produce the same commodity, but because we can produce others to more profit. Let them supply our cities with grain. We will manufacture their cloth and their shoes. Our artisans may eat bread from the West,—we will supply them with what cannot be brought from a distance.

Although some refused to accept this point of view and grumbled about what they termed their hard luck, the majority of New England farmers and those in the Middle states who suffered from the competition of the West either lapsed back into self-sufficiency or raised perishables for the local markets. Those who followed the second course were greatly aided by the growing network of railroads that brought formerly

isolated areas near to the markets. "Probably, in our state," Charles T. Russell of Massachusetts wrote in 1850, "there are now few farms not within ten or twelve miles of a railroad. They are thus enabled to send many articles to market, for which they before had none; while the transit of what they sell and what they consume is wonderfully cheapened." Undoubtedly truck gardening, fruit raising, and the dairy industry were very favorably affected by the spreading railway-net.

In fruit raising the East more than held its own. Few farms in the Northeast were without apple orchards in 1840. Up to this time, however, the trees received little care, and the surplus fruit was used for cider and feed for livestock. As the growing cities increased the market for fruit, farmers began to pay more attention to their orchards. Fruit-tree nurseries multiplied, old orchards were grafted and new ones planted, and horticultural societies were formed. By 1850, New York was the leading apple state, and the Hudson Valley and the southern shore of Lake Ontario were already noted as apple-growing areas. Long Island, central and southern New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland were also important fruit-growing districts, the last two being especially famous for their peach orchards. The peach crop of Delaware alone was estimated at 300,000 baskets in 1847. Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York were the leading markets. Berries of all kinds and melons were also produced in abundance.

In vineyard acreage and wine production, however, the West surpassed the East. In 1844, Nicholas Longworth, "the father of successful wine culture in the West," was reported to have had a vineyard of nearly a hundred acres. During the 1850's Longworth and others used German immigrants to operate extensive vineyards on the tenant system. In round numbers, 1,618,000 gallons of wine were produced in the entire United States in 1860.

In 1840 nearly three fourths of the total value of dairy products for the entire country was produced in the Eastern states; but by 1860, the dairy farming in the North was about equally divided between East and West. In the East, Vermont led New England in the production of butter and cheese, but trailed in the production of milk. The absence of refrigeration, which made it impossible to transport fresh milk long distances, coupled with growing urbanization, resulted in a marked increase in dairy farming in the industrial counties of both the Middle states and New England. In New York, the Hudson and Mohawk valleys had large dairies as early as 1815. By 1850 the dairy business of the state had expanded to include all of the central part of the state as well as the northern counties of Jefferson and St. Lawrence. Southeastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware, and northeastern Maryland produced great quantities of butter and milk for the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore markets. West of the Alleghenies, Ohio was the chief

dairy competitor of the East. In 1848 the Western Reserve, or north-eastern counties of the state, sent 15,593,000 pounds of cheese to the markets of the East and to Cincinnati and St. Louis. Although no important dairy center developed west of Ohio before 1860, many farmers in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin were already abandoning wheat farming for dairying.

Of the winter rations for the dairy cow, as well as for other livestock, hay was an important item. In 1840 the hay-producing area of the United States was confined mainly to the Northeast. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the hay supply came almost entirely from natural meadows. By 1840, however, many upland areas, with careful tillage, liming, and fertilization, were producing fine crops of clover and timothy. For the twenty-year period before 1860, New York led the states in hay production. Hay was also one of the principal crops in New England, where the output was 25 per cent larger in 1860 than in 1840 and of much better quality. Eastern Pennsylvania likewise produced bumper crops of hay. With the exception of Ohio, the Western states paid little attention to the cultivated grasses until the 1850's. Up to that time the farmer depended upon the wild marsh and prairie grasses, which grew in great abundance. As the West became more populous and interest in general farming and dairying increased, the systematic cultivation of improved feed grasses became more important. Although the East still led in hay production in 1860, southern Michigan, northern Illinois, eastern Iowa, southeastern Minnesota, and northwestern Missouri, together with Ohio, were producing almost 30 per cent of the country's total crop.

Ohio and Michigan were leading potato producers in the West, but the greater part of the potato crop was raised in the East. In 1840, New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey produced more than 70 per cent of the total crop of the country. New York alone raised thirty million bushels or 27.8 per cent. Southwestern Maine, Vermont, central New York, and Long Island were already famous for their large crops of high-quality potatoes. In all these sections, potatoes were as a rule planted on sod land or on land that had been in corn the previous year. Where the land possessed high native fertility or was heavily manured, yields of from four hundred to seven hundred bushels an acre were not uncommon.

Beginning in 1843, however, the flourishing potato industry of the East suffered greatly from the ravages of blight, or "potato rot," as it was then called. Unable to explain its cause and therefore unable to control it, the farmer looked helplessly on while the new disease rapidly consumed his crops. "The time was," a Federal official recorded in 1847, "when this crop was numbered among our most successful ones. . . . But within a few years there has been a sorrowful change, and through-

out almost the whole extent of the country where the common potato is cultivated, instead of ascertaining the amount of the crop, our attention is rather demanded to learn the amount of the loss suffered." The census of 1850 indicated that smaller acreage and the ravages of blight were responsible for an output of 65,600,000 bushels in contrast to 108,300,000 bushels ten years earlier. The potato crop in New England alone declined more than 40 per cent during the twenty years preceding 1860.

91. PROBLEMS OF THE NORTHERN FARMER

AS BUSINESSMEN, Northern farmers in general and those of New England in particular were backward. Although agricultural societies and farm papers provided them with ample advice, much of it was conflicting. Despite the work of Jesse Buel and John Johnston in the interest of better agriculture, consistent leadership was lacking. The exodus from the rural communities of the East to the cities and to the West deprived the Eastern farmer not only of labor but of valuable leadership. As Donald G. Nutshell declared, what farmers most needed were brains. "Wit, ingenuity, shrewdness, tact," he said, "seem to gravitate, all of them, into other pursuits, into cities, into shops, into courts, into pulpits: and the dullest of the sons takes the farm. I dislike to say it. I dislike to say it all the more, because it is so true."

But want of leadership was not the only difficulty; most farmers were without business training and experience. Few had more than the rudiments of common schooling. About the workings of the economic system they knew almost nothing. Sales and purchases were made largely through the country store. In buying seed, fertilizer, and implements, and in disposing of cattle, wool, potatoes, and other products, they were often the victims of sharp practice; as a consequence, they believed that all businessmen were tricksters to be avoided as much as possible. Though often unjustified, this attitude undoubtedly prevented many farmers from making desirable improvements and from heeding the advice of persons engaged in other pursuits. On the other hand, some farmers were not always scrupulous in their dealings.

Lack of capital and credit also severely handicapped persons engaged in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of farmers, instead of investing their surplus in new seed varieties, improved livestock, or labor-saving devices, used what profits they made to enlarge their houses or for various nonagricultural enterprises. Farmers, moreover, exercised little or no control over prices, with the result that returns from their surplus produce often did not furnish them with adequate working capital.

With the exception of milk producers and possibly market gardeners and producers of small fruit, farmers as a rule marketed their pork, butter, cheese, potatoes, and grain in late autumn or in winter. But the returns were not usually sufficient to enable them to support their families and at the same time secure seed, fertilizer, machinery, and labor that would yield maximum results. Consequently, they were virtually compelled either to borrow funds or to employ only half as much labor as they could have profitably used and to get along without fertilizers and much-needed machinery. The situation was summarized in the *New England Farmer*:

Their hired hands must be paid in autumn, if not sooner, and if they expect to get store goods and mechanics' work at a reasonable rate, they must pay as they go along. A farmer sells his pork, butter, cheese, grain etc. from January to April. The cost of producing all these was paid (or ought to have been) the summer and autumn before. His sheep are sheared in May, and should he be able to convert their fleeces immediately into money (which he cannot always do), still the whole expense of producing this wool, excepting about two months spring pasturing, was paid the year before, a considerable portion of it the August before.

It cannot be denied that a farmer can get along after a fashion with little or no capital, because it is done by thousands every year. . . . A farmer without capital, in the first place, will not perhaps hire more than half as much labor as his farm requires; of course all his work is slighted, and all done out of season, and half crops is the consequence. When the time arrives for paying his laborers, perhaps he will get something out of the store for them on trust, or borrow a little money to pay them in part, and put off paying the remainder until winter or spring, to the no small injury of his credit, otherwise he must force sale of some of his scanty produce at a reduced price, to make out the pay. In the next place he buys of the storekeeper wholly on a long credit, and pays a price accordingly, say twenty to thirty per cent more than the cash price. His dealings with the blacksmith, shoemaker, and mechanics in general, are after the same fashion. And thus he passes his life continually pinched for the want of a little money, incessantly harassed by duns, and once in a while appalled by a tap on the shoulder, though gentle it may be, of the practiced hand of the constable.

Banks were not interested in financing agriculture, and few farmers made use of bank credit. "Bank loans," Henry Colman wrote, "are in general too short and capricious to be safe or convenient for farmers; besides that banks never were designed for farmers; they are only for merchants and manufacturers, and for a much more numerous class,

who are the very curse of every industrious community, gamblers and speculators. . . ." Many farmers feared and distrusted bankers more than any other class of businessmen. "A farmer should shun the door of a bank," the *New England Farmer* warned, "as he would the approach of the plague or cholera; banks are for men of speculation, and theirs is a business with which farmers should have little to do." The country store was practically the only source of agrarian credit, although upon occasion a few well-to-do farmers made loans to their less fortunate neighbors. The country storekeeper of the midnineteenth century granted credit freely but at high cost. As a rule interest rates indicated the difference between cash and credit prices, though in some cases they were even higher. Country-store credit had other disadvantages of which not all farmers appear to have been aware.

Few farmers [ran an official Massachusetts report] keep any accounts, and before they are at all aware they have a long score on the trader's books, and that not only for the current price of goods, but enhanced by an additional charge for the delay of payment. But there is another circumstance in this case which is not always considered. In many instances the trader will purchase the produce of the farmer only upon what is called store pay—that is, making his payment in goods from his store. The farmer, in this way, is not only obliged to sell at the lowest market price, and pay the trader the profit upon his goods, but he and his family are induced to purchase a great many things which they do not need and which they would be better without. This leads likewise to the keeping of an open account; which if not most rigidly watched and frequently settled, is as sure as fate to surprise the farmer with an unexpected and heavy balance against him. This usually produces ill blood between both parties, leads to vexatious lawsuits and all the miserable consequences. . . .

The injuries and losses that farmers suffered from dependence upon the country merchant resulted in part from imperfect marketing-facilities. Farm marketing-organizations were almost unheard of in America, and, although some produce went directly from the farmer to the consumer, most of it was disposed of to the country store or to specialized salesmen. Frequently, farm produce passed through the hands of four or more middlemen before reaching its ultimate destination. The country merchant made little or no attempt to inspect and grade the pork, beef, cider, butter, eggs, poultry, grain, and household manufactures brought to him by the farmers in his community. Because the same price was paid for a product irrespective of whether it was good, bad, or indifferent, there was little incentive for farmers to improve the quality of their product, although middlemen, by refusing to pay "top prices"

for what they asserted to be second-class, lent some encouragement to the repeated plea of the farm journals for production of commodities of superior quality. Both country merchants and professional buyers often circulated false rumors for the purpose of depressing prices; and most farmers, hard pressed by creditors, were not in a position to hold their produce for more favorable quotations.

It is impossible to ascertain the extent to which these imperfect credit and marketing facilities were responsible for the increase in farm mortgages, but the available evidence indicates that at least one third of all Eastern farms were mortgaged. The relation between credit and marketing opportunities on the one hand and farm tenancy on the other is even more difficult to trace. That some farms were worked by tenants, mostly for a share of the crop, is certain. From one fourth to one third of all the farms in Warren County, New Jersey, are reported to have been operated by tenant farmers in 1843. The Wadsworth estate, comprising nearly forty square miles of the Genesee Valley in New York State, was worked entirely by tenants. There was also tenancy west of the Alleghenies, notably in the valleys of the Scioto and the Wabash.

On the whole, farms in the North were small. There were in the free states in 1860 only 787 farms of more than 1000 acres; and of these, 262 were in California. The average size of all farms in 1860 was 199.2 acres, of which 79.8 were improved land. Furthermore with the advent of Western competition and industrialization, much poor land, which at the beginning of the century had been under cultivation, was permitted to return to timber and bush.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOUTHERN FARMER

- 92. THE LAND
 - 93. THE PEOPLE
 - 94. THE GREAT STAPLES
 - 95. AGRICULTURAL METHODS
 - 96. FARM AND PLANTATION
 - 97. THE SLAVE SYSTEM
-

DURING the first half of the nineteenth century the South developed a distinctive way of life that set it off from the other sections of the United States. Although made up of a number of markedly different regions and inhabited by individuals representing every class in American society, the South had at least a superficial unity. Its overwhelmingly agrarian economy was dominated by the staples that it produced for consumption outside the South; its political and social institutions were controlled by a relatively small number of large planters; and all its people were directly or indirectly affected by the presence of slavery in their midst.

92. THE LAND

THE SOUTH embraces approximately one million square miles, or about one third of the area of continental United States, including the region extending from Chesapeake Bay south and westward to San Antonio, Texas, and up the Mississippi Valley to take in Arkansas, the greater part of Tennessee and Kentucky, and portions of Missouri. Physiographically, this vast expanse contains six fairly distinct

sections: an extensive low-lying coastal plain on the east and south; a deep embayment formed by the Mississippi and its tributaries; the elevated plain or piedmont plateau; the Appalachian Mountains; the western plateau beyond the Cumberland and Allegheny escarpment; and the prairie plateau west of the Mississippi.

The coastal plain, extending the entire length of the seaboard, rises gently at the rate of a few feet a mile from the swampy, indented coast to the head of navigation, or fall line, on the west. Nowhere does it attain an elevation of more than three hundred feet. Stretching southwestwardly from Baltimore and Washington through Richmond, it reaches a width of two hundred miles in North Carolina, embraces all of Florida and the territory south of an irregular line running from Columbus on the Chattahoochee to Paducah, thence southwestwardly to Little Rock, Fort Worth, Austin, and San Antonio. Its soil, the product of decomposed rock, is excessively sandy and contains little or no lime. Exposed to the rays of the long summer sun, it tends to bake or harden and to resist moisture percolation. In sharp contrast to the light, sandy soil that covers most of the coastal plain are the alluvial strips and pockets bordering the larger streams from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, and the very fertile clay-limestone areas in Alabama known as the black belt, the black waxy zone of Texas between Dallas and Austin, the region about the Delaware and Chesapeake bays, a broad wedge-like strip on the Flint and Chattahoochee rivers, and the present rice-growing district in south-central Louisiana.

The Mississippi embayment, marking the site of an estuary that once extended as far north as the mouth of the Ohio, was formed by the silting of the Mississippi. Where protected by levees and not waterlogged, its soil is admirably suited for cotton growing and truck gardening. Westerly winds have carried silt dust from the dried mud flats and deposited it on the adjacent bluffs that extend from Memphis to Natchez and beyond, thus forming a loess of great fertility but subject to easy erosion. "The soil," wrote Stephen F. Austin, referring to the Natchez region in 1812, "is very good and produces well for a few years until wash'd away by the rain."

The rolling area between the coastal plain and the Appalachian Mountains, extending southwestward from New York to east-central Alabama, has been known since colonial times as the piedmont. In altitude it varies from a hundred to a thousand feet. Its soil, formed by the decomposition of granite and other crystalline rocks, consists largely of heavy clays and clay loams that, with the addition of sufficient moisture and humus, are excellent for agriculture. Occasionally rock formations protrude. The entire territory is drained by an intricate system of small streams that empty into major streams like the Potomac, James, Roanoke, Savannah, and Chattahoochee. Most of the region was once cov-

ered with forests of hardwood, but the Indians, before the coming of the Europeans, had cleared considerable tracts by means of fire. In its denuded state, the rolling surface of the piedmont offers little or no resistance to erosion; the rivers run bright brick-red in time of flood and cloudy in dry weather; and innumerable gullies disfigure the landscape.

Separating the piedmont from the Cumberland and Allegheny escarpment is the Appalachian chain, which reaches a height of six thousand feet in North Carolina. Containing remarkable coal and iron fields as well as lead, zinc, oil, gas, manganese, limestone, cement rock, glass sands, phosphates, salt, and building stone, this area is almost wholly unfitted for agriculture with the exception of a great corrugated-limestone valley extending from Pennsylvania to Georgia. This valley, some forty miles in width and bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge, is known in its upper reaches as the Shenandoah. Though unsuited by climate for the production of Southern staples, it has long excelled every other section of the South, except the Kentucky and Nashville basins, for grass, grain, livestock, and fruit.

Beyond the Cumberland and Allegheny escarpment lies what is known as the western plateau, extending from Cincinnati to northern Alabama. Except for level bits and isolated coves, the lean soil and rugged contour of its eastern portion render it unfit for profitable farming. To the westward, however, the plateau gradually melts into gentler terrain, and its three great limestone basins, the Kentucky "Bluegrass," the Nashville district, and the Tennessee Valley of northern Alabama, are among America's most fertile agricultural areas.

The prairie plateau west of the Mississippi, the youngest region of settlement in the antebellum South, is separated from the valley of the Missouri by the Ozark Mountain plateaus, which extend as far eastward as the Mississippi. It embraces all southwestern Arkansas, the western half of Louisiana, and all Texas east of Fort Worth, Austin, and San Antonio. Like the fertile areas of the coastal plain and the piedmont, this region is ideally suited for the production of Southern staples.

As important as soil in shaping the civilization of the pre-Civil War South was climate. Although the southern tip of Florida is the only part of the South that is tropical, much of the region, with the exception of the Appalachians, has, in comparison with the North, lengthy summers of from six to nine months. The growing season is so long that in some parts three crops of vegetables can be raised in a year. Peas, beans, sweet potatoes, and the smaller fruits grow in great abundance. Because of the extreme heat and the tendency of an otherwise abundant rainfall to run off instead of soaking in, shallow-rooted vegetation easily parches, and by comparison with the North, the greater part of the South is ill-suited for grass and grain, with the exception of rice, which is artificially watered. As a consequence, the pre-Civil War South did

not specialize in livestock, and this in turn made the problem of maintaining the fertility of the soil more difficult.

93. THE PEOPLE

SIX fairly distinct social groups, or classes, differentiated from one another very largely by economic circumstances, comprised the South's antebellum population. Firmly established at the top was the planter aristocracy, consisting largely of cotton magnates. This group owned extensive tracts and numerous slaves; it included in its ranks the Cobbs, the Aikens, the Hairstons, and other agrarian millionaires. These planters numbered only three or four thousand out of a total population of approximately nine and a half million in 1850, but they monopolized the wealth of the entire section. Within the class itself the comparative prestige of individual families was closely related to the agrarian capital controlled by each. Capable, conservative, and usually well educated and widely traveled, these aristocrats, rather than merchants, bankers, and lawyers, determined the customs and usages of their respective communities. Such unquestioned economic and social supremacy in the hands of an able leisure class naturally brought with it considerable political influence, which, throughout the South at least, amounted to virtual domination.

More numerous and less wealthy than the great planters were the middle-class farmers and well-to-do townsmen. The landowners who held from five to twenty slaves differed somewhat from their wealthier and more aristocratic neighbors in that they devoted more attention to general farming than to the production of staple crops. In origin they were often immigrants or descendants of immigrants who had come to America as indentured servants. In personal characteristics and social life they formed a distinct class. Yet if they were less given to lavishness than the more affluent planters, it was usually for want of means, and like the planter barons, they were stout defenders of the South and its institutions. The merchants and professional men of the towns were associated with the planters and middle-class farmers in business and society and consequently shared their interests and point of view. Because the prosperity of even the largest cities of the antebellum South was dependent upon the well-being of the agricultural community, the ideals of the section were those of the plantation rather than of the town.

Small farmers, white mechanics, and lesser tradesmen made up the yeomanry of Southern society. Comparatively poor—for few of those who owned land had slaves, and many had neither—the members of

this group closely resembled in family traditions, religious opinions, and household arrangements the artisans and middle-class farmers of the North. In capacity they varied all the way from the highly intelligent and ambitious to the illiterate and commonplace whose chief concern was a meager existence. Some aspired to be wealthy planters, but most were content to keep from slipping down the economic scale. Fond of sociability, the reputation of this class for hospitality was not surpassed by that of the well-to-do planters. In matters of faith, by far the greater number were Baptists, Methodists, or Presbyterians. All were more or less versed in political lore and, with some exceptions, subscribed to Jacksonian doctrines. Many were as enthusiastic in their support of slavery and sectionalism as those whose benefits from both had been materially greater. From the ranks of the yeomanry came many of the plantation overseers and occasionally a professional man or a political leader.

The "poor whites," inhabitants of the unproductive pine barrens, were in many respects the most unfortunate people in the South. Termed collectively "white trash" but known locally as "sand hillers," "crackers," "tar heels," "hill billies," "red necks," "wool hats," "rag tails," "bob tails," "clay eaters," and by other euphemistic names, they occupied the bottom on the social and economic scale among the whites. The planter's monopoly of the staple markets and the better lands and the lack of free capital had practically forced these people from their original holdings on to worthless tracts that yielded them a bare subsistence. The poor white lived in a one-room log cabin chinked with clay and straw; a few rickety chairs, a long bench, a dirty bed or two, a skillet, a rude cupboard, a rifle, and a spinning wheel comprised its principal furnishings. One or two ramshackle outbuildings housed his dogs, horse, cow, pigs, and poultry. On the small clearing surrounding his home he raised a little corn, a few pumpkins, and perhaps a small quantity of garden truck. His scanty crops were supplemented by hunting and sometimes by fishing. His clothing as well as that of his numerous family was homemade. Lank, angular, sallow-complexioned, a victim of fever and hookworm, addicted to tobacco and strong drink, he was in manner and speech listless, uncouth, and shambling. Few poor whites could read, and fewer could write; and among them ignorance and superstition were general. Frances A. Kemble in her *Journal* characterized them as "the most degraded race of human beings claiming an Anglo-Saxon origin that can be found on the face of the earth." Even the slaves, toward whom they were bitterly hostile, scorned them.

The highlanders, or mountaineers, resembled the poor whites only in externals. Both were poor, both lived rude self-sufficient lives, both were handicapped by isolation and ignorance. Usually, however, the life of the highlander was characterized by less squalor and less filth.

Psychologically, he was superior to the poor white. Although more or less addicted to bibulous habits, the highlander was frequently cheerful, amiable, sociable, hospitable, and intensely religious. Moreover, his idleness and laziness were not the results of vice, listlessness, and inertia; his narrowness of view and aversion to innovation were usually occasioned by his limited intellectual horizon.

Many planters, prompted for the most part by economic, sentimental, or humanitarian motives, freed some or all their slaves; and in this way there arose in the South a class of free Negroes. By 1790 the number of freedmen in Southern states exceeded thirty thousand, and by 1860 it was more than a quarter of a million. Although there were free Negroes in all the Southern states, they were most numerous in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Louisiana. Elsewhere the stringency of the laws regarding their status and the high price of slave labor tended to reduce their numbers. The free Negroes varied greatly in character and in talent. At one extreme were those who owned considerable property, including slaves; at the other were vagabonds who scarcely possessed the qualifications necessary to gain a livelihood. Many freedmen were mere squatters on waste lands or abandoned farms, where they tilled a few acres on their own account, and when occasion offered, worked for the whites at a wage. Like the poor whites, the free Negroes were considered outcasts of Southern society and with some exceptions were "regarded with distrust bordering on apprehension." The majority were without capital or the means of obtaining it. Few were educated, and in most of the Southern states, statutes debarred them from formal schooling. Moreover, numerous restrictions curtailed their freedom of movement and economic activity. In most Southern states, free Negroes were required to register before a county court and in some cases to give bonds for their good behavior. In some states they were even required to wear badges showing registry number, name, and occupation. They were usually required to have licenses for peddling and other forms of merchandising and were forbidden certain employments. Sometimes free Negroes were fraudulently re-enslaved; the kidnapping of freedmen for the purpose of selling them as slaves was a common occurrence. A few voluntarily converted themselves into slaves.

At the bottom of the social-economic scale were the slaves, who constituted approximately 90 per cent of the Negro population of the South. For the most part, however, they were concentrated in the rice-, cotton-, and sugar-producing areas. During the first half of the nineteenth century the total slave population more than doubled; but during the last decades of the period the increase was far greater in the newer states of the Southwest than in the old South. Indeed, slave ownership in the South was not widespread. Probably not more than 400,000

of the 8,000,000 Southern whites in 1860 were slaveholders; and of these, 277,000 owned fewer than ten slaves apiece. Allowing 5 persons to a family, at least 6,000,000 Southerners did not possess slaves and had no direct interest in slave labor.

Lack of industrial opportunity, the competition of slave labor, and the relatively high cost of good land made the antebellum South, in comparison with the North, unattractive to immigrants. Moreover, most of those who turned to America in search of greater economic opportunity knew nothing about the production of the leading Southern staples, and the climate was not always to their liking. Baltimore, Charleston, New Orleans, and to a lesser degree, Savannah and Galveston received large numbers of immigrants, but these cities were little more than points of debarkation from which most of the newcomers pushed on to the frontier. The Federal census of 1850 showed that Virginia, with a population of 894,000, had only 22,953 foreign-born. The Carolinas had even fewer; in North Carolina there were 2,568, and in South Carolina, 8,508. In all three states the foreign-born were concentrated in the larger cities and in the mountainous western counties. In 1860 only 4.4 per cent of the people of the South were of foreign birth as compared with 18.7 per cent for the remainder of the country.

The population of the agrarian South was much more diffused than that of the North. In 1860 the Northern states had an average of 20.59 persons per square mile and the South, 13.65. The fact that the South had fewer large cities than the North partly explains this difference. Baltimore, the largest Southern city, in 1860 had a population only slightly larger than that of New York in 1830. Compared with many Northern towns Richmond, Savannah, Mobile, Nashville, and Louisville grew slowly; and between 1850 and 1860, Charleston remained almost stationary. Nor were the cities of the South surrounded by numerous towns and villages as were the larger urban communities of the North. Furthermore, from colonial times to about 1850 there was a more or less continual outpouring of persons from the older Southern states to the territories of the West, Southwest, and Northwest. The planters of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, discouraged by the small returns from their wornout land, were virtually compelled by economic necessity to choose between disposing of their slaves and making a bare livelihood for themselves and their families on the old homesteads or migrating to richer lands. Thousands moved to the cotton lands of Alabama, Mississippi, and adjacent Southwest territories.* Other thousands of middle-class and yeoman farmers, discontented

* The Alabama-Mississippi population increased in round numbers from 40,000 in 1810 to 200,000 in 1820, 445,000 in 1830, 965,000 in 1840, 1,377,000 in 1850, and 1,660,000 in 1860.

with their social-economic status and enticed by accounts of opportunities for quick riches beyond the mountains, also migrated. Some went to the prairies of the Northwest, but a larger number followed the great planters to the lower South, where, as William Dodd observed, they hoped that they would be able to "preëempt a tract of government land, buy a slave or two, and [then] set up as planters." * By 1850 there were 388,059 Virginians and 127, 799 Marylanders living in other states. The white population of several piedmont and tidewater counties of both states was no greater in 1850 than in 1820 or 1830, and in a few instances it was even less. The Carolinas, too, lost thousands of citizens who turned westward in quest of fresh lands and a better living.

The rapid expansion westward of Southern agriculture and soil exhaustion were principally responsible for the decline of the older communities east of the Appalachians. The exhausted or semi-exhausted soils of the Old South could not compete successfully with the level lands of the alluvial or prairie regions, free from stumps and rocks. Moreover, before the introduction of railroads many piedmont planters were compelled to haul their products long distances over poor roads, whereas many of the Western planters were near navigable rivers, convenient to such great exporting cities as Mobile and New Orleans. Furthermore, the greater productivity of Southwestern lands enabled the Southwest to overbid the older planting regions for their labor force. The high prices for slave labor, occasioned in part by Western competition, made it difficult for the planters of the older regions to readjust their agriculture and restore the fertility of their soils. During the ten years preceding the Civil War the demand for slave labor in railway construction, mining, lumbering, and manufacturing in some of the border states aggravated the labor problem of the planters of the Old South.

94. THE GREAT STAPLES

GENERAL farming was carried on in some Southern localities—notably the Shenandoah Valley and the Bluegrass country—but by far the greater portion of the tillable land was devoted to the production of the great commercial staples: tobacco, rice, sugar cane, and cotton. Each was produced in more or less irregularly defined and sometimes overlapping zones, depending upon climate. The area including southern Maryland, Virginia east of the Blue Ridge, northern North Carolina, northern and western Kentucky, northwest Tennessee, and the eastern and north-central counties of Missouri had a growing

* William E. Dodd: *The Cotton Kingdom* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1919), p. 32.

season averaging six months and constituted the heart of the tobacco country. Rice, with a growing season of nine months, was concentrated along the coast of the Carolinas and Georgia and in the delta of the Mississippi, and sugar cane, with a similar season, was concentrated in Louisiana and about Galveston. The cotton belt, with seven- to nine-month summers, varied in width from two hundred miles in Carolina and Texas to six or seven hundred miles in the Mississippi Valley and extended more than a thousand miles from Albemarle Sound to San Antonio. Wheat and corn were grown as main crops in some localities of Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, where normally tobacco might have been produced.

Tobacco culture in the South before 1840 had changed little since colonial times. In late winter or very early spring the almost microscopic seeds were sown in a seedbed. The young plants were protected from frost by cloth or brush coverings and from insect pests by various kinds of powders. At the end of spring and immediately following copious rains the plants were "set out" in hills usually about three feet apart in fields made ready by tillage. Cultivation with plow and hoe began almost at once and continued until the leaf spread made further tillage impossible. During growth the plants had to be "topped"—the process of cutting off the whole top when the flower or bud appeared, so that the stalk leaves might receive more nourishment and thus become larger—"suckers," or branch shoots, had to be removed, and hornworms, or tobacco caterpillars, and other injurious pests had to be destroyed. Sometimes the bottom leaves were removed from the growing plants, but this practice, known as priming, was far from universal. In late summer or early autumn, when the leaves began to yellow, the plants were cut. After they had wilted in the field, they were carried to specially constructed barns, where they were hung up to air cure or put through a special process of fire curing. The following spring, when the weather was moist, the leaves were stripped, graded, and packed in hogsheads for market. From the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, a thousand pounds per acre was the standard of a good crop. On an average, each acre of tobacco required the work of a full-time laborer.

At the opening of the nineteenth century, tobacco occupied first place among the Southern staples, and more than one half of the total Southern population was engaged in, or dependent upon, its cultivation. Its supremacy, however, soon came to an end. First, the War of 1812 and the embargo and nonintercourse measures preceding it curtailed the market for Southern tobacco. In 1806, tobacco exports totaled 83,186 hogsheads; in 1808, they fell to 9,576 hogsheads, and in 1814, to 3,125 hogsheads. Europeans turned to Cuba, Colombia, and Sumatra for supplies, and some began to produce their own leaf tobacco. Moreover,

several European countries levied higher import taxes on luxuries, including tobacco. Second, and more important perhaps, was the competition of cotton, whose profitableness, thanks to the cotton gin, spinning jenny, and power loom, was rapidly increasing. From 1800 to 1840 the production of Southern tobacco was relatively unprofitable.

But after 1840 the industry took on new life. The introduction in 1837 of charcoal heat for curing tobacco enabled the grower to produce the "bright yellow"—a popular leaf; and in 1852 the lemon-colored leaf, a new variety that soon gained fame at home and abroad, was introduced in North Carolina. This new leaf perhaps more than any other single factor helped the South to regain its former European markets. During the decade 1850–60 tobacco production increased 115 per cent.

Rice culture was confined to a more restricted area than tobacco. Because of the need for an abundant supply of fresh water, the floodplains on the tidal course of a fresh-water stream were selected for the crop. Along the bank of the stream a wall of earth, or levee, was thrown up. Behind the levee a main ditch was dug, connected at right angles with tributary ditches that divided the field into plots of substantially an acre. At high tide the fields could be flooded by admitting water through gates in the levee, and in like manner, they could be drained at low tide. The seed was sown in shallow drills from twelve to fifteen inches apart. The process of watering varied somewhat, but commonly water was let in when the seedlings were breaking through the ground ("point flow"), again in midseason ("long flow"), and still again when the stalks were approaching maturity ("lay-by flow"). Weeds and grass were removed between flows. After the last flow was drained, the grain was cut with a sickle, bound into sheaves and stacked, and then threshed and milled.

Long before 1850, American rice culture was greatly improved by both seed selection and cultivation. Among other things the so-called white seed was supplanted by the superior "golden seed." Many planters made systematic efforts to keep up the fertility of their rice soils, and some were successful. Nevertheless, others by repeated cropping practically ruined their acres for further production; and both crop and land were sometimes destroyed by floods or by salt water driven inshore by hurricanes. Output depended on acreage, soil fertility, and season; in 1850 it totaled more than 245,000,000 pounds, the maximum crop produced in this period. Four fifths of the annual crop came from the coastal regions of South Carolina and Georgia. Carolina rice was reputed to be the best in the world, but its output declined considerably between 1850 and 1860.

Climatic conditions narrowly confined the profitable production of cane sugar to southern Louisiana and to the southeastern coast of Texas. The first commercially successful crop of sugar in Louisiana was produced by Étienne de Bore on his plantation near New Orleans in

1796. By 1822, when steam engines were first used in the mills, the output was about 30,000 hogsheads of 1,000 pounds each, and 1,500,000 gallons of molasses. Five years later, when the output had trebled, the state had 308 sugar plantations employing 21,000 slaves. By 1844 the number of plantations had increased to 762 and their slave hands to more than 50,000. Despite frosts, floods, outside competition and low prices, the industry expanded, and in 1858 the 1,288 cane-growing plantations produced 362,296 hogsheads of sugar. In the same year, forty Texas plantations produced some 6,000 hogsheads. During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Georgia was a promising rival of Louisiana, but because the climate was unfavorable and cotton culture afforded greater profits, Georgia planters abandoned the industry.

Compared with tobacco and cotton, the production of sugar was extremely arduous. The cane fields, varying greatly in size, were seeded by laying two or three rows of cane parallel in deep furrows about five feet apart and then turning the soil over them with a plow. As soon as the shoots began to emerge from the eyes at the joints of the buried stalks, cultivation was begun and continued almost to the time of harvest. The cane was allowed to stand until just before the frost period. It was then cut. With four strokes of a heavy knife each stalk was stripped of its leaves, topped, and severed from its root. The stalks were then carted to the mill, where the juice was extracted and transformed into sugar and molasses. Men were better able than women and children to perform these tasks.

Before 1860, numerous improvements enabled the sugar producer to increase his yield per acre. These improvements included deeper plowing, better drainage, fertilization, the introduction of new varieties of cane,* better milling machinery and processes, and the substitution of coal for fuel.

Of all the Southern staples, cotton was in many respects the simplest to produce. The fields chosen for the year's crop were usually seeded in the month of April. The seed was somewhat thickly sown in drills three or four feet apart. When two or three inches above the ground, the plants were thinned to clusters twelve or eighteen inches apart. In another fortnight, when the danger of cutworms was past, the clusters were in turn thinned so that only the most promising plant in each cluster remained. Cultivation began soon after planting and continued until about the end of July, when the growth of the plant made further hoeing and plowing impossible. In late August or early September, the harvest began and usually continued until Christmas, or even longer if the weather was bad. The pickings, usually three in number, were en-

* Of the new cane varieties the striped and purple, both natives of Java and introduced by J. J. Cairon in 1817 and 1825, were the most important. The striped, because it ripened earlier, was especially popular.

tirely by hand. The amount of seed cotton per picker per day varied greatly with the character of the crop and the health, dexterity, and perserverance of the picker. The gin house, to which the picked cotton was taken, was a rather crude, barnlike structure some forty feet square, raised eight or ten feet above the ground on well-braced wooden pillars. The press for baling the cleaned lint stood nearby. Both gin and press were operated by draft animals.

In planning his cotton acreage the Southerner, whether one-horse farmer or large plantation-owner, was governed by his harvesting capacity, for he knew that a laborer could plant and cultivate about twice as much cotton as he could pick. It was customary, therefore, for many to supplement their cotton with other crops, especially corn, sweet potatoes, peanuts, cowpeas, and small grain. On a well-managed farm or plantation, a full-time hand was expected to care for from six to ten acres of cotton and from eight to ten acres of corn or its equivalent in peanuts and sweet potatoes. The winter months were usually devoted to clearing new lands, fencing, ditch digging, and breaking soil for new crops. The most careful planner, however, could never be certain about his cotton yields, for he always faced the possibility of too little or too much rain, frosts, insect ravages, and plant diseases. And whether his crop was large or small he had little or no voice in determining the price he would receive for it.

The machinery for marketing cotton did not differ essentially from that employed in the marketing of tobacco during the colonial period. By far the greater proportion of the crop ultimately moved through the four great export towns of Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans. A little cotton from the backcountry went to Virginia and to the interior markets of Louisville and Cincinnati, and some went overland and by river and canal to New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and the factories of the Northeast. The greater part of the cotton was consigned to factors or cotton brokers, who served both as commission merchants and as bankers. Each factor or broker sold the cotton shipped to him by the planter for a customary commission of 2.5 per cent. The proceeds were credited to an account, which was frequently overdrawn for the purchase of land, slaves, and other commodities. If the factor or broker served as the purchasing agent, as he often did, he charged a second commission of 2.5 per cent. Frequently he acted in the double role of seller and buyer of cotton. When the factor acted as banker and advanced loans to the planter, he charged interest varying from 8 to 12 per cent and often much higher. Often he required the planter not only to consign to him his entire crop, but to guarantee that the crop would not fall below a stipulated number of bales. If the crop fell below this guarantee, the planter was under penalty to pay the factor a percentage for each bale of shortage. In addition to commissions and interest on

advances, there were numerous other marketing charges, such as freight, storage, insurance, draying, weighing, sampling, and bale re-pairage. All things considered, the cost of marketing a bale of cotton ranged from \$2.50 to \$4.00, depending largely upon location, producing territory, and ultimate place of consumption. Several of the Southern states attempted to establish banking systems; but the banking facilities of the region, in so far as they gave credit to the planters, did so indirectly through the factors or brokers.

The Southern grower, like the producer of other agricultural commodities, was usually victimized by the existing market arrangements. Cotton brokers had special facilities, not enjoyed by the planters, for obtaining information relative to cotton acreage and other conditions. As early as 1805, a Liverpool firm began to issue weekly information concerning sales and imports, and other English brokers soon followed this practice. Southern cotton producers, furthermore, believed that brokers and other middlemen enjoyed undue advantages, and rumors that combinations of leaders were cornering or otherwise influencing or controlling the market often created great discontent among the planters. Credit institutions, particularly the Bank of England, were accused of influencing cotton prices adversely for the planter.

Although the great staples were the South's chief money crops, they by no means constituted its entire source of agricultural wealth. In every Southern state many planters and farmers produced much of their own food supply and sometimes had a surplus. In 1850, more than half of the entire corn crop of the United States was raised in the South. In the same year Richmond, which had become a great milling center, shipped to Brazil more than 90,000 barrels of flour, manufactured from Virginia-grown wheat. Lesser quantities of other cereals were also grown. Apples, peaches, sweet potatoes, and peanuts were especially abundant in the upper South, and the gardens of the planter and the more thrifty farmer often rivaled those of the North. Both fruit and vegetables were preserved in a great many Southern homes. The South also produced 87.1 per cent of the country's hemp, 36.8 per cent of the flax, 17.7 per cent of the flaxseed, and 80 per cent of its peas and beans. Several Southern states—notably Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Georgia, and Alabama—raised horses, mules, hogs, sheep, cattle and other livestock.

95. AGRICULTURAL METHODS

IN THE production of both staples and nonstaples the Southerner exhausted the soil. An abundance of land, scarcity of capital and labor, market demand for the great staples, ignorance, fixed habits,

and the desire for quick returns led him to follow ruinous methods. He paid little or no attention to crop rotation, drainage, or fertilization. Year after year he practiced shallow plowing and still shallower cultivation. By constant replanting of the same crop on the same soil he depleted it of its plant-food materials and developed soil toxicity. Many piedmont hillsides formerly rich in soil fertility soon became gullied and bare. In Madison County, Alabama, an observer noted "fields, once fertile, now unfenced, abandoned and covered with those evil harbingers, foxtail and broomsedge. . . . Indeed a country in its infancy, where, fifty years ago, scarce a forest tree had been felled by the axe of the pioneer, is already exhibiting the powerful signs of senility and decay, apparent in Virginia and the Carolinas."

A number of Southerners—mostly planters—aware of the vast acreage that year after year was becoming impoverished, began to urge reform. Outstanding among them were the Virginians, John Taylor and Edmund Ruffin, both of whom were enthusiastic and untiring advocates of deep plowing, crop rotation, and soil improvement by application of dung and calcareous materials; James H. Hammond of South Carolina, promoter of crop diversification, drainage, hillside terracing, livestock improvement, and fertilization; the Georgians, Jethro V. Jones, breeder of new strains of cotton, and David Dickson, skillful organizer, champion of new methods of plowing, planting, and cultivation, and exponent of making every laborer an expert operative; N. B. Cloud of Alabama, specialist in fertilizing, organizer of state and county agricultural societies and fairs, and keen supporter of the movement for some practical agricultural education; and Dr. M. W. Philips of Mississippi, all-round agricultural experimenter and propagandist. Taylor and Ruffin were particularly outstanding.

To disseminate information about their theories and experiments the champions of scientific agriculture depended largely upon agricultural societies and the press. With one or two exceptions, agricultural societies, both local and state, had been organized in every Southern state by 1850. In addition to arranging for papers and addresses on various problems of the farm and the plantation, these societies held fairs and plowing contests, gave prizes for improved implements and for the best methods of reclaiming worn-out lands, gathered information on improvements, distributed agricultural papers to their members, sponsored better agricultural education, and on every occasion gave their support to internal improvements that seemed likely to better marketing facilities. Supplementing the work of these organizations were such agricultural papers as the *Farmers' Register*, the *American Farmer*, and the *Southern Planter*. Although handicapped by lack of financial support, these papers served as a useful medium of communication for those interested in improvement. The *Farmers' Register*, established by Ruffin

in 1833, carried not only accounts of experiments dealing directly with agriculture but also articles on political economy relating to agriculture, chemistry, topography, soils, minerals, internal improvements, and the like. During its ten-year existence it was, in the judgment of many, the best publication on agriculture on either side of the Atlantic.

The success of the movement for agricultural improvement varied greatly from section to section. The reformers found many planters and an overwhelming majority of farmers wedded to the older and more primitive methods and either opposed or indifferent to suggestions for improvement. "Let a farmer introduce an improvement in the art of husbandry and how slowly do those around him profit by his example," commented one reformer. "They work on with indifference, nay, nine out of ten shake their heads with that air so characteristic of agricultural obstinacy, and pertinaciously stick to the system which they and their fathers before them followed from time immemorial." In parts of Maryland and Virginia there was marked improvement in methods and output, and in both states soil exhaustion had been partially checked by 1860. Elsewhere throughout the South there was little progress except for the introduction of improved varieties of cotton.

The South was also slow to adopt improved implements and machinery. At the beginning of the nineteenth century most of the implements used throughout the section were the products of the plantation blacksmith or of neighborhood artisans. All were more or less clumsy and unstandardized. Not until the 1840's did the farmer and planter begin to accept improvements, but after 1850 the number of Southern inventions of agricultural tools and machines greatly increased. Richmond and Louisville became important centers of manufacture and distribution of factory-made implements. At the same time, Southern merchants began to introduce Northern-made tools and machines, though their customers often complained that the Northern goods were of inferior quality. The lack of adequate capital, the low cost of labor, the want of local markets where the improved implements might be displayed and sold, the ignorance of the small-farmer class, and aversion to innovations account in large degree for the failure of the Southern agrarian to make greater use of new inventions.

96. FARM AND PLANTATION

THE PRE-CIVIL War South was not a land of large plantations, but a region of farms interspersed with fairly localized plantation areas. In the great valley of Virginia, in the greater part of North Carolina, in the pine barrens, and in the hilly and mountainous

regions of Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky, farmers comprised nearly the entire population. Only in the cotton counties of the Mississippi delta was the small landowner unknown; elsewhere in the plantation South many small proprietors lived on the "thinner" lands adjacent to the plantations. Most of the large holdings were located in the tobacco areas about Chesapeake Bay and in central Kentucky, in the sugar area of Louisiana, in the rice and cotton regions of South Carolina, and in the Gulf South. Comparatively few plantations were to be found in the piedmont. At any time before 1860, nine tenths of the South's landowners were small proprietors.

By 1830 the farmers outnumbered the planters in every Southern state. Cultivating from fifty to a hundred acres or so, rarely owning slaves, living in a small and poorly furnished house, "earning by the sweat of his brow . . . a none too luxurious living, courteous, hospitable, withal simple, frolicking in mild fashion on rare occasions, voting for Jefferson and those he felt the followers in spirit of the great democrat, genuinely but not painfully pious after a Methodist, Baptist or Presbyterian fashion, raising—not rearing—a family of children, and sleeping at last with his fathers," * he was the typical farmer of the antebellum South. Unsung by poets and romancers, he managed by hard work to make ends meet, to give his children at least a minimum of schooling, and sometimes to send a son or daughter to a denominational college.

Although the piedmont and Appalachian valleys were predominantly farmer areas and are often referred to as the farmers' South in contrast to the tidewater, or planters' South, the farmer class was not confined entirely to these regions. Many farmers occupied the poorer lands between the plantations, marketed their crops on the wharves of their wealthier neighbors, and bought their supplies from the planters who ordered direct from the North or Europe. The farmer's crops and the methods of producing them did not differ greatly from those of the planter. Although few were slaveholders, the majority of the farmers feared that the abolition of slavery would release an unmanageable and dangerous mass of semihostile Negroes. This fact perhaps more than any other helps to explain why the farmer was not more antagonistic toward the planter, and why farmers volunteered in such large numbers for the Confederate armies.

The plantations varied greatly in size, ranging from three or four hundred acres to holdings of five or six thousand acres or more. Colossal estates were the exception rather than the rule; the average plantation consisted of about a thousand acres. Several planters, of whom Wade Hampton, Samuel Hairston, and Nathaniel Heywood were

* Howard W. Odum: *An American Epoch: Southern Portraiture in the National Picture* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1930), p. 54.

typical, owned vast tracts, but in few cases did their tracts comprise a single plantation. Heywood owned fourteen rice plantations, a cotton plantation, a considerable tract of pine woodland, and nine residences in Charleston. Hairston's properties consisted of many plantations lying in the piedmont along both sides of the Virginia-North Carolina boundary. From colonial times to the outbreak of the Civil War there was a tendency, particularly in the staple-growing areas, for the planters to increase the size of their holdings by acquiring adjacent farms.

As one man grows wealthy and thereby increases his stock of Negroes [a member of the South Carolina legislature said in 1805], he wants more land to employ them on; and being fully able, he bids a large price for his less opulent neighbor's plantation, who by selling advantageously here can raise money enough to go into the back country, where he can be more on a level with the most forehanded, can get lands cheaper and speculate or grow rich by industry as he pleases.

The great Mississippi plantation of Joseph and Jefferson Davis was made up of dozens of small farms whose owners were forced westward. Exhausted or abandoned plantations, particularly in the Atlantic seaboard states, were sometimes divided into farms and tilled by free labor.

Most of the smaller plantations and even a few of the larger ones were managed directly by their owners, who, in so far as possible, undertook the entire work of supervising the plantation's many activities. In general, however, the large plantation was managed by a hierarchy strikingly similar to that of the factory with its general manager, superintendents, and foremen. At the top, in charge of a group of plantations, was a steward, over each plantation an overseer, and at the head of each slave gang a foreman or "driver." Both stewards and overseers received their instructions from the planter. While differing in detail, these instructions were basically similar in that all stressed the importance of carefully supervising the slaves at all times and keeping them happy and well, and all emphasized the necessity of producing as large crops as possible. Planters who absented themselves from their plantations usually put their instructions in written form. Some planters required their overseers to keep a record of the weather, progress of the work, conditions of the crops, births, deaths, and sickness, and to submit such reports monthly.

From the standpoint of training and fitness, the overseers varied considerably. Some were ambitious but poor young men struggling to advance in the world; some were small farmers acting in a temporary capacity; some could find no other employment. Most were not overzealous, intelligent, or ambitious. One reputable planter writing in

1850 referred to the overseer class as "the cowhide fraternity . . . the most faithless and piratical of our population." In hiring overseers, planters sought men who were capable, sober, and not hot tempered. Many planters were convinced that young men recruited from nearby farms or from among white laborers in their own employ made the best overseers. Even these were sometimes disappointing, and the vexing problem of securing and keeping a good overseer was almost constant. The wages of overseers differed with time and locality. Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century it was common practice to engage the overseer on a share basis. But this scheme led to exploitation, and with the rise in slave prices it was abandoned in favor of a fixed wage supplemented sometimes by a partial food supply and the use of a house and garden. No uniform wage prevailed; the amounts ran from as low as one hundred dollars to six hundred dollars or higher yearly. In some cases a Negro foreman virtually managed the plantation, and on some of the larger ones the overseer had slave-gang bosses or "slave drivers," whose business it was to see that the slaves performed their tasks. Since these "drivers" were relieved of physical work and could inflict punishment on those under them, they were often mistrusted and disliked by both master and slave.

97. THE SLAVE SYSTEM


PLANTATION labor was almost entirely slave. Before the closing of the African slave trade in 1808 the native slave supply was augmented by slave cargoes from across the sea. Even after the passage of the prohibitory legislation there was considerable smuggling that was not checked until Congress in 1820 declared maritime slave trade to be piracy. To what extent smuggling went on after that date is unknown, but that it did not cease entirely is certain. Some authorities place the number of illicit importations between 1808 and 1860 as high as 270,000. In 1808 the United States had about 1,000,000 slaves, and upon these and their descendants—and whatever Negroes were smuggled in—the planters depended for their labor supply.

The closing of the African slave trade combined with the exhaustion of the soils of parts of Maryland and Virginia, the production of tobacco at smaller cost in the trans-Appalachia, and the production of cotton on a large scale in the Gulf states, tended to stimulate interstate traffic in slaves. The older planting East, unable to compete with the new West in the production of staples, and finding itself overstocked with labor, turned to the profitable business of supplying the Gulf-state planters with slaves. Many slaves were carried from the older regions

9. GROWTH OF NEGRO POPULATION IN THE SOUTHERN STATES, 1810-60

STATE	1810	1820	1830	1840	1850	1860
OLD SOUTH						
<i>Maryland</i>	145,000	147,000	155,000	151,000	165,000	171,000
<i>Virginia</i>	423,000	462,000	517,000	499,000	526,000	549,000
<i>North Caro- lina</i>	179,000	219,000	265,000	268,000	316,000	361,000
<i>South Caro- lina</i>	200,000	265,000	323,000	335,000	394,000	412,000
<i>Georgia</i>	107,000	151,000	220,000	283,000	384,000	465,000
NEW SOUTH						
<i>Florida</i>			16,000	26,000	40,000	62,000
<i>Alabama</i>		42,000	119,000	255,000	345,000	437,000
<i>Mississippi</i>	17,000	33,000	66,000	196,000	310,000	437,000
<i>Louisiana</i>	42,000	79,000	126,000	193,000	262,000	350,000
<i>Texas</i>					58,000	183,000
<i>Arkansas</i>		2,000	5,000	20,000	47,000	111,000
<i>Tennessee</i>	45,000	82,000	146,000	188,000	245,000	283,000
<i>Kentucky</i>	82,000	129,000	170,000	189,000	220,000	236,000
<i>Missouri</i>	4,000	10,000	25,000	59,000	90,000	118,000

PER CENT INCREASE OVER 1810





Based on U. S. Census Reports

to the new by migrating farmers and planters who sold them and used the proceeds for new homesteads. By far the greater part of the traffic between Virginia and the lower South, however, was conducted by firms specializing in this particular business. Each of these had its assembling headquarters, field agents, selling agency and auctioneers, and perhaps a coastwise vessel or two for transport. The peak of the long-distance traffic was reached in 1835, when it was estimated that dealers and emigrating owners had carried 120,000 slaves out of Virginia alone. After 1840 the declining price of cotton and the renaissance of Virginia's agriculture served somewhat to check the southward flow.

Masters were understandably eager to dispose of slaves who were indolent, unruly, or suspected of misdemeanors, and frequently even of those who for one reason or another were beginning to lose their vigor and vitality. The dealers on the other hand preferred "likely Negroes from ten to thirty years old." Such were men who had been "drivers" or who were artisans, women who were comely or expert in some domestic art, and laborers of either sex who were physically strong. Dealers assembled their purchases in private stockades, public jails, taverns, and warehouses. Those slaves not shipped in coastwise vessels or by river steamers were sent overland in coffles and often were disposed of to planters and townsmen along the way. Prices, which varied from decade to decade and from locality to locality, were governed in large measure by staple prices. At the beginning of 1837, when cotton was selling at \$.13 a pound in New York City, an able-bodied Virginian field hand would sell for as high as \$1100. In 1845, when cotton reached the low-water mark of \$.05 a pound, an able-bodied slave would bring only \$500.

Of all the Southern whites the slave trader was the most despised—even in the South he was as a rule socially ostracized. In 1860, D. R. Hundley of Alabama wrote:

Preeminent in villainy and a greedy love of filthy lucre stands the hard-hearted Negro trader. . . . Some of them, we do not doubt, are conscientious men, but the number is few. Although honest and honorable when they first go into the business, the natural result of their calling seems to corrupt them; for they usually have to deal with the most refractory and brutal of the slave population, since good and honest slaves are rarely permitted to fall into the unscrupulous clutches of the speculator. . . . He is outwardly a coarse, ill-bred person, provincial in speech and manners, with a cross-looking phiz, a whisky-tinctured nose, cold, hard-looking eyes, a dirty, tobacco-stained mouth, and shabby dress. . . . He is not troubled evidently with a conscience, for although he habitually separates parent from child, brother from sister, and husband from wife, he is yet one of the jolliest dogs alive, and never evinces the



10. SLAVES AND COTTON IN THE SOUTH, 1860

These maps show the high correlation between the principal areas of cotton production in 1860 and the highest density of Negro slave population.

least sign of remorse. . . . Almost every sentence he utters is accompanied by an oath. . . . Nearly nine-tenths of the slaves he buys and sells are vicious ones, sold for crimes and misdemeanors, or otherwise diseased ones sold because of their worthlessness as property. These he purchases for about one-half what healthy and honest slaves would cost him; but he sells them as both honest and healthy, mark you! So soon as he has completed his "gang" he dresses them up in good clothes, makes them comb their kinky heads into some appearance of neatness, rubs oil on their dusky faces to give them a sleek healthy color, gives them a dram occasionally to make them sprightly, and teaches each one the part he or she has to play; and then he sets out for the extreme south. . . . At every village of importance he sojourns for a day or two, each day ranging his gang in a line on the most busy street and whenever a customer makes his appearance the oily speculator button-holes him immediately and begins to descant in the most highfalutin fashion upon the virtuous lot of darkness he has for sale. . . . So honest! so truthful! so dear to the hearts of their former masters and mistresses! Ah! Messrs. Stock-Brokers of Wall Street—you who are wont to cry up your rotten railroad, mining, steamboat and other worthless stocks—for ingenious lying you should take lessons from the southern Negro trader.

Closely related to slave trading was slave hiring, which was common in all Southern states. When confronted with financial reverses or with the opportunity to profit by the transaction, the slave owner gladly rented his chattels to others. Many thousands of slaves were annually rented as household servants for private families, boarding houses, and hotels. Even larger numbers were hired to work in fields, forests, mines, and on construction jobs. Merchants, mechanics, contractors, drovers, and others hired slaves as helpers. Small farmers, unable to buy a slave, frequently hired one for part time. Slaves were hired out either directly by the owner or through an agent. Those who hired them succeeded temporarily to the owner's authority over, and obligations to, the slave. Although treatment accorded the slave varied, it was always to the interest of the owner to see that his property did not suffer physical injury.

To carry on the work of the plantation the slaves were divided according to strength and ability into classes: field hands, carpenters, blacksmiths, bricklayers, house servants, and the like. Of the two accepted methods of slave labor—piecework, or the task system, and time work, or the gang system—the former was most used on the rice coast, where the half- and quarter-acre plots formed by the drainage ditches made it extremely easy to divide up the work. The individual plot as-

NEGROES.

Sale of Negroes.

On the 1st of October next my house will be opened and a large supply of all classes of Negroes offered for sale, imported from Virginia, Maryland and Georgia. Afterwards, during the whole season, the supply shall be kept good by the receipt of large lots of the choicest Negroes to land from the above States. Apply at 64 Baronne street, between Common and Gravier, and two squares west of the St. Charles Hotel. [669-9m] **WALTER L. CAMPBELL.**

Just Received.

Forty very likely young NEGROES, consisting of Field Hands, Mechanics, Seamstresses, House Servants, &c., and for sale, for cash or good city paper. Apply to **C. F. HATCHER.** 619-17 196 Gravier street, New Orleans.

Negroes for Sale.

Having been made to the corner of Baronne and Gravier streets, two squares west of the St. Charles Hotel, where I will keep constantly on hand a choice lot of Maryland and Virginia Negroes, consisting of Field Hands, House Servants, Mechanics, Cooks, Washers and Ironers, &c.; all of which will be sold low for cash, or on time for good city acceptances. **J. M. WILSON.** n869-6m

Carolina and Virginia Negroes for Sale. I have received Fifty Carolina and Virginia Negroes, consisting of Field Hands, Cooks, Washers and Ironers; also, two No. 1 Blacksmiths, one No. 1 Bricklayer, five good Carpenters, and one good Cooper. Will be receiving fresh gangs every month during the season, which I will sell low for cash, or good 15 months' city acceptances. Persons wishing to purchase would do well to give me a call before purchasing elsewhere. Apply to **H. P. PETERSON, 15 Perdido street, between St. Charles and Carondelet.** 624-6m

C. F. Hatcher.

No. 196 Gravier street, New Orleans, La.—Liberal Advances made on Property placed in my hands for Sale.—Slaves.—Terms, Mississippi and Louisiana Lands Bought and Sold.

C. M. JOHNSON, Superintendent Slave Depot. NOTICE TO MERCHANTS, PLANTERS, TRADERS and Owners of Slaves.—Having made extensive alterations and accommodations on my old stand, I am now prepared to receive and accommodate from two to three hundred slaves, for sale on commission. I can also accommodate the owners with good board and comfortable rooms, on reasonable terms. Those having business in my line would do well to call and see for themselves before looking elsewhere, as the inducements I offer are unequalled. A good stock of Negroes for sale will be constantly kept on hand, consisting of Field Hands, Mechanics, House Servants, Seamstresses, Nurses, Hair Dressers, &c. **C. F. HATCHER.** New Orleans, September 26, 1859. a28 69-17

R. H. Elam.

(Formerly of Natchez, Mississippi.) Has located at No. 58 Baronne and 176 Gravier street, New Orleans, two squares in the rear of St. Charles Hotel, where he now has a large lot of SLAVES for sale, which will be regularly recruited by fresh importations during the season. It is only necessary for my old customers to know where to find me. To others I would say, please give me a trial. 614-6m

Committed.

To the Jail of Greene County, Ala., on the 30th day of June, 1859, a negro man named JIM, who says he belongs to John Studman, who lives in the fork of Red and Black Rivers, and says his master's shipping point is Clark's Depot on Landing on Red River. Said boy is about 30 or 35 years old, weighs about 175 or 180 pounds, 5 feet 1½ inches high, scar on his right wrist, which produced a little stiffness in the little finger of the same hand; color black; full beard. The owner is hereby notified to come forward, prove property, pay charges and take him away, or he will be dealt with as the law directs.

Eutaw, July 1, 1859.

W. R. HARDAWAY, Sheriff. 824-6m

For Sale.

Just arrived, with a choice lot of VIRGINIA and CAROLINA NEGROES, consisting of Plantation hands, Blacksmiths, Carpenters, Cooks, Washers, Ironers and Seamstresses, and will be receiving fresh supplies during the season, which I offer for sale, for cash or approved paper.

JOHN B. SMITH,
At the old store, cor. Esplanade and Chartres sts.
n21-8m & W New Orleans La.

Negroes for Sale.

Just arrived, with 100 Negroes, from Virginia, consisting of Field Hands, House Servants, and Mechanics; and will be receiving fresh lots every month. All of which are offered on accommodating terms at my old stand, corner of Esplanade and Chartres streets, near the Mint. Omnibuses running on Royal and Chartres streets all pass my house. **JOSEPH BRUN.** 606-6m & W

Slaves for Sale.

I have received near one hundred Negroes on consignment, of all classes—several likely families, which I wish to sell, cheap for cash, or for equivalent. In addition to the above I have since received fifty more Negroes—two of which are first rate Blacksmiths. **C. M. RUTHERFORD,** No. 68 Baronne street. 60-3m

Slaves for Sale.

Having permanently established myself in this city, I shall keep constantly on hand a full supply of Negroes, selected for this market, comprising Mechanics and House Servants of every description, and choice Field Hands. My stock all ready purchased is large, and will be added to as required during the season. Will be sold low for cash or approved city acceptances. **A. WISEMANN,** 65-3m 177 Gravier street.

PHENIX HOUSE,

96 St. Charles St.



BAR,

OYSTER SALOON,

RESTAURANT, and

BOWLING SALOON.



A FREE LUNCH

New Orleans Picayune, January 4, 1860

ADVERTISEMENTS BY NEW ORLEANS SLAVE TRADERS

Advertisements such as this one from the Picayune, January 4, 1860, were carried in most of the leading papers of the Deep South. Note the places from which these Negroes came and that in addition to field hands, many were advertised as blacksmiths, bricklayers, mechanics, carpenters, or seamstresses.

signed to each field hand each morning constituted his or her task for that day, and when it was completed, the slave had at his disposal such time as remained. Usually the more difficult tasks were assigned to those who were best fitted to perform them. The possibility of an hour or two of leisure made for diligence and speed and insured accomplishment, for drivers saw to it that the work was well done. The task system was employed extensively in South Carolina and Georgia.

On the tobacco, short-staple cotton, and sugar plantations the gang system prevailed. The workers were divided into gangs of varying numbers, each of which was paced and supervised by a driver, and any worker who failed to keep up with the driver was liable to punishment. On several estates the whip was frequently used, but many planters felt that the best results were obtained when other incentives were employed. On many plantations where the gang system was used, the hours of labor were from sunrise to sunset. Some planters, however, thought it advisable to divide the long day with a midday recess of from one to three hours. The gang system probably reached its maximum efficiency in the black-belt territory along the Mississippi, where the plantation system was more highly commercialized than in the older South.

Control of the slave was based on physical force, regulated by statutory law and modified by such schemes of nonviolent control as individual masters found practicable. Although many planters sought to rule their slaves by kindness and affection rather than through fear, others relied chiefly on the infliction of severe punishments for disobedience or infractions of any sort. State laws forbade slaves to assemble, carry arms without a permit, or fish in certain waters. Theft, arson, assault, rape, murder, resisting legal arrest, and conspiracy to rebel were punishable by death. Fear of insurrection, which became greater after the Nat Turner Insurrection of 1831, caused most of the Southern states to guard against the movement of slaves, especially at night; they passed curfew laws and laws forbidding Negroes to leave their plantation without written permission of the master or his representative and enforced them by means of patrols. All minor delinquencies, though punishable by the courts, were usually taken care of privately by the owner of the slave; but sometimes mild-tempered masters and mistresses sent the guilty one to the local jail to be whipped by the jailer. Whipping or flogging was meted out for lesser offenses. Brutal floggings were not unknown, and lynching tended to increase. Slaves were sometimes punished for no offense, and mutiny and desertion frequently resulted. How many runaways there were will in all probability never be exactly ascertained. Newspaper advertisements indicate that the number was not small. Often runaways were caught and brought back only to abscond again. Sometimes, when the private punishment was unduly severe, the person inflicting it was hailed into court. At other times the slave would take the law into his own hands by setting fire to his oppressor's house, or by killing him with axe, poison, cudgel, knife, or bullet.

The effect of slavery on the planter's profits is a question on which few historians agree. On the one hand is the indisputable fact that slaves worked for nothing beyond their subsistence. On the other hand are the

numerous economic risks involved in the use of slave labor: weak slave children might be born, a slave might be temporarily or permanently incapacitated, and in old age the slave was likely to become an economic burden. Again, losses might be incurred through disease, theft, flight, or accident. A bolt of lightning, for example, killed twenty slaves on one plantation, and on another a poisoned well carried off a whole gang and reduced its owner to bankruptcy. At other times smallpox and fever epidemics would sweep one third or more of a plantation's slave population into their graves in the course of a few weeks. The problem is further complicated by the fact that in the fifteen years preceding the Civil War the price of field hands approximately doubled, while the price of cotton fluctuated with shifts in supply and demand in the world market. Although this rise in the cost of slaves produced a corresponding rise in the value of the planter's property in slaves, it also made it that much more difficult for a planter to add to his supply of workers. The increase in slave prices undoubtedly worked the greatest hardship on small owners who lacked the financial resources to purchase slaves at the higher prices. Moreover, unlike the large planters, who could count on their labor force being increased by slave births, the small planters frequently owned only male slaves. All things considered, it seems reasonable to conclude that there was a direct ratio between the size of the plantation and the profitability of slavery.

Regardless of the effect of slavery on the planter's profits, there can be no doubt that it victimized the South as a whole. The yeomanry and more prosperous farmers found competition with large-scale production difficult and were encouraged to buy or hire slaves at excessive cost. Furthermore, the whites tended to feel that work, especially manual labor such as slaves had to do, was beneath them; and this attitude helped discourage immigration and was demoralizing to the poor whites. Even more important, Southern capital, tied up in land and slaves, was not available for investment in the industries that were rapidly creating wealth in the North.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RISE OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM

- 98. ORIGINS OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM
 - 99. GROWTH OF INDUSTRY
 - 100. THE FACTORY OWNER
 - 101. THE FACTORY WORKER
 - 102. LABOR CONDITIONS
 - 103. BEGINNINGS OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT
 - 104. THE WORKER IN POLITICS
 - 105. TRADE UNIONISM
-

ALTHOUGH the United States remained an agrarian nation from the adoption of the Constitution until the outbreak of the Civil War, these years witnessed a tremendous growth in American industry. With an unbounded optimism engendered by a rapidly expanding economy in a relatively new nation, America's businessmen erected factories along New England's streams, exploited the country's mineral resources, and sought special privileges from state and Federal governments. Shortages of labor, scarcity of capital, and technological problems often impeded, but never prevented, the rise of American industry, for to the nation's entrepreneurs the apparently limitless opportunities for profits overshadowed the ever-present possibility of failure.

98. ORIGINS OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM

IN 1790 the United States was not a manufacturing nation. Before the Revolution the abundance of cheap agricultural land, sparse population, relatively high-priced labor, lack of capital, and re-

strictive legislation by England, in varying degree had hindered manufacturing enterprise in America. During the War of Independence, however, Americans, finding it impossible to establish satisfactory trade relations with any of the western European states, began to manufacture articles that formerly had been imported in large quantities. Certain industries closely connected with the prosecution of the war, such as the making of powder and firearms, were enlarged, and the output of household manufactures increased. With the conclusion of peace, however, these enterprises were in large part destroyed by the British, who flooded the United States with cheaper goods. "Let the dispute with America be settled as it may," an English pamphleteer wrote in 1782, "while their wool continues inferior to ours, they [the Americans] must from interest, the strongest tie of friendship, deal with us. Interest is more binding than any treaty of commerce."

During the post-Revolutionary years there was little change in the methods of production. The handicraft system still prevailed. But despite the absence of machine production in the United States, many Americans were familiar with the economic and technological developments in Europe that for want of a better term are collectively spoken of as the Industrial Revolution. England's industrial expansion was made possible in part by new productive techniques that not only revolutionized methods of manufacture but also multiplied the output many times. In consequence, British merchants and manufacturers, in their desire for the additional profits that would accrue from expanding markets, did everything in their power to monopolize the new improvements. To this end the new inventions were carefully guarded, and Parliament by a series of acts prohibited the exportation of any machines or models under penalty of heavy fine or imprisonment. Laws were also enacted restraining emigration of artificers and laborers. These were vigilantly enforced, and they seriously delayed the establishment of the factory system in the United States.

Despite British efforts to monopolize the new techniques, several attempts were made to introduce the new processes into the United States before the opening of the nineteenth century. As early as 1775, Samuel Wetherill, Jr., a Quaker merchant of Philadelphia, together with a number of his fellow townsmen, founded the United Company of Philadelphia for Promoting American Manufactures. During the next quarter of a century similar organizations were established in several other cities. The Philadelphia company set up a textile factory, but this had to be abandoned when the British captured the city in 1777. Following the war the factory was re-established by the Philadelphia Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures, heir of the United Company. In 1786-7 Hugh Orr, a metallurgist of Bridgewater, Massachusetts, with financial assistance from the state built a number of

crude textile machines modeled after those in operation in England. In 1788 a factory using home-made machines was set up with state aid at Beverly, Massachusetts, but it was soon abandoned as an unprofitable venture. Similar experimental attempts undertaken at various towns in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island failed either partially or completely.

While these experiments were in progress, announcement of premiums for cotton machinery, offered by American societies interested in promoting manufacturing in the New World, came to the attention of Samuel Slater, who was in charge of the manufacture of machinery in an English cotton factory. Slater sailed secretly for the United States. Landing in New York in 1789 at the age of twenty-one, he obtained employment with a small cotton-manufacturing concern. Not satisfied, he accidentally got into communication with Moses Brown, member of the famous commercial family of Providence, who was desirous of improving the technique of cotton manufacturing. Following an exchange of letters, Slater went to Providence, where, with the aid of a local carpenter and a blacksmith and working from memory, he succeeded in building two carding machines and a water frame of twenty-four spindles. With the financial backing of Brown he opened the first successful cotton factory in the United States in 1790. Four years later two Yorkshire men, John and Arthur Scholfield, set up power-driven machinery for carding wool at Byfield, Massachusetts. Subsequently another brother, James Scholfield, arrived in this country and set up a carding mill at Andover, Massachusetts. In 1803, Arthur Scholfield moved to Pittsfield, where he began the manufacture of carding machines.

Although numerous small cotton mills were erected during the early 1790's, at the opening of the nineteenth century only fifteen factories were in operation, and all of these were in New England. The demand for American agricultural produce and the prosperous condition of commerce made it far more profitable for the United States to import manufactured goods than to produce them. But as soon as Britain and Napoleon began to molest neutral shipping, American commerce fell off rapidly; farmers were unable to market their produce, and importation of foreign manufactured goods declined. Cut off from the imports of Europe, Americans were forced to make their own commodities, and large amounts of capital formerly employed in trade and shipping were transferred to manufacturing. As in Revolutionary days, home manufacture became a patriotic duty. States, counties, municipalities, and societies organized to encourage manufactures, offered bounties and premiums, or bought stock in new manufacturing concerns. In 1810, Albert Gallatin, in a report to the House of Representatives, stated that the United States was manufacturing sufficient quantities of woolen and

leather goods, soap, tallow candles, spermaceti oil, flaxseed oil, refined sugar, coarse earthenware, snuff, chocolate, hair powder, and mustard to supply the needs of the entire population. Among those manufactures firmly established and supplying all or a greater part of the needs of home consumption were iron goods, textiles, hats, paper, malt and spirituous liquors, gunpowder, and window glass.

99. GROWTH OF INDUSTRY

ALTHOUGH the factory system had secured a foothold in the United States by the end of the War of 1812, the new industries faced a severe test in the years immediately following the conflict. Scarcely had peace been declared before British merchants and manufacturers, anxious to empty their overstocked warehouses and regain their American markets, began to export enormous quantities of goods to the Western world. Importations, which totaled only \$13,000,000 in 1813, mounted to \$147,000,000 in 1816. Between 1815 and 1820 each inhabitant of the United States consumed imported goods averaging \$13.50 as against \$2.50 per capita for the years 1810-14. In the face of this competition and of the rising price of raw materials occasioned by the reopening of the European market, American textile manufactures were prostrated. In 1816, there were nearly 150 mills in operation in the mill district of Rhode Island; a year later all but the old Slater mill were closed. Cheap foreign goods had put them out of business.

Neither foreign competition, however, nor the period of world economic depression from 1816 to 1820 could permanently destroy American manufactures. New factories equipped with more modern machines were soon built. At first the textile machinery in the United States had been for carding and spinning only. In 1814, however, Francis Cabot Lowell, Harvard graduate and son of a New England lawyer, with the assistance of Paul Moody, a mechanic, perfected a power loom that they installed in a factory of the Boston Manufacturing Company at Waltham, Massachusetts. This new machine, which differed markedly from its English predecessors, made it possible to combine spinning and weaving under one roof. In 1815, William Gilmour, an artisan of foreign birth and training, built a simpler and less costly loom. The Lowell-Moody and Gilmour looms wove only cotton. In 1824, Samuel Batchelder constructed a loom that wove pattern fabrics. In addition, the process of woolen manufacture was greatly facilitated by the inventions of John Goulding; authorities have rated his carding machine, introduced in 1826, as "the most important of all contributions to the card-wool industry of the world" during the nineteenth century. Chemical bleaching instead of lawn bleaching, and cylinder machines for print-

ing, also came into general use long before 1860. In 1846 Elias Howe patented the sewing machine, destined to revolutionize the manufacture of clothing, and of boots, shoes, and such leather goods as saddles and harness, although it did not come into general use either in home or in factory until the Civil War.

Considerable technical advance was also made in the manufacture of primary metals and in the fabrication of these metals into finished products. The first improvement in the extraction of iron was made by a German-American Lutheran clergyman, the Rev. Dr. Frederick W. Geisenhainer, who in 1830 successfully melted iron ore with anthracite coal. The old blast furnace was replaced by the so-called hot blast about 1840. By 1855, anthracite smelting had definitely replaced charcoal smelting in the production of pig iron. Bituminous coal and coke were little used for this purpose until the Civil War and after. In 1851, William Kelly, a Kentucky ironmaster, independently discovered the Bessemer method of decarbonizing molten metal by forcing air through it. By that time the nation's furnaces were producing approximately 600,000 tons annually. At the same time, mechanisms for turning out finished iron products were numerous; nails, tacks, bolts, files, wire, screws, spikes, chains, firearms, and other metal articles formerly produced by hand were now manufactured by machines. Largely as the result of the efforts of Eli Whitney and Simeon North, the principle of interchangeable parts was being very widely employed in the manufacture of clocks, firearms, and certain kinds of machinery. In originality, variety, and efficiency, American machine tools surpassed those of Europe.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century water power drove practically all the mill machinery in America. Although some early textile machines were run by hand or horsepower, these were the exception rather than the rule. By 1830 New England's streams were harnessed to nearly their full capacity. The Blackstone Valley between Worcester, Massachusetts, and Providence, Rhode Island, for example, had more than a hundred textile mills and over thirty machine shops and iron works. The early water wheels, however, utilized only a small fraction of the power applied to them. The first turbine used for power in New England was built in 1843 by George Kilburn, a New Hampshire mechanic. Steam for driving mill machinery appears to have been first used in New York soon after 1800. Although the low-pressure Boulton and Watt engine of England was employed to some extent, the high-pressure engine, an invention of Oliver Evans of Philadelphia, was generally regarded as superior, and it cost less. Steam was first used in those sections where water power could not easily be obtained, and in such industries as glass manufacture, bleacheries, and print works, where heat was required. According to the census of 1830, 57 out of 161 plants in Pennsylvania used steam; in Rhode Island, on the other hand, only 4

out of 132 textile mills used steam. The Middle West relied almost entirely on steam for power.

Although wood was the principal fuel employed for generating steam power before 1860, coal was also used; indeed, by 1860, coal was of prime importance to the whole industrial economy. As early as 1769, Obadiah Gore, a Connecticut blacksmith who had settled in Pennsylvania's Wyoming Valley, had burned anthracite in his forge, but not until the first decade of the nineteenth century was it tried in grate stoves. Even then, the competition of wood and the unwillingness of the public to try something so radically new retarded its adoption, and the Lehigh Coal-Mine Company, the first anthracite mining concern to attract notice, was for many years unsuccessful. Before the War of 1812 was over, however, the increasing scarcity of wood began to hamper fuel-using manufacturers whose plants were located in the vicinity of the larger Atlantic coast cities, and they turned to bituminous, or soft, coal, which had been discovered near Richmond, Virginia, about 1750. Hard coal during these years was less in demand, partly because neither producer nor purchaser knew how to use it efficiently, and partly because it was less accessible. Between 1820 and 1830 diminishing wood supplies, a growing population, better grates and furnaces, and the increasing use of steam for manufacturing and transportation stimulated the demand for coal. The expansion of the smelting industry from 1830 to 1860 was also of great importance. The total output of coal rose from less than 50,000 tons in 1820 to more than 14,000,000 tons in 1860. In addition, American consumption of foreign coal reached an average of 235,000 tons a year between 1850 and 1860.

The improvements in the manufacture of textiles and iron and in the development of power were characteristic of the progress made in every branch of industry during the first half of the nineteenth century. Although most factories were small, practically all of them were quick to seize upon new ideas and devices that promised to increase their efficiency. Some conception of the remarkable accomplishments of the American inventor may be gained by examining the records of the Patent Office. From 1790 to 1810 the number of inventions patented annually averaged 77; in 1830 they numbered 544; by 1850 the number had risen to 993, and ten years later to 4,778. During this period the United States granted more patents than England and France combined. Testifying before a parliamentary committee in 1841, a witness said: "I apprehend that the chief part . . . [of the] new inventions . . . have originated abroad, especially in America." He went on to say that the Americans, not being able to secure machines from England,

have set themselves about to make a machine in the readiest mode to accomplish that which they required; they have been untram-

meled by predilections in favor of a machine already in existence, but having an idea of a mode in which to carry out a process they have at once set their minds and ingenuity to work and in so doing the most round about mode has suggested itself to accomplish the object.

The effects of the application of machinery to the manufacturing process are revealed in part by the census returns. By 1840 American manufactures were valued at \$483,278,000; twenty years later the figure stood at \$1,885,861,000. The number of men engaged in manufacturing establishments having an output valued at \$500 or more increased from 791,000 in 1840 to 1,311,000 in 1860. During this period the leading manufactured products of the United States were textiles, iron, flour, lumber, machinery, agricultural implements, vehicles, cooperage, furniture, iron rails, locomotives, leather, cordage, lard, soap, candles, and malt and distilled liquors. Of these, textiles were easily pre-eminent. More than 5,235,000 cotton spindles were in operation in 1860, or more than double the number used in 1840. At the outbreak of the Civil War approximately 1,900 woolen mills were turning out products valued at over \$68,865,000 as compared with \$20,696,999 in 1840. During the same period silk manufacture increased from almost nothing to an amount valued at \$6,500,000.

Manufacturing was concentrated in two areas, or mill zones, one along the Atlantic coast of the Northeast and Middle states, the other in the trans-Allegheny. New England, with its poor soil, abundance of water power, proximity to markets, active commerce, and the aptitude of its people to handle machinery, led the rest of the country in the manufacture of textiles, producing in 1860 two thirds of all the nation's cotton goods. Although Philadelphia, with its 200,000 spindles, and with another 200,000 in tributary districts, was still the leading textile center in 1860, Massachusetts could boast of Lowell, Fall River, New Bedford, and a score of lesser textile towns. With the possible exception of Maryland and Virginia, the South made little progress in manufacturing before 1860. In that year the value of the Southern cotton-goods production was only \$8,145,067 as compared with \$79,359,900 for New England and \$26,534,700 for the Middle states; the city of Lowell alone had more spindles than the entire South. Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut led in the manufacture of woolens in the order named, while Connecticut and New Jersey excelled in silk manufacture. The Northeast also surpassed all other sections in 1860 in the manufacture of textile machinery, ships, steam engines, boots and shoes, clothing, glassware, pottery, cutlery, rubber goods, fine furniture, jewelry, silverware, stoves, and vehicles.

Behind this first, or coastal, mill zone there developed a second in-

dustrial "belt" extending westward from a line running roughly from Utica, New York, to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. By 1860 this zone excelled in the manufacture of river boats, flour, cordage, cotton bagging, distilled and brewed liquors, and agricultural machines, in lumber and in meat packing. Before 1840 the Northeast led in the manufacture of farm machinery, but from then on, this industry increasingly centered in the trans-Allegheny. In 1847, Cyrus H. McCormick, son of a Virginia piedmont farmer, in partnership with others established a plant at Chicago to manufacture the automatic reaper for which he had taken out his first patent in 1834. Three years earlier at Racine, Wisconsin, Jerome I. Case laid the foundation of what eventually became the greatest thresher works in the world. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Ohio and Illinois led all other states in the production of agricultural machinery. New England, however, retained its lead in the manufacture of such farm implements as spades, hoes, forks, and rakes. The small amount of textile manufacturing in the second mill zone was confined almost entirely to Pittsburgh and Cincinnati. Neither mill zone enjoyed marked supremacy over the other in iron production. In 1810, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey were the leading iron-ore-producing states; half a century later Ohio led, followed by Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

MANUFACTURING BY SECTIONS, 1860

SECTION	NUMBER OF ESTABLISH- MENTS	CAPITAL INVESTED	AVERAGE NUMBER OF LABORERS	ANNUAL VALUE OF PRODUCTS
<i>New England</i>	20,671	\$257,477,783	391,836	\$468,599,287
<i>Middle States</i>	53,387	435,061,964	546,243	802,338,392
<i>Western States</i>	36,785	194,212,543	209,909	384,606,530
<i>Southern States</i>	20,631	95,975,185	110,721	155,531,281
<i>Pacific States</i>	8,777	23,380,334	50,204	71,229,989
<i>Territories</i>	282	3,747,906	2,333	3,556,197
TOTAL	140,533	\$1,009,855,715	1,311,246	\$1,885,861,676

Practically all early factories were small establishments competing with household manufactures. In 1815, for example, half of the 167 cotton mills of Rhode Island ran less than 500 spindles each; in 1840 the average number of spindles per mill for the entire United States was only 2,000 as compared with 5,000 twenty years later. Most early mills were owned by individuals, families, partners, or joint-stock companies. The corporate form of control did not become general until after 1815, and even then it was for many years chiefly confined to Massachusetts, Maine, and New Hampshire. Of 50 woolen mills in 1833, 34 were operated on an individual or partnership basis. Sometimes a concern or-

ganized on an individual basis would undergo transformation. Thus James Shepherd set up a small woolen factory in Northampton in 1809; the following year it was reorganized as a family co-partnership; in 1824 it came under control of a joint-stock company. As yet state authorization for incorporation was unnecessary; moreover, the sale of corporate securities expedited the raising of capital funds. Shares in the joint-stock companies were usually in small denominations; stock ownership was, as a rule, concentrated in the hands of a few, and as early as 1820 there was a marked tendency for larger concerns to buy up their lesser rivals. In addition to these amalgamations there were numerous alliances not unlike the post-Civil War "gentlemen's agreement." But the movement in this direction, although presaging monopoly and price control, was not marked before 1860.

100. THE FACTORY OWNER

THE RISE of the factory system profoundly affected American society. With the gradual shift of interest from farm and wharf to waterfall, there emerged in the already stratified society of the East two new social groups—manufacturing capitalists and factory workers. In the past, manufacturing had been almost entirely either a handicraft or a domestic industry. Production had been on a small scale. The artisan, whether merchant, master, or journeyman, had enjoyed almost complete economic independence. He had been his own capitalist, the cost of his tools and buildings had been nominal, he had manufactured for a limited or local market, and in consequence his supply of raw materials and finished products had been measured by immediate needs. Moreover, no wide social gap had existed, in general, between master-owner and journeyman-worker. Often working side by side, they had known and had had mutual respect for each other, and their families had usually mingled.

By 1850 the older methods of production, although still widespread in mountainous areas and in frontier communities, were being gradually, and in some industries rapidly, supplanted by the factory system. In New England the factory had practically put the old-fashioned spinning-wheel out of business in the manufacture of textiles. Young men, instead of becoming apprentices, either devoted their efforts to invention or became owners or operatives of the new machines. Many craftsmen, farmers, small merchants, retired shippers and sons of shippers had by this time amassed fortunes and made reputations either as manufacturers or as merchant-capitalists. Equipped with costly machines, their factories turned out in large quantities the goods formerly pro-

duced by inexpensive hand tools in the home or shop. Improved highways and waterways, the development of the steamboat and railroad, the growth of the West, and an increasing population throughout the nation enormously expanded their markets. Better banking facilities, the heavy shipments abroad of American grain, cotton, and other raw materials, and the eagerness of Old World investors to place their money in overseas enterprises yielding a higher rate of interest than they could get at home enabled the American manufacturer to secure the capital with which to build and equip his factories and warehouses.

Many early factories were managed or supervised directly by their entrepreneur-owners. But with the rapid expansion of the factory unit and the acquisition of wealth the owner retired from immediate control, and his place was taken by a paid manager or supervisor. The owner's connection was represented by his investment, usually in the form of stocks and bonds. Often he had little or no knowledge of conditions in the factory. As a shareholder and a businessman he was primarily concerned with dividends and profits; whatever interest he may have had in his workers was, as a rule, secondary.

Although in the minority, the new industrialists, like their English compeers, challenged the political leadership and social prestige of the commercial and landed aristocracy. It was a challenge by the "new rich" to the "old rich." Men like the Abbotts, Lawrences, and Browns, who had completely or in large measure turned from commerce to manufacturing, were not content that the old aristocracy should continue to control the government. From 1825 on, the new captains of industry were increasingly represented in both local and national politics by lawyers who seldom lost an opportunity to safeguard the industrial *bourgeoisie*. New England and Middle states communities long dominated by the old aristocracy gradually passed into the control of the rising industrialists. Members of the new money class, at first frowned upon by the older aristocracy, eventually gained admission to society too, making up in display and extravagant living any shortcomings they may have had in family tradition, manners, and culture.

101. THE FACTORY WORKER

IN STRIKING contrast to the industrial capitalists were the industrial laborers. The competition of other industries for labor and the sparseness of population made it difficult for the early mill-owners and mine operators to secure workers. A few of the textile factories in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire employed skilled foreign artisans from Great Britain and Ireland, but the number

of these was small. Of 612 operatives at Fall River in 1826, for example, only 38 were foreigners, and these appear to have been employed in the more responsible positions. Not until the 1850's did foreigners constitute a majority of the mill population in the Fall River district or in other New England mill towns. America's factory labor supply had to be recruited at first from the native population.


Before 1860, many factory workers came from farmers' families. Many farmers' sons and daughters sought employment in factories to help a struggling father pay off a mortgage on a hillside farm, to obtain a little extra money, to help send a brother to school or college, or to escape altogether from what they regarded as the narrow horizon of farm life. Frequently the entire family left the country for the city or town. In addition, many men took factory jobs in the winter months and spent the summers in farm work.

Most important of all, irrespective of whether they came from town or country, were the children from four to sixteen years of age who worked in the textile factories. Very young children constituted the principal labor supply in the early textile plants. Samuel Slater's first nine operatives were seven boys and two girls under twelve years of age. In the opinion of many people, including Hamilton, factory employment of children was distinctly advantageous, for it not only added to both the family income and the nation's wealth but could free the community from the expense of caring for orphans and paupers. Furthermore, these children could be taught proper habits of work that would make them God-fearing, industrious citizens. In some localities where parents were reluctant to allow their children to be employed in a factory, the owners, following in the footsteps of the early English textile operator, sought pauper apprentices. Dejected in countenance, broken in spirit, mentally and physically stunted, and denied the usual pleasures of childhood, these children in numerous respects closely resembled their English counterparts. With a few exceptions, all opportunity for even the most rudimentary education was precluded. From 1800 to 1860, children constituted from two fifths to three fifths of the total number of factory hands.

Women also sought and found employment in factories. They were among the first adults to be employed in the cotton and woolen mills. According to testimony before the House Committee on Manufactures in 1828, 41.4 per cent of the employees in the seven largest woolen mills in the country were women; four years later the woolen plants of Massachusetts employed 49 per cent women as against 42 per cent men. The percentage of women employed in cotton mills was considerably higher. Of the 6,000 operatives employed in the Lowell cotton mills in 1836, 5,000 were reported to be "young women from seventeen to twenty-four years of age, the daughters of farmers from the different New England

states." Outside of household production, women probably constituted about one fifth of the total labor supply of manufacturing industries in 1860. Increasing numbers of women were also being employed in mercantile establishments. Both women and children were paid a lower wage than men for comparable work.

By midcentury, immigrants constituted an important source of industrial labor. Between 1820 and 1830 less than 500,000 foreigners—principally English, Welsh, Scotch, German, and Irish—came to America. From 1830 to 1850, however, nearly 2,500,000 immigrants were



11. IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES, 1820-60

The great increase during the decades of the 1840's and 1850's was occasioned in part by the political disturbances on the continent of Europe.

added to a population that increased altogether from slightly less than 13,000,000 to more than 23,000,000; and 2,700,000 foreigners arrived during the decade preceding the Civil War. The poverty of the Old World, America's need for labor and for settlers for the western lands, and the widespread belief that the United States was a land of opportunity and a refuge for the oppressed were principally responsible for the beginnings of this second great migratory wave to America. Many objected to the newcomers, but businessmen, stimulated by desire for additional profits and in need of unskilled labor, welcomed them. As early as 1832, Seth Cutler, a Boston labor leader, declared that American manufacturers, in their eagerness to reduce wages, had sent agents to Europe to lure workers to the United States.

The English, Scotch, and Welsh immigrants varied considerably in social class and in occupation. By far the greater number of English were artisans. A few became businessmen, others turned to the farms of the Northwest, but the majority—perhaps two thirds—became factory operatives in the Northeastern mill zone. The Welsh and Scotch came in smaller numbers than the English, but their distribution was much the same.

Poverty and devastating famines during the 1840's drove hundreds of thousands of the Celtic Irish to America. In Ireland, hundreds died of starvation, the unburied dead lying where they fell with their mouths stained green from the weeds and thistles eaten as a last extremity. Of those who survived, 1,500,000 migrated to America, before 1860. Like the immigrants from the British Isles, a few of the better educated went directly into business; but the great majority settled in groups in the cities and villages of the industrial Northeast, where as unskilled laborers they were eagerly sought by mill owners and builders of canals, railroads, and other enterprises. In the cities Irish girls soon displaced native-born help as domestic servants.

Ranking next to the Irish in numbers were the Germans. From the Revolution to about 1830, German migration virtually ceased. Between 1830 and 1860, however, a series of economic circumstances set in motion a great migratory wave to the New World. Foremost among these were the inability of the German household-produced linens to compete successfully with English factory-made cottons and linens, and the famine conditions in the Rhine Valley occasioned by the frequent failure of the potato crops and by the loss to the Americans of the English grain market. The desire to emigrate can also be traced to the failure of German liberals to unite and democratize the Germanies from 1830 to 1850. In 1847, 50,000 Germans entered the United States, and by 1860 more than 1,000,000 had arrived. Unlike the Irish, many Germans landed on this side of the Atlantic with a little money, and several of them had had considerable experience in politics, business, and the professions in their native land. The Germans comprised the single largest group of political refugees in the United States. Numerous Germans settled along the Eastern seaboard; but the majority, recognizing that to remain in the older settled region of the country would mean starting at the bottom of the social-economic ladder, went beyond the Alleghenies, where they became prosperous farmers or formed an important element in the growing cities of Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, and Milwaukee.

Of the other foreigners who came into the mill zones before 1860, the French-Canadians were numerous in New England, to which they came from rural homes to work for wages in the textile and lumber mills. In Michigan, Iowa, and Wisconsin, there were Dutch, Belgians,

and Swiss who had been attracted to America by American propaganda and the desire to escape hard times, crop failures, and low wages.

102. LABOR CONDITIONS

FROM whatever source recruited, the life of the factory worker was at best one of narrow, blighting routine. He labored an average of from twelve to fifteen hours a day for a wage that ranged from one to six dollars a week. If he happened to be employed in a factory where remuneration was on the basis of tasks performed—that is, on the basis of piecework—the hope of obtaining a living wage induced him to work long hours. As late as 1849, Dr. Josiah Curtis in a report given before the American Medical Association stated that there was not a state's prison or a house of correction in New England where the hours of labor were so long, hours for meals so short, and ventilation so much neglected as they were in the cotton mills of that section. Except in rare instances the factory worker had no ownership in the plant or its equipment, and frequently his house was also owned by his employer. If by use of modern labor methods he sought to better his condition or raise his pay, he was liable under the English Common Law to arrest and punishment for conspiracy. Without capital reserve or extended credit, he was easily reduced to the margin of subsistence. His only asset was his labor, and this he sold on terms arranged by the employer.

The children employed in the factories were even worse off than were adult workers. A committee of the Massachusetts legislature investigating child labor in 1825 found that the time of employment was "generally twelve or thirteen hours each day excepting the Sabbath," and that "this left little opportunity for daily instruction." Not until 1836 did Massachusetts rule that all children under fifteen years of age must have at least three months' schooling a year. Four years later somewhat similar action was taken by Rhode Island. The first legislation prohibiting child labor was enacted in 1848 by Pennsylvania, which forbade the employment of children under twelve years of age in textile factories.

In a few cases women workers enjoyed better than average conditions. Harriet Martineau, who cannot be accused of being overpartial to American employers, portrayed the life of the factory operative in Waltham in 1835:

I visited the corporate factory establishment at Waltham, within a few miles of Boston. . . . The establishment is for the spinning and

weaving of cotton alone, and the construction of the requisite machinery. Five hundred persons were employed at the time of my visit. The girls earn two, and . . . three, dollars a week, besides their board. . . . Most of the girls live in the houses provided by the corporation, which accommodate from six to eight each. When sisters come to the mill, it is a common practice for them to bring their mother to keep house for them and some of their companions, in a dwelling built by their own earnings. In this case, they save enough out of their board and clothe themselves, and have their two or three dollars a week to spare. Some have thus cleared off mortgages from their fathers' farms; others have educated the hope of the family at college; and many are rapidly accumulating an independence. I saw a whole street of houses built with the earnings of the girls, some with piazzas and green Venetian blinds, and all neat and sufficiently spacious.

The factory people built the church, which stands conspicuous on the green in the midst of the place. The minister's salary (eight hundred dollars last year) is raised by a tax on the pews. The corporation gave them a building for a lyceum, which they have furnished with a good library, and where they have lectures every winter—the best that money can procure. The girls have, in many instances, private libraries of some merit and value.

The managers of the various factory establishments keep the wages as nearly equal as possible, and then let the girls freely shift about from one to another. When a girl comes to the overseer to inform him of her intention of working at the mill, he welcomes her, and asks her how long she means to stay. It may be six months, or a year, or five years, or for life. She declares what she considers herself fit for, and sets to work accordingly. If she finds that she cannot work so as to keep up with the companion appointed to her, or to please her employer or herself, she comes to the overseer and volunteers to pick cotton, or sweep the rooms, or undertake some other service that she can perform.

The people work about seventy hours per week, on the average. The time of work varies with the length of the days, the wages continuing the same. All [appear] . . . well dressed. . . . The health is good; or rather (as this is too much to be said about health anywhere in the United States), it is no worse than it is elsewhere.

These facts speak for themselves. There is no need to enlarge on the pleasure of an acquaintance with the operative classes of the United States.


But Miss Martineau's picture, although perhaps not overdrawn for the mills she described, was not representative of the general run of

American textile plants. Even the so-called Waltham system had its drawbacks. Chief of these was the blacklist. If an operative was dishonorably discharged, the employer made a record of that fact and forwarded the name to other employers. A few states attempted to remedy the worst evils of employment by legislation, but any advance in this direction was exceedingly slow. Here and there a humanitarian friend of the factory worker raised his voice in protest against the existing system; the worker, he asserted, was at least entitled to a shorter day, a higher wage, healthier conditions of employment, and a better home.

103. BEGINNINGS OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT

THE AMERICAN labor movement, unlike that of England, originated, not among factory operatives, but among skilled artisans. Before 1825, numerous local organizations of skilled mechanics had been formed in various centers to protect the living standards of their members. As early as 1786, the printers of New York and Philadelphia had active societies; eight years later the cordwainers of these same cities had organized. These local societies were isolated and independent of each other, and often quite divergent in interests and in principles. In general, they opposed the competition of inferior workers, the training of too many apprentices, and long hours. They also advocated a minimum wage. Nearly all paid sickness and death benefits. Though small in numbers, these early societies relied primarily upon the strike, or "turnout," as it was then called, to enforce their demands.


In spite of attempts to better working conditions, American labor organizations made little headway during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Any combination of workmen for the purpose of raising wages was illegal by the prevailing English Common Law. "A combination of workmen to raise their wages," said a Philadelphia judge in 1806 in instructing a jury in the first criminal conspiracy trial in this country, "may be considered in a twofold point of view: one is to benefit themselves . . . the other is to injure those who do not join their society. The rule of law condemns both." If friends of the workman complained that this view of the law "was incompatible with the existence of freedom, and prostrates every right which distinguishes the citizen from the slave," the courts merely shifted their ground by ruling that "where diverse persons confederate together by direct means to impoverish or prejudice a third person, or to do acts prejudicial to the community" they were engaged in an unlawful conspiracy. Of six criminal conspiracy cases against the shoemakers' labor organizations



THE MONKEY SYSTEM
OR EVERYONE FOR HIMSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS NEIGHBOR


This cartoon caricatures Clay's American System

The Library of Congress




GENERAL HARRISON'S LOG CABIN MARCH: A QUICK STEP


When Harrison's opponents in 1840 maintained that he belonged in a log cabin making hard cider, the Whigs were quick to seize the opportunity to label Harrison the log-cabin candidate.




ANDREW JACKSON



HENRY CLAY



DANIEL WEBSTER



JOHN C. CALHOUN

between 1805 and 1815, four resulted in indictments; in two the prosecution was financed in part by the employers.

Tradition and public opinion as well as the law aided the employers of the striking workmen to maintain what they believed were their property rights. Labor's demands were invariably met with the argument that higher wages would mean higher prices for what the consumer must buy. The employers also condemned the labor organizations as being un-American, unpatriotic, and dangerous. Boston carpenters on strike in 1825 for a shorter working day angered those who financed construction in that city. Such action, they declared, was "a departure from the salutary and steady usages which have prevailed in this city, and all New England, from time immemorial." Should the Carpenters' Union and its use of the strike be countenanced, they went on to say,

it must of consequence, extend to and embrace all the Working Classes in every department in Town and Country, thereby effecting a most injurious change in all the modes of business, and in the operations of agriculture and commerce, opening a wide door for idleness and vice, and finally commuting the present condition of the Mechanical Classes, made happy and prosperous by frugal, orderly, temperate and ancient habits, for that degraded state by which in other countries, many of these classes are obliged to leave their homes, bringing with them their feelings and habits, and a spirit of discontent and insubordination to which our native mechanics have hitherto been strangers.

Before the first decade of the new century had ended, several employers had their own associations to combat the workers' organizations.

Notwithstanding the sporadic attempts of the earlier organizations to improve labor conditions, it was not until 1827, when the Mechanics' Union of Trade Associations was organized in Philadelphia, that the labor movement actually began. This organization, which was the first city central union, resulted directly from the failure of a strike of journeymen carpenters who sought a ten-hour day. Labor leaders of the city apparently realized that all trades must co-operate if strikes were to be won and workingmen's demands respected. It was the first time, declared the *Mechanics' Free Press* in 1828, that workingmen had attempted in a public meeting to inquire whether they possessed, as individuals or as a class, any right to say by whom they should be governed.

To many persons the organization of the new union was evidence that labor was becoming class-conscious. This view was re-enforced by the attitude of some of labor's more outspoken supporters. For example, Frances Wright, an ardent champion of labor, free education and women's rights, wrote in the *Free Enquirer* of November 27, 1830:

What distinguishes the present from every other struggle in which the human race has been engaged, is that the present is, evidently, openly and acknowledgedly, a war of class, and that this war is universal. It is no longer nation pitched against nation for the good pleasure and sport of Kings and great Captains, not sect cutting the throats and roasting the carcasses of sect for the glory of God and satisfaction of priests, nor is it one army butchering another to promote the fortunes of their leaders—to pass from a James to a George or a Charles to a Louis Philippe the privilege of coining laws, money and peers, and dividing the good things of the land among his followers. No; it is now everywhere the oppressed millions who are making common cause against oppression; it is the ridden people of the earth who are struggling to throw from their backs the “booted and spurred” riders whose legitimate title to starve as well as [to] work them to death will no longer pass current; it is labour rising up against idleness, industry against money; justice against law and against privilege. And truly the struggle hath not come too soon. Truly there hath been oppression and outrage enough on the one side, and suffering and endurance enough on the other, to render the millions rather chargeable with excess of patience and over abundance than with too eager a spirit for the redress of injury, not to speak of recourse to vengeance.

It has been long clear to me that in every country the best feelings and the best sense are found with the laboring and useful classes, and the worst feeling and the worst sense with the idle and the useless. Until all classes shall be merged, however, by gradual but fundamental changes in the whole organization of society, much bad feeling must prevail everywhere.

Frances Wright, like so many reformers during these years, was far more radical than most of the workingmen for whom she professed to speak. The early American labor movement was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. It did not aim to change the system, but to improve the lot of the laborer within the system. Moreover, as many workers had recently received the right to vote, it was natural that they should attempt to attain their objectives through political action rather than through a militant trade union movement.

104. THE WORKER IN POLITICS

THE FIRST workingmen's party, an outgrowth of the Mechanics' Union of Trade Associations, was organized in Philadelphia

in 1828. It nominated candidates regularly for four years but reached its zenith in 1829 when it succeeded in acquiring a balance of power between the old parties in both the city and county of Philadelphia. Mechanics' lien laws, universal free education, abolition of imprisonment for debt, abolition of chartered monopolies, equal taxation, revision or abolition of the militia system, direct election of all public officials, judicial reform, and the banning of all legislation on religion were the principal aims of the party. Of these, the abolition of monopolies—especially banking monopolies, such as the Bank of the United States—and free education were most stressed.

A labor party organized in New York in 1829 was somewhat more successful. Like the Philadelphia party, it believed that the workingman's troubles were primarily due to inequitable legislation. "The interests of the producing classes," the New York party said, "are the chief objects which should first engage the attention of a wise and prudent legislature." It viewed "with surprise and alarm, the neglect which these interests have received, and the greater consideration which has been bestowed upon the moneyed and aristocratical interests of this State." Public officials, especially members of the state legislature, had been taken, it declared, "entirely from that class of citizens denominated, or supposed to be, rich, or property holders, thereby leaving our own most numerous body without a voice in making those laws which we are compelled to obey."

In the autumn campaign of 1829 the workers' party of New York, in addition to winning many local contests, elected one of its candidates to the state assembly. In 1830, however, it became hopelessly split into three factions each with its party organ and its party candidates. The first of these, the Agrarians, led by Thomas Skidmore, a disciple of Thomas Paine and an advocate of equal distribution of wealth, voiced their opinions in the *Friend of Equal Rights*. The State Guardianship party, led by Robert Dale Owen and G. H. Evans, championed a statewide system of education and demanded the abolition of monopolies and imprisonment for debt, the regulation of auction sales, reform of the militia system, land reforms, and the enactment of mechanics' lien laws. The views of this faction were put forward by the *Daily Sentinel* and the *Working Man's Advocate*. The third and largest faction, variously styled the North American Hotel party, the Anti-Education party, and the Twenty-five, registered through the *Evening Journal* its bitter opposition to the educational plank of the State Guardianship group. The third faction had the support of most of those "up-staters" who had come into the ranks of the workingmen's party. Tammany Hall, the powerful New York City Democratic organization, witnessed with unmixed delight the disintegration of the workers' party. By means of persuasive propaganda and incorporation in its own platform of

some of the demands of the workers, it succeeded in completing the destruction of the organization.

This political uprising of labor was not confined to Philadelphia and New York, but spread rapidly to other parts of the country. "From Maine to Georgia," the *New York Village Chronicle* said in May, 1830, "within a few months past, we discern symptoms of a revolution, which will be second to none save that of '76. Universal education, and equal advantages at the polls, are the great and leading objects for which they [the workingmen] contend." From the Albany (New York) *Advocate* came similar evidence: "Throughout this vast republic the farmers, mechanics and workingmen are assembling . . . to impart to its laws and administration those principles of liberty and equality unfolded in the Declaration of our Independence." Workingmen's candidates met with considerable success in New England, Delaware, and New Jersey. Reverberations of the movement were even heard in the South and West, and for a time a national workingmen's party was contemplated.

The labor parties, however, survived for only a short time, and many of their ambitions were not realized. A series of more or less interrelated circumstances contributed to the decline and eventual collapse of the new labor parties. Internal dissension within the parties, which was nurtured by agents of the older political units, tended to weaken and destroy them. Lack of political experience, coupled with the various psychological pressures exerted by the older parties—such as ostracism, promises, slander, threats of bodily harm, and appeals to traditional party spirit—also helped to discredit the new parties. In addition the older parties incorporated into their own programs some of labor's more acceptable demands. Finally, the workingmen's parties were continually hampered by the fact that during these years labor comprised neither a cohesive group nor a distinct class. Workers, like practically all other Americans, were individualists who felt that they could get ahead on their own without resort to collective action. The factory system was still in its infancy, and an industrial proletariat—in the modern sense of the term—had not yet emerged. Although the United States had an abundance of self-appointed spokesmen for labor, there is no indication that any one of them represented more than a very small part of the country's working population. In several instances the workingmen's parties were labor organizations in name only, for they frequently obtained most of their support from upper- and middle-class reformers rather than from the rank and file of the nation's workers.

Despite numerous obstacles, early American labor parties were at least indirectly responsible for a number of reforms. By their strategic position—a position often enjoyed by third parties—they virtually forced the older parties to accept many of their proposals. Among the most important was their demand for free schools. Before 1830 only the

tolerably well-to-do enjoyed an opportunity for schooling, and in both Europe and America, education, frequently controlled and directed by some religious sect, was considered a private affair. Nowhere in the United States was there a free-school system supported by the state. The few free elementary schools in existence were regarded as institutions for the poor, and these "pauper" schools were less efficient than the private ones. In 1829, New York City had an estimated 24,200 children between the ages of five and fifteen years who did not attend any school. In 1833 the number of illiterate children in the United States totaled 1,000,000; a year later it had increased to 1,250,000. To men of property and influence the uneducated man was a social inferior. By many, like President Dwight of Yale, he was even regarded as an undesirable, if not a positively dangerous, member of the community. Others believed that "equality among men results only from education," and that "the educated man is a good citizen, the uneducated an undesirable member of the body politic."

In such an atmosphere the wage earner naturally believed that education would ultimately furnish an effective tonic for all his social ills. In New York City, workingmen in 1829 resolved

that the most grievous species of inequality is that produced by inequality in education, and that a national system of education and guardianship which shall furnish to all children of the land equal food, clothing, and instruction at the public expense is the only effectual remedy for this and for almost every species of injustice. Resolved, that all other modes of reform are, compared to this particular, inefficient or trifling.

Confronted by labor's demand for educational reform, the farmers and employers, who with few exceptions vigorously opposed it, were forced to yield. New York was typical. Appropriations for educational purposes materially increased, Tammany, with an eye to the labor vote, took up the slogan of "Schools for All," and the state legislature enacted a measure providing for a school system supported entirely by taxation. At the end of two years the legislature, in response to the insistent demands of the opponents of the reform, submitted the question of repealing the law to a state-wide referendum. The result was significant. Thirty-two rural counties voted almost as a unit against its continuance; but seventeen counties, in which the more important cities of the state were located, saved it from defeat. The experience of other states was similar.

To the labor parties also belongs the credit for the enactment of mechanics' lien laws. Before 1830 practically every Northern state gave first lien to the master or person furnishing the material. A contractor, for example, might engage to build a house; he might purchase, but not

pay for, his materials and employ workmen. When the house was completed, the contractor might abscond, go bankrupt, or for some other reason fail to meet his financial obligations; legally, those who furnished the raw materials had first lien. Under these circumstances the workmen were frequently deprived of their wages. The new laws, by giving the workmen first lien, laid the foundation for the system that today requires the employer to pay his workmen in preference to all other creditors. By 1840, wage earners in almost every state were safeguarded by this reform.

The labor parties were outspoken also in their condemnation of imprisonment for debt. By 1830 only Ohio and Kentucky had abolished this practice; and in that year it was estimated that 75,000 persons in the United States were annually placed behind prison walls for debt. New York headed the list with 10,000; Pennsylvania had 7,000, and Massachusetts and Maryland 3,000 each. In 1828 more than 1,000 individuals were sent to jail for debts in the city of Boston, and nearly the same number in Baltimore in 1829. Prison sentences were meted out to those who owed trifling sums as well as to those whose debts were large. Out of 817 debtors imprisoned in Philadelphia during an eight months' period in 1829, 80 owed less than \$1 each. In 1830, reports from 32 prisons indicated that 2,841 persons had been imprisoned for owing less than \$20. Workingmen in their meetings, party platforms, and press demanded the abolition of the pernicious system. Again Tammany, with its eye on the labor vote, pushed an act through the New York State legislature in 1831 abolishing all imprisonment for debt except in case of fraud. By 1840, statutes exempting the debtor from imprisonment had been enacted in practically every Northern state. In the South, however, a debtor could be imprisoned as late as 1860.

The workingmen in their party platforms also opposed the compulsory militia system. Inaugurated in the early days of the republic in place of a standing army, this system compelled every able-bodied man, under penalty of fine or imprisonment, to provide himself at his own expense with arms and other necessary equipment and to be in attendance at drills and parades. The well-to-do, who could easily afford it, usually absented themselves and paid their fine; nonattendance for the poor man meant imprisonment. By 1830 a few states had abolished military parades and were even preparing to abolish their militia laws altogether. In New York, however, a bill introduced the same year to reduce the time required for military training from two days to one afternoon a month failed of passage.

A ten-hour day, equal taxation, complete religious liberty, the abolition of banks and other chartered monopolies, election and judicial reforms, and the abolition of prison labor were among other issues seriously advocated by the labor parties. They especially condemned con-

vict labor. New York stonecutters went on strike when they learned that the granite for new buildings had been cut by prison labor, and Boston cabinetmakers were so infuriated because prison-made furniture was being disposed of at auction sale that they dispersed the customers and destroyed the furniture.

Let no man [ran a communication in the New York Mechanics' Gazette] who is a mechanic think himself safe because his business is not conducted in the prison; for he knows not how soon an attempt may be made to wrest from him what must be ever dear to him, a fair opportunity of supporting his wife and children, by the labor of his hands and the profits of his trade.

Wage earners were urged to cast their votes only for candidates who would pledge themselves to stop the "vile business of manufacturing in prison."

105. TRADE UNIONISM

FOLLOWING the disruption of the workingmen's parties there was a lull in labor activities. But it was of short duration. Business depression in the early 1830's, followed by a period of rising prices and inflated currency preceding the Panic of 1837, once more aroused the worker. His cost of living rose nearly 70 per cent in less than three years, but his wages trailed. His employer, stimulated by mounting prices and the "taste of unusual profits," often drove him throughout a long working day to increase production. In an effort to remedy these and similar unsatisfactory conditions the worker now turned to trade unionism and its principal weapon, the strike. From 1834 to 1837, 150 labor societies and trade unions were established in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Women employed as seamstresses, factory hands, bookbinders, and in other occupations, formed unions of their own. Eleven cities formed central labor unions. During these same years the cordwainers, combmakers, carpenters, weavers, and printers made crude attempts to organize national trade-unions. In 1834 some thirty delegates, representing local unions and central trade-unions from six industrial cities, assembled in New York City, where they organized the National Trades' Union, the first national labor organization of its kind in the Western world. Subsequent conventions were held in 1835, 1836, and 1837. It declared itself in favor of a system of free, universal education, demanded that public lands, which were being acquired by speculators, be retained by the government for actual settlers, deplored the condition of children em-

ployed in textile factories, advocated a ten-hour day, and opposed special privilege for a "favored few." The union membership of the six industrial centers of the nation in 1834 totaled approximately 26,250. Two years later it had risen to 300,000.

Labor, however, did more than organize and hold conventions. It made use of its principal weapon—the strike. Of the 173 strikes in the United States between 1833 and 1837, 103 were for higher wages and 26 for a ten-hour day. Out of the total number, 34 were credited to the building trades, and 24 to the shoemakers and cordwainers. Tailors, hatters, bakers, sailors, ropemakers, printers, teamsters, coal heavers, and, in fact, every organized group went on strike. The factory worker, who up to this time had played little part in the labor movement, now began to agitate feebly for reform. The carpet weavers at Thompsonville, Connecticut, for example, struck for higher wages; the employees in the cotton mills at Paterson, New Jersey, struck for a shorter day, and in Lowell, Massachusetts, against a threatened reduction in wages. In the eyes of the courts, strikes were still illegal, and not until 1842, in *Commonwealth vs. Hunt*, was it ruled that workers had a legal right to organize and to adopt peaceful measures to accomplish their ends.

Although many of the new unions were wiped out by the Panic of 1837, the trade-union movement nevertheless provided the principal impetus for the agitation that resulted in the establishment of the ten-hour day. In the Northeast, workingmen asserted that "ten hours well and faithfully employed is as much as an employer ought to receive, or require, for a day's work; and that it is as much as any artisan, mechanic or laborer, ought to give." In the first half of the 1830's there were demonstrations in all the larger industrial centers against a working day of more than ten hours. By 1835 the movement had assumed nation-wide proportions. There were parades with bands and banners bearing the inscription "From 6 to 6." Circulars and pamphlets urged shorter working hours, and the movement was pushed by mass meetings and strikes. The ten-hour day, it was argued, would improve the worker's health and efficiency and give him the leisure necessary to his moral and mental development. Although artisans and handicraftmen began the agitation, it attracted the attention of many factory workers.

The trade-union movement was doubtless partly responsible for President Van Buren's order in 1840 that everyone employed on public works came within the scope of the ten-hour rule for those employed by the national government; and the unions made serious efforts to obtain state legislation for a ten-hour day. The first state to enact such a law was New Hampshire, which in 1847 provided that "no person shall be required . . . to perform more than ten hours' labor in one day, except in pursuance of an express contract requiring greater time." This law also forbade employment of minors under fifteen years of age in any

manufacturing establishment for more than ten hours without the written consent of either parents or guardians. The "express contract" clause, however, made the law ineffective, for many New Hampshire employers virtually compelled their employees to sign contracts for longer hours. Those who refused to sign were not only discharged but black-listed. The following year Pennsylvania enacted similar legislation for employees in textile and paper factories. Here, too, there was a special contract loophole. In Massachusetts, which was the scene of considerable agitation for the ten-hour day, petition after petition was presented to the legislature. The state, however, refused to pass remedial legislation; and a report made by a committee of the lower house stated that labor was "intelligent enough to make its own bargains, and look out for its own interests" and that the remedy for the abuse was to be found "in the progressive improvement in art and science, in a higher appreciation of man's destiny, in a less love for money, and a more ardent love for social happiness and intellectual superiority."

In the decade preceding the Civil War, there was a marked decline in the interest of organized labor in both politics and reform; but the period was characterized by the formation of a number of national craft unions, notably the printers, stone cutters, molders, machinists and hat workers. These workers were motivated largely by a desire to restrict entrance to the trade and to exact better terms from their employers; they had little interest in the welfare of the working class as a whole. Although these unions included only a small percentage of the nation's workers, they demonstrated the feasibility of a national labor movement and revealed an increasing desire among skilled workingmen to monopolize the job.

CHAPTER XVIII

MERCHANTS AND SHIPPERS

- 106. ROADS AND TURNPIKES
 - 107. INLAND WATERWAYS
 - 108. CANAL CONSTRUCTION
 - 109. RAILROADS
 - 110. DOMESTIC TRADE
 - 111. OVERSEAS COMMERCE
-

THE GROWTH of American industry and agriculture was made possible in part by the expansion of the nation's transportation system. During the fifty years preceding the Civil War, old roads were improved and new ones constructed, a network of canals was built, and a system of railroads was established. While these developments stimulated and facilitated domestic commerce, a flourishing overseas trade provided Americans with foreign products and with markets for their surplus goods.

106. ROADS AND TURNPIKES

AT THE close of the Revolutionary era American domestic trade was relatively unimportant. Aside from local merchandising, practically all domestic commerce in 1790 consisted of the exchange of imported wares for the surplus agricultural produce from the inland regions east of the Appalachians. Thousands of dollars' worth of imported goods were annually turned over to farmers of Pennsylvania,

New Jersey, and Delaware by Philadelphia merchants in payment for large quantities of meat, grain, flour, and lumber. In like manner, goods from abroad largely paid for the lumber, pot- and pearl-ashes, leather, dairy products, and other materials that reached the wharves of New York from the Hudson, Mohawk, and Connecticut valleys. Farmers from the upper Chesapeake Bay regions and from the extensive territory drained by the Susquehanna looked to Baltimore as a market for their products and a source of supply for their needs. In the South, European agents continued to exchange their goods for tobacco, rice, and flour.

As population increased and people began to move into the trans-Allegheny, the need for adequate inland transportation facilities became more urgent. At first an effort was made to solve the problem by transforming the old Indian trails into earth roads. Over sandy areas these roads proved fairly satisfactory, but wherever the soil was of clay they became sloughs of mud with every rain and thaw. "The road in general," (from Havre de Grace to Baltimore) an English traveler wrote in 1788, "is frightful; it is over a clay soil, full of deep ruts, always in the midst of forests; frequently obstructed by trees overset by the wind, which obliged us to seek a new passage among the woods." Dirt roads in other sections of the country were described by travelers as "execrable," "savage," "shameful," "infamous," "tedious," and "wretched."

The very inadequacy of these crude and often impassable dirt roads for the needs of farmer, merchant, consumer, and speculator in frontier lands, coupled with the competition of the leading Atlantic coast towns for the rapidly growing Western trade, led to a remarkable era in improved road building. Pennsylvania took the lead. In 1792 the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Company was chartered to build a road connecting the headwaters of the Potomac and Ohio rivers, and within two years it had completed a 62-mile pike at a cost of \$465,000. The Lancaster Pike achieved almost instant success. It not only became one of the leading thoroughfares for those headed for the Ohio country, but it also enhanced land values and brought to merchants of the Quaker City a rich trade from one of the most fertile agricultural regions in America. The traffic over it was so great that its nine tollgates, located on the average about seven miles apart, turned in a revenue that enabled the company to pay dividends running as high as 15 per cent.

News of the success of the Philadelphia-Lancaster enterprise soon reached other sections of the country, and the next twenty or thirty years were characterized by great activity in turnpike building.* Turn-

* The name "turnpike" came from the fact that at the places where tolls were collected long poles with pikes were swung across the road, thus barring advance until payment had been made.

piques and turnpike companies became leading topics of conversation for farmers, crossroad storekeepers, landowners, moneylenders, merchants, and speculators. Pennsylvania chartered 86 companies, and by 1832 the state had more than 2,000 miles of improved highways. Approximately 180 turnpike companies were formed in New England by 1810, of which New Hampshire chartered 20 and Vermont 26. Connecticut built nearly 800 miles of hard-surfaced roads. By 1811, New York had chartered 137 companies whose combined capital totaled \$7,500,000; these companies constructed about 1400 miles of road. From Baltimore 3 turnpikes to the westward were constructed. In addition to stock subscriptions and state aid, many turnpike companies raised capital by lotteries; some received contributions from towns and counties. Streams were crossed by tollbridges and ferries, which were in the hands of private companies chartered and financed in the same manner as the turnpike corporations.

Although several early turnpikes ran in a westerly direction, not one actually extended into the trans-Allegheny country. Settlers who had gone into western Pennsylvania, western New York, or into the valley of the Ohio were compelled to depend upon old dirt roads or the Mississippi and its tributaries for getting their produce to market. Overland charges, especially for long hauls, were prohibitive. As a consequence, the Western farmer soon discovered that it was impossible for him to share in the prosperity occasioned by the heavy English importation of American foodstuffs during the Napoleonic Wars; * and he vigorously demanded that the Federal government take steps to remedy his unfortunate situation. Manufacturers in search of cheaper raw materials and widening markets united with the Westerners in their agitation for internal improvements.

Although the purchase of Louisiana and the opening of the Mississippi eased the problem somewhat, the agitation for internal improvements, especially for better connections between the East and the West, did not subside. Many people argued that the government should either build roads and canals or help finance private enterprise engaged in such undertakings. In 1803, when Ohio came into the Union, Federal lands within the boundaries of the new commonwealth were exempted from taxation for five years, and Congress agreed to spend 5 per cent of the net proceeds from the sale of such lands for the construction of roads. As Ohio was authorized to spend 3 per cent for the building of roads within the state, only 2 per cent was left for a national road from the Ohio River to the seaboard. Similar agreements were subsequently made with Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. By 1805 this arrangement had produced \$12,600, and in March of the following year Con-

* During the Napoleonic Wars the average price of flour in America rose from \$5.40 to \$9.12 per barrel.

gress voted to construct a road from Cumberland, on the Maryland side of the Potomac, to Wheeling, on the Virginia side of the Ohio.* Selection of the actual route, surveys, and the securing of rights of way † delayed construction, and it was 1811 before the first contract was let, and 1818 before the 130-mile stretch from the Potomac to the Ohio was completed. Its extension westward was opposed by many Easterners on sectional and economic grounds, but the road, largely through the efforts of Henry Clay,‡ was continued to Columbus, Ohio, in 1833, then due west through Richmond, Indianapolis, and Terre Haute, Indiana, until it reached Vandalia, Illinois, in 1852. By 1836, Congress had turned the road over to the states through which it ran.

The economic results of the Cumberland (or National) Road, the eastern portion of which was opened to traffic in 1817, can scarcely be overestimated. For nearly two decades it was one of the leading arteries to the trans-Allegheny empire. A person could now go from Baltimore to Wheeling in three days, whereas formerly it had taken eight. Property along the route rose in value, and villages multiplied in number and population. The road was the main route for emigrants. For merchant and pioneer farmer it afforded a long-hoped-for avenue between the East and the West over which merchandise and Western farm products of all kinds could be shipped at greatly reduced costs.

The success of the Cumberland Road stimulated interest in internal improvements of all kinds, and between 1815 and 1830 numerous turnpike and canal companies were organized. Many were designed for purely local projects; others planned undertakings of an interstate character. Nearly all of the latter companies, and even some of the former, hoped that they would be financially assisted by the national government. Some were disappointed in this expectation, but many received

* Among those who enthusiastically advocated the new road was Albert Gallatin, Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury. Gallatin's attitude toward the road and his anticipations as to its utility were set forth in a letter from Gallatin to Jefferson, April 13, 1807: "The immense importance of that road as part of a great western travelling road and principally as the main communication for the transportation of all the foreign or Atlantic articles which the western states consume and even for the carriage of western flour and produce to the Potomac, induce one strongly to wish that that part particularly which lies between the Potomac and the Monongahela may be completed in the most substantial manner. . . . Ten thousand tons will be carried westward annually and perhaps one hundred thousand barrels of flour brought back. I think the annual saving in expenses of transportation will exceed two hundred thousand dollars."

† The state of Pennsylvania was slow to grant consent largely because the Philadelphians, who were anxious to monopolize as much of the Western trade as possible, felt that the road was being "constructed in the direct interests of Baltimore." The city of New York also feared that the construction of the road would be detrimental to its interests. See J. S. Young: *A Political and Constitutional Study of the Cumberland Road* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904), pp. 21-3.

‡ Between 1806 and 1838, Clay supported more than thirty acts for the building and maintenance of the road.

THE
AMERICAN TRAVELLER;
OR,
National Directory,

CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF
ALL THE GREAT POST ROADS,
AND
MOST IMPORTANT CROSS ROADS,
IN THE
United States,
LEADING FROM WASHINGTON CITY TO THE SEVERAL EXTREMITIES
OF THE UNION; AND FROM THE
LARGE CITIES AND STATE CAPITALS,
TO
TOWNS AND INTERESTING PLACES IN VARIOUS
DIRECTIONS,

WITH
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE COUNTRY AND VARIOUS SCENERY WHICH
THOSE ROADS PASS THROUGH:

Some of the principal Lines of Stages, Steam-boats, and Packets;
Statements at large of some of the most Respectable Hotels,
Genteel Boarding Houses, Establishments, and Institutions, in
the large Cities, at the Springs, and Places of Fashionable
Resort.

A GEOGRAPHICAL AND STATISTICAL VIEW
OF THE
UNITED STATES
WITH INFORMATION ON OTHER SUBJECTS INTERESTING
TO TRAVELLERS.

—♦—
BY D HEWETT, A. M.
Lecturer on Geography.

—♦♦♦♦—
WASHINGTON.

PRINTED BY DAVIS & FORCE, (FRANKLIN'S HEAD,
PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE

.....
1825.

TITLE PAGE TO A GUIDE BOOK FOR TRAVELERS

*This was the first guidebook of national scope for stagecoach
travelers, and the first comprehensive printed list of United States
roads.*

Federal aid. The practice of granting Federal appropriations for road building, however, was halted for a generation when President Jackson in 1830 vetoed the Maysville Road bill, a measure providing for a sixty-mile turnpike from Maysville to Lexington, entirely in the state of Kentucky. The veto shifted the burden of highway construction to the several states and the towns and counties that composed them. In the future only military roads would be financed or constructed by the national government.

The Maysville veto was a severe blow for all those who were in any way interested in building better roads. Western farmers were especially hard hit, for the younger commonwealths considered themselves too poor to vote adequate funds for road making. Private toll companies still functioned, but with the coming of the steamboat and the railroad they ceased to be profitable ventures. In some states, particularly in the South and West, plank roads were built during the 1840's and 1850's, but while these enabled the farmer to market his produce more cheaply and yielded a profitable return to the stockholders, they were not always satisfactory, and by 1860 they were fast losing favor. Taking the country as a whole, the roads, aside from the turnpikes, were abominable, and Charles Dickens did not seriously exaggerate when in 1842 he described American roads as "a series of alternate swamps and gravel pits."

107. INLAND WATERWAYS

MORE important than roads in the development of early American domestic commerce were waterways. Before the railroad and even later, the principal rivers and their tributaries were used—except when frozen—by an endless variety of small craft. There were no tolls to pay and no oxen, mules, or horses to feed or wagons to repair. Rapids, falls, treacherous currents, headwinds, and occasionally, low water were the main drawbacks. With the exception of New England, where the fall line is near the coast, the region east of the Alleghenies contains a number of navigable streams. Chief among these are the Hudson and the Delaware in the Middle states, and the Potomac, Rappahannock, James and Savannah in the South. Beyond the Alleghenies the Mississippi with its tributaries, the Ohio and the Missouri, affords a network of navigable channels. Since roads were poor or altogether lacking, many farmers, particularly those of the trans-Allegheny region, were virtually compelled to depend on these streams to get their surplus produce to market.

River transportation was practically revolutionized by the steamboat.


Some years before 1800 a number of Americans had begun to experiment with the use of steam for the propulsion of boats. In 1786, John Fitch attained a speed of 3 miles an hour on the Delaware with a boat driven by 12 mechanically operated upright oars. Subsequent models had more power and greater speed. Though Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York, New Jersey, and Virginia granted him the sole right to operate steamboats on their waters, his attempt in 1790 to make regular trips between Philadelphia, Bordentown, Trenton, and Wilmington proved unprofitable.

It was reserved for Robert Fulton to make steam navigation a success. In 1801, while living abroad, Fulton met Robert R. Livingston, the American minister to France. Both were interested in the possibilities of the steamboat, and together they studied the attempts at steam navigation that had been made on either side of the Atlantic. Fulton came to the conclusion that a powerful and well-built engine was indispensable to success. Through Livingston's influence he succeeded in inducing the British government to allow a Boulton and Watt engine to be shipped to America. This engine he installed in the *Clermont*, a 160-ton side-wheeler, which in August, 1807, completed a round trip between Albany and New York City in 62 hours.

In 1803, Fulton, Livingston, and their associate, Nicholas Roosevelt, obtained exclusive control of the navigable waters of New York State. Eight years later the New Orleans Territory gave them an exclusive monopoly of the lower Mississippi. In the same year they established a shipyard at Pittsburgh, where at a cost of approximately \$38,000 they built the *New Orleans*, the first steamboat to ply American Western waters. The *New Orleans* reached the city for which it was named early in 1812, but was unable to return against the powerful current. In 1816, however, a better-built boat, the *Enterprise*, made the upstream trip from New Orleans to Louisville in twenty-five days. The next year, the *Washington*, built at Wheeling and the largest and most pretentious craft that had as yet appeared on Western waters, made a round trip between Louisville and New Orleans in forty-one days. Meanwhile steps had been taken in both New York and Louisiana to break Fulton and Livingston's monopoly. In New York, Thomas Gibbons opened a line of ferries between Elizabeth, New Jersey, and New York City in opposition to one operated by Aaron Ogden, who held a license from Fulton. Ogden obtained an injunction in the New York courts restraining Gibbons from operating his line. The case finally reached the United States Supreme Court, and in 1824, Chief Justice Marshall ruled in favor of Gibbons on the ground that the Federal Constitution authorized Congress to regulate interstate commerce.

This decision ended state control of navigable rivers carrying interstate commerce and opened the way for increased steamboat traffic on

inland waters. On the Hudson several new companies were soon operating between New York and Albany and intermediate points. Steam navigation on the other leading rivers emptying into the Atlantic grew steadily. West of the Alleghenies, Pittsburgh, Wheeling, and Cincinnati became famous steamboat-building centers. By 1820, sixty steamboats were in operation on the Mississippi and its tributaries. Twenty years



*The Anson Northrup, A RIVER STEAMBOAT ON
WESTERN WATERS*

The steamboats on Western waters were larger than those that plied Eastern rivers. Sternwheelers became increasingly popular because of their effectiveness in shallow waters.

later the number had multiplied to over four hundred, and by 1860 to more than a thousand.

Steamboat transportation on the Great Lakes developed more slowly, for until the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825, the whole Lakes region was outside the range of navigation and settlement. Immigrants found it far easier to reach the valleys of the Ohio, Mississippi, and the Missouri and their tributaries than the Great Lakes; and Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Louisville, and St. Louis were thriving cities at a time when Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago were struggling villages. The first steamboat on Lake Ontario was built in 1816. Two years later *Walk-in-the-Water*, launched at Black Rock, near Buffalo, made her first trip on

Lake Erie. After the Erie and Ohio canals were built, the Lakes trade grew rapidly; the tonnage, only 3,500 in 1820, had increased to 75,000 in 1840, and to 470,000 in 1860.

Although steamboats on the Western waters were able to reduce the time from New Orleans to Pittsburgh from one hundred to thirty days, to cut the cost of transportation in half, and to expand the market for both farmer and merchant, they operated under most trying conditions. Submerged rocks, snags, fallen trees, shoals, swiftly running currents, and changing channels were constant dangers to the navigator of the winding streams. Often the boats were flimsily constructed, and their engines were frequently called upon for performances far beyond those for which they were built. Cylinder heads blew out and boilers burst, with loss of life and property. Sparks from the wood fuel sometimes caused disastrous fires. Collisions due either to carelessness or the difficulties of navigation were numerous. Fairly accurate records indicate that by 1850, 1,070 vessels, representing a total cost of \$7,100,000, had been lost with human casualties of 2,269 killed and 1,881 wounded. The diarist Philip Hone concluded that steam had become "a substitute for war in the philosophical plan of keeping down the superabundance of the human race, and thinning off the excessive population of which political economists have from time to time expressed so much dread." Between 1822 and 1860 the Federal government appropriated more than \$3,000,000 for the improvement of traffic conditions on the Mississippi, Ohio, Missouri, and Arkansas rivers.

Despite the fact that the National Road and the steamboat facilitated settlement of the trans-Allegheny country and materially aided both farmer and merchant, they by no means solved the transportation problem. Farmers in western New York, northern Ohio and Indiana, and other sections of the country remote from the national pike or a navigable stream continued to demand better communications with the East. Even those north of the Ohio, who could make use of the Mississippi and its tributaries, complained of the long, roundabout, and hazardous route by which their commodities reached the seaboard or European markets. A shorter, more direct, and cheaper route between the Atlantic coast and the trans-Appalachia was still urgently needed. Not until New York State built the Erie Canal, connecting Lake Erie with the Hudson River, was this need met.


108. CANAL CONSTRUCTION

PLANS for canals in America antedated the Revolution, and before the close of the eighteenth century a number of short canals around rapids or falls or between important towns had been built or

were in process of construction. But nearly all of these enterprises were local in character, and not one of them linked the East with the West. Although such a waterway had been visualized by Washington, Robert Morris, Albert Gallatin, and many others, it was not until the British blockade had put an end to coastwise shipping that discussion of the project was revived. The continued high cost of sending merchandise overland from the Atlantic coast towns to the West was causing the merchants of the Ohio country to wonder if it would not be more profitable to buy their imported goods from New Orleans rather than from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Far-sighted Easterners feared that they would be deprived of Western markets, and that East and West might as a consequence drift apart commercially and politically.

As early as 1784-5, Christopher Colles, a New Yorker of remarkable engineering talent, had endeavored to interest the legislature of the state of New York in building a waterway across the state. Others, notably Elkanah Watson and General Philip Schuyler, were equally enthusiastic, and largely through their efforts the state chartered two companies to provide navigable waterways between the Hudson on the one hand and Lakes Ontario and Champlain on the other. Many New York City businessmen were convinced that without a navigable water channel between the Hudson and the Great Lakes, New York would suffer irrevocable economic loss. In support of their contention they pointed to the growing trade enjoyed by Philadelphia and Baltimore, both of which were aided by the improved roads to the West. By contrast, grain and timber produced in the western part of New York were shipped down the Ohio and the Mississippi to New Orleans, or to Montreal by way of the St. Lawrence. Even products of the Lake Champlain area went north to Canada rather than south to the Hudson. Despite these considerations, the scheme met with numerous obstacles. Many persons within the state—especially taxpayers—were either apathetic or opposed; the Federal government repeatedly refused to assist; even Westerners, with an eye to the conquest of Canada, declined to lend support. But in 1817, the state of New York, thanks to Governor DeWitt Clinton, finally undertook the task alone. The \$7,000,000 estimated as the cost of building the two waterways was borrowed on the credit of the state. Funds for the interest and principal of this indebtedness were to be obtained by taxes on auction sales, manufactured salt, and tickets for stated distances on the Hudson River steamboats. Additional funds were to come from lottery proceeds, private donations, and legislative appropriations. Tolls collected, when the canals were built, were also to be applied toward the indebtedness.

Actual construction of the Erie Canal was entrusted to small contractors. The first strip of the Lake Erie-Hudson River waterway—the



12. PATHS OF INLAND COMMERCE

Both canals and highways—that is wagonroads—are shown. The canals connect important waterways. Of the canals the Erie, which joins the Hudson River with Lake Erie, led all others as a transportation artery. Of the many highways, the Cumberland Road, or National Pike, which extended from Cumberland, Maryland, to Pittsburgh and thence westward, was completed to Springfield, Ohio, and partly built to Vandalia, Illinois. From Vandalia to Jefferson City, Missouri, the Federal government never completed the road.

fifteen-mile stretch between Rome and Utica—opened in 1819; four years later, boats could pass from Rochester into the tidewater of the Hudson at Albany, and in 1825 a triumphant fleet headed by the *Seneca Chief* made its way from Lake Erie to New York Bay, where on November 4, Governor Clinton poured a cask of lake water into the sea to symbolize “the marriage of the waters.”

This [he said] is intended to indicate and commemorate the navigable communication which has been accomplished between our Mediterranean Seas and the Atlantic Ocean, in about eight years,

to the extent of more than four hundred and twenty-five miles, by the wisdom, public spirit, and energy of the people of the State of New York; and may the God of the Heavens and the Earth smile most propitiously on this work, and render it subservient to the best interests of the human race!

The original Erie Canal was 363 miles long and cost between \$7,000,000 and \$8,000,000. So great was the traffic, however, that the tolls during the first nine years more than covered the cost of construction. During its first year, when it was operated only part of the season, the tolls equaled one seventh of its original cost. But the financial returns to the state from the Erie Canal were of little consequence in comparison with its far-reaching economic, social, and political effects. The canal served as a highway not only for the farmers of the western New York wheat region but for the entire western Lakes district. The time required for freight shipments from Buffalo to New York was reduced from 20 to 6 days, and the cost from \$100 to \$8 a ton. Grain, lumber, pot- and pearl-ashes and other bulky products that formerly had gone by river or pike to Baltimore, Philadelphia, Montreal, and New Orleans were now sent eastward at greatly reduced rates. In 1835, ten years after the canal opened, 868,561 barrels of flour from western New York, and 268,259 barrels from states farther west, arrived at tidewater by way of the new route. By 1846 the arrival of wheat and flour at Buffalo had surpassed that at New Orleans. Western farm products increased rapidly in volume and in some sections doubled or trebled. Land values rose correspondingly. The canal also served to lower the prices of Eastern manufactures for the Westerner. New York City, where real and personal property rose from \$70,000,000 in 1820 to \$125,000,000 in 1830, was transformed from a market town for the Hudson Valley into the leading metropolis of America. By 1850 it had outstripped Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore in both population and wealth. The Lakes towns of Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Chicago now developed with amazing rapidity and by 1850 were challenging Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and New Orleans for the commercial supremacy of the West.

The Erie Canal also increased economic specialization. Eastern farmers, particularly those of New England, who were handicapped by poor soil, were now unable to compete with the farmers of the West. Potatoes, for example, which had sold readily for seventy-five cents a bushel before the opening of the canal, were practically replaced by Western-grown potatoes at half that price. More and more, the production of transportable farm produce was left to the trans-Allegheny; and an ever-increasing number of New England farmers left their stony hillsides for the rising mill towns or swelled the growing streams of pioneers headed westward. Many of the emigrating farmers, as well as

nearly all of the Germans and Irish who went West, made use of the canal packet boats, which covered the distance between Albany and Buffalo in four and a half days.

The success of the Erie Canal led at once to a demand for canals in other seaboard states. Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and to a lesser extent, Charleston took immediate steps to improve their transportation facilities with the West. Early in 1825 the legislature of Massachusetts created a commission "to ascertain the practicability of making a canal from Boston to the Connecticut River and extending the same to some point on the Hudson River in the State of New York in the vicinity of the junction of the Erie Canal with that river." Unfortunately for Boston, the topography of western Massachusetts did not lend itself to canals, and the trade that its merchants hoped to capture passed into the hands of their New York rivals. Pennsylvania was more active, and between 1826 and 1834 at a cost of \$10,000,000 it constructed a system of canals between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Because there was no pass through the Pennsylvania mountains such as the Mohawk Valley in New York, the loaded canal boats were conveyed over the Alleghenies by a 33½-mile portage railway. Although the Pennsylvania canal never seriously rivaled the Erie route, it enabled Philadelphia to retain a share of the trade that otherwise would have gone to New York. Baltimore also sought to tap the West with the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. Originally planned to extend along the Potomac from Georgetown to Cumberland and then by a tunnel under the mountains to the Youghiogheny, the project was begun in 1828, but never completed.

The large-scale projects that were designed to join the Atlantic with the Middle West were supplemented by a number of smaller canals. In the Northeast most of these were built as feeders to the main canals or as outlets for the anthracite coal district of eastern Pennsylvania. In the Middle West with its great distances, lack of roads, and desire for better transportation facilities, canals were viewed as economic necessities. The most important of these canals were those that, by joining the Great Lakes with the Ohio and Mississippi systems, provided continuous inland water communication to either New York or New Orleans. Of the major sections, only the South failed to build canals on a large scale. In the states south of Maryland and the Ohio River, the mountainous terrain more often than not made canal construction difficult, if not impossible.

Before 1850, nearly 3,200 miles of canals were built in the United States. To finance this expansion in the nation's transportation system was a major undertaking. The principal burden was borne by the states, which by 1840 had spent \$200,000,000 on internal improvements. To raise this sum the states had to borrow. State securities were generally

regarded as first-rate investments; but because America lacked enough liquid capital to float all the state bond issues, it was necessary to turn to the Old World for financial aid. It was estimated in 1839 that American states and corporations owed European creditors at least \$200,000,000. Englishmen had invested more than \$110,000,000 in American stocks. In addition to borrowing money, several states—notably Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois—received generous grants of land (consisting of alternate sections from a strip five miles wide on either side of the canals) from the Federal government. Few internal improvements were built from money raised by taxation.

109. RAILROADS

THE CRAZE for canals had scarcely reached its height before all existing systems of inland transportation were challenged by the railroad. Long used in English mines, quarries, and manufacturing plants, where the cars were propelled by gravity or by men and horses, the railway along an inclined plane was introduced into the United States during the opening decade of the nineteenth century. At the same time, engineers, realizing that steam might be used to propel wheeled vehicles as well as boats, were experimenting on both sides of the Atlantic. As early as 1786, Oliver Evans of Philadelphia petitioned the legislature of Pennsylvania for the sole right to use wagons propelled by steam on the state's highways. To prove that the idea of operating land wagons by mechanical power was sound, Evans in 1804 put a five-horsepower steamboat on wheels and drove it through the streets of Philadelphia. In 1820, John Stevens built and successfully operated a narrow-gauge steam railroad on his estate at Hoboken, New Jersey; and in 1829 the *Rocket*, a locomotive built by the Englishman, George Stephenson, hauled a train weighing thirteen tons over the Liverpool-Manchester railway at an average speed of fifteen miles an hour.

Meanwhile in 1826 a three-mile tramway was built from the granite quarries at Quincy, Massachusetts, to the Neponset River. The following year the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company opened a similar tramway between Honesdale and Carbondale, a distance of about sixteen miles. At the very time these lines were being built, a group of Baltimore citizens was planning a railroad to the West to keep for Baltimore its share of the trans-Allegheny trade. The project was received with considerable favor, and in April, 1827, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company was incorporated. On July 4, 1828, the day that President John Quincy Adams turned the first shovelful of dirt for the

Baltimore and Ohio Canal, Charles Carroll, the last surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, turned the first soil for the new railroad. By the end of 1828 the fourteen-mile stretch to Ellicotts Mills was opened for traffic; four years later the line had been completed to Point of Rocks, about seventy-three miles west of Baltimore. In South Carolina, the Charleston and Hamburg, chartered in 1829 primarily for the purpose of diverting traffic from Savannah to Charleston, had 137 miles in operation by 1834. The Mohawk and Hudson, parent company of the New York Central system, was chartered as early as 1826; it opened its seventeen-mile line between Albany and Schenectady five years later. In 1828, Pennsylvania authorized the first link in the present Pennsylvania system, a road connecting Philadelphia with Columbia on the Susquehanna. Massachusetts began to charter railroad companies in 1830, and by 1835, lines were running from Boston to Lowell, Worcester, and Providence (Rhode Island). By 1840 the railway mileage of the country totaled 2,818 miles. Nearly all the roads, however, were short lines that served purely local needs.

For half a century or more the railroad promoters struggled to overcome the ignorance and prejudice of the public, the opposition of vested interests, and a variety of mechanical and engineering obstacles. Aside from Evans, Stevens, and Benjamin Dearborn of Boston, few Americans in 1820 knew anything about railroads. As late as 1823 the editor of a leading Pennsylvania newspaper, when asked by a correspondent: "What is a railroad?" was unable to answer, and suggested that "perhaps some other correspondent can tell." Even the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Internal Improvements, organized in 1824, could give no satisfactory description of the new means of transportation. Far more difficult to overcome than the ignorance and distrust of the public was the hostility of such vested interests as turnpike, plank-road, bridge, steamboat, canal, and stagecoach companies, state governments, tavern keepers, and even farmers who thought that the new means of transportation would seriously impair the market for horses, hay, and grain. Opposition of the turnpike and canal companies was especially strong where the railroad was a prospective competitor. The promoters of the Boston and Worcester Railway, for example, found their chief opponents in the owners of the stage lines and those dependent upon them. Likewise, the canal interests in New York State hampered the railroads in every way possible. Along the Erie Canal, mass meetings demanded that railroad competition should not be allowed to affect the receipts of the canal, and the legislature in 1833 prohibited any railroad in the state from carrying freight. In 1844 an amendment permitted the railroads to haul freight during the periods when canal navigation was suspended; but not until 1851 were the restrictions on railroad freight from Albany to Buffalo removed. Rail-

road companies in other states experienced similar opposition. In the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad met a powerful adversary; and the Pennsylvania Railroad was compelled by its charter to pay a tonnage tax of five mills per mile. Many of the competing concerns were rivals not only for business but for capital.

Numerous engineering difficulties relating to roadbed trackage, motive power, and equipment also had to be overcome. Because most of the earlier railroads closely followed existing highways and trails, they followed sharp curves and steep grades. Roadbeds, with some exceptions, were poorly constructed and in most cases had to be rebuilt later to withstand the strain of heavier rolling stock. The first rails, made of wooden beams or cut stone laid end to end and covered with strips of iron, were bolted to granite or wooden piles. Iron rails, which began to come into use in 1844, permitted heavier loads and greater speed. Gauges varied greatly at first; the width between the rails ranged from four feet three inches on the Delaware and Hudson road to six feet on both the Erie and the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western. All the early railroad bridges were made of timber; the first iron bridge of any size was not built until the decade of the 1850's. After unsuccessful experiments with imported English locomotives, American engineers began to build their own. The *Best Friend of Charleston*, the *West Point*, the *Tom Thumb*, the *DeWitt Clinton*, and the *York*, the first American-built locomotives for practical use, were wood-burners without cabs. The original passenger cars were little more than highly ornate, brightly painted stagecoach bodies placed on flanged wheels. As models of discomfort they were unsurpassed. Almost immediately, however, they began to be superseded by longer cars with seats on either side of a central aisle and doors at the ends. Both locomotives and cars were at first equipped with brakes like those of a stagecoach, heavy blocks of wood that were pressed against the rim of the wheels by hand and foot levers.

Despite handicaps, railroad construction grew steadily, and by 1860 more than 30,000 miles had been built. Almost three quarters of this mileage was in the industrial-commercial Northeast and in the Old Northwest. From 1850 to 1860 there was not only an enormous expansion in railway mileage but the beginning of the consolidation of short independent lines into great trunk lines. In 1851 the New York and Erie, the first trunk line to join the Atlantic coast and the Middle West, was finally completed to Dunkirk on Lake Erie. Two years later several roads between Albany and Buffalo were combined to form the New York Central. In 1853 the Baltimore and Ohio reached Wheeling, and the next year the Pennsylvania established through connections between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. A dozen years earlier Boston and

Albany had been connected by the Western Railroad. By 1854, Charleston, Savannah, and Atlanta had direct connections with the Northwest by way of the Western and Atlantic Railroad of Georgia and the Nashville and Chattanooga, and over this route quantities of Western meat and grain were shipped to the Eastern cotton belt. Two years before the outbreak of the Civil War the Central Virginia, running west from Richmond, had made connections with the Memphis and Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga.

Beyond the Alleghenies, where by 1850 only about 1,000 miles had been constructed, railroad mileage in ten years multiplied more than tenfold. Towns and cities on the Great Lakes were united with those on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and the entire section connected with the western termini of the Eastern roads. Chicago, rather than its rival, St. Louis, became the great railroad center of the Midwest. The region south of the Ohio was also interested in railroad building during this same period. Here, too, commercial rivalry was the motivating force, and by 1860 approximately 8,000 miles had been built between the Ohio and the Gulf.


Funds for the construction of America's expanding railway net were not easily obtained at first. The United States in comparison with Europe was rich in land but poor in capital. Then, too, what capital it had was largely tied up in turnpikes, canals, farms, commerce, and other enterprises; and because the railroad was new and untried, many persons were reluctant to give it financial support. Nevertheless, more than \$1,250,000,000 was invested in railroads in the three decades preceding the Civil War. American farmers and merchants, motivated by the prospect of quicker and perhaps cheaper transportation facilities and higher land values, donated lands for roadbeds and stations or subscribed to stock in the new companies. Bankers were also generous subscribers as soon as it became evident that railroads were profitable ventures; and with the decline of whaling and shipping, much of New England's capital was reinvested in manufactures and railroads. In their effort to secure funds, railroad promoters resorted to various devices. They induced press and pulpit to give publicity to the elaborate prospectuses, they opened subscription books along the routes, they made house-to-house canvasses, and they held public subscription meetings. "It is almost impossible," ran an account in the early 1830's, "to open a paper without finding an account of some railroad meeting. An epidemic on this subject seems nearly as prevalent throughout the country as the influenza." Europeans, especially the French and Germans, were heavy investors in American railroad securities.

Railroad promoters were also able to obtain substantial aid from towns, counties, cities, states, and the Federal government in the form

of gifts of money or land, stock subscriptions, and guarantees for the whole or part of a railroad's securities. In 1853 the railroad debt of Wheeling amounted to \$55 per capita; Baltimore, \$43; Pittsburgh, \$34; St. Louis, \$30; Louisville, \$25; New Orleans, \$23; and Philadelphia, \$20. The town of Keene, New Hampshire, voted a subsidy equal to 3 per cent of its valuation to the Manchester and Keene Railroad, and Gibson County, Tennessee, voted \$150,000 to aid the Mobile and Ohio and pledged taxes for three years as security. By 1858, Milwaukee had subsidized railroads to the extent of \$1,614,000. Many Southern states were liberal stock subscribers; Virginia, for example, subscribed more than \$21,000,000 before the Civil War. Massachusetts and Ohio were the only Northern states that gave the railroads aid through stock subscriptions.

States in every section lent money to the railroad builders. Massachusetts advanced \$40,000,000 to the Great Western and \$3,600,000 to the Boston, Hartford, and Erie. In like manner New York gave aid to nine railroads to the extent of over \$8,000,000. Georgia endorsed bonds of the Macon and Brunswick to the amount of \$2,550,000. Other forms of state aid included grants of money to cover expenses of route surveys, the permission to railroad corporations to issue paper money to pay for labor or purchase materials, and grants of land. Federal aid to the railroads was extended in the form of land grants and tariff remission on rails. During the ten years 1832-42, rails were released from duty, thus reducing their cost by as much as twenty dollars a ton. Congressional land grants on a lavish scale began in 1850, when the state of Illinois, largely through the efforts of Stephen A. Douglas, received 2,700,000 acres from the national government to be used for the Illinois Central. Subsequent grants totaling 31,600,842 acres were made to Missouri, Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, and Mississippi by the end of 1860.

Railroad operation, as well as communication generally, was enormously facilitated by the invention of the telegraph. From the days of Benjamin Franklin men on both sides of the Atlantic had experimented with electricity and its possible use in transmitting messages. In 1837 the Englishman William F. Cooke patented an electro-magnetic telegraph. Meanwhile the American Samuel Finley Breese Morse, whose talents ranged from portrait painting to medicine, was at work on a similar undertaking. Utilizing information obtained from Alfred Vail, Ezra Cornell, Professor Joseph Henry of Princeton, and others, Morse had succeeded by 1837 in making his apparatus practical. Without means of his own and unable to attract private capital, he sought government aid. With the help of Amos Kendall and other friends he finally induced Congress to appropriate \$30,000 for the construction of a line



13. RAILROADS IN 1860

By 1860 the eastern half of the United States was a gridiron of railway lines. Note the important railway centers and the general direction in which the lines ran. The fact the North had more railway mileage than the South gave the North a decided advantage during the Civil War.

from Baltimore to Washington. Two years later, when a private company opened a line between New York and Philadelphia, the feasibility of the telegraph was assured. Less costly to build than railroads and with fewer obstacles to overcome, telegraph lines soon connected the leading towns of the Northeast. By 1860 the country east of the Rockies had been linked together by about 50,000 miles of telegraph.

110. DOMESTIC TRADE

DOMESTIC trade was fundamentally altered by these improved methods of communication and transportation. In the early days of the republic, when means of commercial intercourse were inadequate, trade, as in pre-Revolutionary times, was generally localized. Foremost among the agencies of distribution was the village general store, which bartered sugar, tea, coffee, molasses, cloth, hardware, firearms, powder, and earthenware for grain, meat, poultry, cheese, butter, fruits, vegetables, candles, and other rude articles of domestic production that neighborhood farmers had to sell. The farm products were in turn disposed of to the villagers or sent to the city merchant in exchange for imported articles or goods of domestic manufacture. But the village store had its rivals. Chief among them was the peddler, who in town and sparsely settled countryside brought the store in miniature to the consumer's door. Thousands of Yankee traders with pack-horse, cart, or wagon covered the roads and trails from Cape Cod to the Great Lakes and the Mississippi, and from Maine to Louisiana. Like the storekeeper, his wares were not sold for cash but were exchanged for almost anything the customers might have that in turn could be disposed of in the towns. By the midnineteenth century many peddlers had become wholesalers. Henry W. Carter of Vermont, for example, amassed a fortune by supplying country stores with Yankee notions. Whether retailer or wholesaler, the peddler lightened the burden of household manufacture and widened the market for both town merchant and manufacturer.

West of the Alleghenies, merchants made extensive use of the rivers during the greater part of the first half of the nineteenth century. Before 1825, goods for the West were shipped overland from New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia to Pittsburgh or Wheeling. Here they were loaded on flatboats, or arks, and peddled from farm to farm and from hamlet to hamlet along the Ohio and the Mississippi and their tributaries. Levi Woodbury, who made a trip down the Mississippi in 1833, wrote:

At every village we find from ten to twenty flat bottom boats, which besides corn on the ear, pork, bacon, flour, whisky, cattle, and fowls, have a great assortment of notions from Cincinnati and elsewhere. Among them are brooms, cabinet-furniture, cider, plows, apples, cordage, etc. They remain in one place until all is sold out, if the demand be brisk; if not, they move farther down. After all is

sold they dispose of their boat and return with the crews by the steamers to their homes.

With the increase in size and wealth of the Southern plantations, their owners, instead of depending on the floating stores for supplies, sold their cotton and made their purchases through agents at New Orleans, and peddling from wharf to wharf gradually declined. By 1825 more than half of the trans-Allegheny river traffic was carried by steamers, although as late as 1846 flatboat arrivals at New Orleans numbered nearly 2,800. Ten years later the flatboat had ceased to be of importance in Western trade.

Many of the products brought to the door of the planter by flatboat and steamer came from the upper Mississippi Valley. Just as the West depended in large measure on the East for manufactured goods, so the South relied on the West for foodstuffs and other agricultural supplies. Most of the planter's grain other than corn, as well as his horses, mules, cattle, and hogs, came from the West. Raising livestock for Southern markets was one of the leading occupations of the Ohio Valley states. Moreover, much of the surplus produce of the West not disposed of directly to the planter went to market by way of New Orleans. Flour shipments to the Southern metropolis rose from 221,000 barrels in 1832 to 1,618,000 barrels in 1847. In 1847, receipts of bacon, hams, lard, and pork amounted in value to more than \$7,500,000, and the receipts of corn, wheat, and whisky to almost as much. Large supplies of cotton, sugar, molasses, and tobacco from the states on the lower Mississippi helped to increase the trade and wealth of New Orleans. By 1850 its total annual trade was just under \$100,000,000, of which cotton accounted for almost half.

Although New Orleans in 1860 could point to the fact that its trade had almost doubled in a decade, it was fast ceasing to be the principal entrepôt for the upper Mississippi Valley, and the economic alliance between this region and the South was seriously threatened. As the industrial population of the northeastern United States and of western Europe grew and the East-West railroads supplemented the Great Lakes and the Erie Canal, the farmers of the upper Mississippi Valley were less dependent upon the South as a market or upon New Orleans as an outlet for their surplus. J. D. B. DeBow, professor of political economy at the University of Louisiana and one of the South's leading economic spokesmen, declared in a speech at Nashville in 1851 that Northern enterprise had "rolled back the mighty tide of the Mississippi and its ten thousand tributary streams until their mouth, practically and commercially, is more at New York and Boston than at New Orleans." As early as 1840 the grain shipped by the Great Lakes and the Erie Canal far exceeded that shipped down the Mississippi. After 1850

nearly all the surplus produce of the Ohio River country went to the East and to Europe by way of the railroads and the great New York waterway. Receipts of Western produce that in 1820 formed 58 per cent of the commodities coming to New Orleans totaled only 23 per cent in 1860.

In addition to changing the course of Western trade, the railroads were in part also responsible for increasing its volume. In 1860 the westbound traffic of the New York Central, the Pennsylvania, the New York and Erie, and the Baltimore and Ohio amounted to more than 400,000 tons, two thirds of which consisted of boots and shoes, clothing, hardware, nails, machinery, drugs, drygoods, and other forms of merchandise. As late as 1860, however, the combined freight tonnage of these four railroads was not as great as that of the Erie Canal. But like the canal, the East-West railroads sharpened the competition between the farmers of the two sections. Boston, for instance, was now able to procure its foodstuffs more cheaply from the Middle West than from New York or Pennsylvania. The production of wool and of beef cattle passed from New England to Ohio, and Illinois rapidly gained supremacy over the Middle states as the great wheat-producing region of the country.

Despite canal and railroad, by far the greater portion of domestic commerce during the half-century preceding the Civil War was carried by ship along the coast. New England vessels laden with ice, fish, apples, rum, lumber, textiles, carriages, furniture, boots, shoes, saddles, and other commodities made their way to New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Savannah, Charleston, Mobile, and New Orleans. From the South they brought back cargoes of cotton, rice, tobacco, hemp, naval stores, sugar, molasses, and cheap food that had come down the Mississippi to New Orleans. Every pound of cotton for New England's mills came by sailing vessels.

111. OVERSEAS COMMERCE

WHILE domestic trade grew rapidly, American overseas commerce, although increasing in volume, experienced a series of cyclical fluctuations. Because of favorable legislation at home and disturbed conditions in Europe, American shipping enjoyed unparalleled prosperity from 1790 to 1807. In 1807 the value of American exports totaled about \$108,000,000 and imports \$138,000,000. Not only did trade with England, the West Indies, and continental Europe increase, but an ever larger number of Yankee merchantmen plied the waters of the Far East. The year that George Washington was elected first President

of the United States, forty-seven American vessels were trading beyond the Cape of Good Hope. Ships from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Salem brought home from China and the East Indies rich cargoes of tea, silk, nankeen, chinaware, coffee, pepper, and other spices which they had obtained in exchange for furs, ginseng, cotton, cotton goods, flour, timber, candles, whale oil, tobacco, and gold and silver specie. High on the list of the merchant princes who obtained large profits from the Far Eastern trade during these prosperous years stand the names of Robert Morris, Elias Hasket Derby, and Samuel Shaw.


American commercial expansion during these early years faced serious obstacles. Before the Tripolitan Treaty of Peace in 1805, American merchantmen were exposed to attacks by the Barbary pirates. The European wars, although they enabled Americans to make millions in the carrying trade, seriously impeded American commercial activities, and the effects of the Embargo and Nonintercourse Acts were even more devastating. The traveler John Lambert reports that when he visited New York in November, 1807

the coffee-house slip and the corners of Wall and Pearl streets were jammed up with carts, drays and wheelbarrows; horses and men were huddled promiscuously together, leaving little or no room for passengers to pass. Such was the appearance of this part of town when I arrived. Everything was in motion; all was life, bustle, and activity. The people were scampering in all directions to trade with each other, and to ship off their purchases for the European, African and West Indian markets. Every thought, word, look, and action of the multitude seemed to be absorbed by commerce; the welkin rang with the busy hum, and all were eager in the pursuit of its riches.

A few months later he found the same city


so gloomy and forlorn, that had it been the month of September instead of April I should verily have thought that a malignant fever was raging in the place; so desolating were the effects of the embargo, which in the short space of five months had deprived the first commercial city in the State of all its life, bustle, and activity; caused above one hundred and twenty bankruptcies; and completely annihilated its foreign commerce.

But neither restrictive legislation nor the War of 1812, which followed, completely drove American commerce from the high seas. England continued to receive American grain and cotton. Sometimes shippers, openly breaking the law, took their cargoes direct from American ports to Great Britain. Others, less bold or more discreet, first sailed to some West Indian or European port where either the registry of their




AN AMERICAN FACTORY (1855)

This contemporary woodcut of a factory for the manufacture of scissors and other implements shows a well-lighted room supplied with lathes, presses, and grindstones.



THE Atlantic

This early "train" ran on the Baltimore and Ohio line.



LOCKPORT ON THE ERIE CANAL

From C. D. Colden: Memoirs Prepared at the Request of a Committee of the Common Council of the City of New York at the Celebration of the Completion of New York Canals (New York: 1825). The New York Public Library.


DE WITT CLINTON

DeWitt Clinton, Governor of New York, was a leading sponsor of the Erie Canal.



A MISSISSIPPI FLATBOAT

Flatboats were indispensable to river traffic before the introduction of the steamboat.



vessels would be changed or else the goods would be transshipped in English vessels. During the War of 1812 the English authorities actually encouraged this illicit traffic. Not only did England continue to receive shipments of cotton, but her troops in Spain and in Canada and her fleets off the American coast were supplied with American provisions. Moreover, during this period the British West Indies depended almost entirely upon America for many commodities.

Soon after the Treaty of Ghent had been signed, American foreign commerce assumed abnormal proportions. Exports rose from less than \$7,000,000 in 1814 to \$52,500,000 in 1815, and to \$93,281,000 in 1818. By far the larger part of the goods exported were domestic in origin, for the return of peace to Europe marked the end of the profitable re-export trade that had enriched American merchants during the Napoleonic Wars. Despite the clandestine trade, great quantities of surplus cotton, flour, grain, tobacco, and lumber had accumulated during the War of 1812. England and the Continent, largely deprived of cotton and other American products during the war, eagerly awaited resumption of trade, and as soon as peace had been declared and the European, West Indian, and British trade could be resumed, American shippers hastened to make the most of the opportunity; \$31,000,000 worth of American exports reached England in 1818. France, Germany, Holland, Spain, the West Indies, Portugal, South America, the East Indies, and China were also heavy purchasers of American products. Of the \$62,897,000 worth of American farm products marketed abroad in 1818, cotton alone accounted for half.

Imports, too, mounted during the years immediately following the War of 1812. The value of all imported commodities rose from less than \$13,000,000 in 1814 to \$113,041,000 in 1815, and to \$121,750,000 in 1818. During the war, Old World merchants and manufacturers had piled up cargoes of unmarketed goods that normally would have gone to America. Then, too, American merchants and consumers, who during the war had had to depend upon domestic manufactures, welcomed the arrival of foreign goods.

During the last months of 1818, when there were numerous indications that the country was heading into a severe depression, foreign trade rapidly declined. Imports declined in value from \$121,750,000 in 1818 to \$87,125,000 in the following year. Similarly, exports fell from \$93,281,000 to \$50,977,000. For twelve years foreign trade continued in the doldrums. Every Atlantic port complained about the dullness of the import trade. Export business fared somewhat better. Shipments to the East Indies, the Swedish and Danish West Indies, Cuba, and Spain did not decline; those to France, Canada, Scandinavia, Italy, and Brazil increased slightly, but those to England and the British, Dutch, French and Spanish (except Cuba) West Indies, and to Holland, Russia, the

Hanse towns, Portugal, and China suffered greatly. The stagnation of the export trade during these years was most severely felt in the Atlantic states. New York alone of these states increased its shipments to foreign markets.

For half a dozen years after 1830 there was marked improvement in overseas trade. During this period treaties providing for reciprocal trading relations were negotiated with a number of European and Central and South American states. Perhaps the most important of these was the treaty made in 1830 with England, which permitted American vessels to engage in the British colonial trade on equal terms with the British. Exports and imports more than doubled in value between 1830 and 1836. Most of this increased trade was carried on with Great Britain, France, and the countries of northern Europe. Trade to the newer markets of the world remained about stationary during these years.

The gains in overseas commerce during the early 1830's were soon swept away by the Panic of 1837, and it was not until 1846 that foreign trade began to rise to new levels. Between 1846 and 1860 the tonnage of the United States engaged in overseas trade more than trebled. Heading the list of the items that account for this rapid increase stands the enormous output of American agricultural commodities during the decade and a half before the Civil War. This increase coincided with a series of European events—the most important of which were the repeal of the English corn laws, the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848, the Irish famine, and the Crimean War—that created a demand for the products of the American farm. During these years American vessels on the Atlantic were laden—if eastward bound—with cotton, wheat, and other American agricultural provisions and with goods picked up in Central and South America for re-export; or—if headed westward—with cargoes of immigrants, hemp, wines, fruits, and manufactured products.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY DECADES

YEAR	TOTAL EXPORTS	TOTAL IMPORTS
1800	\$ 70,972,000	\$ 91,253,000
1810	66,758,000	85,400,000
1820	69,692,000	74,450,000
1830	71,671,000	62,721,000
1840	123,609,000	98,259,000
1850	144,376,000	172,510,000
1860	333,576,000	353,616,000

New York City, with its excellent harbor, its water connections with the agricultural West, its growing population, and its varied industry, was by 1830 the entrepôt of the New World. It had already surpassed

Philadelphia and was drawing away the trade of Baltimore, Savannah, and Charleston. Even the commercial towns of New England were unable to survive its competition. Boston alone hung on, but much of its trade, too, was ultimately transferred to New York. In the South, Mobile and New Orleans enjoyed a profitable export trade, but their import business was negligible.

The clipper ship was also responsible in part for the rapid development of American shipping during the late 1840's and early 1850's. Greatest in width in the middle, tapering in hull, and long and narrow in bow, the clipper ship could outdistance any other sailing vessel afloat; and with a fair breeze it was more than a match for a steamship. Many clippers made more than three hundred miles a day. On her maiden voyage in 1851 Donald McKay's *Flying Cloud* broke all records with a day's run of 374 miles and covered the distance from New York to San Francisco in 89 days. Similar records were made by the *Sovereign of the Seas*, the *Comet*, the *Flying Scud*, and others. By 1850 a "clipper fever" had affected shippers on both sides of the Atlantic, and between 1851 and 1855 construction of this type of vessel more than doubled; about 20 per cent of the clippers built in the United States during the five years 1854-8 were bought by foreigners. The supremacy of the clipper, however, was short-lived, for by 1850 it was evident that steam tonnage would soon replace wooden sailing vessels in ocean navigation. During the ten-year period preceding the Civil War ocean freight carried by steamers increased from 14 to 28 per cent.

But despite the superiority of the clipper, the decade of the 1850's marked the comparative decline of the American merchant marine and left Great Britain the world's undisputed leader in the ocean-carrying trade. Great Britain, with an abundance of iron and coal but without wood, began much earlier than the United States to build steam-driven iron vessels. After a number of trials with steam in the 1820's, a group of British businessmen organized the Great Western Steamship Company in 1836. Its vessel, the *Great Western*, a steam-driven side-wheeler, made the voyage from Bristol to New York in April, 1838, in fourteen and a half days. Seven years later the screw-propelled iron steamer *Great Britain* arrived in New York Harbor. Satisfied on the basis of these performances that steam rather than wind was to be the motive power of the immediate future, Englishmen quickly organized other companies. The Peninsular and Oriental came into being in 1837, and the Cunard Company and the Pacific Steam Navigation Company in 1840. Because these companies were heavily subsidized by the British government, they were in a position to drive the American clippers out of the Atlantic, Asiatic, and South American trade.

To meet this competition, Congress somewhat tardily came to the assistance of a number of American steamship companies established

during the 1840's. The Ocean Steamship Company, operating between New York and Havre and Bremen, received \$200,000 a year; the Collins line, principal competitor of the Cunard, obtained \$858,000 a year; and the Pacific Mail, was granted a subsidy of \$250,000 a year. But the South strongly opposed government subsidies and in 1858 Congress practically abandoned the entire subsidy policy. Meanwhile the Collins line, which had lost two of its fastest and most luxurious boats and had had its subsidy cut to \$385,000, went bankrupt during the Panic of 1857. The sale of its remaining vessels to English companies left the British in complete control of the trans-Atlantic steamship service. Despite the loss of government aid, however, the American lines operating between New York and the Pacific coast managed not only to survive but to improve their services.

No less important than British competition in accounting for the relative decline of the American merchant marine were certain fundamental economic changes which occurred in the United States between 1790 and 1860. Capital that before the War of 1812 had been invested in commerce was increasingly transferred to other enterprises such as manufacturing, internal improvements, mining, and land speculation. The familiar thesis that the Civil War alone caused the decline in the American merchant marine is not substantiated by the facts. The decline had previously set in; the war merely gave it added momentum.

CHAPTER XIX

PATTERNS OF PROTEST AND REFORM

- 112. HUMANITARIANISM
 - 113. ABOLITIONISM
 - 114. UTOPIANISM
 - 115. TRANSCENDENTALISM
 - 116. LITERATURE
 - 117. JOURNALISM
 - 118. RELIGION
-

DURING the middle years of the nineteenth century American civilization was in a state of flux. Growing sectional differences, territorial expansion, new intellectual currents, and the development of industrialism produced a series of stresses and strains that led many individuals to question the validity of numerous institutions and mores of the past half-century. Convinced that America had failed to fulfill its original promise, they set out to reform both the nation and its people. These reformers believed that progress was inevitable; but they were impatient with delays and wished to speed up the process. To their mind, man was a rational creature who had been retarded and degraded, not by himself, but by his surroundings, and given adequate opportunity, he could better himself spiritually and intellectually as well as materially. With optimism and enthusiasm, they sought and found abuses to attack and reform in nearly every American institution.

112. HUMANITARIANISM


FROM 1800 to 1830 the principal impetus for reform was provided by the revolutionary philosophy that had been advanced during the War of Independence and by the Gospel's admonition to love one's fellow men. As a result, during these years Jeffersonian idealists joined hands with the representatives of every religious denomination to sponsor orphan and insane asylums, temperance crusades, prison reform, educational improvements, and the abolition of slavery. In the 1830's, the ranks of the reformers were augmented by labor groups that campaigned for free public education, the end of imprisonment for debt, mechanics' lien laws, and the reform of militia systems. By 1840 there were few phases of American life that had not been examined and found wanting by the nation's reformers. In the next twenty years, while abolitionism tended to overshadow other reform movements, it by no means had the field to itself.

The reformers of the decades immediately preceding the Civil War were drawn from every group and section, but more often than not they were members of the middle and upper classes and they were more numerous in New England than in other parts of the United States. With the growth of commerce and industry in New England, many members of the region's older families saw the gradual destruction of the way of life to which they had long been accustomed. Some accepted the new order and became factory lords or merchant princes; others turned to intellectual pursuits that enabled them to ignore in large measure a world that they inhabited but had not made; and still others sought to solve their own as well as society's problems by becoming reformers.

One of the most persistent and longstanding reform movements in the United States was the campaign to cut down on the consumption of alcoholic beverages. By 1830 more than a thousand local temperance societies had been organized in the United States, and at a convention at Philadelphia in 1833 the local organizations were consolidated into a federation known as the United States Temperance Union. Three years later, when the Union admitted Canadian units, its name was changed to the American Temperance Union. Although the original temperance groups had been opposed primarily to excessive drinking, after 1830 the movement's leaders increasingly condemned the consumption of alcoholic liquor in any form or amount.

Both the local and national temperance societies employed a variety of techniques to disseminate their ideas on the evils of drink. Speakers—some of them redeemed drunkards like John Hawkins and John B. Gough—denounced the vice of drunkenness, and cartoons, novels, po-

ems, children's books, pamphlets, and periodicals depicted its evils. Lucius M. Sargent's volumes of *The Temperance Tales* had immense popularity throughout the country. Timothy Shay Arthur's *Ten Nights in a Barroom* (1854)—most famous of all temperance works—was quickly dramatized and had a vogue and influence little less than that of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. The advocates of prohibition emphasized the injuri-



The Bettmann Archive

BRINGING BACK THE RUM

The labels on the barrels indicate the cartoonist's views of the results of overindulgence in alcohol.

ous effects of alcohol upon the body, the decreased working efficiency of drinkers, and the demoralizing results of liquor consumption. They painted vivid pictures of sorrowing mothers with wan, ragged children living in dirty, gloomy houses, where besotted fathers not only neglected their responsibilities but terrorized their families.

The prohibitionists tried various methods of curtailing consumption. But systems of licensing, heavy taxes, and restrictions on the quantity that might be purchased all proved to be unsatisfactory, and eventually the prohibitionists sought state legislative enactments that would stop the manufacture and sale of intoxicants except for medicinal and industrial purposes. In 1846 the Maine legislature, led by Neal Dow, passed

the first law in America that prohibited the sale of liquor as a beverage. The law proved difficult of enforcement, and in 1851 it was supplanted by another, which, under the name of the Maine Liquor Law, became a model for all similar legislation. By 1856 thirteen states had laws that were intended to control the sale of intoxicants. Seemingly, prohibition, like so many other issues in the United States, was sectional in nature. No state below the Mason and Dixon line prohibited the sale of liquor by state law. In most of the states prohibition was a continuous controversy. Laws were passed, repealed, and passed again.

Less spectacular than temperance reform, but far more indicative of the deep changes that environment was working in American life, was the gradual emancipation of women from their former position of intellectual, economic, and political subordination. Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, woman's place was in the home. Abigail Adams' ready wit and energy might charm, but she shone chiefly as John Adams' clever wife. An education beyond elementary school was not regarded as necessary or even as advisable. The aim of a girl's training was to fit her for marriage, housekeeping, and the rearing of children. After marriage she immersed herself in her husband's personality; under the common law her property belonged to him, and in turn he was responsible for her conduct and well-being. Any feminine desire to enter into activities accessible to men was ridiculed and deplored as unladylike and in some instances as immoral. Frances Wright, Lucy Stone, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, Margaret Fuller, and other feminists were regarded by some as cranks and by others as dangerous fanatics.

The first loosening of the traditional restrictions on women came in their education. In addition to the numerous girls' seminaries that were established throughout the country during the first half of the nineteenth century, many academies added departments for girls. The movement for public schools that would do without cost what the academies and seminaries did for a fee gained momentum during the 1820's. The first high school for girls is generally accredited to Worcester, Massachusetts. There, a proposal in 1824 to open the Latin Grammar School of the town to girls was defeated by the action of the selectmen, and a Female High School was established instead. Boston in 1826 opened "a public school for the instruction of girls in the higher departments of science and literature." A few weeks earlier, New York City had opened its first girls' high school on February 1, 1826. Other Northeastern cities slowly followed these early examples. Frequently, these institutions were regarded as normal schools rather than high schools, since their chief function was to supply teachers. Oberlin, founded in 1833 by liberal Congregationalists, opened its doors as a coeducational college; Antioch

followed its example in 1853; and in 1858 the University of Iowa became the first state university to admit women.

Since public opinion continued to oppose higher education for women, the early seminaries and girls' high schools aimed at preparing their students for life rather than the professions. Nevertheless, subjects that stressed domestic training, social usefulness, and moral and religious values were gradually supplemented by studies calculated to further mental discipline and intellectual enjoyment. Furthermore the growing demand for women teachers in the lower schools provided careers for many women. Women had rarely taught during the eighteenth century, but by the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century they were sought as teachers. In addition to the many private seminaries, normal and high schools maintained at public expense contributed thousands of women to the nation's teaching staff.

The expansion of educational opportunities for women induced some women to demand that they be granted the same rights as those enjoyed by men. Education awakened women to the social and civil subservience of the female sex, and the demand for teachers extended economic independence to many of them. Previously, men had been willing to employ women in various ways as laborers, but rarely in any capacity involving the use of intellect. In 1849, Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell received from the Geneva Medical School of Western New York the first medical diploma given to a woman in America. She began practice in New York City in 1850, where the prejudice against her led her to establish a private dispensary that in 1857 became incorporated into the New York Infirmary and College for Women, a hospital conducted entirely by women. In 1869 she returned to England, the country of her birth, where in 1875 she became professor of gynecology in the newly established London School of Medicine for Women.

Another woman who successfully entered the professions was Antoinette Louisa Brown, who in 1856 became Mrs. Blackwell through marriage to Dr. Samuel C. Blackwell, a brother of Elizabeth Blackwell. She was born in New York State in 1825, and after an early career of teaching entered Oberlin College, where she completed the literary course in 1847 and the theological course in 1850. Refused a ministerial license because of her sex, she nevertheless was made the pastor of the Congregational church in South Butler, New York. Theological difficulties led her to resign her pastorate in 1854. She vigorously advocated prohibition, women's rights, and the abolition of slavery. After the Civil War, Mrs. Blackwell continued to participate in the movements for woman suffrage and prohibition. Another member of the Blackwell family, Henry Brown Blackwell, a brother of Elizabeth Blackwell and Samuel C. Blackwell, married the prominent feminist Lucy Stone.

Among the champions of women's rights, none was more outspoken than Margaret Fuller. As editor of the *Dial*, as a reviewer for Horace Greeley's *Tribune*, and in her many personal contacts she strove to reform what was for her an unsatisfactory society. In 1845 she shocked the prim element of America by the publication of her *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*. The book was an apology for the efforts of women to emancipate themselves from man-made customs. Going beyond a discussion of equality of economic opportunity and of political rights for women, she discussed sexual morality, marriage, and prostitution—a scandalous procedure according to the prevailing standards of propriety.

Despite the agitation of the feminists, the movement for the liberation of women from civil and political restraints made relatively little progress in the period before 1860. Mississippi in 1839 was the first state to grant women control of their own property after marriage, and by 1850, Texas, Indiana, Pennsylvania, New York, California, and Wisconsin had adopted similar legislation. In 1848 the first women's-rights convention was held at Seneca Falls, New York. The delegates issued a declaration in language similar to that of the Declaration of Independence, saying that "all men are created equal," and asserting the right of women to share equally with men all economic, political, legal and educational advantages.

Of the numerous reformers of the nineteenth century, probably none accomplished more than Dorothea Lynde Dix (1802-87). Following positions as a teacher in Boston and Worcester, she discovered her life's work in 1841, when she became a Sunday-school teacher in the East Cambridge House of Correction. Here she found feeble-minded and insane people mixed with criminals; for in 1840 there were only eight insane asylums in the United States, and the insane, who were regarded as willful, perverse, or depraved, were imprisoned and were harshly and even brutally treated. For two years Miss Dix quietly investigated the condition of the insane in jails, almshouses, and houses of correction in the entire state of Massachusetts. In 1843, influential men presented her *Memorial to the Legislature of Massachusetts*, which called attention to "the present state of insane persons confined within this commonwealth, in cages, closets, cellars, stalls, pens! Chained, naked, beaten with rods, and lashed into obedience!" At the same time Miss Dix wrote letters to the press in an attempt to arouse public opinion. One immediate result was the enlargement of the Worcester Insane Asylum.

Miss Dix worked indefatigably for the enlargement of existing hospitals for the insane and the establishment of new ones. Between 1845 and 1852 she was largely responsible for the establishment of state hospitals in Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Maryland, and

for the founding of the hospital at Halifax, Nova Scotia. She also worked diligently for the passage by Congress of an act that would allocate funds from the sale of the national domain for the care of the insane. The bill passed both houses of Congress only to be vetoed by President Pierce. It would be difficult to point to a greater benefactor of mankind in the nineteenth-century United States than this frail woman who devoted the vigor of a sound mind to the welfare of unsound ones.

Many reformers of both sexes believed that the lack of sufficient schools provided the single greatest barrier to the progress of the American individual. With the extension of the franchise, an increasing number of Americans also argued—as had Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Rush before them—that universal education was the chief source of republican strength. Among these was Governor DeWitt Clinton of New York, who in his message to the legislature in 1826 stated:

The first duty, and the surest evidence of good government, is the encouragement of education. A general diffusion of knowledge is the precursor and protector of republican institutions; and in it we must confide as the conservative power that will watch over our liberties and guard them against fraud, intrigue, corruption, and violence. . . . I consider the system of our common schools as the palladium of our freedom, for no reasonable apprehension can be entertained of its subversion as long as the great body of the people are enlightened by education. . . .

Those who agreed with Clinton maintained that every child should be given at least an elementary education in a free, nonsectarian, public-school system supported by taxation. With the exception of abolition, no question aroused more feeling than this proposal. Aligned against it were most of the propertied, conservative people and the spokesmen for the private schools. Because of this opposition the battle was hard-fought and long-drawn-out, but by 1860 most of the states outside the South had accepted the principle of tax-supported, publicly controlled schools.

During the Middle Period a number of states also sought to provide students with an opportunity for a high-school education. Before 1820 those who desired more than an elementary school education went to the private or semiprivate academies. In the 1820's Massachusetts established a few public high-schools in response to an increasing demand. The academies and taxpayers objected however, and by 1840 not more than a dozen high schools had been established in Massachusetts, and few other states had followed its example. Nevertheless, pressure for public high schools gradually increased, and in 1860, Massachusetts had 78, New York 41, and Ohio 48. According to the census of 1850, the nation had approximately 80,000 elementary schools with nearly 3,500,-

ooo pupils, and more than 6,000 secondary schools—mostly private—with 250,000 students. The elementary schools were staffed with more than 90,000 teachers, and the secondary schools with more than 12,000 teachers.

The administration of the public schools varied greatly from state to state. Maryland in 1826 became the first state to create the office of superintendent of education, but it abolished the position two years later. For ten years (1825–35) supervision of the schools in Illinois, Vermont, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee was entrusted to the secretary of state, and it was not until 1837 that Massachusetts created a state board of education.

Horace Mann (1796–1859) who served as the first secretary of the Massachusetts board of education, soon became the outstanding educational leader of the Middle Period. In 1839 he secured the first state-supported American normal school, at Lexington, Massachusetts. Six years later he organized a state association of teachers in Massachusetts. He also established teachers' institutes, advocated compulsory education as a bar to child labor in factories, studied the educational value of physiology and hygiene, supported the introduction of instruction in music, sought ways to help defectives and delinquents, and insisted that women should have equal privileges with men in the schools. Mann's activities soon attracted nation-wide attention; his reports were eagerly read, and other states began to emulate Massachusetts. By 1849, fourteen states had superintendents of education, and a number of the larger urban communities had appointed city superintendents.

Rivaling Mann in many respects was Henry Barnard (1811–1900). Trained at Yale and in Germany, he helped found the American Association for the Advancement of Education and became its first president in 1855. He also established the *American Journal of Education* and edited it for more than a quarter of a century. Countless teachers were indebted to him for his translations of the writings of Comenius, Rousseau, and Pestalozzi. Like Mann, he was interested in arousing a professional spirit among teachers and in the problem of delinquency. The work of both Mann and Barnard was promoted by the efforts of a group of able women including Catharine Beecher, Mary Lyon, Elizabeth Peabody, Emma Willard, and her sister, Mrs. Almira Phelps.

Among the colleges, the older institutions—notably Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Dartmouth, Princeton, and Williams—remained strongholds of conservatism. Mercantile and business affairs received some attention, but the advocates of scientific and humanistic subjects made slight inroads upon the classical monopoly. On the other hand, many new colleges and universities were established. Some of these, particularly in the South and West, were state institutions. By far the larger number,

however, were small denominational colleges that were controlled by the clergy and that were narrowly sectarian in character.

Practically all institutions of higher learning were handicapped by a lack of money, books, and trained teachers. Of the denominational colleges established during this period many began with a subscribed capital fund of less than \$10,000, and several of the older colleges lived in a state of continual financial crisis. College libraries were generally inadequate and little used by students. At Dartmouth, for example, the library was open one hour a week, and a fee was collected for each book borrowed. With the exception of a few brilliant teachers like Francis Wayland of Brown and Mark Hopkins of Williams, the faculties were mediocre.

Despite the low standards that prevailed in most colleges, a few institutions were able to attract scholars of the first rank. Benjamin Silliman occupied the first chair of chemistry and natural history at Yale, founded the first American scientific periodical, wrote one of the earliest scientific textbooks in the United States, and was among the first Americans to examine from a scientific viewpoint the Bible's interpretation of the creation. Joseph Henry taught at Princeton from 1832 to 1846, served as the first director of the Smithsonian Institution, and conducted experiments of far-reaching significance in electromagnetism. At the South Carolina College, Francis Lieber produced several pioneer works in political science and was easily the most renowned American scholar in this field. Finally, at Harvard there were a number of able scholars. George Bancroft, Joseph G. Cogswell, Edward Everett, and George Ticknor—all of whom had graduated from Harvard and studied in Germany—made Harvard the nation's outstanding center for the study of history and the humanities. In the sciences, the Swiss-born Louis Agassiz, who joined the Harvard faculty in 1846, introduced the laboratory method in zoology, shattered traditional geological concepts with his glacial theory, and stimulated interest among amateur and professional scholars in numerous forms of scientific endeavor.

113. ABOLITIONISM

OF ALL the reform movements in antebellum America, none attracted as much attention, produced as much acrimony, and had as much effect on the nation's politics as the anti-slavery crusade. Before the invention of the cotton gin, it had seemed likely that slavery would gradually disappear in the South as it had in the North, and during the first decades of the nineteenth century the most active anti-slavery

groups were in the South and the Middle states, but in New England, interest in the slavery question was largely academic and theoretical. The early anti-slavery reformers were both inspired and influenced by the work in England of Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce, who finally succeeded in 1807 in inducing Parliament to prohibit the slave trade.

Church groups took an active part in the first stages of the anti-slavery crusade. In 1812, the Methodist General Conference voted that a slaveholder could not continue as a local elder. The Presbyterian General Assembly in 1815 recommended the education of slaves as a preparatory step toward emancipation. Certain Baptist congregations refused to admit slaveholders to membership; and the Quakers, relying on their fundamental doctrine that God reveals His Spirit to each person, remained adamant in their opposition to slavery in any form. As time went on, however, and as the anti-slavery crusade became more militant and slavery became entrenched in the South, the slavery issue disrupted some of the larger denominations. In 1844 the issue of whether a Methodist bishop could hold slaves led to the organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church South. In the same year the Baptists also divided over the question of whether a slaveowner might become a missionary. In 1853 the Presbyterians split on the question, one faction refusing membership to any slaveholder.

While the churches were registering opposition to slavery, anti-slavery agitators like Benjamin Lundy and James G. Birney were busily engaged in organizing anti-slavery societies. By 1830 more than a hundred such organizations were not only providing centers of discussion, but were issuing addresses, memorializing legislatures, protecting Negroes, and sustaining anti-slavery publications. In 1832 the New England Anti-Slavery Society was organized in Boston. The next year a national organization, known during the later years of its life as the American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and Improving the Condition of the African Race, was formed in Philadelphia. Both organizations carried on an active propaganda and were instrumental in keeping the anti-slavery discussion alive.

Side by side with the abolitionist bodies were the colonization societies organized for the purposes of ultimately ridding the country of its Negro population. Of these the most important was the American Colonization Society, formed at Washington in 1817. Aided by state auxiliaries, county and city societies, and by state and Federal appropriations, this organization in 1822 planted a Negro settlement called Liberia on the west coast of Africa. Distance and unhealthy environment, however, combined with savage neighbors and the desire of most free Negroes to remain in the United States, practically ruined the scheme. In the ten years 1820-30, the society, though it spent \$100,000, transferred

fewer than twelve hundred persons, and of these the greater number died within a few years after reaching their new home. This poor showing disheartened many of the society's supporters, and the organization soon declined in importance.

Until about 1830 the crusade against slavery was, on the whole, marked by an absence of bitterness, not because the arguments against it differed from those of later date, but rather because the earlier abolitionists hoped that their objectives might be achieved through a quiet campaign of education. Lundy, a pious Quaker, and Birney, a former slaveholder, carried on their work in a spirit of moderation, appealing to reason rather than to prejudice or passion. With the emergence, however, of the democratic idealism of the 1830's with its emphasis on social justice, the movement assumed a more belligerent form. Men of the stamp of William Lloyd Garrison and George Bourne, ignoring the constitutional and legal guarantees surrounding slavery, militantly and uncompromisingly demanded immediate and unconditional emancipation. In an address "To the Public," published in the first number of his anti-slavery paper, the *Liberator*, which appeared in Boston on January 1, 1831, Garrison apologized for ever having "assented to the popular but pernicious doctrine of *gradual* abolition," and declared that he would "strenuously contend" for the immediate emancipation and enfranchisement of the entire slave population.

I will be as harsh as truth, and as uncompromising as justice [he wrote]. On this subject, I do not wish to think, or speak, or write, with moderation. No! No! Tell a man whose house is on fire to give a moderate alarm; tell him to moderately rescue his wife from the hands of the ravisher; tell the mother to gradually extricate her babe from the fire into which it has fallen—but urge me not to use moderation in a cause like the present. I am in earnest—I will not equivocate—I will not excuse . . . —AND I WILL BE HEARD!

Garrison and his followers were heard. Abolitionist orators shocked conservatives with loud and violent speeches. Northern businessmen, particularly financiers and manufacturers interested in cotton, denounced them as half-crazed fanatics determined to destroy the sacredness of private property and undermine the Union itself. Most colleges as well as many churches also opposed the abolitionists. Even political leaders like Van Buren and Cass decried the movement as an agitation that threatened to upset the political *status quo*. The meeting places of the abolitionists were frequently attacked, even sometimes burned; abolition orators were hissed, stoned, tarred, and feathered. Garrison himself was dragged through the streets of Boston and narrowly escaped with his life. Officials of Philadelphia treated the abolitionists virtually as outlaws.

In spite of the attention given to Garrison's activities in New England, it was in the Old Northwest that the abolitionist movement attracted the largest number of supporters. In those parts of the Northwest that had been settled by New Englanders, anti-slavery sentiment was far more widespread than in comparable areas in the East. Moreover, in Theodore Weld the Western abolitionists possessed a leader who did far more to arouse opposition to slavery than did Garrison or any other Easterner. A skillful organizer and expert publicist, Weld not only won over large numbers of Northerners to abolitionism, but he was also more responsible than any other individual for the establishment of an anti-slavery bloc in Congress. Western abolitionists, like those of New England, often aroused considerable hostility. In Cincinnati the office of the *Philanthropist*, an abolitionist paper was gutted, and desperate efforts were made to kill its editor, James G. Birney. At Alton, Illinois, Elijah Lovejoy, preacher and publisher of an abolition paper, was killed by a mob, and his printing press was destroyed.

As the anti-slavery crusade gained momentum in the North it died out in the South. Garrison's denunciation of slavery as "a damning crime" was enough to cause resentment; but on top of this was his sweeping characterization of the Southern people:

We would sooner trust the honor of the country and the liberties of the people in the hands of the inmates of our penitentiaries and prisons, than in their hands for safe keeping. . . . They ought not to be allowed seats in Congress. No political, no religious co-partnership should be had with them, for they are the meanest of thieves, and the worst of robbers. We should as soon think of entering into a compact with the 'convicts' at Botany Bay and New Zealand. . . . We do not acknowledge them to be within the pale of Christianity, of republicanism, of humanity.

Such statements naturally aroused the hostility of the South. Alarmed by the Nat Turner insurrection (1831), which resulted in heavy destruction of property and loss of life, the section took immediate steps to protect itself against every possible anti-slavery onslaught. The militia in several Southern states was reorganized, and special statutes to prevent and to suppress uprisings and to curb slavery discussion were enacted. Attempts were made to close the mails to abolitionist books and newspapers, and abolitionists were threatened with drastic punishments if they dared set foot on Southern soil. Moreover, in 1836 a gag rule preventing the consideration of anti-slavery petitions was pushed through the House of Representatives. The free states, under threat of economic boycott, were requested to prohibit publication of abolitionist literature, to silence abolitionist orators, and to suppress abolitionist societies.

Despite opposition the movement for abolition gained in strength and intensity. The abolition press, filled with editorials and illustrations depicting the reputed horrors of slavery, increased in circulation; state legislatures and Congress were bombarded with anti-slavery petitions, and anti-slavery organizations rapidly multiplied from hundreds to thousands. More and more, too, abolitionists, particularly those who were churchgoers and members of philanthropic societies, assisted slaves to escape along the "Underground Railroad" to places of safety in the North or over the border to Canada.*

114. UTOPIANISM

IN CONTRAST to the humanitarians who wished to reform society piecemeal were utopian reformers who felt that remedial measures were at best temporary palliatives. They believed that man could become perfect, but that first society—and especially competitive industrial society—needed fundamental reorganization. Among these utopian reformers were Theodore Parker, Charles A. Dana, George and Sophia Ripley, Margaret Fuller, Horace Greeley, Albert Brisbane, Parke Godwin, Josiah Warren, Robert Owen, and Frances Wright. Practically all these utopians were New Englanders, and in almost every instance their programs reveal a strong ethical protest against the harsh realities produced by the growth of industry in their section.

The American utopians were all influenced in some measure by the proposals of numerous European reformers. In France, Charles Fourier, Count of Saint-Simon, and Étienne Cabet had devised schemes for social reorganization that they believed would substitute harmony, equality of opportunity, and co-operation for greed, conflict, and misery. In Scotland, Robert Owen was demonstrating that humaneness rather than exploitation could be the guiding principle in the management of a factory. In every European country there were reformers with programs for the improvement of mankind; but none was more radical than Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Unlike the utopians, whose proposals they subjected to bitter criticism, they did not believe in reforming the existing order; instead, they proposed to abolish it. Their *Communist Manifesto*, issued in 1848, depicted the history of mankind as contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes, and predicted that the "proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, *i.e.*, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class."

* For a discussion of the slavery controversy, see Chapter XXI, pp. 563-604.

Godwin's *Democracy, Pacific and Constructive* was praised by Greeley as the best of the contemporary studies on Fourierism. Charles A. Dana, afterward editor of the *New York Sun*, George Ripley, literary editor of the *Tribune*, and John S. Dwight, poet and music lover, were among the many others who accepted Fourier's basic principles. The Unitarian leader William Ellery Channing, though not a member of the "inner circle," showed sympathy during the last years of his life for the Associationists, as the disciples of Fourier were called.

Between 1840 and 1850 more than forty communistic projects were launched in America. Most were short-lived, but some, notably the Brook Farm experiment, attracted considerable attention. In 1841 a group of about twenty intellectuals * led by George Ripley, a Unitarian minister, took over a two-hundred-acre dairy farm near Boston for the purpose of substituting "a system of brotherly co-operation for one of selfish competition." They proposed

to secure for our children and to those who may be trusted to our care, the benefits of the highest physical, intellectual and moral education, which in the present state of human knowledge, the resources at our command will permit; to institute an attractive, efficient, and productive system of industry; to prevent the exercise of worldly anxiety by the competent supply of our necessary wants; to diminish the desire for excessive accumulation by making the acquisition of individual property subservient to upright and disinterested uses; to guarantee to each other the means of physical support and of spiritual progress, and thus to impart a greater freedom, simplicity, truthfulness, refinement and moral dignity to our mode of life.

To this end they fixed a uniform rate of compensation for all labor, established a maximum working day of ten hours, and provided free education, medical care, and library facilities. All persons were to be employed according to their taste and ability. Dances, music, and literary and scientific discussions were arranged for leisure hours. But Brook Farm was no more successful than the other collectivist communities. In 1846 a fire destroyed the nearly finished phalanx building, and in a few months the experiment was only a memory.

Without exception the American communistic enterprises failed. They were often founded with little or no preparation, and frequently without capital. The majority of the members were unskilled in either agriculture or craftsmanship. Internal dissension over religion and other controversial matters created disharmony. Furthermore, communist theories were difficult to work out in a world dedicated to personal

* Among them were Nathaniel Hawthorne, Charles A. Dana, and George William Curtis.

ownership. To conservatives the reformers were either lunatics or dangerous radicals whose doctrines, if accepted, would wreck the existing social system. American society was individualistic, and collective or communistic systems of economy were alien to it.

115. TRANSCENDENTALISM

WHILE the utopians sought to transform society and the humanitarians attempted to rid it of specific abuses, a small group of New Englanders, called transcendentalists, maintained that society could only be reformed through the moral reformation of the individual. Churches for centuries had preached a similar doctrine, but the transcendentalists argued that churches were more interested in form than in content and more concerned with dogma than with man. To the transcendentalists, man alone could provide himself with that which formal religion had failed to give him; for he contained a spark of the divine that made him spiritually self-sufficient and that permitted him to lift himself above his immediate environment. The transcendentalists were both idealistic and realistic. As idealists they believed that the moral law transcended the natural law and that man could better his spiritual lot in this world through faith, imagination, and will power. As realists, they tried to get behind appearances to actualities. As Henry Steele Commager has written:

*Never was there a more realistic, a more practical group of men than these high-flying souls of Concord and Boston, for all their talk of the Over-Soul and the cult of mysticism. What they sought, with patience and courage, was the reality behind the façade of institutions, the kernel of truth within the husk of convention. They sought the reality of religion within the dogma of the Church, the reality of government within the artificialities of politics, the reality of economy within the chaos of business and industry. They distinguished between life and mere living. . . .”**

Transcendentalism was an outgrowth of New England's religious past, for it drew heavily on both Puritanism and Unitarianism. From the Puritans the transcendentalists inherited their concern with morality and their concept of the individual's responsibility to God. From the Unitarians they inherited their rejection of original sin and predestination and their belief in the perfectibility of man; many of them at one time had been members of the Unitarian Church. The successive steps

* Henry Steele Commager: *Theodore Parker* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1936), pp. 58-9.

from Calvinism to Unitarianism to Transcendentalism are revealed in part by the changing belief in God. The Calvinists believed in an anthropomorphic God, considered Jesus divine, and worshiped "God in three persons." The Unitarians insisted that there was but a single God and that Jesus instead of being divine was the perfect "Son of Man." Transcendentalists rejected the idea of God's "personality" and thought of Him as an impersonal force that worked in conjunction with the moral law. Because Unitarianism itself had become formalized and decorous (Ralph Waldo Emerson called it "corpse-cold") and because it seemed to be doing nothing to prevent men from dissipating their energy in getting and spending, the transcendentalists withdrew from the church and began to preach lay sermons to men of all faiths.

The transcendentalists were influenced by the romantic movement in Europe as well as by their own section's religious past. Emerson maintained that, although he and the members of his group disagreed on many points, they "agreed in having fallen upon Coleridge and Wordsworth, and Goethe, then on Carlyle, with pleasure and sympathy." Like the German and English romantics, the American transcendentalists rejected the precepts of the eighteenth-century enlightenment and felt that man should be guided by intuition rather than by reason. They accepted the deists' concept of a natural law; but they insisted that natural law was incapable of a mechanistic interpretation and subordinate to the moral law. Finally, the transcendentalists shared the romantics' concern for the individual and deplored the stultifying effects of the new industrialism on the individual's efforts to achieve self-realization.

As a group the transcendentalists had little cohesion and were seldom if ever in full agreement. Emerson was undoubtedly the best known, but others included Henry David Thoreau, who was Emerson's neighbor in Concord; Margaret Fuller, an able journalist and an outstanding social reformer and critic; Bronson Alcott, a teacher, writer, mystic and the founder of his own utopian community at Fruitlands; and Theodore Parker, a Unitarian minister, who had broken with the leaders of his church but who continued to preach to large audiences in Boston. Among creative writers, those influenced in some measure by transcendentalist ideas included Walt Whitman, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Herman Melville. If the transcendentalists can be said to have had an organ of opinion, it was the *Dial*, which was edited by Margaret Fuller. To a certain extent Brook Farm was an attempt to translate some of their theories into practice, but it is significant that Emerson, Parker and Thoreau did not participate in the experiment. The transcendentalists had no hard and fast organization; they were a group of individuals who held roughly similar ideas on man and the universe.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82) studied at Harvard, served as a Unitarian minister, and subsequently withdrew from the church; and

in 1836, he advanced his transcendentalist philosophy in his first book, a small volume entitled *Nature*. He wished to formulate a philosophy that would encompass God, the soul of man, and nature and thus establish the "original relation" of man to the universe. Having rejected materialism (for it denied both man's soul and God), he turned to mysticism, pantheism, and idealism. But each of these in some measure he found wanting, for each in varying degree slighted the world of nature. The idealist regarded nature as the mere product of mind; the pantheist slighted nature for the Almighty power of which (he believed) nature was the expression; and the mystic ignored nature. But to Emerson, nature was an immediate reality that held the key to both man and his universe; mind and nature were one.

In the woods [he wrote] we return to reason and faith. . . . Standing on the bare ground,—my head bathed by the blithe air and uplifted into infinite space,—all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God.

If man were to realize his full potentialities, Emerson believed, he must become "man thinking"; and in a Phi Beta Kappa address at Harvard in 1837 he described the road to this goal. The present "state of society," he complained was "one in which the members have suffered amputation from the trunk, and strut about so many walking monsters,—a good finger, a neck, a stomach, an elbow, but never a man." Under the circumstances the tradesman was "ridden by the routine of his craft . . . the priest becomes a form; the attorney a statute-book; the mechanic a machine; the sailor a rope of the ship." If the scholar wished to avoid a similar fate—if he wished to become man thinking—he had, first, to be aware of nature and to "settle its value in his mind." Secondly, he must know the "mind of the Past"; but in coming to know it he must guard against letting books become his master. Man thinking "must not be subdued by his instruments. . . . When he can read God directly, the hour is too precious to be wasted in other men's transcripts of their readings." Finally, he must realize that action, although subordinate, was essential and that without it "thought can never ripen into truth." All of these ideals were capable of attainment for the man who realized that "the world is nothing, the man is all; in yourself is the law of all nature . . . ; in yourself slumbers the whole of Reason; it is for you to know all; it is for you to dare all."

In Emerson's opinion all men could achieve self-realization by pursuing the goals that he had set for scholars, and in his essays "Self-Reliance" and "The Over-Soul"—both of which were published in 1841—he sought to convince his readers that God had given them the power to transcend both their environment and their times. "Man," he wrote,

"is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; he dares not say 'I think,' 'I am,' but quotes some saint or sage." To such men Emerson said: "Insist on yourself; never imitate. . . . [A] great man is a unique." Happiness and strength were to be found neither by lamenting the past nor by hoping for the future but by "living with nature in the present, above time." The self-reliant man recognized that "nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of . . . [the] mind"; he was guided by intuition or "that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within"; he understood the limits of the church and the limitlessness of man; and he sought to live according to the dictates of the Over-Soul, the universal spirit of which both man and nature were the expression and which provided the universal moral law that made it possible for all men to live in harmony with nature.

Emerson was a preacher who realized that few were capable of heeding his sermons and that those who did would be branded nonconformists and whipped by the world "with its displeasure." On one occasion he wrote in his journal that he had been "writing and speaking what were once called novelties, for twenty-five or thirty years, and have now not one disciple. Why?" Perhaps the answer lay in the fact that his was the counsel of perfection. Or perhaps it lay in his requirement that each man form a party of one rather than become his or any other man's disciple.

Of all the transcendentalists Henry David Thoreau (1817-62) came closest to approximating Emerson's concept of the self-reliant individual. Thoreau viewed transcendentalism as a practical everyday creed, and throughout his life he epitomized "man thinking." In *Walden*, his account of the two years he spent in a cabin at Walden Pond, he sought to understand life rather than to escape it.

I went to the woods [he wrote in Walden] because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived. I did not wish to live what was not life, living is so dear; nor did I wish to practise resignation, unless it was quite necessary. I wanted to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life, to live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to rout all that was not life, to cut a broad swath and shave close, to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its lowest terms, and, if it proved to be mean, why then to get the whole and genuine meanness of it, and publish its meanness to the world; or if it were sublime, to know it by experience, and be able to give a true account of it in my next excursion.

Walden is not to be viewed—and found wanting—as a tract for the times, but as a discussion of one man's attempt to lead a meaningful life

in the midst of an apparently meaningless society. Thoreau never suggested that every individual should take to the woods. Instead, he tried to show how his sojourn at Walden Pond had fulfilled his own particular needs. He did not urge every man to accept his solution to the problem, but he believed that every thinking man should both recognize the problem and attempt to solve it.

Thoreau had little use for the forces that were transforming New England during his lifetime. "Trade," he said, "curses everything it touches; and though you trade in messages from heaven, the whole curse of trade attaches to the business." Nevertheless, Thoreau was not a reformer. He was too much an individualist to believe in the efficacy of such co-operative experiments as Brook Farm. "I came into this world," he declared, "not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad." For such institutions as church and state he had only contempt, and when the state applied the principle of coercion, he countered with the principle of passive resistance. Complete human freedom was his ideal.

Of the creative writers of the Middle Period, few, if any, more clearly reflected the views of the transcendentalists than Walt Whitman (1819-92). A mystic and romantic, who glorified self-expression and extolled individual freedom, Whitman viewed life from an emotional rather than intellectual standpoint. Although he at times criticized certain institutions of contemporary society, he found his fellow men exhilarating, America a land of promise and fulfillment, and democracy ennobling. Whitman looked at America and was thrilled; the transcendentalists, on the other hand, were disturbed by the failure of Americans to realize their potentialities. The transcendentalists had pointed out the way for man to achieve self-realization, but they doubted that man would take their advice. Whitman, while sharing their views concerning man's nature, refused to share their doubts concerning man's future.

Whitman looked on himself as the poet of democracy and America and thought the two terms synonymous. To him, writing in *Democratic Vistas* (1871), democracy was not the rule of the majority, but a way of life and a form of government that assured every individual the right of self-expression and the opportunity for self-development. Such a democracy could only be built on the brotherhood of man, a brotherhood in which all men would be free to realize their spiritual potentialities. America had not yet attained this goal, but Whitman did not doubt that it would. The dangers were great, but the promise of America was even greater.

While Whitman modified transcendentalism to fit the needs of a new and growing nation, Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804-64) and Herman Melville (1819-91) accepted its premises but rejected its conclusions.

Both thought man the center of the universe, both sought to discover truth through intuition and imagination rather than reason, and both believed that the central problem confronting man was his own self-realization. But here their similarity with the transcendentalists stopped, for both concluded that man was incapable of self-realization. To Hawthorne man's ultimate and inevitable failure could be attributed to the defects inherent in man and society; to Melville it could be attributed to the workings of a universe that man could never understand but to which he was invariably compelled to submit.

Hawthorne made the role of morality in the life of the individual the central theme of his work. In *The Scarlet Letter*, *The House of Seven Gables*, *The Blithedale Romance*, and *The Marble Faun*, his range extended from Puritan New England to nineteenth century Rome; but time and place were unimportant, for Hawthorne's major concern was to unravel the mysteries of what he thought was man's essentially painful relation to his fellow man and to his universe.

Herman Melville, like Hawthorne, was a seeker whose search ended in pessimism. Uninterested in trade, finance, and politics, he turned to the sea in his quest for the meaning and purpose of life. His experiences as a sailor and on a South Sea island provided the material for his earlier books, but it was only in *Moby Dick* that he found a subject worthy of his extraordinary talents. Capable of a variety of interpretations at any number of levels, *Moby Dick* is a tour de force that can be compared to no other American novel. Whether considered as a story of a whaling voyage, an account of the whaling industry, an allegory, or a study in mythology, *Moby Dick* is almost unbearably powerful. Each of its many incidents is replete with significant implications, but running through the entire work is Melville's fascination with good and evil and his conviction that man's search for happiness is doomed to failure from the outset and that life itself is meaningless.

116. LITERATURE

DURING the Middle Period there was a flowering of American literature to which every section made notable contributions. Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, Hawthorne, and Melville were major figures; but there were many others, and most of them in some measure reflected the time and place in which they wrote. Living in an age of emergent democracy, growing sectionalism, and expanding business enterprise, the writers of the antebellum years were part of an America that was questioning its old values and searching for new ones. No serious poet or novelist could ignore these developments; and whether

they rejected or approved of the changes in American mores and institutions, they could not escape the influence of these changes.

Throughout the Middle Period, New England dominated the literary scene, and the writers of Boston, Cambridge, and neighboring towns dominated New England. Emerson once wrote that "from 1790 to 1820 there was not a book, a speech, a conversation or a thought," in Massachusetts; but during the next four decades the state more than made up for its earlier deficiencies. Politicians like Charles Sumner and Daniel Webster, historians like William H. Prescott and Francis Parkman, poets like Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and John Greenleaf Whittier, ministers like William Ellery Channing and Theodore Parker, essayists like Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, and reformers like William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips supplied not only Massachusetts but New England, the United States and the world with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of books, speeches, conversations, and thoughts.

A large part of New England's literary output was provided by a small group of so-called Brahmins, who lived in Boston and Cambridge. Whether they were poets like Longfellow, Lowell, and Holmes, or historians like Parkman, Prescott, or Motley, the Brahmins were men of erudition, charm and literary distinction. They had but little concern, however, for the reform of man or his environment; although they disapproved of many aspects of contemporary society, they approved of their own society and seemed supremely satisfied with the place that they occupied in it. In most instances they were men of means, and as gentlemen scholars they devoted their lives to the pursuit of culture, learning, and literature. According to present-day standards the Brahmins may be judged both aloof and prudish (Lowell once said: "Let no man write a line that he would not have his daughter read"), but during the Middle Period they were among the most popular authors in the United States.

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-82), who, with Holmes and Lowell, taught at Harvard, generally abstained from the controversies of his age. Although in 1842 at the instigation of his abolitionist friend Sumner he published his *Poems on Slavery*, for the most part his poetry was concerned with stories from the past rather than the controversies of the present. While his poems might not arouse deep emotions or raise any profound questions, they were enormously popular with a vast number of Americans who presumably preferred his glowing accounts of an earlier and simpler America to the confusing reality of the nineteenth century. Longfellow's sales numbered in the tens of thousands—*The Song of Hiawatha* sold 30,000 copies in the first five months after its publication—and he became the first American to gain a sizable income from poetry.

James Russell Lowell (1819-91), as a poet, essayist, humorist, editor, teacher, and diplomat, was perhaps the most versatile of the Brahmins. But his very versatility proved a liability, for it prevented him from making a sustained contribution to any of the numerous fields in which he was interested. Nevertheless, his accomplishments were notable. He served as the first editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*; his *Biglow Papers* effectively presented the Yankee arguments against both the Mexican War and slavery; he did as much as any man of his generation to further American interest in literature; and in an age in which every variety of radicalism seemed to flourish he stood out as a sound and intelligent conservative.

Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809-94) was a doctor, poet, and teacher whose faith in science was matched by his opposition to Calvinism. In "The One-Hoss Shay," *Elsie Venner*, and *The Guardian Angel*, he attacked Calvinism with vigor; but he is best remembered as the author of light verse and amusing essays. In *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table*, he paraded his biases and prejudices with wit, charm, and erudition. A master of Yankee small talk who often appeared clever rather than profound, he wrote with verve and bounce on an endless variety of subjects from the standpoint of a Brahmin who believed that the "Boston State-House is the hub of the solar system."

Although John Greenleaf Whittier (1807-92) lived in Haverhill, Massachusetts, rather than Boston or Cambridge, was a Quaker rather than a Unitarian, and played a much more prominent part in the anti-slavery crusade than Holmes, Longfellow and Lowell, he shared the Brahmins' affection for the New England past, and for a way of life that was rapidly being destroyed by the counting house and the textile mill. In his abolitionist poems, he made up for what he called his lack of "rounded art" and "seer-like power" with a vigor and sincerity that revealed the depth of his opposition to slavery and his devotion to freedom. But in the "Yankee pastorals," most of which were written after the anti-slavery poems, he dealt affectionately with the rural folkways of an earlier New England. If to twentieth century Americans these poems often seem both superficial and overly sentimental, to many of Whittier's contemporaries they were pleasant and accurate reminders of familiar childhood scenes and events.

The relatively high level attained by some of the nation's creative writers was matched by a group of distinguished historians, all of whom were born in New England and educated at Harvard. Of these, the first was Jared Sparks (1789-1866), who gained a well merited reputation as a collector and publisher of manuscripts. Although his twelve volumes of *The Life and Writings of George Washington* were marred by his alteration of parts of his subject's original writings, Sparks de-

serves commendation for his work as editor of *The Library of American Biography*, which was published in twenty-five volumes from 1834 to 1847. George Bancroft (1800-91), like Sparks, was a notable pioneer in the study of America's past; and his *History of the United States*, the first volume of which appeared in 1834, still has much to offer the discerning student of American history. Although Bancroft's *History* is colored by the author's prejudices and patriotism and is weighted down with an exuberant, even florid, prose style, it is largely based on source materials and reflects the thoroughness of the German historical methods that the author had learned abroad. Less stilted and more dispassionate than Bancroft was Richard Hildreth (1807-65) in his *History of the United States*, which was published in six volumes from 1849 to 1852. Hildreth's facts are unembellished by the extravagant rhetoric of Bancroft's volumes. Of his work the *Edinburgh Review* remarked: "We encounter the muse of American history descended from her stump, and recounting her narrative in a key adapted to our own ears."

Francis Parkman (1823-93), William H. Prescott (1796-1859), and J. L. Motley (1814-77) were all historians of great literary ability who handled major themes with extraordinary skill. Emphasizing the drama and color of their material, they wrote in a heroic vein that made their books moving as well as informative. All three were patient and thorough researchers, but they never permitted their scholarship to impede the flow of their stories. Parkman's multivolumed account of the struggle in North America between the French and English is remarkable for its evocative descriptions and the pace of its narrative. Motley and Prescott, writing on Dutch and Spanish history respectively, were excellently trained and equipped for their tasks, and both earned international distinction as historians. Although their volumes have been in large measure supplanted as the authoritative treatments of their subjects, they still stand as models of narrative history. In the present age of monographs and "scientific history," the works of Parkman, Motley, and Prescott continue to furnish the most convincing evidence that history can also be literature.

Although the flowering of New England may have marked the high point in the development of American literature before the Civil War, it was New York rather than Massachusetts that first produced a group of poets and novelists whose writing attracted attention both at home and abroad. Known as the Knickerbocker Group and living in or around New York City, they published their most important works during the first three decades of the nineteenth century. They derived their name from Washington Irving's so-called Knickerbocker *History of New York*; in addition to Irving the group included William Cullen Bryant, poet and head of the New York *Evening Post*; James Kirke Paulding, whose

The Backwoodsman, and *The Puritan and His Daughter* are still remembered if seldom read; Gulian Verplanck, a lawyer, scholar, and essayist; and Nathaniel Parker Willis, a poet and novelist.

Perhaps the most important member of this group was Washington Irving (1783-1859), an urbane, cultivated gentleman of Federalist leanings and a writer of impeccable craftsmanship, who won a European as well as an American audience. His work, while perhaps revealing a desire to forget rather than reflect contemporary America, often provided his readers with a romantic and charming—and sometimes humorous—account of the American past. His imaginative writing was seldom original in either form or content, and in some respects he was an Old World writer in a New World setting. But he was also an American man of letters whose *A Tour on the Prairies*, *Astoria*, and *The Adventures of Captain Bonneville, U. S. A.*, suggest that the frontier was probably the most American-like feature of American civilization. *The Life of George Washington*, although it reflects the Federalist viewpoint and lacks both imagination and insight, provides further evidence of his desire to arouse in his countrymen an awareness of their national traditions.

James Fenimore Cooper (1789-1851), an upstate New Yorker of considerable wealth and strong opinions, shared with Irving the distinction of being the outstanding writer in the Middle Atlantic states during the first half of the nineteenth century. His literary output (consisting of some fifty books and pamphlets) was almost evenly divided between social criticism and tales of life at sea and on the frontier. In his *Leather-Stocking Tales* he created an idealized version of the frontiersman that was adopted by almost all writers of every subsequent frontier in American history. These stories became very popular in Europe, where they were translated into many languages and, along with Irving's writings, created for the first time an interest in American literature. In all his writings, Cooper consistently stated the views of a landed aristocrat who was equally opposed to nineteenth-century capitalism and Jacksonian equalitarianism. "God help the nation," he wrote in *The Redskins*, "where self-government, in its literal sense, exists"; and in *The American Democrat* he announced that he was "not a believer in the scheme of raising men very far above their natural propensities."

Southern literature, while in many respects as diversified as that of the New England and Middle Atlantic states, was more regional in character. As slavery became more firmly entrenched in the South during the antebellum years, Southerners grew increasingly aware that it was the slave system that gave their section its unique quality and its sense of unity. Although Southern writers dealt with a variety of themes, most of them chose subjects that seemed peculiarly Southern and many of them defended in prose and poetry the mores and institutions of their

section. Despite the regional character of Southern literature, many Southerners preferred to read books and papers produced beyond their section's borders. Often they subscribed to Northern rather than to Southern newspapers and magazines, and they soon acquired the habit of looking to the North for the latest literary and scientific news. "We have been too long tributary to the North," wrote a Southern editor; "it is high time to awake from our lethargy, to arise in the majesty of our intellectual strength, to put on the panoply of talents and genius, and strike for the price of the high calling in literature."

Charleston, South Carolina, with a population in 1825 of approximately fourteen thousand whites and slightly more than that number of Negroes, was not only the mecca of the romantic verse-makers of the South but the intellectual capital of the Old South. Center of plantation fashion and politics, and home of an aristocracy that boasted the Petigrues, Hegers, Legarés, Grimké, and others of French Huguenot extraction, it was nevertheless in manner and prejudices pronouncedly English. "We are decidedly more English than any other city in the United States," said Hugh S. Legaré, who had traveled widely and was intimately acquainted with both the North and the Old World. Like the aristocracy of England, the first families of Charleston were legal-minded in politics and Anglican in religion. Ownership of landed property was in its estimation the highest goal to which one could aspire. Law and politics were regarded as worthy vocations, but were rated as secondary to that of plantation-owning. For its literature Charleston depended in large measure on London, and those who affected a love of letters were enamoured of the "heroic couplet and the Addisonian essay." In poetry Moore, Byron, and Scott were the idols of the Southern versifier.

Of what might be called the Charleston school of literature, William Gilmore Simms (1806-70), Henry Timrod (1828-67), and Paul Hamilton Hayne (1830-86) were the outstanding representatives. Each employed his pen to extol the South and its institutions; each was a skilled literary craftsman; and each reflected the influence of the English romantics. Simms, who during his lifetime wrote more than a hundred volumes of prose and poetry, was most effective in such historical novels as *The Yemassee*, a romance of colonial South Carolina and the Southern Indians, and *The Partisan*, which was set in South Carolina during the Revolution. Both Timrod and Hayne were poets who wrote either poems praising the South or romantic odes to nature. Although all three men loved their section, they repeatedly criticized it for its comparative lack of progress in literature, and they spent their lives trying to stimulate an interest in literary endeavors. Yet all three were discouraged by the little progress that they made, and after the Civil War, Hayne wrote:

I trust that few surpass me in rational patriotism, and a love for my own unfortunate section. Yet the truth must be confessed, a more uncultivated, soulless, and groveling set of Yahoos (so far as letters, poetry especially, are concerned) never cumbered the Earth, than these same people of what is called the earnest Tropical and passionate South!! If I write with bitterness, God knows I have good reason to be spleenful. . . . Can the foundations of an enduring literature be laid in the quagmires of individual vanity? Can a people's mental dignity and aesthetic culture be vindicated by petting incompetency, and patting ignorance and self-sufficiency on the back?

Of the other writers of the plantation South both John Pendleton Kennedy (1795-1870) and William Grayson (1788-1863) deserve mention. Kennedy although living in Baltimore, was more Northern than Southern in outlook. Nevertheless, he had a romantic attachment to plantation life, and in *Swallow Barn* (1832) he wrote with affection and sympathy of the heyday of plantation society in the Old Dominion. Grayson was a cultured and well-to-do South Carolina attorney, whose poem *The Hireling and The Slave* presents what is perhaps the best Southern defense of slavery in verse form. In this sixteen-hundred line poem Grayson argued that the lot of the bond slave was better than that of the wage slave and that every abolitionist was a hypocrite in that he denounced slavery and at the same time closed his eyes to the wretchedness of the wage slaves who toiled in English and in Northern mines and factories.

Not all Southern writers, however, wrote of slaves and plantations, for many authors made literary capital out of the folkways on the Southern frontier. David Crockett's (1786-1836) *A Narrative of the Life of David Crockett of . . . Tennessee* presented a graphic picture of Southern society in the backcountry through the eyes of an assertive, opinionated, and likable backwoodsman. Augustus Longstreet (1790-1870), a Georgia lawyer of humble origins, described in *Georgia Scenes* the country dances, debating societies, horse trades, fox hunts, shooting matches, rough-and-tumble fist fights, and the adventures of "Ned Brace," hero and practical joker. Of the others who wrote in this genre, perhaps the most important from a literary-historical point of view was Joseph G. Baldwin (1815-64). As a country barrister in Alabama at the time of the planter migration to that state, he gradually formed an acquaintanceship with lawyers and politicians who furnished him an abundance of material for his volume *The Flush Times of Alabama and Mississippi*, published in 1853. In it Baldwin humorously described not only the bar but the sharpers, boasters, liars, spread-eagle orators, and hangers-on who infested the rapidly filling lower South.

Of the numerous writers that lived in the South before the Civil War, Edgar Allan Poe (1809-49) depicted neither the Southern or national scene, but rather, his own interior landscape. Poverty, alcoholism, and violent stresses caused him to lead his life, as he put it, "in terrible agony." Despising transcendentalism, equalitarianism, and all other "isms" of his period, he thought that "reformist demigods" were "merely devils turned inside out." He viewed literature as the "creation of beauty," and much of his work reveals his preoccupation with the "purely sensual" and his belief that

*All we see or seem
Is but a dream within a dream*

Misunderstood and largely unappreciated by his countrymen, he had a more profound influence on subsequent literary developments here and abroad than any other American of his time. The range of this influence has been enormous. He originated the detective story, was in effect this country's first literary critic, and produced some of the earliest—and still the most readable—examples of what has come to be known as "science fiction." Most important of all, perhaps, was the impetus that his work gave to the development of a type of poetry that emphasizes form and tonal quality. Not only the French Symbolists, but T. S. Eliot and many other modern poets owe an immeasurable debt to the neurotic genius of Edgar Allan Poe.

117. JOURNALISM

JOURNALISM, as well as imaginative literature and historical study, experienced a remarkable transformation during the thirty years before the Civil War. In 1830, newspapers were published in limited quantities primarily for the upper classes. In 1860, newspapers were printed for the masses, and their contents belonged to anybody who could read. Among the many factors contributing to the change were reduced newspaper prices, introduction of the steam press, new reporting methods, and increased freedom of the press from party control. Before 1830, almost all papers cost six cents to subscribers and were sold only by subscription. But the success of James Gordon Bennett's *New York Herald*, a penny paper that he established in 1835, was followed by many others in various parts of the country. In 1841 another famous penny paper, the *Tribune*, was founded in New York by Horace Greeley. Although these papers increased their price to two cents before the Civil War, the practicability of cheap daily papers had been proved. The "penny dreadfuls" at first were smaller and had briefer

descriptions of news events than did their rivals. Ultimately, however, the larger circulations enabled the cheaper newspapers to offset the handicap of the cheaper sale price of individual copies. They did not restrict their output to subscribers, but employed boys to deliver the papers to houses and to sell them on the streets. The older papers, except those of a specialized nature, eventually yielded the field to their adversaries, a surrender largely caused by the public realization that, although the penny papers pandered to the common man's taste for the sensational with descriptions of scandals, murders, fires, and robberies, they also were more inclined to impartiality in their treatment of national and international events. Newspaper editors frequently were assaulted for the contents of their papers, and the *Herald* often reported attacks on James Gordon Bennett under the standing head "Bennett Thrashed Again." The trials of a newspaper editor of the period may be gathered from one of Bennett's editorials of 1836:

We published yesterday the principal items of the foreign news, received by the Sheffield, being eight days later than our previous arrivals. Neither The Sun nor The Transcript had a single item on the subject. The Sun did not even know of its existence. The large papers in Wall Street had also the news, but as the editors are lazy, ignorant, indolent, blustering blockheads, one and all, they did not pick out the cream and serve it out as we did. The Herald alone knows how to dish up the foreign news, or indeed domestic events, in a readable style. Every reader, numbering between thirty and forty thousand daily, acknowledges this merit in the management of our paper. We do not, as the Wall street lazy editors do, come down to our office about ten or twelve o'clock, pull out a Spanish cigar, take up a pair of scissors, puff and cut, cut and puff for a couple of hours, and then adjourn to Delmonico's to eat, drink, gormandize, and blow up our contemporaries. We rise in the morning at five o'clock, write our leading editorials, squibs, sketches, etc., before breakfast. From nine till one we read all our papers and original communications, the latter being more numerous than those of any other office in New York. From these we pick out facts, thoughts, hints and incidents, sufficient to make up a column of original spicy articles. We also give audiences to visitors, gentlemen on business, and some of the loveliest ladies in New York, who call to subscribe—Heaven bless them! At one we sally out among the gentlemen and loafers of Wall street—find out the state of the money market, return, finish the next day's paper—close every piece of business requiring thought, sentiment, feeling, or philosophy, before four o'clock. We then dine moderately and temperately—read our proofs—take in cash and advertisements, which are increasing like

smoke—and close the day by going to bed always at ten o'clock, seldom later. That's the way to conduct a paper with spirit and success.

The technical process of printing the journals required improvement during the 1840's, for the more important newspapers found that the quantity of their production lagged behind the demand of the public. The Treadwell steam press, which was introduced in 1822, was supplanted in 1830 by the more effective steam press of Isaac Adams. In a few years the Adams press gave way to the Richard M. Hoe steam cylinder press. Hoe devised the scheme of taking the type from the flat bed and putting it on the cylinder. With four impression cylinders revolving around the type cylinder, the press printed approximately eight thousand papers on one side during one hour. By increasing the number of impression cylinders to ten the Hoe press increased production to twenty thousand an hour. With the outbreak of the Civil War the demand for newspapers necessitated faster presses, and Greeley and Bennett negotiated with Hoe for the construction of twenty-cylinder type-revolving presses. Despite faster presses printers still had to set the pages in duplicate. The difficulty was finally solved when Charles Craske in 1861 perfected a method of stereotyping pages with the use of a *papier-maché* composition. The process eliminated any need for additional cylinders on the press, since pages could be easily duplicated with *papier-maché* stereotypes. Several presses could then be used simultaneously to print the same edition of the newspaper. The cheap sale price, the technical improvements in production, and the policy of publishing daily newspapers that were suitable for the intellect and taste of the masses resulted in enormously enlarged circulations.

The Middle Period of American history was in some respects "the golden age of periodicals." How many magazines made their appearance between 1825 and 1860 cannot be stated in exact figures. Probably less than a hundred were in existence in 1825, and between six and eight hundred in 1860. One observer characterized the whole tendency of the age as "magazineward," and Charles A. Dana thought that the "fecundity" of the magazine family was greater than that of any species of animal. Some were quarterlies; others were monthlies and weeklies. Some professed to be primarily concerned with the diffusion of useful knowledge; others stressed their restriction to belles-lettres. Prices varied too. At one extreme of the price scale was the *Dollar Magazine* and at the other the *Penny Magazine*. Every form of writing can be found in this vast array of magazines—literary, dramatic, and musical criticism, poetry, novels, short stories, biographies, historical essays, travel descriptions, humor, and articles of a social, economic, moral, scientific, and educational nature. Nearly all magazines faced financial difficulties and in the 1840's most contributors were underpaid, or not

paid at all. Magazine advertising at the beginning of the period was unimportant; but by 1860 many magazines were running advertising sections of from four to eight pages, sometimes printed on colored stocks.

Of the magazines of these decades, *Graham's Magazine*, *The Knickerbocker Magazine*, *The New-England Magazine*, *The Southern Literary Messenger*, and *Godey's Lady's Book* were outstanding. *Graham's*, published in Philadelphia, was the first American magazine to make adequate and even liberal payment for its contributions. Edgar Allan Poe was literary and contributing editor of *Graham's* for more than a year, and it boasted of being the sole repository of the work of Bryant, Longfellow, Cooper, and James Kirke Paulding. *The Knickerbocker*, published in New York and greatly loved by its readers, owed its success to its gifted editor, Lewis Gaylord Clark. *The New-England Magazine*, though short-lived (1831-5), was perhaps the most important general magazine published in New England before the birth of the *Atlantic Monthly*. *The Southern Literary Messenger*, to which Poe also contributed, abounds in material relative to Southern society and politics for the thirty years, 1834-64. But in many respects the most extraordinary of the magazines of the midnineteenth century was *Godey's Lady's Book*, which Louis A. Godey described as bringing "unalloyed pleasure to the female mind." A contemporary author says of *Godey's Lady's Book*: "The stories and poems were read and reread and cried over, the fashions were studied and copied, the engravings were cut out and framed, and the editor's advice was considered the final pronouncement." The circulation of the *Lady's Book* attained the then seemingly incredible figure of 150,000, and Godey died a wealthy man. Mrs. Sarah J. Hale, who for a brief period was the literary editor of the magazine, was a writer of poetry of enduring if not esthetic qualities, and her "Mary had a little lamb" may be accepted as typical of the spirit of *Godey's Lady's Book*. Many of the leading American authors, both men and women, contributed to the magazine, which for a time was regarded by the genteel people of the United States as the final arbiter of literary taste, morals, and manners.

118. RELIGION

AMERICA during the second quarter of the nineteenth century was a land of religious dissension. Protestants were arrayed against Catholics, and Protestants against Protestants. Even the Unitarians, most liberal of all religious groups in America, found it impossible to agree among themselves. Rabid individualism, the failure of

existing church organizations to shepherd carefully their flocks, the new streams of population pouring in from Ireland and southern Germany, and the emotionalism growing out of the slavery controversy were largely responsible for the religious upheavals of these years.

The effect of the dissension upon Protestantism was especially noticeable. Everywhere in the United States, but particularly west of the Alleghenies, new doctrines and new ceremonials of worship were attracting adherents. Many of the new denominations operated under a name resembling that of the parent religion but qualified by a distinctive word or phrase that indicated the cause of the secession. Among the Baptists there were the regular Baptists, Seventh-day Baptists, Free Baptists, Free-will Baptists, General Six Principle Baptists, Seed-in-the-Spirit Predestinarian Baptists, and three Negro Baptist bodies. Among the Methodists there was similar confusion. In addition to the regular organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, ultimately divided into the Church and the Church South, there were the Methodist Church, New Congregational Methodist Church, and Independent Methodist Church. The Negro Methodists worshipped by themselves and formed their own denominations: the African Methodist Episcopal Church, African Union Methodist Protestant Church, Union American Methodist Episcopal Church, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, Reformed Zion Union Apostolic Church and others. The Presbyterian Church was less divided, but some of the divisions were superficially perplexing—for instance, the distinction between the Presbyterian Church in the United States and the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

In addition to the larger and more prominent Protestant organizations, many lesser religious groups attracted attention during this period. Of these the most important were the Adventists (who appeared under half a dozen names), the United Society of Believers (or Shakers, as they were generally called), the Rappites, the Dunkers (or German Baptist Brethren), the Quakers, Mormons, Moravians, Schwenkfelders, Campbellites, Universalists, and the many varieties of Mennonites, including the Amish and the Old Amish. With the coming of the Scandinavian and German immigrants in the 1850's many more sects were added.

The Adventists in many respects were typical of the lesser religious groups. They had their origin in 1831, when William Miller, an earnest New England farmer of Baptist background, began to warn the people of the United States that the end of the world was at hand. Evangelists had been preaching this idea for some time, and it was only when Miller set the second coming of Christ for sometime in 1843 that he began to attract widespread interest. In 1839 he was invited to preach in the leading Baptist church in Boston, and he soon had calls from many

large churches in all parts of the country. Journals such as the *Signs of the Times* in Boston, the *Midnight Cry* in New York, and the *Philadelphia Alarm* propagated the new gospel. As the time approached for the supposed end of the world, great meetings were held in churches, tents, public buildings, fields, and groves. The dawn on March 21, 1843, found Miller's followers—variously estimated at from 50,000 to 1,000,000—in graveyards, and on housetops, hilltops, and mountainsides. Some were in white robes; others wore their best clothes. The failure of the Lord to appear nearly prostrated Miller, and his followers decreased. Nevertheless, all did not desert him, and in 1845 he perfected a loose organization known as the Adventists. The following year the Seventh Day Adventists separated from the main body over the question of observing the seventh day, Saturday, instead of Sunday.

Of the new sects, none attracted more attention or aroused greater hostility than Mormonism. The Church of Latter Day Saints, as the Mormon Church is called, was founded in 1830 by Joseph Smith at Palmyra, New York. Smith proclaimed that an angel had directed him to a cave on a hillside where he had found concealed a number of golden plates bearing strange inscriptions. These records, which Smith asserted he alone could translate, formed the basis of *The Book of Mormon*, the Bible of the sect. Smith became the first head of the church, and "revelations" from time to time gave him complete control over the moral, temporal, and spiritual welfare of its members. His persuasive personality, his claim of direct revelation, and the mystic and authoritative nature of the new religion soon won Smith thousands of converts. In England alone, Mormon proselytizers gained more than four thousand converts in the course of three years. Mormonism, with its miracles, signs, and revelations, and its promise of a new Zion, drew many from their allegiance to the older sects.

From the outset the Mormons encountered opposition and even persecution. The prophet and his followers moved from New York to Kirtland, Ohio, in 1831, where the flock remained only a short interval before taking up a new residence at Independence, Missouri, the place selected for the permanent site of Zion. Here, after two years of peace and prosperity, the Latter Day Saints became embroiled with the non-Mormon inhabitants, and in 1833 the sect sought refuge in Clay County, Missouri, where, far removed from its persecutors, it founded a semi-socialistic community. Only a few years elapsed, however, before the Southern pioneers began to surround the colony. Hostility quickly developed, for neither the new faith nor the socialistic organization of the community appealed to the individualistic frontier farmers. Friction and mutual animosities, resulting in systematic and bitter persecution, culminated in 1838 in the wholesale expulsion of the Saints from Missouri. Taking refuge in the state of Illinois, they purchased the aban-

cloned frontier village of Commerce and in 1840 rechristened it Nauvoo. By thrift and by hard work they acquired new farms, established manufactures, and accumulated wealth. New disciples arrived every month from the Eastern states, England, Scandinavia, and the Germanies, and in a comparatively short time Nauvoo had a population of approximately fifteen thousand people. But in 1843 a new revelation sanctioned polygamy, and this, together with Smith's alleged political intrigues and the charges that the Mormons were harboring cattle thieves, counterfeiters, and other criminals, led to turbulence both within and without the community. In the following year Smith and his brother Hyrum, who had been jailed by the authorities, were seized by a mob and murdered.

Smith was succeeded by Brigham Young, a man of remarkable energy and gifted leadership. Under his direction the Nauvoo population with 3,700 wagons, 30,000 cattle, large flocks of sheep and poultry, a number of hogs, and "all manner of tools, machinery, and materials deemed serviceable in the colonization of a wilderness," migrated to Council Bluffs, Iowa, during the spring and summer of 1846. Early the next year Young, with a company of picked men, set out in quest of the long-sought haven. Pushing rapidly up the north bank of the Platte, past Fort Laramie to South Pass, the party turned southwestward until it finally reached the narrow semidesert valley west of the Wasatch Mountains. Here on the tableland overlooking Great Salt Lake, far removed from their former persecutors, Young staked out the site of what proved to be the Mormons' permanent home. At the time, the region lay within Mexican territory, but the following year it was ceded to the United States. Late in September, 1847, the first division of the main body, numbering 1,553 men, women, and children, arrived; others followed, and by 1850, Utah had a population of more than 11,000.

Under Young's directing genius the colony soon became a great co-operative community. On the theory that "land belongs to the Lord and his Saints are to use so much as each can work profitably," the new city was laid out in wide streets with business lots of an acre and a quarter each; beyond these were five-acre lots for mechanics, which in turn were flanked by farms varying in size from ten to eighty acres. Those with plural wives and large families received proportionately larger holdings. Mills, roads, bridges, canals, and even machinery were built on a co-operative basis. A co-operative store purchased supplies and sold produce, and the profits went to the common good. Most important of all the co-operative undertakings were the irrigation works, which enabled the Mormons to transform the desert into one of the most productive spots in America. Young, however, was not content that the settlement should remain merely a colony of farmers. He wanted it to be economically independent of the outside world and therefore encour-

aged both mining and manufacturing. In the 1850's, the church erected a mill to crush corn and beets for the manufacture of sugar and built a tannery, a pottery, a woolen mill, and a nail factory.

The establishment of new sects did not prevent the continued growth of a number of the older denominations. As nearly as can be ascertained, the Presbyterians from 1800 to 1850 increased from 40,000 to 500,000, the Baptists from 100,000 to 800,000, and the Methodist Episcopal Church in all its branches from 65,000 to more than 1,250,000. Most of the growth in these three denominations was west of the Alleghenies, and any increases in the original thirteen states were usually at the expense of the Episcopal and Congregational churches.

Largely because of the influx of Irish immigrants into the United States, the Catholic Church also grew rapidly during these years. Although Irish Catholics had migrated to the United States in small numbers since colonial times, not until the 1840's was there a mass movement of population from Ireland to America. Numerous political grievances, an inequitable distribution of land and taxes, and the failure of the potato crops in 1845-7 brought them. The new arrivals accounted in large measure for the increase in the number of American Catholics from 600,000 in 1820 to 3,500,000 in 1850. The Catholic Irish settled in every section of the United States, but they were heavily concentrated in New England. As Frederick Jackson Turner said in *The United States, 1830-1850*:

[A census of Boston in 1850] showed 35,287 natives of Ireland, as against 68,687 natives of all Massachusetts. In 1848 half the primary-school children of Boston were said to be of foreign parentage. Theodore Parker commented on the Massachusetts census returns for 1855: "Suffolk County is 'County Cork'; Boston is a young Dublin." By 1850 the foreign-born population in New England numbered 300,000 (two-thirds of them Irish).*

Many native Protestants, alarmed by the rapid growth of the Catholic Church, revealed their opposition to the newcomers in a variety of ways. In 1834 anti-Catholics burned the Ursuline convent in Charlestown, Massachusetts; the next year S. F. B. Morse's *Foreign Conspiracy* attacked the Catholic Irish in America; and in every large city there were occasional anti-Catholic demonstrations. Nativist agitators roused their countrymen by pointing out that the squalid sections of cities, where many immigrants lived, were breeding places of vice and crime. Protestant Americans were terrified as they beheld the "hordes" of Catholics building churches, establishing convents, and organizing parochial schools. Patriots like Lyman Beecher exhorted their fellow

* Frederick Jackson Turner: *The United States, 1830-1850: The Nation and Its Sections* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1935), p. 55.

citizens to guard against the dark designs of the revolutionaries who were streaming to America intent on overturning the nation's government and cherished institutions. Politicians opposed to a liberal land policy declared it would invite to America "the bandit of the Apennines, the mercenary Swiss, the hungry loafer of the cities of the Old World, the offal of disorged jails, penitentiaries, and houses of correction of foreign countries."

As a result of this widespread clamor against the immigrant, a nationalistic organization known as the Supreme Order of the Star-Spangled Banner, or the Sons of the Sires of '76, was formed in New York in 1850. An oath-bound fraternity, made up of members descended from at least two generations of American ancestors who had never been members of the Catholic Church, this organization pledged itself to put none but native Americans in office and in every other way possible "preserve America for Americans." * Because members when asked about the order invariably replied, "I don't know" or "I know nothing," they were dubbed "Know-Nothings" and their organization the Know-Nothing party. Although the Know-Nothing, or Native American, party, as its members preferred to call it, won some startling successes at the polls,† particularly in 1854 and 1855, it soon declined. Its platform in the presidential campaign of 1856 declared that Americans must rule America; that no state or territory could admit to suffrage or political office any except native citizens unless previously naturalized under Federal law; that twenty-one years' residence for naturalization should be required; and that there should be no union of church and state, no state interference with religion, and no religious oaths for office. With Millard Fillmore as its standard bearer in the election of 1856 the party ran a poor third. It had gained phenomenal success in the two previous years partly because numerous Democrats and Whigs, dissatisfied with

* In initiating members into the organization the president addressed the candidates as follows: "In every city, town and hamlet, the danger has been seen and the alarm sounded. And hence true men have devised this order as a means . . . of advancing America and the American interest on the one side, and on the other of checking the stride of the foreigner or alien, of thwarting the machinations and subverting the deadly plans of the Jesuit and the Papist."

† In Massachusetts in 1854 Nativists elected a governor and practically the entire legislature, elected forty members to the state legislature of New York, and helped elect a governor and some members of the legislative body of Pennsylvania. They also elected a few Know-Nothings to Congress from these states. The following year Know-Nothing governors were elected in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, California, and Kentucky. The Know-Nothings also controlled the legislatures of all these states with the exception of New Hampshire. In Texas, New York, and Maryland, where there were no gubernatorial contests, Know-Nothing state tickets triumphed. In New Hampshire, Maryland, and Tennessee the legislatures were controlled by a fusion of Whigs and Know-Nothings, and the legislatures of New York, Virginia, Georgia, and Louisiana boasted strong Know-Nothing minorities. Know-Nothing candidates were also elected to Congress and to many municipal offices.

the policies and leadership of their respective parties, had voted the Know-Nothing ticket as a protest; but inefficient leadership, barrenness of legislative achievement, the prominence of the slavery issue, the birth of the Republican party, and the need for more labor in a rapidly expanding country proved to be rocks upon which the Know-Nothings foundered.

Despite anti-Catholic agitation, America in the Middle Period was becoming more tolerant religiously. Laws that discriminated against members of disapproved religious bodies—the proscription, for instance, of Catholics, Jews, and atheists from the exercise of the franchise and from officeholding—were gradually abolished in the states. The polygamy of the Mormons might offend the moral fastidiousness of the nation, and the fear of papal machinations might produce fanatical organizations, but most Americans could worship without any interference; for the multiplicity of creeds prevented the predominance of any one denomination and reduced the opportunities for religious persecution. Many examples may be cited of brutalities caused by religious bigotry, such as the hounding of the Mormons; yet if one recalls the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe and the period of the early English colonies, it would seem that by the eve of the Civil War, religious intolerance had abated.

CHAPTER XX

CONTINENTAL EXPANSION

- 119. MANIFEST DESTINY
 - 120. AMERICANS IN OREGON
 - 121. AMERICANS IN TEXAS
 - 122. THE ACQUISITION OF TEXAS AND OREGON
 - 123. AMERICANS IN NEW MEXICO AND CALIFORNIA
 - 124. THE MEXICAN WAR
 - 125. THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH
-

THE CONSOLIDATION of the trans-Mississippi West into the United States strikingly exemplifies the interaction between peaceful penetration and imperial conquest. The same motives—economic, religious, and patriotic—that inspired Englishmen to seize India and to settle in Australia, Frenchmen to acquire Algiers, and Spaniards to plant their flag on the soil of Cuba and the Philippines drove Americans during the nineteenth century first into the trans-Appalachian country and then into the territory beyond the Mississippi. Missionary and fur trader were followed by pioneers, gold seekers, speculators, and businessmen. Ignoring national boundaries, American settlers did not hesitate to push into foreign-held lands with the confident conviction that their government would support their invasion. Nor did their government disappoint them, for by 1850 the American territorial domain of 1789 had been trebled, and the nation's western boundary had been pushed to the shores of the Pacific.

119. MANIFEST DESTINY

BY THE opening years of the 1840's many Americans had reached the conclusion that the United States was destined to assume control over all of North America. In their minds, their country had been entrusted with a mission to spread democracy and liberty, and they could think of no better way to carry out this mission than to have their government take over the administration of the entire continent. Convinced of the moral, spiritual, political, and economic superiority of the United States, the expansionists argued that this nation could not shirk its responsibility to provide the "less fortunate people" in neighboring countries with the "blessings of American freedom and democracy." The imperialists were so certain that it was the "Manifest Destiny" of the United States to expand that they found it difficult to believe that either Englishmen or Mexicans in North America could think otherwise. On the other hand, if foreigners were not prepared to accept American rule peacefully, the expansionists were ready to impose it on them by force.

"Manifest Destiny"—the term used to describe the American expansionist spirit of the 1840's—was characterized by a bumptious enthusiasm and naive nationalism; its proponents claimed that the United States had the world's best government, that its people were better off than those of any other nation, and that its imperialist designs were sanctioned by both divine and natural law. Under the circumstances, it was not difficult for the imperialists to convince themselves that the expansion of the United States was not only desirable from the standpoint of all concerned but also that it was inevitable. This line of reasoning, in turn, led them to the conclusion that the European nations were imperialistic for selfish reasons, whereas the United States was expanding for the benefit of all mankind. In reality, Manifest Destiny was in many ways similar to every other nation's philosophy of imperialism: it was justified by forces beyond the control of the expansionists; it was advanced as a doctrine that would uplift both the conquerors and the conquered; and its advocates were utterly lacking in either self-restraint or a sense of humor. The following statement, made by a speaker at the New Jersey Democratic State Convention in 1844, is a typical example of imperialistic oratory in this period:

Land enough—land enough! Make way, I say, for the young American Buffalo—he has not yet got land enough; he wants more land as his cool shelter in summer—he wants more land for his beautiful pasture grounds. I tell you, we will give him Oregon for

his summer shade, and the region of Texas as his winter pasture. Like all of his race, he wants salt, too. Well, he shall have the use of two oceans—the mighty Pacific and the turbulent Atlantic shall be his. . . . He shall not stop his career until he slakes his thirst in the frozen ocean.

The appearance of Manifest Destiny in the 1840's can be explained in part by the widespread fear of British power in North America. The United States and Great Britain had occupied Oregon jointly since 1818, and after the Texas war of independence in 1836 the British repeatedly tried to dominate the Texan republic. A Southern expansionist spoke for Americans in every section when he said "Some people talk as though they were affeered of England. . . . Haven't we licked her twice and can't we lick her again? Lick her! Yes; jest as easy as a bar can slip down a fresh peeled saplin'." Many imperialists argued that the expansion of American democracy was the only way to thwart the spread of British "autocracy" in the New World. In this respect, Manifest Destiny was a reaffirmation of the principles announced by James Monroe in 1823.

Sectional controversy also fostered enthusiasm for expansion. By the 1840's many political leaders had come to realize that any regions subsequently obtained by the United States would in all likelihood determine the outcome of the contest that was developing between the North and the South over the control of the Federal government.* New territories would eventually be carved into states whose representatives would upset the old political balances by allying themselves with either the North or the South; and the section that could count on the support of these new states would be in a position to dictate the nation's tariff, land, banking, and slave policies. Under the circumstances the South wished to acquire more slave territory, and the North was equally desirous of adding free territory to the nation. Each section opposed the expansion of the other, but both favored some form of expansion. As a result, there were very few people in the United States during these years who did not advocate the acquisition of more land.

120. AMERICANS IN OREGON

THE OREGON country was a region larger than the combined area of New England, New York, and Pennsylvania. Before the Lewis and Clark expedition or the founding of Astoria, France, Spain, Russia, and England had all laid claim to this territory. The

* See Chapter XXI, pp. 565-604.


French claims, based on voyages of seamen between 1763 and 1779 and on the possession of Louisiana, were surrendered to the United States with the purchase of Louisiana in 1803. Spain's title, also founded on explorations of her seamen, passed into American hands through the treaty of 1819. Russia's claims were based upon the expeditions of Vitus Bering, a Danish explorer in the service of the Tsar, and on the operations of fur merchants who had organized the Russian-American Fur Company at the close of the eighteenth century. By a treaty with the United States in 1824, however, Russia renounced all claim to the territory south of latitude $54^{\circ}40'$.

England's original claim to the Oregon country was based on the voyage of Sir Francis Drake, who in 1579 supposedly anchored his ship, the *Golden Hind*, in Oregon waters. Two centuries later—during the American Revolution—the British admiralty sent Captain James Cook to explore the northwest coast of America and to find, if possible, the long-sought northwest passage. In 1778, Cook anchored off Nootka, Vancouver Island, where he obtained a few otter skins that were subsequently disposed of in Canton, China, at fabulous prices. The Spanish, however, were also interested in this region, and in 1789 Spanish war vessels seized two British merchantmen in Nootka Sound. War was averted by the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790, which provided that neither nation was to interfere with the activities of the other in the region. Two years later, Captain George Vancouver reached Oregon with instructions to explore the Pacific coast from the thirtieth to the sixtieth parallel. In the course of this expedition he discovered and named Puget Sound, circumnavigated the island that bears his name, explored the coast of British Columbia, and named Mount Baker. In addition to these voyages and explorations the British claim was strengthened by the overland expeditions of the Northwest Company.

America's title to the Oregon country rested substantially upon the same basis as England's—exploration and trade. American independence had scarcely been recognized before Yankee merchants and shippers had begun to push into the Pacific. In 1784 the *Empress of China*, a New York merchantman, had entered Canton Harbor, and other American vessels had soon followed, but all had been handicapped by the fact that the goods that they brought were much less in value than those they obtained. To remedy this difficulty a group of Boston mer-

14. THE OREGON CONTROVERSY

The vast and rich Oregon country provided a controversial issue. This map indicates the basis in terms of exploration and discovery for the respective claims of the United States and Great Britain, and shows the compromise line of 1846.



chants decided to combine the fur trade of the Pacific with the Far Eastern trade. Accordingly, two vessels, the *Columbia* and the *Lady Washington*, under command of Robert Gray and John Kendrick respectively, left Boston in 1787 with cargoes of blankets, knives, iron bars, copper pans, and trinkets that were to be exchanged with the Oregon Indians for furs. Both vessels reached the Nootka Sound region the following year, and in the fall of 1789, Captain Gray sailed for China with a cargo of furs. He returned home by the Cape of Good Hope in 1790 and in a few months was again on his way to the Pacific. In 1792, while engaged in exploring the coast south of Vancouver, he discovered and named the Columbia River. The government at the time paid almost no attention to his discoveries; but it was largely indebted to him and to Captain Kendrick for its claim to the Oregon territory.

With the exception of those connected with the fur trade, few Americans displayed any interest in Oregon during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1818, representatives of Great Britain and the United States attempted to divide the territory and to establish a definite boundary from the Rockies to the Pacific. Because the British insisted on the line of the Columbia River, whereas the Americans were committed to the forty-ninth parallel, no division was effected; but the two countries agreed to a joint occupation for ten years. Theoretically, the citizens or subjects of either country were to enjoy equal rights to settle or to trade in any part of the country; but in reality, the Americans were practically excluded from the territory by the Hudson's Bay Company, which had absorbed Astor's old rival, the Northwest Company. The American fur interests, acting through a Virginia representative, John Floyd, and Senator Benton of Missouri, attempted without success to secure relief from Congress. But many representatives from the older states argued that the annexation and occupation of Oregon would decrease land values in the East, cause high wages, and restrict development of manufactures. Others declared that the Rocky Mountains formed a natural boundary for the United States on the west and that the "most prolific mind" could not picture a time when territory up to this boundary would be densely populated; they felt that seizure of the Oregon territory by any nation would be a blessing for the United States. In 1827, after another futile effort to reach an agreement on the boundary, the joint occupation was renewed for an indefinite period, each nation retaining the right to terminate the treaty at a year's notice.

Among those who were convinced that the United States had a clear title to Oregon and that the Hudson's Bay Company was an interloper was Hall Jackson Kelley, a Boston schoolmaster. Kelley, who became interested in the region after reading the Lewis and Clark account,

concluded that actual settlement would supply the most effective argument for the recognition of the American claim. With this in mind he campaigned for an "American Oregon." In 1829 he published his *Geographical Sketches of Oregon*, which stressed the natural resources of the country—furs, fisheries, forests, soil, and climate—the importance of Christianizing the Indians, and the possibilities of a transcontinental railroad. Shortly afterward he started the American Society for the Encouraging the Settlement of the Oregon Territory. Moreover, in a circular entitled *Manual of the Oregon Expedition* he made a special plea for physicians, shipbuilders, wheelwrights, carpenters, blacksmiths, and other artisans. After considerable delay Kelley set out for Oregon with a small party in 1833. At New Orleans his followers deserted him, but the following year he fell in with Ewing Young, an American trader, with whom he journeyed to Vancouver. Thwarted at every turn by the Hudson's Bay Company, however, he returned to Massachusetts in 1836, half sick and completely discouraged with the project to which he had devoted so much of his time and money.

In the meantime Nathaniel J. Wyeth, a Cambridge ice dealer, had become interested in Kelley's scheme. Unlike Kelley, he was a practical businessman who believed that the unoccupied territory between the Columbia and the Spanish boundary offered unexcelled possibilities for trade. Impatient with the delay in the departure of the Kelley expedition, he formed an independent company with the financial backing of the Boston firm of Hall, Tucker & Williams. This company organized an expedition that was to go overland from St. Louis while a supply ship carrying goods for the Indian trade was to go round the Horn. The expedition, which left for Oregon in 1832, proved a melancholy failure. Returning home, Wyeth organized a new concern, The Columbia Fishing and Trading Company, which sent a second and equally unsuccessful expedition to the Pacific Northwest. When Wyeth returned to Boston in 1836 he was unable to secure financial support for a third venture. Nevertheless, Wyeth's overland trips demonstrated the practicability of an all-wagon route to the Oregon country. Certainly his enterprises stimulated additional interest in Oregon.

More important than the efforts either of Kelley or of Wyeth in causing the actual settlement of Oregon was the work of the missionaries. According to a story now considered fictitious, in 1831 representatives from the Nez Percé and Flathead Indians—two tribes that lived beyond the Rockies—came to St. Louis to ask that Christian missionaries be sent to teach their people. Whether this request was real or fanciful, an account of it was published in the Eastern press and attracted the attention of the Methodists and Presbyterians. Through Dr. Wilbur Fisk, President of Wesleyan University, the Methodist Missionary Society voted three thousand dollars to carry the Gospel to the Flatheads.

Additional funds were raised by Methodists in New York, New Haven, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and in 1834 a band of missionaries headed by Jason Lee set out with the second Wyeth expedition. Instead of settling among the Flatheads, Lee established his mission on the east side of the Willamette, about sixty miles from its mouth. Following the example of the Methodists, the Presbyterians also sent out missionaries, who, under the leadership of Dr. Marcus Whitman and two preachers, Samuel Parker and H. H. Spaulding, made settlements in the upper Walla Walla Valley. Other Protestant sects, and the Catholics as well, soon had missionaries on the spot, and by 1840, Oregon had an American population of at least four hundred. All of these pioneers located south of the Columbia, partly because they felt that they were on what would ultimately become American territory, but more especially because of the fertile agricultural soil. The territory north of the Columbia River, the boundary proposed by the British, was heavily wooded, and there American settlement was strenuously opposed by the Hudson's Bay Company.

The efforts of the missionaries aroused additional interest in the region. Reports and letters describing the beauty and fertility of the country gained wide publicity in the *Christian Advocate*, the *Congregationalist*, the *Missionary Herald*, and in numerous secular newspapers. Largely a result of this publicity, emigrants—most of whom were Southern uplanders and frontiersmen from Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois, Iowa, and Arkansas—moved into Oregon in increasing numbers. By 1845 approximately six thousand emigrants had settled south of the Columbia, and by the end of the next year the number had doubled. Many upon arrival received generous help from Dr. John McLoughlin, agent of the Hudson's Bay Company, but as numbers increased and good farm land south of the river became scarcer and less accessible, this generosity failed to induce the Americans to regard the region north of the Columbia as British territory, an attitude that the officials of the British fur corporation were not slow in comprehending. The Joint Occupation Agreement of 1818, renewed in 1827 for an indefinite period, was still in force—the boundary question had been omitted from the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842—and as the influx of strangers continued, the company realized that armed resistance would be necessary if the pioneers were to be excluded from the territory north of the Columbia. As early as 1839 the British, anticipating such an eventuality, considered the advisability of shifting their main depot from the Columbia River to a new location at the tip of Vancouver Island, and in 1845 this change was made. The declining fur trade in the valley of the Columbia and the dangerous entrance to that river were also partly responsible for the shift.

Meanwhile in the East, state legislatures and public meetings passed

a number of resolutions favoring the acquisition of all of Oregon. In 1843, representatives from six Mississippi Valley states met at Cincinnati, where they adopted a series of resolutions demanding, among other things, that the United States take immediate possession of the territory up to latitude $54^{\circ}40'$. At the same time the Oregon pioneers created a provisional government. To many contemporaries it seemed only a matter of time before the United States would have to go to war with England to uphold its claims to Oregon.

121. AMERICANS IN TEXAS

WHILE many American expansionists were urging the acquisition of all of Oregon, others—particularly in the South—were demanding the annexation of Texas. In 1819, when Spain transferred East Florida to the United States, the Texan boundary had been fixed at the Sabine River. With the consent of the Mexican government, however, Americans crossed this boundary and moved into Texas. In December, 1821, Stephen Austin, taking up a colonization grant which had been obtained by his father from the Spanish government, settled with a group of followers on the banks of the lower Brazos. A year later this grant was confirmed by the new government in Mexico. In 1825, the state of Coahuila and Texas enacted a colonization law, which invited foreigners to enter the region, guaranteed them security of person and property, and assured them of the right to choose and to follow any calling. They had to swear to obey the federal and state constitutions and to observe the Catholic faith.

By the time this law was passed, Austin's colony was prospering, and men who had unsuccessfully sought grants at an earlier period took advantage of the opportunities offered by the new law. In a short time an area approaching the present confines of Texas had been blocked out, and by 1830 approximately 20,000 Americans had crossed the border. The majority of these came from Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana, but the population included representatives from all parts of the United States.

The rapid increase in the number of Anglo-American settlers alarmed the Mexican officials. Moreover, it soon became evident that the newcomers, instead of becoming good Mexicans, were retaining their social characteristics and were developing a feeling of political consciousness. Quarrels between the natives and the Anglo-Americans increased; and as early as 1826, Haden Edwards, experiencing difficulties with land titles within his grant, had unsuccessfully attempted to establish an independent republic within Texas. Following the Fredonian Rebellion

—as Edwards' uprising was called—the Mexican government stopped^{*} further immigration into Texas. All pending land contracts were suspended; foreigners were forbidden to enter the northern borders unless provided with passports from Mexican officials; heavy duties were levied upon all imported goods; and troops were dispatched to enforce the collection of these duties.

Americans in Texas protested against these restrictive measures, and in 1833 they petitioned for their repeal. Since the United States had ratified a treaty in April, 1832, which conferred upon the citizens of each country the right to reside and to remain in the territories of the other, the Mexican government repealed the law forbidding American immigration; but otherwise the petitioners gained nothing. In 1835 the Mexican congress—at the instigation of General Santa Anna, who had made himself dictator of Mexico—enacted a series of laws abolishing the federal constitution of 1824, and a military governor was sent to rule the territory. Many Texans, however, openly defied the Mexican authorities; and by 1836 a movement for self-government had been converted into a war for independence. The struggle was of short duration. On March 2, 1836, Texas issued a declaration of independence; fifty-three of the sixty signers were Americans, the majority of whom came from the slave states.

Four days after the announcement of Texas' independence, 5,000 Mexicans successfully concluded a thirteen-day siege of the Alamo mission in San Antonio. But all of the Alamo's 188 defenders preferred death to surrender, and "Remember the Alamo" soon became the battle cry of the Texan rebels. Three weeks later more than 300 American volunteers under James Fannin were captured and murdered at Goliad. Within a month, however, the Texans, under the leadership of Sam Houston, a former Governor of Tennessee and close friend of Andrew Jackson, rallied and won the war at the battle of San Jacinto (April 21, 1836). This decisive victory marked the end of Mexican domination over Texas, and the region was at once organized as a separate republic with Houston at its head.

The new republic did not, however, desire to remain an independent nation. As early as 1833, Houston, who had then been in Texas only two months, wrote Jackson that nineteen-twentieths of the population favored annexation to the United States; three years later, when the question was submitted to popular referendum, there was hardly a dissenting vote. Several reasons account for this unanimity. The majority of the Texans were Americans. Furthermore, annexation would afford the Texans a greater degree of stability; men of property were tired of turmoil and wished to enjoy the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Finally, and most important, the Texans

believed that annexation would prevent Mexico from attempting to regain the lost province.

Many Americans thought it advisable to annex the new republic without delay. They argued that annexation not only would add to the United States' wealth, resources and power, but that it would also prevent the development of a formidable and even dangerous rival on the Southwestern frontier. Unless Texas were annexed, they maintained, it might become an unfriendly state or enter into an alliance with England. In either event it might seize all northern Mexico, drain the South of its slaves, outstrip the United States in the production of cotton, injure American commerce and manufactures, and involve the United States in difficulties with foreign powers.

Sentiment for annexation was strongest in the South, where it was generally believed that Texas presented an unparalleled opportunity for extending the area of cotton cultivation and for increasing the power of the slave states in the Federal government. To the Southerners it seemed imperative that both these needs be met immediately. The expansion of the world market for cotton and the exhaustion of the soil in the Old South required the acquisition of new cotton lands in the West. At the same time the rapid growth of population in the North had led to a corresponding increase in Northern political strength that could only be offset by the admission to Congress of additional representatives and senators from the South.

Of all the Southern leaders, Calhoun was among the first to recognize the importance of Texas to his section. Calhoun had withdrawn from the Democratic party after the nullification struggle with Jackson and for some years had remained a man without a party. But Texas presented him with a chance to improve both his own and his section's political fortunes. In Calhoun's mind, not only would the acquisition of Texas add to the political and economic strength of the South, but the inevitable Northern opposition to annexation would force the South to unite and to present a common front against its opponents within the Union. Finally, Calhoun believed that he was the obvious choice to lead a united South in its struggle with the North. He therefore rejoined the Democratic party and became one of the most outspoken advocates of the annexation of Texas.

Throughout the North opposition to annexation was pronounced. Anti-slavery agitators and the anti-slavery press condemned it as a slaveholders' conspiracy that would embroil the nation in a war with Mexico.

I trust indeed [William Ellery Channing said] that Providence will beat back and humble our cupidity and ambition. I now ask

whether as a people we are prepared to seize on a neighboring territory to the end of extending slavery? I ask whether as a people we can stand forth in the sight of God, in the sight of nations, and adopt this atrocious policy? Sooner perish! Sooner our name be blotted out from the record of nations!

Six or eight slave states as large as Kentucky, the opposition asserted, could be carved out of Texas, and the South would then control the nation. A number of Northern states presented formal protests to Congress, and William Lloyd Garrison called upon the North to secede rather than acquiesce in the annexation of Texas as a slave state.

Faced by such uncompromising opposition and by the Mexican threat of war, President Jackson, though personally favoring annexation, thought it advisable to delay action. He did, however, recognize the independence of Texas. Van Buren continued Jackson's policy by refusing to press the issue of annexation.

Meanwhile the Texans, refused by the United States, turned to Europe for support. Nor were they disappointed. England was quick to recognize the advantages of an independent Texas that would serve as a barrier to further American expansion to the south, relieve English textile firms of their dependence on American cotton, and provide English manufacturers with a market for their products. Largely because of these considerations, England recognized Texas's independence and concluded treaties of commerce and amity with the new republic. Texas obtained similar concessions from France.

Texan success in treating with England worried Americans who favored annexation, and when Tyler, an ardent pro-slavery man, succeeded Harrison as president, he re-opened negotiations for the acquisition of the Lone Star Republic by the United States. In 1844 he submitted to the Senate an annexation treaty that had been drafted by Secretary of State John C. Calhoun.* The lines were clearly drawn between North and South, and resolutions, memorials, and petitions were circulated in both sections. Thomas Hart Benton asserted that while the measure was under discussion, the State Department, White House, and Senate lobbies were crowded with speculators in Texas land and holders of depreciated Texas bonds, all of whom were working for ratification. Yet when the vote was taken, the treaty was rejected thirty-five to sixteen. Tyler's unpopularity, the Northern fear of increasing the political power of the South, and the opposition of leaders like Clay and Webster explain its defeat.

* Calhoun succeeded Abel Upshur as Secretary of State in 1844. Upshur had become Secretary of State in 1843 following Daniel Webster's resignation.

122. THE ACQUISITION OF TEXAS AND OREGON

BOTH the Texas and Oregon questions played a major role in the presidential campaign of 1844. The Whigs unanimously nominated Henry Clay, and in an effort to avoid antagonizing the North they did not even mention Texas in their platform. The Democrats, on the other hand, paired the Oregon and Texas issues in an attempt to gain the support of both the slavery and anti-slavery groups and at the same time to capitalize on the powerful expansionist sentiments in every section of the country. The Democratic platform therefore supported the United States title to all of Oregon and demanded the "re-annexation of Texas," on the ground that under the treaty of 1803 Texas had been part of the Louisiana Purchase and that it had been "disannexed" by the treaty of 1819. Van Buren had been the leading preconvention candidate for the Democratic nomination, but he had straddled the issue of expansion. As a consequence, the delegates passed over the New York leader and nominated James K. Polk of Tennessee, an avowed expansionist.

Manifest Destiny was the principal issue of the campaign of 1844. Polk repeatedly emphasized the desirability of acquiring Oregon and Texas, whereas Clay, in an attempt to win the support of both friends and opponents of expansion, shifted like a weather vane. Polk won a sweeping victory; he carried every Western and Southwestern state with the exception of Ohio, and the Democrats gained a large majority in Congress.

Tyler and his supporters interpreted the election as an endorsement of their program for the annexation of Texas. Tyler had laid the question before Congress immediately after his treaty had been defeated in the Senate. He now suggested that Congress annex Texas by a joint resolution, which would require only a majority vote of both houses, and in 1845 Congress acted. The joint resolution admitted Texas to the Union on an equal footing with the original states. Not more than four additional states could be formed out of its territory, and then only with its consent. The territory was to assume its own debt, but the resolution explicitly stated that any disputes that might arise over the Texas boundary were to be settled by the United States.

Following the adoption of the joint resolution by Congress, England renewed its efforts to prevent the union of Texas and the United States. For a time English leaders had thought that annexation would be forestalled by a Whig victory in the election of 1844; but when Polk defeated Clay, Lord Aberdeen, the British Foreign Secretary, decided that only British diplomacy could preserve Texas' independence. Ac-

cordingly, in May, 1845, a special British representative induced the Mexican government to recognize Texan independence. But the British and the Mexicans had delayed too long. Congress had already acted, and to most Texans, Mexico's belated recognition seemed a poor alternative to the advantages that they could obtain as citizens of the United States. The result was that in the summer of 1845 a convention of Texas delegates voted almost unanimously to join the United States; and in December, 1845, Texas entered the Union as a slave state.

Because the Texas question was virtually settled when Polk assumed office on March 4, 1845, he immediately turned his attention to the problem of Oregon. American expansionists, who were demanding "all Oregon or none," had made "fifty-four forty or fight" their war cry. But Polk did not have to be goaded. He agreed with the stand on Oregon expressed in the Democratic platform. He had repeatedly attacked the British claim, and in his annual message of 1845 he urged Congress to adopt measures that would insure the American right to all of Oregon, and recommended that Great Britain be notified that the United States planned to end the joint occupation at the end of a year.

At the end of the year's notice, [he went on] should Congress think it proper to make provision for giving that notice, we shall have reached a period when the national rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That they can not be abandoned without a sacrifice of both national honor and interest is too clear to admit of doubt.

After months of debate Congress on April 27, 1846, adopted a resolution embodying the President's recommendation.

Despite the bluster of the expansionists and the threats of Polk, the United States did not want to precipitate a war in the Northwest. Polk was already deeply involved in a dispute with Mexico, and he knew that armed conflict with Great Britain would delay—if not prevent—him from carrying out his plans for the acquisition of New Mexico and California. The British, beset by internal difficulties, also wished to avoid war. The dispute over the repeal of the corn laws had produced a serious split in England; and British manufacturers wanted to prevent any development that would deprive them of American markets and raw materials. Largely because of these considerations and because of Aberdeen's determination to settle the question peacefully, the British offered a compromise plan to the United States. Although Polk was reluctant to abandon the American claim to all of Oregon, he agreed to submit the British proposals to the Senate before taking action. The Senate advised acceptance, and on June 15, 1846, the treaty was signed. The forty-ninth parallel became the boundary from the Rockies to the sea; Great Britain, however, retained the whole of Vancouver Island

and the right to navigate the Columbia. Possible war with Great Britain was averted, and all but the more rampant expansionists were satisfied.

The population of Oregon continued to increase, especially after Congress in 1850 passed the Donation Land Act, which granted land on liberal terms to previous settlers and to those who settled in Oregon before 1854. In 1859 the present state of Oregon was admitted to the Union.

123. AMERICANS IN NEW MEXICO AND CALIFORNIA

IN NEW MEXICO and California, as in Oregon and Texas, an advance guard of American settlers and traders prepared the way for eventual annexation. In 1800 the territories of New Mexico and California, which had been organized by Spain as defensive barriers against England and Russia, were separated from the advancing American frontier by more than a thousand miles of desert and mountains. At this time the people of the United States were almost totally ignorant of the extent and resources of these regions. The New Mexicans, fifteen hundred miles away from Vera Cruz and unable to pay the freight charges on commodities brought in from that port, had few manufactures. Common articles such as needles, thread, cotton goods, hardware, spoons, cutlery, and ammunition were scarce and costly. Spain still adhered rigidly to her earlier mercantilist policy, and some American traders who reached Santa Fé in 1812 with a pack train of merchandise were imprisoned and their goods confiscated.

In 1821, when Mexico broke away from Spain, William Becknell journeyed from Missouri to Santa Fé with a stock of merchandise that he sold at profit. The next year he repeated the venture on a larger scale and with even better results. News of his success reached the East, and merchants on the Atlantic seaboard began to exploit the new market. Goods were sent by way of Pittsburgh or New Orleans to St. Louis, Franklin, or Independence, and then carried by trading caravans to the Santa Fé region. Josiah Gregg in his *Commerce of the Prairies, or the Journal of a Santa Fé Trader* recounts that between 1822 and 1843 from seventy to some three hundred men were engaged in the caravan trade annually. He estimates that goods sold for double their cost and that profits for the period ranged from 10 to 20 per cent.

For a time this trade was unmolested by the Mexican authorities and the treaty of 1832 between the United States and Mexico sanctioned it. The 60 per cent *ad valorem* duty was high, but the traders paid it or entered into a deal with the collector by which only one third of the legal charge was paid into the Mexican treasury and the remaining two

thirds was divided equally between the trader and the collector. In the early 1830's, however, the authorities began to interfere with the trade. In 1835 the Governor of Chihuahua, under the guise of raising money to keep the Indians in check, imposed a tax of twenty-five dollars on Americans and five dollars on natives. Four years later the whole burden of the tax on storehouses and merchant establishments was shifted to foreigners and naturalized citizens. At the same time, a tax of five hundred dollars, in addition to the regular import duties, was levied on each freight wagon. The slightest deviation from the minutely described routes, tariffs, or bills of lading was made the pretext for confiscation. The climax came when in 1843 Santa Anna, fearing that continued commercial intercourse might lead to revolution and to possible loss of the New Mexican territory, laid an embargo on the traffic despite Mexico's commercial treaty with the United States. This action enraged not only the people of Santa Fé but all Americans who in any way benefited from the trade. It unquestionably tended to make expansionists and annexationists out of all those that it affected adversely.

The history of the relations between Americans and Mexicans in California followed a somewhat similar pattern. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Spanish *padres* had established a string of missions from San Diego to Sonoma for the purpose of carrying the Catholic faith and Spanish civilization to the natives on the coast. These religious outposts had been completely secularized by 1830. Long before this process was completed, however, the choice regions of the territory had been pre-empted by Spanish laymen. These people tilled the soil in primitive fashion, had practically no manufactures, and carried on just enough trade to supply their necessary wants and to satisfy their craving for luxuries. But California was not to remain a land of missions and farms. Before 1800, Yankee traders, despite Spanish protests, were collecting otter skins along the California coast. About the same time American whalers began to visit the California harbors for supplies. After California became a Mexican province, a small group of Boston merchants, headed by John Bryant, William Sturgis, and William Alden Gale, built up a profitable hide and tallow trade along the California coast.

The first American settlers in California were attracted to the region because of this trade. Enterprising merchants like T. O. Larkin, Nicholas Den, Nathan Spear, and William H. Davis established themselves in the port towns. By becoming naturalized, adopting the Catholic faith, and marrying Spanish women they ingratiated themselves with the Californians and soon became trusted, influential citizens. Their number was augmented by sailors and mechanics who deserted the whalers and hide ships. Westward over the Rockies came trappers and adventurers attracted by the glowing accounts of men like Jedediah Smith,

James Pattie, and J. R. Walker, who had made their way into California in the late 1820's. Many, like Dr. John Marsh, a New Englander, came by way of Santa Fé over the route blazed by Ewing Young in 1829. Marsh established himself on a rich tract near the confluence of the San Joaquin and Sacramento rivers; and within a few years his ranch, with its orchards and vineyards, tilled fields, and great herds of cattle, made him one of the most influential Americans in the province.

Although the number of American settlers increased yearly, in 1840 there were less than four hundred of them in a total population of between five and six thousand. But the tales of wandering trappers and newspaper accounts of California's "cloudless skies" and fertile soil were arousing the imagination of Americans in every section. Companies of emigrants were soon on their way westward, and by 1845, seven hundred Americans were in California. A few went by the Santa Fé route, but the majority followed the more direct route by way of Great Salt Lake and the Carson and American rivers. Some settled in the coast towns, but by far the larger number built homes and marked out farms in the valley of the Sacramento or its tributaries. Many were befriended by John A. Sutter, a man of German-Swiss extraction, who arrived in San Francisco in 1839. Sutter became naturalized and received a grant of eleven square leagues of land along the American River, where he built an elaborate establishment including a fort, a blacksmith shop, a distillery, a tannery, a gristmill, and a carpenter shop. In addition to four thousand cattle, two thousand horses, and as many sheep, he owned extensive orchards, vineyards, and grain fields.

As the number of American settlers in the province increased, however, the Mexican authorities began to fear that California might become a second Texas. "Even now," Sir George Simpson wrote from California in 1842, "the Americans only want a rallying point for carrying into effect their theory that the English race is destined by 'divine right' to expel the Spaniards from their ancient seats. . . ." As early as 1829, rumors reached Mexico City that Americans were plotting to seize the port of San Francisco. The following year the California authorities were instructed that the Russian and American element together must not exceed one third of the population. Shortly afterward, orders were issued compelling every foreigner to justify his residence in the country under penalty of fine or imprisonment. Finally, in 1843 Santa Anna, once more in violation of the Mexican treaty with the United States, issued an edict forbidding all immigration into California. Any foreigner without a passport was denied legal status and the right to purchase land. The American representative at Mexico City secured the repeal of this edict only to have a similar one issued in 1845. But neither edicts nor land decrees could prevent prairie schooners from

climbing the mountain passes or pioneers from pre-empting lands along the Sacramento.

124. THE MEXICAN WAR

POLK entered office in 1845 as an expansionist who was determined that the United States should acquire not only New Mexico and California but other parts of northern Mexico. Two circumstances enabled him to inaugurate his imperialistic plans almost immediately. In the first place, the United States had claims against Mexico that had been reduced from an original \$5,000,000 to \$2,000,000 by an agreement between the two countries; these represented the accumulated business losses of American citizens over a long period of years. After the first three installments, which totaled \$300,000, had been paid, the Mexican payments ceased. Secondly, the Texas-Mexico boundary was as yet unadjusted. The Texans wanted to establish the boundary at the Rio Grande, but from the Mexican standpoint, all of Texas was still a part of Mexico, and the Sabine River was still the boundary between the United States and Mexico.

In November, 1845, Polk sent John Slidell to the Mexican capital with instructions to settle both the boundary and indemnity questions. Specifically, Slidell was ordered to uphold the American position in the boundary dispute, to offer to assume the United States' claims against Mexico, and to pay Mexico as much as twenty-five million dollars if she would cede the disputed territory and both New Mexico and California. But when Slidell reached Mexico he found the country in political upheaval. "Every morning it looked for a revolution and every night for a mutiny." Moreover, when it was learned that he had been sent to Mexico to acquire New Mexico and California, Mexicans accused the United States of having stolen Texas and of plotting the further dismemberment of the republic. Angry patriots and politicians demanded war. Under such circumstances the tottering Herrera government did not dare to receive the American minister; and its successor, headed by Paredes, persisted in the refusal. Slidell could accomplish nothing and sailed for home.

Polk was not discouraged by Slidell's failure, for he had reason to believe that his plans could be realized by the seemingly inevitable war. Even before Slidell had been dispatched on his mission, Polk and his cabinet had prepared for a conflict. In June, 1845, they sent General Zachary Taylor to protect the "historic" western boundary of Texas, and the following winter, he took up a position near the mouth of the Rio Grande. The American fleet in the Pacific was re-enforced by vessels

from the Mediterranean and East Indian squadrons; and Thomas O. Larkin, wealthy Monterey merchant and United States Consul in California, was told that, although the Administration would not attempt to detach California from Mexico by force, it would welcome any move that the people of that province might make toward independence. He was further instructed to stir up a "spontaneous" revolt among the Californians against Mexico and to induce them to seek annexation to the United States.

Polk, who was becoming daily more impatient, decided to ask Congress to declare war on the ground that Slidell had not been received and that the claims of American citizens were as yet unsatisfied. His war message to Congress was unfinished when, on May 9, 1846, news arrived that a detachment of General Taylor's army had been defeated in a skirmish with the Mexicans on the Texas side of the Rio Grande. This was the incident that Polk had long awaited, for Mexico could now be pictured as the aggressor. In his revised message the President declared:

The grievous wrongs perpetrated by Mexico upon our citizens throughout a long period of years remain unredressed. . . . The cup of forbearance had been exhausted even before the recent information from the frontier of the Del Norte [Rio Grande]. But now after reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil.

The Mexican government had refused to receive an American envoy or to listen to his propositions. "War exists, and notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself." Nowhere in the message was there any mention that the boundary was a disputed boundary, or that the territory upon which blood had been spilled was disputed territory. As to the responsibility for precipitating the war, both nations seemed eager for a clash. As long as Mexico insisted that the United States had no right to annex Texas and the United States contended that it had such a right, war appeared inevitable.

The war message swept all before it. Congress in a burst of patriotic fervor authorized the President to raise a volunteer army of 50,000 men and placed at his disposal \$10,000,000. Throughout the South and West the war was extremely popular. Of the 69,540 volunteers who enlisted, at least 40,000 were from the Western states, whereas the more populous and wealthy North furnished only 7,930. All through the North there was opposition to the struggle. Some denounced it as an unwarranted attack on a smaller and weaker nation; some opposed it because they were Whigs and Polk was a Democrat; still others objected to it because they believed it would lead to the annexation of more slave territory. James Russell Lowell spoke for the last group in his *Biglow Papers*:

*They may talk o' Freedom's airy
Tell they're pupple in the face,—
It's a grand gret cemetary
Fer the barthrights of our race;
They jest want this Californy
So's to lug new slave-states in
To abuse ye, an' to scorn ye,
An' to plunder ye like sin.*


From the outset, the American conduct of the war was hampered by the President's fear that Taylor and General Winfield Scott, both of whom were Whigs, would be able to make political capital out of their exploits in the field. Polk, remembering how Jackson's and Harrison's military reputations had appealed to the voters, was in the awkward position of wanting the Whig generals to win battles without winning glory. It was in part because of these considerations that Scott spent the first months of the war in Washington. Taylor, who was instructed to march on Mexico City, was compelled to wait two months for adequate supplies, and his army of six thousand did not begin its advance until August, 1846. Despite his troops' lack of training and the difficulty of the terrain, Taylor reached Monterey on September 21, and after a three-day battle its Mexican defenders surrendered. But when Taylor permitted the enemy forces to evacuate the town after its surrender, Polk felt that the American commander had demonstrated his incompetence. Taylor's popularity at home, however, made his removal inexpedient, and following the victory at Monterey he resumed the march southward. The relatively slow progress made by Taylor's army enabled Santa Anna to gather a force of approximately twenty thousand to repel the invaders. The two armies met at Buena Vista (February 22-23, 1847), and again the Americans, who were outnumbered three to one, defeated the Mexicans.

Following Taylor's failure to capitalize on his victory at Monterey, Polk had decided to alter the over-all American strategy by having an army under Scott's command invade the eastern coast of Mexico. Scott, who was placed in charge of all American troops in Mexico, landed with a force of approximately twelve thousand at Vera Cruz on March 9, 1847. After occupying the city, he proceeded inland along the route that Cortez had taken to Mexico City more than three hundred years earlier. At Cerro Gordo Pass, his way was blocked by an army that Santa Anna had gathered after the battle of Buena Vista. By using a mountain road discovered by Captain Robert E. Lee, Scott's troops were able first to outflank and then to inflict a disastrous defeat on the Mexicans. Although the road to Mexico City was now open, Scott was forced to halt at Puebla for recruits to replace the volunteers whose terms of

enlistment had expired. In mid-August Scott resumed the advance and encountered no opposition until he met and defeated the Mexicans at Contreras (August 19). In the next three and a half weeks Scott fought his way to the gates of Mexico City, and on September 14, 1847, the Americans entered the Mexican capital.

While Taylor's and Scott's troops were defeating Santa Anna's armies in Mexico, other Americans were conquering New Mexico and California. In August, 1846, Colonel Stephen W. Kearny at the head of an army of Missouri volunteers captured Santa Fe. After establishing a territorial government for New Mexico, Kearny sent south the larger part of his force under Colonel A. W. Doniphan's command to join Taylor in Mexico, while he set out with three hundred dragoons for California. When Kearny reached his destination, he found the revolt in California in full progress. Larkin, who had been ordered to conciliate the Californians and "to arouse in their bosoms that love of liberty and independence so natural to the American continent," had carefully and adroitly carried out his instructions. At the same time John C. Frémont, the ambitious son-in-law of Thomas Hart Benton, was taking a leading part in the rebellion. In company with Kit Carson and about one hundred men, Frémont had set out in 1845 to find the best route to the Pacific south of Oregon. No sooner had he arrived in California, however, than his actions had aroused the suspicions of the Mexican officials, who had ordered him to leave the country. He had then retreated to Klamath Lake in Oregon, where he had been overtaken by Lieutenant Gillespie, who brought him official dispatches and family letters. Apparently gambling on the chance that by this time hostilities had broken out between the United States and Mexico, Frémont turned back to California, where rumors had begun to circulate that the Mexican authorities were planning to drive Americans out of the country. The alarmed settlers prepared to revolt, and on June 15, under the leadership of William B. Ide, they proclaimed California an independent republic. On July 7 Commodore John D. Sloat raised the American flag over Monterey and posted a proclamation that California was annexed to the United States. For a short time the native Californians fought against the American forces, commanded by Colonel Kearny, Commodore Robert F. Stockton and Frémont. But the odds were too great, and by the autumn of 1846, California had been conquered.

→The entrance of Scott into Mexico City in September, 1847, virtually marked the end of the war. Mexico, defeated and torn by internal dissension, was powerless. How much of the conquered republic the victor would take and on what terms was the question that now divided the people of the United States into two diametrically opposed groups: imperialists and anti-imperialists. Speculators in quest of new lands for investment, manufacturers desirous of extending their markets, planters



15. EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE SOUTHWEST

Note the disputed boundary between the Republic of Texas and Mexico. The Texans claimed the land south to the Rio Grande; the Mexicans claimed the land north to the Nueces River. Note also the territory acquired by the annexation of Texas in 1845 and by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo at the close of the Mexican War in 1848. The Gadsden Purchase of 1853, by which the United States acquired territory suitable for a railroad route across the continent, is now a part of Arizona.

and planter-politicians eager to enlarge slave territory, and army officers ambitious for jobs and promotion favored total annexation. "Destiny beckons us," said Secretary of State Buchanan, "to hold and civilize Mexico." Many other politicians agreed with him.

God has not made a more magnificent land than Mexico [the New York Sun wrote]. It is a paradise blessed with every species of fruit and flowers on the face of the earth. . . . If you look beyond her beauty to her wealth, behold the cotton, wheat, maize, indigo, and cochineal fields, a source of wealth inexhaustible. Look too at her forests of mahogany, rose, zebra and satin woods—at her dye woods richer than the treasures of India. . . . Look at the gold and silver glittering there in masses that wait for the pick of the Saxon. . . . Four years ago we saw and urged the advantages of a ship canal or

railway across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and five months ago we saw and urged the necessity of occupying that beautiful country Mexico. . . . We welcome . . . the whole press of the Union to share our admiration. Let them repeat it until it becomes a common theme, and we shall see the Aztec and the American eagle clasping wings, and our Yankee boys swapping knicknacks with the Americanized Rancheros for gold.

To anti-imperialists the demands of the imperialists were "wicked and uncalled for." To despoil Mexico of a foot of territory would constitute, they declared, a greedy and shameless act. Opponents of slavery were outspoken in their protests, and even Calhoun, fearing that the acquisition of more territory might precipitate a slavery crisis, offered a resolution to the effect that to incorporate Mexico into the Union would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war was fought, in "conflict with the character and genius" of our government, and "in the end subversive of our free and popular institutions."

But the wishes of neither imperialist nor anti-imperialist prevailed, for the treaty of peace signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, was a compromise. By its terms Mexico ceded New Mexico and California—an area of 523,802 square miles—to the United States. She recognized the annexation of Texas by agreeing to the Rio Grande as the boundary between the two nations. In compensation for the loss of territory, she received \$15,000,000, and the United States assumed the claims against Mexico held by American citizens. Polk had indeed "conquered a peace."

In negotiating the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the American envoy, Nicholas P. Trist, received last-minute instructions to include the entire Gila River Valley in the ceded territories. This region contained the lowest passes of the Rocky Mountains and thus the only available railroad route between the southern United States and the Pacific. Though Trist failed to obtain the desired territory, it was acquired five years later through the negotiations of James Gadsden, a South Carolina railroad president, for \$10,000,000. Thus another slice of Mexican territory, amounting to 54,000 square miles, was added to the United States' imperial domain.

125. THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH

LESS than two weeks before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed, James Marshall, while engaged in building a saw-mill for John A. Sutter in the Sacramento Valley, discovered that the region was rich in gold. Despite Sutter's efforts to keep the matter a

secret, the news spread quickly, and people rushed to the new mining country. "Settlements were completely deserted; homes, farms, and stores abandoned. Ships deserted by their sailors crowded the Bay of San Francisco; soldiers deserted wholesale; churches were emptied; town councils ceased to sit; merchants, clerks, lawyers, and judges and criminals everywhere, flocked to the foothills." By the middle of the following summer rumors of the new El Dorado had reached the East. At first people were somewhat skeptical, but all doubt was removed when in September an official communication reached Washington that there was "more gold in the country drained by the Sacramento and the San Joaquin rivers than would pay the cost of the late war with Mexico a hundred times over."


The effect of this report, published in all the leading newspapers of the country, was phenomenal. California became the topic of excited conversation; visionary stories, not unlike the *Travels of Sir John Mandeville*, stirred the imagination of artisan and banker alike; and men of every age and class abandoned the farm, drygoods counter, workshop, bank, lawyer's desk, for the "Golden West." Three highways were open to the fortune hunters: by ship around Cape Horn, by the way of the Isthmus of Panama, and overland across the plains.

The first of these routes was extremely popular during the winter months. Between December 14, 1848, and January 18, 1849, sixty-one vessels, averaging fifty passengers each, left New York, Boston, Salem, Norfolk, Philadelphia, and Baltimore for the Pacific coast. During the same period an even larger number sailed from Charleston, New Orleans, and other ports for the same destination. In February, 1849, approximately one hundred fifty vessels loaded with "Forty-niners" from New England and the Middle states set sail for San Francisco. In the course of a few weeks it became almost impossible for an Easterner to book passage to California. The Pacific Mail Steamship Company, chartered just before Marshall's discovery, was besieged by those seeking transportation to the gold fields, and many persons paid as much as a thousand dollars for steerage tickets from Panama to the Golden Gate.

The impatient and the reckless chose the shorter Isthmus route, and the rise in traffic soon led to demands and proposals for either a rail-

16. TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES


This map shows the territorial extent of continental United States in 1783 and the subsequent acquisition of additional areas. Within a period of less than seventy-five years after the close of the American Revolution the United States more than trebled its original territory and enormously increased its physical resources.



road or a canal across the Isthmus. In 1846 the expansionists negotiated a treaty of amity and commerce with New Granada—after 1863 known as the “United States of Colombia,” and after 1886, as the “Republic of Colombia”—which gave the United States a right of way across the Isthmus. Two years later the treaty was ratified, and at once a group of American capitalists began constructing the much-talked-of railway. At the same time another American company was authorized by the Nicaraguan government to build a canal across Nicaragua. After this corporation—the American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company, under the leadership of Cornelius Vanderbilt—had failed to interest English capital in the project because a preliminary survey did not show the plan to be feasible, a Vanderbilt subsidiary obtained from Nicaragua the monopoly of a route that combined land and water travel across Nicaragua. The mutual fear of England and the United States that the other would gain control of the practicable routes across the Isthmus resulted in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850). By its terms England and the United States agreed to join in promoting the construction of a ship canal by the Nicaraguan route. Neither was ever to “obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal,” or “assume or exercise any dominion . . . over any part of Central America.” Both governments also agreed to guarantee and protect the neutrality of the canal unless there should be “unfair discriminations” or oppressive exactions in its management. By Article VIII the same principle of neutrality was extended to every means of transit that might be constructed across any part of the Central American isthmus. From the standpoint of the expansionists the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was far from satisfactory, for it in large measure nullified the concessions obtained from New Granada in 1846 and prevented the United States from enjoying exclusive control over any transit project across the Isthmus.

17. TRANS-MISSISSIPPI ROUTES TO THE WEST

There were three main trails across the Plains country. (1) The Mormon trail and the Oregon trail followed the Platte to Fort Bridger. After passing through the mountains, just beyond Fort Hall, the Oregon trail split; one part went southwest to Sacramento and San Francisco, the other northwest to Oregon. (2) The Santa Fé trail, starting from Fort Independence near the western boundary of Missouri, extended southwestward to Santa Fé. (3) The Southern-Desert trail from Galveston to Los Angeles joined the Spanish trail, an extension of the Santa Fé trail, and ran through south central California to the gold area. San Francisco was the terminus of ships from Panama and from the East by way of Cape Horn.



The majority of "forty-niners" went overland from the Mississippi Valley. Many were already experienced pioneers who earlier had migrated from other regions. Some from the lower part of the valley went from New Orleans by steamer to Matagorda Bay, and then west through Victoria and San Antonio to El Paso and up the Rio Grande to Santa Fé and Los Angeles. Others made Fort Smith, on the western border of Arkansas, their point of departure and traveled along the Santa Fé or the Cherokee trail. This trail extended west along the Grand River to Fort Gibson, then northwestward to the Arkansas River at a point near Fort Mann. From there it passed near the base of Pikes Peak to Cherry Creek, down Cherry Creek to the South Platte, over the mountains to Utah, and on to California. The gathering place for those farther up the valley was Independence, Missouri, a favorite starting point for those who crossed the prairies before the "rush" began. In the spring of 1849, long trains of prairie schooners set out from this frontier town for the California gold fields. Some followed the Santa Fé trail, others the more northerly route to the Great Salt Lake country and the Humboldt River. There they turned southwestward along the river to Humboldt Sinks, along the Truckee River to Truckee Lake, and then down the Yuba to the Feather and Sacramento rivers. There were modifications of this route, but it was the most popular and the most direct.

Irrespective of route, the overland journey usually required about five months—months filled with anxiety and suffering. On the plains the Indians and the buffalo herds were a constant menace. Water was scarce, and many died of thirst. The supply of grass for cattle and horses was undependable, and many animals died of starvation. Some emigrants undertook the trip with insufficient supplies; others set out overburdened with personal belongings. Wagons frequently mired in crossing streams or were demolished in mountain passes. The narrow valley of the Humboldt was covered with breast-high sagebrush, and the trail across the desolate desert beyond the sinks was soon strewn with the wreckage of broken wagons and skeletons of cattle, horses and men. Yet in spite of all difficulties, between twenty and thirty thousand people crossed the Rockies during the summer and autumn of 1849.

Those who migrated to California in 1849 and in the years immediately following were not all Americans. From Mexico, Peru, and Chile came experienced miners; from Australia, exconvicts; from the Sandwich Islands, fortune-hunting Kanakas; and from the Far East, the Chinese and the Malays. Even Europe did not escape the fever. The revolutions of 1848 and the consequent industrial depression threw thousands out of employment. To these as well as to Old World speculators California seemed a promised land. Before the middle of January, 1849, five mining and trading companies with an aggregate capital of £1,275,000 were chartered in London. Similar companies, such as *La Californie*, *Lingot*

d'or, and Aurifère, were organized in Paris, and some four thousand impecunious Frenchmen were transported to California. In addition, many Frenchmen came on their own initiative; still others deserted the ships dispatched to California by Paris and Bordeaux merchants.

California's population in 1850 was almost a hundred thousand, a tenfold increase in two years. Of this number 21,629 were foreigners, 11,700 came from New England, 15,600 from New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, 13,700 from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, 7,400 from Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, and 22,800 from the Carolinas. The number of Negroes was less than a thousand. Although the Chinese had totalled only 791 in 1850, a year later the number exceeded 4,000. Places like Stockton and Sacramento, not in existence in 1848, were thriving towns by 1850. The population of San Francisco in the course of a few years mounted from a few hundred to 35,000.

The men who profited most from the gold craze were not the miners but those who catered to them—transportation and express companies, merchants and traders, speculators, shopkeepers, proprietors of hotels, restaurants, gambling houses, saloon keepers, bogus physicians, prostitutes, and even farmers and ranchmen. Every mining camp was infested with middlemen who soon grew rich. Horses that cost \$20 sold for \$200, and cattle that had been bought for \$6 were sold for from \$100 to \$200. Flour sold for from \$1.50 to \$5 per pound, and pork from \$1.20 to \$4 per pound; boots brought \$20 a pair. Land in San Francisco and Sacramento sold for \$1,000 an acre. Merchants and agents of transportation companies covered up the pitiable stories of the thousands of men who annually returned from the mines broken in health and penniless by sedulously circulating reports of "lucky finds," "fabulous strikes," and sudden wealth.

The phenomenal increase in population produced by the gold rush led to early agitation for California's admission to the Union. As early as 1847 the *California Star* had urged that a constitution be drafted. It was not until two years later, however, that General Bennet Riley, provisional Governor of California, issued a proclamation calling a constitutional convention. More than two thirds of the forty-eight delegates were under forty years of age; fourteen were lawyers, eleven farmers, and seven merchants. Fifteen of the number came from Southern states, and of these, eight had been in California less than thirteen months. Of the twenty-three members from Northern states, fifteen had been in California for at least three years. The clause in the state constitution prohibiting slavery caused a long and bitter debate on the floor of Congress, but California was finally admitted as a free state in 1850.*

The admission of California raised issues of more than local interest,

* See Chapter XXI, pp. 571-3.

for both the North and South looked to the new state's congressmen for support in the struggle for the control of the national government. As a consequence, the question of whether California should be admitted to the Union as a slave or free state intensified the sectional conflict and set in motion a series of events that were to culminate in civil war.

CHAPTER XXI

THE POLITICS OF SECTIONALISM

- 126. THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF SECTIONALISM
 - 127. SLAVERY AND SECTIONALISM
 - 128. SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND EXPANSION
 - 129. THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
 - 130. THE FAILURE OF COMPROMISE
 - 131. THE STRUGGLE FOR TERRITORIES
 - 132. THE INTENSIFICATION OF SECTIONAL CONFLICT
 - 133. THE ELECTION OF 1860
 - 134. THE SOUTH SECEDES
 - 135. WAR
-

BEFORE the Civil War the United States was a federation of sections as well as a union of states. The lines dividing the sections were not always clear-cut; but nevertheless, by 1850 the South gave its allegiance to social, political, economic, and intellectual ideals that differed radically from those of the Northern, or nonslaveholding, regions. Regardless of whether the controversy between the sections at any time happened to center on tariff rates, territorial expansion, public-land policy, or the moral aspects of slavery, the fundamental issue remained the same; primarily it involved, not theories, but two incompatible modes of living. On repeated occasions the disputes arising from this conflict were settled by peaceful means; but as bitterness increased, the possibility of compromise diminished. By 1860 there were influential and respected leaders in both the North and South who felt that further

concessions were out of the question. Although few responsible citizens in either section professed a desire for war, no one was able to devise a formula that would both preserve peace and satisfy North and South alike.

126. THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF SECTIONALISM

THE CONTRASTING modes of living that developed in the North and South were largely the result of natural conditions—topography, resources, and climate. Although both sections at first depended for subsistence in large measure upon agriculture, the North early embarked upon a career of economic diversification that added to its wealth and influenced every phase of its civilization. The change from a purely agricultural to an agricultural-manufacturing-commercial system, which had become marked by 1840, was even more noticeable twenty years later.

In sharp contrast to the North with its diversified industry, its flourishing cities, its growing commerce, and its financial power was the South. A mild climate, perhaps more than any other single factor, had made the region almost exclusively agricultural. Instead of engaging extensively in commerce and manufacturing, the South devoted its energies to the production of the great staples—rice, cotton, tobacco, and sugar. By 1860 the planting South stretched from Maryland to the Rio Grande and as far up the Mississippi Valley as Kentucky and Missouri. Over 400,000 square miles were devoted primarily to the production of cotton. Between 1840 and 1860 the annual production of 500-pound bales increased from 1,347,640 to 3,841,416. Cotton, which constituted about 22 per cent of the value of the total exports of the United States in 1810, constituted 57 per cent in 1860. Between these same years the value of cotton exports increased from \$15,108,000 to \$191,806,555. Cotton was not the only basis of Southern wealth. Sugar and tobacco, as well as hemp, rice and other agricultural products, contributed their share.

Since the staples yielded annual returns of \$300,000,000, it was natural that Southern leaders should regard agriculture as the section's main source of strength and prosperity. "Cotton is King" became the slogan of Southern statesmen and politicians. On the South, they declared, rested the prosperity of the nation and indeed of the whole industrial world; for the South furnished the bulk of exports and thus provided the basis for American credit abroad. From its fields came the cotton for the textile plants of England, France, and America, which employed millions in capital and hundreds of thousands of hands; and with its

staples it was able to purchase provisions and manufactured goods, whose production, sale, and transportation gave employment to farmers, laborers, shippers, and merchants. "I rejoice," John B. Floyd said in a speech in New York, "that the great staples of the South are the chief means by which your commerce is fostered, and your mechanics and artisans kept constantly at work." Jefferson Davis expressed the same sentiment in addressing a Boston audience in Faneuil Hall when he said: "Your interest is to remain a manufacturing, and ours to remain an agricultural people. Your prosperity, then, is to receive our staple and to manufacture it, and ours to sell it to you and buy the manufactured goods." Other Southern leaders emphasized the agrarian nature of the South. "That the North does our trading and manufacturing mostly is true," said the *Daily Confederation* of Montgomery, "and we are willing that they should. Ours is an agricultural people, and God grant that we may continue so. We never want to see it otherwise. It is the freest, happiest, most independent, and, with us, the most powerful condition on earth." The same notion was stated even more emphatically by George Fitzhugh during the prosperous years before the war. "For fifty years," he wrote, "she [the South] had been more usefully, more industriously, more energetically and more profitably employed than any people under the sun. Yet all the while she had been envying and wishing to imitate the little 'truck patches,' the filthy, crowded, licentious factories, the mercenary shopkeeping, and the slavish commerce of the North."

Despite these arguments, many Southern leaders saw the growing economic disparity between the South and North. (In their opinion the South, with comparatively few manufactures, little mining, and restricted banking capital, was virtually a dependent colony of the North. Without a merchant fleet of its own, its cotton, rice, and tobacco that was not carried in English bottoms was shipped in Northern vessels. Practically all foreign goods for Southern consumption entered through Northern ports. Northern factories supplied an increasing portion of the cloth, hats, and agricultural implements of the South, and Northern bankers furnished the money with which to buy more land and more slaves. These leaders believed that Northern merchants and bankers were prospering at the expense of the planter. Their feeling was expressed in 1851 by Professor F. A. P. Barnard of the University of Alabama:

At present the North fattens and grows rich upon the South. We depend upon it for our entire supplies. We purchase all our luxuries and necessities from the North. . . . With us every branch and pursuit in life, every trade, profession and occupation is dependent upon the North; for instance, the northerners abuse and denounce

slavery and slave-holders, yet our slaves are clothed with northern manufactured goods, have northern hats and shoes, work with northern hoes, plows and other implements, are chastised with a northern made instrument, are working for northern more than southern profits. The slave-holder dresses in northern goods, rides in a northern saddle . . . sports his northern carriage, patronizes northern newspapers, drinks northern liquors, reads northern books, spends his money at northern watering-places. . . . The aggressive acts upon his rights and his property arouse his resentment—and on northern-made paper, with a northern pen, with northern ink, he resolves and re-resolves in regard to his rights! In northern vessels his products are carried to market, his cotton is ginned with northern gins, his sugar is crushed and preserved by northern machinery; his rivers are navigated by northern steamboats, his mails are carried in northern stages, his Negroes are fed with northern bacon, beef, flour and corn; his land is cleared with a northern axe, and a Yankee clock sits upon his mantelpiece; his floor is swept with a northern broom, and is covered with a northern carpet; and his wife dresses herself in a northern looking-glass . . . ; his son is educated at a northern college, his daughter receives the finishing polish at a northern seminary; his doctor graduates at a northern medical college; his schools are supplied with northern teachers, and he is furnished with northern inventions and notions.

This economic dependence of the South was one of the basic causes of sectional rivalry. Southerners viewed with envy and even alarm the material growth of the North. The Southern statistician Thomas P. Kettell calculated in *Southern Wealth and Northern Profits* that the North obtained annually millions in profits from manufacturing for the South, carrying its commerce and acting as its banker. It was natural, therefore, that the Southern people should resent being in what they termed a state of "degrading vassalage." The Northerner's boast of his prosperity and superior civilization angered them, and they were humiliated by the contrast made by every foreign traveler between the backward, agrarian South and the wealthy, populous North with its attractive towns and cities, its efficient transportation facilities, its manufactures and mines, its commerce, its superior agricultural methods, its homes, its shops, its places of amusement, its schools and colleges, its newspapers, and its literature and art.

During the decade before the outbreak of the Civil War, the economic differences that divided the North and South were intensified rather than modified. While the residents of the Northeast and Northwest expanded their factories, free farming areas, railroad systems, and overseas commerce, Southerners increasingly devoted their energies to the pro-

duction of a relatively few staples. By 1860, what had once been a difference in degree had become one of kind.

127. SLAVERY AND SECTIONALISM

THE BASIC economic differences between the North and South need not have ended in armed conflict. On the contrary, the economies of the two sections were complementary rather than conflicting, for each concentrated on the production of what the other needed; and history is replete with examples of agrarian and commercial-industrial regions living side by side in peaceful co-operation. Moreover, it should be remembered that the economic relationship between the Northwest and the Northeast was not unlike that between the South and the North. The Northwest, too, as a predominantly agrarian section, could complain of Northeastern control over credit, transportation, and marketing facilities. There was more than an economic division between North and South; what set the South off from the rest of the nation was that it alone adhered to the slave system.

Around slavery was built the entire structure of Southern civilization. More than anything except climate, slavery accounted for the agricultural economy of the South, its sparsity of population, its social organization, its general educational and cultural backwardness, and its political ideals and methods. Long before 1860, slavery was thought to be absolutely essential to Southern prosperity, and consequently Southern spokesmen with few exceptions defended it as right and shaped their policies to secure both its protection and extension. Certainly it was the most important influence in the growth of sectionalism during the pre-Civil War period.

In defending slavery the Southerners pointed out that slavery was sanctioned by the ancient Greeks and Romans, that it was legalized by the Jews, and that it was even approved by some of the fathers of the medieval Church. England had formerly sanctioned villeinage, and Locke had permitted slavery in his model constitution for the Carolinas. To precedent was added the argument of scriptural authority. Did not the Tenth Commandment forbid man to covet "his manservant, or his maidservant," and were not the Jews allowed to buy bondmen or bondmaids? "If his master have given him a wife, and she have born him sons or daughters; the wife and her children shall be her master's." Passages from the New Testament were also frequently quoted in defense of slavery. "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called." "Servants, be obedient to them that are *your* masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart,

as unto Christ." And again, "Let as many servants as are under the yoke count their own masters worthy of all honour." Similar Biblical passages were often repeated as undeniable proof that slavery was right and proper.

Another argument, formulated by Thomas R. Dew (first an instructor in, and later president of, William and Mary College) and elaborated at length by Chancellor William Harper of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, was based on the theory that slavery was part of the natural order of things. Men are not equal; some were designed to be without property and to toil in the fields while others were to manage and direct.

The exclusive owners of property [said President Dew] ever have been, ever will and perhaps ever ought to be the virtual rulers of mankind. . . . It is the order of nature and of God that the being of superior faculties and knowledge and therefore of superior power should control and dispose of those who are inferior. It is as much in the order of nature that men should enslave each other as that other animals should prey upon each other.

This statement, which first appeared in 1832, soon became the prevailing philosophy of the South. Six years later it was re-emphasized by Chancellor Harper in his work entitled *A Memoir on Slavery*: "To constitute a society a variety of offices must be discharged from those requiring the very lowest degree of intellectual power to those requiring the very highest." Harper held that the lowest class in society—the slaves—should be trained only to labor and be kept in a state of ignorance: "If there are sordid, servile, and laborious offices to be performed, is it not better that there should be sordid, servile, and laborious beings to perform them?" James H. Hammond of South Carolina declared that "God created Negroes for no other purpose than to be subordinate 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'—that is, to be the slaves of the white race."

Slavery was also defended on the ground that it was economically profitable. Dew, though admitting that Virginia and Maryland were too far north for the advantageous employment of slave labor, never lost an opportunity to point out the profits that these slave-breeding states derived each year. "It is, in truth, the slave labor in Virginia," he wrote, "which gives value to her soil and her habitations; take away this, and you pull down the Atlas that upholds the whole system; eject from the State the whole slave population, and the Old Dominion will be a 'howling wilderness.'" Other spokesmen, like Edmund Ruffin of Virginia, stressed the economic importance of large-scale agricultural production, the advantage of purchasing supplies in large quantities, and the saving possible through specialization of labor and the elimination of conflicts between capital and labor.

Many Southerners asserted that slavery held advantages for everyone concerned. They maintained that it was socially beneficial to the whites because it improved their manners, created higher respect for white women and provided them with leisure for cultural pursuits, and fostered kindness and affection. Slavery was beneficial to Negroes, they argued, because it rescued them from savagery and brought them in contact with Christianity and the influences of civilization; taught them "habits of regular and patient industry"; relieved them of care for themselves and their offspring; saved them from jungle diseases; and afforded them opportunity for comfort and happiness. Finally, the planter contended that slavery was a national benefit because every part of the Union shared in the fruits of slave labor. "Upon the South as upon the strong arm of a brother," said B. F. Stringfellow, "so as long as Negro slavery exists, the North can rely; it will furnish materials for its workshops, a market for its manufactures, wealth to its capitalists, wages to the laborers."

As slavery became more entrenched in the South, Northern opposition to it increased. The repressive efforts of the pro-slavery group, particularly those affecting the right of petition and freedom of the press, not only quickened the zeal of the abolitionists but won converts to their cause. Northerners and Westerners who had been at least outwardly indifferent to the slavery controversy now began to accept the abolitionists' statements that slavery was inhuman and that the "slavocracy" was bent on curtailing the white man's liberty. The South, on the other hand, angered by abolitionist attacks, became more dogged in its defense of slavery and in its attitude towards the North. To the extremists of both sections—the Garrisons, the Phillipses, the Yanceys, the Quitmans—belongs the responsibility for removing the problem of slavery from the realm of reason to that of emotion.

128. SLAVERY, POLITICS AND EXPANSION

ALTHOUGH abolitionism produced endless and heated controversies, it was not until the slavery question was transformed into a political issue that it threatened to disrupt the Union. The slavery controversy was injected into national party politics with the debate in Congress over the anti-slavery petitions of the 1830's. At first these petitions dealt only with slavery in the District of Columbia, but within a short time they touched on every side of the subject and were so numerous that they threatened to interfere with the conduct of the ordinary business of Congress. In an effort to solve this problem and at the same time to avoid committing itself on slavery, Congress in 1836

adopted a resolution stating that all such petitions should be laid on the table without debate.

This so-called gag rule, which had been sponsored by Southern members of Congress, raised questions concerning the constitutional right of petition that had a fundamental bearing on the conduct of the government and the rights of its citizens. No one realized this fact more clearly than John Quincy Adams, who had been a member of the House of Representatives since the end of his presidential term, and he consistently opposed the resolution until its repeal in 1844. Historians have been unable to agree on Adams's reasons; but regardless of whether he was motivated by his opposition to slavery or by a desire to discredit the Administration, the fact remains that his militant stand brought the slavery question out into the open. Many politicians who would have preferred to remain silent on such a controversial matter had for the first time to stand up and be counted. Slavery had become a political issue, and it was to remain one until the Civil War.

Most of the anti-slavery petitions had originated in the Old Northwest, a section in which there was a strong abolitionist movement and a widespread conviction that the South was gaining more and more control of the national government. The adoption of the gag rule confirmed this conviction, and the anti-slavery groups, disgusted with the indifference of the Whigs and the Democrats, felt that there was no other alternative to establishing their own party. The Liberty party, which entered the campaign of 1840 with James G. Birney as its presidential candidate, was thus more than an anti-slavery movement; it was also a product of feeling in the Northwest that the South dominated the established parties. In 1840, Birney polled only 7,069 votes; four years later he received 62,300 votes. Despite the poor showing of the Liberty party in both elections, subsequent events were to demonstrate that it had raised the most vital issue of the age.

The reluctance of either the Whigs or Democrats to take a clean-cut stand on the slavery question can be attributed to their transectional character. With supporters in the North and the South, both parties wished to ignore an issue that threatened to split them along sectional lines. Eventually, however, the problems arising from westward expansion forced them to consider the slavery issue.

Long before the crusade against slavery had assumed a militant character, the planter aristocracy had realized that the security of slavery as well as their economic and political control of the South depended on the expansion of slave territory. New lands were needed for additional acreage and for replacing fields that had been cropped to exhaustion. Politically, it was of utmost importance to have territory from which new slave states might be carved to balance the admission of new

free states. Southern leaders were aware that once the political balance between the two sections was destroyed, the South would be practically at the mercy of the more populous North when there was legislation to be passed respecting tariffs, bounties, ship subsidies, internal improvements, banking, and currency.

The thousands of emigrants who had passed beyond the Alleghenies into the Mississippi Valley had laid the foundations of a slaveholding Southwest and a free Northwest. Both sections were alike in that they were frontier communities, but there the similarity practically ceased, for the culture of one was formed on the basis of plantations and slave labor, and that of the other on small farms tilled by freemen. As the Southern desire for more slave territory was matched by the opposition of the rising anti-slavery sentiment in the North and as the two frontiers advanced upon the fertile middle zone suitable to both systems of exploitation, it was almost inevitable that sooner or later a struggle for territorial, and consequently political, control would ensue between the North and the South.

The question of the expansion of slavery was extensively debated in Congress at the time of the Missouri Compromise, but not until the age of Manifest Destiny did it again become an issue that threatened the Union. It will be remembered that Southern leaders enthusiastically supported the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of the Mexican cession; for a sufficient number of slave states could be carved from the two areas to counterbalance all the new free-soil commonwealths in prospect for many years to come and enable the South to retain its grip upon the Federal government indefinitely. Throughout the North, on the other hand, anti-slavery people viewed the future with despair. "No living man," said John Quincy Adams, "will see the end of slavery in the United States!" With the election of Polk to the presidency in 1844, the Democrats became the first of the two major parties to suffer from this association of the slavery and expansion issues, for many Northerners felt that the acquisition of Texas and the Mexican War were parts of a thinly disguised plot to add more slave states to the Union, and others were offended by the Oregon Compromise. Furthermore, the unity of the Democratic party was now threatened: Van Buren's failure to support the annexation of Texas—an effort to avoid sectional divisions over slavery and expansion—had cost him the Democratic nomination in 1844, and his wing of the party in the North was therefore unfriendly to Polk; when Polk chose as his Secretary of War William Marcy, Van Buren's principal political rival in New York, the Little Magician and his followers broke with the Administration.

Economic issues also began to divide the Democratic party along sectional lines. The bill providing for the re-establishment of the Inde-

pendent Treasury system in 1846 was a party measure that was approved by all good Democrats in every section; but the Administration's tariff program accurately reflected the interests of the party's Southern members. Polk made clear his attitude toward the tariff by appointing as Secretary of the Treasury Robert J. Walker of Mississippi, an admirer of Richard Cobden and an advocate of free trade. In his famous report of December 3, 1845, Walker laid down six principles that in his opinion were basic: no more money should be collected than was necessary for the wants of the government economically administered; no duty should be imposed on any article above the lowest rate that would yield the largest amount of revenue; below such a rate, discrimination might be made, descending in the scale of duties; or, for imperative reasons, the article might be placed in the list of those free from all duty; the maximum duty should be imposed on luxuries; all minimums and all specific duties should be abolished and *ad valorem* duties substituted; and all duties should be so imposed as to operate as equally as possible throughout the Union. The Tariff Act of 1846, which incorporated Walker's proposals, was adopted only after Vice-President George Dallas's vote had broken a tie in the Senate. Many Northern Democrats—including Dallas—who voted for the Walker tariff had to subordinate the interests of their constituents to the demands of party loyalty. Largely to assuage these groups, Congress adopted a pork-barrel bill that provided for Federal expenditures on river and harbor improvements in those parts of the North where Democratic opposition to the Tariff of 1846 was strongest. But Polk vetoed the bill, and Northern Democrats were more convinced than ever that the South controlled the executive branch of the government.

By 1846, the Northern Democrats were in open revolt. The center of the rebellion was Pennsylvania, a Democratic stronghold and the most protectionist state in the Union; and it was perhaps not accidental that the controversial Wilmot Proviso was introduced by a congressman from that state. In August, 1846, when the war with Mexico was only a few months old, President Polk asked Congress for an appropriation of \$2,000,000 to be used in the acquisition of Mexican territory. When the bill for this amount was on its way through Congress, David Wilmot, as spokesman for the disgruntled Northern Democrats, moved the following amendment:

Provided, that as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the Executive of the moneys . . . appropriated, neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any

part of said territory except for crime, whereof the party shall first be duly convicted.

The language of the Proviso was unmistakable: slavery was to be forever excluded from any territories acquired from Mexico.

The effect of the Proviso upon the country was not unlike that of the Tallmadge Amendment almost thirty years before. In the North hundreds of Wilmot Proviso Leagues were formed; in the South mass meetings and conventions denounced the proposal. Resolutions of ten free states endorsing the measure were met with condemnatory resolutions from slave states. Radicals both North and South used it as a theme for preaching disunion. A contemporary writing for the *Nineteenth Century* declared that the measure had aroused "more noise in the land than any other since the bank question. It has been discussed in Congress, in the newspapers, on the stump, at the street corners, all over the whole country. . . ." Although accepted by the House, the Proviso was twice defeated by the Senate; its rejection, however, by no means settled the question of slavery extension.

129. THE COMPROMISE OF 1850

IN THE election of 1848, both the major parties did their best to obscure the issues that had been raised by the Wilmot Proviso. The Democrats, whose program under Polk had been decidedly pro-Southern, nominated a Northerner who argued that the slavery question should be ignored, and the Whigs, who had consistently opposed Polk's policies, selected a Southern slave owner who had no discernible opinions on any public question. The Democrats made Lewis Cass of Michigan their candidate because they thought that his location would appeal to the dissatisfied Westerners in the party and because he had proposed a policy—"squatter sovereignty"—that would take the problem of the expansion of slavery out of Congress (where it had split the Democratic party) and leave it to the decision of the voters in each of the territories. The Whigs made Zachary Taylor of Louisiana their standard bearer because he stood for nothing in the minds of the voters except the glories of the military life. One Whig politician, in explaining his party's choice, said: "We must mix up a little *humbugging* with our glorious Whig creed, before we can expect a victory—and General Taylor's *military fame* is about the best we can make use of at present."

The anti-slavery void left by both major parties was filled by the Free Soil party, which held its first convention in 1848 and nominated

Martin Van Buren for the presidency. The Free Soil party was made up of abolitionists, members of the anti-Administration, or Barnburner,* faction of the Democratic party in New York, Liberty party men, and those Whigs who because of their refusal to abide by their party's decision to repudiate the Wilmot Proviso were known as "Conscience Whigs." Despite the presence of some abolitionists among the Free Soilers, the party's principal objective was not the end of slavery but the end of slave expansion into the territories. The party's motto was "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor and Free Men," and its platform also called for river and harbor improvements, free land for settlers on the public domain, and a protective tariff. Twelve years later the Republicans were to elect Lincoln on much the same platform.

Although the Free Soilers did not carry a single state, the 291,263 votes polled by Van Buren were probably the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the election. By drawing votes from Cass in several key Northern states, the Free Soilers undoubtedly made possible Taylor's victory. In addition, the new party elected thirteen of its members to the House of Representatives. If nothing else, the election of 1848 demonstrated that the Democrats and Whigs could not indefinitely ignore the slavery issue.

It was the outcome of the Mexican War that was responsible for the revival of the sectional conflict, for Congress could not put off making a decision on the status of slavery in the territories granted the United States under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The North was convinced that only the Wilmot Proviso could solve this problem, whereas the South was equally certain that its entire future required the government's protection of slavery in the new possessions. "In the presence of the living God," Robert Toombs said, "if by your legislation you seek to drive us from the territories of California and New Mexico. I am for disunion." South Carolina declared that the day had come for the Southern states to join "in resisting the application of the Wilmot Proviso at any and all hazards." The Virginia legislature asserted that the adoption and attempted enforcement of the measure would force the people of the state to accept one of two courses: either "abject submission to aggression and outrage" or "determined resistance at all hazards and to the last extremity." Seventy Southern members of Congress drafted an address to their constituents in 1849 in which they assailed the anti-slavery forces and urged the South to unite. In the North every free-state legislature, except that of Iowa, passed resolutions de-

* The name "Barnburner" came from the Dutch expression that it was worth burning a barn to get rid of the rats. The New York anti-Administration Democrats were given this name because of their willingness to wreck the party for their principles. The Administration faction in the state's Democratic party were called Hunkers because of their "hunkering" for office. Van Buren was the leader of the Barnburners, and William L. Marcy, the chief of the Hunkers.

claring that Congress had power to prohibit and should prohibit slavery in the territories; several states wanted slavery abolished in the District of Columbia, and many enacted legislation compelling state officials to protect runaway slaves, or at least forbidding them to give aid to slaves' pursuers.

As sectional lines tightened and threats of secession became more numerous, the break-up of the Union seemed imminent. It was clear that if a national catastrophe was to be averted, some satisfactory solution to the question of slavery in the new Southwest must be quickly found. Among the various suggestions made, in addition to the Wilmot Proviso, were proposals for the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific; admission of slavery to the territories on the ground that it could not be legally prohibited; and application of the principle of "squatter sovereignty" or "popular sovereignty," as it was afterward renamed by Stephen A. Douglas. This doctrine rested on the assumption that it was the right of the settlers in any territory to decide the fate of slavery or any other institution—not forbidden by the Federal constitution—within their borders.

Since no one of these solutions was acceptable to everyone, the Union was in jeopardy; and it was at this point that Henry Clay came forward with his famous compromise resolutions. California, whose population had made a phenomenal increase because of the gold rush, was to be admitted as a free state; the slave trade, but not slavery, was to be abolished in the District of Columbia; Congress was to enact a more effective fugitive slave law; Texas was to relinquish its claim to disputed New Mexican territory in return for which the Federal government would assume the Texas debt contracted before annexation; Congress was to have no power to interfere with the slave trade between slave states; and the territories of Utah and New Mexico were to be created with the provision that either, or any part of either, might be admitted to the Union "with or without slavery as their constitution may provide at the time of their admission." In short, the doctrine of popular sovereignty rather than the Wilmot Proviso was to apply to the remaining territories of the Mexican cession. In advocating adoption of these resolutions, Clay, an old man of seventy-three, made a passionate plea for sectional conciliation. "At this moment," he said, "we have in the legislative bodies of this capitol and in the states twenty odd furnaces in full blast, emitting heat and passion and intemperance and diffusing them throughout the whole extent of this broad land." It was a time, he declared, for mutual sacrifice and for both sections to support his compromise scheme in order to restore "concord, harmony, and peace."

The enfeebled Calhoun, champion of the planting South, opposed Clay's plan as being both unconstitutional and ineffectual. The North, he asserted, was responsible for the present crisis, for it had upset the

equilibrium of the sections by excluding slavery from about three fourths of the territory added to the original states. Moreover, he added, it had driven the South toward secession by enacting protective tariffs and other measures favorable to the Northern businessman and detrimental to the Southern planters. The Union could be saved, not by compromises, but by granting the South its full measure of justice: equal rights in acquired territories, return of fugitive slaves, suppression of all anti-slavery propaganda, and the restoration of political equilibrium between the two sections by constitutional amendment.

Webster stood with Clay in defense of the resolutions. In answer to Calhoun's charge of Northern aggression, he pointed out that the South had dominated the politics of the country for three fourths of its national history. On the other hand, he condemned the Wilmot Proviso; geography and climate, he said, had settled "beyond all terms of human enactment" that slavery could not exist in New Mexico or California. "I would not [try] . . . to reaffirm an ordinance of nature, nor to re-enact the will of God. And I would put in no Wilmot Proviso for the [sake] . . . of a taunt or a reproach." To the dismay of the anti-slavery faction he denounced the abolitionists and declared that the South was right in its charge that the North had failed to respect the laws regarding the return of fugitive slaves. Like Clay, he felt that secession could never be accomplished peacefully, and that if it were accomplished, it would not solve the problems that were then distracting the country. His entire speech was a fervent appeal for tolerance between the sections, for the upholding of the Constitution, and above all, for the perpetuation of the Union. Webster's stand was denounced by the great majority of the anti-slavery voters; some openly accused him of sacrificing his conscience and truckling to the slave interests to win the presidency. James Russell Lowell referred to his "mean and foolish treachery." "He is a man," said Emerson, "who lives by his memory; a man of the past, not a man of faith and hope. His finely developed understanding only works truly and with all its force when it stands for animal good; that is, for property." Horace Mann characterized him as "a fallen star! Lucifer descending from heaven!" Theodore Parker said that he knew of "no deed in American history done by a son of New England to which I can compare this but the act of Benedict Arnold. The only reasonable way in which we can estimate this speech is as a bid for the presidency." And John Greenleaf Whittier undoubtedly expressed the thoughts of thousands in his *Ichabod*:

*Let not the land once proud of him
Insult him now,
Nor brand with deeper shame his dim,
Dishonored brow.*


But those who denounced Webster's action apparently failed to comprehend what he clearly saw: that the adoption of Clay's resolutions would cut the ground from under the feet of the Southern extremists and postpone secession perhaps long enough to enable the North to outstrip the South more completely in man power and material resources. In justice to Webster it should be noted that his "treachery" existed only in the minds of the abolitionists. Webster, who had never been an abolitionist, could hardly be accused of treachery to them.

William Seward of New York and Salmon P. Chase of Ohio were the principal spokesmen for the Northern radicals. Both denied that the Constitution recognized chattel slavery and demanded that it be excluded from the territories. Seward, voicing his opposition to all legislative compromises because he thought they were "radically wrong and essentially vicious," asserted that there was "a higher law than the Constitution," which forbade slavery. These prophetic words soon became the slogan for all opponents of slavery. If the "higher law" was to prevail, then the South should be compelled by force, if necessary, to agree to it.

On April 18, 1850, after weeks of debate, the compromise measures were referred to a Senate committee of thirteen, of which Clay was chairman. On May 8 the committee reported the resolutions in the form of five bills. Around these a tempest raged for weeks; finally they were passed as separate measures by both houses. Meanwhile Taylor had died in July, 1850, and had been succeeded by Vice-President Millard Fillmore of New York. Fillmore, who at one time had been considered a representative of the anti-slavery forces, had emerged from the crisis of 1850 a strong Union man, and in September of that year he signed all the compromise measures that had been adopted by Congress.

All but the extremists approved the Compromise of 1850. "The Closing of the Drama," "The Country Saved," "Most Glorious News from Washington," were typical newspaper headlines announcing the passage of the compromise. Businessmen, who believed that the agitation had upset normal conditions, welcomed the settlement as an omen of "better times." Enthusiastic meetings endorsing the Compromise and sponsored by tradespeople were held in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and other Northern centers. Even the majority of the Southern planters acquiesced, for the advance in cotton prices and the general upward trend of business in the early 1850's momentarily helped them to forget their grievances. Most politicians, anxious to be rid of a troublesome problem that was already disrupting party ranks, gave it their unqualified support.

The respite proved short-lived. The appearance of several new causes of friction indicated that neither the problem of slavery nor sectional rivalry had been finally disposed of by the Compromise. An im-



mediate source of controversy was the Fugitive Slave Act. Designed in the interests of the planter, this law vested the Federal government with almost unlimited powers for the apprehension and return of runaway slaves. The alleged fugitive was denied trial by jury, could not summon witnesses or testify in his own behalf, and was liable to capture even though he might have escaped years before the statute was enacted. Moreover, any Federal official charged with the apprehension and return of fugitive slaves might, if he feared a rescue, summon the aid of any person. Heavy penalties were to be inflicted on any official who failed to perform his duty and on those who harbored or aided in the escape of a fugitive. Under this law, "slave-catching" and "man-hunting" were brought close to every Northerner, and hundreds of thousands of people who had formerly been moderates, or at least indifferent to the slave question, now became hostile to the whole system of slavery. On the other hand, the violations of the law embittered the South and strengthened the threats of those who had warned that failure to enforce it would mean disruption of the Union. The reaction of both sections to the Fugitive Slave Act revealed that the Compromise of 1850 had dealt with the surface, not the roots, of the issues that were threatening to disrupt the Union.

130. THE FAILURE OF COMPROMISE

THE ELECTION of 1852 was the last presidential contest before the Civil War in which the politicians of both major parties sought to avoid rather than face the issues that were splitting the nation into two hostile sections. The Whigs, who hoped that once again they would be able to win with a military figure, nominated General Winfield Scott. The Democrats, who had suffered most from the events of the preceding decade, were confronted by the difficult task of selecting a candidate who would be acceptable to all factions—the Southerners, Unionists, and the Free Soilers. Some old-line Democrats felt that Cass should be given another chance; the Southerners favored James Buchanan of Pennsylvania, a Northerner with Southern views; the Western wing of the party wanted Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois; the New Englanders backed Supreme Court Justice Levi Woodbury. Wood-

18. SLAVE AND FREE TERRITORY IN 1850

This map indicates the legal status of slavery in the several states and territories. The territories open to slavery were limited, and the greater part were physically unsuited for the plantation system as it prevailed in the slaveholding states.


bury died, however, before the convention met, and the New Englanders shifted their allegiance to Franklin Pierce, a relatively unknown politician and lawyer from New Hampshire. Pierce's lack of a political past proved to be his greatest asset, and after more than 100 ballots, the Democratic convention made him the party's candidate. The Free Soilers nominated John P. Hale of New Hampshire.

Because Pierce had not committed himself on any of the major issues of the day, he was acceptable to all the Democratic factions. Even the Barnburners returned to the party to support him, yet the Southerners felt that he was safe on the slavery issue. Scott, on the other hand, proved an inept candidate. Although he came from Virginia, many Southerners thought that he was allied with the Conscience Whigs of the North. In addition, despite the fact that his military career was more illustrious than that of either Harrison or Taylor, he never captured the imagination of the voters. The result was that Pierce swept the election. With 254 electoral votes to 42 for his opponent, he carried every state but Massachusetts, Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee.

With the election of 1852 behind them, the Democratic politicians looked forward to four years of peace and harmony. They had defeated the Whigs by ignoring the issues, and they now planned to enjoy the fruits of their victory by avoiding any questions that threatened the *status quo*. But the issues would not remain dormant, and within a short time proposals for a transcontinental railroad had revived the conflict between North and South over the expansion of slavery in the territories.

Soon after Pierce had taken office, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis announced his plan for a transcontinental railroad that would follow an all-Southern route and have its eastern terminus in Memphis, Tennessee. This proposal, unacceptable to the Northerners, was countered by another railroad project, advanced by Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois. A dynamic individual with his eye on the White House, Douglas was closely associated with powerful railroad and real estate interests in Chicago. The railroad suggested by Douglas was to extend from Chicago through Nebraska and Wyoming to the Pacific coast. Although this route went through territory that contained few inhabitants and some of the highest mountains in the United States, Douglas selected it in the hope that it was central enough to be acceptable to both the North and the South.

Before a railroad could be constructed, the territories through which it would pass had to be organized by the Federal government. Douglas, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, drew up a bill that called for the formation of two territories—Kansas and Nebraska. In an effort to avoid the slavery issue, Douglas incorporated in the act a provision stating that the question of slavery would be left to the inhab-



19. THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND THE KANSAS NEBRASKA TERRITORIES

The Missouri Compromise Line of 1820 was explicitly repealed in 1854, when the Kansas-Nebraska Act was passed. The act organized the Kansas and Nebraska territories on the principle of popular sovereignty and thus opened up the possibility of their becoming slave territories. A bitter contest followed between pro-slavery and anti-slavery elements for the control of Kansas.

itants of each of the territories—a provision that in effect repealed the Missouri Compromise, for states north or south of the Mason-Dixon line would no longer be automatically free or slave. Douglas's measure, however, could not be adopted without the support of Southern congressmen, who refused to vote for it unless it specifically repealed the Missouri Compromise. Popular sovereignty was not enough. Douglas agreed to their demand, and when the Kansas-Nebraska Act was adopted in 1854, it contained provisions for both popular sovereignty and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

The sections in the Kansas-Nebraska Act dealing with slavery provided Northern anti-slavery politicians with a clear-cut issue on which they could attack both the Administration and Douglas. The first man

to take advantage of this situation was Salmon P. Chase, a Democratic senator from Ohio, whose "Appeal of the Independent Democrats in Congress to the People of the United States" offered Northerners a platform on which they could unite to oppose Southern plans for the expansion of slavery. This statement, which was signed by several anti-slavery Democrats in Congress, was printed in nearly every free-state newspaper and was widely circulated in pamphlet form. Declaring that the Kansas-Nebraska Act "menaced the freedom of our institutions" and "the permanency of our union," it warned that the bill would transform all the Western territories into "a dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves." It stated that the bill was "an atrocious plot to exclude from a vast unoccupied region immigrants from the Old World and free laborers from" the East. Regardless of the truth of these charges—and historians have been unable to agree on this point—there can be no doubt that the "Appeal" accurately reflected the widespread dissatisfaction in the North over Southern control of the government.

Northerners were also alarmed by the Administration's program of expansion. In his inaugural address Pierce had practically announced that he was an apostle of "Manifest Destiny" and that he desired to carry out the imperialistic program inaugurated by Polk. One of his first acts was to send James Gadsden to Mexico to purchase a strip of land adjacent to the United States so that an American railway line might be built along the Gila River to the coast. At the time, the *New York Herald* asserted that Gadsden had been secretly instructed to acquire the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Sonora, and Lower California.

Next, on the advice of his Secretary of State, William L. Marcy, Pierce in 1854 instructed Pierre Soulé, a Louisiana imperialist who had been sent to Spain the previous year, to purchase Cuba, which between 1848 and 1854 had been the scene of a number of filibustering expeditions supported by prominent Southerners. The Spanish government, however, refused to sell, and Soulé finally withdrew to Belgium, where he was joined by James Buchanan and John Y. Mason, American ministers to Great Britain and France respectively. The three then drafted the "Ostend Manifesto." After declaring that geographically Cuba was a part of the United States, this startling proclamation recommended that if Spain refused to sell, the United States should "by every law, human and divine" seize Cuba by force. Although Marcy repudiated the sentiments expressed in the Manifesto, the mere knowledge that such a recommendation had been made excited the anti-slavery factions.

The events of the first two years of Pierce's administration marked an important turning point in the sectional controversy that preceded the outbreak of the Civil War. An increasing number of Northerners had come to view the South as an obstacle to national progress, and in both sections the central question was no longer slavery itself, but its

expansion to the West. These attitudes, in turn, were largely responsible for the formation of the Republican party. This party, which originated in the Old Northwest as a spontaneous protest against the Kansas-Nebraska Act, was a manifestation of both the moral fervor and economic discontent that pervaded that area. In contrast to the early Whigs and Democratic-Republicans, the Republicans had no outstanding leader like Clay or Jefferson; but they did have a crusading zeal and a sense of righteous indignation that sent them flocking to meetings throughout the Old Northwest to protest the Kansas-Nebraska Act. These rallies were attended by both dissatisfied Whigs and Democrats; and, although those who gathered at such places as Ripon, Wisconsin, and Jackson, Michigan, referred to themselves as Republicans, most of them did not realize that they were participating in the formation of a new party. The product of a popular upheaval, the Republican party was a people's party, a reform party, and a party whose main plank was opposition to the extension of slavery.

Despite its initial popularity, the Republican party was not the only political organization competing for the support of those who were dissatisfied with Democratic rule. For example, the Know-Nothings * had already demonstrated their prowess as vote-getters in the South as well as the North. Scott's overwhelming defeat in 1852 had made many Whigs in both sections turn to the American party. Southerners, realizing that the immigrant population of the North contributed to the increasing political power of the section, were understandably attracted to a party that promised to cut off the flow of foreigners to the United States. The Southern view was succinctly expressed by one planter who said: "The mistake with us has been that it was not made a felony to bring in an Irishman when it was made piracy to bring in an African." In the North the Nativists were able to capitalize on both the fears of native workers and the prejudices of American-born Protestants. In 1854, the Know-Nothings swept the Massachusetts election and joined with the Whigs to win control of Pennsylvania's government; and they held the balance of power in the new House of Representatives. In Ohio they provided nine out of the ten nominees on the Republican slate in the election of 1855.

The political situation was still further confused by the presence of two other parties. The Whig party was still in existence, and contemporaries had no way of knowing that it had already participated in its last presidential election. In addition, there were the Prohibitionists, who in a number of state elections had exhibited unexpected strength. Maine, under the leadership of Neal Dow, had adopted state-wide prohibition in 1851, and in the next two years Rhode Island, Michigan, Vermont and Wisconsin followed suit. Although the Prohibitionists

* See Chapter XIX, pp. 527-8.

never formed a national political party, they played an influential rôle in many states, and their endorsement was often sought by the candidates of the other parties.

In the midterm elections of 1854 there were as many as five separate tickets in some states. When the final returns were in, it was found that the Democrats had lost, but no one could be sure who had beaten them. Although the opposition groups appeared to outnumber the Democrats, they could accomplish little until they could agree on a positive program with which to oppose the Administration. This problem, however, was soon solved by developments in the newly organized territories, and within two years "bleeding Kansas" had helped to make the Republicans the second largest political party in the nation.

Kansas and Nebraska were opened up for settlement in 1854. Some people from Missouri had already moved into Kansas, and many more followed after the territory was formally organized. The Missourians, practically all of whom favored the extension of slavery in the territories, were not to have Kansas to themselves, however, for the region also proved very attractive to New Englanders. But the New Englanders wished to make Kansas over in the image of their former communities in the East and were determined that Kansas would be a land neither of slaves nor of plantations. The New England emigration was aided by the New England Emigrant Aid Company, founded by Eli Thayer of Worcester, Massachusetts, to assist anti-slavery men who wished to settle in Kansas.

Within a few months, the Missourians had established the towns of Atchison and Leavenworth along the Missouri River, and the New Englanders had set up communities at Topeka and Lawrence further to the west. It was not long before the two groups were fighting a miniature and sporadic civil war over conflicting land claims and the slavery issue. The Missourians banded together in "Protective Associations"; the free groups were armed with Sharps rifles, or "Beecher's Bibles," as they were called after Henry Ward Beecher had said that they could be a "greater moral agency" in Kansas than the Bible.

Meanwhile Andrew H. Reeder, an anti-slavery Pennsylvania Democrat, had been appointed Governor of Kansas by Pierce. He reached the territory in 1854 and immediately began buying up large blocs of land in the hope of making a speculative profit. In November, a pro-slavery territorial delegate was elected to Congress with the help of sixteen hundred inhabitants from Missouri who crossed the border into Kansas on election day. The following March a similar influx of Missourians resulted in the selection of a pro-slavery legislature. When the legislature met at Pawnee, the site of one of Reeder's more prominent speculative ventures, it refused to seat the anti-slavery members, passed a bill over the Governor's veto to move the capital to Shawnee Mission,

adopted a slave code similar to that of Missouri, and petitioned Pierce to remove the Governor. When Reeder, who made no attempt to conceal his anti-slavery views, refused to resign, the President accepted the legislature's advice and dismissed him. Meanwhile the free-state groups refused to recognize the territorial legislature, drew up their own constitution, and established an anti-slavery government.

When other expedients failed, the inhabitants of Missouri and Kansas were not above employing violence to achieve their objectives. On May 21, 1856, a band of "border ruffians" from Missouri sacked the free-state capital at Lawrence, burned many of the town's buildings, and destroyed all its newspaper offices. At this point John Brown, a fanatical—and perhaps, insane—abolitionist, decided that it was his duty to punish the friends of the South for the "sack of Lawrence." Accordingly, on May 24, Brown and six followers murdered five pro-slavery men in the so-called Pottawatomie Massacre. In all, 200 people—one of whom was a son of Brown—lost their lives in "bleeding Kansas," and more than \$2,000,000 worth of property was destroyed in the course of the conflict. Yet the census of 1860 revealed that there were only two slaves in Kansas. Clearly the issue was not slavery, but rather the question of whether the disputed area would be controlled by the North or South.

While free- and slave-state groups struggled in Kansas for control of the territory, representatives of the North and South debated the issue in Congress. On May 19, 1856, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, an outspoken abolitionist and leading Republican, stated the radical Northern view in a long and savage philippic that he entitled "The Crime against Kansas." After accusing the South of "the rape of a virgin Territory, compelling it to the hateful embrace of slavery," Sumner launched into a bitter and very personal attack on Senator Andrew P. Butler of South Carolina. Three days later—and two days before the Pottawatomie Massacre—Preston Brooks, who was Butler's nephew and a member of the House from South Carolina, attacked Sumner while he was at his desk in the Senate and beat him with a cane until he was unconscious. Sumner, who retired from the Senate for three years, became a martyr throughout the free states. In the South, Brooks was hailed as a hero.


The struggle in Kansas was more responsible than any other event for making the Republicans the leading opposition party. Republican leaders throughout the North made countless speeches denouncing Southern tactics in Kansas, and Republican papers such as the *Chicago Tribune* gave their readers detailed—and often biased—accounts of events in the territory. Kansas had become the battleground of the sections, and the Republicans made full use of Kansas as an example of the results of the Southern determination to extend slavery to the territories.

When the Republicans gathered at Philadelphia in 1856 for their first national nominating convention, the party had assumed the character it was to retain until the Civil War. Consisting of ex-Democrats as well as ex-Whigs, Germans as well as Nativists, workers as well as farmers, and abolitionists as well as Free Soilers, its only unifying principle was the determination of its members to prevent the extension of slavery to the territories. From an economic standpoint it was a party of small producers. Ideologically, it was a reforming—or even crusading—party. And geographically, it was a party that found its greatest strength in the New England zone of settlement that stretched from Vermont and Massachusetts across up-state New York to the upper Northwest bordering on the Great Lakes.

The Republicans' candidate in 1856 was John C. Frémont, whose outstanding asset was his "availability." Known to all Americans as an explorer and soldier, he was a colorful figure who had done nothing to antagonize any of the factions that made up the Republican party. As a famous man and a political nonentity, he was an ideal candidate for a new party that was made up of many diverse groups. To oppose Frémont, the Democrats passed up Pierce and Douglas because of their close identification with the unhappy events of the preceding four years and gave the nomination to James Buchanan of Pennsylvania. The remnants of the Know-Nothing party, which had disintegrated because of its failure to take a stand on slavery, made ex-President Fillmore its candidate. During the campaign Buchanan, whose service as minister to England had kept him out of most of the sectional controversies of the Pierce administration, was put forward by the Democrats as a safe and sane statesman who would refrain from any rash acts that might split the Union. The Republicans, in contrast, campaigned as a strictly sectional party; their slogan was "Free Soil, Free Speech and Frémont," and their principal issue, "Bleeding Kansas." The outcome of the election would seem to indicate that a majority of the voters still put the preservation of the Union before all other considerations, for Buchanan received 174 electoral votes to 114 for Frémont and 8 (from Maryland) for Fillmore. On the other hand, Frémont had carried all but five Northern states, and if he had won in Pennsylvania and Illinois, the Republicans would have triumphed.

131. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE TERRITORIES

WHEN Buchanan became President in 1857, his backers believed that as a Northerner who was sympathetic toward the South he would be able to hold the Union together by playing down




SACRAMENTO CITY CAL.

FROM THE FOOT OF J STREET.
SHOWING I. J. K. ST. WITH THE SIERRA NEVADA IN THE DISTANCE.

SACRAMENTO CITY IN 1849

This contemporary lithograph shows the beginnings of the future capital city of California. Sacramento was laid out about a mile from Sutter's Fort during the Gold Rush of 1849.



PORK AND BEANS IN THE GOLD DIGGINGS

This cartoon depicts the fashion in which California merchants were able to obtain huge profits from their transactions with miners.

any issues that threatened to split the sections. But events had reached the stage where they could no longer be controlled by Buchanan. Southerners insisted on the extension of slavery to the territories; most Northerners were equally determined that slavery should be barred from the territories; and both sides were convinced that further compromise was out of the question. As a result Buchanan, instead of narrowing the chasm that separated North and South, was not even able to hold his own party together.

Two days after Buchanan's inauguration on March 4, 1857, the Supreme Court entered the slavery controversy with its decision in the case of *Dred Scott vs. Sandford*. Scott, a slave held by Dr. John Emerson, an army surgeon, had been taken by his master first into the free state of Illinois and then into the northern part of the Louisiana Purchase, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise. In 1838 both master and slave returned to Missouri. After Emerson's death in 1843, Scott brought suit in a Missouri court for his liberty on the ground that his residence in free territory automatically made him a free man. In the trial court, Scott won, but the state's Supreme Court, to which the question was carried, ruled against him. Meanwhile Mrs. Emerson became the wife of Dr. C. C. Chaffee of Springfield, Massachusetts, a Know-Nothing and an abolitionist. To allow Scott to bring the case into the United States District Court, the Chaffees sold him, his wife, and children to Mrs. Chaffee's brother, J. F. A. Sanford, of New York. In this court Scott won. After a long period of litigation the case finally came before the Federal Supreme Court. The first question that the Court had to decide was whether or not Scott was a citizen. If not, the case would presumably be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and the Court would not be called upon to pass on the more important question of his freedom. The majority opinion, handed down by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, declared that since no state had had Negro citizens at the time the Constitution was adopted, that document was intended to apply only to white men. Scott was, therefore, not a citizen and could not bring suit in the Federal courts. Here the case could have ended, but Taney and his associates, hoping that an *obiter dictum* backed by the courts would materially assist in putting an end to the slavery controversy, went on to argue that Congress had no authority to deprive any person of his property, in whatever form, within the domains of the United States. Congress, consequently, had no power to prohibit slavery in the territories, and the Missouri Compromise had from the day of its enactment been null and void. Justice Curtis of Massachusetts, who with Justice McLean of Ohio dissented from the majority opinion, argued that Negroes had been citizens in 1787 and since; he denied Taney's contention that Congress had no right to prohibit slavery in the territories; and he asserted that the Missouri Com-

promise had been constitutional until repealed in 1854, and that Scott's residence on free soil had made him free.

Instead of settling the slavery problem the decision merely increased sectional hostility. The South was jubilant, for the nation's highest court had recorded its opinion that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in the territories. Such action would now require constitutional amendment, for which the necessary majorities were at the time unobtainable. Slavery was now a domestic institution that under the Constitution the Federal government was bound to protect, and could neither prohibit nor destroy. Anti-slavery leaders, on the other hand, stressing the fact that five of the nine judges came from slave states, declared that the decision was further proof that the slave interests were strengthening their hold on every branch of the Federal government. For the newly organized Republican party, whose basic principle was the restriction of slavery extension in the territories, the decision was in reality a challenge. Some of its leaders favored the reorganization of the Court so that its decisions would conform to anti-slavery views. "We know," said Lincoln, "the Court that made it has often overruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it overrule this." Horace Greeley, writing in the *New York Tribune*, declared that the decision was "entitled to just so much moral weight as would be the judgment of a majority of those congregated in any Washington bar-room."

The sectional animosity engendered by the Dred Scott decision was heightened by the effect of the Panic of 1857 on both the North and the South. Caused by overexpansion and unsound banking policies and resulting in widespread misery and hardship, the panic undoubtedly strengthened the hands of those Southerners who favored disunion. A free and independent South, they argued, would forever put an end to the danger of panics for which this section was in no way responsible. Moreover, the South was not injured as much by the financial crash as were the West and North. In the South there had been less expansion and less speculation; and large crops and good prices in the years immediately following the panic enabled the section to recover rapidly. Some of the Southern leaders interpreted this quick recovery to mean that the South was economically superior to the North, an argument that they stressed in advocating secession. The North for its part was inclined to attribute the severity of the ensuing depression to Southern political tactics. Many Northerners believed that only some form of Federal aid to business and a homestead act could restore prosperity, but this program was blocked by the efforts of Southern congressmen.


The cleavage illustrated by the different reactions of the two sections to the Panic of 1857 was still further widened by the government's tariff, land, and expansionist policies during Buchanan's administration. Despite the demands of Northern protectionists for an increase in customs

duties, Congress in 1857 lowered rather than raised the tariff in an act that reduced the rates for all dutiable schedules and greatly enlarged the free list. When Congress three years later over the objections of the South adopted a homestead act that provided for the disposal of the public domain to actual settlers at twenty-five cents an acre, Buchanan vetoed the measure. If any further proof were needed of the Administration's pro-Southern bias, it was furnished by Buchanan's expansionist plans and the wholehearted fashion in which they were endorsed by the inhabitants of the slave states. Southerners, who had closely watched the filibustering expeditions against Nicaragua led by William Walker of Tennessee, approved the President's statement in 1858 that all Central America would become a part of the United States by the natural course of events. In like manner they endorsed his program for the acquisition of a part of northwestern Mexico in return for ten million dollars from which were to be deducted claims of citizens of the United States against Mexico. When Mexico rejected this offer, Buchanan—again with Southern approval—recommended that the United States assume a protectorate over northern Mexico; and in 1859 he asked Congress for authority to send an expeditionary force for the ostensible purpose of collecting debts and restoring order. Congress, however, was too much agitated by other issues raised by slavery to heed the President's request, and his proposals came to nothing.

Once again, as in Pierce's administration, Kansas both dramatized and intensified the issues dividing the North and South. In June, 1857, an election was held in Kansas to choose delegates to a convention for the purpose of drawing up a constitution to submit to Congress when the territory applied for statehood. Because the election was sponsored by the Southern groups in Kansas, the free-state inhabitants refused to participate in it, and only pro-slavery delegates were chosen for the convention. In the following October the delegates convened at Lecompton and drew up a constitution that protected slavery in Kansas. Instead of permitting the voters to pass on the entire document, the convention decided to submit only the slavery clause for ratification; because the constitution contained other provisions dealing with slavery, the result would make Kansas a slave state regardless of how its people voted. Once more the free groups refused to vote, and the Lecompton Constitution was overwhelmingly adopted. Meanwhile in an election for a new territorial legislature the free-state elements won their first victory; for Robert J. Walker, the territorial Governor, disqualified the pro-slavery returns in two precincts in which the number of votes cast exceeded the number of inhabitants. The free-state majority in the new legislature voted to have the entire Lecompton Constitution submitted to the electorate. Only the free-state men participated in this election, and the constitution was almost unanimously

rejected. A comparison of the two referendums on the Lecompton Constitution indicates that the free-state elements easily outnumbered their opponents. In the first election, 6,226 votes were cast for the slavery clause; in the second, 10,226 votes were cast against the Lecompton Constitution.

Throughout the struggle in Kansas, Buchanan sided with the slave-state groups. In November, 1857, he forced Walker to resign, and in



The Ridgway Library, Library Company of Philadelphia

THE AMERICAN EAGLE AT THE BEGINNING AND AT THE END OF BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION

This cartoon satirizes Buchanan's administration. Buchanan's political opponents maintained that under his administration the bird had been plucked by the slaveholding South.

February of the following year he requested Congress to admit Kansas as a state under the Lecompton Constitution. In taking this stand, Buchanan openly defied Stephen A. Douglas, the most powerful Northerner in the party and the Administration's heir apparent. Douglas had staked his whole political career on a popular sovereignty that was now being ignored by both the slave-state interests in Kansas and the President. Thus Douglas had no alternative but to reject the Lecompton Constitution and to insist that Congress pass an enabling act providing for an election under Federal supervision. But Buchanan refused to change his position, and in an interview with Douglas at the White

House he pointed out that he was still President and that the Illinois senator would have to abide by the Administration's decision. When Buchanan appealed to history and mentioned that Jackson had known how to handle recalcitrant congressmen, Douglas is reported to have replied: "Mr. President, Andrew Jackson is dead."

Despite Douglas' break with the Administration, Buchanan's plan for admitting Kansas as a slave state was approved by the Senate. But in the House, it was blocked by a combination of Republicans and Northern Democrats. At this point, however, the open rupture of the Democratic party was prevented—or, at least, postponed—by a compromise measure known as the English Bill. Kansas had requested an exorbitant land grant, and the compromisers decided to use this request to conceal the slavery issue. Accordingly, under the terms of the English Bill (May 4, 1858), the Lecompton Constitution was to be resubmitted with the provision that if it was adopted, Kansas would receive a considerably smaller land grant from the government. On August 2, 1858 the inhabitants of Kansas rejected the constitution by a vote of 11,300 to 1,788. As a result of these developments Kansas stayed out of the Union until 1861.

132. THE INTENSIFICATION OF SECTIONAL CONFLICT

ALTHOUGH the English Bill permitted the Democratic party to remain outwardly intact, it did not end the split between Douglas and the Administration. Despite the South's opposition to popular sovereignty—Southerners saw it as a device that would make not only Kansas, but all the territories free—Douglas would not retreat from his original stand, and he emphasized it repeatedly during his campaign for re-election to the Senate in 1858. To oppose Douglas, the Illinois Republicans selected Abraham Lincoln, a Springfield lawyer and one of the most prominent members of the party in the state. Born in Kentucky in 1809, Lincoln had lived as a boy in both Indiana and Illinois. When he was only 23, he was a candidate for office, and during his campaign he displayed—according to Albert J. Beveridge—the "vagueness and dexterity . . . of the natural politician, a type of which he was to become, excepting only Jefferson, the supreme example." * Before he was thirty, Lincoln had become one of the leading members of the Whig delegation in the Illinois legislature. Like other good Whigs, he was on friendly terms with Illinois business interests, and

* Albert J. Beveridge: *Abraham Lincoln, 1809-58* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), Vol. I, p. 118.

there is no evidence that he had any strong feelings about slavery in these years. During the Polk Administration, Lincoln was elected to the House of Representatives; but when he joined the other Whigs in opposing the Mexican War, he was not returned to Washington for a second term by his bellicose constituents in Illinois. Although he served as a Republican elector in 1856 and was given some support for the party's vice-presidential nomination in the same year, he was still more of an ex-Whig than a Republican.

In his speech accepting the senatorial nomination of the Illinois Republicans in June, 1858, Lincoln outlined a program that was broad enough to appeal to all the Northern Republicans. Arguing that "a house divided against itself cannot stand" and that "this government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free," he asserted: "Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new—North as well as South." After a recital of the events of the preceding three years, Lincoln declared that, if the South's hold on the government was not broken, it would be only a matter of time before there would be "another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits." Therefore, he concluded, the voters of Illinois had a moral duty to defeat a man like Douglas, who, despite his opposition to the Southern Democrats, was willing to countenance the spread of slavery if it was approved by the people in the territories.

In the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates, which highlighted the Illinois senatorial contest of 1858, Lincoln refused to be pinned down to any definite program of action by his Democratic opponent. At the same time, he was able to compel Douglas to make a number of admissions that were distasteful to the Southern wing of the Democratic party. Particularly damaging to Douglas was his stand on the Dred Scott decision. When Lincoln at the debate in Freeport asked if the people in a territory could exclude slavery, Douglas was placed in the position of having to repudiate either the Supreme Court ruling or his own version of popular sovereignty. In answering this question Douglas stated—in what came to be known as the "Freeport Doctrine"—that regardless of how the Supreme Court decided the question, the people of a territory "have the lawful means to introduce it [slavery] or exclude it as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day . . . unless it is supported by local police regulations." To the South this answer seemed little better than heresy, whereas to many Northerners it appeared to express the views of a man who was willing to subordinate moral considerations to political expediency.

Lincoln lost the election of 1858; * but in going down to defeat he gained a national reputation and demonstrated to his party the type of strategy that would produce a victory in 1860. Knowing that the North could outvote the South, he sought to avoid any issues that threatened the unity of the free states and to dissociate the Republican party from such extremists as the abolitionists. He stated that the country was menaced by a plot to extend slavery to the territories and even to the free states and maintained that every Northerner had an obligation to support a party that was seeking to check the growth of slavery in the West and the power of the slavocracy in Washington. Slavery presented more than a moral problem, for Lincoln insisted that every free worker suffered from its presence. His conclusion was inevitable: if the existence of slavery was detrimental to all free men, then all free men must oppose its expansion. Here, in short, was a platform on which all the anti-Administration groups in the North could unite.

The succession of intersectional crises during Buchanan's administration was climaxed by John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry in 1859. Disappointed with the Republican party because it refused to adopt an abolitionist program and obsessed with the idea that he had been divinely ordained to exterminate slavery, Brown resolved to stir up a slave insurrection and levy war against the slaveholding South. Brown succeeded in enlisting the interest and the support of prominent Northern abolitionists, including Gerrit Smith, Theodore Parker, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, and George L. Stearns, who with others contributed four thousand dollars to the enterprise. With a band of twenty-one followers, three of whom were his own sons and five of whom were Negroes, he seized the government arsenal and rifle pits at Harper's Ferry on Sunday night, October 16, 1859. A few Negroes were set free, but the hoped-for insurrection did not materialize, and the following morning armed men from the surrounding countryside quickly hemmed in the invader. Late Monday evening Colonel Robert E. Lee arrived with a small detachment of United States marines, and the next morning Brown and his surviving followers were captured; ten of his band had been killed and four had escaped. Brown was indicted for conspiracy, murder, and treason, found guilty, and publicly hanged on December 2, 1859.

Unimportant in itself, Brown's raid with its abrupt ending had profound consequences. Southerners charged the Republicans with responsibility for the deed. Even Stephen A. Douglas openly declared that it was his "firm and deliberate conviction that the Harper's Ferry crime was the natural, logical, inevitable result of the doctrines and teachings

* Actually the Republican vote in Illinois exceeded that of the Democrats, but the legislature was controlled by the Democrats, and it selected Douglas as the state's Senator.

of the Republican party." Jefferson Davis characterized it as "the invasion of a State by a murderous gang of abolitionists bent on inciting slaves to murder helpless women and children." In the free states, Brown was hailed as a martyr. Instead of his lawlessness, anti-slavery people remembered his fortitude and his purpose. On the day of his execution, funeral bells were tolled, and memorial services were held, throughout the North. Addressing a Boston audience, Ralph Waldo Emerson referred to Brown as "that new saint than whom none purer or more brave was ever led by love of men into conflict and death—the new saint awaiting his martyrdom, and who, if he shall suffer, will make the gallows glorious like the Cross." The divisive effects of John Brown's raid were also reflected in Congress. Members of both houses were too excited and too embittered to listen to reason. Altercations were an everyday occurrence on the floor of the House, where a long-drawn-out contest for the speakership followed; bitter personal attacks led to challenges to duels, and the unchecked hisses and applause from the galleries added to the confusion. Many even feared bloodshed. "The members on both sides," wrote Senator Grimes of Iowa, "are mostly armed with deadly weapons, and it is said that the friends of each are armed in the galleries." This statement was corroborated by another senator, who declared that "every man in both Houses is armed with a revolver—some with two—and a bowie-knife."

While politicians in and out of Congress were wrangling over the slavery issue, propagandists both North and South were adding still more fuel to the fires of sectional controversy. In the North, pulpit, press, and platform seemed to compete with each other in condemning slavery and the section where it flourished. Horace Greeley, through the columns of the *Tribune*, of which he was both owner and editor, denounced slavery and slaveholders. During the 1850's the circulation of the *Tribune* increased fivefold; throughout the free states, where most of its subscribers lived, it wielded unprecedented power as a mold of public opinion. The *Tribune*, in turn, set the pace for the *New York Times*, the *Springfield Republican*, and lesser anti-slavery sheets. More sensational than the newspapers was Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, which appeared in book form in 1852. This novel, depicting the most brutal features of slavery, caught the attention of millions of people. Three hundred thousand copies were sold the first year, and the story was soon dramatized and played in every Northern city and town. Enraged Southerners denounced it as a hideous distortion of the truth, but it made a lasting impression on the North and particularly on the countless thousands of boys who were to be voters in 1860 and who were to hear Lincoln's call for volunteers. Less important than Mrs. Stowe's work in shaping the sentiment of the two regions was Hinton Rowan Helper's *The Impending Crisis of the South*;

How to Meet It. Helper, a poor white of North Carolina, denounced slavery as fatal to the interests of the middle and lower whites of the South. It was his thesis that if these classes were to prosper, if the South were to advance, if the region were ever to develop a varied commerce and industry and to enjoy the same degree of cultural progress as the North, then slavery must go. In the eyes of the controlling element of the South, Helper was a traitor, and Northern endorsement of his book, a malicious and unpardonable insult.

The South also had its propaganda after 1850. The North was painted as a land of "poverty, crime, infidelity, anarchy, and licentiousness." Every Southern youth was taught to regard Northerners as vulgar and depraved people "reeking with irreligion, blasphemy, and radicalism." Even De Bow defined "Yankees" as a "species of the human race who foster in their hearts lying, hypocrisy, deceit and treason." Calhoun's *Disquisition on Government* was studied in Southern colleges, and appeals were made to forego the use of Northern literature.

So long as we use such works as Wayland's Moral Science [one pro-slavery leader wrote] and the abolitionist geographies, readers, and histories, overrunning as they do with all sorts of slanders, caricatures, and blood-thirsty sentiments, let us never complain of their use of that transitory romance [Uncle Tom's Cabin]. They seek to array our children by false ideas against the established ordinances of God.

133. THE ELECTION OF 1860

WHEN the Democrats gathered in April, 1860, for their convention in Charleston, South Carolina, for the first time in their history they were forced to face the fact that they, like the rest of the nation, were divided into two hostile camps. The Southerners arrived at the convention determined to reject any platform that failed to provide for Federal protection of slavery in the territories. The Northerners were equally convinced that the party could not survive unless it endorsed the principle of popular sovereignty and nominated Douglas for the presidency. Both groups had compromised for the last time, and both felt that the conflict in their party was irreconcilable. Of the 33 states represented in the convention, 15 were slave and 18 free; but among the latter, two states—Oregon and California—voted with the South. The platform committee, which consisted of one representative from each state, presented a report advocating Federal protection of slavery in the territories, and the convention, voting by delegates rather than by states, defeated the proposal. Rather than accept this decision,

most of the delegates from eight Southern states withdrew from the convention. The remaining delegates then made an unsuccessful attempt to select a presidential candidate. Douglas was unable to obtain the required two thirds vote, and after ten days of balloting the convention broke up.

The Democrats reconvened at Baltimore on June 18 only to discover anew that the issues dividing them could not be compromised. Within a few days, the delegates had formed two conventions. The Northerners nominated Douglas on a platform of popular sovereignty. The Southerners selected John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky and reaffirmed their demand for the Federal protection of slavery in the territories. Meanwhile representatives of the defunct Whig and American parties had formed the Constitutional Union party. Meeting at Baltimore in May, they nominated John Bell of Tennessee for president and Edward Everett of Massachusetts for vice-president. In their platform, the members of the new party condemned "the creation and encouragement of geographical and sectional parties" and recognized "no political principle other than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the states, and the enforcement of the laws."

Although the Democratic schism virtually insured a Republican victory in 1860, the delegates to the Republican convention at Chicago nevertheless were careful to draw up a platform that appealed to every major interest group in the free states. The poor in both the East and West were promised free homesteads, and within a short time "Vote yourself a farm" had become one of the Republicans' most effective campaign slogans. A tariff plank was included in an effort to win the support of Northeastern industrialists, while the other half of Clay's American System—internal improvements—was provided for by a demand for a transcontinental railroad to be constructed with Federal assistance. Finally, the platform, while condemning popular sovereignty and "threats of disunion," denied "the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States."

The Republicans' choice of a candidate also revealed a desire to conciliate all the factions in the party. For some months before the convention it was generally thought that Seward would receive the nomination. But Seward, who had been in public life for many years, had committed himself on too many issues to be acceptable to all the groups in the party. He was opposed by the ex-Know-Nothings because he had been on good terms with the Catholics during his term as Governor of New York State, and he was distrusted by the party's conservatives who recalled his outspoken attacks on slavery. When it became apparent that Seward could not obtain the nomination, the delegates turned to the favorite sons of the various Northern states—Simon

REPUBLICAN MASS MEETING.



A Grand Mass Meeting will be held at

ITHACA, ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 31, 1860,

AT NOON,

For the purpose of RATIFYING the Nomination of

LINCOLN AND HAMLIN

—AND THE—

STATE TICKET.

HORACE GREELEY,

OF NEW YORK.

GEN. B. F. BRUCE,

OF MADISON CO., AND

HON. C. L. BEALE

MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM COLUMBIA CO.

Have been POSITIVELY ENGAGED, and will address the meeting.

HON. DAVID WILMOT,

OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Has been written to and is expected to be present.

A LINCOLN CAMPAIGN POSTER FOR THE ELECTION OF 1860

Cameron of Pennsylvania, Edmund Bates of Missouri, Caleb Smith of Michigan, Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, and Salmon Chase of Ohio. Of these, only Lincoln was acceptable to the party's major factions, for he alone had not antagonized the abolitionists, the groups opposed to the extension of slavery, the Know-Nothings, the immigrants, the prohibitionists, the ex-Whigs and the ex-Democrats. Lincoln's nomination by the Republican delegates on the third ballot marked the triumph of availability.

Throughout the campaign of 1860 the Republicans made repeated


appeals to Northern workingmen and businessmen. They warned workingmen that slavery threatened to deprive them of their livelihood, and Republican orators asked: "How can the free laboring man ever get two dollars a day when a black slave [now] costs his master only ten cents a day?" Their efforts to win the support of the businessman centered in Pennsylvania, where they campaigned as the people's party and emphasized the tariff to the exclusion of all other issues. Nevertheless, while many iron producers in Pennsylvania undoubtedly voted for Lincoln, it is doubtful that businessmen as a class backed the Republicans in 1860. As an exclusively Northern party, the Republicans were viewed with distinct suspicion by the businessmen who were part of an intersectional economy. Northern manufacturers produced goods for the South, Northern bankers loaned money to the South, Northern railroad men shipped goods to and from the South, and Northern merchants sold their products in the South. Although these groups might approve of the Republican tariff and railroad planks, they did not approve of a party that threatened to destroy this highly profitable economic alliance of the sections. Under the circumstances, most Northern businessmen probably felt that the Constitutional Union party best represented their interests.

In winning the election of 1860, Lincoln carried all the free states except New Jersey and received 180 electoral votes and about 40 per cent of the popular vote. Breckinridge received 72 electoral votes, all from the slave states, but only 18 per cent of the popular vote. Douglas polled more than 29 per cent of the popular vote but secured only 12 electoral votes. Bell, though receiving less than 13 per cent of the popular vote, obtained 39 electoral votes. Because both Bell and Douglas were Union candidates, they were outside the sectional contest, and the relative smallness of their combined vote is one indication of the cleavage in the American electorate. Lincoln had won because free workers and free farmers in the Northeast and the Northwest outnumbered the voters in the South who placcd allegiance to their section ahead of loyalty to their nation. But this situation had always existed, and Lincoln's victory must be attributed to the fact that the Republi-

20. THE ELECTION OF 1860

From this map of the electoral vote in the presidential election of 1860 it will be seen that Lincoln and Breckinridge had exclusively sectional support.

The inset map shows the results of the election in Lincoln's home state, Illinois. Here neither Bell nor Breckinridge made a strong showing. Bell had more than 5 percent of the vote in only 11 counties and Breckinridge in only 3, all in the extreme south of the state.



cans were the first party in the nation's history to devise a formula for uniting the North. The Republican triumph in 1860 signalized the union of the sections with the parties.

134. THE SOUTH SECEDES

BY 1860, instead of one nation with common ideals and common purposes there were, in reality, two nations: one Northern, the other Southern. Each had thwarted the economic and political ambitions of the other; each held diametrically opposite views of slavery; each had hurled vituperation at the other; each firmly believed that the other was bent on the ruin of its sectional rival; each hated and mistrusted the other.

To the South the election of Lincoln seemed the last straw. In the opinion of many Southerners, the Republican party had been organized by "Yankee abolitionists" bent on the destruction of slavery and on the political subjugation of the section where it existed. Lincoln was branded as the leader of the abolitionists, a compatriot of Garrison; and his election on a platform calling for internal improvements, a protective tariff, and a railroad to connect the Northwest with the Pacific was regarded as conclusive evidence that the worst was about to happen. "With Lincoln," said the Richmond *Examiner*, one of the South's leading newspapers, "comes something worse than slang, rowdiness, brutality, and all moral filth; something worse than all the rag and tag of western grog-shops and Yankee factories. . . . With all those comes the daring and reckless leader of Abolitionists." Furthermore, Lincoln's opposition to the acquisition of additional slave territory and his statement that the Union must become all free or all slave were emphasized as proofs that slavery was to be everywhere abolished. It was this feeling in part that prompted the Governor of South Carolina to advise the South Carolina legislature on the eve of the election of 1860 to be prepared for any emergency "in view of the probability of the election to the presidency of a sectional candidate by a party committed to the support of measures which, if carried out, will inevitably destroy our equality in the Union, and ultimately reduce the Southern states to mere provinces of a consolidated despotism, to be governed by a fixed majority in Congress hostile to our institutions and fatally bent upon our ruin." Many conservative Southerners believed that a Republican administration would mean more abolitionist agitation, more runaway slaves, more personal-liberty laws, more John Brown raids, more likelihood of unfriendly Federal legislation. Secession and independence seemed to afford the only avenue of escape from impending evils.

On December 20, 1860, a South Carolina convention formally repealed the state's ratification of the Constitution of the United States and the subsequent amendments and adopted an ordinance of secession from the national government. By February 1, 1861, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana had also left the Union. Texas soon followed. Of the remaining eight slave states, four—Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas—with fewer slaves and a larger non-slaveholding population than the lower South, delayed until after the bombardment of Fort Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops. Then they too severed their connection with the Union. The other four—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri—though having less at stake in slavery than the states of the cotton belt, nevertheless contained powerful secessionist factions and were saved to the Union largely by the prompt and vigorous action of the Federal authorities. In the mountainous counties of northwestern Virginia, inhabited mostly by nonslaveholding people of Scotch-Irish and German ancestry, whose social and economic interests did not always accord with those of the tidewater planters, the sentiment for the Union was strong. Therefore, when Virginia voted to secede, the mountaineers dissented, and aided and abetted by the Federal government, they set up the new state of West Virginia, which was admitted to the Union in 1863.

No sooner had the states of the lower South withdrawn from the Union than steps were taken to form a Southern confederacy. A congress of delegates from the six cotton states meeting at Montgomery, Alabama, on February 4 organized a *de facto* government under the name of the "Confederate States of America." For president it selected Jefferson Davis, a West Pointer, who had served as Secretary of War in Pierce's cabinet and later as senator from Mississippi, and who represented the conservative planter class. Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, who had attempted to delay and defeat secession, was chosen vice-president. The constitution of the Confederacy closely resembled the famous document drafted at Philadelphia in 1787. There were, however, some notable differences: Congress could not grant bounties, levy protective tariffs, or subsidize internal improvements except as an aid to navigation. A duty could be laid on exports only with the consent of a two-thirds vote of both houses. Congress was bound to protect slavery in all territories and could enact no law denying or impairing the right of property in slaves. Despite the agitation before secession for restoration of the slave trade, the document prohibited the importation of slaves, possibly as a gesture for European sympathy. An executive budget was provided for, and the president, who was limited to a single six-year term, could veto any item in an appropriation bill. Congress could grant seats to the heads of executive departments on the floor of

either house, where they were to enjoy the privilege of discussing any measure pertaining to their department.

The Southern states withdrew from the Union for a number of reasons. The most important consideration, perhaps, was the widely held belief that with Lincoln's election the South would never again be able to regain its political power in the Federal government. Between 1850 and 1860, three free states, California, Minnesota, and Oregon, had been taken into the Union, whereas not a single slave state had been admitted. Efforts to secure slave territory in the Caribbean regions had been unsuccessful, and topography and climate assured that no additional slave states would be formed in the existing territorial domain. Moreover, the rapidly developing Northwest, now more securely linked by social and economic ties with the East than with the South, could no longer be counted upon for political support. The old political balance had been upset, and the ability of the South to safeguard and promote its interests had been curtailed. Under such circumstances secession seemed to many the only alternative to subjection.

For many Southerners who advocated secession the Republican triumph meant the loss of office and with it the loss of money. For half a century or more, Southerners had filled the administrative departments of the Federal government and had occupied most of the offices in the army, navy, and diplomatic service. With Lincoln at the helm all would be changed; Southerners would be ousted in favor of "Black Republicans" who would draw the salaries and distribute the patronage.

Southern spokesmen also urged the dissolution of the Union on the ground that such action would protect slavery and promote the material prosperity of the South. The slave states, they asserted, had for generations been exploited economically by the North. The South, they declared, paid more than its share of the taxes, suffered from a deficiency of capital, and was forced, as long as it remained in the Union, to depend on the North for manufactured goods. Once it declared its independence and set up a separate republic, its economic difficulties would disappear. The discriminatory tax burden would cease; direct trade with Europe could be established; manufacturing would develop; the African slave trade could be revived; a great Southern confederacy, including Cuba, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and perhaps, Central America, could be created; internal commerce and banking facilities would be expanded; mechanical arts would flourish; immigrants would pour in—in a word, as *De Bow's Review* said: "Every industrial and every professional pursuit would receive a vivifying impulse." Avowed secessionists held that it was next to useless to advocate the diversification of Southern industry as long as the Union continued. "Direct trade with the customers of the South in Europe," said the *Charleston Mercury*,

"is an impossibility. . . . Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, are only suburbs of New York."

Less tangible, but nevertheless influential, in creating support for secession was the spirit of Southern nationalism. The vast majority of the Southern people loved their homeland. As children they had been taught to respect local institutions and to devote their lives to the well-being of their respective states. With many, the state took sentimental precedence over the Union. It was in part this patriotic fervor that led Southern men and women to preach secession when they believed that their civilization was endangered by the ascendancy of the North. It was this spirit that caused them to resent the constant denunciation of the South and of slavery by politicians, press, pulpit, and platform of the North. It was this same attitude that impelled Robert E. Lee to resign his commission in the United States Army and to offer his services to the Confederate forces. Moreover, it was to local pride and patriotism that the Southern radicals appealed when, in their campaign for secessionist converts, they declared that "every Yankee had hated every Southern citizen from the day of his birth." The South, they insisted, was in reality already a nation and possessed population and resources sufficient to enable it to take its place among the nations of the earth.

Following the example of the Second Continental Congress, several of the secession conventions—apparently for the purpose of influencing public opinion at home, in the border states, in the North, and in Europe—adopted formal declarations of grievances: These documents, almost without exception, stressed the violation of the Constitution by the North. Rejecting the Northern theory that the Constitution was an agreement of the people and the United States therefore an indestructible Union from which no state could withdraw, the secessionists followed Calhoun's interpretation and asserted that the Constitution was a mere compact among sovereign states and the Union under it an alliance that the states could dissolve. The Northern states, they contended, had violated the Constitution by the passage of personal-liberty laws, by anti-slavery legislation, and by elevating to the presidency a candidate of a sectional party hostile to slavery. One declaration went so far as to declare that the North had overthrown the Constitution and had transformed the republic into a "consolidated democracy" in which the South was a hopeless minority. All the secessionist leaders were agreed that inasmuch as the Southern states had entered the Union voluntarily under the "constitutional compact," they were now at liberty to leave it.

More significant than constitutional considerations, however, was the fact that Southern leaders who advocated secession contended that from an economic standpoint cotton was "King." As early as 1830 the Southern states had become formidable competitors of the other cotton-producing

areas of the world, and ten years later they had practically monopolized the world's production. In the years 1849-51 more than a million bales of American cotton were exported annually to Great Britain. Of a total importation into Great Britain of nearly 4,800,000 bales for the two-year period 1859-60, approximately 4,000,000 bales came from the South. At the same time these states shipped large quantities to the North and to continental Europe. It was the importance of cotton in the economic system of the world that led Southerners to argue that secession would be peaceful. They reasoned that Northern industry would be paralyzed without cotton and without a Southern market, and that the North in consequence would be unable to wage war. Even should war follow, they felt reasonably sure that England and France, rather than suffer an interruption of their cotton supply, would at once recognize the South as a separate nation, conclude favorable commercial treaties with it, and come to its assistance with military and naval forces. Beyond a doubt, the idea that the South held the key to the world's economic structure exerted a powerful influence on those who advocated secession.

Finally, the secessionist leaders hoped that the Ohio Valley states would come to their support. In southwestern and central Kentucky slave labor was used on a fairly extensive scale, and many families in other parts of the state were closely allied by blood or friendship to the planting kingdom. Furthermore, the southern parts of the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, settled mostly by Southerners, were still connected with the South by commercial ties. Although slavery was legally forbidden in these states, it nevertheless existed under the guise of voluntary servitude, a system of slave contract labor. For these reasons among others, disunionist leaders entertained dreams that were never to be realized.

While Southern spokesmen on the eve of the Civil War sought to create the impression of sectional unanimity, there were many within the South who actively or passively opposed secession. Sentiment for disunion was strongest in the cotton states and in the larger tobacco-growing areas of Virginia. Though not hostile to slavery, those who lived in the backcountry, or in the districts where small farms prevailed and where the slave population was small, tended to oppose secession. The propertied, mercantile, and financial elements of the towns protested for a time against secessionist agitation but were with some exceptions finally converted to the cause. A number of Southerners opposed it on principle, others on grounds of expediency. Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, who had already been elected Vice-President of the Confederacy, counseled against secession as a remedy for "anticipated aggressions." Lincoln's election, he declared, was not sufficient reason for leaving the Union.

The President of the United States is no Emperor, no Dictator—he is clothed with no absolute power. He can do nothing unless he is backed by power in Congress. The House of Representatives is largely in a majority against him. . . . In the Senate he will also be powerless. . . . Why, then, I say, should we disrupt the ties of this Union, when his hands are tied—when he can do nothing against us?

But the secessionists had grown too strong to be halted. Two weeks after Stephen's plea for delay he wrote: "I am daily becoming more and more confirmed in the opinion that all efforts to save the Union will be unavailing. The truth is our leaders and public men . . . do not desire to continue it on any terms. They do not wish any redress of wrongs; they are disunionists *per se*, and avail themselves of present circumstances to press their objects." Three days later he wrote: "I . . . fear it is too late to do anything; . . . the people are run mad. They are wild with passion and frenzy, doing they know not what."

135. WAR

IN the North, word that the Southern states had seceded was received with mingled emotions. Throughout the section the burning question was whether the "wayward sisters" should be compelled to return to the fold or should be allowed to go their way in peace.

Chief among those who were willing that the South should leave the Union unmolested were the radical abolitionists who themselves had advocated secession unless slavery was abolished. Garrison and Phillips rejoiced that the Southerners and their "nefarious institution" had left the Union.

If the cotton states [said Greeley in the columns of the New York Tribune] shall become satisfied that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. . . . Whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep them in. We hope never to live in a republic where one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets.

Whittier expressed the same opinion in verse:

*They break the links of Union; shall we light
The flames of hell to weld anew the chain
On that red anvil where each blow is pain?*

A second group willing to see the Southern states leave the Union peacefully consisted of numerous Northern businessmen—manufacturers, merchants, and bankers. Much as these interests desired to see the Union kept intact, they feared that any coercive measure to preserve it would result in war and in the confiscation of the estimated \$200,000,000 that the South owed to the North in 1860. The apprehension of such a catastrophe had caused the banks of Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh to suspend specie payment and had caused a panic on the New York stock market. In some of the larger commercial centers of the North the money interests declared that the abolitionists were responsible for the country's plight. "It is sad," Nathan Appleton of Boston wrote, "to see this powerful, glorious nation, in the midst of unparalleled prosperity, shattering itself into fragments, and all out of an impracticable idea, a nonentity, connected with the institution of slavery." In Boston a mob, composed for the most part of businessmen, raided an anti-slavery meeting that had assembled to commemorate the anniversary of John Brown's death. In New York the mercantile interests were outspoken in their condemnation of the abolitionists as well as of any plan that entailed the use of force to compel the seceded states to acknowledge Federal authority. Fernando Wood, the mayor, went so far as to suggest that the city declare its independence and thus save its trade.

Although Buchanan did not condone secession, he made no move to prevent the withdrawal of the Southern states from the Union. In his annual message, delivered on December 3, 1860, before a single Southern state had seceded, he attributed the crisis in the South to the radicals and abolitionists in the North. In addition, although maintaining that secession was unconstitutional, he made it clear that he did not think that the Federal government should employ force to preserve the Union. On repeated occasions he argued that the dispute could be ended by compromise, but the kind of settlement that he recommended invariably required the North (which, whatever else it had done, had not seceded) to do all the compromising. Thus, he urged the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would assure the Southerners of the return of their runaway slaves and that would guarantee slavery not only in the states where it already existed but also in all the territories. Buchanan, however laudable his intentions in an admittedly difficult situation, often gave the impression that he was totally unaware of the outcome of the election of 1860.

Buchanan's only attempt to uphold the rights of the Union was his unsuccessful effort to defend Federal property in Charleston Harbor. Following South Carolina's secession, Major Robert Anderson, who was in command of the Federal troops in the region, evacuated Fort Moultrie and transferred the garrison to Fort Sumter, which was located on

an island at the harbor's entrance. Although Anderson had to have reinforcements to maintain his position, Buchanan for some time hesitated to make any move that might offend South Carolina. But on January 5, 1861, the President ordered two hundred soldiers to be sent to Fort Sumter on the *Star of the West*, a merchant vessel. When this ship approached Charleston Harbor, it was fired on by shore batteries, and it returned to New York without completing its mission. Buchanan made no further attempt to aid Anderson.

While Buchanan was doing nothing to check the secession movement, a number of other politicians were drawing up conciliatory proposals that were designed to save the Union. Of these, the most important were the Crittenden Plan and the Virginia, or Peace Convention Plan. The Crittenden scheme, drafted in December, 1860, and named after the senior Senator from Kentucky, provided, among other things, for six constitutional amendments. (1) The Missouri Compromise line was to be re-established. In territory north of the line, slavery was to be prohibited, and south of it slavery was to be recognized and protected. Any state formed out of territory on either side of the line was to be admitted with or without slavery as its constitution might prescribe. (2) Congress was to have no power to abolish slavery in places under its exclusive jurisdiction but situated within the limits of a slave state. (3) Congress was to have no power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia so long as it existed in Maryland and Virginia. In addition, it had to have the consent of the people of the district and furnish just compensation. (4) Congress was forbidden to interfere with the domestic slave trade. (5) Owners of fugitive slaves were to be paid full value by the Federal government when arrest of fugitives was prevented or rescue made. (6) The Constitution was never to be amended so as to affect the above provisions or to interfere with slavery in any of the slaveholding states.

The Virginia, or Peace Convention Plan, which was sponsored by leading Virginians, was the product of more than a month's labor by 150 delegates from 21 of the 33 states of the Union. The proposals of the conference, which convened in Washington on the same day that the delegates from the seceded states assembled at Montgomery to form a Southern confederacy, did not differ markedly from the Crittenden scheme. Provision was made, however, that with some exceptions no new territory should be acquired unless by treaty ratified by four fifths of all the members of the Senate.

Despite strong popular support, both the Crittenden and the Virginia Plans faced insurmountable obstacles. The radical leaders, both North and South, did not want compromise. President-elect Lincoln, who was rapidly becoming the acknowledged leader of the faction that was determined to preserve the Union without surrendering its control to the planters, opposed the Crittenden Plan as no longer pertinent to the

situation as it existed. In his inaugural address, he declared that the Union was much older than the Constitution, that no state could lawfully depart from it of its own volition, that the ordinances of secession were legally void, that acts of violence to uphold them were insurrectionary or revolutionary, and that he would enforce the laws of the country to the fullest extent of his ability; he thus virtually served notice on every man and woman in the land that the Union would be preserved by force if necessary. His entire address, though couched in kindly and sympathetic language, was an ultimatum that admitted of neither secession nor compromise.

Lincoln was a nationalist, a Unionist, and the first President since Andrew Jackson to refuse to be intimidated by Southern threats. He did not want war, but he preferred it to the destruction of the American nation. When he entered office, he tried to refrain from making any overt move that would impel the border states to join the Deep South in secession. At the same time, if war came, he wished to have it precipitated by the South rather than the North; but he was not going to stand idly by while the secessionists broke up the Union.

Although the seceding states had seized Federal forts, post offices, and customhouses throughout the South, it was Fort Sumter, rather than any one of a hundred or more other places, that had become a symbol of the conflict between the government of the United States and the South. Because Anderson was running out of supplies, the question facing Lincoln could not be postponed. If the President did not send a relief expedition to Fort Sumter, the South, the North and the entire world would conclude that his Administration was willing to countenance rebellion. On the other hand, if he attempted to aid Anderson's beleaguered forces, it would mean war. Despite the objections of most of his cabinet and of General Winfield Scott, Lincoln on April 4, 1861, decided to send assistance not only to Fort Sumter but also to Fort Pickens at Pensacola, Florida. The first expedition accomplished its mission, and Fort Pickens remained in Northern hands throughout the war; but the success of the Sumter expedition was prevented by the South's decision to force the issue. On April 12, General P. G. T. Beauregard, acting on orders from the Confederate cabinet, began the bombardment of Fort Sumter with Charleston's shore batteries. Two days later Anderson surrendered and transferred his troops to the relief ships, which had arrived, but had not participated in the engagement. On April 15, Lincoln issued a call for the militia of the loyal states and ordered Congress to convene in special session on July 4. The Civil War had begun.

THE CIVIL WAR

- 136. THE ARMED FORCES
 - 137. SUPPLYING THE ARMED FORCES
 - 138. FROM BULL RUN TO VICKSBURG
 - 139. FROM GETTYSBURG TO APPOMATTOX
 - 140. FINANCING THE WAR
 - 141. ATTITUDE OF EUROPE TOWARD THE WAR
 - 142. EUROPEAN AID FOR THE CONFEDERACY
 - 143. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH
 - 144. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH
 - 145. GOVERNMENT BY COALITION
 - 146. END AND BEGINNING
-

THE CIVIL WAR was the first modern war fought by the American people. The vast numbers of men involved, the close connection between the military establishments and the civilian economies, the enormous sums of money that were required to maintain the contending military machines, and the intensity of feeling aroused by the conflict all combined to make the Civil War a precursor of the global wars of the twentieth century. During the conflict, no American could escape its effects; and if the War Between the States—to use the Southern term—was not total war, it was only one step removed. If nothing else, the Civil War demonstrated that in a long, drawn-out struggle, a relatively static, agricultural society could not defeat a people who possessed an expanding, diversified, capitalist economy.

136. THE ARMED FORCES

AT THE outset of the Civil War, the states of the Confederacy with a population of \$,700,000, including nearly 3,500,000 slaves, were pitted against 22 states with a population of approximately 23,000,000. With the admission of Kansas in 1861 and West Virginia in 1863 the ratio of population, if slaves are excluded, was about five to one. Only one slave state, Missouri, ranked among the seven most populous states of the Union in 1860—and it did not join the Confederacy. Even if the Confederacy had been able to carry with it Missouri, Kentucky, Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia, the addition of the combined population of these five states (totaling 3,600,000) would still have left the South numerically inferior to the North.

In wealth, as well as population, the North enjoyed a marked superiority. Its real and personal property was valued at \$11,000,000,000 as compared with \$5,370,000,000 for the South; the valuation of its farm lands alone totaled \$4,800,000,000 or more than two and a half times that of the Confederacy. Its banking capital of approximately \$330,000,000 was more than seven times that of the South. Most important of all, in its factories, mines, railroads, and ships, the North possessed a supply of developed material resources and industrial techniques from which to obtain the elements of war and to which the agrarian South could oppose no adequate counterpart.

The crisis of Fort Sumter found both sides unprepared for war. Neither had a first-class army, nor the munitions and other supplies with which to equip one. The small regular army of 18,000 was widely scattered, and few of its officers had seen action except against the Indians; many West Point graduates had left the service to engage in some civilian pursuit.

In raising armies, North and South each employed both the volunteer system and conscription. In the spring of 1861, when patriotism in both sections was running high and when only Robert E. Lee and a few others perceived that the struggle would be long and bitter, both central governments called for short-term volunteers. The response at first was so great that neither government had sufficient arms and equipment for all. Many recruits were sent to organization camps, where, dressed in the clothes they had worn at home and drilling with broomsticks as muskets, they prepared for the front. In the course of a few months, however, enthusiasm gave way to disillusionment, for every day it became increasingly evident that both sections were in earnest and that the conflict would be much longer and more destructive of human life than had been at first anticipated. Many of those who had had a taste

of war had grown tired of it and failed to re-enlist at the expiration of their terms of service; others, perceiving the opportunities for high wages or large profits at home, displayed no eagerness to shoulder a musket and share the hardships and dangers of army life. Under these circumstances both sections resorted to bounties to stimulate enlistments.

The two central governments—and the states, counties, and municipalities as well—employed the bounty system. The Federal government inaugurated the practice in July, 1861, by offering \$100 to every volunteer, an amount subsequently increased to \$302 for recruits and \$402 for veterans. The sums offered by the states and the smaller political units of each section varied greatly, but in comparison with the grants of the central governments, they were considerable. In addition to bounties, the volunteer who served as a private received clothes and rations and \$13 a month until May 1, 1864, when his pay was increased to \$16. The bounty system soon led to the crime of "bounty jumping"; for a man to enlist and desert eight or ten or even a dozen or more times was not an uncommon occurrence. Immigrants in many instances proved easy victims for unscrupulous agents. All told, the Federal government paid \$300,000,000 for bounties, and \$286,000,000 more was expended by the Northern states and municipalities for the same purpose.

Before the war was two years old the authorities in Washington and Richmond began to realize that voluntary enlistment, even when stimulated by bounties, could not be relied upon to furnish the numbers necessary to keep the armies up to strength. Accordingly both sections were forced to the only remaining expedient: conscription. In this move the Confederacy was first. On April 16, 1862, President Davis signed a conscription act that called to the colors every able-bodied white male between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. This law was supplemented by the act of September 27, 1862, which extended the age limit to forty-five. Exemptions were provided for the physically unfit, and for all Confederate and state officials, teachers, preachers, keepers of apothecary shops, hospital officials, newspaper proprietors, persons employed in transportation and important war industries, and overseers on the larger plantations. Before 1863 exemption could also be gained by supplying a substitute. The pressure to fill the depleted ranks of the army toward the close of the war was so great that the Confederate Congress in March, 1865, provided for the service of slaves, each state to furnish its quota, which was not to exceed one quarter of its slaves.

In the North the first step in the direction of conscription was taken on August 4, 1862, when Lincoln ordered a draft of 300,000 militiamen through the agency of the states. The result was disappointing, for only about 87,000 soldiers were obtained. After protracted debate, Congress on March 3, 1863, passed a conscription act that formed the basis for all future drafts. By its terms all able-bodied male citizens or alien de-

clarants between the ages of twenty and forty-five if unmarried, and twenty and thirty-five if married, were enrolled in the forces of the United States and made subject to military duty at the president's call unless exempted for certain specified reasons. The law further provided that each draft should be apportioned among the several enrollment districts and that the names should be drawn by lot. In districts where the required quota was raised by voluntary enlistments no draft was to be made. High public officials, teachers, preachers, criminals, and men who were the sole support of dependent families were the principal classes exempted. Any drafted man, however, could escape service by furnishing an acceptable substitute or by paying the government a fee not to exceed \$300.

The conscription acts angered the people of both sections, and their results were far from satisfactory to the governments. In the South, defenders of states' rights, like Robert Barnwell Rhett and Vice-President Stephens, asserted that the Confederate government in enacting the conscription laws had exceeded its authority and that the laws were unconstitutional. Acting on this assumption, Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia refused to permit them to be carried out in his state. In North Carolina, where opposition was even more bitter, the legislature at the suggestion of Governor Zebulon B. Vance not only drafted a formal protest against the policy of conscription, but later passed a law, in direct contravention to the act of the Confederate Congress that exempted millers, blacksmiths, and others from military service. It is impossible to ascertain how many able-bodied Southern men escaped military service by claiming to belong to the exempted classes, but it is known that many physicians were bribed to issue certificates of disability; that apothecary shops sprang up overnight; and that many who had never thought of doing so before became preachers or teachers. In 1864, General John S. Preston of the Confederate Bureau of Conscription declared that "from one end of the Confederacy to the other every constituted authority, every officer, every man and woman, is engaged in opposing the enrolling officer in the execution of his duties."

In the North, opposition to conscription was equally widespread. Exponents of states' rights, Quakers and other conscientious objectors, "copperheads"—that is, those who wanted immediate peace at any price—and those who distrusted the government for any reason whatsoever asserted that the Conscription Act was unconstitutional, contrary to the traditional policy of the nation, and the work of a "military despotism." The provision of the act that allowed a man to evade service by furnishing a substitute or by paying \$300 into the Federal treasury was denounced by the laboring classes and others of limited means as a scheme favoring the well-to-do in "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight." In several states—notably Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Wis-

consin, New Jersey, and New York—the draft was forcibly opposed and in some instances the enrollment officers were murdered.

In New York City the first draft under the law was accompanied by four days of rioting. When the lists of the conscripts were published on Sunday, July 13, 1863, it appeared that nearly all were mechanics and laborers of foreign birth, some of whom were on strike and whose places had been filled with Negro strike-breakers. The resumption of drawings the next day was the signal for revolt. Mobs destroyed conscription offices; robbed Unionists in the streets and pillaged and burned their homes; attacked the residence of the mayor; and burned out the office of the *New York Tribune*. Negroes, as well as abolitionists, were blamed for having caused the war and the draft, and on them the mob poured forth its fury. Some were shot, others were beaten to death, and a number were hanged from trees and lamp posts. An orphan asylum for Negro children was sacked and burned. Business was almost completely paralyzed, and not until troops had raked the streets with cannon and howitzers and had arrested many of the ringleaders was order restored. It was estimated that at least a thousand people were killed or wounded and that property was damaged to the extent of \$1,500,000. Similar disturbances, but on a much smaller scale, occurred in several other cities.

Authorities differ as to the number of officers and men in the armies during the war. Some contend that from 1,200,000 to 1,400,000 served under the Confederate flag; others maintain that this figure is too large. The Union enlistments numbered 2,898,304, but these included bounty jumpers and others who enlisted more than once. The total number was probably in the neighborhood of 2,675,000, an estimate that includes more than 100,000 Negroes recruited from the seceded states and 54,000 whites from the Confederacy, of whom 31,000 came from Tennessee.

137. SUPPLYING THE ARMED FORCES

IN equipping its armed forces the Confederacy was greatly handicapped in comparison with the North. Before the war the South had done little to develop its rich deposits of coal and iron. It had purchased nearly all its iron goods and railroad materials in the North. Iron was so scarce that during the war the suggestion was made that the Confederate government make a public appeal for broken or worn-out plows, plow points, hoes, spades, axes, broken stoves, and household and kitchen utensils. Moreover, when hostilities began, the South had no adequate factories for the production of clothing, boots and shoes, and other necessary supplies. Yet, despite these deficiencies, the Confederacy managed to equip its armies in some fashion until the

very last month of the war. The government seized, either directly or through the states, practically the entire stock of arms, ammunition, and machinery stored in the Federal forts and arsenals within the seceded states. In addition, small amounts of war equipment were acquired from several of the Southern governments, especially from Virginia and South Carolina, which had purchased considerable stores of arms and ammunition before the ordinances of secession were passed. Part of this material had come from abroad and part from the North. Only a few days before the firing on Fort Sumter began, Confederate agents placed large contracts for munitions with Northern firms; and throughout the war, supplies of arms and ammunition were smuggled through the Northern lines. Another—and in some respects the most important—source was Europe and particularly England. Through Caleb Huse, leading Confederate purchasing agent abroad, the South bought millions of dollars worth of guns, ammunition, and machinery; Europe supplied approximately one half of all the small arms used by the Confederate armies. Supplies of all sorts were also salvaged from the battlefields or obtained from Northern prisoners of war. Lastly, the Confederacy itself manufactured supplies. It set up blast furnaces, although they were greatly inferior to those of the North; and it established foundries and produced heavy ordnance and some small arms. It erected numerous powder mills, which produced almost enough ammunition to supply the wants of the armies, although at times there was a scarcity of saltpeter. Textile factories and tanneries also multiplied in numbers and in output, but they were unable to meet the demands of both the public and the army.



The problem of feeding the Confederate armies occasioned even greater concern than that of equipping them. During the first year of the war there was no serious difficulty, for crops were abundant and of excellent quality. By the autumn of 1862, however, conditions had changed. A severe drought had cut short the grain supply, money was rapidly depreciating, prices rose precipitously, and transportation facilities were not functioning properly. Realizing the danger, both the central and state governments brought pressure to bear on the planters by legislation and by appeal to grow less cotton and more wheat and corn, and the press, planters' conventions, and other agencies carried on an aggressive campaign to the same end. As a result, cotton acreage diminished, and that devoted to cereals increased. But even though crop yields for 1863 were above normal, the situation did not improve. Vicksburg had been taken and the Texas granary had thus been cut off; transportation facilities were more demoralized than ever; and farmers refused to accept Confederate currency in return for their products. Meanwhile the Confederate Congress on March 23, 1863, passed an impressment act authorizing army officers to seize any property anywhere in the Confederacy "for the good of the service." During the

following month, it imposed a tax of one tenth in kind on agricultural products.

Like the Conscription Act, both measures were condemned by many Southerners. The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that the compensation clause of the Impressment Act was unconstitutional and void, and the Georgia legislature declared that through the execution of the law citizens had been "greatly harassed, defrauded, and wilfully wronged." Resolutions passed by other state legislatures complained of the law in similar terms. Even General Lee, who thought that impressment was necessary, admitted that it was "very objectionable in many ways—and not calculated to bring out fully the resources of the country." Though both tithe and impressment were probably unavoidable, they undoubtedly lessened production of foodstuffs. Furthermore, the increasing loss of Southern soil to the Federal armies in 1863 and 1864 constantly reduced the food-producing area on which the Confederacy had to depend for its sustenance; and some regions, though not occupied by Northern forces, were so devastated that they were almost useless to the South for food production. With the growing scarcity of food, it became increasingly difficult to supply the armies with even the usual rations.

Defective transportation as well as lower production of food supplies undoubtedly contributed to the difficulty of feeding the armed forces during the latter part of the war. As early as 1863 the Confederate Secretary of War complained about the "dilatatory and irregular transportation on the railroads." Cut off from their former source of equipment and without labor or materials with which to make repairs, the Southern railroads steadily deteriorated. The government's attempts to provide through traffic by combining short lines were often frustrated by towns apparently more concerned with saving their transfer business than with feeding the army. Supplies destined for the army piled up along railway lines, and during the last two years of the war the Confederacy suffered not so much from lack of food as from a defective system of distribution. While Sherman's army found plenty of food in Georgia, Lee's soldiers were almost starving in Virginia.

The North with its ever-increasing number of factories, overflowing granaries, superior transportation system, and sound credit, experienced few of the difficulties with which the South had to contend in equipping and rationing its troops. At the outset of the war, it is true, the North was as unprepared as its rival, and like the South, it turned at once to European manufacturers for arms and other supplies. During 1861, the fortunes of war turned in no small degree upon the ability of the two contestants to secure the necessary munitions from the Old World. According to the report of the United States Ordnance Officer for the fifteen months ending June, 1862, the Federal government purchased



21. COMPARISON OF NORTH AND SOUTH, 1860

This chart indicates the marked advantage of the North over the South in physical resources.

726,000 rifles from European makers and only 30,000 from American manufacturers. Several Northern states, including Ohio, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, also placed orders in Europe for arms.

Northern dependence on Europe proved of short duration, and by the second year of the struggle, foreign contracts for war materials ceased. Stimulated by the greatly increased demand and by the remarkable opportunity to make enormous profits, dozens of private concerns turned to the production of war materials: new iron plants were constructed, munition factories were enlarged, and machine shops were transformed into gun factories. Some materials were also manufactured by the Federal government; three thousand men employed at the armory at Springfield, Massachusetts, turned out a thousand rifles a day. The government might also have engaged in the manufacture of cannon and projectiles had the opposition of private interests not been so strong. Government clothing factories, meat-packing establishments, and laboratories for the manufacture of drugs and medicines were set up despite the efforts of those who did not favor such forms of government enterprise. Not all of the Northern war material was of first-class quality, however. Unscrupulous businessmen, more intent on riches than service to their country, amassed fortunes by selling inferior goods to the government. Supposedly all-wool uniforms and overcoats for which the government paid excessive prices turned out to be made of old rags chopped into pulp and pressed into a species of cloth called shoddy. Such large quantities of shoddy shoes, hats, stockings, and the like were sold to the government that "shoddy" became a popular synonym for fraud and corruption, and profiteers were soon labeled the "shoddy aristocracy."

In sharp contrast to their rivals, the Federal troops never suffered for want of rations or for lack of adequate means of transporting goods and supplies to the front. Throughout the war the agricultural output of the North steadily increased despite the drain on its man power made by the armies in the field and the new mines of the Far West. Immigrants, Eastern laborers, and women and children turned to farm labor, and by using such labor-saving devices as the drill, reaper, and thresher, they kept the granaries full. Other agricultural products, including meat and vegetables, maintained the pace set by the grain crops. The railroads and waterways, though often taxed to their capacity in serving both the army and the public, were immeasurably superior to those of the Confederacy. Unprecedented quantities of rations and equipment moved with remarkable celerity from the Northern commercial centers to the army depots behind the lines.


The armies of both belligerents suffered severely from lack of modern medical and surgical facilities. Knowledge of medicine and of the rules of hygiene had made little advance since the days of the Revolution. Thousands died of typhoid fever and other diseases. Careful estimates indicate that more than half the deaths in all the armies were caused by typhoid and pneumonia. Anesthesia—nitrous oxide gas, ether, and

chloroform—had been introduced and was employed to some extent in the Federal armies; frequently, however, the Confederate forces were entirely without it. Antiseptic surgery had not yet been developed, and the surgeons were inadequately trained for handling the enormous burden thrust upon them. Moreover, there were no trained nurses, although thousands of self-sacrificing women like Clara Barton left their homes in the North and South to risk their lives as army nurses.

The lot of the soldier was made easier by the enormous amount of relief work carried on by the noncombatant population. Hostilities had no sooner begun before women in every part of the North began to organize Ladies' Aid Societies to make bandages, shirts, underwear, towels, blankets, and other supplies. In New York City some fifty or sixty of these groups under the leadership of Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell formed the Women's Central Association for Relief. Largely as a result of the efforts of this body, the Federal government approved the creation of the United States Sanitary Commission in June, 1861. Although this national organization supplemented the work of the United States government in caring for sick, needy, and wounded soldiers and their dependent families, it was supported entirely by private contributions. Most of the local relief societies immediately affiliated with the Sanitary Commission, although some continued to act independently and to devote their energies to the troops recruited from their own communities. Measured in dollars and cents, the services the Sanitary Commission rendered to the soldiers in camp, on the battlefield, and in the hospitals were estimated at close to \$35,000,000. After the battle of Gettysburg the Commission distributed \$75,000 worth of food and clothing among the wounded. During the months of May and June, 1864, it spent \$515,000 for battlefield service in Virginia. It sent thousands of bushels of potatoes, onions, and cabbages, as well as other vegetables, to scurvy-threatened areas. It also provided hospital care, surgeons, convalescent camps, and soldiers' homes.

The work of the Sanitary Commission was supplemented by that of the United States Christian Commission, which was organized in November, 1861, under the auspices of the Young Men's Christian Association to promote "the spiritual good of the soldiers and, incidentally, their intellectual improvement and social and physical comfort." In addition to carrying on evangelical work, it established free reading rooms in the camps, where the soldiers had access to religious literature, periodicals, and county and state newspapers and could find writing tables, stationery, and free postage stamps. It even furnished food and succor to the wounded after battle, and many men undoubtedly owed their lives to the Commission's prompt and benevolent action.

Although the South had no such central body as the Sanitary Commission, innumerable state and county relief associations, such as the



PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY—PROSPECT OF A SMASH-UP


The split in the Democratic party foreshadowed Lincoln's election.

The New York Historical Society




THE COPPERHEAD PARTY—IN FAVOR OF A VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF PEACE!

The "copperheads" were Midwestern Democratic congressmen, whose desire to make peace with the South is here interpreted as a threat to the Union.




ABRAHAM LINCOLN



JEFFERSON DAVIS



ULYSSES S. GRANT



ROBERT E. LEE

Central Association for the Relief of South Carolina Soldiers and the Hospital Aid Association of Virginia, carried on in more restricted fashion much the same type of work. Similarly, the Bible Society of the Confederate States functioned in somewhat the same way as the Christian Commission. It distributed Bibles and religious tracts, conducted camp services, and comforted the wounded and diseased.

Unless the Confederate soldier owned land, the lot of his family bordered on the tragic. Faced with high prices and a depreciated currency, deprived of medicines and other necessities, and living in constant fear of being driven from their shelters by an invading army or a pitiless landlord, these families led a precarious existence. Their desperate circumstances undoubtedly account in part for the large number of desertions from the Confederate ranks, especially during the latter half of the war.

138. FROM BULL RUN TO VICKSBURG

THE MILITARY strategy of both belligerents was conditioned by the resources that they had at their command. At the beginning, the advantage of leadership rested clearly with the Confederacy. Many of the reputedly best officers of the United States Army cast their lot with the South. Furthermore, Jefferson Davis, a West Point graduate, veteran of the Mexican War and Secretary of War during Pierce's administration, knew intimately the capacities of most of the prominent army officers, both of the North and South. The leading Southern generals occupied commands of importance from the outset. Robert E. Lee, who declined the informally tendered command of the Union forces in favor of a commission in the Army of Virginia; Joseph E. Johnston, considered by some as the equal of Lee as a military leader; energetic, versatile "Stonewall" Jackson; and the talented Albert Sidney Johnston were the most brilliant of the Confederate leaders. The deaths of Albert Sidney Johnston and Jackson before the military crisis of the war had been reached undoubtedly impaired the effectiveness of the Southern armies in the field. In contrast to the Confederacy's success in assigning men of competence to responsible posts was Lincoln's desperate quest for capable generals. Before the end of the war the Union had its share of outstanding generals, but not one was recognized at the beginning. Before Ulysses Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip Sheridan emerged as the leaders to whom the major operations would be entrusted, Lincoln dolefully fumbled with a series of commanders of the main Union army operating in Virginia—McClellan, Pope, McClellan again, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade. Some, if not all of them, were competent

division or even corps commanders, but they failed lamentably in the formulation and execution of major operations that required skill in strategy as well as in tactics. Not until 1863 were Grant and Sherman revealed as the men able to lead the Union troops to ultimate victory. Before then the activities of Union generals seldom did more than to provide a colorful background for the deft handling of the Confederate forces by Lee, with the able assistance of Jackson.

Throughout the war, one of the North's most important assets was its naval supremacy. On April 19, 1861, Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of all enemy-held ports in an effort to deprive the South of the goods that it had to import to survive. Although at the time, the Union navy consisted of only ninety ships, most of which were obsolete, the fleet was steadily expanded until there were approximately seven hundred vessels participating in the blockade at the end of the war. As the blockade grew in effectiveness, shortages of civilian and military goods in the South increased proportionately. Beyond any doubt, the blockade made a major contribution to the ultimate defeat of the Confederacy. In addition, the Union navy supported the Northern armies in the "river war" in the West and won important victories at Port Royal, South Carolina, in 1861, at New Orleans in 1862, at Mobile in 1864, and Wilmington in 1865.

The South's naval efforts were confined to raids upon Northern shipping on the high seas and to an attempt in 1862 to break the blockade with an ironclad named the *Virginia*. Constructed by placing on the captured U.S.S. *Merrimac* armor plate made from railroad rails, the *Virginia* on March 8, 1862, sank two Union warships and damaged three others in an engagement at Hampton Roads. But on the following day the Union navy was able to meet this challenge with the *Monitor*, an ironclad that consisted of little more than a revolving gun turret on a floating platform. At the end of the day's fighting neither vessel had been able to cripple the other, and the battle of the ironclads ended in a stalemate. The following month, however, the Confederates sank the *Virginia*—or *Merrimac*, as it was generally known despite its change in name—to prevent it from being captured by the Union forces.

The land warfare of the Civil War falls into two distinct phases. Until the summer of 1863 the North was able to accomplish little or nothing on the Virginia front, although Union armies in the West won a number of significant victories. In 1864-5, however, the North held the initiative as Grant struck at Lee in Virginia and Sherman devastated large areas of the Deep South. During the entire war, the immediate objective of the Union was the capture of Richmond, but the North's over-all strategy called for an "anaconda movement" in which the South would be encircled and crushed. Lee, for his part, hoped that an invasion of the North would induce the Northern public to abandon the war. After

Gettysburg, Lee's strategy was calculated to inflict such terrible losses upon the Union forces that a war-weary, disheartened North would give up the struggle.

In the opening weeks of the war, most Northerners supposed that the Union army would capture Richmond within a short time and that the war would be over in a matter of months. "On to Richmond" became the Northern war cry, and in early July, Lincoln, despite the advice of Scott, ordered General Irvin McDowell to begin an advance on the Confederate capital. After a five-day march McDowell's 30,000 troops came into contact with approximately 24,000 Confederates under Beauregard at Bull Run Creek. On the first day of the battle of Bull Run (July 21), the Federals had the advantage; but on the following day, when General Joseph E. Johnston arrived with reinforcements for Beauregard and General Thomas J. Jackson earned his nickname "Stonewall" by holding his ground against repeated Northern attacks, the tide of battle turned, and the Union troops were routed. As they fled in confusion, their way was impeded by numerous social and political figures from Washington who had come to watch what they thought would be a decisive Union victory. For a time it was feared that Beauregard would capture Washington, but heavy rains checked his advance, and the capital was saved.

Following the Union defeat at Bull Run, George B. McClellan succeeded McDowell as commander of the Army of the Potomac. McClellan, who had seen some action in western Virginia during the first months of the war, was a superb administrator and immediately set to work to drill and reorganize the Union troops. By October he had a well-trained force of 100,000 men; but, despite the pressure of both Lincoln and public opinion in the North, he refused to undertake an offensive against the 50,000 Confederates under Johnston's command. Throughout the winter of 1861-2, McClellan, who in November had been made commander in chief of all Union forces following Scott's resignation, remained in winter quarters while Congress and the Union press ranted against his dilatory tactics. The repeated announcements of "all quiet along the Potomac" accurately described the situation and infuriated those Northerners who had expected a short and glorious war.

In March, 1862, after Lincoln had given specific orders for an advance, McClellan began to transfer his army to the peninsula that lies between the James and York rivers; and by May 1 he had assembled 112,000 men at Fortress Monroe. By slow stages he pushed forward until at the end of the month his advance guards were less than five miles from Richmond. Then on May 31, Johnston attacked at Seven Pines in a two-day battle that proved indecisive. Johnston, however, was wounded, and Lee was named commander of all the "armies in eastern Virginia and North Carolina." Lee immediately began preparations for an of-

fensive. On June 18, J. E. B. Stuart at the head of 1,200 men was sent on a reconnoitering expedition that was to take him clear around the entire Union army, and Jackson was recalled from the Shenandoah Valley, where his troops had inflicted a series of severe defeats on much larger Federal forces in this region. On June 26, Lee began the attack that inaugurated the Seven Days Battles (Mechanicsville, June 26; Gaines Mill, June 27; Savage Station, June 29; Frayser's Farm, June 30; and Malvern Hill, July 1). At the end of the week-long struggle, Confederate casualties were twice as large as those inflicted on the Union army, but McClellan had been compelled to retreat twenty miles to Harrison's Landing on the James. McClellan then proposed that he cross the James and approach Richmond from the south. But this plan was vetoed by General Henry W. Halleck, who had now been named general in chief. McClellan was removed and ordered to Aquia Creek on the Potomac; and General John Pope, who had served in the West, assumed command of the "Army of Virginia" on the Rappahannock. Lee attacked Pope at the end of August, and in the second battle of Bull Run (August 29-30, 1862) a Confederate army of 48,000 overwhelmingly defeated a Federal force of 75,000. Lee's losses were only 9,000 in contrast to Pope's 16,000, and once again Washington was saved from capture by torrential rains that made the roads impassable.

The second battle of Bull Run marked the nadir of the Union's military fortunes, and before the North could recover, Lee invaded Maryland. By this move he hoped to cut the North's east-west communications, find a new source of supply for his army, and to weaken the Northern desire to continue the war. After crossing the Potomac at Leesburg, Virginia, he sent part of his army under Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry while he advanced with the remainder toward Hagerstown. But McClellan, who had been restored to his command after Pope's defeat at Bull Run, learned of these plans after one of Lee's orders had been intercepted. Lee, nevertheless, had time to reunite his army and take up positions on Antietam Creek. In the ensuing battle of Antietam (September 17), McClellan was able to check Lee's northern advance. Both sides, however, claimed a victory, and because McClellan made no move to press his advantage, Lee was able to recross the Potomac without interference on September 19.

Despite repeated requests from Lincoln, McClellan did not cross into Virginia until October 26. But Lincoln had already lost his patience with McClellan, and on November 5, he dismissed "Little Mac" and replaced him with General Ambrose Burnside. Within a month the Union armies were again on the march. Lee, however, had established his army in entrenched positions at Fredericksburg on the south side of the Rappahannock. At noon on December 13, 1862, Burnside's troops crossed the Rappahannock and began a frontal assault on the Confed-

erate fortifications on the hillside. For the rest of the day the Southerners mowed down the advancing Federals in a great slaughter in which Burnside's losses totalled 12,600 to 5,300 for the Confederates. Two days later Burnside retired to the north side of the river, and on January 25, 1863, he was replaced by General Joseph ("Fighting Joe") Hooker.

By April, 1863, Hooker had 130,000 men across the Rappahannock, and once again the Union forces were advancing along the short—but seemingly endless—road to Richmond. As in the past, it was Lee who picked the time and place of the decisive battle, and on May 2, he launched his attack in a wooded area of thickets and underbrush known as the "Wilderness." While part of the Confederate army under Jackson rolled back Hooker's right flank west of Chancellorsville, another force under Lee drove against the Union troops from the east. After three days of fighting, the Union army was forced to withdraw despite its two-to-one numerical superiority. Lincoln still had not found a general who could outthink and outmaneuver Lee. Chancellorsville was one of Lee's most brilliant victories, but it was also one of his costliest, for on May 2, Jackson was wounded, and eight days later he died.

It was in the West rather than in Virginia that the Union armies under the leadership of General Ulysses S. Grant demonstrated their fighting ability during the opening years of the war. A graduate of West Point and veteran of the Mexican War, Grant had resigned from the regular army in the 1850's to avoid being courtmartialed for drunkenness. At the outbreak of the Civil War he had assumed command of an Illinois regiment, and within a few months he had risen to the rank of brigadier-general. Despite the objections of Halleck, who in November, 1861 had been placed in charge of all the Union forces in the West, Grant drew up plans for an offensive against the Confederate positions in northeastern Tennessee. On February 6, 1862, he won his first victory when Fort Henry surrendered after a bombardment by Union gunboats commanded by Commodore Andrew Foote. A week later he made an unsuccessful attack against Fort Donelson; but when the Confederates attempted to fight their way out of the trap into which Grant had maneuvered them, they were repulsed, and on February 15, Grant accepted the "unconditional and immediate surrender" of the fort's 12,000 defenders.

Because Halleck did not permit Grant to follow up his victory at Fort Donelson, General Albert Sidney Johnston was able to assemble a Confederate force of approximately 40,000 at Corinth on the Tennessee-Mississippi border. In the early spring, Grant began to advance on Corinth; but before he reached his objective, he was attacked by Johnston near Pittsburg Landing. In the two-day battle of Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862), in which both sides claimed a victory, Johnston was killed, Grant was caught napping, and the Union forces made no attempt to inter-

fere with the withdrawal of the Confederates to Corinth. Halleck then assumed personal command of Grant's army, and on May 30, 1862 he occupied Corinth without a battle. Although the Army of the West was relatively inactive for the remainder of the year, by July 1 the Navy under Admiral David G. Farragut had captured New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Natchez. Meanwhile Halleck was transferred to Washington to be general in chief, and Grant was placed in charge of all the Union forces in western Tennessee and northern Mississippi.

Farragut's victories had given the North control over all of the Mississippi except the region around the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg. Grant was determined to capture Vicksburg at any cost. Defended by 30,000 Confederates under General J. C. Pemberton, Vicksburg was inaccessible from the river because of the high bluffs on which it rested, while on the north it was guarded by extensive swamps and bayous. Grant at first tried to take it from the north with a force of 30,000 led by General William T. Sherman and then by digging a canal to divert the course of the Mississippi; but when both these attempts failed, he decided to cross the river below Vicksburg and attack the city from the southwest. By May 1, his army was on the east bank of the Mississippi sixty miles below Vicksburg. In the next three weeks, Grant met and defeated the Confederates on five different occasions and then bottled Pemberton up in Vicksburg. After two frontal assaults against the city had failed, Grant besieged Vicksburg until July 4, when Pemberton surrendered. Many historians have attributed Grant's victory to bull-headed determination rather than military genius; but regardless of how his ability is assessed, he deserves the principal credit for placing the entire Mississippi in Union hands and for cutting off the Southwest from the rest of the Confederacy.

139. FROM GETTYSBURG TO APPOMATTOX

THE FALL of Vicksburg coincided with Lee's defeat at Gettysburg. Desiring to capitalize on the North's war weariness, Lee had decided in early June to invade Maryland and Pennsylvania. Crossing the Potomac near Harper's Ferry on June 25, 1863, he reached Pennsylvania before the end of the month. Although Hooker thought that Lee's invasion of the North presented the Union with a priceless opportunity to take Richmond, he was instructed by Lincoln to keep his army between the Confederate force and Washington. But on June 28, Hooker resigned after a disagreement with Halleck, and General George G. Meade took over his command. Three days later, advance units of the Confederate and Union forces met outside Gettysburg

in the opening skirmishes of the most important battle of the Civil War. In the fighting during the remainder of the day, the Federal troops were forced to give ground along the entire line, and on the morning of July 2, they had only a precarious hold on Cemetery Ridge, while the Confederates were drawn up in full strength on Seminary Ridge a mile away. On the second day of the battle Lee had hoped to outflank the Union forces with a dawn attack on Little Round Top at the southern extremity of Meade's position; but General James Longstreet delayed his offensive until four o'clock in the afternoon. By then it was too late, for the Federals had had time to dig in, and could not be dislodged. After the Confederates had failed to capture Little Round Top, Lee had no alternative but to launch a frontal assault, and on July 3, General George E. Pickett led ten thousand men on their famous charge against the Union center. Moving across the shallow valley separating the two lines with the precision of troops on a parade ground, most of the Confederates were cut down by artillery fire. A few reached the stone wall on top of Cemetery Ridge, but Pickett's charge was repulsed, and the South had lost the battle of Gettysburg. The next day Lee began his retreat to Virginia. The Confederacy had suffered the worst defeat in its brief history, but Meade made no attempt to annihilate Lee's battered army, which crossed the Potomac for the last time on July 13.

During the period of comparative calm that followed the battle of Gettysburg on the eastern front, the Union armies undertook an advance in the West. General William Rosecrans, having occupied Chattanooga on September 9, 1863, without a fight, was attacked on September 19 at Chickamauga Creek by a Confederate army commanded by General Braxton Bragg. Although Rosecrans' right and center gave way before the Confederate assault, the left under General George H. Thomas stood firm and prevented a complete rout of the Union troops. After the battle, the Federal forces retreated to Chattanooga, while Bragg took up positions on nearby Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Grant, who had recently been placed in charge of all Union operations in the West, reached Chattanooga on October 23 and was soon joined by Sherman with the Army of the Tennessee. On November 23, Grant attacked, and in a two-day battle Bragg's troops were driven from both Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Bragg then withdrew to Georgia, and Grant was promoted to lieutenant-general and given command over all Northern forces.

In March, 1864, Grant arrived in Washington to take over the conduct of the war in Virginia, and Sherman prepared for a drive into the Deep South from Tennessee. When Sherman began his advance in May, 1864, at the head of 100,000 Union veterans, his principal objective was Atlanta. With an army of only 53,000 Confederates, General Joseph Johnston could at best only delay Sherman. In early July, after

victories at Resaca, New Hope Church, and Kenesaw Mountain, Sherman was within sight of Atlanta. General J. B. Hood, who had succeeded Johnston, made a futile effort to turn back the Federal troops at Peach Tree Creek (July 20) and at Ezra Church (July 28), and on September 2 Sherman entered Atlanta. Hood then marched into Tennessee, where he was overwhelmingly defeated by Thomas at Nashville on December 15-16.

Sherman, after burning Atlanta, set out for the sea in mid-November with 60,000 troops. Living off the country and destroying the property that could be of any conceivable value to the Confederacy, Sherman more than made good his boast that he would "make Georgia howl." By December 10, Sherman had reached Savannah, and within two weeks he was able to present the city to Lincoln as a Christmas gift. Turning northward in February, he entered South Carolina, where his army repeated the tactics that it had perfected on its famous march to the sea.

While Sherman was laying waste to large areas in the Carolinas, Grant at the head of more than 100,000 men was fighting the final Union campaign against Lee in Virginia. The forces of the war's two leading generals met for the first time in the Wilderness on May 5-6, 1864, and Lee handled Grant in much the same fashion that he had Hooker a year earlier. Although Union losses were 18,000, Grant immediately resumed his advance, and at Spottsylvania Court House he lost another 12,000 men in a five-day battle (May 8-12). Nevertheless, once more Grant pushed forward, and on June 3, 1864, his army suffered its most crushing defeat of the campaign at Cold Harbor. In a month, Lee, with a force that was half the size of Grant's, had deprived the Union commander of the services of approximately 50,000 soldiers.

Following the battle of Cold Harbor, Grant crossed the James and Lee dug in at Petersburg. After Union troops had been repulsed in a four-day attack (June 15-18), Grant settled down to a siege. Grant could afford to wait, for he was confident of Sherman's ultimate success in the Deep South, and he knew that his own army would never want for either supplies or men. Lee's forces, on the other hand, consisted of approximately 40,000 ragged and often barefooted soldiers who were short of both food and ammunition and whose ranks were daily depleted by desertions. At the end of July, Grant's army tried unsuccessfully to dislodge the Confederates by mining a 5,000 foot tunnel, while Lee hoped that General Jubal A. Early's exploits in the Shenandoah Valley would force the Federals to send a major part of the army attacking Petersburg to the defense of Washington. At one point, Early was only five miles from the Union capitol, but Grant sent General Philip Sheridan to the valley with a force that was many times larger than Early's. With victories at Winchester (September 19), Fisher's Hill (Septem-

ber 22), and Cedar Creek (October 19), Sheridan destroyed all Confederate resistance in the Shenandoah and so devastated the region that "a crow flying over the country would have to carry his own rations."

By February, 1865, Lee's position had become desperate. Grant had begun to extend his lines south of Petersburg, Sherman was on his way north, and the underfed, poorly clothed Confederate troops were suffering untold hardships in the frozen trenches. A month later, when Sheridan rejoined Grant, the Confederate situation became even more hopeless. On April 2, after an attack the day before at Five Forks had failed, Lee led his 30,000 veterans on their last retreat. Moving westward from Petersburg, Lee reached Amelia Courthouse on April 4 only to learn that the provisions that he expected had not arrived. For four more days the half-starved, exhausted remnants of a once-glorious army struggled on with Grant in close pursuit. But on April 9, Lee, realizing that his army could neither retreat nor fight, surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Courthouse. Under Grant's terms, officers and men of the Confederate army were released on parole. The Union commander also permitted the Confederate artillerymen and cavalymen to keep their horses for use on their farms. On April 26, Sherman accepted Johnston's surrender in North Carolina.

140. FINANCING THE WAR

THE CIVIL WAR, like all wars, was expensive. The total cost in money was about \$5,000,000,000 for the North and \$3,000,000,000 for the South; or, together, three or four times the estimated value of all the slaves in the Confederacy. Neither side was prepared at the outset to meet this enormous financial strain, and before the conflict was over, both sections were forced to resort to nearly every known expedient to obtain necessary funds.

When Lincoln issued his first call for volunteers in 1861, Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase was confronted with a virtually empty treasury and an income insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of government. Chase recommended that revenue for ordinary expenditures, for interest on the public debt, and for a sinking fund to extinguish the debt be raised by taxation and that the expenses of the war be met entirely with borrowed funds. In view of the economic strength of the North, this policy was a blunder, but Chase apparently feared that any great increase in taxes might cause businessmen to become hostile to the war and the Administration. Furthermore, Chase, who opposed high taxes on democratic principles, believed that the war

would be of short duration. Although receipts from taxation increased enormously as the war progressed, they were still greatly overbalanced by the amount obtained from loans.

Taxation took various forms, of which one of the most important was the tariff. When Lincoln took the oath of office, the United States was very nearly on a free-trade basis. Under the tariff of 1857, duties on many articles had been lowered and the free list had been enlarged. The income of the Federal government, which had averaged more than \$68,000,000 annually during Pierce's administration (1853-7), had dropped to \$46,500,000 in 1858; during the next three years deficits had accumulated to the amount of \$50,000,000, and the government had been compelled to resort to borrowing to pay its bills. To balance the budget and to afford more adequate protection for "home interests," the Republicans, under the leadership of Justin Morrill of Vermont, succeeded in securing the adoption of a tariff measure in March, 1861, which it was thought would increase the revenues of the government and insure moderate protection to American manufactures. This law was revised in 1862 and again from time to time until finally, by the act of 1864, the average rate of duties on all imports was advanced to 47 per cent, the highest in the history of the country up to that time. This war measure, enacted ostensibly to protect the Northern manufacturer from foreign competition and thus to enable him to pay heavy internal taxes, marked the beginning of a new tariff policy under which manufacturing was to become more profitable than ever before.

Coincident with the increase in tariff rates, in 1862 Congress passed a sweeping internal revenue law. Guided by the principle that it was better to impose moderate duties upon a large number of goods than excessive duties upon a few, its framers provided for a variety of taxes, including levies upon liquor and tobacco, manufactures and manufactured products, auction sales, carriages and yachts, billiard tables, railroads, steamboats, and ferry boats, meat, banking institutions and insurance companies, advertisements and inheritances, and upon salaries and pay of officers in the service of the United States. The law also provided for an elaborate system of stamp duties and licenses for occupations. Its far-reaching character was summarized by a critic who said that it imposed a tax upon virtually

every article which enters into the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot; upon everything which is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste; upon warmth, light and locomotion; upon the sauces which pamper man's appetite and the drug that restores him to health; upon the poor man's salt and the rich man's spice.

No industry and no occupation escaped taxation, and in 1864 the rates were increased. It was a new experience for a country that had been

free from internal taxation for more than a generation. To what extent these taxes were passed on to the ultimate consumer has never been ascertained. The tax on incomes, although it came under the category of internal revenue, was something quite new in the annals of American taxation. First levied in 1861, it authorized a 3 per cent tax on incomes above \$800. In 1862 and again in 1865 the law was amended to tax all incomes between \$600 and \$5000 at 5 per cent and above \$5000 at 10 per cent. From the outset there was considerable opposition to this tax, and the inadequate machinery for enforcing it made evasion easy. Moreover, the greater part of the revenue derived from it was not received until the war was over.

The government embarked on a policy of large-scale borrowing in the summer of 1861, when Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow not more than \$25,000,000. To float such a loan was not easy. There was only a small amount of gold in the country, and commercial concerns naturally competed for it with the government. Then, too, many of those who had money were reluctant to lend it, for there was as yet no certainty of a Northern victory. Early reverses suffered by the Federal troops and the unfriendly attitude of Great Britain and France made the outlook extremely dubious. Despite these and other handicaps, Chase, with the assistance of a group of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston bankers succeeded in obtaining \$150,000,000 in 1861 on three-year notes bearing 7.3 per cent interest, and in disposing of \$50,000,000 worth of twenty-year 6 per cent bonds. But the cost of the war averaged \$2,000,000 a day, and the funds from these first loans did not last long. The money had scarcely been received before Chase requested additional funds, and from the beginning of 1862 until the close of the war the government borrowed repeatedly. Many bonds were sold to the banks at a rate below par, to be resold by them to the public at a profit. Jay Cooke, a Philadelphia banker who was allowed a commission of .005 per cent on all bonds sold up to \$10,000,000 and .0375 per cent on all sums above that amount, organized a country-wide system for disposing of them. In less than a year this experienced banker and his twenty-five hundred agents, by recourse to the appeal that it was the patriotic duty of every person to buy a bond, sold \$400,000,000 worth of "five-twenties." All these loans lacked uniformity. Some were sixty-day loans and others, like the "ten-forties," were redeemable at the option of the government in from ten to forty years; some bore compound interest, others did not; some were paid for in gold, others in paper money; some carried the express stipulation that they should be redeemed in coin, others made no mention of the medium of redemption.

Because of the rapidly mounting military expenditures, the inadequacy of the tax receipts, and the inability of the treasury at times to

dispose of its bonds except at a great discount, the government was forced early in the war to resort to the issuance of fiat, or paper, money. The first issue of \$150,000,000, authorized by the Legal Tender Act of February, 1862, was followed by another of \$150,000,000 in June of the same year. Two more issues were authorized in January and March, 1863, for \$100,000,000 and \$50,000,000 respectively. Of the \$450,000,000 thus authorized, \$431,000,000 was outstanding in June, 1864. All this currency was in the form of noninterest-bearing notes, unsupported by specie reserve, and dependent for ultimate redemption upon the good faith and the future financial solvency of the government—in short, a forced loan, without interest, from the people. Moreover, these “greenbacks” were made receivable at face value and constituted legal tender for all debts except duties on imports and interest on the public debt, which were to be payable in coin. Following the Northern victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the sale of government bonds increased, and no paper money was issued for the remainder of the war.

As soon as it became known that the government was contemplating the use of paper money, opposition arose. Metropolitan papers, with few exceptions, denounced the proposal as dangerous and contrary to every principle of sound finance. Morrill of Vermont spoke of it as “a measure not blessed by one sound precedent and damned by all.” Bankers and their representatives hastened to Washington, where they sought to induce the government to adopt some other policy. But the demand for greenbacks was too strong. The bankers and their spokesmen were branded as “usurers” and “note shavers,” and the greenbacks’ supporters asserted that the government should free itself from the grip of the “money monopoly.”

The vicissitudes of war, the abundance of the greenbacks, speculators’ manipulations, and the fact that the paper currency was not only too plentiful but was not full legal tender, caused violent fluctuations in its value, with a marked trend toward depreciation. In January, 1862, \$1.00 in paper currency was worth .98 cents in gold, but twelve months later its value had dropped to \$.69. In the summer of 1864, it reached the low point of \$.39, and at the close of the war it stood at \$.67. Depreciation quickly led to an increase in the premium on the precious metals and to a rise in commodity prices. The workingman’s wages, though in many instances they increased, lagged behind the cost of living.

With the rise in the premium on precious metals, silver coins disappeared from circulation. In desperation, cities and business establishments issued their own paper money and metallic substitutes. Congress in July, 1862, authorized the use of postage stamps, but this inconvenient medium was replaced in March, 1863, with fractional paper currency, or “shinplasters,” as they were commonly called. Before the war was over, \$50,000,000 of these noninterest-bearing paper notes had

been authorized. Issued in denominations as low as three cents, they proved a most serviceable addition to the currency of the country.

Northern finances were also directly affected by the establishment of the National Banking System. For a number of years before the outbreak of the war there had been a growing sentiment that Congress should enact a national currency law that, among other things, would regulate the banking business of the country. Several arguments in favor of such a law were advanced. In the first place, its advocates declared that it would make for uniformity and standardization of currency. On January 1, 1862, there were approximately fifteen hundred banking institutions in the United States that enjoyed the power to issue banknotes. Chartered under the laws of twenty-nine different states, possessing different privileges, and subject to different restrictions, they issued a variety of currency differing widely in quality and in amount. In some states, boards of bank commissioners made frequent and thorough examinations; in others such boards did not exist or existed in name only. More than seven thousand different kinds of banknotes circulated in addition to thousands of counterfeits and altered notes. Some of these notes had adequate security behind them; many had little or none. The substitution of national banknotes for the paper issues of the state banks, it was argued, would provide the country with a standardized currency. Secondly, national control was advanced as a guarantee of a more evenly distributed currency. Currency issued by the state banks was subject to violent contractions and expansions. Moreover, as the majority of the state banks were located in the older settled regions of the country, the East enjoyed a larger banknote circulation than did the West. New England in 1862, for example, had a note circulation of \$50,000,000, whereas Ohio, with a population three fourths as large, had a circulation of only \$9,000,000. A third important argument was that the establishment of national control would strengthen the spirit of nationalism, obtain for the government the more cordial backing of the business interests, and enable the Federal Treasury to market its bonds to better advantage. In helping to float the early bond issues the state banks had obtained substantial profits. A properly drafted national banking act, it was argued, would relieve the government of the necessity of making bad bargains with these private institutions. The state banks did not favor the proposed legislation, and when it was recommended by the Secretary of the Treasury in 1861, they were able to prevent it. An act of 1863, however, together with an amending act of 1864, provided for the organization of national banking associations. Each association was required to buy Federal bonds to the extent of one third of its capital (the minimum capital was fixed at \$50,000 for places under 6,000 population, \$100,000 for places not exceeding 50,000, and \$200,000 for larger cities) and to deposit them with the treasurer of the

United States as security for circulating banknotes that it might issue up to 90 per cent of the market value of the bonds it owned. Interest on the bonds was to be paid to the banking association depositing them, and the government guaranteed the ultimate redemption of the banknotes. Provision was also made for national supervision of the entire system. The slowness with which the state banks accepted the new system caused Congress in 1865 to levy an annual tax of 10 per cent on all state banknotes. This law had the desired effect, and by the end of 1865 there were 11,582 national banks with over \$400,000,000 capital, possessing \$440,000,000 of government bonds and circulating notes amounting to \$213,000,000. Except for its failure to furnish an elastic currency capable of expanding and contracting in response to the needs of trade, the National Banking Act accomplished the results expected of it.

Funds for the Confederate war chest were derived from sources similar to those of the North. When the war broke out, the Confederacy at once seized about \$1,000,000 belonging to the Washington government—practically all the money in the branches of the United States Mint and in the customhouses in the South. To conserve its specie supply and to harass the North, it also enacted a law in 1861 prohibiting the payment of private debts to Northern creditors and directing that such debts be paid into the Confederate treasury. Additional revenue to finance the war, it confidently expected, would be derived in part from the sale of cotton, tobacco, and other Southern staples. But when the Northern blockade quickly and effectually shattered this plan, the South was forced to turn to taxation, loans, and paper money.

Acting reluctantly on the recommendation of C. G. Memminger, Secretary of the Treasury, the Confederate Congress in August, 1861, levied a direct tax of .005 per cent on all property except Confederate bonds and money. There were certain exemptions—for instance, for the property of religious, charitable, and educational institutions. In accordance with the Confederate constitution, the tax was apportioned among the states. As in the days of the Revolution, the states either refused to act or raised their respective quotas by issuing bonds or paper money, and only Texas made any effort to raise the necessary amount by means of taxation. After the direct tax on property had proved unsatisfactory, the Confederate legislature adopted an internal revenue measure in 1863 that provided for excise duties on naval stores, salt, liquors, tobacco, and other produce payable in kind. Although the rates for both direct and indirect taxes were increased during the last years of the war, it is impossible to estimate the exact effect of the increase in tax rates on Southern finances.

From the beginning of the struggle, the South resorted to borrowing to finance its military program. As early as February, 1861, the Secretary

of the Treasury was authorized to float a \$15,000,000 8 per cent bond issue that effectively drained the Southern banks of most of their specie. This loan was followed by a number of bond issues payable in produce, which gave the government possession of considerable quantities of cotton, tobacco, sugar, naval stores, and other commodities. These staples were used as security in floating a \$15,000,000 bond issue in Europe in 1863, which netted the Confederacy only about \$6,250,000. In addition, the states of the South issued bonds for war purposes.

Because of the meagerness of its credit resources the South was compelled to rely chiefly on issues of irredeemable paper money. Printings followed one another in rapid succession until by 1864 more than \$1,000,000,000 of Confederate treasury notes were in circulation in addition to the varied assortment of paper currency issued by states, municipalities, banks, factories, railroads, turnpike and insurance companies, and other private concerns. As in the North, postage stamps and "shin-plasters" added to the profusion of fiat money. In less than six months after the first issue this unsecured paper began to depreciate. In March, 1861, \$1.00 in gold would exchange for \$1.00 in paper; in March, 1862, for \$1.30; in March, 1863, for \$4.10; in March, 1864, for \$22; in March, 1865, for \$61; during the last days of the war, Confederate paper money was worthless.

141. ATTITUDE OF EUROPE TOWARD THE WAR

THROUGHOUT the war the leaders of both sections were aware that the outcome of the struggle might depend on the attitude of Europe. If the Federal government could successfully cut the South off from commercial intercourse with the outside world, and if, while preventing the exchange of Southern staples for European manufactured goods, it could also avoid provoking foreign nations to diplomatic or military intervention, it could be reasonably certain of ultimate victory. If the Confederacy, on the other hand, could secure European recognition and military aid, the chances were strong that it would win. Consequently, the foreign and many of the domestic policies of the rivals throughout the war were framed in the light of their probable effect on the major European powers.

No factor was perhaps more influential in deciding the fate of the Confederacy and in shaping European sentiment than the enforced economic isolation of the South. The war was only a few days old when President Lincoln on April 19, 1861, issued a proclamation blockading the ports of the Confederacy. Within a remarkably short time the South found it difficult to market its tobacco and cotton or to obtain ade-

quate supplies and manufactures from abroad. Cotton exports, which amounted to \$202,000,000 in 1860, fell to \$42,000,000 in 1861, and \$4,000,000 in 1862. Ordinary commodities like salt, tea, coffee, soap, matches, and drygoods became extremely scarce. The conveniences and comforts of life to which the well-to-do were accustomed were difficult to obtain. Southern newspapers were forced to decrease their size and in some instances were printed on brown wrapping paper of home manufacture.

The effect of the blockade on Europe, while not as disastrous as on the South, was, nevertheless, important. Great Britain, with 2,650 cotton factories that housed more than twice as many spindles as all the other European nations combined, was cut off from the source of most of its raw material. At the time the blockade was proclaimed, England was overstocked with raw cotton, and cotton manufactures were a glut on the market. Manufacturers therefore welcomed the decrease in cotton importations, for it enabled them to dispose of their finished goods on hand at high prices. Part of England's oversupply of cotton was even reshipped to America during the early months of the war at prices considerably in advance of the original cost. By the end of 1862, however, England and France were confronted with a cotton famine. English importations from America, declined from 2,580,700 bales in 1860 to 1,841,600 bales in 1861, and to less than 72,000 bales in 1862. Cotton mills were forced to close, and a half-million operatives who were thrown out of work became dependent on public and private charity. Similar conditions prevailed in the cotton-manufacturing districts of France. In one department more than a hundred thousand laborers, forced into idleness, had to depend on alms for subsistence. Bankers who loaned money and businessmen who had sold supplies to the Confederacy on a cotton security basis became alarmed as the blockade tightened and cotton importations fell off. Cotton manufacturers and affiliated banking and commercial interests began to urge the recognition of the Confederacy and the breaking of the blockade.

Apart from the questions of cotton supply, markets, and the blockade, the government circles in Great Britain and other leading European states were inclined to favor, or at least to sympathize with, the South. The aristocracy of the Old World rejoiced at the prospect of the permanent disruption of the powerful Western democracy. The English privileged classes feared that a Northern victory would strengthen the democratic movement in England. The upper classes of Europe looked upon the Southern planter as an aristocrat with whom they had much in common. Finally, many Europeans, like Napoleon III, felt that the disruption of the United States would nullify the Monroe doctrine and open up new opportunities for the European acquisition of American territory.

Fortunately for the North, the pressure of these powerful influences was counterbalanced by others. The people of Europe were far from unified in sentiment or in policy toward the American struggle. Although the British aristocracy and Napoleon III openly favored the South, they distrusted each other, and this fact was in some measure responsible for their failure to agree on any common plan of action. Napoleon on more than one occasion proposed that the two nations co-operate in mediating between the warring sections, but each time Great Britain objected. Napoleon was unwilling to intervene alone, because he was afraid intervention would mean war with the North and partly because he feared that if such a war broke out, Prussia, Russia, Austria, Sardinia, and possibly Great Britain would promptly take advantage of his distraction.

The British rejection of the French proposals, however, was due not so much to mutual distrust as to lack of unanimity in Great Britain itself and to the course of events in America. The majority of the English aristocracy—as well as of the manufacturers and the commercial class, whose interests were adversely affected by the blockade—strongly sympathized with the South. Whatever moral compunctions these groups may have entertained respecting slavery were apparently subordinated by their strong sympathy for the cotton planter and by their desire for profits. A minority of the ruling class and the leaders of five or six million unenfranchised wage earners did not share this sympathy and unreservedly sided with the North. In their opinion, the South was fighting for the institution of slavery. Throughout the war, John Bright, Richard Cobden, William Forster, John Stuart Mill, Thorold Rogers, and many others actively campaigned in favor of the North. Anti-slavery societies were formed, hundreds of meetings addressed, and tons of literature distributed. Although the majority of the meetings were held in London and in the great manufacturing districts about Manchester, no part of England or Scotland was neglected. To counteract pro-Northern efforts, James Spence, William Lindsay, and other Southern propagandists staged mass meetings and drafted giant petitions. Both Federal and Confederate sympathizers used slush funds freely among the ignorant, poverty-stricken industrial workers of England who were sorely in need of the necessities of life. To what extent the docile, unenfranchised English worker influenced his government is difficult to say.

That neither England nor France nor any other European nation recognized the Confederacy as an independent state was due in no small measure to the course of military events in America. In the late summer of 1862, when Great Britain and France were inclining toward intervention, MacClellan checked Lee at the battle of Antietam. Lord Palmerstown, the British Prime Minister, who had been expecting a

great Southern victory, at once expressed doubt whether the moment was ripe for European overtures or recognition. Proposals for immediate action soon gave way to hesitation and cautious delay. Less than a year later, Vicksburg fell, and Lee was turned back at Gettysburg. These victories ended, or at least indefinitely postponed, the execution of any plans for recognition of the South.

Another event that kept Europe neutral was the announcement of emancipation. Anti-slavery sentiment was particularly strong in England, and many Englishmen found it difficult to support the North as long as Lincoln insisted that the Federal government had no intention of abolishing slavery. But Lincoln's emancipation proclamations (September 22, 1862, and January 1, 1863), and the growth of the subsequent movement for widespread emancipation removed many doubts as to the purpose of the war and strengthened the position of those who favored the North.

The dependence of Great Britain on Northern wheat during the greater part of the war period also probably served in considerable measure to keep the Old World neutral. By 1860 the United Kingdom had become a great wheat-importing country. Wheat imports, which had averaged only 900,000 quarters for the decade 1830-40, increased to 5,030,000 quarters for the decade 1850-60. Most of this imported grain came from the United States, Russia, Germany, and France. A succession of crop failures at home during the three-year period 1860-2 made it necessary for Great Britain to import nearly one half its wheat supply. Largely because of short harvests, the wheat-producing regions of continental Europe, Egypt, and South America were unable to meet this demand; consequently, Great Britain had to turn to the wheat-growing states of the North. Some notion of Great Britain's dependence may be gained from the fact that the wheat exports of the United States mounted from 17,500,000 bushels in 1860 to 53,000,000 bushels in 1861 and to 62,000,000 bushels in 1862. Moreover, America's wheat was most needed at the very time when there was an oversupply of cotton. In the industrial centers, Bright, Forster, and others stressed the possibility of a wheat famine if England and the United States should go to war. Again it is difficult to determine to what extent, if any, the British government was influenced by this consideration. There is some reason to believe that the threat of a wheat famine was Federal propaganda. Certainly it was not discussed in Parliament or by the cabinet. With few exceptions the British press ridiculed the idea, and the *Times* pointed out that without wheat shipments to England, the United States would have been unable to pay for its tremendous purchases of war materials in Europe during these years.

Northern diplomacy also helped to keep Europe neutral. In Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy Adams, the North had a minister at

the Court of St. James's admirably suited by education, family, and character for the difficult tasks of war time. Equipped with a keen intellect, possessed of wide knowledge of European affairs, and renowned for his calm judgment, Adams was particularly fitted to deal with the British government. Diplomatic representatives of high caliber were also sent to the continental countries.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all the reasons for England's failure to intervene, was the item of war profits. Not only British cotton manufacturers but those interested in the linen and woollen industries obtained large profits. Excess profits in linens alone had mounted to nearly \$100,000,000 by 1865. Another business that prospered during these years was the munitions industry. Exclusive of clothing, tents, shoes and leather goods, Great Britain sold the American belligerents approximately \$100,000,000 worth of war supplies. Blockade runners and shipbuilders became increasingly aware of the advantages of neutrality as the profits rolled in. The American merchant marine was practically driven from the seas, and its business fell largely to England.

142. EUROPEAN AID FOR THE CONFEDERACY

FAILURE to recognize the South as a sovereign nation, however, did not prevent both England and France, and to a much lesser extent Spain, from actions distinctly favorable to the Confederacy. Each, by issuing a proclamation of neutrality, recognized the South as a belligerent. Both Great Britain and France allowed their ports to be used as bases of operation against Northern commerce. Confederate raiders like the *Alabama* and the *Florida*, built and equipped in British harbors, destroyed Northern shipping worth millions of dollars. At first the North protested in vain against this manifest infringement of neutrality, and not until after the Union victories of 1863 and Adams' forceful warning to the British Foreign Office that the "escape" of any more vessels destined for the Confederate service would be an act of war did the British government take steps to enforce its neutrality obligations.

The *Trent* affair came closer than any other event to causing an open rupture between Great Britain and the North. In 1861 the Confederacy sent James M. Mason and John Slidell to England and France respectively to work for Southern recognition. Eluding the blockade at Charleston, they reached Havana and took passage for Liverpool on the British steamer *Trent*. When one day out from Havana, the *Trent* was stopped by the *San Jacinto*, an American man-of-war commanded by Captain Charles Wilkes, and the Confederate commissioners and

their secretaries were taken off by force and carried to Boston, where they were held as prisoners. Wilkes had acted "without orders," but the news of his exploit was received by the people of the North with enthusiasm. The press proclaimed him a hero, and the House of Representatives gave him a vote of thanks for his "brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct." Great Britain viewed the matter differently. A neutral vessel sailing from one neutral port to another had been held up on the high seas and "searched." Forgetting the War of 1812, the English denounced Wilkes' action as an affront to the nation. An American living in London at the time wrote Seward that "there never was within memory such a burst of feeling as has been created by the news of the boarding of the *Trent*. The people are frantic with rage, and were the country polled I fear 999 men out of a thousand would declare for immediate war. Lord Palmerston cannot resist the impulse if he would." The British government under threat of war demanded the instant release of the commissioners and an apology. The navy, arsenals, and dockyards were put on a war footing, and eight thousand soldiers were hurried off to Halifax to the tune of "Dixie." Fortunately for the Federal government, the British demand was softened, and by the time it reached the United States—there being no cable or wireless—public anger on both sides had cooled. Moreover, since Wilkes' action ran counter to America's traditional policy regarding the freedom of the seas, it seemed wise to yield, and on December 26, Lincoln ordered the release of the detained commissioners. By this action the United States ended what for a time looked like a fairly certain prospect of armed aid and recognition for the South.

Napoleon III, to whom neutrality obligations meant even less than they did to the British Ministry, supported the British in the *Trent* affair; at the same time he sanctioned the construction of Confederate commerce-destroyers in French shipyards, indirectly assured the Confederate agents that such vessels might be fitted out in French ports, and sought to set up a puppet regime in Mexico. Victimized by foreign investors, mismanagement, and revolution, Mexico had accumulated during the years preceding the outbreak of the Civil War a foreign debt of more than \$80,000,000. Of this amount she owed English bankers \$69,000,000, French \$9,000,000, and Spanish a much smaller amount. Unable to collect their debts, the creditor banks appealed to their respective governments for assistance. After some delay, during which the three powers concerned endeavored without success to induce the United States to join them in intervening in Mexican affairs, in 1861 they seized Vera Cruz and other coast towns. But when Napoleon, who hoped to re-establish a French empire in the New World, suggested the capture of the Mexican capital and the reconstruction of the Mexican government—a procedure contrary to the original agreement of the

allies—the British and Spanish withdrew. Backed by a Mexican faction composed for the most part of clericals, the French captured Mexico City and set up a monarchy with Maximilian of Austria, brother of Francis Joseph, as Emperor.

Before the coming of the French the Confederacy had cultivated the friendship of the Mexicans and had formulated various schemes for gaining ultimate control of Mexican territory. Consequently, there was reason to believe that the Confederates would redouble their efforts to secure French recognition and that they would also undoubtedly seek an alliance with the Maximilian government. Many Northerners, citing the Monroe Doctrine, wanted the Federal government to take immediate action. Aware that such a policy might lead to a war with France at a time when the United States was conducting a far more important struggle, Seward at first refrained from any mention of the Monroe Doctrine and tactfully notified Napoleon that the American people were not in sympathy with his Mexican project. After Appomattox, however, in more peremptory language he insisted that the French withdraw. Napoleon, faced by domestic opposition and danger from the Prussians and realizing that the United States was now in a position to press its demands, yielded as gracefully as possible. Soon after the withdrawal of the French troops the Emperor Maximilian fell into the hands of Juarez, the deposed Mexican President, who had waged constant warfare against the European invaders with arms and munitions quietly supplied by the North. All pleas for clemency for Maximilian were unavailing, and in June, 1867, the Hapsburg Prince, who knowingly or unknowingly had been the tool of Napoleon, met death at the hands of a firing squad.

Spain also had visions of enlarging her American empire. In 1861 she annexed the Dominican Republic, comprising the former Spanish portion of the island of Santo Domingo. Three years later she became involved in a war with Peru, largely on the pretext that Peru had refused to reimburse certain Spaniards for alleged injuries sustained during the Peruvian wars for independence. She also seized the Chincha Islands, although the Spanish government emphatically denied any intention of acquiring them permanently. The United States protested in both instances but was powerless to do more while the Civil War lasted. With the termination of war, Spain withdrew from both territories, although her dispute with Peru was not settled until years afterward.

143. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH

ALTHOUGH the first year and a half of the war was accompanied by hard times, the Northern economy was on the whole greatly stimulated by the struggle. At first business slackened, mills closed, and many persons began to shift about in search of a livelihood. The *New York Tribune* in August, 1862, commented on "our paralyzed industry, obstructed commerce, our over-loaded finances, and our mangled railroads." But this state of affairs was only temporary. By the autumn of 1862 the business cycle had begun to swing upward, aided by the bumper crops of 1861 and 1862, the foreign demand for food-stuffs, and government purchases of war material.

Depression gave way to renewed industrial activity and to an unprecedented period of money making. The Northern output of coal, iron, copper, salt, and the precious metals for the years 1861-5 surpassed all previous records. Twenty-one million tons of coal were mined in 1864 as against 13,000,000 tons in 1860. The pig iron output of 821,000 tons for 1860 increased to 1,014,282 tons in 1864. Petroleum production rose from almost nothing in 1859 to 128,000,000 gallons in 1862, and during the last two years of the war the North exported a total of 60,000,000 gallons. New deposits of iron, copper, and salt were opened up in Michigan, and new mines in the West augmented manyfold the supply of gold and silver. Lumber production kept pace with mining; the output of the lumber camps in Maine, New York, and the Great Lakes region was the largest in the history of the industry. The farms of the North not only multiplied in number but yielded more than ever before. The wheat production of the loyal states in 1862 was greater than that for the entire Union in 1859. Wool production increased from 60,000,000 pounds in 1860 to 142,000,000 pounds in 1865. Throughout the North the evidence was the same: more acreage, larger flocks, and greater output.

The remarkable increase in Northern manufactures during the war constitutes another index of Northern prosperity. The manufacturer not only provided for the needs of the people at home but was called upon to supply clothing, arms, ammunition, cannon, wagons, and medical stores for the Northern armies. New factories were built or old ones remodeled and enlarged, new machines and new processes were introduced, and new fortunes were amassed. The woolen industry was typical: during the war the number of carding machines increased from 3,000 to 5,090, and the annual consumption of wool mounted from 85,000,000 to more than 200,000,000 pounds. Government contracts,

currency inflation, and high protective tariffs helped create high prices and enormous profits. A few industries, notably the manufacture of cotton cloth, suffered as a result of the war.

The wartime prosperity of the North was also manifested by greatly increased commercial activity. Banks and insurance companies flourished, and money at reasonable rates was easy to obtain. The large and profitable trade of the South, lost by secession, was more than compensated for by business expansion in the North and West. After 1862, commercial failures were astonishingly few in number, and the liabilities involved were small. Everywhere boards of trade and chambers of commerce carried on campaigns for advancing the business interests of their respective towns and of the country as a whole. Trade conventions and trade excursions were numerous, and few merchants complained.

Other evidence of the North's industrial prosperity during the war was furnished by added transportation facilities and increased shipments of both raw material and manufactured goods. New railway lines were built, and the formation of trunk lines, previously begun, was continued. Freight tonnage on many roads, including the Illinois Central, Erie, and Pennsylvania, increased by 100 per cent. Shipments by water were even larger than those by land. During the second year of the war the number of Great Lakes vessels entering and clearing from the port of Buffalo was five times that of the best previous year. In the same year, the Erie Canal carried a tonnage greatly exceeding that of the Erie and New York Central railroads together. The Western rivers and canals also did an excellent business. On the other hand, the American merchant marine suffered. In 1860, foreign trade to the value of \$507,000,000 was carried in American vessels; in 1864, the traffic was only \$184,000,000. Capture or fear of capture by the *Alabama* and other Confederate cruisers, the transfer of vessels to the government for transport service, the inability of American shipowners to compete with subsidized foreign vessels, and the movements of American capital away from ocean transportation account in large measure for the decline of American ocean shipping during the war.

The wartime prosperity of the North was accompanied by extravagance and luxurious living. Speaking of the unprecedented number of recently acquired fortunes, the *New York Independent* in June 25, 1864, wrote:

Who at the North would ever think of war if he had not a friend in the army, or did not read the newspapers? Go into Broadway and we will show you what is meant by the word extravagance. Ask Stewart about the demand for camels' hair shawls, and he will say "monstrous." Ask Tiffany what kind of diamonds and pearls are called for. He will answer "the prodigious; as near hen's egg size

as possible; price no object." What kind of carpetings are now wanted? None but "extra." Brussels and velvets are now used from basement to garret. Ingrains and three-plys won't do at all. Call a moment at a carriage repository. In reply to your first question you will be told: "Never such a demand before, sir." And as for horses, the medium-priced five-hundred-dollar kind are all out of the market. A good pair of "fast ones," "all right," will go for a thousand dollars sooner than a basket of strawberries will sell for four cents. Those a "little extra" will bring fifteen hundred to two thousand, while the "superb" 2:40 sort will bring any price among the "high numbers."

Not all the people of the North became rich as a result of the war. The laboring and salaried classes and those who lived in less favored rural communities were hard hit by the war. Wages lagged behind commodity prices. Many families were reduced to poverty, and industrial unrest was common by 1863. "In many manufactories," the *Springfield Republican* said in 1864, "whose profits have been augmented beyond the wildest dreams of their owners, wages are only from twelve to twenty per cent higher than they were before the war, and there is absolute want in many families while thousands of young children who should be at school are shut up at work that they may earn something to eke out the scant supplies at home." If the worker quit, his place was filled by a newly arrived immigrant or his duties were performed by some labor-saving device. Faced with this situation, he could either join the army, withdraw to a Midwest farm or to the mines of the Far West, or keep his job and try to improve it by joining a labor organization. Strikes were frequent and sometimes successful. At the close of the war the laborer, though better off financially than in 1863, was worse off than in 1860.

Many Northern municipalities, in spite of the war and its attendant problems, instituted numerous improvements during the years 1861-5. In practically every Northern city new dwellings, hotels, business houses, schools, and churches were erected. In Philadelphia approximately 7,200 building permits were issued during the last three years of the war. Portland, Boston, Lowell, and New Haven erected city halls; Brooklyn and Cleveland built new courthouses; New York City built twenty-three churches and Chicago fifteen. Many cities installed water, gas, and sewage systems and fire-alarm telegraphs, while twenty-seven built streetcar lines. A number opened new parks and improved their streets and sidewalks.

Northern education was not seriously affected by the war. Except for the decreased attendance occasioned by enlistment and by the with-

drawal of Southern students, college life went on as usual. Fifteen institutions of higher learning, including Vassar, Cornell, Bates, Swarthmore, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, were founded between 1861 and 1865. During the same period, private endowments totaling more than \$5,000,000 were raised for educational purposes. Moreover, the movement for Federal aid for the promotion of agricultural education, begun in the 1850's, culminated in 1862 in the passage of the Morrill Act, which provided that every state in the Union should receive 30,000 acres of public land for every congressional representative it had in 1860 or might have at the time of its admission. At least 90 per cent of the gross proceeds of the grant were to be used for the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college for instruction in "such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts." Under this act the states received 10,400,000 acres of land, an area about equal to the state of Maryland. Private and professional schools flourished during the war, and the lower grades of the public schools, in spite of the demand for child labor, were filled to overflowing. Low salaries and the need for man power in the army and in the business and professional worlds resulted in the replacement of men by women in the personnel of the teaching force. As with wages, the scale of salaries increased somewhat during the war, but in 1865 there were still hundreds of teachers receiving less than a dollar a day. Throughout the war the intellectual life of the North was constantly stimulated by public lectures, periodicals, libraries, learned societies, the pulpit, and the press.

144. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH

SOCIALLY and industrially the South furnished a striking contrast to the North. Hemmed in by the blockade, overridden by armed forces, and without fluid capital or a well-established industrial order, the majority of its people suffered privations. The decrease in the supply of commodities that had formerly been obtained from the North or from abroad led to strenuous efforts to produce them at home. Salt works were established in Virginia, North Carolina, Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama. Small, poorly equipped factories for turning out boots and shoes were set up here and there. Cotton mills backed by state subsidies were also put in operation in Georgia, South Carolina, and Alabama. Other manufactures, including hats, blankets, hosiery, candles, lamp black, printers' ink, glass, matches, and pottery, were also

established, but it is doubtful if any of these industries got beyond the experimental stage, largely for want of capital, necessary machinery, and skilled labor.

During the war, Southern transportation facilities steadily deteriorated. Compared with the North, the South had few railroad systems and no trunk lines. Of the 9,283 miles in operation in 1861, approximately 3,000 miles soon fell into the hands of the Federals. The roads that were not captured or destroyed often were in need of repairs and new equipment. The consequent slow movement of goods retarded manufacturing processes, isolated many rural sections, and seriously impaired the fighting efficiency of the armies. Passenger travel was dangerous, and the mails were irregular and long delayed.

Under such circumstances, many merchants were ruined. Tradesmen in the larger centers benefited from blockade-running, for adventurous businessmen and others who had capital soon realized that evading the blockade afforded rare opportunity for profits. Swift, narrow, side-wheel steamers loaded with cotton frequently slipped through the blockade squadron and made their way to Bermuda, Nassau, or Havana, where they exchanged their cargoes for army equipment, tea, soap, fabrics, medicines, liquors, wines, and other European merchandise. Wilmington and Charleston were the chief ports of entry on the return trip. Some trade was also carried on with Europe by way of Mexico. Furthermore, commercial intercourse between the two warring sections went on throughout the struggle, either illicitly or under quasi-authority.

Like the North, the South had its *nouveaux riches*. Men without a dollar at the beginning of the war accumulated fortunes. Others who were already well-to-do grew richer. "The greed for gain now so prevalent in the southern Confederacy," a journalist wrote in 1863, "is more wicked and infamous than the same vile passion in Yankee hearts." In the same year Jefferson Davis wrote: "The passion for speculation has seduced citizens of all classes from a determined prosecution of the war to a sordid effort to amass money." Still others spoke of "the insatiable thirst for gain and speculation." Luxury and extravagance naturally followed. Richmond and Charleston were crowded with those who had prospered. Theaters were well patronized, and dances, dinners, and receptions were common occurrences. In February, 1864, the Confederate Congress prohibited the importation of foreign luxuries, but this had little effect on those who were determined to spend their quickly gained wealth.

The mass of the Southern people not only failed to acquire wealth during the war but even went without many of the everyday necessities of life. As in the North, those with fixed incomes or salaries found it extremely difficult to make ends meet. By 1863, after the transportation

system had begun to disintegrate, many parts of the South were impoverished. Such articles as tea and coffee were not to be had except by the rich. Salt was so scarce in Alabama that the "earthen floors of smoke-houses, saturated by the dripping of bacon, were dug up and boiled." Calicoes and homespuns replaced velvets and silks. Practically every household became a workshop for the manufacture of wearing apparel. In communities where commodities were available, the person of ordinary means frequently could not pay the high prices demanded. The systematic devastation of Southern territory by Northern troops during the last years of the war made the problem of securing food, clothing, and shelter still more difficult.

Civil liberty in both sections was considerably restricted during the war. In the North, President Lincoln, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, performed acts that in the minds of many persons were of doubtful constitutionality, even in wartime. Among these were the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, the authorization of arbitrary arrests, and the abridgment of freedom of speech and of writing. The writ of *habeas corpus* was first suspended in Maryland in 1861 when it was felt that a majority of the Maryland legislature would vote for secession. Several members were accordingly arrested on the charge of plotting treason and imprisoned without benefit of the writ. They at once appealed to Chief Justice Taney of the United States Supreme Court, who ruled that they had committed no crime against the civil law. Lincoln, however, ignored the ruling, and the prisoners were not released. Military arrests were made in all parts of the North, the most notorious being that of Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio, leader of the "copperheads," a name given to a powerful group of Northerners who opposed the war. On September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation suspending the writ of *habeas corpus* throughout the Union and ordering the arrest of all persons discouraging enlistment or guilty of any other "disloyal practice." Hundreds of arrests followed in all parts of the North, and the victims were jailed without a hearing or sentenced by military courts without a jury. This action aroused widespread opposition, and Congress passed a law generally known as the *Habeas Corpus Act* of 1863. It empowered the president to suspend the writ, but no arrested person could be kept in prison more than twenty days unless indicted by a grand jury. Lincoln virtually ignored this act, however, and military arrests of civilians continued to the end of the war. Even the press did not escape; the *New York World* and the *Chicago Times* were among the newspapers temporarily suppressed. The civil courts were powerless to assert their authority, although in 1866 the Supreme Court in the case of *ex parte Milligan* ruled that the constitutional rights of a person

accused of crime could not be set aside either by the president or by the Congress in any part of the country where the regular courts were "in the proper and unmolested exercise of their jurisdiction."

In the South the central government exhibited greater regard for the liberty of the individual. Unlike Lincoln, the President of the Confederacy never assumed that he had the right to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, and when in 1862 he declared martial law and suspended the writ in certain disaffected areas, he acted under the express authorization of his Congress. In the secession states, martial law was not used as effectively and harshly as it was in the North; and yet it met with powerful resistance. In North Carolina it was bitterly denounced, and the Supreme Court of the state went so far as to issue writs of *habeas corpus* to persons arrested and held by Confederate authority. The Georgia legislature in 1864 unanimously provided that a justice of any court who refused to grant a writ of *habeas corpus* should be subject to a fine of \$2,500. Sensing the strength and determination of the opposition, the Confederate Congress gradually curtailed the President's sweeping use of this legal instrument. Finally, in 1864, after protracted debate, it refused to accede to his request for a renewal of the privilege. Except when requested by the Confederate authorities to refrain from publishing dispatches that might aid the enemy, the Southern newspapers were entirely without censorship or control.

145. GOVERNMENT BY COALITION

THROUGHOUT the Civil War, Lincoln had to contend with four distinct political groups in the North: the Conservative Republicans, Radical Republicans, War Democrats, and Copperheads. The Conservative Republicans, who comprised the bulk of the party, viewed the war simply as a struggle to preserve the Union. The Radical Republicans, whose leaders were Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, Benjamin Wade of Ohio, and Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, considered the war primarily a crusade against slavery. The War Democrats, although critical of the Lincoln Administration, backed the Northern war effort. The Copperheads opposed both the Union cause and Republican rule. The key to an understanding of Lincoln's political strategy lies in his efforts to gain the support of all these groups except the Copperheads, while at the same time he sought to prevent anyone of them from dominating either him or the government. To maintain this coalition, Lincoln agreed with the Conservative Republicans that the war was being fought to preserve the Union, for this war aim was endorsed by the War Democrats as well

as the Conservatives; and the Radical Republicans also approved of it, although they felt that it did not go far enough.

The make-up of the cabinet reveals a great deal about Lincoln's political strategy and the nature of the Republican party. Secretary of State William H. Seward was an ex-Whig leader from New York, Lincoln's chief rival for the Republican nomination at Chicago, and as the war progressed, spokesman for the party's conservative wing. Balancing Seward's conservatism was the radicalism of Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, an ex-Democrat from Ohio and another unsuccessful candidate for the Republican nomination in 1860. Secretary of War Simon Cameron, the boss of the Republican machine in Pennsylvania, and Secretary of the Interior Caleb Smith of Indiana were both appointed because of deals arranged by Lincoln's political managers before his nomination. Attorney General Edward Bates of Missouri and Postmaster General Montgomery Blair of Maryland provided the border states with representation in the Administration. In addition, Bates was closely allied with the "American" faction of the party, while Blair was a member of a family that for years had been identified with Jacksonian Democracy. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles knew nothing about naval affairs, but he was an ex-Democrat and the only New Englander in the cabinet. Regardless of the ability of the members of Lincoln's cabinet, they all possessed certain clearly recognizable political assets. In the aggregate they represented every section and every faction that had given any support to the Republican party. Moreover, it is worth noting that, when corruption in the War Department compelled Lincoln in January, 1862, to remove Cameron and make him minister to Russia, Edwin M. Stanton, a War Democrat, who had served as Attorney General under Buchanan, became Secretary of War. With Stanton in the cabinet and McClellan—who was also a Democrat—at the head of the Union armies, the management of the Northern war effort was largely in the hands of Democrats.

The difficulty encountered by Lincoln in his attempts to maintain what in reality amounted to a coalition government was illustrated by an incident that occurred during his first month in office. On April 1, 1861, Seward, who was confident of his ability to dominate both the President and the Administration, sent Lincoln a memorandum entitled "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration." After stating that the government was "without a policy, either domestic or foreign," Seward proposed that the United States declare war against Spain and France. This move, the Secretary of State argued, would solve the sectional crisis, for the South would undoubtedly return to the Union to help in a war against a foreign enemy. In conclusion, Seward suggested that he be entrusted with the management of this program. Instead of dismissing or reprimanding Seward for this preposterous proposal, Lin-

coln politely rejected it. By adopting this course, he not only avoided an open break with the party's outstanding conservative, but he also made it clear that he, not Seward, was responsible for the formulation of the government's policies.

Despite the Seward incident, Lincoln's principal troubles arose over his relations with the Radicals rather than with the Conservatives in his party. The Radicals in Congress made their influence felt by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, which was formed by the House and Senate in the first year of the war. Dominated by Radicals, the committee investigated every aspect of the war effort, sought to impose its strategic concepts on the Union military leaders, complained of McClellan's dilatory tactics, supported those generals who shared the Radicals' view on the slavery question, and repeatedly criticized Lincoln's attitude toward the war and his conduct of the nation's military affairs. In one sense, the activity of the committee on the conduct of the war was an accurate indication of the determination of the Radicals to convert the war into a crusade against slavery; in another, it reflected the desire of many congressmen to deprive the President of the war powers granted to him by the Constitution; and in still another, it provided one more example of the civilian's deep-seated conviction that he knows more about the conduct of war than professional soldiers do.

The results of the midterm elections of 1862, which provided the free-state voters with their first opportunity to pass on the Administration's program, furnished Lincoln with little ground for encouragement. The Democrats carried five more Northern states—including Lincoln's own state of Illinois—than in 1860; and if the South had been in the Union, the Republicans would have lost the election. The Democratic gains in part reflected the dissatisfaction with events in the field and the widespread opposition to Lincoln's proclamation suspending the writ of *habeas corpus*. In addition, the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which was issued on September 22, 1862, seemed to the Conservatives to go too far, while the Radicals complained that it did not go far enough. In sum, in trying to retain the support of all the loyal groups, Lincoln had ended up by completely satisfying none of them.

The results of the election and the continued military reverses led to a renewed Radical attempt to take over the control of the Lincoln Administration. Accordingly, a group of Radical senators called on the President and urged him to make "such selections and changes [in the cabinet] . . . as will secure to the country unity of purpose and action." Seward, realizing that he was the principal target of the Radical attack, sought to save the President from further embarrassment by offering to resign. But when Lincoln conferred with the committee a second time, he arranged the meeting so that all the members of the cabinet except Seward were present. Chase, although he had been in constant contact

with the members of the committee and was the leading Radical in the cabinet, was thus placed in a position where he felt forced—however reluctantly—to state “that the cabinet were all harmonious.” “The upshot of the whole matter,” in the words of Professor James G. Randall, “was that Chase as well as Seward resigned; Lincoln promptly refused to accept either resignation; and the crisis passed with a ‘milder spirit’ prevailing, the cabinet continuing as before, the senators somewhat chagrined, Chase embarrassed, and the President holding the tricks.” *

Lincoln’s ability to outmaneuver the Radicals could not obscure the fact that their stand on the slavery question was threatening to disrupt both the Republican party and the Administration. Moreover, as the war progressed, it became increasingly clear that Lincoln could not indefinitely postpone taking a stand on this issue. He had been elected on a platform calling for the restriction, but not for the abolition, of slavery. Moreover, Congress, on July 22, 1861, had passed a resolution stating that the war was being waged, not to overthrow slavery or interfere with the rights or the established institutions of the South, but to preserve the Union, and with this resolution Lincoln was in accord. Nevertheless, the President himself and many others in addition to the abolitionists believed that slavery was wrong and that it ought to be abolished. Despite his private convictions on the question, despite the innumerable petitions and suggestions for emancipating the slaves, and despite the denunciations hurled at him by the gifted abolitionist leader, Wendell Phillips, and others, he remained adamant throughout 1861. For his inaction and for what seemed to many his wavering policy, Lincoln had numerous reasons. He believed that neither he nor Congress had any authority under the Constitution to emancipate a single slave; and he feared that if such action were taken it would lead to the secession of the four border states. Furthermore, he knew that many Northern soldiers who had enlisted to save the Union would not have enlisted to free slaves.

By the spring of 1862, circumstances had changed. Throughout the Confederacy, Negroes were being used for military purposes: they produced food for the soldiers, served as teamsters in the army, and helped to construct entrenchments. Many prominent Northerners believed that drastic action should be taken to put an end to this source of Southern military strength. Moreover, hundreds of escaped slaves flocked into the camps of the Northern armies, and their presence raised a number of embarrassing questions. Were they contraband property, and if so, should they be confiscated? If not, should they be returned to their masters in accordance with the Fugitive Slave Act? Then too, the anti-slavery extremists or radical element of the Republican party, daily growing stronger and more influential, insisted that slavery be forever

* James G. Randall: *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1937), pp. 606–07.

terminated. Finally, certain Northern leaders believed that perhaps the best way to prevent foreign intervention and to strengthen the cause of the North would be to favor widespread emancipation. Consequently, the Federal government began to modify its course. On April 10, 1862, Congress voted to extend financial aid to any state that might adopt gradual emancipation. Within a week it enacted another law providing for compensated liberation of the slaves in the District of Columbia. Two months later, on June 19, the Republican majority swept slavery forever from the Federal territories, despite the fact that Chief Justice Taney still lived and that the Dred Scott decision had supposedly settled the question of slavery for all time. This action was followed on July 17, 1862, by the passage of the Second Confiscation Act.*

• Meanwhile, Lincoln, aware of changing conditions and especially of the growing Northern sentiment in favor of emancipation, had decided that slavery had to go; but he wanted it to disappear peacefully and with as little rancor as possible. Accordingly, he formulated a program providing for gradual emancipation, full compensation to owners, and the colonization of the freedmen in Liberia or Latin America. But this proposal came to nothing. The border-state leaders, with whom Lincoln pleaded for its adoption, rejected it as infringing the constitutional right to hold slaves and as being financially impracticable. Abolitionists condemned it as a scheme for "enriching thieves and robbers!" Chagrined by his failure to effect gradual abolition, Lincoln concluded that if the Union was to be saved, the time had arrived for him to emancipate the slaves by proclamation. Basing his authority for such action on the war powers of the Constitution, he read the draft of a proclamation of emancipation to his cabinet on July 22, 1862, just ten days after his last futile meeting with the representatives of the border states. On the advice of Seward, however, he laid it aside until the North should achieve a notable victory on the field of battle. Antietam afforded the desired opportunity, and on September 22, 1862, a preliminary proclamation declared that all slaves in any part of the Confederacy in rebellion against the United States on January 1, 1863, should be forever free. This proclamation did not apply to the four border states or to those parts of the Confederacy under the control of the Federal armies.

The preliminary proclamation provoked various reactions. Some anti-slavery Radicals, dissatisfied because Lincoln did not free all the slaves, continued to attack him. The pro-slavery element both North and South

* The First Confiscation Act (1861) provided that property used for insurrectionary purposes was subject to confiscation. The Second Confiscation Act stated that slaves owned by "rebels" and within the Union lines were free; that those convicted of treason against the United States were subject to fine and imprisonment or death; that those involved in "rebellion" were liable to fine, imprisonment, and loss of their slaves; and that those supporting the "rebellion" would have to forfeit their property to the United States.

professed to see in the proclamation the menace of Negro equality and social demoralization. In England, where the proclamation was regarded as an effort on the part of the Administration to incite a servile war, it was received with apprehension by the public and contempt by the press. On the Continent much the same feeling prevailed.

Lincoln, though greatly perturbed by the opposition to the preliminary proclamation and by the fact that his party lost more than thirty seats in Congress in the fall elections of 1862, did not alter his course. In his message of December, 1862, he said: "Without slavery the rebellion could never have existed; without slavery it could not continue." On January 1, 1863, he issued a second proclamation that confirmed the first and announced that the former slaves would be received into the armed forces of the United States. Thereafter the movement for emancipation gathered headway. Between 1863 and 1865, Missouri, Tennessee, Maryland, and parts of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Virginia abolished slavery by state action. Emancipation was completed on December 18, 1865, with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, which forbade slavery and involuntary servitude anywhere in the United States or in territory subject to its jurisdiction, except as punishment for crime.

The Emancipation Proclamation did not end Lincoln's troubles with the Radicals; and as the election of 1864 approached, there again seemed no way to prevent a split in the party. Despite Chase's presence in the cabinet, his supporters were working openly for his nomination for the presidency. Even more damaging to party unity was the nomination of John C. Frémont at a Radical convention held in Cleveland in May, 1864. Despite these developments, the Union (that is, the Republican) convention was dominated by Administration supporters. Lincoln was unanimously renominated, and Andrew Johnson, a War Democrat of Tennessee, was named the party's vice-presidential candidate. The Democrats selected McClellan as their candidate and adopted a "peace plank," which referred to the war as "four years of failure." But, since both McClellan and his Democratic supporters also thought that the Union should be preserved at all costs, their position in reality was not unlike that of the Republican, or Union, party.

Throughout a large part of the campaign it seemed likely that Lincoln would be defeated; but two developments shortly before election day insured his victory. On September 22, Frémont dropped out of the campaign; and news of Sherman's entrance into Atlanta convinced even the most dubious Northerners that the collapse of the Confederacy was only a matter of time. Although Lincoln's popular majority over McClellan was only 400,000, he carried every free state but New Jersey, Kentucky and Delaware, and the electoral vote was 212 for Lincoln to 21 for McClellan.

The election of 1864 was in a very real sense a vindication of Lincoln's

policies. He had held the Republicans together and he had retained the support of a majority of Northerners despite defeats in the field and factionalism in his party. At times he appeared to be the only political leader in the North who realized that the preservation of the Union required the united efforts of all those who were fighting the South. The Civil War had—among other things—transformed Lincoln from a local politician in quest of a job into a national leader and statesman.

On April 15, 1865—six days after Lee's surrender—Lincoln was assassinated by John Wilkes Booth. The shock occasioned by the President's death was exceeded only by the extent to which friends and foes of the fallen leader vied in praising him. Lincoln died a martyr, but he was more than that; as Americans increasingly came to appreciate his humility, his contribution to the preservation of their nation, his magnanimity, and his ability to laugh at himself while sympathizing with others, they made him a symbol of all that they treasured most in their nation's history.

146. END AND BEGINNING

THE CIVIL WAR marked, but did not necessarily cause, the conclusion of one era and the beginning of another in the history of American civilization. In the years following the conflict the United States was to turn to those pursuits that have continued to preoccupy its citizens until the present day. With the elimination of the menace of disunion, the American people increasingly devoted their energies to developing industry, exploiting the country's mineral deposits, expanding its transportation facilities, and building up its financial power.

A decade before Sumter the United States had been an agrarian civilization; twenty years after Appomattox it was being transformed into a business civilization. Although large numbers of Americans still depended on agriculture for a livelihood, it was the banker, merchant, and industrialist rather than the farmer who shaped the course of national policy, controlled the country's economy, and set the standards by which their fellow citizens lived and thought. This transformation was symbolized by the growth of the city. Although millions of Americans continued to live in rural areas, it was in the city—the home of the nation's businessmen and the site of the nation's business activity—that the culture of postbellum America was developed and then imposed upon the rest of the country.

In one sense, the Civil War represented—but, again, did not necessarily cause—the first major attack upon the traditional American con-

cept of individualism. Although Americans for years after the conflict continued to glorify the exploits of the individual, the fact remained that the individual was steadily losing out to the institutions that he had created. Individualism was still a basic tenet of the American creed, but in an age of big business, big government, big labor, and big agriculture the kind of individualism that had been expounded by Jefferson and Emerson could serve no other function than to remind Americans of a past that they could never recapture. The Civil War had been fought to solve problems that had grown out of an earlier age; but it paved the way for the emergence of those problems, institutions, mores, and ideals that today are still very much a part of American life. In short, the Civil War signalized the advent of modern American civilization.

APPENDIX

- I. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
- II. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- III. UNITED STATES POPULATION, 1790–1860
- IV. ADMISSION OF STATES TO THE UNION, 1789–1865
- V. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1824–64
- VI. PRESIDENTS AND THEIR CABINETS, 1789–1865
- VII. JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789–1865

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE*

In Congress, July 4, 1776,

THE UNANIMOUS DECLARATION OF THE THIRTEEN UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA

WHEN in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.—Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of re-

* Reprinted from Frank Monaghan: *Heritage of Freedom: The History & Significance of the Basic Documents of American Liberty* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 19–22. Copyright 1947 by and reprinted with the permission of American Heritage Foundation.

peated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.

He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.

He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.

He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.

He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.

He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within.

He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws of Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.

He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.

He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.

He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our People, and eat out their substance.

He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislature.

He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.

He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their acts of pretended legislation:

For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:

For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States:

For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:

For imposing taxes on us without our Consent:

For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury:

For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences:

For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province,

establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies:

For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments:

For suspending our own Legislature, and declaring themselves invested with Power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.

He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us.

He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.

He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.

He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.

He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.

In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free People.

Nor have We been wanting in attention to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.

We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.

And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.

JOHN HANCOCK.

NEW HAMPSHIRE *

Josiah Bartlett
William Whipple
Matthew Thornton

MASSACHUSETTS-BAY

Samuel Adams
John Adams
Robert Treat Paine
Elbridge Gerry

RHODE ISLAND

Stephen Hopkins
William Ellery

CONNECTICUT

Roger Sherman
Samuel Huntington
William Williams
Oliver Wolcott

GEORGIA

Button Gwinnett
Lyman Hall
George Walton

MARYLAND

Samuel Chase
William Paca
Thomas Stone
Charles Carroll

VIRGINIA

George Wythe
Richard Henry Lee
Thomas Jefferson
Benjamin Harrison
Thomas Nelson, Jr.
Francis Lightfoot Lee
Carter Braxton

NEW YORK

William Floyd
Philip Livingston
Francis Lewis
Lewis Morris

PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Morris
Benjamin Rush
Benjamin Franklin
John Morton
George Clymer
James Smith
George Taylor
James Wilson
George Ross

DELAWARE

Caesar Rodney
George Read
Thomas M'Kean

NORTH CAROLINA

William Hooper
Joseph Hewes
John Penn

SOUTH CAROLINA

Edward Rutledge
Thomas Heyward, Jr.
Thomas Lynch, Jr.
Arthur Middleton

NEW JERSEY

Richard Stockton
John Witherspoon
Francis Hopkinson
John Hart
Abraham Clark

* The full names of the signers follow, not their signatures as printed in Monaghan: *Heritage of Freedom*.

*THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.

ARTICLE I.

SECTION 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

SECTION 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

[Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.] † The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four,

* This version of the Constitution is that published by the Office of Education, United States Department of the Interior, 1935, and follows the original document in spelling and capitalization.

† Replaced by the 14th Amendment.

Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

SECTION 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one-third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law.

SECTION 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of Chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

SECTION 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties, as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

SECTION 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States shall be a Member of either House during his continuance in Office.

SECTION 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

SECTION 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

SECTION 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or

duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

SECTION 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

ARTICLE II.

SECTION 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

[The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State

with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice-President.] *

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

No person except a natural-born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

SECTION 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon

* Superseded by the 12th Amendment.

any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

SECTION 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

SECTION 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

ARTICLE III.

SECTION 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

SECTION 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; *—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall

* Restricted by the 11th Amendment.

have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

SECTION 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

ARTICLE IV.

SECTION 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

SECTION 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

SECTION 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

SECTION 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and

Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

ARTICLE VII.

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names.*

GEORGE WASHINGTON

President and deputy from Virginia

CONNECTICUT

William Samuel Johnson

Roger Sherman

NEW HAMPSHIRE

John Langdon

Nicholas Gilman

NEW YORK

Alexander Hamilton

MASSACHUSETTS

Nathaniel Gorham

Rufus King

NEW JERSEY

William Livingston

David Brearley

William Paterson

Jonathan Dayton

* The full names of the signers follow, not the signatures as they appear on the document.

PENNSYLVANIA

Benjamin Franklin
Thomas Mifflin
Robert Morris
George Clymer
Thomas FitzSimons
Jared Ingersoll
James Wilson
Gouverneur Morris

DELAWARE

George Read
Gunning-Bedford, Jr.
John Dickinson
Richard Bassett
Jacob Broom

MARYLAND

James McHenry
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer
Daniel Carroll

VIRGINIA

John Blair
James Madison, Jr.

NORTH CAROLINA

William Blount
Richard Dobbs Spaight
Hugh Williamson

SOUTH CAROLINA

John Rutledge
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
Charles Pinckney
Pierce Butler

GEORGIA

William Few
Abraham Baldwin

ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PROPOSED BY CONGRESS, AND RATIFIED BY THE LEGISLATURES OF THE SEVERAL STATES, PURSUANT TO THE FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION *

[ARTICLE I.] †

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

[ARTICLE II.]

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

[ARTICLE III.]

No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

[ARTICLE IV.]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and

* This heading appears only in the joint resolution submitting the first ten amendments.

† In the original manuscripts the first twelve amendments have no numbers.

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

[ARTICLE V.]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

[ARTICLE VI.]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

[ARTICLE VII.]

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

[ARTICLE VIII.]

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

[ARTICLE IX.]

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

[ARTICLE X.]

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

[Amendments I–X, in force 1791.]

[ARTICLE XI.] *

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

* Adopted in 1798.

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

[ARTICLE XII.] *

The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

ARTICLE XIII.†

SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

ARTICLE XIV.‡

SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the

* Adopted in 1804.

† Adopted in 1865.

‡ Adopted in 1868, proclaimed July 28, 1868.

State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

SECTION 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.

SECTION 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

ARTICLE XV.*

SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude—

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

* Proclaimed March 30, 1870.

III

UNITED STATES POPULATION, 1790-1860

Source: Bureau of the Census

STATE	1790	1800	1810	1820	1830	1840	1850	1860
ALABAMA								
ARKANSAS								
CALIFORNIA			1,062	127,901	309,527	590,758	771,623	964,201
COLORADO				14,273	30,388	97,574	209,897	435,450
CONNECTICUT	237,946	251,002	261,942	275,248	297,675	309,978	92,597	379,994
DELAWARE	59,096	64,273	72,674	78,749	76,748	78,085	370,792	460,147
DISTRICT OF COL.		14,093	24,023	33,039	39,834	43,712	91,532	112,216
FLORIDA					34,730	54,477	51,687	75,080
GEORGIA	82,548	162,680	252,433	340,989	516,823	691,392	87,445	140,424
ILLINOIS			12,282	55,211	157,445	691,392	906,185	1,057,286
INDIANA		5,641	24,520	147,178	476,183	851,470	851,470	1,711,951
IOWA					343,031	685,866	988,416	1,350,428
KANSAS						43,112	192,214	674,913
KENTUCKY	73,677	220,955	406,511	564,317	687,917	779,828	982,405	1,07,206
LOUISIANA			76,556	153,407	215,739	352,411	517,762	1,155,684
MAINE	96,540	151,719	228,705	298,335	399,455	501,793	517,762	708,002
MARYLAND	319,728	341,548	386,546	407,350	447,040	470,019	583,169	628,279
MASSACHUSETTS	376,787	422,845	472,040	523,287	610,408	737,699	583,034	687,049
MICHIGAN				8,896	31,639	212,267	994,514	1,231,066
MINNESOTA			4,762				397,654	749,113
							6,077	172,023

[670]

MISSISSIPPI	8,850	40,352	75,448	136,621	375,651	606,526	791,305
MISSOURI		19,763	66,586	140,455	383,702	682,044	1,182,012
NEBRASKA							28,841
NEVADA							6,857
NEW HAMPSHIRE	141,885	183,858	214,460	244,161	284,574	317,976	326,073
NEW JERSEY	184,139	211,149	245,562	277,575	373,306	489,555	672,035
NEW MEXICO						61,547	93,516
NEW YORK	340,120	589,051	959,049	1,372,812	2,448,921	3,097,394	3,880,735
NORTH CAROLINA	393,751	478,103	555,500	638,829	737,987	869,039	992,622
OHIO		45,365	230,760	581,434	1,519,467	1,980,329	2,339,511
OREGON						13,294	52,465
PENNSYLVANIA	434,373	602,365	810,091	1,049,458	1,724,033	2,311,786	2,906,215
RHODE ISLAND	68,825	69,122	76,931	83,059	108,830	147,620	174,620
SOUTH CAROLINA	249,073	345,591	415,115	502,741	594,398	668,507	703,708
SOUTH DAKOTA							4,837
TENNESSEE	35,691	105,602	261,727	422,823	681,904	1,002,717	1,109,801
TEXAS						212,592	604,215
UTAH						11,380	40,273
VERMONT	85,425	154,465	217,895	235,981	280,652	314,120	315,068
VIRGINIA	747,610	880,200	974,600	1,065,366	1,211,405	1,421,661	1,596,318
WASHINGTON							11,504
WISCONSIN						305,391	775,881
GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS.							
NEW ENGLAND	1,009,408	1,233,011	1,471,973	1,660,071	1,954,717	2,728,116	3,135,283
MIDDLE ATLANTIC	958,632	1,402,565	2,014,702	2,699,845	3,587,664	5,868,735	7,458,085
EAST NORTH CENTRAL		51,006	272,324	792,719	1,470,018	4,523,260	6,926,884
WEST NORTH CENTRAL			19,783	66,586	446,814	880,335	2,160,832
SOUTH ATLANTIC	1,851,806	2,286,494	2,674,891	3,061,063	3,645,752	4,879,090	5,364,703
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL	109,368	335,407	708,590	1,190,489	1,815,969	3,363,271	4,020,991
WEST SOUTH CENTRAL			77,618	167,680	246,127	940,251	1,747,667
MOUNTAIN						72,927	174,923
PACIFIC						105,891	444,053
TOTAL	3,929,214	5,308,483	7,239,881	9,638,453	* 12,866,020	23,191,876	31,443,321

* Includes persons on public ships in the service of the United States, not credited to any geographic division.

*ADMISSION OF STATES
TO THE UNION, 1789-1865*

STATE	DATE OF ADMISSION	AREA (Sq. miles)
DELAWARE	1787	2,307
PENNSYLVANIA	1787	45,126
NEW JERSEY	1787	8,222
GEORGIA	1788	59,265
CONNECTICUT	1788	4,965
MASSACHUSETTS	1788	8,266
MARYLAND	1788	12,327
SOUTH CAROLINA	1788	30,989
NEW HAMPSHIRE	1788	9,341
VIRGINIA	1788	42,627
NEW YORK	1788	49,204
NORTH CAROLINA	1789	52,426
RHODE ISLAND	1790	1,248
VERMONT	1791	9,564
KENTUCKY	1792	40,598
TENNESSEE	1796	42,022
OHIO	1803	41,040
LOUISIANA	1812	48,506
INDIANA	1816	36,354
MISSISSIPPI	1817	46,865
ILLINOIS	1818	56,665
ALABAMA	1819	51,998
MAINE	1820	33,040
MISSOURI	1821	69,420
ARKANSAS	1836	53,335
MICHIGAN	1837	57,980
FLORIDA	1845	58,666
TEXAS	1845	265,896
IOWA	1846	56,147
WISCONSIN	1848	56,066
CALIFORNIA	1850	158,297
MINNESOTA	1858	84,682
OREGON	1859	96,699
KANSAS	1861	82,158
WEST VIRGINIA	1863	24,170
NEVADA	1864	110,690

V

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS;
1824-64

ELEC- TION	CANDIDATES	PARTIES	POPULAR VOTE	ELEC- TORAL VOTE
1824	JOHN QUINCY ADAMS	No party	108,740	84
	Andrew Jackson	designations	153,544	99
	William H. Crawford		46,618	41
	Henry Clay		47,136	37
1828	ANDREW JACKSON	Democrat	647,231	178
	John Quincy Adams	National Republican	509,097	83
1832	ANDREW JACKSON	Democrat	687,502	219
	Henry Clay	Whig	530,189	49
	John Floyd	Whig	33,108	11
	William Wirt	Anti-Mason	7	7
1836	MARTIN VAN BUREN	Democrat	761,549	170
	W. H. Harrison	Whig	73	73
	Hugh L. White	Whig	26	26
	Daniel Webster	Whig	14	14
	W. P. Mangum	Whig	11	11
1840	WILLIAM H. HARRISON	Whig	1,275,016	234
	Martin Van Buren	Democrat	1,129,102	60
	J. G. Birney	Liberty	7,069	
1844	JAMES K. POLK	Democrat	1,337,243	170
	Henry Clay	Whig	1,299,062	105
	J. G. Birney	Liberty	62,300	
1848	ZACHARY TAYLOR	Whig	1,360,099	163
	Lewis Cass	Democrat	1,220,544	127
	Martin Van Buren	Free Soil	291,263	
1852	FRANKLIN PIERCE	Democrat	1,601,274	254
	Winfield Scott	Whig	1,386,580	42
	John P. Hale	Free Soil	155,825	
1856	JAMES BUCHANAN	Democrat	1,838,169	174
	John C. Frémont	Republican	1,341,264	114
	Millard Fillmore	American	874,534	8
1860	ABRAHAM LINCOLN	Republican	1,866,452	180
	Stephen A. Douglas	Democrat	1,375,157	12
	John C. Breckinridge	Democrat	847,953	72
	John Bell	Union	590,631	39
1864	ABRAHAM LINCOLN	Republican	2,213,665	212
	George McClellan	Democrat	1,802,237	21

PRESIDENTS AND THEIR CABINETS 1789-1865

GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789-97

JOHN ADAMS

<i>Secretary of State</i>	THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1789-94 EDMUND RANDOLPH, 1794-5 TIMOTHY PICKERING, 1795-7
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1789-95 OLIVER WOLCOTT, 1795-7
<i>Secretary of War</i>	HENRY KNOX, 1789-95 TIMOTHY PICKERING, 1795-6 JAMES MCHENRY, 1796-7
<i>Postmaster General</i>	SAMUEL OSGOOD, 1789-91 TIMOTHY PICKERING, 1791-5 JOSEPH HABERSHAM, 1795-7
<i>Attorney General</i>	EDMUND RANDOLPH, 1789-94 WILLIAM BRADFORD, 1794-5 CHARLES LEE, 1795-7

JOHN ADAMS 1797-1801

THOMAS JEFFERSON

<i>Secretary of State</i>	TIMOTHY PICKERING, 1797-1800 JOHN MARSHALL, 1800-01
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	OLIVER WOLCOTT, 1797-1801 SAMUEL DEXTER, 1801
<i>Secretary of War</i>	JAMES MCHENRY, 1797-1800 JOHN MARSHALL, 1800 SAMUEL DEXTER, 1800-01 ROGER GRISWOLD, 1801
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	BENJAMIN STODDERT, 1798-1801
<i>Postmaster General</i>	JOSEPH HABERSHAM, 1797-1801
<i>Attorney General</i>	CHARLES LEE, 1797-1801 THEODORE PARSONS, 1801

THOMAS JEFFERSON 1801-05

AARON BURR

THOMAS JEFFERSON 1805-09

GEORGE CLINTON

<i>Secretary of State</i>	JAMES MADISON, 1801-09
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	SAMUEL DEXTER, 1801
	ALBERT GALLATIN, 1801-09
<i>Secretary of War</i>	HENRY DEARBORN, 1801-09
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	BENJAMIN STODDERT, 1801
	ROBERT SMITH, 1801-05
	JACOB CROWNINSHIELD, 1805-09
<i>Postmaster General</i>	JOSEPH HABERSHAM, 1801
	GIDEON GRANGER, 1801-09
<i>Attorney General</i>	LEVI LINCOLN, 1801-05
	ROBERT SMITH, 1805
	JOHN BRECKINRIDGE, 1805-07
	CAESAR RODNEY, 1807-09

JAMES MADISON 1809-13

GEORGE CLINTON

JAMES MADISON 1813-17

ELBRIDGE CERRY

<i>Secretary of State</i>	ROBERT SMITH, 1809-11
	JAMES MONROE, 1811-17
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	ALBERT GALLATIN, 1809-14
	GEORGE CAMPBELL, 1814
	ALEXANDER DALLAS, 1814-16
	WILLIAM CRAWFORD, 1816-17
<i>Secretary of War</i>	WILLIAM EUSTIS, 1809-13
	JOHN ARMSTRONG, 1813-14
	JAMES MONROE, 1814-15
	WILLIAM CRAWFORD, 1815-17
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	PAUL HAMILTON, 1809-13
	WILLIAM JONES, 1813-14
	BENJAMIN CROWINSHIELD, 1814-17
<i>Postmaster General</i>	GIDEON GRANGER, 1809-14
	RETURN MEIGS, 1814-17
<i>Attorney General</i>	CAESAR RODNEY, 1809-11
	WILLIAM PINCKNEY, 1811-14
	RICHARD RUSH, 1814-17

JAMES MONROE 1817-25

DANIEL D. TOMPKINS

<i>Secretary of State</i>	JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, 1817-25
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	WILLIAM CRAWFORD, 1817-25
<i>Secretary of War</i>	ISAAC SHELBY, 1817
	GEORGE GRAHAM, 1817
	JOHN C. CALHOUN, 1817-25
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	BENJAMIN CROWNINSHIELD, 1817-18
	SMITH THOMPSON, 1818-23
	SAMUEL SOUTHARD, 1823-5

<i>Postmaster General</i>	RETURN MEIGS, 1817-23 JOHN MCLEAN, 1823-5
<i>Attorney General</i>	RICHARD RUSH, 1817 WILLIAM WIRT, 1817-25

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 1825-9

JOHN C. CALHOUN

<i>Secretary of State</i>	HENRY CLAY, 1825-9
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	RICHARD RUSH, 1825-9
<i>Secretary of War</i>	JAMES BARBOUR, 1825-8 PETER B. PORTER, 1828-9
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	SAMUEL SOUTHARD, 1825-9
<i>Postmaster General</i>	JOHN MCLEAN, 1825-9
<i>Attorney General</i>	WILLIAM WIRT, 1825-9

ANDREW JACKSON 1829-33

JOHN C. CALHOUN

ANDREW JACKSON 1833-7

MARTIN VAN BUREN

<i>Secretary of State</i>	MARTIN VAN BUREN, 1829-31 EDWARD LIVINGSTON, 1831-3 LOUIS McLANE, 1833-4 JOHN FORSYTH, 1834-7
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	SAMUEL INGHAM, 1829-31 LOUIS McLANE, 1831-3 WILLIAM DUANE, 1833 ROGER B. TANEY, 1833-4 LEVI WOODBURY, 1834-7
<i>Secretary of War</i>	JOHN H. EATON, 1829-31 LEWIS CASS, 1831-7 BENJAMIN BUTLER, 1837
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	JOHN BRANCH, 1829-31 LEVI WOODBURY, 1831-4 MAHLON DICKERSON, 1834-7
<i>Postmaster General</i>	WILLIAM BARRY, 1829-35 AMOS KENDALL, 1835-7
<i>Attorney General</i>	JOHN M. BERRIEN, 1829-31 ROGER B. TANEY, 1831-3 BENJAMIN BUTLER, 1833-7

MARTIN VAN BUREN 1837-41

RICHARD M. JOHNSON

<i>Secretary of State</i>	JOHN FORSYTH, 1837-41
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	LEVI WOODBURY, 1837-41
<i>Secretary of War</i>	JOEL R. POINSETT, 1837-41
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	MAHLON DICKERSON, 1837-8 JAMES K. PAULDING, 1838-41
<i>Postmaster General</i>	AMOS KENDALL, 1837-40 JOHN M. NILES, 1840-1

Attorney General BENJAMIN BUTLER, 1837-8
 FELIX GRUNDY, 1838-40
 HENRY D. GILPIN, 1840-1

WILLIAM H. HARRISON 1841

JOHN TYLER

Secretary of State DANIEL WEBSTER, 1841
Secretary of Treasury THOMAS EWING, 1841
Secretary of War JOHN BELL, 1841
Secretary of Navy GEORGE E. BADGER, 1841
Postmaster General FRANCIS GRANGER, 1841
Attorney General JOHN J. CRITTENDEN, 1841

JOHN TYLER 1841-5

Secretary of State DANIEL WEBSTER, 1841-3
 HUGH S. LEGARÉ, 1843
 ABEL P. UPSHUR, 1843-4
 JOHN C. CALHOUN, 1844-5
Secretary of Treasury THOMAS EWING, 1841
 WALTER FORWARD, 1841-3
 JOHN C. SPENCER, 1843-4
 GEORGE M. BIBB, 1844-5
Secretary of War JOHN BELL, 1841
 JOHN MCLEAN, 1841
 JOHN C. SPENCER, 1841-3
 JAMES M. PORTER, 1843-4
 WILLIAM WILKINS, 1844-5
Secretary of Navy GEORGE E. BADGER, 1841
 ABEL P. UPSHUR, 1841-3
 DAVID HENSHAW, 1843-4
 THOMAS GILMER, 1844
 JOHN Y. MASON, 1844-5
Postmaster General FRANCIS GRANGER, 1841
 CHARLES A. WICKLIFFE, 1841-5
Attorney General JOHN J. CRITTENDEN, 1841
 HUGH S. LEGARÉ, 1841-3
 JOHN NELSON, 1843-5

JAMES K. POLK 1845-9

GEORGE M. DALLAS

Secretary of State JAMES BUCHANAN, 1845-9
Secretary of Treasury ROBERT J. WALKER, 1845-9
Secretary of War WILLIAM L. MARCY, 1845-9
Secretary of Navy GEORGE BANCROFT, 1845-6
 JOHN Y. MASON, 1846-9
Postmaster General CAVE JOHNSON, 1845-9
Attorney General JOHN Y. MASON, 1845-6
 NATHAN CLIFFORD, 1846-8
 ISAAC TOUCEY, 1848-9

ZACHARY TAYLOR 1849-50

MILLARD FILLMORE

<i>Secretary of State</i>	JOHN M. CLAYTON, 1849-50
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	WILLIAM M. MEREDITH, 1849-50
<i>Secretary of War</i>	GEORGE W. CRAWFORD, 1849-50
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	WILLIAM B. PRESTON, 1849-50
<i>Secretary of Interior</i>	THOMAS EWING, 1849-50
<i>Postmaster General</i>	JACOB COLLAMER, 1849-50
<i>Attorney General</i>	REVERDY JOHNSON, 1849-50

MILLARD FILLMORE 1850-3

<i>Secretary of State</i>	DANIEL WEBSTER, 1850-2
	EDWARD EVERETT, 1852-3
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	THOMAS CORWIN, 1850-3
<i>Secretary of War</i>	CHARLES M. CONRAD, 1850-3
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	WILLIAM A. GRAHAM, 1850-2
	JOHN P. KENNEDY, 1852-3
<i>Secretary of Interior</i>	ALEXANDER H. H. STUART, 1850-3
<i>Postmaster General</i>	NATHAN K. HALL, 1850-2
	SAM D. HUBBARD, 1852-3
<i>Attorney General</i>	JOHN J. CRITTENDEN, 1850-3

FRANKLIN PIERCE 1853-7

WILLIAM R. KING

<i>Secretary of State</i>	WILLIAM L. MARCY, 1853-7
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	JAMES GUTHRIE, 1853-7
<i>Secretary of War</i>	JEFFERSON DAVIS, 1853-7
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	JAMES C. DOBBIN, 1853-7
<i>Secretary of Interior</i>	ROBERT McCLELLAND, 1853-7
<i>Postmaster General</i>	JAMES CAMPBELL, 1853-7
<i>Attorney General</i>	CALEB CUSHING, 1853-7

JAMES BUCHANAN 1857-61

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE

<i>Secretary of State</i>	LEWIS CASS, 1857-60
	JEREMIAH S. BLACK, 1860-1
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	HOWELL COBB, 1857-60
	PHILIP F. THOMAS, 1860-1
	JOHN A. DIX, 1861
<i>Secretary of War</i>	JOHN B. FLOYD, 1857-61
	JOSEPH HOLT, 1861
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	ISAAC TOUCEY, 1857-61
<i>Secretary of Interior</i>	JACOB THOMPSON, 1857-61
<i>Postmaster General</i>	AARON V. BROWN, 1857-9
	JOSEPH HOLT, 1859-61
<i>Attorney General</i>	JEREMIAH S. BLACK, 1857-60
	EDWIN M. STANTON, 1860-1

ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1861-5

HANNIBAL HAMLIN

ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1865

ANDREW JOHNSON

<i>Secretary of State</i>	WILLIAM H. SEWARD, 1861-5
<i>Secretary of Treasury</i>	SALMON P. CHASE, 1861-4
	WILLIAM P. FESSENDEN, 1864-5
	HUGH McCULLOCH, 1865
<i>Secretary of War</i>	SIMON CAMERON, 1861-2
	EDWIN M. STANTON, 1862-5
<i>Secretary of Navy</i>	GIDEON WELLES, 1861-5
<i>Secretary of Interior</i>	CALEB B. SMITH, 1861-3
	JOHN P. USHER, 1863-5
<i>Postmaster General</i>	HORATIO KING, 1861
	MONTGOMERY BLAIR, 1861-4
	WILLIAM DENNISON, 1864-5
<i>Attorney General</i>	EDWARD BATES, 1861-3
	TITIAN J. COFFEY, 1863-4
	JAMES SPEED, 1864-5

*JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT,
1789-1865*

NAME	SERVICE	
<i>Chief Justices in Italics</i>	TERM	YEARS
<i>John Jay</i> , N. Y.	1789-1795	5
John Rutledge, S. C.	1789-1791	1
William Cushing, Mass.	1789-1810	20
James Wilson, Pa.	1789-1798	8
John Blair, Va.	1789-1796	6
Robert H. Harrison, Md.	1789-1790	1
James Iredell, N. C.	1790-1799	9
Thomas Johnson, Md.	1791-1793	1
William Paterson, N. J.	1793-1806	13
<i>John Rutledge</i> , S. C.	1795-	1
Samuel Chase, Md.	1796-1811	15
<i>Oliver Ellsworth</i> , Conn.	1796-1799	4
Bushrod Washington, Va.	1798-1829	31
Alfred Moore, N. C.	1799-1804	4
<i>John Marshall</i> , Va.	1801-1835	34
William Johnson, S. C.	1804-1834	30
Brockholst Livingston, N. Y.	1806-1823	16
Thomas Todd, Ky.	1807-1826	18
Joseph Story, Mass.	1811-1845	33
Gabriel Duval, Md.	1812-1835	22
Smith Thompson, N. Y.	1823-1843	20
Robert Trimble, Ky.	1826-1828	2
John McLean, Ohio	1829-1861	32
Henry Baldwin, Pa.	1830-1844	14
James M. Wayne, Ga.	1835-1867	32
<i>Roger B. Taney</i> , Md.	1836-1864	28
Philip P. Barbour, Va.	1836-1841	5
John Catron, Tenn.	1837-1865	28
John McKinley, Ala.	1837-1852	15
Peter V. Daniel, Va.	1841-1860	19

NAME <i>Chief Justices in Italics</i>	SERVICE	
	TERM	YEARS
Samuel Nelson, N. Y.	1845-1872	27
Levi Woodbury, N. H.	1845-1851	5
Robert C. Grier, Pa.	1846-1870	23
Benj. R. Curtis, Mass.	1851-1857	6
John A. Campbell, Ala.	1853-1861	8
Nathan Clifford, Me.	1858-1881	23
Noah H. Swayne, Ohio	1862-1881	18
Samuel F. Miller, Iowa	1862-1890	28
David Davis, Ill.	1862-1877	14
Stephen J. Field, Cal.	1863-1897	34
<i>Salmon P. Chase</i> , Ohio	1864-1873	8

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE literature of American History is voluminous and constantly growing. This bibliography makes no pretense of being exhaustive and all-inclusive; only the most important and useful titles are cited. Two reading lists have been prepared. The first includes titles that we believe will be most helpful as supplementary reading. The second and longer list is intended for the convenience of advanced students and others who desire wider knowledge of the topics discussed in the several chapters and sections of this book. Consequently, both lists follow the book's organization. To assist the reader further the lists are preceded by citations of general works.

1. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDES

One of the most recent and valuable aids is H. P. Beers, *Bibliographies in American History: Guide to Materials for Research* (1942). Useful also are the annual volumes of bibliography sponsored by the American Historical Association and prepared by Grace G. Griffin and others under the title *Writings on American History* (1906-1938). W. H. Allison and others, *Guide to Historical Literature* (1931) is a general bibliography. Of the older bibliographies the following are still authoritative: Edward Channing, A. B. Hart, and F. J. Turner, *Guide to the Study and Reading of American History* (1912) contains classified lists of books including general and special histories, geography, travel, biography, state and local history, literature, education, music, fine arts, and special topics relating to constitutional, diplomatic, economic, social and religious history. J. N. Larned (ed.), *Literature of American History* (1902) has signed evaluations or reviews of over four thousand important books. A. P. C. Griffin, *Bibliography of American Historical Societies, The United States and the Dominion of Canada* (2nd ed., 1907) has tables of contents of all important historical societies in the United States from their foundation; it also has a subject index. It appeared as Volume II of the Annual Report of the American Historical Association in 1905. The most complete guide to American agricultural history is E. E. Edwards, *A Bibliography of the History of Agriculture in the United States*. (1930)

The use of Federal public documents published before 1881 is made laborious by the inadequacies of indexes. B. P. Poore, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Publications of the United States, September 5, 1774-March 4, 1881* (1885) was published as Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 67, 48th Cong., 2 sess. Unfortunately it is without subject entries. This difficulty was partially overcome when in 1902 there was published *Tables of and Annotated Index to Congressional Series of United States Public Documents*. J. G. Ames, *Comprehensive Index to the Publications of the United States Government, 1881-1893* (2 vols., 1905) appeared as House Document No. 754, 58 Cong. 2 sess. Since 1893 a separate index for each

Congress has been published. For those interested in economic history the most comprehensive guide to state documents is A. R. Hasse, *Index to Economic Material in Documents of the States of the United States* (13 vols., 1907-22). Also see Poole's *Index to Periodicals* (1893) and *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* (1901-)

2. DICTIONARIES AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS

Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography (1886-1922), though largely superseded by more recent works, is still useful. Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), *Dictionary of American Biography* (20 vols., 1928-36), modeled after the *British Dictionary of National Biography*, contains 14,000 biographies of Americans with a bibliography at end of each biography and maintains high levels of scholarship and literary style. E. R. A. Seligman (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (15 vols., 1930-5) should also be consulted by those interested in social and economic history. James T. Adams and R. V. Coleman (eds.), *Dictionary of American History* (6 vols., 1940) is a useful reference to anyone in search of specific facts, events, trends or policies relating to American history.

3. PERIODICALS

The American Historical Review (1895-) is the organ of the American Historical Association founded in 1884. It reviews all new historical literature and in each of its quarterly issues prints important articles and documents. The following periodicals also include valuable book reviews as well as lists of current books and articles: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1890-), *Political Science Quarterly* (1886-), *American Economic Review* (1911-), *Journal of Economic History* (1941-), and *Agricultural History* (1927-). Of the many state, regional, or subject periodicals the best are the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (1915-), *The New England Quarterly* (1928-), *New York History* (1919-), *The William and Mary Quarterly*, (1892-), the *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* (1877-), *Journal of Negro History* (1916-), the *Proceedings and Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society* (1791-), the *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society* (1812-), *Journal of Southern History* (1935-), *Catholic Historical Review* (1915-).

4. GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

R. H. Brown, *Historical Geography of the United States* (1948), E. C. Semple, *American History and Its Geographic Conditions* (revd. 1933) and A. P. Brigham, *Geographic Influences in American History* (1903) are pioneer works still standard. Isaiah Bowman, *Forest Physiography* (1911) and J. R. Smith, *North America* (1942) are the best descriptive accounts of the geography of the United States. Isaiah Bowman, *The New World* (1928) and N. S. Shaler (ed.), *The United States of America* (2 vols., 1894) stress the relation of geography to economics and history. A. B. Hulbert, *Soil* (1930) traces its influence on American history; his *Historic Highways of America* (16 vols., 1902-05) is a monographic collection on the great rivers and highways of the United States. Constance L. Skinner (ed.), *The Rivers of America* (1937-) interprets parts of our history against a geographical background. The three most usable historical atlases are D. R. Fox, *Harpers Atlas of American History* (1920). C. O. Paullin, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States* (1932) and C. L. and E. H. Lord, *Historical Atlas of the United States* (1944). Those interested in maps should also consult E. M. Avery, *A History of the United States* (7 vols., 1904-10).

5. COMPREHENSIVE HISTORIES OF THE UNITED STATES

No individual work of a comprehensive nature covers the history of the United States from its beginning to the present; only co-operative undertakings have suc-

ceeded in this enterprise. The outstanding effort by an individual is Edward Channing *A History of the United States* (6 vols., 1905-25), which carries the story to 1865. Based on source materials and singularly free from inaccuracies, this work is most dependable. During the twentieth century co-operative histories of the United States have increased in number. The first important series to appear was A. B. Hart (ed.), *The American Nation: A History* (28 vols., 1904-18). Volumes uneven in content, but each contains excellent maps and bibliography; a new series of this work is now being prepared under the editorship of H. S. Commager. Another co-operative enterprise in historical writing is Allen Johnson and Allan Nevins (eds.), *Chronicles of America* (56 vols., 1918-51). These volumes though short and popular in literary style are, with some exceptions, scholarly and cover all phases of American history through the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt; this series is uneven in merit. A. M. Schlesinger and D. R. Fox (eds.), *A History of American Life* (13 vols., 1927-48) with its emphasis upon social and intellectual rather than political history is unquestionably the most important work of its kind to date; it is especially valuable for bibliography. Henry David and others (eds.), *The Economic History of the United States* (9 vols. 1945-), now in progress, will be extremely useful for the history of the economic development of the United States. R. E. Spiller and others, *Literary History of the United States* (3 vols., 1948) is a major co-operative effort with a comprehensive bibliography constituting the third volume. R. H. Gabriel (ed.), *The Pageant of America* (15 vols., 1925-9) is a successful co-operative attempt to present the story of the United States through pictures and other graphic material. It should be supplemented by J. T. Adams (ed.), *Album of American History* (4 vols., 1944-8), Stefan Lorant, *The Presidency: A Pictorial History of Presidential Executives from Washington to Truman* (1951); and Marshall Davidson, *Life in America* (2 vols., 1951). The outstanding comprehensive interpretative work covering the entire period is C. A. and M. R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization: I, The Agricultural Era* (rev., 1933); *II, The Industrial Era* (rev., 1933); *III, America in Midpassage* (1939); *IV, The American Spirit* (1942). More factual but also interpretative is Joseph Dorfman, *The Economic Mind in American Civilization* (3 vols., 1946-9), which has detailed bibliography. In the field of biography, *The American Statesman* series (40 vols., 1898-1917), edited by John T. Morse, Jr., is comprehensive, but uneven; a new edition of this work is now being prepared under the editorship of Oscar Handlin.

Important for the colonial period are: H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (3 vols., 1904-07) and *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (4 vols., 1924-5), C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History* (4 vols., 1934-8), George Bancroft, *History of the United States* (10 vols., 1834-75). Bancroft catches the buoyant spirit of America, but his treatment is somewhat partisan and provincial. J. A. Doyle, *English Colonies in America* (5 vols., 1882-1907) best represents the English viewpoint. Osgood is excellent on the development of colonial political institutions. Another comprehensive work of great value is L. H. Gipson, *The British Empire before the American Revolution* (1936-). To date seven volumes have been published.

Of the general histories of the United States during the period from the Revolution to 1865 the following should be consulted: James Schouler, *History of the United States of America, Under the Constitution* (7 vols., 1880-1913). Though biased and somewhat antiquated and peculiar in style, it contains much that is extremely valuable on political and constitutional matters. John B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States, from the Revolution to the Civil War* (8 vols., 1883-1913), which covers the years 1784-1861 is rich in social and economic facts and records obtained largely from newspapers and other contemporary sources; it is badly organized, however, and is difficult to read consecutively. It is supplemented by a ninth volume, *A History of the People of the United States during Lincoln's Administration* (1927). E. P. Oberholtzer, *A History of the United States Since the Civil War* (5 vols., 1917-37) continues the work of McMaster and brings the story to 1901. Henry Adams's *History of the United States of America During the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison* (9 vols., 1889-91) covers

the administrations of Jefferson and Madison. The first volume contains a valuable account of the state of society in 1800. Herbert Agar (ed.), *The Formative Years* (2 vols., 1947) is a convenient condensation of this famous work. See also Richard Hildreth, *The History of the United States of America* (6 vols., 1856-60), and Hermann von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States* (new ed., 8 vols., 1899). The first five volumes of J. R. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850* (9 vols., 1893-1919) give a detailed account of the causes and events of the Civil War. The same period is now being re-examined by Allan Nevins. To date four volumes have been published: *Ordeal of the Union* (2 vols., 1947); *The Emergence of Lincoln* (2 vols., 1950). Admirable in almost every respect, these four volumes cover the years 1847 through 1861.

6. SOURCE MATERIALS

There is no lack of collections of source materials. The following are commended: H. S. Commager (ed.), *Documents of American History* (5th ed., 1949) excellent for political and constitutional sources; so also is William McDonald, *Documentary Source Book of American History, 1606-1926* (3rd ed., 1926). L. M. Hacker and H. S. Zahler, *The Shaping of the American Tradition* (2 vols., 1947) contains a voluminous amount of social, economic, and cultural material that is most illuminating; H. S. Commager and Allan Nevins (eds.), *The Heritage of America* (rev. ed., 1949) contains good materials on American social development; extremely useful are A. B. Hart (ed.), *American History Told by Contemporaries* (5 vols., 1897-1929) and Willard Thorp, M. E. Curti, and Carlos Baker (eds.), *American Issues* (2 vols., 1941). The principal source books on economic history are G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States, 1765-1860* (1909) which has excellent introductory essays, E. L. Bogart and C. M. Thompson, *Readings in the Economic History of the United States* (1916), and F. Flügel and H. U. Faulkner, *Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States* (1929). Those wishing source material on other special subjects should consult R. J. Bartlett, *The Record of American Diplomacy* (1947), I. F. Woestemeyer and J. M. Gambrill, *The Westward Movement* (1939), and L. B. Schmidt and E. D. Ross, *Readings in the Economic History of American Agriculture* (1925).

7. SPECIAL PHASES OF AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

Useful on certain phases of American history are the following books:

1. *Economic History*: E. C. Kirkland, *A History of American Economic Life* (rev. ed., 1939); H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (6th ed., 1949); E. L. Bogart and D. L. Kemmerer, *Economic History of the American People* (rev. ed., 1947); B. and L. M. Mitchell, *American Economic History* (1947); F. A. Shannon, *America's Economic Growth* (3rd ed., 1951) and C. W. Wright, *Economic History of the United States* (rev. ed., 1949) are the best of the one-volume economic histories. Several aspects of American economic history are treated in the volumes published by the Carnegie Institute of Washington. Though inadequate and uneven in merit, they are still very useful: E. R. Johnson et al., *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States* (2 vols., 1915); B. H. Meyer et al., *History of Transportation in the United States Before 1860* (1917); F. W. Taussig, *The Tariff History of the United States* (8th ed., 1931); V. S. Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States*, (new ed., 3 vols., 1929); P. W. Bidwell and J. A. Falconer, *History of Agriculture in the Northern United States, 1620-1860* (1925) and L. C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860* (2 vols., 1933). All of these works have extensive bibliographies.
2. *Financial History*. D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States*, (12th ed., 1936) is the standard authority. It should be supplemented by W. J. Schultz and M. R. Caine, *Financial Development of the United States* (1937).
3. *Agriculture and Land Policies*: The definitive history of American agriculture is yet to be written. Joseph Schafer, *The Social History of American Agriculture*

(1936) is a brief outline. An older work is A. H. Sanford, *The Story of Agriculture in the United States* (1916). Far more satisfactory is E. E. Edwards, "American Agriculture—The First 300 Years," United States Department of Agriculture, *Yearbook* (1940). The newest treatise on public lands is R. M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936* (1942). An older work is B. H. Hibbard, *A History of the Public Land Policies* (1924). For a mass of undigested factual information, consult Thomas Donaldson, *The Public Domain* (1884).

4. *Immigration*: The best accounts are M. L. Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History* (1940) and *The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860* (1940); J. R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America* (new ed., 1920); and G. M. Stephenson, *A History of American Immigration, 1820-1924* (1926). M. R. Davie, *World Immigration* (1936) gives valuable comparative material, a helpful list of immigrant biographies, and considerable literary material treating immigrants and immigration; Edith Abbott, *Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem: Select Documents* (1926) also contains valuable source material. See also Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America* (1948) and Oscar Handlin's excellent *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People* (1951).

5. *Constitutional History*: Consult A. C. McLaughlin, *A Constitutional History of the United States* (1935); C. B. Swisher, *American Constitutional Development* (1943); H. C. Hockett, *The Constitutional History of the United States, 1776-1876* (2 vols., 1939); B. F. Wright, *The Growth of American Constitutional Law* (1942); A. H. Kelly and W. A. Harbison, *The American Constitution, Its Origins and Development* (1948) and R. L. Schuyler, *The Constitution of the United States* (1923).

6. *Foreign Relations*: T. A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (4th ed., 1950) and S. F. Bemis, *The Diplomatic History of the United States* (rev. ed., 1948) are standard one-volume surveys. There is a wealth of material in S. F. Bemis (ed.), *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (10 vols., 1927-9). For our relations with Canada, see J. T. Shotwell (ed.), *The Relation of Canada with the United States* (14 vols., 1939). The best collection of treaties in convenient form is W. M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers 1776-1937* (4 vols., 1910-37). The documentary history of foreign relations is available in the following government compilations: *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1783-1789* (7 vols., 1833-4); *American State Papers, Foreign Relations 1789-1828* (6 vols., 1832-61) and since 1870, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, in one or more annual volumes. Between 1828 and 1860 the papers on foreign relations of the United States have not been collected and are to be found only in congressional documents. From 1860 to 1870 they were published annually under various titles. Students for foreign relations will find rich material in J. B. Moore, *History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party* (6 vols., 1898), and *A Digest of International Law* (8 vols., 1906).

7. *Military and Naval History*. Few comprehensive accounts of these aspects of American history have as yet been written. Consult O. L. Spaulding, *The United States Army in War and Peace* (1937); H. and M. Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (1939); C. S. Alden and A. Westcott, *The United States Navy* (1943); D. W. Knox, *A History of the United States Navy* (1948); and C. H. Metcalf, *A History of the United States Marine Corps* (1939). Among the many works dealing with wars to which the United States has been a party the following may be cited: On the War of Independence: C. F. Adams, *Studies Military and Diplomatic, 1775-1865* (1911); G. W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution* (2 vols., 1913); W. M. Wallace, *Appeal to Arms* (1951). *The War of 1812*. A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812* (2 vols., 1905); C. P. Lucas, *The Canadian War of 1812* (1906). Mexican War: R. S. Henry, *The Story of the Mexican War* (1950); J. H. Smith, *The War with Mexico* (2 vols., 1919). Civil War: J. C. Ropes and W. R. Livermore, *The Story of the Civil War* (4 vols., 1894-1913); J. C. Randall, *Civil War and Reconstruction* (1937); F. A. Shannon, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army* (2 vols., 1928); R. S. Henry,

Story of the Confederacy (1931); D. S. Freeman, R. E. Lee, *A Biography* (4 vols., 1934-7) and by the same author, *Lee's Lieutenants* (3 vols., 1942-4) and *Lee's Dispatches to Davis* (1915); J. T. Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy* (1886); D. D. Porter, *The Naval History of the Civil War* (1887); J. P. Baxter, III, *The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship* (1933); H. S. Commager, *The Blue and the Gray* (2 vols., 1950).

8. *Travel and Travelers' Descriptions*: The best anthologies of travelers' accounts are H. S. Commager, *America in Perspective* (1947) and Oscar Handlin, *This Was America* (1949). Also consult J. L. Mesick, *The English Traveler in America, 1785-1835* (1922); Allan Nevins, *America Through British Eyes* (1948); H. T. Tuckerman, *America and Her Commentators* (1864); Frank Monaghan, *French Travelers in the United States, 1765-1832* (1933); R. G. Thwaites (ed.), *Early Western Travels* (32 vols., 1904-7) and S. J. Buck, *Travel and Description, 1765-1865* (1914). On conditions of travel, consult Seymour Dunbar, *A History of Travel in America* (4 vols., 1915).

9. *Education*: An older text is E. P. Cubberly, *Public Education in the United States* (1919). It should be supplemented by Paul Monroe (ed.), *A Cyclopedia of Education* (5 vols., 1911-13). Useful also are M. E. Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators* (1935); E. W. Knight, *Education in the United States* (rev. ed., 1941); E. G. Dexter, *A History of Education in the United States* (1922); C. F. Thwing, *A History of Higher Education in America* (1906); T. A. Woody, *A History of Women's Education in the United States* (2 vols., 1929); and C. G. Woodson, *The Education of the Negro Prior to 1861* (1915).

10. *The Fine Arts and Music*. For architecture, consult Sahdkihi Hartmann, *A History of American Art* (2 vols., 1902); C. H. Caffin, *The Story of American Painting* (1907); Eugen Neuhaus, *The History and Ideals of American Art* (1931); Alan Burroughs, *Limners and Likenesses: Three Centuries of American Painting* (1936); J. T. Flexner, *America's Old Masters* (1939); Samuel Isham and Royal Cortissoz, *The History of American Painting* (new ed., 1936); Jerome Mellquist, *The Emergence of an American Art* (1942); Homer St. Gaudens, *The American Artist and His Times* (1941), and Oliver W. Larkin, *Art and Life in America* (1949). The beginnings of American sculpture are appraised in Lorado Taft, *The History of American Sculpture* (rev. ed., 1924) and W. H. Downes, *The Life and Works of Winslow Homer* (1911). The most useful surveys of American music are L. C. Elson, *The History of American Music* (rev. ed., 1925) and J. T. Howard, *Our American Music* (1931). They may be supplemented by H. C. Lahee, *Annals of Music in America* (1922); T. F. Hamlin, *The American Spirit in Architecture* (1926); Lewis Mumford, *Sticks and Stones: A Study of American Architecture and Civilization* (1924); and H. B. Major, *The Domestic Architecture of the Early American Republic* (1926). The graphic arts are best covered by Frank Weitenkampf, *American Graphic Art* (1912) and the drama by A. H. Quinn, *A History of the American Drama from the Beginning to the Civil War* (1923).

11. *Science, Religion, and Philosophy*. On science Max Meisel (comp.), *A Bibliography of American Natural History: The Pioneer Century 1769-1865* (3 vols., 1924-9) is for those who desire acquaintance with scientific progress in America before and during the Civil War. See also the excellent survey, W. M. and M. S. C. Smallwood, *Natural History and the American Mind* (1941). The following are also helpful: E. W. Bryn, *The Progress of Invention in the Nineteenth Century* (1900); Waldemar Kaempffert, *A Popular History of American Inventions* (2 vols., 1924); L. L. Woodruff (ed.), *The Development of the Sciences* (1923); John Fiske, *A Century of Science*, (1899); E. S. Dana and others, *A Century of Science in America* (1918); D. J. Struik, *Yankee Science in the Making* (1948); Bernard Jaffe, *Men of Science in America* (1944) and F. R. Packard, *History of Medicine in the United States* (2 vols., 1931). The most usable books on religion are H. K. Rowe, *The History of Religion in the United States* (1924); W. W. Sweet, *The Story of Religions in America* (1930) and T. C. Hall, *Religious Background of American Culture* (1930). For more detailed accounts of leading denominations, consult Philip Schaff and others, *The American Church History Series* (13 vols., 1893-1901);

J. G. Shea, *A History of the Catholic Church in the United States* (4 vols., 1886-92); H. E. Luccock and P. Hutchinson, *The Story of Methodism* (1926); W. S. Perry, *History of the American Episcopal Church* (2 vols., 1885); and Williston Walker, *A History of the Congregational Churches in the United States* (1894). E. B. Greene, *Religion and the State* (1941) examines a recurring theme in history of America. Two older works on the history of American philosophy are still useful: Woodbridge Riley, *American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism and Beyond* (new ed., 1922) and H. G. Townsend, *Philosophical Ideas in the United States* (1934). More recent treatises are H. W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (1946) and W. H. Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America* (1949).

12. *Intellectual History*. Among the major works are Harvey Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America* (1950); Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (new ed., 2 vols., 1945); V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (3 vols., 1927-30); M. E. Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (1951); R. H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* (1940).

8. HISTORIOGRAPHY

For those desiring a critical estimate of American historiography the following will be useful: W. T. Hutchinson (ed.), *The Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography* (1937); Michael Kraus, *A History of American History* (1937); H. E. Barnes, *A History of Historical Writing* (1937); Allan Nevins, *The Gateway to History* (1938); and Hermann Ausubel, *Historians and Their Craft; a Study of the Presidential Addresses of the American Historical Association* (1950).

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

IN CONTRAST to the longer one that follows, this bibliography has been prepared for class assignment use at the undergraduate level. In addition to the works cited for each chapter the following more detailed and comprehensive histories may be read with great profit by both instructor and student: Edward Channing, *History of the United States* (6 vols., 1905-25); J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States* (8 vols., 1883-1913); James Schouler, *History of the United States of America, Under the Constitution* (7 vols., 1880-1913); J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850* (9 vols., 1893-1919); and the several volumes of the *History of American Life* (1927-48) edited by A. M. Schlesinger and D. R. Fox.

For pictorial material consult *The Pageant of America* (15 vols., 1925-9) edited by R. H. Gabriel, and Marshall Davidson's *Life in America* (2 vols., 1951). *The Dictionary of American History* (5 vols., 1940) edited by J. T. Adams and R. V. Coleman is a valuable short cut to important factual information. The two most usable historical atlases are C. O. Paullin, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States* (1932) and C. L. and E. H. Lord, *Historical Atlas of the United States* (1944).

A wealth of biographical and historical material is available in the *Dictionary of American Biography* (20 vols., 1928-37) edited by Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone. For many articles on social and economic history consult the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (15 vols., 1930-5) edited by E. A. R. Seligman and Alvin Johnson.

A fuller acquaintance with the historical literature pertaining to the topics discussed in each of the chapters of this book may be obtained by consulting the second and more complete bibliography.

1. THE OLD WORLD EXPANDS

The best works on the Old World background are: C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938), chaps. 1-4 and E. P. Cheyney, *The European Background of American History* (1904) Volume I in the American Nation series, chaps. 1-4, 7, 8. On commercial rivalry and a new route to the Indies see J. N. L. Baker, *History of Geographical Discovery and Exploration* (1932). The most interesting volume on Columbus is S. E. Morison, *Admiral of the Ocean Sea* (1942). The fruits of discovery are best described by C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization*, cited above, chaps. 1-2; L. B. Wright, *The Atlantic Frontier* (1947); H. E. Bolton, *Rim of Christendom* (1936); W. B. Munro, *Crusaders of New France* (1918), and H. I. Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man* (1929), Volume I in the History of American Life series.

For source material see H. S. Commager (ed.), *Documents of American History* (5th ed., 1949) documents 1, 3, 6-7, 11, 15-16, 18.

2. THE SETTLEMENT OF COLONIAL AMERICA

The best accounts are C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period in American History* (4 vols., 1934-7), Vol. I, chaps. 5-8, 12-13 and Edward Channing, *History of the United States* already cited, Vol. I, chaps. 6-8, 12-13.

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, cited earlier, documents 22, 25, 28.

3. THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

The most satisfactory work covering this chapter is J. T. Adams, *Provincial Society 1690-1763* (1927), in the History of American Life series. Colonial economic life is briefly described by H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (5th ed., 1943), chaps. 3-5 or E. C. Kirkland, *A History of American Economic Life* (rev. ed., 1939), chaps. 2-3 and C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization*, cited earlier, chaps. 5-6, 8-13.

For source material consult G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States* (1909), pp. 29-84.

4. THE COLONIAL SOCIETY

Excellent, well-written material on colonial social life is available in J. T. Adams, *Provincial Society, 1690-1763*, already cited; C. M. Andrews, *Colonial Folkways* (1919) in the Chronicles of America series; T. J. Wertenbaker, *The First Americans 1607-1690* (1927), chaps. 2-13; and C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization*, cited above chaps. 15-18. There is also valuable material in F. R. Dulles, *America Learns to Play* (1940), chaps. 1-3.

The intellectual aspects of colonial life are treated by V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (3 vols., 1927-30), Vol. I, *The Colonial Mind*; M. E. Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (1951), chaps. 1-4; and in the General Introduction and the introduction to the various parts of P. G. E. Miller and T. H. Johnson (eds.), *The Puritans* (1938).

5. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES

C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization*, cited previously, is the best single volume. See especially chaps. 14, 22-24. Other significant books dealing with the topics considered in this chapter are L. A. Harper, *The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth Century Experiment in Social Engineering* (1939); A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History* (1922), chap. 7; and C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (2 vols., 1917).

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, already cited, documents 23, 27, 30, 31, 33.

6. THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The conflict of interests within the British Empire that led to the American Revolution are brilliantly depicted by J. C. Miller, *Origins of the American Revolution* (1943); C. A. and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (4 vols., 1927-42), Vol. I, chap. 5; L. M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism* (1940), chaps. 11-12; C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization*, previously cited, chap. 22 and C. H. Van Tyne, *The Causes of the War of Independence* (1922), chaps. 1-3, 14. For an Englishman's point of view, consult H. E. Egerton, *The Causes and Character of the American Revolution* (1923), chaps. 1-5.

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History* already cited, documents 35, 38, 40-9, 55-6, and S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution 1764-1788*, (2nd ed., 1929), pp. 1-148.

7. THE REVOLUTION

On the fundamental issues, read Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* in Willard Thorp, M. E. Curti and C. Baker, *American Issues* (1941), Vol. I, pp. 82-90 and C. L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence* (1922). For military events, read Edward Channing, *A History of the United States*, cited earlier, Vol. II, chaps. 6-12. For the revolutionary effects of the war on American society, see J. F. Jameson, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement* (1926) and E. B. Greene, *The Revolutionary Generation, 1763-1790* (1943), chaps 8-13. On the

diplomacy of the Revolution, consult either S. F. Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (1935), chaps. 1-4 or T. A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (3rd ed., 1946), chaps. 2-3.

For source material, see three volumes already cited: H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, documents 57-8, 60-70, 74; and S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents, Illustrating the American Revolution, 1764-1788*, pp. 149-203; G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States* pp. 142-80.

8. THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION

The ablest and most recent study on the Confederation is Merrill Jensen, *The Articles of Confederation* (1940). See also John Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History* (1888), pp. 168-202. On the Constitution, read V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, cited previously, Vol. I (*The Colonial Mind*), pp. 279-306; C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913), chaps. 2-3, 6, 10-11; Carl Van Doren, *The Great Rehearsal* (1948) especially pp. 194-238; and Merrill Jensen, *The New Nation* (1950).

For source material, see the three volumes already cited: G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States*, pp. 180-235; H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, documents 75-88; and S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents, Illustrating the American Revolution, 1764-1788*, pp. 204 ff.

9. THE FEDERALISTS IN POWER

A good account of the organizing of the new republic is to be found in Merrill Jensen's *The New Nation*, previously cited, and in J. S. Bassett, *The Federalist System* (1906), in the American Nation series. On Alexander Hamilton and his system see Nathan Schachner, *Alexander Hamilton* (1946), especially pp. 242-81. On Jefferson's criticism of the Hamiltonian system see Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and the Rights of Man* (1951), chaps. 16-28. C. G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton* is lively but strongly biased in favor of Jefferson. N. W. Stephenson and W. H. Dunn, *George Washington* (1940) give a detailed account of Washington's presidency; H. J. Ford, *Washington and His Colleagues* (1921), in the Chronicles of America series, is a briefer account. On John Adams, consult V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents of American Thought*, Vol. I (*The Colonial Mind*) pp. 307-20. For criticism of the Federalist financial program by a Jeffersonian spokesman, see E. S. Maclay (ed.), *Journal of William Maclay* (1928). On diplomacy, consult S. F. Bemis, *The Diplomatic History of the United States* (rev. ed., 1942), chaps. 6-7 or T. A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (4th ed., 1950), chaps. 5-6.

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, previously cited, documents 90-102.

10. THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

The best account of the social-cultural conditions in America at the beginning of the nineteenth century is J. A. Krout and D. R. Fox, *The Completion of Independence, 1790-1830* (1944), in the History of American Life series. There is also valuable descriptive material in J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States* (8 vols., 1883-1913), Vol. I, chap. 1 and Henry Adams, *A History of the United States from 1801-1817* (9 vols., 1889-91), Vol. I, chaps. 1-4.

11. REPUBLICAN RULE IN WAR AND PEACE

The student will find Allen Johnson's *Jefferson and His Colleagues* (1921), in the Chronicles of America series, an excellent introduction. On Jefferson's political ideas, see V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, cited earlier, Vol. I (*The Colonial Mind*), pp. 342-56, 397-98; Dumas Malone, *Jefferson, the Virginian* (1948), pp. 7-18; and C. A. Beard, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*

(1915). On Jeffersonian Democracy in power, consult Henry Adams, *A History of the United States from 1801-1917*, previously cited, Vol. I, chap. 7; S. K. Padover, *The Complete Jefferson* (1943), chaps. 12-13, or Nathan Schachner, *Thomas Jefferson, a Biography* (2 vols., 1951), Vol. II, chaps. 49-64; Edward Channing, *History of the United States*, already cited, Vol. IV, chaps. 9-14. On the War of 1812, consult J. W. Pratt, *Expansionist of 1812* (1925), especially pp. 153-88.

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, cited earlier, documents 106-16; G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States*, previously cited, pp. 239-60; R. J. Bartlett, *The Record of American Diplomacy*, (1947), pp. 103-29.

12. AMERICA MOVES WEST

An admirable setting is provided in F. J. Turner's, *The Frontier in American History* (1920), chaps. 1-4. See also F. J. Paxson, *A History of the American Frontier 1763-1895* (1924), especially chaps. 47-8; and R. E. Riegel, *America Moves West* (rev. ed., 1947). On the Old West, consult B. W. Bond, Jr., *The Civilization of the Old Northwest* (1934), chaps. 1, 2, 10, and F. J. Turner, *The United States, 1830-1850* (1935), chap. 7. The best brief account of the fur trade of the Far West is to be found in Katharine Coman, *Economic Beginnings of the Far West* (2 vols., 1912) Vol. I, pp. 289-375; Vol. II, pp. 207-220.

For source material, see G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States*, cited earlier, pp. 597-665; and F. Flügel and H. U. Faulkner, *Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States* (1929), pp. 379-97.

13. NATIONALISM AND SECTIONALISM

The topics in this chapter are treated fully by Edward Channing, *History of the United States*, already cited, Vol. IV, chaps. 15-20. On the Monroe Doctrine, consult Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826* (1927), chap. 3. A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall* (4 vols., 1916-19) Vol. IV, pp. 168-219 and C. B. Swisher, *American Constitutional Development* (1943), chaps. 6-12 give an admirable discussion of Marshall and his relation to constitutional interpretation. On the tariff, see either F. W. Taussig, *The Tariff History of the United States* (8th ed., 1931) or Edward Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century* (1903). The party situation is discussed by W. E. Binkley, *American Political Parties* (1943), chaps. 4-5.

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History* cited earlier, documents 113, 118-30; R. J. Bartlett, *The Record of American Diplomacy*, already cited, pp. 137-187.

14. JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY

Two brief but highly informative and interpretative accounts are William MacDonald, *Jacksonian Democracy, 1829-1837* (1906), in the American Nation series, and F. A. Ogg, *The Reign of Andrew Jackson* (1919), in the Chronicles of America series. For a longer account of Jackson, see Marquis James, *Andrew Jackson, Portrait of a President*, especially pp. 179-223. A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (1946) is highly interpretative. C. G. Bowers, *Party Battles of the Jackson Period* is lively, but might be more objective. For the financial history of the period, consult D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* (12th ed., 1935), chaps. 8-10.

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, previously cited, documents 135-48.

15. THE NORTHERN FARMER

Two volumes of the History of American Life series, namely, C. R. Fish, *The Rise of the Common Man, 1830-1850* (1937), chap. 4 and A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible*

Conflict 1850-1865 (1934), chap. 5, and A. H. Sanford, *The Story of Agriculture in the United States* (1916) pp. 92-199 give an adequate introductory survey. These chapters should be supplemented by P. W. Bidwell and J. I. Falconer, *History of Agriculture in the Northern United States 1620-1860* (1925), chaps. 11-25. L. B. Schmidt, *Topical Studies and References on the Economic History of American Agriculture* (rev. ed., 1923) will prove helpful.

For source material, consult L. B. Schmidt and E. D. Ross, *Readings in the Economic History of American Agriculture* (1925) and F. Flügel and H. U. Faulkner, *Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States* cited previously, pp. 153-87.

16. THE SOUTHERN FARMER

W. E. Dodd, *The Cotton Kingdom* (1929) and U. B. Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South* (1929) are the best brief portrayals of antebellum Southern economy and society. For a more detailed account, consult L. C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860*, (2 vols., 1933). This is invaluable in almost every respect. U. B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (1918), especially chaps. 11-20, is the standard work on this subject. It may be supplemented by the recent excellent description of the slave system by Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union*, Vol. I, chaps. 13-15.

For source material, see G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States 1765-1860* (1909), chap. 15 and F. Flügel and H. U. Faulkner, *Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States*, pp. 415-47.

17. THE RISE OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM

An excellent introduction is C. A. and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (4 vols., 1927-42), Vol. I, chap. 14; with it should be read E. C. Kirkland, *A History of American Economic Life* (rev. ed. 1939), chaps. 8-9. For a more detailed treatment consult V. S. Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States* (new ed., 1929); R. M. Tryon, *Household Manufacture in the United States, 1640-1860* (1917) and H. F. Williamson (ed.), *The Growth of the American Economy* (1944), chaps. 11-12. On the condition of labor, see N. J. Ware, *The Industrial Worker, 1840-1860* (1924), chaps. 4-10. On finance and tariff, consult D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* (12th ed.), cited earlier, chaps. 3-11 and F. W. Taussig, *The Tariff History of the United States* (8th ed.), previously cited, Part I.

For source material, see G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States 1765-1860* already cited, pp. 432-78, 727-35, and E. L. Bogart and C. M. Thompson, *Readings in the Economic History of the United States*, (1916), chaps. 8, 9, 16.

18. MERCHANTS AND SHIPPERS

For transportation G. R. Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860* (1951) is indispensable. There is also much valuable material in C. E. MacGill and others, *History of Transportation in the United States Before 1860* (1917), chaps. 2-11, 18; A. B. Hulbert *Paths of Inland Commerce* (1920); A. F. Harlow, *Old Townships: The Story of the American Canal Era* (1926), chap. 6 ff. Malcolm Keir, *The March of Commerce* (1927), Volume VI of the Pageant of America series, is accurate, concise, highly informative, and entertaining. On the merchant marine the standard work is J. R. Soley's account in N. S. Shaler's, *The United States of America* (1894) Vol. I, pp. 518-624. Also consult W. L. Marvin, *The American Merchant Marine* (1902), chaps. 4-14 and S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860* (1921), chap. 3 ff. The co-operative work of E. R. Johnson, T. W. Van Metre, G. G. Huebner, and D. S. Hanchett, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States* (2 vols., 1915) is best for the subjects covered. See Vol. I, chaps. 12, 14, 19.

For source material, see G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States*, cited earlier, chaps. 7-8; F. Flügel and H. U. Faulkner, *Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States*, pp. 194-219; 680-2.

19. PATTERN OF PROTEST AND REFORM

Three volumes in the History of American Life series are indispensable. These are J. A. Krout and D. R. Fox, *The Completion of Independence, 1790-1830* (1944), chaps. 12, 13; C. R. Fish, *The Rise of the Common Man, 1830-1850* (1937), chaps. 7, 9-11 and A. C. Cole, *The Irrespressible Conflict, 1850-1865* (1934), chaps. 1, 4-10. See also M. E. Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, (1943), chaps. 13-16. Harry Laidler's *History of Socialist Thought* (1927) contains valuable material on the several socialistic experiments of the period. With it should be read A. F. Tyler, *Freedom's Ferment* (1944), which is concerned with the forces responsible for the reform movement.

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, cited earlier, documents 162, 163, 172, 173, 178.

20. CONTINENTAL EXPANSION

Excellent for this chapter is Bernard De Voto, *The Year of Decision, 1846* (1943), and A. K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny* (1935), especially chap. 1. The following are also highly recommended: Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union* (1947), Vol. I, chaps. 8-12; N. W. Stephenson, *Texas and the Mexican War* (1921), in the Chronicles of America series; and J. H. Smith, *The War with Mexico* (2 vols., 1919), especially Vol. 2, chaps. 22-34. On Oregon and the Far Northwest, see Joseph Schafer, *History of the Pacific Northwest* (revd. 1918). For California the best general accounts are R. G. Cleland, *From Wilderness to Empire* (1944) and *A History of California: The American Period* (1922). On the gold rush, consult A. B. Hulbert, *Forty-Niners: The Chronicle of the California Trail* (1931).

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, cited previously, documents 164-69, 171 and R. J. Bartlett, *The Record of American Diplomacy*, cited earlier, pp. 188-230.

21. POLITICS OF SECTIONALISM

The first six chapters of J. G. Randall's excellent volume, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (1937) give the best single picture of the factors and events responsible for the coming of the Civil War. On the economic basis of sectionalism, see R. R. Russel, *Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism 1840-1861* (1924) and Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union* (2 vols., 1947). These volumes also cover the Compromise of 1850, Vol. I, chaps. 8-12. See also his *The Emergence of Lincoln* (2 vols., 1950) Vol. I; Jesse Macy, *The Anti-Slavery Crusade* (1919) in the Chronicles of America series; R. F. Nichols, *The Disruption of American Democracy* (1948). G. F. Milton, *The Eve of Conflict: Stephen A. Douglas and the Needless War* (1934), chaps. 7-10 covers the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. For the emergence of the Republican party and the election of 1860 consult W. E. Binkley, *American Political Parties*, cited earlier, chaps. 8-10 and R. H. Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign* (1944).

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, cited above, documents 174-88 and William MacDonald, *Documentary Source Book of American History* (3rd ed., 1925), pp. 397-405.

22. THE CIVIL WAR

The best single volume is J. G. Randall, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, cited above. See chaps. 8-29. It may be supplemented by his *Lincoln the President* (2 vols., 1945), Vol. II, chaps. 15-24 and N. W. Stephenson, *Lincoln* (1922), chaps.

15-34. General Grant's military leadership is assessed in T. H. Williams, *Lincoln and His Generals* (1952), and General Lee's, in Volume IV, chap. 11 of D. S. Freeman's definitive work, *R. E. Lee: A Biography* (4 vols., 1934-5). Account of the creation of the armies and the everyday life of the common soldier can be found in F. A. Shannon's monumental study, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865* (2 vols., 1928) and B. I. Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (1943).

For source material, see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, cited above, documents 189-244.

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER I

The Old World Expands

The European Background. The best account is E. P. Cheyney, *The Dawn of a New Era* (1936). An older work by the same author, *European Background of American History* (1904), is especially valuable on the rise of the trading companies. On the rise of European capitalism consult H. E. Barnes, *An Economic History of the Western World* (1937); L. M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism* (1940); J. W. Thompson, *Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages, 1300-1530* (1931); G. C. Sellery and A. C. Krey, *Medieval Foundations of Western Civilization* (1929) and R. A. Newhall, *The Crusades* (1927). There are also penetrating accounts in a number of first-rate texts: S. B. Clough and C. W. Cole, *Economic History of Europe* (1941); C. J. H. Hayes, *A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe* (rev. ed., 1948) and C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938). For a more detailed account W. C. Abbott, *Expansion of Europe* (2nd rev. ed., 1938) is excellent; it may be supplemented profitably by W. R. Shepherd "The Expansion of Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 43-60, 210-25, 392-411. Henri Pirenne's *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe* (1936) and *Medieval Cities, Their Origins and Revival of Trade* (1925) are the works of one of the greatest of modern scholars. They are indispensable.

Expanding Commerce and Commercial Rivalry. For brief summaries see Clive Day, *A History of Commerce* (rev. ed., (1938); J. E. Gillespie, *A History of Geographical Discovery, 1400-1800* (1933) and L. B. Packard, *The Commercial Revolution, 1400-1776* (1927). J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry* (1926) has valuable chapters on the Commercial Revolution. F. C. Lane, *Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance* (1934) is very valuable, as is A. H. Lybyer, "The Influence of the Ottoman Turks upon the Routes of Oriental Trade," *American Historical Association, Annual Report* (1914). The monumental work of W. Cunningham, *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce* (5th ed., 3 vols., 1910-12) is important.

Early Explorations and Discoveries. As a basis for further study the outstanding authorities are C. R. Beazley, *The Dawn of Modern Geography* (3 vols., 1897-1906); J. K. Wright, *The Geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades* (1925); Joseph Jacobs, *The Story of Geographical Discovery* (1915); and Sir Percy Sykes, *The Quest for Cathay* (1936). Henry Harrisse, *The Discovery of North America* (1892) is the work of a great French-American scholar. See also J. B. Brebner, *The Explorers of North America, 1492-1806* (1933).

On the Norse discovery of America the best brief survey is Halldór Hermannsson, *The Problem of Vineland* (1936); W. Hovgaard, *Voyages of the Norsemen to America* (1914) is useful and A. M. Reeves, *The Finding of Vineland the Good* (1895) contains the relevant sagas and other documents, which are reprinted in J. E. Olson and E. G. Bourne, *The Northmen, Columbus and Cabot 985-1503* (1906). A scholarly study is G. M. Cathorne-Hardy's *The Norse Discoverers of America: The Vineland Sagas* (1921). Not all the material in H. R. Holand's *Westward from Vineland; An Account of Norse Discoveries and Explorations in America, 982-1362* (1940) has as yet been accepted by historians as fully authenticated.

For Portuguese discoveries and colonization the following are highly recommended: J. P. O. Martin, *The Golden Age of Prince Henry the Navigator* (1914); C. R. Beazley, *Prince Henry the Navigator* (1895); A. G. Keller, *Colonization*

(1908), chap. 3 ff.; and S. E. Morison, *Portuguese Voyages to America in the Fifteenth Century* (1940); Beazley's volume should be supplemented by his two excellent articles on Prince Henry in the *American Historical Review*. Vol. XVI (Oct. 1910) and Vol. XVII (Jan. 1912). See also Edgar Prestage, *The Portuguese Pioneers* (1933). A recent work covering Portuguese expansion is H. V. Livermore, *A History of Portugal* (1947), which is more authoritative than H. M. Stephens, *The Story of Portugal* (1891).

The best single volumes on the Spanish discoveries and explorations are E. G. Bourne, *Spain in America, 1450-1580* (1904) and H. E. Bolton, *The Spanish Borderlands; a Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest* (1921). An older publication, John Fiske, *The Discovery of America* (2 vols., 1899), written for the general public, has literary excellence and is still useful. E. J. Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650* (1934) is a significant study; so also is C. H. Haring, *Trade and Navigation Between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (1918). Two early works on Columbus still of use are C. R. Markham, *Life of Christopher Columbus* (1892) and Justin Winsor, *Christopher Columbus* (1891). A more recent life is S. E. Morison, *Admiral of the Ocean Sea* (2 vols., 1942). Volume I of Cecil James (ed.), *Select Documents Illustrating and Four Voyages of Columbus* (2 vols., 1930-1933) should be consulted by those interested in the objective of Columbus. Henry Vignaud, *The Columbian Tradition* (1920) and *Toscanelli and Columbus* (1903) are very important. G. E. Nunn's *Geographical Conceptions of Columbus* (1924) and his article "The Imago Mundi and Columbus," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XL (Oct. 1934) are also important. On early Spanish activities in the New World, see the excellent volume F. A. Kirkpatrick, *The Spanish Conquistadores* (2nd ed., 1946); Theodore Maynard, *De Soto and the Conquistadores* (1930); I. B. Richman, *The Spanish Conquerors* (1919); G. P. Winship, *The Journal of Francisco Vazquez de Coronado, 1540-1542* (1933); A. G. Day, *Coronado's Quest: the Discovery of the Southwestern States* (1940); Bernard Moses, *The Establishment of Spanish Rule in America* (1898) and his more detailed, *The Spanish Dependencies in South America* (2 vols., 1914); and H. C. Lea, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies* (1908) which paints a dark picture. P. A. Means, *The Spanish Main, Focus of Envy 1492-1700* (1935) is an excellent description of the efforts of Old World nations to obtain possessions in America. R. B. Merriman's *The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New* (4 vols., 1918-34) is of major importance, particularly Vols. II, III. W. H. Prescott's *History of the Conquest of Mexico* (rev. ed., 4 vols., 1902), first published in 1843, and his *History of the Conquest of Peru* (rev. ed., 3 vols., 1902), which appeared in 1847, have both gone through many editions. Though certain parts of both works have been superseded as a result of more recent historical investigation, these volumes still have freshness and vividness and are fascinating reading. No one interested in Spanish effort in the new world can ignore H. I. Priestley's *The Coming of the White Man 1492-1848* (1930). This excellent study is the first volume of the History of American Life series.

The literature on French exploration and claims in America is adequate. At the head of the list stands Francis Parkman's *Pioneers of France in the New World* (1907). Since its appearance new material on the French achievement has been added to the Parkman account. See H. P. Biggar, *Precursors of Jacques Cartier, 1497-1534* (1911); *The Voyages of Jacques Cartier* (1924); and *Early Trading Companies of New France* (1901). See also Stephen Leacock, *The Mariner of St. Malo* (1914). G. M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France* (2 vols., 1928) is a detailed scholarly work. Justin Winsor, *Cartier to Frontenac* (1894) is the work of an able historian of the old school. The following are also most useful: W. B. Munro, *Crusaders of New France* (1918); E. G. Bourne (ed.), *The Voyages and Explorations of Samuel de Champlain 1604-1616* (2 vols., 1922); C. W. Colby, *The Founder of New France: Chronicle of Champlain* (1915); L. P. Kellogg, *The French Régime in Wisconsin and the Northwest* (1925); R. G. Thwaites, *France in America* (1905); and Francis Parkman, *The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century* (new ed., 1902). Carl Wittke, *A History of Canada* (3rd ed., 1941),

and Edgar McInnis, *Canada: A Political and Social History* (1947) are the best brief surveys. The following references are highly recommended on Dutch and Swedish efforts in the New World: Chapter 7 in C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938); H. C. Murphy, *Henry Hudson in Holland* (1909); Llewelyn Powys, *Henry Hudson* (1928), which presents new material; J. F. Jameson, *Willem Usselinx Founder of the Dutch and Swedish West Indies Companies* (1887). T. A. Janvier, *The Dutch Founding of New York* (1903); J. H. Innes, *New Amsterdam and Its People* (1902), highly local and specialized; and the volumes that treat the colonial period of the *History of the State of New York* (10 vols., 1933-7), edited by A. C. Flick, are adequate for the Dutch. They may be supplemented with the older, more detailed accounts: J. R. Brodhead, *History of the State of New York* (2 vols., 1853-71) and John Fiske, *The Dutch and Quaker Colonies* (new ed., 2 vols., 1903). Amandus Johnson, *The Swedish Settlements on the Delaware, 1638-1664* (2 vols., 1911) is authoritative. Johnson's material appears in more attractive form in Christopher Ward, *The Dutch and Swedes on the Delaware, 1609-1664* (1930).

The best detailed survey of the English economic background is to be found in E. Lipson, *The Economic History of England* (3 vols., 1915-31). L. F. Salzman, *English Trade in the Middle Ages* (1931); R. H. Tawney, *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century* (1912) and R. D. Richards, *The Early History of Banking in England* (1929) are excellent for the topics to which each addresses itself. George Unwin, *Industrial Organization in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (1904) is unsurpassed for a description of England's economy at the beginning of the colonizing era. The best introduction to English overseas activity is to be found in J. A. Williamson's *Maritime Enterprise 1485-1558* (1913), *The Voyages of John and Sebastian Cabot* (1937), *Sir John Hawkins, the Time and the Man* (1927) and *The Age of Drake* (1938). More popular general accounts are C. R. Beazley, *John and Sebastian Cabot* (1898), E. F. Benson, *Sir Francis Drake* (1927); J. D. Upcott, *Sir Francis Drake and the Beginnings of English Sea Power* (1927); E. K. Chatterton, *English Seamen and the Colonization of America* (1930), D. B. Chidsey, *Sir Walter Raleigh, that Damned Upstart* (1931) and *Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Elizabeth's Racketeer* (1932); and J. A. Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion* (1930). C. P. Lucas, *The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise* (1917) is an excellent brief summary of English commercial evolution. Stimulating also is William Cunningham, *The Progress of Capitalism in England* (1916). Henry Harris, *John Cabot, the Discovery of North America, and Sebastian, His Son* (1896) is detailed and technical; N. M. Crouse, *In Quest of the Western Ocean* (1928) is scholarly and well written. J. S. Corbett's *Drake and the Tudor Navy* (2 vols., 1898) and his *The Successors of Drake* (1900) are by an authority on naval history. William McFee, *The Life of Sir Martin Frobisher* (1928); H. R. Wagner, *Sir Francis Drake's Voyage Around the World: Its Aims and Achievements* (1926); M. Waldman, *Sir Walter Raleigh* (1928); A. D. Innes, *The Maritime and Colonial Expansion of England under the Stuarts, 1603-1714* (1932); H. L. Rowland and G. B. Manhart, *Studies in English Commerce and Exploration in the Reign of Elizabeth* (1924); C. H. Wood, *Elizabethan Sea-dogs: A Chronicle of Drake and His Companions* (1918); W. G. Gosling, *The Life of Sir Humphrey Gilbert* (1911) are all important. William Foster, *England's Quest of Eastern Trade* (1933); D. B. Quinn, *The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert* (2 vols., 1940); *Raleigh and the British Empire* (1947); and W. R. Scott, *The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720* (3 vols., 1910-12) should be consulted. E. G. R. Taylor (ed.), *The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts* (2 vols., 1935) is the standard authority on the work of this famous father and son, whose *Principall Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation* has been frequently reprinted.

CHAPTER II

Settlement of Colonial America

Establishment of English Colonies in North America. The literature is voluminous. In addition to the works by Bancroft, Channing, Andrews, Osgood, Doyle and Gipson cited above, the following are important: C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938), the best single volume survey; M. W. Jernegan, *The American Colonies 1492-1750* (1929), well organized; T. J. Wertenbaker, *The First Americans, 1607-1690* (1938), excellent social history; L. B. Wright, *The Atlantic Frontier* (1947), a more recent interpretation which stresses the European background. On Virginia and Maryland, see: P. A. Bruce, *Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century* (rev. ed., 2 vols., 1935), *Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century* (2 vols., 1910) and *Social Life of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century* (2 vols., 1907), three great works; they should be supplemented by W. F. Craven, *Dissolution of the Virginia Company* (1932) and *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 1607-1689* (1949); T. J. Wertenbaker, *Virginia under the Stuarts, 1607-1688* (1914), *The Planters of Colonial Virginia* (1922), *The Old South; The Founding of American Civilization* (1942), and *Patrician and Plebeian in Virginia* (1910); M. M. P. Stanard, *The Story of Virginia's First Century* (1928); and Alexander Brown, *The First Republic in America* (1898). John Fiske, *Old Virginia and Her Neighbors* (2 vols., 1897) is interesting reading, but not always accurate. E. K. Chatterton, *Captain John Smith* (1927) gives the essential facts of this notable's life; see also J. G. Fletcher, *John Smith—Also Pocahontas* (1928). For documentary and contemporary material, see Alexander Brown (ed.), *The Genesis of the United States* (2 vols., 1896); S. M. Kingsbury (ed.), *Records of the Virginia Company of London* (4 vols., 1906-35); Edward Arber, *Travels and Works of Captain John Smith* (new ed., 1910), and Robert Beverley, *History and Present State of Virginia*, which first appeared in 1705 and has been reprinted recently (1947).

For the architecture of colonial Virginia and Maryland as well as the other colonies H. R. Shurtleff, *The Log Cabin Myth* (1939); S. F. Kimball, *Domestic Architecture of the American Colonies and of the Early Republic* (1922) and H. D. Eberlein, *The Architecture of Colonial America* (1915) are the most helpful. Of special interest is the pictorial approach afforded by T. F. Hamlin, *The American Spirit in Architecture* (1926), one of the volumes (XIII) of the Pageant of America series. B. D. Steiner, *Beginnings of Maryland, 1631-1639* (1903); J. M. Gambrill, *Leading Events of Maryland History* (rev. ed., 1917); M. P. Andrews, *History of Maryland: Province and State* (1929); C. C. Hall, *The Lords Baltimore and Maryland Palatinate* (1904); W. H. Browne, *George Calvert and Cecilius Calvert* (1890); C. C. Hall (ed.), *Narratives of Early Maryland, 1633-1684* (1910); J. T. Scharf, *History of Maryland* (3 vols., 1879); N. D. Mereness, *Maryland as a Proprietary Province* (1901) cover the early history of Maryland. W. H. Fry, *New Hampshire as a Royal Province* (1908); G. L. Clark, *A History of Connecticut, Its People and Institutions* (1914) are extremely useful on the founding of individual colonies.

On the New England colonies, Andrews, Channing, and Osgood are excellent. Critical of the Puritans is J. T. Adams, *The Founding of New England* (1921). See also C. M. Andrews, *The Fathers of New England* (1921), and *Our Earliest Colonial Settlements* (1933); S. E. Morison, *Builders of the Bay Colony* (1930); T. J. Wertenbaker, *The Puritan Oligarchy* (1947); Frances Rose-Troup, *The Massachusetts Bay Colony and Its Predecessors* (1930); G. F. Willison, *Saints and Strangers* (1945); I. M. Calder, *The New Haven Colony* (1934); H. S. Burrage, *The Beginnings of Colonial Maine, 1602-1658* (1914); C. M. Andrews, *The Beginnings of Connecticut, 1632-1662* (1934); I. B. Richmond, *Rhode Island: Its Making and Its Meaning* (2 vols., 1902). For the background of Pilgrim emigration, consult H. M. Morton Dexter, *The England and Holland of the Pilgrims* (1905); it may be supple-

mented profitably with R. G. Usher, *The Pilgrims and Their History* (1918). J. G. Palfrey, *A Compendious History of New England 1689-1727* (4 vols., 1884) is a detailed account of the entire period. Useful biographical material is contained in S. E. Morison, *Builders of the Bay Colony* (1930); R. C. Winthrop, *Life and Letters of John Winthrop* (2 vols. 1864-67); Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana* (2 vols., 1820); S. H. Brockunier, *The Irrepressible Democrat; Roger Williams* (1940); Augustine Jones, *The Life and Work of Thomas Dudley, the Second Governor of Massachusetts* (1899); and E. Curtis, *Anne Hutchinson* (1930).

From the extensive literature of the middle colonies the following are recommended: New Netherland and New York are well covered in the first two volumes of the *History of the State of New York* (1933), edited by A. C. Flick, and in T. J. Wertenbaker's *The Founding of American Civilization: The Middle Colonies* (1938); M. W. Goodwin, *Dutch and English on the Hudson* (1919); T. A. Janvier, *The Dutch Founding of New York* (1903), cited above. J. H. Kennedy, *Thomas Dongan, Governor of New York, 1682-1688* (1930) is helpful. Christopher Ward, *New Sweden on the Delaware* (1938) treats adequately the influence of the Swedes in this part of the New World. A. C. Myers (ed.), *Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, West New Jersey and Delaware, 1630-1707* (1912) is useful for source material. The definitive biography of William Penn is yet to be written. The best accounts are C. E. Vulliamy, *William Penn* (1933); Bonamy Dobree, *William Penn, Quaker and Pioneer* (1932); Arthur Pound, *The Penns of Pennsylvania and England* (1932); W. I. Hull, *William Penn, A Topical Biography* (1937); W. W. Comfort, *William Penn, 1644-1718, Tercentenary Estimate* (1944); and the older S. G. Fisher, *The True William Penn* (1900). Excellent are S. G. Fisher, *The Quaker Colonies* (1919), *The Making of Pennsylvania* (rev. ed., 1932), and *Pennsylvania, Colony and Commonwealth* (1897).

On the Carolinas and Georgia, see S. A. Ashe, *History of North Carolina* (2 vols., 1908-25), a general history; J. S. Bassett, *The Constitutional Beginnings of North Carolina, 1663-1729* (1894); Archibald Henderson, *North Carolina, The Old North State and the New* (5 vols., 1941); Edward McCrady, *The History of South Carolina under the Proprietary Government, 1670-1719* (1897) and his *The History of South Carolina Under Royal Government, 1719-1776* (1899); W. R. Smith, *South Carolina as a Royal Province, 1719-1776* (1903); L. F. Brown, *The First Earl of Shaftesbury* (1933), which is scholarly and detailed; and D. D. Wallace, *The History of South Carolina* (4 vols., 1934), which is very useful. See also A. B. Saye, *New Viewpoints in Georgia History* (1943). J. R. McCain, *Georgia as a Proprietary Province, the Execution of a Trust* (1917) is well organized and informing; E. M. Coulter, *Short History of Georgia* (1933) is a first-rate state history. A. A. Ettinger, *James Edward Oglethorpe: Imperial Idealist* (1936) and L. F. Church, *Oglethorpe: A Study in Philanthropy in England and Georgia* (1932) are able biographies. V. W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (1929) is a scholarly account of expansion of the Carolina frontier and the beginnings of Georgia; J. E. Callaway, *The Early Settlement of Georgia* (1948) is a useful study.

The British West Indies are covered by C. M. Andrews. Useful studies of exploration and international rivalry are A. P. Newton, *The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688* (1933); Richard Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763* (1936); and L. M. Penson, *The Colonial Agents of the British West Indies* (1924). V. T. Harlow, *A History of Barbadoes 1626-1685* (1926) is lively. C. C. S. Higham, *The Development of the Leeward Islands Under the Restoration, 1660-1688* (1921) is a careful, detailed study. Henry Wilkinson, *The Adventurers of Bermuda* (1933) is interesting. West Indian economy is surveyed in F. W. Pitman, *The Development of the West Indies, 1700-1763* (1913). J. A. Williamson, *The Caribbee Islands under the Proprietary Patents* (1926) is excellent.

Emigration to Colonial America. The best brief accounts are C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938), chap. 15 and the early chapters of M. L. Hansen *The Atlantic Migration 1607-1860* (1940). The early chapters of Carl Wittke's, *We Who Built America: The Saga of the Immigrant* (1939) should also be consulted. On national groups, consult A. B. Faust, *The German Element in the*

United States (2 vols., 1909), an outstanding authority; Lucy F. Bittinger, *The Germans in Colonial Times* (1901), a good introduction for the German settlements in Pennsylvania; F. R. Diffenderfer, *The German Immigration into Pennsylvania, 1700-1775* (1900), a factual treatment; Dieter Cunz, *The Maryland Germans, a History* (1948), which covers German settlement in a restricted area; W. A. Knittle, *Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration* (1937), a thorough study; L. O. Kuhns, *The German and Swiss Settlements of Colonial Pennsylvania* (1901), a readable and compact account; Ralph Wood (ed.), *The Pennsylvania Germans* (1942), an accurate account; G. D. Bernheim, *History of the German Settlements in . . . North and South Carolina* (1872), old but reliable; Herrmann Schuricht, *History of the German Element in Virginia* (2 vols., 1898), useful as a reference; J. W. Wayland, *The German Element of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia* (1907), a special study; H. J. Ford, *The Scotch-Irish in America* (1915), an outstanding study; J. P. MacLean, *An Historical Account of the Settlements of Scotch Highlanders in America Prior to the Peace of 1783* (1900), detailed but useful; Maude Glasgow, *The Scotch-Irish in Northern Ireland and in the American Colonies* (1936); A. C. Myers, *Immigration of the Irish Quakers into Pennsylvania, 1682-1750 with Their Early History in Ireland* (1902), scholarly; M. K. Freund, *Jewish Merchants in Colonial America* (1939), a standard account; L. M. Friedman, *Early American Jews* (1934), somewhat fragmentary; C. W. Baird, *History of the Huguenot Emigration to America* (2 vols., 1885), which emphasizes Huguenot leaders and families; A. H. Hirsch, *The Huguenots of Colonial South Carolina* (1928), an excellent study; M. J. O'Brien, *A Hidden Phase of American History* (1919), which deals with Irish emigration and is entirely reliable; and C. H. Browning, *Welsh Settlement of Pennsylvania* (1912) which deals with early emigration of Welsh Quakers.

Colonial Land Systems. See Melville Eggleston, *The Land System of the New England Colonies* (1886), a brief, accurate essay; Edward Channing, *The Narragansett Planters* (1886), a study of a unique type of land development in New England; C. P. Gould, *The Land System in Maryland, 1720-1765* (1913), a scholarly treatment; B. W. Bond, *The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies* (1919), comprehensive; T. J. Wertenbaker, *The Planters of Colonial Virginia* (1922); V. F. Barnes, "Land Tenure in English Colonial Charters of the Seventeenth Century" in *Essays in Colonial History Presented to Charles M. Andrews* (1931), excellent; R. H. Akagi, *The Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies, 1620-1770* (1924), which contains useful material.

CHAPTER III

The Colonial Economy

Agriculture. The best contemporary account of colonial agriculture is to be found in the anonymous work—first published in two volumes in 1775—*American Husbandry*, edited by H. J. Carman (1939). Standard works covering the period are Lyman Carrier, *The Beginnings of American Agriculture* (1923), the best introduction to farming techniques; P. W. Bidwell and J. I. Falconer, *History of American Agriculture in the Northern United States, 1620-1860* (1925), important; L. C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860* (2 vols., 1933), important; L. B. Schmidt and E. D. Ross (eds.), *Readings in the Economic History of American Agriculture* (1925), a valuable collection; Joseph Schafer, *The Social History of American Agriculture* (1936), which has some material on colonial period. Of special importance on certain phases are A. O. Craven, *Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1606-1860* (1926); A. H. Hulbert, *Soil: Its Influence on the History of the United States* (1930); Myer Jacobstein, *The Tobacco Industry in the United States* (1907); J. C. Robert, *The Story of Tobacco in America* (1949), which covers production of tobacco in the colonial period; J. E. Brooks, *Tobacco: Its History Illustrated by the Books, Manu-*

script and Engraving in the Library of George Arents, Jr. (4 vols., 1937-43), a comprehensive study; A. S. Salley, Jr., *The Introduction of Rice Culture into South Carolina*, Bulletin No. 6 of the Historical Commission of North Carolina (1919); L. G. Connor, *A Brief History of the Sheep Industry in the United States* (1921); U. B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (1918) and *Life and Labor in the Old South* (1929); and J. H. Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes* (1947).

The Products of Forest and Sea. On the fur trade, consult Clarence A. Vandiveer, *The Fur-Trade and Early Western Exploration* (1929), a clear, concise, brief introduction; F. X. Maloney, *The Fur Trade in New England, 1620-1676* (1931), a first-rate study by a college undergraduate; V. W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier 1670-1732* (1929), the best description of the Southern fur-trade; A. H. Buffington, "New England and the Western Fur-Trade, 1629-1675," *Publications Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, Vol. XVIII (1917); H. Broshar, "The First Push Westward of the Albany Traders," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. VII (Dec., 1920); A. T. Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 1741-1782* (1926), a detailed study of a prominent Indian agent, trader, and land speculator, who had first-hand information on fur trade; H. A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada* (1930), an exhaustive and scholarly study; see also his suggestive article "Interrelations Between the Fur Trade of Canada and the United States," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. XX, (Dec. 1930); C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (2 vols., 1917), an admirable discussion of the influence of the fur trade upon imperial policy. C. A. Hanna, *The Wilderness Trail* (1911) contains much information on fur trade. Sydney Greenbie, *Frontiers and the Fur-Trade* (1929) is a popular narrative.

For lumber and other forest products the following are useful: J. E. Defebaugh, *History of the Lumber Industry of America* (2 vols., 1906-07); W. H. Rowe, *The Maritime History of Maine: Three Centuries of Shipbuilding and Seafaring* (1948); R. G. Albion, *Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy* (1926), excellent; F. E. Coyne, *The Development of the Cooperage Industry, 1620-1940* (1940), very informing on the colonial period; T. J. Wertenbaker, *The First Americans 1607-1690* (1929); W. A. Knittle, *The Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration* (1936), which describes a British government redemptioner project to manufacture naval stores in America; R. H. Gabriel, *Toilers on Land and Sea* (1926), Volume III of Pageant of America Series, which has useful pictures.

For colonial fisheries and whaling a good introduction is to be found in Volume I of E. R. Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States* (2 vols., 1922). Other first rate studies are Raymond McFarland, *A History of the New England Fisheries* (1911); R. G. Lounsbury, *The British Fishery at Newfoundland, 1634-1763* (1934); W. S. Tower, *A History of American Whale Fishery* (1907); C. B. Hawes, *Whaling* (1924); and E. O. Horman, *The American Whalers* (1928). H. A. Innis, *The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy* (1940) is excellent on colonial period.

Manufactures. R. M. Tryon's *Household Manufactures in the United States, 1640-1860* (1917) is the standard authority. More popular accounts are W. C. Langdon, *Everyday Things in American Life 1607-1776* (1937) and Arthur Train, Jr., *The Story of Everyday Things* (1941). V. S. Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States, 1607-1860* (1916-28) is comprehensive and authoritative. Volumes II and III of L. H. Gipson's, *The British Empire before the American Revolution*, published in 1936, survey colonial industries and are indispensable; so also is Volume II of Channing already cited. Two older works J. L. Bishop, *A History of American Manufactures from 1608-1860* (3 vols., 1868) and A. G. Bolles, *Industrial History of the United States* (1879), though out of date, contain a mass of interesting details not easily accessible elsewhere. A briefer and later book based on the Bishop volumes is C. D. Wright, *The Industrial Evolution of the United States* (1897). For other brief accounts, consult Malcolm Keir, *Manufacturing Industries in America* (1920) and *Epic of Industry* (1926), the latter in the Pageant of America series. For particular sections, see W. B. Weedon, *Economic and Social*

History of New England 1620-1789 (2 vols., 1890); P. A. Bruce, *Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century* (2 vols., 1895) reprinted (1935); and E. Q. Hawk, *Economic History of the South* (1934).

On special industries the following contain valuable information for the colonial period: F. J. Allen, *The Shoe Industry* (1922), excellent; A. C. Bining, *British Regulation of the Colonial Iron Industry* (1933) and his especially valuable *Pennsylvania Iron Manufacture in the Eighteenth Century* (1938); Kathleen Bruce, *Virginia Iron Industry in the Slave Era* (1930), which describes Virginia's iron industry from its origin to 1865; A. H. Cole, *The American Wool Manufacture* (2 vols., 1926), a definitive study; Curtis Nettels, "The Menace of Colonial Manufacturing," *New England Quarterly*, Vol. IV, pp. 230-69; B. E. Hazard, *The Organization of the Boot and Shoe Industry in Massachusetts before 1875* (1921); C. B. Kuhlman, *The Development of the Flour-Milling Industry in the United States* (1929), the chapter that covers the colonial period; M. W. Jernegan, "Slavery and the Beginnings of Industrialism in the American Colonies," *American Historical Review* Vol. XXV, (Jan., 1920) describes the influence of slave labor upon industry.

Commerce and Trade. For introductory accounts, see Clive Day, *History of Commerce of the United States* (4th ed., 1938) and S. E. Forman, *Rise of American Commerce and Industry* (1927). Far more satisfactory is E. R. Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States* (2 vols., 1915); Volume I is devoted to colonial commerce. See also R. M. Keir, *The March of Commerce* (1927), Pageant of America Series. For special aspects, consult G. F. Dow and J. H. Edmonds, *The Pirates of the New England Coast, 1630-1730* (1923); A. O. Exquemelin, *The Buccaneers of America* (1924); S. C. Hughson, *The Carolina Pirates and Colonial Commerce 1670-1740* (1894), a pioneer study; Phillip Gosse, *The History of Piracy* (1934); R. W. Irwin, *Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Barbary Pirates 1776-1816* (1931); E. S. Maclay, *A History of American Privateers* (new ed., 1924), authoritative; and J. F. Jameson (ed.), *Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period* (1923). W. W. Claridge, *A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti* (1915); W. E. B. DuBois, *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America, 1638-1870* (1896) and U. B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (1918) deal with the colonial slave trade. See also, C. H. Haring, *The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century* (1910); V. T. Harlow, *A History of Barbadoes, 1625-1685* (1926); M. S. Morris, *Colonial Trade of Maryland, 1689-1715* (1914), a superior study; R. M. Hooker, *The Colonial Trade of Connecticut* (1936); A. P. Newton, *The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688* (1933), excellent; J. A. Williamson, *The Carribee Islands under the Proprietary Patents* (1926), a splendid study; C. S. S. Higham, *The Development of the Leeward Islands under the Restoration, 1660-1688* (1921); Richard Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763* (1936); F. W. Pitman, *The Development of the British West Indies, 1700-1763* (1917), which analyzes the West Indian economy; W. H. Rowe, *The Maritime History of Maine: Three Centuries of Shipbuilding and Seafaring* (1948); F. B. Tolles, *Meeting House and Counting House; The Quaker Merchants of Colonial Philadelphia, 1682-1763* (1948), which is accurate and well written. There is excellent material on commerce in E. B. Greene, *The Foundations of American Nationality* (1922), M. W. Jernegan, *The American Colonies, 1492-1750* (1930), and W. B. Weedon, *Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1789*, cited above.

CHAPTER IV

The Colonial Society

Social Life. An excellent brief account is G. M. Andrews, *Colonial Folkways: A Chronicle of American Life in the Reign of the Georges* (1919), one of the *Chronicles of America* series. It should be supplemented with T. J. Wertenbaker, *The First Americans, 1607-1690* (1929), *The Golden Age of American Culture* (1942),

The Founding of American Civilization; the Middle Colonies (1938), and *The Old South* (1942); J. T. Adams, *Provincial Society, 1690-1763* (1936), Volume III of the History of American Life series; Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness, 1625-1742* (1938); and Carl and Jessica Bridenbaugh, *Rebels and Gentlemen; Philadelphia in the Age of Franklin* (1942). *Gentleman's Progress; The Itinerarium of Dr. Alexander Hamilton, 1744*, edited by Carl Bridenbaugh (1948) gives an invaluable picture of Northern society. The first two volumes of D. S. Freeman's *George Washington* (4 vols., 1948-1950) give a similar picture for Virginia. S. G. Fisher, *Men, Women, and Manners in Colonial Times* (2 vols., 1898); E. A. Dexter, *Colonial Women of Affairs* (1924); A. W. Calhoun, *A Social History of the American Family from Colonial Times to the Present* (3 vols., 1917-19); Carl Van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin* (1938); and P. A. Bruce, *Social Life of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century* (1907) contain much information on things social. M. P. Stanard, *Colonial Virginia, Its People and Customs* (1917) is excellent. Esther Singleton, *Social New York under the Georges, 1714-1776* (1902) has good material. See also Dixon Wecter, *The Saga of American Society: A Record of Social Aspiration, 1607-1937* (1937); F. R. Dulles, *America Learns to Play: A History of Popular Recreation, 1607-1940* (1940); G. F. Willison, *Saints and Strangers* (1946); G. F. Dow, *Everyday Life in the Massachusetts Bay Colony* (1935); M. W. Jernegan, *Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America 1607-1783* (1931); and W. F. Craven, *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 1607-1689* (1949). H. R. Shurtleff, *The Log Cabin Myth* (1939) submits evidence that the log cabin did not originate in Colonial America. The many volumes of Alice Morse Earle are useful. On horse racing, see J. H. Wallace, *The Horse of America* (1897) and F. B. Culver, *Blooded Horses of Colonial Days* (1922); R. Wright, *Hawkers and Walkers in Early America* (1927) sheds light on an interesting element of colonial society.

On special topics, consult L. V. Lockwood, *Colonial Furniture in America* (2 vols., 1913); Katherine A. Sanborn, *Old Time Wall Papers* (1905); Arthur Hayward, *Colonial Lighting* (1923); Elizabeth McClellan, *Historic Dress in America, 1607-1800* (1904). M. S. Benson, *Women in Eighteenth Century America* (1935) is an interesting scholarly study. See also R. B. Morris, *Government and Labor in Early America* (1946); J. A. Krout, *Annals of American Sport* (1929), the last volume Pageant of America series, the first chapter of which is devoted to colonial sports and recreation; L. H. Gipson, *Crime and Its Punishment in Provincial Pennsylvania* (1935), a valuable study; Monica Kiefer, *American Children, Through Their Books, 1700-1835* (1948); S. H. Sutherland, *Population Distribution in Colonial America* (1936); and J. C. Spruill, *Women's Life and Work in the Southern Colonies* (1938).

Religion. W. W. Sweet's *Religion in Colonial America* (1942) and the first chapters in his earlier volume *The Story of Religion in America* (revised 1939) give a good introduction. They should be supplemented by T. C. Hall, *The Religious Background of American Culture* (1930) and P. G. Mode, *The Frontier Spirit in American Christianity* (1923). For the Great Awakening, consult Joseph Tracy, *The Great Awakening* (1842), which is mainly concerned with New England; C. H. Maxson, *The Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies* (1920), concise and informative; H. B. Parkes, *Jonathan Edwards, the Fiery Puritan* (1930), a readable biography; O. E. Winslow, *Jonathan Edwards, 1703-1758* (1940); A. C. McGiffert, *Jonathan Edwards* (1932), scholarly; P. G. E. Miller, *Jonathan Edwards* (1949), an analytical study; W. M. Gewehr, *The Great Awakening in Virginia, 1740-1790* (1930), an excellent study; A. D. Belden, *George Whitefield, The Awakener* (1930); and Luke Tyerman, *The Life of the Rev. George Whitefield* (2 vols., 1876-7), which is scholarly and complete. Puritanism and the New Awakening are treated in I. W. Riley, *American Philosophy: The Early Schools* (1907); H. W. Schneider, *The Puritan Mind* (1930); V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (1927) Vol. I; P. G. E. Miller, *The New England Mind* (1939); R. B. Perry, *Puritanism and Democracy* (1944); P. G. E. Miller and T. H. Johnson (eds.), *The Puritans* (1938); and chap. 18 of C. P. Nettels, *Roots of American Civilization*, already cited.

On particular denominations see P. G. E. Miller, *Orthodoxy in Massachusetts, 1630-1650* (1933), an unsurpassed authority on the early Puritan Church in Massachusetts; E. T. Corwin, *History of the Reformed Church, Dutch* (1895); R. M. Jones, *The Quakers in the American Colonies* (1911), excellent; C. A. Briggs, *American Presbyterianism* (1885); L. F. Bittinger, *German Religious Life in Colonial Times* (1906), which stresses the externals of pietism; A. H. Newman, *A History of the Baptist Churches in the United States* (6th ed. 1915); J. G. Shea, *The Catholic Church in Colonial Days 1521-1763* (1886); Williston Walker, *A History of the Congregational Churches* (1894), very factual; L. J. Trinterud, *The Forming of An American Tradition: A Re-examination of Colonial Presbyterianism* (1949). Important biographies of the Mathers are K. B. Murdock, *Increase Mather, The Foremost American Puritan* (1925); Ralph and Louise Boas, *Cotton Mather, Keeper of the Puritan Conscience* (1928), excellent. For the growth of religious liberty the following are recommended: S. H. Cobb, *The Rise of Religious Liberty in America* (1902), informative; A. L. Cross, *The Anglican Episcopate and the American Colonies* (1902); E. F. Humphrey, *Nationalism and Religion in America, 1774-1789*; E. B. Greene, *Religion and the State* (1941); S. M. Reed, *Church and State in Massachusetts, 1691-1740* (1914), a study in religious dissent; J. C. Meyer, *Church and State in Massachusetts, 1740-1833* (1930), a detailed study continuing the Reed study cited above; Max Savelle, *Seeds of Liberty: The Genesis of the American Mind* (1948); H. M. Morais, *Deism in Eighteenth Century America* (1934), an outstanding study; G. L. Kittredge, *Witchcraft in Old and New England* (1929), the standard book on the Salem persecutions; and Marion L. Starkey, *The Devil in Massachusetts* (1950).

Intellectual Interests. Unquestionably among the leading authoritative works in the field of intellectual thought are V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, already cited; P. G. E. Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (1939); S. E. Morison, *The Puritan Pronaos: Studies in the Intellectual Life of New England in the Seventeenth Century* (1936); M. E. Curti, *The Growth of American Thought* (1943); H. W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (1946); W. H. Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America* (1949).

For literature and journalism consult volume one of the *The Cambridge History of American Literature* (4 vols., 1917-23), edited by Carl Van Doren, and P. H. Boynton, *A History of American Literature* (1919), which gives some space to colonial literature. Both of these older works should be supplemented by R. E. Spiller and H. Blodgett (eds.), *The Roots of National Culture: American Literature to 1830* (1933); C. Angoff, *A Literary History of the American People* (2 vols., 1931), F. L. Pattee, *The First Century of American Literature, 1770-1870* (1935) and R. Blankenship, *American Literature as an Expression of the National Mind* (1931). V. L. Calverton, *The Liberation of American Literature* (1932) emphasizes economic influences on literature; see also Bliss Perry, *The American Spirit in Literature* (1918), *Chronicles of America*. See L. B. Wright and Marion Tiling (eds.), *The Secret Diary of William Byrd of Westover, 1709-1712* (1941); and S. T. Williams, *The American Spirit in Letters* (1926) a volume in the Pageant of America series. For an interesting work, see E. H. Cady, *The Gentleman in America: A Literary Study in American Culture* (1949). W. G. Bleyer, *Main Currents in the History of American Journalism* (1927) is an introductory survey; J. M. Lee, *History of American Journalism* (rev. ed., 1936) and G. H. Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States* (1920) cover the colonial period briefly. The best account on the development of freedom of the press is C. A. Duniway, *The Development of the Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts* (1906). The Zenger case is treated adequately by L. A. Rutherford, *John Peter Zenger, His Press, His Trial and a Bibliography of Zenger Imprints* (1904). L. N. Richardson, *A History of Early American Magazines, 1741-1789* (1931), a detailed study, and F. L. Mott, *A History of American Magazines, 1741-1885* (3 vols., 1938) cover this aspect of colonial journalism.

Those interested in colonial education will profit by consulting E. G. Dexter, *A History of Education in the United States* (1904) and E. P. Cubberly, *Public Education in the United States* (1919). E. E. Brown, *The Making of Our Middle*

Schools (1907) gives English background and is excellent. R. F. Seybolt, *Apprenticeship and Apprenticeship Education in Colonial New England and New York* (1917); Clifton Johnson, *Old Time Schools and School Books* (1904) and W. W. Kemp, *The Support of Schools in Colonial New York by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel* (1913) discuss special subjects. Among regional studies W. H. Small, *Early New England Schools* (1914), Thomas Woody, *Early Quaker Education in Pennsylvania* (1920), and E. W. Knight, *Public Education in the South* (1922) are the best. Excellent is M. E. Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators* (1935). The first volume of Paul Monroe's *The Founding of the American Public School System from the Earliest Settlements to the Close of the Civil War Period* (1940) is concerned with the colonial period. Very important is A. O. Hansen's *Liberalism and American Education in the Eighteenth Century* (1926), which discusses the several plans suggested between 1785 and 1800 for a national system of education in America.

For higher education the standard work is C. F. Thwing, *A History of Higher Education in America* (1906). Thomas Woody, *A History of Women's Education in the United States* (2 vols., 1929) is without a competitor for the period covered. Splendid histories of some of the higher institutions of learning have been written including many of those founded in the colonial period: S. E. Morison, *Three Centuries of Harvard, 1636-1936* (1936); T. J. Wertenbaker, *Princeton, 1746-1896* (1946), and Edwin Oviatt, *The Beginnings of Yale, 1701-1726* (1916). Closely related to the efforts to establish colleges in the colonies were the stirrings in science and medicine. See F. P. Bowes, *The Culture of Early Charleston* (1942), which discusses the interest in science; Carl Becker, "Progress," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (Vol. 12, 1934); W. M. and M. S. C. Smallwood, *Natural History and the American Mind* (1941), a splendid study of background of American natural science; T. Hornberger, *Scientific Thought in the American Colleges, 1638-1800* (1945), an excellent brief survey; H. B. Shafer, *The American Medical Profession 1783-1850* (1936) and M. B. Gordon, *Aesculapius Comes to the Colonies: The Story of the Early Days of Medicine in the Thirteen Original Colonies* (1949), which are excellent; and F. R. Packard, *History of Medicine in the United States* (2 vols., 1932). G. W. Russell, *Early Medicine and Early Medical Men in Connecticut* (1892), Richard Dillard, *Some Early Physicians of the Albemarle* (1911); G. W. Norris, *The Early History of Medicine in Philadelphia* (1886), and H. R. Viets, *A Brief History of Medicine in Massachusetts* (1930) are valuable. The sketches of early American scientists in the *Dictionary of American Biography*, especially Carl Becker's essay on Franklin, are extremely useful.

The fine arts did not come to full bloom during the colonial period, but there were indications that the seed had sprouted. On architecture S. F. Kimball's *Domestic Architecture of the American Colonies and the Early Republic* (1922), despite its title, is not entirely satisfactory; better perhaps are H. D. Eberlein, *The Architecture of Colonial America* (1915) T. E. Tallmadge, *The Story of Architecture in America* (rev. ed., 1936), and Joseph Jackson, *American Colonial Architecture, Its Origin and Development* (1924). Marion Harland, *Some Colonial Homesteads* (1897) describes many well-known upper-class homes. Richard Pratt, *A Treasury of Early American Homes* (1949) is extremely valuable for its illustrative material on colonial homes. In the Pageant of America series, *The American Spirit in Architecture* (1926) by T. F. Hamlin is also particularly good for its many illustrations and comments. Those interested in colonial architecture will find much of value in H. D. Eberlein and C. V. Hubbard, *Portrait of a Colonial City, Philadelphia, 1670-1838* (1939), a comprehensive description of Philadelphia; L. A. Coffin and A. C. Holden, *Brick Architecture of the Colonial Period in Maryland and Virginia* (1919) excellent; A. G. Robinson, *Old New England Houses* (1920) Frank Cousins and P. M. Riley, *The Colonial Architecture of Philadelphia* (1920) and D. E. Huger Smith, *The Dwelling Houses of Charleston, South Carolina* (1917), a careful study.

On painting, see Holger Cahill and Alfred Barr, *Art in America* (1935); Virgil Barker, *A Critical Introduction to American Painting* (1931); Oscar Hagen, *The Birth of the American Tradition in Art* (1940); Samuel Isham, *The History of Amer-*

ican Painting (1936) and F. J. Mather and Others, *The American Spirit in Art* (1927) in the Pageant of America series are the most satisfactory. J. H. Morgan, *Early American Painters* (1921) and F. W. Bayley *The Life and Works of John Singleton Copley* (1915) are useful for biographical data. J. T. Howard, *Our American Music* (1931) is the outstanding work on the early history of music. O. G. Sonneck, *Early Concert Life in America, 1731-1800* (1907) is detailed, but not easy to read. For the early stage, consult A. H. Quinn, *A History of the American Drama. . . to the Civil War* (1923), G. C. D. Odell, *Annals of the New York Stage* (15 vols., 1927-41), first 8 vols., and Arthur Hornblow, *A History of the Theater in America* (2 vols., 1919), Vol. I, chaps. 1-6.

CHAPTER V

The Administration of the Colonies

Political Control. The longer and more detailed accounts by Bancroft, Osgood, Doyle, Gipson, Andrews and Channing, already cited, may be profitably supplemented by C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938) chap. 20; L. W. Labaree, *Royal Government in America* (1930), an outstanding study of imperial administration in the colonies; E. B. Greene, *The Provincial Governor* (1898); O. M. Dickerson, *American Colonial Government 1696-1765* (1912), the standard work on the Board of Trade; E. B. Russell, *The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council* (1915), an excellent survey; G. A. Washburne, *Imperial Control of the Administration of Justice in the Thirteen American Colonies, 1684-1776* (1923), a first-rate study; O. P. Chitwood, *Justice in Colonial Virginia* (1905), a lucid analysis; C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution* (rev. ed., 1931), chap. 1 in which is an excellent survey of imperial control; J. J. Burns, *The Colonial Agents of New England* (1935); A. H. Bayse, *The Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations* (1925), an excellent survey for the years 1748-82; R. V. Harlow, *The History of Legislative Methods in the Period before 1825* (1917), especially chaps. 1-3; P. L. Kaye, *The Colonial Executive Prior to the Restoration* (1900); P. S. Flippin, *The Royal Government in Virginia, 1624-1775* (1919); W. R. Shepherd, *History of Proprietary Government in Pennsylvania* (1896); E. P. Tanner, *The Province of New Jersey 1664-1738* (1908); E. J. Fisher, *New Jersey as a Royal Province 1738-1776* (1911); W. H. Fry, *New Hampshire as a Royal Province* (1908); C. L. Raper, *North Carolina, A Royal Province 1729-1775* (1904); C. W. Spencer, *Phases of Royal Government in New York, 1691-1719*, (1905); E. I. McCormac, *Colonial Opposition to Imperial Authority During the French and Indian War* (1911); L. P. Kellogg, "The American Colonial Charter," *American Historical Association Report for 1903* (1904); J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England, 1691-1776*, (1923). On the power of Parliament, consult L. B. Namier, *The Structure of British Politics at the Accession of George III* (1929); C. G. Robertson, *England Under the Hanoverians* (1911), a readable survey; Edward Jenks, *Parliamentary England* (1903), a brief introduction to the development of the cabinet; M. T. Blauvelt, *The Development of Cabinet Government in England* (1902), a concise outline; C. H. McIlwain, *The High Court of Parliament* (1910); and a E. R. Turner, *The Privy Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 1603-1784* (1927), detailed and scholarly. Excellent studies of colonial governors are A. M. Keys, *Cadwallader Colden* (1906); G. A. Wood, *William Shirley* (1920); Leonidas Dodson, *Alexander Spotswood* (1932); and Everett Kimball, *The Public Life of Joseph Dudley* (1911).

Regulation of Trade and Industry. In addition to the more detailed accounts to be found in Osgood, Channing, Andrews, and Gipson, excellent material is to be found in L. A. Harper, *The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth Century Experiment in Social Engineering* (1939); G. L. Beer, *The Origins of British Colonial Policy, 1578-1660* (1908), *British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765* (1907) and *The Old Colo-*

nial System, 1660-1754 (1912); C. P. Nettels, "The Menace of Colonial Manufacturing, 1690-1720" and "The Place of Markets in the Old Colonial System," *New England Quarterly* Vol. IV, pp. 230-66, Vol. VI, pp. 491-512; H. E. Egerton, *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (1897); G. B. Hertz, *The Old Colonial System* (1905); J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England, 1691-1776* (1923). On the theory of colonial trade the following are indispensable: Gustav Schmoller, *The Mercantile System and Its Historical Significance* (1896); E. F. Heckscher, *Mercantilism* (2 vols., 1935); L. M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism* (1940), chaps. 3-8. On colonial manufacturing, see V. S. Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States, 1607-1860* (1916); A. C. Bining, *British Regulation of Colonial Iron Industry* (1933); A. H. Cole, *The American Wool Manufacture* (2 vols., 1926).

Land and Currency Policies. Those interested in the struggle for land and in land policies will find, in addition to the references listed under the section "Colonial Land Systems" for chapter 2 above, valuable material in chapter 14 of C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938); Volume II of L. H. Gipson, *The British Empire before the Revolution* (1936), and Volumes II and IV of H. L. Osgood's *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (4 vols., 1924-30). C. W. Alvord's, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (2 vols., 1917) is excellent. Useful also are L. K. Mathews, *The Expansion of New England, 1620-1865* (1909); W. T. Root, *Relations of Pennsylvania with the British Government, 1696-1765* (1912); J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England, 1691-1776* (1923); F. J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (1920); and T. P. Abernethy, *Western Lands and the American Revolution* (1937), an important study. On currency and colonial finances C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938), chapter 10 and his *The Money Supply of the American Colonies before 1720* (1934) are both excellent. Also consult D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* (12th ed., 1936), chap. 1; C. P. Gould, *Money and Transportation in Maryland, 1720-1765* (1915), which contains an excellent discussion of colonial currency. C. J. Bullock, *Essays on the Monetary History of the United States* (1900), Part I, chaps. 1-3 are helpful for the colonial period. No less important is the illuminating contemporary account, edited by C. J. Bullock in 1897, by William Douglass, *A Discourse Concerning the Currencies of the British Plantations in America* (1740). For source material, see A. M. Davis, *Colonial Currency Reprints, 1682-1751* (4 vols., 1910-11). His *Currency and Banking in the Province of the Massachusetts Bay* (1901) furnishes splendid background for colonial paper money not only in Massachusetts Bay but in other colonies as well. There is much material in C. H. Wilson, *Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century* (1941).

CHAPTER VI

The Conflict of Interests

The Conflict of Cultures. The cultural conflict that led ultimately to crisis in colonial administration and ultimately to civil war within the British Empire is admirably portrayed in three works by J. C. Miller: *Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda* (1936), *Origins of the American Revolution* (1943), and *Triumph of Freedom, 1775-1783* (1948). Excellent material is also to be found in E. B. Greene, *The Revolutionary Generation, 1763-1790* (1943), in the *History of American Life* series; C. L. Becker, *Eve of the Revolution* (1918), in the *Chronicles of America* series; C. H. Van Tyne, *The Causes of the War of Independence* (1922); J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England, 1691-1776* (1923); and the shorter but brilliant accounts in C. A. and M. R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (4 vols., 1928-42), Vol. I, chap. 5, A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History* (1922), chap. 7, C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938), chap. 22, and L. M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism* (1940), chaps.

11-12. The economic phases of the conflict are illuminated by A. M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776*, (1917); W. S. McClellan, *Smuggling in the American Colonies* (1912); V. D. Harrington, *The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution* (1935); L. Sellers, *Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution* (1934); R. A. East, *Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era* (1938); C. M. Andrews, *The Boston Merchants and the Non-importation Movement* (1917); B. W. Bond, Jr., *The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies* (1919); and R. B. Morris (ed.), *The Era of the American Revolution* (1939). Very useful in understanding the cultural and economic conflict are E. B. Greene and V. D. Harrington, *American Population Before the Federal Census of 1790* (1932); S. H. Sutherland, *Population Distribution in Colonial America* (1936); C. H. Lincoln, *The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania 1760-1776* (1901); and H. S. Allan, *John Hancock, Patriot in Purple* (1948). H. E. Egerton, *Causes and Character of the Revolution* (1923) views the conflict through English eyes. W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade, 1763-1800* (1928) presents an excellent analysis of the economics of the fur trade and of the political influence of the British fur traders.

The Crisis in Colonial Administration. For the effects on the colonies of the British effort to put the whole colonial system on a more systematic basis, the references cited in the above section are adequate. They may be supplemented by W. T. Baxter, *The House of Hancock, 1724-1775* (1945); M. E. Curti, *The Roots of American Loyalty* (1946); Philip Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783* (1941); F. J. Hinkhouse, *The Preliminaries of the American Revolution as Seen in the English Press, 1763-1775* (1926); A. A. Giesecke, *American Commercial Legislation before 1789* (1910); and V. L. Parrington, *The Colonial Mind, 1620-1800* (1927), Volume I of *Main Currents in American Thought*. The best biographies of imperially minded British spokesmen are Albert von Ruville, *William Pitt, Earl of Chatham* (3 vols., 1907) and Lord Fitzmaurice, *The Life of William, Earl of Shelburne* (2nd ed., 2 vols., 1912). Much light is shed on imperial policy by two articles that appeared in the *American Historical Review*: W. T. Grant, "Canada Versus Guadeloupe," Vol. XVII (July, 1912) and Hubert Hall, "Chatham's American Policy," Vol. V (July, 1900). C. L. Becker, "The Spirit of '76" in *Everyman His Own Historian* (1935) catches the spirit of class struggle. W. T. Laprade, "The Stamp Act in British Politics," Vol. XXXV (July, 1930) and R. A. Humphreys, "Lord Shelburne and British Colonial Policy, 1766-1768," *English Historical Review*, Vol. L (April, 1935) are also most useful. L. H. Gipson, *Jared Ingersoll* (1920) is excellent for pre-Revolutionary events in Connecticut. See also A. L. Burt, *The Old Province of Quebec* (1933); S. G. Fisher, *The Struggle for American Independence* (2 vols., 1908), which portrays the ugly reactions of colonists to British policy; J. H. Rose, A. P. Newton, and E. A. Benians (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. I (1929) which is excellent on imperial aspects of colonial history.

Southern Grievances. These are best discussed in the books already cited for this chapter. In addition to them, the following should not be overlooked: I. S. Harrell, *Loyalism in Virginia: Chapters in the Economic History of the Revolution* (1926); H. J. Eckenrode, *The Revolution in Virginia* (1916); C. R. Lingley, *The Transition in Virginia from Colony to Commonwealth* (1910); C. A. Barker, *The Background of the Revolution in Maryland* (1940) and J. S. Bassett *The Regulators of North Carolina (1765-1771)* in *American Historical Association Reports* (1894).

Growing Opposition and Division. Two recent studies throw much light upon the personalities in the years immediately preceding 1776. These are C. Meigs, *The Violent Men: A Study of Human Relations in the First American Congress* (1949) and Lynn Montross, *The Reluctant Rebels* (1950). C. P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization* (1938), chap. 33, is an excellent summary of what transpired during the momentous years. Rich in information and interpretation are J. P. Boyd *Anglo-American Union: Joseph Galloway's Plans to Preserve the British Empire, 1774-1788* (1941); E. C. Burnett, *The Continental Congress* (1941), a scholarly presentation; W. A. Brown, *Empire or Independence* (1941), a penetrating study;

R. G. Adams, *Political Ideas of the Revolution: Britannic-American Contribution to the Problem of Imperial Organization, 1765-1775* (1922), which describes various plans set forth by Revolutionary leaders to reconcile colonial autonomy with imperial unity and control; and R. L. Schuyler, *Parliament and the British Empire* (1929). These important studies may be supplemented with E. C. Burnett, *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress* (8 vols., 1921-8) and W. C. Ford and Gaillard Hunt (eds.), *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789* (34 vols., 1904-37). Vols. I-XXV cover the years 1774-83. No student can afford to overlook C. H. Lincoln, *The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania 1760-1776* (1901); D. L. Kemmerer, *The Path to Freedom: The Struggle for Self-Government in Colonial New Jersey, 1703-1776* (1940); C. L. Becker, *The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776* (1909); M. B. Jones, *Vermont in the Making, 1750-1777* (1939); E. A. Bailey, *Influences Toward Radicalism in Connecticut, 1754-1775* (1920); A. E. McKinley, *The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America* (1905); O. M. Dickerson, *Boston Under Military Rule, 1768-1769, as Revealed in a Journal of the Times* (1936). A. L. Cross, *The Anglican Episcopate and the American Colonies* (1902) and Alice Baldwin, *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution* (1928) are excellent for the attitude of the clergy toward the Revolutionary movement. In addition to those already cited, the following biographies are most useful: R. V. Harlow, *Samuel Adams, Promoter of the American Revolution* (1923); Jacob Axelrad, *Patrick Henry, The Voice of Freedom* (1947); C. J. Stille, *The Life and Times of John Dickinson 1732-1808* (1891); M. D. Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine* (2 vols., 1892); Gilbert Chinard, *Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of Americanism* (2nd ed., revised, 1939); F. W. Hirst, *Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson* (1926); Dumas Malone, *Jefferson, the Virginian* (1948); William Tudor, *The Life of James Otis* (1823); C. F. Mullett, *Some Political Writings of James Otis* (1929), Vol. IV, University of Missouri Studies; Esther Forbes, *Paul Revere and the World He Lived In* (1942); J. T. Adams, *The Adams Family* (1930); Gilbert Chinard, *Honest John Adams* (1933); C. P. Nettels, *George Washington and American Independence* (1951), an excellent study.

The Declaration of Independence. The best work on the Declaration of Independence is C. L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas* (1922). More elementary is M. M. and H. F. Carlton, *The Story of the Declaration of Independence* (1926). Herbert Friedenwald, *The Declaration of Independence, an Interpretation and an Analysis* (1904) discusses grievances in detail. Another detailed study is J. H. Hazelton, *The Declaration of Independence, Its History* (1906). Useful material concerning the Declaration can be found in T. V. Smith, *The American Philosophy of Equality* (1927); G. W. Graham, *The Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence* (1905); D. M. Clark, *British Opinion and the American Revolution* (1930); and Allan Nevins, *The American States During and After the Revolution, 1775-1789* (1924).

On the whole conflict between Britain and her American colonies S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution 1764-1788, and the Formation of the Federal Constitution* (1923) will be found useful.

CHAPTER VII

The Revolution

The best general survey of the Revolution is to be found in Volume III of Edward Channing's *History of the United States*, already cited. G. O. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution* (4 vols., 1899-1913), by a distinguished English historian, is sympathetic to the American cause. S. G. Fisher, *The Struggle for American Independence* (2 vols., 1908) is a vivacious account, but not entirely reliable. J. C. Miller, *The Triumph of Freedom* (1948), E. B. Greene, *The Revolutionary Generation*,

1763-1790 (1943), and C. H. Van Tyne, *The War of Independence* (1929) are excellent one-volume accounts.

Civil War. For a brief discussion of the internal political and social conflicts, consult J. F. Jameson, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement* (1926). On the Whigs and Tories the best introduction is Lewis Einstein, *Divided Loyalties* (1933). For biographical material, see Lorenzo Sabine, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution* (rev. ed., 2 vols., 1864). C. H. Van Tyne, *The Loyalists in the American Revolution* (1902) is a general account covering the entire field. The best of the monographic studies are A. C. Flick, *Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution* (1901); I. S. Harrell, *Loyalism in Virginia* (1926); R. O. DeMond, *The Loyalists in North Carolina During the Revolution* (1940); J. H. Stark, *The Loyalists of Massachusetts* (1910); L. H. Gipson, *Jared Ingersoll* (1920); J. K. Hosmer, *The Life of Thomas Hutchinson* (1896); A. G. Bradley, *Colonial Americans in Exile* (1932). Jonathan Bouchier, (ed.), *Reminiscences of an American Loyalist, 1738-1789* (1925). G. E. Ellis, *Memoir of Sir Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford* (1871) and J. A. Thompson, *Count Rumford of Massachusetts* (1935) are especially valuable for the Loyalist point of view. H. E. Egerton (ed.), *The Royal Commission on the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists, 1783 to 1785* (1915) is rich in information on this subject. On the dispersal of the Loyalists, see W. H. Siebert's articles in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vols. I, II, VII and *Ohio State University Bulletin*, Vols. XVII-XXVI and his *Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785* (2 vols., 1929); see also recent work by H. B. Yoshepe, *The Disposition of Loyalist Estates in the Southern District of the State of New York* (1939).

War Finances. The standard authority on this subject is W. G. Sumner, *The Financier and Finances of the American Revolution* (2 vols., 1891). Useful also are A. S. Bolles, *The Financial History of the United States from 1774 to 1789* (2nd ed., 1884), C. J. Bullock, *Essays on the Monetary History of the United States from 1775 to 1789* (1895), D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* (12th ed., 1936), and R. V. Harlow, "Aspects of Revolutionary Finance, 1775-1783," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXXV (October, 1929). E. P. Oberholtzer, *Robert Morris, Patriot and Financier* (1903) and C. E. Russell, *Haym Salomon and the Revolution* (1930) are biographic accounts of two important financial figures. J. A. James, *Oliver Pollock* (1937) describes the work of a Louisiana merchant who contributed provisions and munitions to the American army.

Plans and Campaigns. Of military and naval leaders Washington heads the list in biographic material. The best brief account is C. P. Nettels, *George Washington and American Independence* (1951). More detailed is D. S. Freeman, *George Washington* (4 vols., 1948-1951). Another brief survey is T. G. Frothingham, *Washington, Commander-in-Chief* (1930). Bernard Knollenberg, *Washington and the Revolution, A Reappraisal* (1940) is critical of Washington and puts Gates in a more favorable light. Other worthwhile accounts are H. B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution, 1775-1781* (1876); J. C. Fitzpatrick, *George Washington Himself* (1933) and *The Spirit of the Revolution* (1924); Rupert Hughes, *George Washington* (3 vols., 1926-30), which discusses Washington's career to 1781; N. W. Stephenson and W. H. Dunn, *George Washington* (1940); W. E. Woodward, *George Washington* (1926); Norman Hapgood, *George Washington* (1901); S. M. Little, *George Washington* (1929); P. L. Ford, *The True George Washington* (1896); L. M. Sears, *George Washington* (1932). For other leaders, see T. S. Anderson, *The Command of the Howe Brothers During the Revolution* (1936); Phillips Russell, *John Paul Jones* (1927); A. F. De Koven, *The Life and Letters of John Paul Jones* (1913), most reliable; G. M. Wrong, *Washington and His Comrades in Arms* (1921), in the *Chronicles of America* series; J. M. Palmer, *General Von Steuben* (1937); G. Lemaître, *Beaumarchais* (1949); J. R. Alden, *General Gage in America*, (1948); Brand Whitlock, *Lafayette* (2 vols., 1929); G. W. Greene, *The Life of Nathanael Greene* (3 vols., 1867-71); J. A. James, *The Life of George Rogers Clark* (1928); Jean-Edmund Weelen, *Rochambeau, Father and Son* (1936); S. W. Patterson, *Horatio Gates* (1941), a defense of this much criticized officer; and

H. E. Wildes, *Anthony Wayne* (1941). There is valuable material on the military history of the Revolution in Willard Wallace, *Appeal to Arms* (1951); C. K. Bolton, *The Private Soldier Under Washington* (1902); E. E. Curtis, *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution*, (1926); L. C. Hatch, *The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army* (1904); Allen French, *The First Year of the American Revolution* (1934); F. V. Greene, *The Revolutionary War* (1911); V. L. Johnson, *The Administration of the American Commissariat during the Revolutionary War* (1941) which emphasizes food supply for the Continental forces; Allen Bowman, *The Morale of the American Revolutionary Army* (1943), excellent for discipline and training; and Carl Van Doren, *Secret History of the American Revolution* (1941), which deals with conspiracies including that of Arnold. On campaigns and battlefields, see B. J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution* (rev. ed., 2 vols., 1855); C. L. Lundin, *Cockpit of the Revolution* (1940); Hoffman Nickerson, *The Turning Point of the Revolution; or, Burgoyne in America* (1928); Howard Swiggett, *War Out of Niagara* (1933); L. R. Gottschalk, *Lafayette and the Close of the Revolution* (1942); W. S. Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth* (1927); Henry Lee, *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department* (1869), excellent. On naval operations, consult A. T. Mahan, *Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence* (1913); C. O. Paullin, *The Navy of the American Revolution* (1906); G. W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution* (2 vols., 1913), H. and M. Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (1939); and D. W. Knox, *The Naval Genius of George Washington* (1932) and *History of the United States Navy* (1936). The standard work on privateering is E. S. Maclay, *A History of American Privateers*, (1924). For an account of naval operations from the point of view of England, see W. M. James, *The British Navy in Adversity* (1926). On diplomacy, including French aid, the following are reliable: S. F. Bemis, *The Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (1935), scholarly and especially good on peace negotiations; E. S. Corwin, *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778* (1916), excellent for French and Spanish motivation; J. B. Perkins, *France in the American Revolution* (1911); Friedrich W. Elder, *The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution* (1911); Bernard Fäy, *The Revolutionary Spirit in France and America* (1927), which stresses cultural relations; Francis Wharton (ed.), *The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States* (6 vols., 1889), which gives essential documents. Rich material shedding much light on diplomatic relations with Europe during the American Revolutionary period is to be found in Carl Van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin* (1938), B. J. Hendrick, *The Lees of Virginia* (1935) and E. C. Burnett, *The Continental Congress* (1941). On the West and the Revolution, see C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (2 vols., 1917); C. H. Ambler, *George Washington and the West* (1936); K. P. Bailey, *The Ohio Company of Virginia and the Westward Movement, 1748-1792* (1939); Temple Bodley, *Our First Great West, in Revolutionary War, Diplomacy, and Politics* (1938); L. P. Kellogg, *The British Régime in Wisconsin and the Northwest* (1935), Frederick Palmer, *Clark of the Ohio* (1929), and T. P. Abernethy, *Western Lands and the American Revolution* (1937). The British reaction to the Revolution is best explained in G. M. Wrong, *Canada and the American Revolution* (1935) and R. Coupland, *The American Revolution and the British Empire* (1930).

The Internal Revolution. The best general accounts are Channing, *History of the United States*, already cited, Vol. III and Allan Nevins, *The American States During and After the Revolution* (1924). For political and constitutional changes these may be supplemented with H. B. Grigsby, *The Virginia Convention of 1776* (1890-1), R. J. Purcell, *Connecticut in Transition 1775-1818* (1918); R. F. Upton, *Revolutionary New Hampshire* (1936); C. H. Lincoln, *The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania 1760-1776* (1901); R. B. Morris (ed.), *The Era of the American Revolution* (1939); H. J. Eckenrode, *The Revolution in Virginia* (1916); T. F. Moran, *The Rise and Development of the Bicameral System in America* (1895); J. Q. Dealey, *Growth of American State Constitutions from 1776 to 1914* (1915); Helen Hill, *George Mason, Constitutionalist* (1938); and J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England* (1923). For the constitutions themselves, see F. N. Thorpe,

The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other organic laws of the State, Territories, and Colonies now or heretofore Forming the United States of America (7 vols., 1909). Social and economic changes occasioned by the Revolution are best discussed in J. F. Jameson, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement* (1926) and E. B. Greene, *The Revolutionary Generation 1763-1790* (1943). Special studies of importance are J. C. Ballagh, *White Servitude in the Colony of Virginia* (1895); E. T. McCormac, *White Servitude in Maryland, 1634-1820* (1904); M. S. Locke, *Anti-Slavery in America 1619-1808* (1901); Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and His Times*, Vol. I, (1948), which is excellent for changes in Virginia; and R. A. East, *Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era* (1938). The disestablishment of the Anglican Church in the South is adequately described in H. J. Eckenrode, *Separation of Church and State in Virginia* (1910); R. B. Semple, *The Rise and Progress of the Baptists in Virginia* (1894); S. B. Weeks, *Church and State in North Carolina* (1893); R. C. Strickland, *Religion and the State in Georgia in the Eighteenth Century* (1939). For other religious changes wrought by the Revolution, see G. A. Koch, *Republican Religion: The American Revolution and the Cult of Reason* (1933); A. M. Baldwin, *The New England Clergy and the American Revolution* (1928); Peter Guilday, *The Life and Times of John Carroll* (1922); Sister Mary Augustina Ray, *American Opinion of Roman Catholicism in the Eighteenth Century* (1936); and E. F. Humphrey, *Nationalism and Religion in America 1774-1789* (1924).

For an excellent summary of the Revolution in education, see Chapter 20 of E. B. Greene's, *The Revolutionary Generation 1763-1790*, already cited.

CHAPTER VIII

The Confederation and the Constitution

The Confederation. The best general accounts of the Confederation are to be found in A. C. McLaughlin, *The Confederation and the Constitution* (1905), which emphasizes political events; John Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History 1783-1789*, (1888), which is based largely on secondary works and exaggerates darker side of situation; J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War* (8 vols., 1883-1930), which begins with the Confederation and stresses social and economic history; James Schouler, *History of the United States of America* (7 vols., 1880-1913), mainly political; Merrill Jensen, *The Articles of Confederation* (1940), which is the most recent study of this document; and emphasizes social and economic events rather than political, and his *The New Nation* (1950); E. C. Burnett, *The Continental Congress* (1941). J. B. Sanders, *Evolution of Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789* (1935) and *The Presidency of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789* (rev. ed., 1930) are useful.

Frontier Problems. In addition to the references cited in Chapter 7 on the West and the Revolution, consult J. A. Barrett, *Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787* (1891); A. C. Ford, *Colonial Precedents of Our National Land System as It Existed in 1800* (1910); Archibald Henderson, *The Conquest of the Old Southwest* (1920), lively but exaggerated; B. H. Hibbard, *A History of the Public Land Policies* (1924), very useful; W. S. Lester, *The Transylvania Colony* (1935); Max Savelle, *George Morgan, Colony Builder* (1932); C. L. Skinner, *Pioneers of the Old Southwest* (1919) in the Chronicles of America series; H. B. Adams, *Maryland's Influence in Founding a National Commonwealth* (1877), challenged by more recent scholars; P. J. Treat, *The National Land System, 1785-1820* (1910), good on origins of land system; C. W. Alvord, *The Illinois Country, 1673-1818* (1920); Theodore Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West* (4 vols., 1889-96). For a discriminating critique of the last by F. J. Turner, see *American Historical Review*, Vol. II, pp. 171-6. See also B. W. Bond, *The Civilization of the Old Northwest* (1934); A. B. Hulbert,

Ohio in the Time of the Confederation (1918). *Foreign Affairs*. T. A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (4th ed., 1950), the early chapters; S. F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty* (1923), exhaustive and impartial. A. L. Burt, *The United States, Great Britain and British North America* (1940) discusses in detail reasons for British retention of the Northwest posts; dealing with same problem is N. V. Russell, *The British Régime in Michigan and the Old Northwest 1760-1796* (1939). G. C. Wood, *Congressional Control of Foreign Relations during the American Revolution, 1774-1789* (1919) is scholarly and detailed; Frank Monaghan, *John Jay, Defender of Liberty* (1935) is the best biography of the Secretary of State; A. B. Darling, *Our Rising Empire, 1763-1803* (1940) contains a useful summary of foreign affairs covering the period; A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783-1795* (1927) is a scholarly presentation of relations of Spain and United States in the West.

Critical Years and Radical Protests. T. C. Cochran, *New York in The Confederation* (1932) is a study of economic stresses and strains. O. C. Lightner, *The History of Business Depressions* (1922), includes the period of the Confederation. G. R. Minot, *The History of the Insurrections in Massachusetts. In the Year 1786. And the Rebellion Consequent Thereon* (1788) until recently has been the account of Shays' Rebellion upon which historians have relied. Two recent and valuable studies are F. R. Mullaly, *The Massachusetts Insurrection of 1786-1787* (1947), a Smith College master's thesis, and Jonathan Smith, *Some Features of Shays' Rebellion* reprinted in the *William and Mary Quarterly*, January, 1948. E. W. Spaulding, *New York in the Critical Period, 1783-1789* (1932) is a useful study.

Drafting a New Constitution. Two challenging studies are C. A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913), a penetrating analysis, and R. L. Schuyler, *The Constitution of the United States: An Historical Survey of Its Formation* (1923), excellent on drafting of the document. Max Farrand, *The Fathers of the Constitution* (1921), in the *Chronicles of America* series and *The Framing of the Constitution of the United States* (1913) are splendid brief surveys. Carl Van Doren, *The Great Rehearsal: The Story of the Making and the Ratifying of the Constitution of the United States* (1948) is scholarly and has great literary merit. A. T. Prescott, *Drafting the Federal Constitution* (1941) contains a useful rearrangement of Madison's notes. Older and more political in treatment are A. C. McLaughlin, *The Confederation and the Constitution, 1783-1789* (1905) and Charles Warren, *The Making of the Constitution* (1928). Fundamental to any study of Constitution are Max Farrand (ed.), *Records of the Federal Convention* (4 vols., 1911-37). Among the more important biographies of those who helped draft the Constitution are A. E. Smith, *James Madison* (1937); E. M. Burns, *James Madison, Philosopher of the Constitution* (1938); Irving Brant, *James Madison* (3 vols., 1941-50); R. S. Boardman, *Roger Sherman, Signer and Statesman* (1938); N. Schachner, *Alexander Hamilton* (1946); J. T. Adams, *The Adams Family* (1930); Carl Van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin* (1938); A. J. Bethea, *The Contribution of Charles Pinckney to the Formation of the American Union* (1937).

Ratification of the Constitution. The best contemporary argument for the ratification of the Constitution is *The Federalist*, a collection of essays written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay for the purpose of winning popular support for ratification. There are numerous editions. Volume one of A. J. Beveridge's, *The Life of John Marshall* (4 vols., 1916-1919) has an account of the struggle for ratification in Virginia. Highly instructive is O. G. Libby's *The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States on the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788* (1894) and C. A. Beard's criticism of the same in *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* (1915). Other important monographic studies on ratification are E. W. Spaulding, *His Excellency George Clinton, Critic of the Constitution* (1938), Helen Hill, *George Mason, Constitutionalist* (1938), fine study of an able opponent of ratification; F. G. Bates, *Rhode Island and the Formation of the Union* (1898); S. B. Harding, *The Contest Over Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts* (1896); C. H. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1851* (1910); J. B. McMaster and F. D. Stone, *Pennsylvania and the Federal Con-*

stitution, 1787-1788 (1888), E. W. Spaulding, *New York in the Critical Period, 1783-1789* (1932); L. I. Trenholme, *The Ratification of the Federal Constitution in North Carolina* (1932); C. E. Miner, *The Ratification of the Federal Constitution by the State of New York* (1921); F. H. Hart, *The Valley of Virginia in the American Revolution, 1763-1789* (1942). For the debates in the several state conventions over ratification, consult J. Elliot (ed.), *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* (5 vols., 1836-45).

CHAPTER IX

The Federalists in Power

Several of the general histories deal with this period. Channing's *History of the United States* (6 vols., 1905-1925), Volume IV should be supplemented with the more detailed Volumes III and IV of Richard Hildreth's *The History of the United States of America* (6 vols., 1856-1860) and Volume I of James Schouler, *History of the United States under the Constitution* (7 vols., 1880-1913). The first two volumes of J. B. McMaster's, *History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War* (8 vols., 1883-1913) contains much social and economic material that illumines the political narrative. J. S. Bassett, *The Federalist System, 1789-1801* (1906), in the American Nation series, is compact and scholarly. The writings and biographies of the leading statesmen should also be consulted. For brief biographies, consult *The Dictionary of American Biography*, already cited.

Organizing the New Government. Most enlightening are C. A. Beard's three volumes: *The Supreme Court and the Constitution* (1912), *The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* (1915) and *The American Party Battle* (1928). E. S. Maclay (ed.), *The Journal of William Maclay* (1927) gives not only an intimate picture of Congress but the reactions of an Anti-Federalist senator to the Hamilton financial program. Most useful on political organization are R. V. Harlow, *The History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825* (1917); L. D. White, *The Federalists* (1948); H. B. Learned, *The President's Cabinet: Studies in the Origin, Formation and Structure of an American Institution* (1912); Gaillard Hunt, *The Department of State of the United States* (1914); E. S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1948* (3rd rev. ed., 1948); D. S. Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (1916); Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland, *Federal Justice* (1937), a history of the attorney general's office; Lindsay Rogers, *The American Senate* (1926); G. H. Haynes, *The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice* (2 vols., 1938); C. G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton; The Struggle for Democracy in America* (1925), lively, but somewhat biased in favor of Jefferson. J. T. Adams (ed.), *Jeffersonian Principles and Hamiltonian Principles* (1932) are suggestive. H. J. Ford's, *Washington and His Colleagues* (1918), in the *Chronicles of America* series, is a brief survey. C. E. Merriam, *History of American Political Theories* (2nd ed., 1920) is indispensable for the subject covered. For social, economic, and cultural background, consult J. A. Krout and D. R. Fox, *The Completion of Independence, 1790-1830* (1944), in the *History of American Life* series.

Hamilton's Financial Policies. Volume I of *American State Papers: Documents Legislative and Executive* (38 vols., 1832-61), published by the Federal Government, contain Hamilton's reports to Congress. For accounts of the Hamilton program, see D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* (12th ed., 1936); W. J. Shultz and M. R. Caine, *Financial Development of the United States* (1937); A. B. Hepburn, *A History of Currency in the United States* (rev. ed., 1915); F. W. Taussig, *The Tariff History of the United States* (8th ed., 1931); P. W. L. Ashley, *Modern Tariff History* (3rd ed., 1920); D. K. Watson, *History of American Coinage* (2nd ed., 1899). L. D. Baldwin, *Whiskey Rebels: The Story of a Frontier Uprising* (1939) describes the opposition to the excise tax. Two biographic studies are espe-

cially important: Harold Hutcheson, *Tench Coxe: A Study in American Economic Development* (1938) and Nathan Schachner, *Alexander Hamilton* (1946).

Foreign Problems. Brief accounts will be found in such standard books as J. H. Latané and D. W. Wainhouse, *A History of American Foreign Policy* (rev. ed., 1941); T. A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (4th ed., 1950); S. F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (rev. ed., 1942) and A. B. Darling, *Our Rising Empire, 1763-1803* (1940). S. F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty* (1923) and *Pinckney's Treaty* (1926) and A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier 1783-1795* (1927) are indispensable diplomatic studies. They may be supplemented with great profit by H. P. Johnston, *The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay* (4 vols., 1890-3) and B. C. Davenport (ed.), *The Diary of Gouverneur Morris, 1752-1816* (2 vols., 1939). *The Correspondence of French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797*, along with other important documents, can be found in the *Report of the American Historical Association* for 1896 (I), 1897 (II), 1903 (II), 1912 (II), and 1913 (II). The impact of French culture on the United States may be assessed by consulting C. D. Hazen, *Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution* (1897); Bernard Fäy, *The Revolutionary Spirit in France and America* (1927); H. M. Jones, *America and French Culture, 1750-1848* (1927); V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (3 vols., 1927-30), Vol. I; and E. P. Link *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800* (1942). The following will also help illumine the foreign relations of the United States during these years: W. R. Manning, *The Nooka Sound Controversy* in *American Historical Association Reports* (1904); B. W. Bond, *The Monroe Mission to France, 1794-1796* (1907); C. M. Thomas, *American Neutrality in 1793* (1931); A. P. Whitaker, *The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803: A Study in Trade, Politics, and Diplomacy* (1934); G. W. Allen, *Our Naval War with France* (1909); and the two brilliant articles by F. J. Turner, "The Policy of France Toward the Mississippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams," *American Historical Review*, Vol. X (January, 1905) and "The Diplomatic Contest for the Mississippi Valley," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. XCIII (1904) 676-91, 807-17. V. H. Paltsits, *Washington's Farewell Address* (1935) is definitive.

John Adams's Administration. In addition to the references already cited for this chapter the following should be consulted: Gilbert Chinard, *Honest John Adams* (1933); Catherine D. Bowen, *John Adams and the American Revolution* (1950); A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall* (4 vols., 1916-19) and A. E. Morse, *The Federalist Party in Massachusetts to the Year 1800* (1909). On the Alien and Sedition Acts, see John C. Miller's work *Crises in Freedom: The Alien and Sedition Acts* (1951), V. Stauffer, *New England and the Bavarian Illuminati* (1918) complements G. A. Koch's *Republican Religion*, cited above. H. M. Morais, *Deism in Eighteenth Century America* (1934); John Pell, *Ethan Allen* (1929) and Dumas Malone, *The Public Life of Thomas Cooper, 1783-1839* (1926), help to explain the hysteria that gripped conservative Americans and resulted in the passage of the obnoxious laws. E. D. Warfield, *The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798* (1887) and F. M. Anderson, "Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts," *American Historical Association Reports* (1912) and "Contemporary Opinion of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions," *American Historical Review*, Vol. V pp. 45-63, 225-52 are most valuable in understanding both the legislation and its reception. E. Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency* (2 vols., 1928) and B. M. Rich, *The Presidents and Civil Disorder* (1941) cover this stormy period.

CHAPTER X

The Turn of the Century

The three outstanding sources of general information about American life in 1800 are J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States* (8 vols., 1883-1913), Henry Adams, *History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison* (9 vols., 1889-1891) and J. A. Krout and D. R. Fox, *The*

Completion of Independence, 1790-1830 (1944), the last being Volume V of the History of American Life series. McMaster, who depended largely on newspaper, magazine, and pamphlet material, is sometimes discursive and somewhat bizarre. The Adams volumes, especially the first and the last, summarize brilliantly what America was like in 1800. Most satisfactory of all, perhaps, because of its compactness and soundness of scholarship is the Krout and Fox volume. Bess Furman, *White House Profile* (1951) is a social history of the White House and its inhabitants from John Adams onward.

The Social Order. For population, see *A Century of Population Growth, 1790-1900*, especially maps and tables covering census of 1790. Of greatest value are the following: Gaillard Hunt, *Life in America One Hundred Years Ago* (1914), which stresses social life and customs; A. H. Wharton, *Social Life in the Early Republic* (1902); Dixon Wecter, *The Saga of American Society; a Record of Social Aspiration, 1607-1937* (1937); A. W. Calhoun, *A Social History of the American Family from Colonial Times to the Present* (3 vols., 1917-19); J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic, 1776-1850* (1926); P. W. Bidwell, "Rural Economy in New England at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century," *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. XX (1916); P. L. Haworth, *George Washington, Country Gentleman* (1925); U. B. Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South* (1929); R. J. Purcell, *Connecticut in Transition, 1775-1818* (1918); A. D. Mellick, *The Story of an Old Farm* (1889); R. W. Griswold, *The Republican Court; or American Society in the Days of Washington* (1864); S. I. Pomerantz, *New York, An American City, 1783-1803* (1938). Invaluable glimpses of American society and the American way of life at the turn of the century are to be found in the writings of foreign travelers. Their contributions have been made available in three important books: H. T. Tuckerman, *America and Her Commentators. With a Critical Sketch of Travel in the United States* (1864); J. L. Mesick, *The English Traveller in America, 1785-1835* (1922) and Allan Nevins, *American Social History as Recorded by British Travellers* (1923). Frank Monaghan, *French Travellers in the United States, 1765-1932* (1933) also is valuable.

Religion. No satisfactory comprehensive account of religion in America for this period has been written. H. K. Rowe, *The History of Religion in the United States* (1924) and W. W. Sweet, *The Story of Religion in America* (rev. ed., 1939) are somewhat factual and introductory surveys. These may be supplemented with J. A. Faulkner, *The Methodists* (1903); H. E. Luccock and P. Hutchinson, *The Story of Methodism* (1926); W. W. Sweet, *Methodism in American History* (1933), *The Baptists, 1783-1830* (1931), and *The Presbyterians, 1783-1840* (1936); Williston Walker, *A History of the Congregational Churches in the United States* (1894), in the American Church History series; C. A. Briggs, *American Presbyterianism* (1885); J. G. Shea, *History of the Catholic Church in the United States* (4 vols., 1886-92); Peter Guilday, *Life and Times of John Carroll, Archbishop of Baltimore* (2 vols., 1922); Herbert Asbury, *A Methodist Saint: The Life of Bishop Asbury* (1927), an interesting account of pioneer Methodist in America; W. P. Strickland (ed.), *Autobiography of Peter Cartwright* (1856); W. B. Posey, *The Development of Methodism in the Old Southwest, 1783-1824* (1933); C. C. Cleveland, *The Great Revival in the West, 1797-1805* (1916), a scholarly presentation of early frontier revivalist movement; and O. W. Elsbee, *The Rise of the Missionary Spirit in America, 1790-1815* (1928). For relations between state and church the best analysis is F. B. Greene, *Religion and the State* (1941).

Literature. Volume I of *The Cambridge History of American Literature* already cited is most useful for this period. It should be supplemented by the first two volumes of V. L. Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought* cited earlier and M. E. Curti's *Growth of American Thought* (2nd ed., 1951). W. B. Cairns, *British Criticisms of American Writings, 1783-1815* (1918) is useful; so also is Clement Eaton, *Freedom of Thought in the Old South* (1940). Among the more serviceable portrayals of representative men of the time are: D. L. Clark, *Charles Brockden Brown, A Critical Biography* (1923); T. A. Zunder, *The Early Days of Joel Barlow* (1934); C. M. Newlin, *The Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge* (1932);

R. B. Davis, *Francis W. Gilmer: Life and Learning in Jefferson's Virginia* (1939) and A. L. Herold, *James Kirke Paulding* (1926).

Journalism. The best introduction to the magazine literature is F. L. Mott, *A History of American Magazine, 1741-1850* (1930). The newspaper had not yet become a reflector of public opinion and a mirror of social conduct. For an interesting appraisal of the more influential papers, see F. L. Mott, *American Journalism, 1690-1940* (1941). A pioneer study in rural journalism is M. W. Hamilton, *The Country Printer, New York State, 1785-1830* (1936).

The Fine Arts. T. F. Hamlin, *The American Spirit in Architecture* (1926). Pageant of America series, and his *Greek Revival Architecture in America* (1944) are useful especially for illustrations. H. B. Major, *The Domestic Architecture of the Early American Republic* (1926); Sidney Fiske Kimball, *Domestic Architecture of the American Colonies and the Early Republic* (1927) and *Thomas Jefferson and the First Monument of the Classical Revival in America* (1915); Lewis Mumford, *Sticks and Stones: A Study of American Architecture and Civilization* (1924); and B. S. Ravenal, *Architects of Charleston* (1945) round out the Hamlin material. L. C. Elson's, *The History of American Music* (rev. ed., 1921) is, in a sense, introductory to the comprehensive study by J. T. Howard, *Our American Music; Three Hundred Years of It* (1939). On choral singing, consult W. T. Upton, *Anthony Phillip Heinrich* (1939). J. T. Flexner, *America's Old Masters* (1939); Oskar Hagen, *The Birth of the American Tradition in Art* (1940); G. C. Groce, *Early American Portrait Artists, 1663-1860* (1940), which lists names of 1440 persons; O. W. Larkin, *Art and Life in America* (1949), and Samuel Isham and Royal Cortissoz, *The History of American Painting* (new ed., 1936) provide an excellent background for this period. The theater for these years is dealt with by Arthur Hornblow, *A History of the Theater in America* (2 vols., 1919); Laurence Hutton, *Curiosities of the American Stage* (1891); and A. H. Quinn, *A History of the American Drama from the Beginning to the Civil War* (1923). O. S. Coad's *William Dunlap* (1917) is highly informative.

Education. The literature on lower schools is voluminous. The following are the best accounts: E. P. Cubberly, *Public Education in the United States* (rev. ed., 1934); F. H. Swift, *A History of Public Permanent Common School Funds in the United States, 1795 to 1905* (1911); Clifton Johnson, *Old Time Schools and School-books* (1904); G. F. Miller, *The Academy System of the State of New York* (1922); W. A. Maddox, *The Free School Idea in Virginia before the Civil War* (1918); C. L. Coon, *North Carolina Schools and Academies, 1790-1840* (1915); and J. J. McCadden, *Education in Pennsylvania, 1801-1835* (1937). Particularly valuable are R. J. Honeywell, *The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson* (1931); A. O. Hansen, *Liberalism and American Education in the Eighteenth Century* (1926); M. E. Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators* (1935); and H. G. Good, *Benjamin Rush and His Services to American Education* (1918). On higher education C. F. Thwing, *A History of Higher Education in America* (1906) has long been the standing authority but needs to be supplemented at many points. See D. G. Tewksbury, *The Founding of American Colleges and Universities Before the Civil War* (1932) and the following institutional histories: S. E. Morison, *Three Centuries of Harvard, 1636-1936* (1936); V. L. Collins, *Princeton* (1914); W. C. Bronson, *The History of Brown University, 1764-1914* (1914); W. H. S. Demarest, *A History of Rutgers College, 1766-1924* (1924); L. B. Richardson, *History of Dartmouth College* (2 vols., 1932); P. A. Bruce, *History of the University of Virginia 1819-1919*, (5 vols., 1920-2); and E. M. Coulter, *College Life in the Old South* (1928).

CHAPTER XI

Republican Rule in War and Peace

Most of the works listed for Chapter IX (The Federalists in Power) cover the Jefferson Administrations. The outstanding authority, however, is Henry Adams,

History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison (9 vols., 1889-91). Though written more than a half a century ago, it has been superseded on very few points. A much briefer summary is Edward Channing's, *The Jeffersonian System, 1801-1811* (1906), in the American Nation series. P. L. Ford, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (10 vols., 1892-9) will undoubtedly be superseded by the more definitive collection now being prepared under the direction of Julian Boyd of Princeton University. The first four volumes of this collection have already appeared. Two volumes of a projected four volume definitive biography by Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and His Time* (Vol. I, 1948, Vol. II, 1951) have been published.

Theory and Practice of Jeffersonian Democracy. For Jefferson's economic views the most useful sources apart from his writings are A. J. Nock, *Thomas Jefferson* (1926); Adrienne Koch, *The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson* (1943) and *Jefferson and Madison* (1950), and C. A. Beard, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy* (1915). Jefferson's political ideas are discussed in Gilbert Chinard, *Thomas Jefferson, The Apostle of Americanism* (rev. ed., 1939); F. W. Hirst, *Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson* (1926); Allen Johnson, *Jefferson and His Colleagues* (1921), in the *Chronicles of America* series; C. L. Becker, *The Declaration of Independence* (1922); and C. E. Merriam, "The Political Theory of Jefferson," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XVII (1902), pp. 24-5. Marie Kimball, *Jefferson, the Road to Glory, 1743-76* (1943) deals with Jefferson's early years, and her *Jefferson, War and Peace, 1776-1784* (1947) emphasizes the period of his greatest public activity; also see her *Jefferson, the Scene of Europe, 1784 to 1789* (1950). C. G. Bowers, *Jefferson in Power* (1936) is the work of an admirer who is not always unbiased. Unsympathetic to Jefferson is A. J. Beveridge's *Life of John Marshall* (4 vols., 1916-19). H. J. Eckenrode, *The Randolphs* (1946) also is concerned with a severe critic. S. K. Padover, *Jefferson* (1942) emphasizes Jefferson's presidential career. The elections are treated in E. Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency* (new ed., 2 vols., 1916). The permanent contributions of Jefferson are the subject of J. S. Williams, *Thomas Jefferson, His permanent Influence on American Institutions* (1913) and C. M. Wiltse, *The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy* (1935). Those who are primarily concerned with Jefferson's presidency will profit greatly from Henry Adams, *The Life of Albert Gallatin* (1879) and *John Randolph* (1882), and W. E. Dodd, *The Life of Nathaniel Macon* (1903). D. R. Gilpatrick, *Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina, 1789-1816* (1931) is a special study. Also see Leonard White, *The Jeffersonians* (1951) for excellent administrative history. Nathan Schachner, *Thomas Jefferson* (2 vols., 1951) though valuable, is not definitive.

Expansion and Conspiracy in the West. On this topic the great work of Henry Adams may be supplemented by A. P. Whitaker, *The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803* (1934); E. W. Lyon, *Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804* (1934), excellent on European aspects; J. K. Hosmer, *History of the Louisiana Purchase* (1902); F. A. Ogg, *The Opening of the Mississippi* (1904); I. J. Cox, *The Early Exploration of Louisiana* (1906); T. M. Marshall, *A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841* (1914); E. S. Brown, *The Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803-1912* (1920); and J. A. Robertson, *Louisiana Under the Rule of Spain, France and the United States, 1785-1807* (2 vols., 1911). The West Florida controversy is exhaustively treated in I. J. Cox, *The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813* (1918). Three works dealing with United States relations with Caribbean areas during this period are R. W. Logan, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776-1891* (1941); T. L. Stoddard, *The French Revolution in San Domingo* (1914); and C. C. Tansill, *The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873* (1938), which is scholarly and well written. On the Burr conspiracy the best account is W. F. McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy* (1903), in which Burr is defended. S. H. Wandell and M. Mimegerode, *Aaron Burr* (2 vols., 1925) is less satisfactory than McCaleb or Nathan Schachner, *Aaron Burr, A Biography* (1937). J. R. Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior, Major-General James Wilkinson* (1938) is adequate and spicy in presentation. Beveridge's *Life of Marshall*, al-

ready cited, should be consulted and W. C. Bruce, *John Randolph of Roanoke, 1773-1833* (2nd ed., rev., 1939) is valuable.

Trials of a Neutral. Henry Adams, previously cited, is excellent, especially on the diplomatic side. Channing, McMaster, and Schouler also address themselves to this subject. These general works may be supplemented with the briefer surveys of Lattané, Sears, Bailey, Darling, and Bemis. In addition, for the Tripolitan War, see G. W. Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs* (1905); L. B. Wright, *The First Americans in North Africa* (1945); and R. W. Irwin, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816* (1931). Volume III of S. F. Bemis (ed.), *The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy* (10 vols., 1927-9) covers the period of the British Orders in Council, the French Decrees, and the American Retaliatory Acts. See also E. F. Heckscher, *The Continental System* (1922); F. E. Melvin, *Napoleon's Navigation System* (1919); A. C. Clauder, *American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon* (1932); L. M. Sears, *Jefferson and the Embargo* (1927), an excellent account; and W. W. Jennings, *The American Embargo, 1807-1809* (1921), which stresses the economic side of this important subject. There is much information bearing on this topic in N. S. Buck *The Development of the Organization of Anglo-American Trade, 1800-1850* (1925); S. E. Morison, *The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860* (1921). J. F. Zimmerman, *Impressment of American Seamen* (1925) is the authority on this subject.

The War of 1812. The best single work covering what has sometimes been called our "Second War of Independence" is F. F. Beirne, *The War of 1812* (1949). On the causes and background of the war, J. W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (1925) and M. M. Quaife, *Chicago and the Old Northwest, 1673-1835* (1913), stress the influence of the West in bringing on the war. A. L. Burt, *The United States, Great Britain and British North America* (1940) challenges some of Pratt's conclusions and insists that impressment and infringement of neutral rights were the principal causes. Other worthwhile studies that contribute to a better understanding of this conflict are W. F. Galpin, *The Grain Supply of England during the Napoleonic Period* (1925); W. H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. XXVIII (Sept., 1941); G. R. Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. XXXIX (1931); and Elizabeth White, *American Opinion of France From Lafayette to Poincaré* (1927). For Henry Clay's rôle, see G. G. Van Deusen, *The Life of Henry Clay* (1937), an excellent biography. On the opposition to the war, consult J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic* (1926); S. E. Morison, *The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis* (2 vols., 1913); Henry Adams, *Documents Relating to New England Federalism 1800-1815* (1877); C. R. Brown, *Northern Confederacy According to the Plans of the "Essex Junto," 1796-1814* (1915); and E. P. Powell, *Nullification and Secession in the United States* (1897). On the military history of the war, see C. F. Adams *Studies Military and Diplomatic, 1775-1865* (1911), good on battle of New Orleans; Marquis James, *Andrew Jackson, The Border Captain* (1933); J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vols. VIII-X (1919-20); C. P. Lucas, *The Canadian War of 1812* (1906); A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812* (2 vols., 1905); R. D. Paine, *The Fight for a Free Sea* (1920), in the *Chronicles of America* series. The work of the privateers is best described in E. S. Maclay, *A History of American Privateers* (1899) and G. Coggeshall, *History of American Privateers, and Letters of Marque, During our War with England in the Years 1812, '13 and '14* (1856).

Peace. The peace treaty is discussed at length in C. E. Hill, *Leading American Treaties* (1922); F. A. Updyke, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1812* (1915); James Gallatin, *A Great Peace Maker: The Diary of James Gallatin* (1914); W. A. Dunning, *The British Empire and the United States* (1914); C. F. Adams (ed.), *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795-1848* (12 vols., 1874-7) Vols. II and III; and Vol. I of A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (eds.), *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919* (3 vols., 1922-3). Other

postwar settlements with Great Britain are referred to in J. M. Callahan, *The Neutrality of the American Lakes and Anglo-American Relations* (1898) and H. A. Innis, *The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy* (1940).

CHAPTER XII

America Moves West

The standard brief accounts of the westward movement are F. J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (1920) and *Rise of the New West, 1819-1829* (1906), in the American Nation series; F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893* (1924); D. E. Clark, *The West in American History* (1937); R. E. Riegel, *America Moves West* (rev. ed., 1947); C. L. Goodwin, *The Trans-Mississippi West (1803-1853)* (1922) and W. P. Webb, *The Great Plains* (1931). These may be supplemented by J. C. Parish, *The Persistence of the Westward Movement* (1943); F. J. Turner, *The Significance of Sections in American History* (1932); and I. F. Woestemeyer and J. M. Gambrell, *The Westward Movement* (1939), the latter a volume of sources with an extensive bibliography. R. C. Bulley, *The Old Northwest: Pioneer Period 1815-1840* (2 vols., 1950) is a detailed and highly illuminating treatment.

Settlement of the Old West. C. W. Alvord, *The Illinois Country, 1673 to 1818* (1920); A. L. Kohlmeier, *The Old Northwest* (1938); R. C. Downes, *Frontier Ohio, 1783-1803* (1935) and B. W. Bond, Jr., *The Civilization of the Old Northwest: A Study of Political, Social, and Economic Development, 1788-1812* (1934) furnish valuable information on the settlement of a region. T. D. Clark, *The Rampaging Frontier: Manners and Humors of Pioneer Days in the South and the Middle West* (1939) is lively in treatment. L. K. Matthews, *The Expansion of New England 1620-1865* (1909) and Volume VI of the *History of the State of New York* (1934), edited by A. C. Flick, give a good picture of the settlement of western New York. Useful, too, are H. C. Hubbart, *The Older Middle West, 1840-1880* (1936); E. W. Gilbert, *The Exploration of Western America, 1800-1850, An Historical Geography* (1933); F. C. Shoemaker, *Missouri's Struggle for Statehood, 1804-1821* (1916); C. L. Skinner, *Pioneers of the Old Southwest* (1919), in the *Chronicles of America* series; J. W. Monette, *History of the Discovery and Settlement of the Valley of the Mississippi* (1946); and Timothy Flint, *Recollections of the Last Ten Years* (1826). Travelers accounts of what they saw of the Old West are illuminating. F. P. Trollope, *Domestic Manners of Americans* (2 vols., 1832) is adversely critical; Harriet Martineau, *Society in America* (1837), Fredrika Bremer, *The Homes of the New World* (2 vols., 1853); Basil Hall, *Travels in North America, in the Years 1827 and 1828* (3 vols., 1829); and J. S. Buckingham, *The Eastern and Western States of America* (3 vols., 1842) are the best. Of the guidebooks J. M. Peck, *A New Guide for Emigrants to the West* (1836) is typical.

Problems of the Trans-Allegheny Settler. Of the many problems faced by the settler of the Old West none was more vexing than that of transportation. On this subject, see C. H. Ambler, *A History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley* (1932); Seymour Dunbar, *A History of Travel in America* (4 vols., 1915); A. B. Hulbert, *The Old National Road* (1901); T. B. Searight, *The Old Pike. A History of the National Road, with Incidents, Accidents, and Anecdotes Thereon* (1894); George Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860* (1951); L. D. Baldwin, *The Keelboat Age on Western Waters* (1941), in the *Chronicles of America* series; B. H. Meyer, C. E. MacGill, and Others, *History of Transportation in the United States before 1860* (1917), poorly organized but with good maps and bibliography; E. J. Benton, *The Wabash Trade Route in the Development of the Old Northwest* (1903); Lewis Atherton, "Services of the Frontier Merchant," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. XXIV, pp. 153-171; and E. D. Branch, *Westward* (1930). The public domain and land problems are treated in R. M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage: the Public*

Domain 1776-1936 (1942); P. J. Treat, *The National Land System, 1785-1820* (1910); and B. H. Hibbard, *A History of the Public Land Policies* (1924). There is also valuable material, especially on land speculation, in P. D. Evans, *The Holland Land Company* (1924); A. M. Sakolski, *The Great American Land Bubble* (1932); Shaw Livermore, *Early American Land Companies* (1939); T. T. Belote, *The Scioto Speculation and the French Settlement at Gallipolis* (1907); and C. S. Hall, *Benjamin Tallmadge* (1943). The Indian problem receives some attention in two volumes of the *Centennial History of Illinois* (6 vols., 1918-24), edited by C. W. Alvord. These are S. J. Buck, *Illinois in 1818* (1917) and T. C. Pease, *The Frontier State, 1818-1848* (1918). See also Althea Bass, *Cherokee Messenger* (1936), an account of the Reverend Samuel A. Worcester, the plaintiff in the celebrated case *Worcester vs Georgia*; A. H. Abel, *The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi* (1906); Grant Foreman, *Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians* (1932). Cultural conditions in the Old West are best described in F. B. Wright and Others, *Sources of Culture in the Middle West* (1934); D. R. Fox, *Ideas in Motion* (1935); W. H. Venable, *Beginnings of Literary Culture in the Ohio Valley* (1891); J. M. Miller, *The Genesis of Western Culture, The Upper Ohio Valley, 1800-1825* (1938); S. J. and E. H. Buck, *The Planting of Civilization in Western Pennsylvania* (1939); E. G. Seem (ed.), *Letters on the Conditions of Kentucky in 1825* (1916); J. E. Wright and D. S. Corbett, *Pioneer Life in Western Pennsylvania* (1940). H. C. Brown, *The Story of Old New York* (1934); Louis Bromfield, *The Farm* (1933); W. D. Howells, *Stories of Ohio*, (1897), gives personal color. *Years of My Youth* (1916) and *The Leatherwood God* (1916) are semifictional accounts of early Ohio.

Furtrade in the Far West. A satisfactory history of the furtrade is yet to be written. For the trans-Allegheny trade the two best works are W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade, 1763-1800* (1928) and A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish American Frontier: 1783-1795* (1927). Katherine Coman, *Economic Beginnings of the Far West* (2 vols., 1912) is as yet unsurpassed for the trans-Mississippi furtrade. H. M. Chitenden, *The American Fur Trade of the Far West* (3 vols., 1902) is discursive but includes excellent maps. K. W. Porter, *John Jacob Astor, Business Man* (2 vols., 1931) is a first-rate presentation. G. L. Nute, "The Papers of the American Fur Company: A Brief Estimate of their Significance," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXXII, 519-38 is a stimulating article. George Simpson, *Fur Trade and Empire* (1931) is most valuable.

The Middle Border Moves Westward. Many of the volumes cited in the paragraph on the Old West are relevant, especially those by Turner, Paxson, Reigel, and Webb. There is much valuable material on this topic in L. D. Stilwell, *Migration from Vermont, 1776-1860* (1937); L. R. Hafen, *Western America: The Exploration, Settlement, and Development of the Region beyond the Mississippi* (1941); G. D. Lyman, *John Marsh, Pioneer: the Life Story of a Trail-blazer on Six Frontiers* (1930); Bernard De Voto, *The Year of Decision, 1846* (1943) and *Across the Wide Missouri* (1947). Other useful works are R. A. Billington, *Westward Expansion* (1949); Mason Wade, *Francis Parkman, Heroic Historian* (1942); F. P. Weisenburger, *The Passing of the Frontier: 1825-1850* (1941); Bayard Still, *Milwaukee* (1948); R. G. Thwaites, *Wisconsin* (1908); T. C. Pease, *Illinois: The Frontier State, 1818-1848* (1922); B. L. Pierce, *A History of Chicago* (2 vols., 1937-40); Cyrenus Cole, *A History of the People of Iowa* (1921); J. G. Fletcher, *Arkansas* (1947); D. A. Dondore, *The Prairie and the Making of Middle America* (1926); W. W. Folwell, *A History of Minnesota* (4 vols., 1921-30); W. P. Shortridge, *The Transition of a Typical Frontier with Illustrations from the Life of Henry Hastings Sibley* (1922); T. H. McBride, *In Cabins and Sod Houses* (1928), which discusses early Iowa; Irving Richman, *Ioway to Iowa* (1931); W. E. Connelley, *History of Kansas, State and People* (5 vols., 1928), a summary of which has been prepared by the Kansas Historical Society; and Bruce Nelson, *Land of the Dakotahs* (1946).

The Frontier and American Civilization. No one has assessed the relation of the frontier to American development more fully than F. J. Turner in his *Frontier in American History* (1920) and *The Significance of Sections in American History*

(1932). The pros and cons of the Turner thesis are set forth in a book of readings entitled *The Turner Thesis: Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History* (1949) edited with an introduction by G. R. Taylor. This excellent compilation, which is one of the Amherst College Problems in American Civilization series, may be profitably supplemented by the following articles: B. F. Wright, Jr., "American Democracy and the Frontier," *Yale Review*, Vol. XX (1930) pp. 349-65; G. W. Pierson, "The Frontier and the Frontiersmen of Turner's Essay," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. LXIV (1940), pp. 449-78; Murray Cane, "Some Considerations of the Frontier Concept of Frederick Jackson Turner," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. XXVII (1940), pp. 379-400; and Richard Hofstadter, "Turner and The Frontier Myth," *American Scholar*, Fall Issue (1949).

CHAPTER XIII

Nationalism and Sectionalism

The best single volume for this chapter is F. J. Turner, *The Rise of the New West, 1819-1829* (1906), in the American Nation series. For more detailed accounts, consult the appropriate volumes in Channing, McMaster, and Schouler previously cited.

A *National Foreign Policy*. For a compact and scholarly presentation of American foreign policy during this period, see S. F. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (1949). For details this volume may be supplemented by the *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 1795-1848* (12 vols., 1874-7); W. C. Ford (ed.), *The Writings of John Quincy Adams* (7 vols., 1913-17); and S. M. Hamilton, *The Writings of James Monroe* (7 vols., 1898-1903). Volume IV of S. F. Bemis (ed.), *The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy* (10 vols., 1927-9) also covers this period. On the background of the Monroe Doctrine there are a number of helpful works: P. C. Brooks, *Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819* (1939), a scholarly, well-written monograph; I. J. Cox, *The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813* (1918), definitive; H. B. Fuller, *The Purchase of Florida* (1906), a detailed account; C. C. Griffin, *The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822: A Study of the Relations of the United States with Spain and with the Rebel Spanish Colonies* (1937); J. F. Rippey, *Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America, 1808-1830* (1929); W. P. Cresson, *The Holy Alliance* (1922), good for European background, and *James Monroe* (1946); E. H. Tatum, *The United States and Europe, 1815-1823* (1936); C. K. Webster (ed.), *Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830* (2 vols., 1938) and *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-22* (1925), fair and discriminating; W. S. Robertson, *Rise of the Spanish-American Republics as told in the Lives of their Liberators* (1918), *Hispanic-American Relations with the United States* (1923), and *France and Latin-American Independence* (1939); and W. A. Dunning, *The British Empire and the United States* (1914). On the Monroe Doctrine itself the standard authority is Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826* (1927), *The Monroe Doctrine 1826-1867* (1933), and the *Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907* (1937). A briefer and more popular presentation is his *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (1941). The authorship of the doctrine is discussed by W. C. Ford in "John Q. Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," *American Historical Review*, Vols. VII, VIII. There is much worthwhile material on this topic in Waldo Frank, *Birth of a World* (1951).

Other important treatises are H. W. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827*, (1925); W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine* (1898); and J. R. Clark, *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine* (1930), an official history and interpretation. On miscellaneous foreign relation items, see F. A. Golder, *Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641-1850* (1914); B. P. Thomas, *Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867* (1930); A. K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny* (1935);

J. M. Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations* (1899); W. R. Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico* (1916); and F. L. Benns, *The American Struggle for the British West-India Carrying Trade, 1815-1830* (1923).

John Marshall, the Constitution and the American Union. The standard biography of Marshall is A. J. Beveridge, *The Life of John Marshall*, already cited. To offset its bias read E. S. Corwin, *John Marshall and the Constitution* (1919); A. C. McLaughlin, *A Constitutional History of the United States* (1935); Louis Boudin, *Government by Judiciary* (2 vols., 1932); Charles Warren, *The Supreme Court in United States History* (3 vols., 1922) and Felix Frankfurter, *The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite* (1937). Marshall's leading decisions are available in J. M. Dillon (ed.), *John Marshall: Life, Thought, and Character* (3 vols., 1908) and J. P. Cotton (ed.), *Constitutional Decisions of John Marshall* (2 vols., 1905). B. W. Palmer, *Marshall and Taney: Statesmen of the Law* (1939) and B. F. Wright, *The Contract Clause of the Constitution* (1938) also shed considerable light on Marshall. On the formative influence of American law, see Roscoe Pound, *The Formative Era of American Law* (1938). The Missouri Compromise is adequately treated by J. A. Woodburn, *The Historical Significance of the Missouri Compromise in the American Historical Association Report, 1893*; H. A. Trexler, *Slavery in Missouri, 1804-1865* (1914); and F. H. Hodder, *Sidelights on the Missouri Compromise* (1909).

Era of Good and Bad Feelings. The economic issues of these years are summarized in H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* (6th ed., 1949) and E. C. Kirkland, *A History of American Economic Life* (rev. ed., 1951). For the era of "Hard Feeling," consult the appropriate volumes in general histories already cited, notably Channing, McMaster, and Schouler. H. E. Von Holst, *The Constitutional and Political History of the United States* (8 vols., 1876-92) is excellent on the forces tending to disintegrate the nation. See also A. B. Darling, *Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824-1848* (1925) and J. T. Carpenter, *The South as a Conscious Minority, 1789-1861* (1930). C. R. Fish, *The Civil Service and the Patronage* (1905); D. R. Fox, *The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York* (1918); A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South* (1913); E. M. Carroll, *Origins of the Whig Party* (1925); F. M. Green, *Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860* (1930); H. L. McBain, *DeWitt Clinton and the Origin of the Spoils System* (1907); K. H. Porter, *A History of Suffrage in the United States* (1918); and S. R. Gammon, *The Presidential Campaign of 1832* (1922). For a recent and admirable study consult George Dangerfield, *The Era of Good Feelings* (1952).

The Tariff Issue. See F. W. Taussig, *The Tariff History of the United States* (8th ed., 1931); E. Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century* (2 vols., 1903); and D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* (12th ed. 1936). Additional information on manufacturing and the tariff may be found in V. S. Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States, 1607-1928* (rev. ed., 3 vols., 1929); G. P. Fuller, *An Introduction to the History of Connecticut as a Manufacturing State* (1915); C. F. Ware, *The Early New England Cotton Manufacture* (1931); A. H. Cole, *The American Wool Manufacture* (2 vols., 1926); and M. T. Copeland, *The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States* (1912).

The Emergence of New Parties. The best understanding of what was happening to party alignment is perhaps to be found in the biographies of those who played a leading role during this period. Studies of most of the prominent political spokesmen of this period are available. Among the more important are: W. P. Cresson, *James Monroe*, previously cited; Arthur Styron, *Last of the Cocked Hats: James Monroe and the Virginia Dynasty* (1945); Carl Schurz, *Henry Clay* (2 vols., 1899); Bernard Mayo, *Henry Clay* (1937); G. G. Van Deusen, *Life of Henry Clay* (1937), the best one-volume biography; W. M. Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-1828* (1944); Gaillard Hunt, *John C. Calhoun* (1908); Marquis James, *Andrew Jackson: The Border Captain* (1933); Claude Fuess, *Daniel Webster* (2 vols., 1930); and Raymond Walters Jr., *Alexander James Dallas* (1943).

CHAPTER XIV

Jacksonian Democracy

In addition to the standard general histories cited in the previous chapter the Jacksonian era is covered by F. J. Turner, *The United States, 1830-1850* (1935) and William MacDonald, *Jacksonian Democracy, 1829-1837* (1906). Of the biographies of Jackson the following are recommended: Marquis James, *Andrew Jackson: The Border Captain* (1933) and *Andrew Jackson: Portrait of a President* (1937), both lively portrayals and J. S. Bassett, *The Life of Andrew Jackson* (2 vols., 1911), a sound account. James Parton's *Life Of Andrew Jackson* (3 vols., 1860) is partisan and unreliable, though colorful. T. P. Abernethy, *From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee* (1932) portrays Jackson as frontier aristocrat; on the other hand A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his brilliant and controversial book *The Age of Jackson* (1945) pictures him as the spokesman of the common man. C. G. Bowers, *Party Battles of the Jackson Period* (1922) is partisan and not entirely reliable. Jackson's writings were edited by J. S. Bassett under the title *The Correspondence of Andrew Jackson* (7 vols., 1926-35).

Nature of Jacksonian Democracy. Of the several works that help explain the ideological changes during these years, the best are Volume II of V. L. Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought*, called *The Romantic Revolution in America* (1927); Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1838), edited by Phillips Bradley (1945); G. W. Pierson, *Tocqueville and Beaumont in America* (1938), which analyzes De Tocqueville's sources of information; J. B. McMaster, *The Acquisition of Political, Social and Industrial Rights of Man in America* (1903); R. H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* (1940); M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (1902), a penetrating analysis; A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History* (1922); and A. F. Tyler, *Freedom's Ferment* (1944), which is excellent for the social and spiritual basis underlying equalitarian movement.

Jackson and the Democratic Party. Besides the works already cited, valuable material may be found in Charles McCarthy, *The Anti-Masonic Party, A Study of Political Antimasonry in the United States, 1827-1840*, American Historical Association, Report, 1902, Vol. I; F. A. Ogg, *The Reign of Andrew Jackson* (1919), in the *Chronicles of America* series; W. G. Sumner, *Andrew Jackson as a Public Man* (1882); H. E. Von Holst, *John C. Calhoun* (1882); T. D. Jervay, *Robert Y. Hayne and His Times* (1909); T. S. Jenkins, *The Life of Silas Wright* (1847); and J. H. Parks, *Felix Grundy* (1940). T. H. Benton's *Thirty Years' View* (2 vols., 1854-6) is not always to be trusted.

Nationalism at Home and Abroad. On nullification the best accounts are C. W. Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun, Nullifier, 1829-1839* (1949); D. F. Houston, *Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina* (1896); C. S. Boucher, *The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina* (1916); and J. G. Van Densen, *The Bases of Disunion in South Carolina* (1928). Much valuable material may also be found C. E. Merriam, *History of American Political Theories* (new ed., 1920) and E. P. Powell, *Nullification and Secession in the United States* (1897). Dumas Malone's *Public Life of Thomas Cooper*, cited previously, also should be consulted. On Indian removal two works already suggested earlier, Grant Foreman, *Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians* (1932) and Wilson Lumpkin, *The Removal of the Cherokee Indians from Georgia* (1907) are the standard authorities. The best account of the Black Hawk War is to be found in C. Cole, *I Am a Man: The Indian Black Hawk*, (1938) and T. C. Pease, *The Centennial History of Illinois*, Vol. II, previously cited. Jackson's foreign relations are discussed satisfactorily in S. F. Bemis (ed.), *The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy*, cited earlier. This may be supplemented by E. C. Barker, "President Jackson and the Texas Revolution." *American Historical Review*, Vol. XII (July 1907); F. L. Bennis, *The American*

Struggle for the British West India Carrying Trade, 1815-1830 (1923); R. A. McLemore, *Franco-American Diplomatic Relations, 1816-1836* (1941), an excellent monograph, and his *The French Spoilation Claims, 1816-1836: A Study in Jacksonian Diplomacy* (1932); D. R. Moore, *Canada and the United States, 1815-1830* (1910); V. G. Setser, *The Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the United States, 1774-1829* (1937); and E. B. White, *American Opinion of France* (1927).

War on the Bank. R. E. H. Catterall, *The Second Bank of the United States* (1903) is the standard work on this subject. R. C. McGrane (ed.), *Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle, 1807-1844* (1919) is illuminating. Sister M. G. Madeleine, *Monetary and Banking Theories of Jacksonian Democracy* (1943) is a valuable summary. R. C. McGrane, *The Panic of 1837* (1924) is anti-Jackson. Other useful works contributing to an understanding of Jackson's position on the bank are M. S. Wildman, *Money Inflation in the United States: A Study in Social Pathology* (1905); H. E. Miller, *Banking Theories in the United States before 1860* (1927); J. T. Holdsworth and D. R. Dewey, *The First and Second Banks of the United States* (1910); David Kinley, *The Independent Treasury of the United States and Its Relations to the Banks of the Country* (1910). B. C. Steiner, *Life of Roger Brooke Taney* (1922) and C. B. Swisher, *Roger B. Taney* (1935), a definitive biography, are important.

Van Buren's Administration. Other than the works already mentioned, the following are valuable for an understanding of Jackson's successor and his presidency: H. R. Fraser, *Democracy in the Making: the Jackson-Tyler Era* (1938); J. C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, American Historical Association Report (1918) Vol. II, which is diffuse and makes little reference to administration; Holmes Alexander, *The American Talleyrand: The Career and Contemporaries of Martin Van Buren* (1935), which stresses political events; E. G. Bourne, *The History of the Surplus Revenue of 1837* (1885); E. M. Shepard, *Martin Van Buren* (1888), good biography; D. R. Dewey, *State Banking Before the Civil War* (1910); R. C. McGrane, *Foreign Bondholders and American State Debts* (1933); R. E. Chaddock, *The Safety Fund Banking System in New York, 1829-1866* (1910).

Breakup of Jacksonian Democracy. This topic is covered in Channing, McMaster, and Schouler and in E. Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency* (2 vols., 1916). On Van Buren's successor, consult D. B. Goebel, *William H. Harrison: A Political Biography* (1926) and Freeman Cleaves, *Old Tippecanoe* (1939). For Tyler, see L. G. Tyler, *Letters and Times of the Tylers* (3 vols., 1884-96), a laudatory account by Tyler's son, who presents Tyler's views in his quarrel with the Whigs; and the better balanced account by O. P. Chitwood, *John Tyler, Champion of the Old South* (1939). A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South* (1913) is a careful study. G. R. Poage, *Henry Clay and the Whig Party* (1936) details American politics from 1840 to 1852. Other useful works are John Fiske, *Essays, Historical and Literary* (2 vols., 1902), which discusses Whig difficulties; O. D. Lambert, *Presidential Politics in the United States 1841-1844* (1936), which reviews controversy between Tyler and the Whigs; H. R. Mueller, *The Whig Party in Pennsylvania* (1902), a special study; and A. B. Norton, *The Great Revolution of 1840* (1888).

CHAPTER XV

The Northern Farmer

On Northern agriculture P. W. Bidwell and J. I. Falconer, *History of Agriculture in the Northern United States 1620-1860* (1925) is the best introduction and has an extensive bibliography. The fourth volume of L. H. Bailey (ed.), *Cyclopedia of American Agriculture* (4 vols., 1907-09) has an informative article by T. N. Carver entitled "Historical Sketch of American Agriculture." E. E. Edwards, *A Bibliography of the History of Agriculture in the United States* (1930) and his illuminating contribution "American Agriculture—The First 300 Years," pp. 171-276 in the 1940 *Yearbook of Agriculture* are indispensable. L. B. Schmidt and E. D. Ross, *Readings*

in the *Economic History of American Agriculture* (1925) is also very useful. N. S. B. Gras, *A History of Agriculture in Europe and America* (1925) is provocative, but scanty on the United States.

Movement for Agrarian Improvement. The literature on this topic is somewhat fragmentary. See P. W. Bidwell, "Rural Economy in New England at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century," *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. XX; Timothy Dwight, *Travels in New England and New York* (1821-22); W. C. Neely, *The Agricultural Fair* (1935); A. L. Demaree, *The American Agricultural Press 1819-1860* (1941); H. J. Carman, *Jesse Buel, Agricultural Reformer* (1947); and H. A. Kellar (ed.), *Solon Robinson, Pioneer and Agriculturist, Selected Writings* (2 vols., 1936-1937). R. E. Prothero, *English Farming, Past and Present* (1912) gives the English background. It may be supplemented by R. C. Loehr "The Influence of English Agriculture on American Agriculture, 1775-1825," *Agricultural History*, Vol. II.

Improved Tools and Techniques. A. C. True, *A History of Agricultural Experimentation and Research in the United States, 1607-1925*, Department of Agriculture Miscellaneous Publication no. 251 (1937) is little more than a compilation of lists. Much more useful are P. W. Bidwell, "The Agricultural Revolution in New England," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXVI; Leo Rogin, *The Introduction of Farm Machinery in Its Relation to the Productivity of Labor in the Agriculture of the United States* (1931), an excellent study on plow and wheat production. An earlier and standard account is H. W. Quaintance, *The Influence of Farm Machinery on Production and Labor* (1904). E. D. Ross, "Horace Greeley and the Beginnings of the New Agriculture," *Agricultural History*, Vol. VII; C. T. Leavitt, "Attempts to Improve Cattle Breeds in the United States 1790-1860," *Agricultural History*, Vol. VII; A. H. Cole, "Agricultural Crazes, a Neglected Chapter in American Economic History," *American Economic Review*, Vol. XVI; C. R. Ball, "The History of American Wheat Improvement," *Agricultural History*, Vol. IV; A. P. Usher, "Soil Fertility, Soil Exhaustion and their Historical Significance," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. XXXVII are important articles on various phases of agricultural improvement. On agricultural machinery there is a popular account in Waldemar Kaempffert (ed.), *A Popular History of American Invention* (2 vols., 1924). Cyrus McCormick, *The Century of the Reaper* (1931) is the story by an admiring grandson of Cyrus Hall McCormick. Far more accurate is the able and judicious narrative by M. F. Miller, *The Evolution of Reaping Machines*, Department of Agriculture, Office of Experiment Stations, Bulletin no. 103 (1902). A more detailed account of McCormick's contribution is to be found in the scholarly biography by W. T. Hutchinson, *Cyrus Hall McCormick* (2 vols., 1930-5). See also R. L. Ardrey, *American Agricultural Implements* (1894).

Expansion and Reorganization. The works already cited on the movement of the farming population westward may be supplemented by H. C. Hubbart, *The Older Middle West 1840-1880* (1936); R. E. Reigel, *America Moves West* (2nd ed., 1948); C. R. Fish, *The Rise of the Common Man, 1830-1859* (1927); and A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict 1850-1865* (1938), both volumes in the History of American Life series. There is also much material on agricultural expansion in the more important works on immigration. See especially W. F. Adams, *Ireland and Irish Emigration, to the New World, 1815 to the Famine* (1932); A. B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States* (2 vols., 1909); R. B. Anderson, *The First Chapter of Norwegian Immigration, (1821-1840)* (1895); S. C. Johnson, *History of Emigration from United Kingdom to North America* (1913); K. C. Babcock, *The Scandinavian Element in the United States* (1914); T. C. Blegen, *Norwegian Migration to America* (1931); Carl Wittke, *We Who Built America* (1940); C. C. Qualey, *Norwegian Settlement in the United States* (1938); and Edith Abbott, *Historical Aspects of the Emigration Problem; Select Documents* (1926). L. D. Stilwell, *Migration from Vermont, 1776-1860*, already cited, and H. L. Wilson, *The Hill Country of Northern New England* (1936) give valuable information on this topic. Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People* (1951) is indispensable

Agricultural Specialization: The movement of Northern agriculture toward specialization had its beginning before 1860. On this subject see U. P. Hedrick, *A History of Agriculture in the State of New York* (1933); C. R. Woodward, *The Development of Agriculture in New Jersey, 1640-1880* (1927); Edward Wiest, *The Butter Industry in the United States* (1916); R. A. Clemen, *The American Livestock and Meat Industry* (1923); L. G. Connor, "A Brief History of the Sheep Industry in the United States," *American Historical Association Report* (1918) vol. I; Joseph Schafer, *A History of Agriculture in Wisconsin* (1922); B. H. Hibbard, *The History of Agriculture in Dane County, Wisconsin* (1904); J. G. Thompson, *The Rise and Decline of the Wheat Growing Industry in Wisconsin* (1909); and J. A. Hopkins, *Economic History of the Production of Beef Cattle in Iowa* (1928).

Problems of the Northern Farmer. Throughout the entire period before 1860 the Northern farmer faced four major problems: obtaining title to his land, selling and buying for reasonable prices, getting better transportation and credit facilities, and finding a sufficient labor supply. With the exception of transportation, materials covering these several items for the years prior to 1860 are not abundant. On land titles, see B. H. Hibbard, *A History of the Public Land Policies* (1924); R. M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage, The Public Domain 1776-1936* (1942); G. M. Stephenson, *The Political History of the Public Lands, from 1840 to 1862* (1917); R. G. Wellington, *The Political and Sectional Influence of the Public Lands, 1828-1842* (1914); and Shosuke Sato, *History of the Land Question in the United States* (1886). On the price problem there is little that pertains to the period prior to 1860; after that date the literature becomes more extensive. There is some material on the earlier period in Volume VI of the *Report of the Industrial Commission on Trusts and Industrial Combinations* (19 vols., 1900-1902), "The Distribution of Farm Products." See also H. C. Emery, *Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States* (1896); H. M. Larson, *The Wheat Market and the Farmer in Minnesota, 1858-1900* (1926), excellent; and G. A. Lee, "The Historical Significance of the Chicago Grain Elevator System," *Agricultural History*, Vol. XI. In fiction, Hamlin Garland, *A Son of the Middle Border* (1917), Herbert Quick, *One Man's Life* (1925), and H. L. Davis, *Honey in the Horn* (1935) reflect much of the farmer's economic discontent. For bibliography covering transportation facilities, see Chapter 17 below. On farm credit, consult E. S. Sparks, *History and Theory of Agricultural Credit in the United States* (1932).

CHAPTER XVI

The Southern Farmer

The best treatment of Southern agriculture is L. C. Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860* (2 vols., 1933). A briefer but brilliant account is W. E. Dodd, *The Cotton Kingdom* (1919), in the *Chronicles of America* series. U. B. Phillips, *Life and Labor in the Old South* (1929) is a highly literary presentation of a civilization that has vanished.

The Land. See J. D. B. DeBow, *The Industrial Resources, etc., of the Southern and Western States* (3 vols., 1853), most valuable; F. L. Olmsted, *Journeys and Explorations in the Cotton Kingdom* (2 vols., 1861), observations of a Northern reporter; A. O. Craven, *Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1660-1860* (1926) and Edmund Ruffin, *Southerner* (1932); G. G. Johnson, *A Social History of the Sea Islands* (1930); C. C. Lovell, *The Golden Islands of Georgia* (1932); R. R. Russel, *Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 1840-1861* (1924); Isaiah Bowman, *Forest Physiography* (1911); and J. R. Smith, *North America* (1925), a "must" book for understanding the geography of the South.

The People. Gray, Dodd, and Phillips are gold mines of information on the people of the Old South. A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict*, already cited, also contains

much useful data on this subject. On the planter aristocracy, see G. G. Johnson, *A Social History of the Sea Islands* (1930); T. N. Page, *Social Life in Old Virginia* (1897); R. Q. Mallard, *Plantation Life before Emancipation* (1892); Susan D. Smedes, *Memorials of a Southern Planter* (3rd ed., 1888); F. A. Kemble, *Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation in 1838-1839* (1863); and V. V. Clayton, *White and Black Under the Old Régime* (1899). All, with the exception of the Johnson volume, are highly romanticized. A valuable corrective is F. P. Gaines, *The Southern Plantation: A Study in the Development and the Accuracy of a Tradition* (1924). Useful in the same direction are the dispassionate studies by R. S. Cotterill, *The Old South* (1936); F. B. Simkins, *The South, Old and New* (1947); Clement Eaton, *A History of the Old South* (1949), a well-rounded account; M. C. Boyd, *Alabama in the Fifties* (1931); R. B. Vance, *Human Geography of the South* (1932); and G. G. Johnson, *Ante-Bellum North Carolina: A Social History* (1937). The plain people are best depicted in a recent study by Frank Owsley, *Plain Folk of the Old South* (1949), which attempts to shift the emphasis from planter to yeomanry. Also consult Shields McIlwaine, *The Southern Poor White from Lubberland to Tobacco Road* (1939) and *Memphis Down in Dixie* (1948), and Paul Buck, "The Poor White in the Antebellum South," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXXI (1925) pp. 41-54. First hand accounts are A. B. Longstreet, *Georgia Scenes* (1897); F. L. Olmsted, *Journeys and Explorations in the Cotton Kingdom*, cited above; J. H. Ingraham, *The South-West. By a Yankee* (1835); and J. G. Baldwin, *The Flush Times of Alabama and Mississippi* (1853). These biographies will also prove helpful: Broadus Mitchell, *Frederick Law Olmsted, A Critic of the Old South* (1924); D. D. Wallace, *The Life of Henry Laurens* (1915); J. D. Wade, *Augustus B. Longstreet* (1924); J. H. Franklin, *The Free Negro in North Carolina, 1790-1860*, (1943). See also P. H. Buck, "The Poor Whites of the Antebellum South," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXXI; John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (1937); C. S. Davis, *The Cotton Kingdom in Alabama* (1939).

The Great Staples. On this subject Gray is excellent. See also M. B. Hammond, *The Cotton Industry: An Essay in American Economic History* (1897); Meyer Jacobstein, *The Tobacco Industry in the United States* (1907); R. B. Vance, *Human Factors in Cotton Culture* (1929); J. C. Robert, *The Tobacco Kingdom: Plantation, Market, and Factory in Virginia and North Carolina, 1800-1860* (1938) and *The Story of Tobacco in America* (1949); J. H. Easterby, *The South Carolina Rice Factor as Revealed in the Papers of Robert F. W. Allston* (1945). *Agricultural Methods and Farm and Plantation.* Gray is unsurpassed on both of these subjects. Phillips is also most valuable.

The Slave System. On this topic the standard authority has long been U. B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery* (1918), *Life and Labour in the Old South*, cited earlier, and his two volumes of sources in the *Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (11 vols., 1910-11), edited by J. R. Commons. The writings of Phillips on slavery should be supplemented by J. H. Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom* (1947); Herbert Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts* (1943); and C. G. Woodson, *The Mind of the Negro as Reflected in Letters, 1800-1860* (1926). The new slaveholder's stake in slavery is examined by Harvey Wish in "The Revival of the African Slave Trade in the United States, 1856-1860," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 569-88 (1941). H. A. Trexler, *Slavery in Missouri, 1804-1865* (1914); I. E. McDougall, *Slavery in Kentucky, 1792-1865* (1918); R. B. Flinders, *Plantation Slavery in Georgia* (1933); C. S. Sydnor, *Slavery in Mississippi* (1933); R. H. Taylor, *Slave Holding in North Carolina: An Economic View* (1926); C. H. Wesley, *Negro Labor in the United States, 1850-1925* (1927); J. S. Bassett, *The Southern Plantation Overseer as Revealed in His Letters* (1925), letters to President Polk from his overseers; and Benjamin Brawley, *A Short History of the American Negro* (1919), by a Negro. The best accounts of the slave trade are W. E. B. DuBois, *The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1638-1870* (1896); Frederic Bancroft, *Slave-Trading in the Old South* (1931); and W. H. Stephenson, *Issac Franklin, Slave Trader and Planter of the Old South* (1938). The most interesting of the large number of contemporary ac-

counts are J. E. Cairnes. *The Slave Power* (2nd ed., 1862) by an English economist; J. S. Buckingham, *The Slave States of America* (1842), by an intelligent English traveler; H. R. Helper, *The Impending Crisis in the South: How to Meet It* (1857), a bitter, partisan arraignment of the Southern economic system by a middle-class Southerner.

CHAPTER XVII

The Rise of the Factory System

The standard authority on American manufacturing is V. S. Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States 1607-1928* (rev. ed., 3 vols., 1929). In conjunction with R. M. Tryon, *Household Manufactures in the United States, 1640-1860* (1917) it gives the essential information on the rise and early development of the factory system. An older work is J. L. Bishop, *History of American Manufactures from 1608 to 1860* (2 vols., 1866).

Origins of the Factory System. For the English background the best authorities are A. P. Usher, *An Introduction to the Industrial History of England* (1920), which stresses meaning of the Industrial Revolution; J. L. and B. Hammond, *The Rise of Modern Industry* (5th ed. revised, 1937), brilliant interpretation; and C. R. Fay, *Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day* (1928), a summary account. More detailed background treatments are G. W. Daniels, *The Early English Cotton Industry* (1920); George Unwin, Arthur Hulme, and George Taylor, *Samuel Oldknow and the Arkwrights* (1924); and T. S. Ashton, *Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution* (1924). Mill production in America is described in Malcolm Keir, *Manufacturing Industries in America* (1920); Broadus Mitchell, *The Rise of Cotton Mills in the South* (1921); C. F. Ware, *The Early New England Cotton Manufacture: A Study in Industrial Beginnings* (1931); Samuel Batchelder, *Introduction and Early Progress of the Cotton Manufacture in the United States* (1863); G. S. White, *Memoir of Samuel Slater* (1836), a diffuse biography. G. and D. Bathe, *Oliver Evans; A Chronicle of Early American Engineering* (1935); Jack Rohan, *Yankee Arms Maker; The Incredible Career of Samuel Colt* (1935); and Allan Nevins, *Abram S. Hewitt; with Some Account of Peter Cooper* (1935) are excellent accounts of three industrial pioneers. Vera Shlakman, *Economic History of a Factory Town: A Study of Chicopee, Massachusetts* (1935); C. M. Green, *Holyoke, Massachusetts: A Case History of the Industrial Revolution* (1939); and M. T. Parker, *Lowell: A Study in Industrial Development* (1940) shed light on industrial beginnings in the older mill zone. See also J. T. Lincoln, "The Beginnings of the Machine Age in New England," *New England Quarterly*, Vol. VI and the Hamilton and Gallatin Reports on Manufactures and the 1814 Teuch Coxie Digest on Manufactures. A. H. Cole (ed.), *Industrial and Commercial Correspondence of Alexander Hamilton* (1928) is useful. The most reliable survey, however, is Secretary Louis McLane's report of 1832-3, which appears in Executive Document No. 308 (22 Cong. 1 sess.).

The Growth of Industry. This can best be observed in Isaac Lippincott, *A History of Manufactures in the Ohio Valley to the Year 1860* (1914); Kathleen Bruce, *Virginia Iron Manufactures in the Slave Era* (1930), a splendid account; Broadus Mitchell, William Gregg, *Factory Master of the Old South* (1928); and Nathan Appleton, *Introduction of the Power Loom, and Origin of Lowell* (1858). The histories of particular industries furnish evidence of the spread of industrialism. Among these are B. E. Hazard, *The Organization of the Boot and Shoe Industry in Massachusetts Before 1875* (1921); R. A. Clemen, *The American Livestock and Meat Industry* (1923); C. B. Kuhlmann, *The Development of the Flourmilling Industry in the United States* (1929); W. G. Lathrop, *The Brass Industry in the United States* (1926); A. H. Cole, *The American Wool Manufacture* (2 vols., 1926);

L. H. Weeks, *A History of Paper Manufacturing in the United States, 1690-1916* (1916); and A. H. Cole, *The American Carpet Manufacture: A History and an Analysis* (1941). J. M. Swank, *History of the Manufacture of Iron in All Ages* (1892) leaves much to be desired.

The Factory Owner. See the works listed above for this chapter and in addition T. C. Cochran and William Miller, *The Age of Enterprise, A Social History of Industrial America* (1942); L. M. Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism* (1940); J. S. Davis, *Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations* (2 v., 1917); G. R. Wood, *A History of Lumbering in Maine, 1820-1861* (1935).

The Factory Worker. The outstanding work on labor for the whole period is volume I of J. R. Commons and others, *History of Labor in the United States* (4 vols., 1918-1935), but because it emphasizes philosophy and organization rather than conditions under which the employee worked it should be supplemented by Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker 1840-1860* (1924). Ware's description of the working conditions in New England cotton factories is at variance with that of a contemporary H. A. Miles, *Lowell, as it Was, and as It Is* (1845); J. R. Commons (ed.), *A Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, already cited, is valuable for source material and the introductions thereto. On women and child workers, see Edith Abbott, *Women in Industry*. T. S. Adams and H. L. Sumner, *Labor Problems* (1905); E. L. Otey, *The Beginnings of Child Labor Legislation in Certain States: A Comparative Study*, 61st Cong. 2nd Sess. Sen. Doc. No. 645, Vol. VI (1910); and J. B. Andrews and W. D. P. Bliss, *History of Women in Trade Unions*, 61st Cong. 2nd Sess. Sen. Doc. No. 645, Vol. X (1911).

The Beginnings of the Labor Movement, The Worker in Politics, and Trade Unionism. For these three topics, consult J. R. Commons, *History of Labour in the United States*, cited above, and the following: P. S. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the United States*, Vol. I (1947); G. S. Watkins, *An Introduction to the Study of the Labour Problem* (1922); M. R. Clark and S. F. Simon, *The Labor Movement in America* (1938); F. T. Carlton, *The History and Problems of Organized Labor* (rev. ed., 1920); and H. W. Farnham, *Chapters in the History of Social Legislation in the United States to 1860* (1938). There is also some material on these topics in two volumes of the History of American Life series: C. R. Fish, *The Rise of the Common Man, 1830-1850* (1937) and A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict, 1850-1865* (1934).

CHAPTER XVIII

Merchants and Shippers

The literature on the activities of merchants and shippers for the decades before the Civil War is voluminous. The best single work covering nearly the whole subject is E. R. Johnson and Others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States* (2 vols., 1915).

Roads and Turnpikes. A. B. Hulbert, *The Paths of Inland Commerce* (1920), in the Chronicles of America series, is an admirable brief summary. His *Historic Highways of America* (16 vols., 1902-05) devotes a volume to each of the more important turnpikes; that on the Cumberland road should be supplemented by T. B. Searight, *The Old Pike. A History of the National Road* (1894) and P. D. Jordan, *The National Road* (1948). Two regional studies of high quality are J. A. Durrenberger, *Turnpikes: A Study of the Toll Road Movement in the Middle Atlantic States and Maryland* (1931) and F. J. Wood, *The Turnpikes of New England* (1919). Albert Gallatin's Report on Roads and Canals in *American State Papers*, Miscellaneous Vol. I, pp. 724-921 is excellent for its portrayal of road conditions. Engineering problems in the construction of roads and bridges is discussed by N. C. Rockwood, *One Hundred Fifty Years of Road Building in America* (1914) and H. G. Tyrrell, *History of Bridge Engineering* (1911). There is also much material

on roads and turnpikes in the incomplete and badly organized work by B. H. Meyer, C. E. MacGill, and Others, *History of Transportation in the United States before 1860* (1917). U. B. Phillips, *A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to 1860* (1908) is an admirable regional study. Another is W. J. Lane, *From Indian Trail to Iron Horse* (1939), the story of the development of transportation in New Jersey from 1620 to 1860.

Inland Waterways. The presteamboat phase of river transportation is treated by L. D. Baldwin, *The Keelboat Age on Western Waters* (1941) and C. H. Ambler, *A History of Transportation in the Ohio Valley* (1932). See also C. E. Russell, *A-Rafting on the Mississippi* (1928); W. A. Blair, *A Raft Pilot's Log: A History of the Great Rafting Industry on the Upper Mississippi, 1840-1915* (1930). On the steamboat see Thomas A. Boyd, *Poor John Fitch, Inventor of the Steamboat* (1935), an excellent biography; F. H. Dixon, *A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System* (1909); F. E. Dayton, *Steamboat Days* (1925); D. L. Buckman, *Old Steamboat Days on the Hudson River* (1907), picturesque; Herbert and Edward Quick, *Mississippi Steamboatin'* (1926); W. J. Petersen, *Steamboating on the Upper Mississippi* (1937); G. B. Merrick, *Old Times on the Upper Mississippi* (1909), recollections of a steamboat pilot; S. L. Clemens (Mark Twain) *Life on the Mississippi* (1883), a classic source; and A. B. Hulbert, *Waterways of Western Expansion* (1903), in the Historic Highways series. A. B. Hulbert, "Western Ship-Building," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXI, pp. 720-33 and L. D. Baldwin, "Shipbuilding on the Western Waters 1793-1817," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* Vol. XX, pp. 29-44 are important for the subject treated.

Canal Construction. The best popularization is A. F. Harlow's, *Old Towpaths* (1926). Of a more serious nature is S. H. Mitchell, *Mitchell's Compendium of the Internal Improvements of the United States* (1835) and H. S. Tanner, *A Description of the Canals and Railroads of the United States* (1840). Several special studies have been made: W. F. Dunaway, *History of the James River and Kanawha Company* (1922); C. L. Jones, *Economic History of the Anthracite Tidewater Canals* (1908); G. W. Ward, *The Early Development of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Project* (1899); J. W. Putnam, *The Illinois and Michigan Canal* (1918); E. J. Benton, *The Wabash Trade Route in the Development of the Old Northwest* (1903), Christopher Roberts, *The Middlesex Canal, 1793-1860* (1938); W. S. Sanderlin, *The Great National Project: A History of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal* (1946); N. E. Whitford, *History of the Canal System of the State of New York* (2 vols., 1906); T. B. Klein, *The Canals of Pennsylvania and the System of Internal Improvements* (1901); and Julius Winden, *The Influence of the Erie Canal upon the Population along its Course* (1901).

Railroads. There is no general history of railroads for the period before 1860; most of the literature deals with the evolution of separate lines or technical problems of engineering. Consult Slason Thompson, *A Short History of American Railways* (1925); C. E. Carter, *When Railroads Were New* (1909); Milton Reizenstein, *The Economic History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1827-1853* (1897); F. W. Stevens, *The Beginnings of the New York Central Railroad* (1926); Edward Hungerford, *The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1827-1927* (2 vols., 1928); S. M. Derrick, *Centennial History of South Carolina Railroad* (1930); G. P. Baker, *The Formation of the New England Railroad Systems* (1937); H. W. Schotter, *The Growth and Development of the Pennsylvania Railroad* (1927); Paul Gates, *The Illinois Central Railroad and Its Colonization Work* (1934); and F. B. C. Bradlee, *The Eastern Railroad* (1917) and *The Boston and Maine Railroad* (1921). L. H. Hancy's *A Congressional History of Railways in the United States to 1850* (1908) is important for those interested in national aid and policy. T. W. Van Metre, *Early Opposition to the Steam Railroad* (1924) is an interesting compilation of contemporary comments from newspapers and pamphlets. A. D. Turnbull, *John Stevens, An American Record* (1928) is a biography of a pioneer inventor whose life was closely associated with transportation. Much information on the financing of these internal improvements may be found in E. L. Bogart, *Internal Improvement and State Debts in Ohio* (1924), L. H. Jenks, *The Migration of British Capital to 1875*

(1927), and R. C. McGrane, *Foreign Bondholders and American State Debts* (1935).

Domestic Trade. In addition to the works already listed in this chapter valuable material on domestic commerce is available in C. M. Depew (ed.), *One Hundred Years of American Commerce, 1795-1895* (2 vols., 1895); Allan Nevins, *History of the Bank of New York and Trust Company, 1784 to 1934* (1934); J. E. Hedges, *Commercial Banking and the Stock Market before 1863*; Richardson Wright, *Hawkers and Walkers in Early America* (1927), which describes phases of the peddler's career; W. H. Hillyer, *James Talcott, Merchant, and His Times* (1937); P. M. Bannan, *Arthur and Lewis Tappan* (1950); K. W. Porter, *John Jacob Astor, Business Man* (2 vols., 1931); R. T. Thompson, *Colonel James Nielson, A Business Man . . . in New Jersey, 1784-1862* (1940); H. B. Howe, *Jedediah Barber* (1939); and Sister Marietta Jennings, *A Pioneer Merchant of St. Louis, 1810-1820* (1939). W. B. Smith and A. H. Cole, *Fluctuations in American Business, 1790-1860* (1935) is invaluable. Domestic commerce during this period was aided by improved postal facilities. On postal developments, see A. F. Harlow, *Old Post Bags* (1928) and Clyde Kelly, *United States Postal Policy* (1931).

Overseas Commerce. Of the voluminous literature the following works are most satisfactory. J. H. Frederick, *The Development of American Commerce* (1932); N. S. Buck, *The Development of the Organization of Anglo-American Trade, 1800-1850* (1925), which throws light on a little understood subject; R. G. Albion, *The Rise of New York Port 1815-1860* (1939), an admirable study, and *Square Riggers on Schedule* (1938); S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860* (1921); F. L. Bennis, *The American Struggle for the British West India Carry Trade, 1815-1830* (1923); F. R. Rutter, *South American Trade of Baltimore* (1897); F. R. Dulles, *The Old China Trade* (1930); G. S. Kimball, *The East India Trade of Providence from 1787 to 1807* (1896); R. E. Peabody, *Merchant Venturers of Old Salem* (1912); J. R. Spears, *The Story of the American Merchant Marine* (1910), reliable; B. H. Holland, *The Fall of Protection, 1840-1850* (1913), which describes British Free Trade System; L. W. Maxwell, *Discriminating Duties and the American Merchant Marine* (1926), a judicious treatment; K. W. Porter, *The Jacksons and the Lees: Two Generations of Massachusetts Merchants, 1765-1844* (2 vols., 1937); Edward Gray, *William Gray of Salem, Merchant* (1914); J. B. McMaster, *Life and Times of Stephen Girard* (1918); W. R. Lawrence (ed.), *Extracts from the Diary and Correspondence of Amos Lawrence* (1855); C. E. Trow, *The Old Shipmasters of Salem* (1905); Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (1922), excellent; and C. L. Chandler, *Inter-American Acquaintances* (2nd ed., 1917), a detailed account of the beginnings of South American commerce. On whaling, see J. T. Jenkins, *A History of the Whale Fisheries* (1921). Ship subsidies are treated in R. Meeker, *History of Shipping Subsidies* (1905) and M. M. McKee, *The Ship Subsidy Question in United States Politics* (1922). For ship architecture, consult H. E. Chapelle, *The History of American Sailing Ships* (1935). The best authorities on the clipper ship era are A. H. Clark, *The Clipper Ship Era 1843-1869* (1910), excellent; F. C. Bowen, *A Century of Atlantic Travel, 1830-1930* (1930); C. C. Cutler, *The Story of the American Clipper; Greyhounds of the Sea* (1930); and G. L. Eskew, *The Pageant of the Packets* (1929), which is superficial.

CHAPTER XIX

Pattern of Protest and Reform

The following works already cited furnish a foundation for the topics discussed in this chapter. These are Volume II of V. L. Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought*, M. E. Curti, *Growth of American Thought*, C. R. Fish, *The Rise of the Common Man, 1830-1850*, A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict, 1850-1860*, and

Harvey Wish, *Society and Thought in Early America*. For a discussion of the forces responsible for the reform movement, see A. F. Tyler, *Freedom's Ferment* (1944). There are also many suggestive observations in Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, previously cited (the best edition is that brought out by Phillips Bradley in 1945) and in Charles Mackay, *Life and Liberty in America* (1859).

Humanitarianism. On prison reform, see L. N. Robinson, *Penology in the United States* (1921); O. F. Lewis, *The Development of American Prisons and Prison Customs, 1776-1845* (1922) and H. E. Barnes, *History of the Penal, Reformatory and Correctional Institutions of New Jersey* (1918), *The Repression of Crime: Studies in Historical Penology* (1926), and *The Evolution of Penology in Pennsylvania* (1927). The story of the efforts to improve the lot of the mentally ill is reviewed in Helen Marshall, *Dorothea Dix, Forgotten Samaritan* (1937) and Francis Tiffany, *Life of Dorothea Lynde Dix* (1890). On the blind consult W. H. Illingworth, *History of the Education of the Blind* (1910). For Temperance see J. C. Woolley and W. E. Johnson, *Temperance Progress in the Century* (1903); E. H. Cherrington, *The Evolution of Prohibition in the United States* (1920); Ernest Gordon, *The Maine Law* (1919); and most important of all, J. A. Krout, *The Origins of Prohibition* (1925), a thorough study. J. B. Gough, *Autobiography and Personal Recollections* (1869) tell the story of the experiences of a leading temperance worker. The morals of the period are discussed by Leo Markun, *Mrs. Grundy: A History of Four Centuries of Morals in Great Britain and the United States* (1930). The movement for the social, economic, and political emancipation of women is treated by E. C. Stanton, S. B. Anthony and Others in *History of Woman Suffrage* (6 vols., 1881-1922); E. C. Stanton, *Elizabeth Cady Stanton as Revealed in Her Letters, Diary and Reminiscences* (1922); A. S. Blackwell, *Lucy Stone, Pioneer of Woman's Rights* (1930); and C. H. Dall, *The College, the Market, and the Court* (1867). For the concern of women spokesmen about health and education during these years, see M. E. Harveson, *Catherine Esther Beecher, Pioneer Educator* (1932). Also in connection with women's rights, consult K. S. Anthony, *Margaret Fuller: A Psychological Biography* (1920); W. R. Waterman, *Frances Wright* (1924); M. R. Beard, *America Through Women's Eyes* (1933); H. A. Bruce, *Woman in the Making of America* (rev. ed., 1928) and Abbie Graham, *Ladies in Revolt* (1934).

Abolitionism. See A. D. Adams, *The Neglected Period of Anti-Slavery in America, 1808-1831* (1908). G. H. Barnes, *The Anti-Slavery Impulse, 1830-1844* (1933) and D. L. Dumond, *Antislavery Origins of the Civil War* (1939) will serve as a good introduction, even though both are hostile to William Lloyd Garrison and friendly to the West and Theodore Weld. More comprehensive is A. B. Hart, *Slavery and Abolition, 1831-1841* (1906), in the American Nation series. These volumes may be supplemented with profit by a contemporary, D. V. Bartlett, *Modern Agitators: or, Pen Portraits of Living American Reformers* (1855) and by the biographies and memoirs of the principal abolitionist leaders: G. H. Barnes and D. L. Dumond (eds.), *Letters of Theodore D. Weld, Angelina Grimké Weld and Sarah Grimké, 1822-1844* (2 vols., 1934); H. S. Commager, *Theodore Parker* (1936); C. H. Birney, *The Grimké Sisters* (1885); William Birney, *James G. Birney and His Times* (1890); W. P. and F. J. Garrison, *Wm. Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879: The Story of His Life Told by His Children* (4 vols., 1885-9), a detailed, highly laudatory account. J. J. Chapman's *William Lloyd Garrison* (1913) is so eulogistic as to be almost useless. Best for Garrison is Lindsay Swift's brief and judicious *William Lloyd Garrison* (1911). See also L. E. Richards (ed.), *Letters and Journals of Samuel Gridley Howe* (2 vols., 1906-09) and *Samuel Gridley Howe* (1935), both the work of his daughter; Whitman Bennett, *Whittier, Bard of Freedom* (1941); R. V. Harlow, *Gerrit Smith, Philanthropist and Reformer* (1939); Lorenzo Sears, *Wendell Phillips, Orator and Agitator* (1909). On fugitive slaves, see the standard authority W. H. Siebert, *The Underground Railroad from Slavery to Freedom* (1898) and his supplementary article in the *New England Quarterly*, Vol. IX. Important on this subject are L. D. Turner, *Anti-Slavery Sentiment in American Literature prior to 1865*, and Henrietta

Buckmaster, *Let My People Go* (1941). E. L. Fox, *The American Colonization Society, 1817-1840* (1919) is a thorough study. W. S. Jenkins, *Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South* (1935) is first-rate.

Utopianism. The best introductory accounts are J. H. Noyes, *History of American Socialisms* (1870); Charles Nordhoff, *The Communitistic Societies of the United States; from Personal Visit and Observation* (1875); W. A. Hinds *American Communities and Cooperative Commonwealths* (2nd ed., 1908) and the popular account by V. F. Calverton, *Where Angels Dared to Tread* (1941). For particular Utopias, see C. E. Sears, *Days of Delusion* (1924), which deals with Millerites, and her Bronson Alcott's *Fruitlands* (1915); Albert Shaw, *Icaria, A Chapter in the History of Communism* (1884); G. W. Noyes (ed.), *Religious Experiences of John Humphrey Noyes, Founder of the Oneida Community* (1923); P. B. Noyes, *My Father's House* (1937), memoir of Oneida community where the author was brought up; Lindsay Swift, *Brook Farm: Its Members, Scholars, and Visitors* (1900); B. M. H. Shambaugh, *Amana That Was and Amana That Is* (1932); A. E. McBea, *From Utopia to Florence: The Story of a Transcendentalist Community in Northampton, Massachusetts, 1830-1852* (1947). An important biography that supplements Lindsay Swift's account of Brook Farm is O. B. Frothingham, *George Ripley* (1882) about one of the leaders of Brook Farm movement and experiment. Related to the Utopian movement by the fact that it was an expression of discontent was the anti-rent struggle in New York State, which is dealt with competently in Henry Christman's *Tin Horns and Calico* (1945).

Transcendentalism. The best general survey is O. B. Frothingham, *Transcendentalism in New England: A History* (1876). For oriental influence see A. B. Christy, *The Orient in American Transcendentalism: A Study of Emerson, Thoreau and Alcott* (1932). Also consult H. C. Goddard, *Studies in New England Transcendentalism* (1908); W. H. Werkmeister, *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America* (1949); F. O. Matthiessen, *American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman* (1941); P. H. Boynton, *Literature and American Life* (1936); Van Wyck Brooks, *The Flowering of New England, 1815-1865* (1936); Volume II, pp. 379-434 of V. L. Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought*, previously cited; Bliss Perry (ed.), *The Heart of Emerson's Journals* (1926); Walter Leighton, *French Philosophers and New England Transcendentalism* (1908); and Volume I, pp. 326-48, of *Cambridge History of American Literature*, already cited. The following biographies will be most helpful: Odell Shepard, *Pedlar's Progress: The Life of Bronson Alcott* (1937); R. L. Rusk, *The Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (1949); J. W. Krutch, *Henry David Thoreau* (1948); Mason Wade, *Margaret Fuller* (1940); Newton Arvin, *Nathaniel Hawthorne* (1929).

Literature. The *Cambridge History of American Literature*, cited earlier, is a collection of essays by eminent authorities. It should be supplemented with V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, Vol. II, already cited; Bliss Perry, *The American Spirit in Literature* (1918), in the *Chronicles of America* series; and W. F. Taylor, *A History of American Letters* (1936). For the "Knickerbocker School" Van Wyck Brooks, *The World of Washington Irving* (1944) and S. T. Williams, *The Life of Washington Irving* (2 vols., 1935) are highly recommended. Raymond Weaver, *Herman Melville, Mystic and Mariner* (1921), Lewis Mumford, *Herman Melville* (1929) and Newton Arvin, *Herman Melville* (1950) are the authorities on this important personage. On New England Van Wyck Brooks, *The Flowering of New England, 1815-1865*, cited above, is somewhat impressionistic, and those who desire a sound appraisal of the literary effort of this part of the nation should consult the biographies and memoirs of such writers as John Bigelow, H. H. Brownell, W. C. Bryant, R. W. Emerson, T. W. Higginson, O. W. Holmes, H. W. Longfellow, J. R. Lowell, C. E. Norton, R. H. Stoddard, H. D. Thoreau, J. T. Trowbridge and J. G. Whittier. For brief sketches of these men and their literary contribution see the *Dictionary of American Biography*. On the South the following are important: W. M. Baskervill, *Southern Writers* (2 vols., 1897-1903); Carl Holliday, *A History of Southern Literature* (1906); and M. J. Moses, *The Literature of the South*, (1910). See also A. H. Quinn, *Edgar Allan Poe, A Critical Biography* (1941)

and W. P. Trent, *William Gilmore Simms* (1892). Of interest to all sections was the more popular literature. This has been partially inventoried in Jennette Tandy, *Crackerbox Philosophers in American Humor and Satire* (1925) and Edmund Pearson, *Dime Novels* (1929). Related to literature was publishing. On this subject the best works are J. C. Derby, *Fifty Years Among Authors, Books and Publishers* (1886); Lea Brothers and Company, *One Hundred and Fifty Years of Publishing* (rev. ed., 1925); J. H. Harper, *The House of Harper* (1912) and E. L. Bradsher, *Mathew Carey, Editor, Author and Publisher* (1912).

Journalism. F. L. Mott, *American Journalism, 1690-1940*, cited earlier, is the best account. Other surveys are J. M. Lee, *History of American Journalism* (rev. ed., 1923); G. H. Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States* (1920); and W. G. Bleyer, *Main Currents in the History of American Journalism* (1927). Much valuable information and considerable insight into the culture of that part of the nineteenth century before 1865 may be obtained from the history of outstanding newspapers. See especially Allan Nevins, *The Evening Post* (1922), F. M. O'Brien, *The Story of the Sun* (1918); C. J. Rosebault, *When Dana Was the Sun* (1931); Elmer Davis, *History of the New York Times* (1921); E. Francis Brown, *Raymond of the Times* (1951); Royal Cortissoz, *The New York Tribune* (1923); Horace Greeley, *Recollections of a Busy Life* (rev. ed., 1930); D. C. Seitz, *The James Gordon Bennetts, Father and Son* (1928); and Richard Hooker, *The Story of An Independent Newspaper* (1924), being the *Springfield Republican*. On magazines, consult Algernon Tassin, *The Magazine in America* (1916) and the more detailed and authoritative F. L. Mott, *A History of American Magazines*, already cited. The first two volumes treat the period covered by this book. Two special studies are M. A. deW. Howe, *The Atlantic Monthly and Its Makers* (1919) and B. B. Minor, *The Southern Literary Messenger, 1834-1864* (1905).

Religion. The references listed for the topic "Religion" in Chapter X apply here. In addition the following works will prove useful for a fuller understanding of this phase of American civilization: R. A. Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860* (1938); the story of the Nativist Movement; M. C. Brown, *Sunday School Movements in America* (1901); J. H. Denison, *Emotional Currents in American History* (1932); L. A. Weigle, *American Idealism* (1928), in the Pageant of America series; and Gustavus Myers, *The History of American Idealism* (1925).

CHAPTER XX

Continental Expansion

The best detailed histories covering this subject are Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union* (2 vols., 1947) and Chapter 12, Volume I of his *Emergence of Lincoln* (2 vols., 1950); Volume VI of Edward Channing's *History of the United States*, cited earlier; Volume VII of J. B. McMaster's *History of the People of the United States*, previously cited; and the first five volumes of J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to 1909* (new ed., 7 vols., 1928). Rhodes should be used with caution, for it is somewhat biased against the South and fails to give adequate weight to economic factors. For shorter accounts, consult A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict, 1850-1865* (1934); G. P. Garrison, *Westward Extension, 1841-1850* (1906), in the American Nation series; Cardinal Goodwin, *The Trans-Mississippi West (1803-1853)* (1922); F. L. Paxson *History of the American Frontier, 1763-1893* (1924); D. E. Clark, *The West in American History* (1937); R. E. Riegel, *America Moves West* (2nd ed., 1947) and L. R. Hafen, *Western America: The Exploration, Settlement, and Development of the Region beyond the Mississippi* (1941).

Manifest Destiny. On the philosophy and spirit of expansion, see Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny* (1935); Bernard De Voto, *The Year of Decision, 1846* (1943); E. D. Branch, *Westward: The Romance of the American Frontier* (1930);

J. F. Willard and C. B. Goodykoontz (eds.), *The Trans-Mississippi West: Papers Read at a Conference Held at the University of Colorado June 18-June 21, 1929* (1930); S. K. Humphrey, *Following the Prairie Frontier* (1931); J. C. Malin, *Indian Policy and Westward Expansion* (1921); and R. H. Gabriel, *The Lure of the Frontier* (1929), in the Pageant of America series.

Americans in Oregon. See W. J. Ghent, *The Road to Oregon* (1929), for the Oregon Trail; Francis Parkman, *The Oregon Trail* (1849), published originally as *The California and Oregon Trail*; George Simpson, *Fur Trade and Empire* (1931); L. W. Hastings, *The Emigrants' Guide to Oregon and California* (1845; reprinted 1932); J. C. Bell, *Opening a Highway to the Pacific, 1838-1846* (1921); Jesse Applegate, "A Day with the Cow Column in 1843," *Oregon Historical Society Quarterly*, Vol. IV, pp. 371-83 (1900), an illuminating account; Joseph Schafer, *A History of the Pacific Northwest* (2nd ed., 1918), first rate; K. W. Porter, *John Jacob Astor, Business Man* (2 vols., 1931); C. J. Brosnan, *Jason Lee, Prophet of the New Oregon* (1932); and the sources edited by A. B. Hulbert and others: *The Call of the Columbia* (1934), *The Oregon Crusade* (1935), and *Marcus Whitman, Crusader* (3 vols., 1936-41). J. S. Reeves, *American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk* (1907) gives details of treaty with England over Oregon.

Americans in Texas. W. C. Binkley, *The Expansionist Movement in Texas, 1836-1850* (1925); L. G. Bugbee, *The Texas Frontier, 1820-1825* (1900); E. C. Barker, *Mexico and Texas 1821-35* and his excellent *Life of Stephen F. Austin* (1925) give the story of early American activities in Texas. Important source material on the Southwest can be found in *The Southwest Historical series* (12 vols., 1931-43) edited by R. P. Bieffer and L. R. Hafen.

The Acquisition of Texas and Oregon. The standard authority on the acquisition of Texas by the United States is J. H. Smith, *The Annexation of Texas* (1911). It may be supplemented by Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union*, cited earlier; J. W. Schmitz, *Texas Statecraft, 1836-1845* (1941); G. P. Garrison, *Texas: A Contest of Civilizations* (1903); M. K. Chase, *Négociations de la République du Texas en Europe, 1837-1845* (1932), concerned with work of Texas agents in Europe; and E. D. Adams, *British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846* (1910), which is excellent. There is also valuable material in the following biographic studies; O. P. Chittwood, *John Tyler, Champion of the Old South* (1939), splendid on annexation; E. I. McCormac, *James K. Polk, A Political Biography* (1922); Marquis James, *The Raven* (1929), a vivid portrayal of Sam Houston; and M. M. Quaife (ed.), *The Diary of James K. Polk, During his Presidency, 1845 to 1849* (4 vols., 1910), most usable and available in an abbreviated edition prepared by Allan Nevins with a biographical sketch under the title *Polk: The Diary of a President, 1845-1849* (1929). For source material, consult E. C. Barker, *The Austin Papers*, *American Historical Association Reports*, 1919 and 1922, and his *Readings in Texas History* (1929). On the acquisition of Oregon, see the references above and F. V. Holman, *Dr. John McLoughlin, the Father of Oregon* (1907), good for activities of Hudson's Bay Company; C. H. Carey, *History of Oregon* (1922); H. C. Dale, *The Ashley-Smith Explorations, 1822-29* (1918); Frederick Merk, "Oregon Pioneers and the Boundary," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXIX, (1942), which is very important; and W. I. Marshall, *Acquisition of Oregon and the Long Suppressed Evidence about Marcus Whitman* (2 vols., 1911).

Americans in New Mexico and California. Of the growing volume of historical literature dealing with the far Southwest the following are most satisfactory: R. L. Duffus, *The Santa Fé Trail* (1930); H. H. Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888* (1888), in the *History of the Pacific States* series; R. E. Twitchell, *The Leading Facts of New Mexican History* (5 vols., 1911-17); Allan Nevins, *Frémont, Pathmaker of the West* (1928); Josiah Gregg, *Commerce of the Prairies: or, the Journal of a Santa Fé Trader* (1844), an excellent account; and R. P. Beiber and L. R. Hafen (eds.), *The Southwest Historical Series*, previously cited. The literature on California is voluminous. The best account of life on the California trails is A. B. Hulbert *Forty-Niners: The Chronicle of the California Trail* (1931). See also Charles Kelly, *Salt Desert Trails: A History of the Hastings Cut off and Other Early*

Trails which Crossed the Great Salt Desert . . . (1930); L. R. Hafen, *The Overland Mail 1849-1869* (1926); G. D. Bradley, *The Story of The Pony Express* (1913); G. D. Lyman, *John Marsh, Pioneer: The Life Story of a Trail Blazer on Six Frontiers* (1930); Katharine Coman, *Economic Beginnings of the Far West*, already cited; R. G. Cleland, *A History of California: The American Period* (1922) and *Pathfinders* (1929), on one advance into southern California; Stanley Vestal, *Mountain Men* (1937); Bernard De Voto, *Across the Wide Missouri* (1947); M. S. Sullivan, *Jedediah Smith* (1936); Walter Colton, *Three Years in California, 1846-1849* (1850), a contemporary account; H. E. Bolton, *The Spanish Borderlands* (1921), which pictures California before advent of forty-niners. The contribution of the Mormons to Western settlement and territorial acquisition is given adequate treatment in N. Anderson, *Desert Saints* (1942); W. J. McNiff, *Heaven on Earth* (1940); L. H. Creer, *Utah and the Nation* (1929); B. H. Roberts, *A Comprehensive History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints* (6 vols., 1930); W. A. Linn, *The Story of the Mormons* (1902), the most impartial treatment to date; C. H. Brough, *Irrigation in Utah* (1898); and G. Thomas, *The Development of Institutions under Irrigation* (1920). The last two are valuable for early social and economic development. The best accounts of Mormon leaders are M. R. Werner, *Brigham Young* (1925), inaccurate; M. R. Hunter, *Brigham Young, the Colonizer* (1940); J. H. Evans, *Charles Coulson Rich: Pioneer Builder of the West* (1936) and *Joseph Smith* (1933), both official biographies; F. M. Brodie, *No Man Knows My History* (1945); I. W. Riley, *The Founder of Mormonism* (1902), a hostile account; and Reva Stanley, *A Biography of Parley P. Pratt* (1937). F. A. Golder, *The March of the Mormon Battalion* (1928) is the study of the Mormon participation in the Mexican War. Lloyd Lewis, *Captain Sam Grant* (1950) covers Grant's service in the Mexican War.

The Mexican War. The best brief summaries are N. W. Stephenson, *Texas and the Mexican War* (1921), in the *Chronicles of America* series and A. H. Bill, *Rehearsal for Conflict: The War with Mexico, 1846-1848* (1947). J. H. Smith, *The War With Mexico* (2 vols., 1919) is more detailed. The most recent scholarly account is to be found in Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union* already cited. For relations with Mexico, see J. M. Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations* (1932); J. S. Reeves, *American Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk* (1907) and G. L. Rives, *The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848* (2 vols., 1913), which is comprehensive. Brainerd Dyer, *Zachary Taylor* (1946); S. B. McKinley *Old Rough and Ready, The Life and Times of Zachary Taylor* (1946); C. W. Elliott, *Winfield Scott, The Soldier and the Man* (1937); and Laura Long, *Fuss 'n' Feathers* (1944), a life of General Winfield T. Scott, discuss the leading military events of the Mexican War. The attitude of the Whigs toward the war is best discussed in G. R. Poage, *Henry Clay and the Whig Party* (1936) and A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South* (1913).

California Gold Rush. The subject is well cared for in W. J. Trimble, *The Mining Advance into the Inland Empire* (1914); C. H. Shinn, *The Story of the Mine* (1896); G. F. Willison, *Here They Dug the Gold* (1931); Julian Dana, *Sutter of California* (1936); S. E. White, *The Forty Niners* (1918), in the *Chronicles of America* series; H. H. Bancroft, *History of California* (7 vols., 1884-1890), which is uneven in quality; G. W. Read (ed.), *A Pioneer of 1850, George Willis Read, 1819-1880* (1927); F. A. Buck, *A Yankee Trader in the Gold Rush* (1830), which has excellent material presented in sparkling fashion; O. C. Coy, *Gold Days* (1929); E. S. Mead, *The Story of Gold* (1908); C. B. Glasscock, *The Big Bonanza: The Story of the Comstock Lode* (1931). The problem of maintaining order is treated in M. F. Williams, *History of the San Francisco Committee of Vigilance of 1851* (1921).

CHAPTER XXI

Politics of Sectionalism

The best comprehensive accounts of the decade preceding the Civil War are the general histories already cited: Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union* and *The Emergence of Lincoln*; Edward Channing, *History of the United States*, Vol. VI; J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, Vols. I-V; J. B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, Vols. VII, VIII; James Schouler, *History of the United States Under the Constitution*, Vol. V; and Volumes XVII and XIX of the American Nation series, namely T. C. Smith, *Parties and Slavery, 1850-1859* (1906) and F. E. Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War, 1859-1861* (1906). In connection with these one should read A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict, 1850-1865*, previously cited, which is excellent for its treatment of social and cultural forces. It is regrettable that the detailed work of Herman Von Holst, *The Constitutional and Political History of the United States* (new ed., 8 vols., 1899), so valuable for its extensive use of official documents, pamphlets and Northern periodicals, should be impaired by the author's abolitionist leanings, ignorance of Southern conditions, and his unsympathetic attitude toward many American ways and institutions.

The Economic Basis of Sectionalism. An outstanding volume on this topic is R. R. Russel, *Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 1840-1861* (1924). On a particular state, see the excellent study by J. G. Van Deusen, *Economic Bases of Disunion in South Carolina* (1928). Another helpful book by the same author is *The Ante-Bellum Southern Commercial Conventions* (1926), which may be supplemented with Herbert Wender, *Southern Commercial Conventions, 1837-1859* (1930). For a view of some Northern businessmen toward the South, see P. S. Foner, *Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict* (1941). Although they should be used with caution there is much material on this topic in three contemporary accounts: T. P. Kettell, *Southern Wealth and Northern Profits* (1860); H. Chase and C. W. Sanborn, *The North and the South* (1856); and C. J. Stille, *Northern Interests and Southern Independence* (1863). Other works that may be profitably consulted are: J. T. Carpenter, *The South as a Conscious Minority, 1789-1861* (1930); A. O. Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War* (1942); D. L. Dumond, *The Secession Movement, 1860-61* (1931); R. F. Nichols, *The Disruption of American Democracy* (1948); C. F. Dunbar, *Economic Essays* (1904); and J. G. Randall, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (1937).

The Slavery Issue. For an introductory survey, see Jesse Macy, *The Anti-Slavery Crusade* (1919). More comprehensive is A. B. Hart, *Slavery and Abolition, 1831-1841* (1906), in the American Nation series; D. L. Dumond, *Anti-Slavery Origins of the Civil War* (1939); and A. Y. Lloyd, *The Slavery Controversy, 1831-1860* (1939). Other works to be consulted are Avery Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War* (1942), which leans to the Southern side and is challenging but opinionated; Herbert Aptheker, *American Negro Slave Revolts* (1943); Frederic Bancroft, *Slave-Trading in the Old South* (1931); J. S. Bassett, *Slavery in the State of North Carolina* (1899) and his *North Carolina Methodism and Slavery* (1900); J. W. Coleman, Jr., *Slavery Times in Kentucky* (1940); John Hume, *The Abolitionists* (1905); W. S. Jenkins, *Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South* (1935); B. B. Munford, *Virginia's Attitude Toward Slavery and Secession* (1909); Charles Sydnor, *Slavery in Mississippi* (1933); S. B. Weeks, *Anti-Slavery Sentiment in the South* (1898); and C. B. Going, *David Wilmot, Free Soiler* (1924), an exhaustive study.

The Compromise of 1850. The best work dealing with the famous compromise and its failure is Allan Nevins *Ordeal of the Union* cited above. See also R. F. Nichols, *The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854* (1923) and his *Franklin Pierce, Young Hickory of the Granite Hills* (1931), an outstanding biography and the best account of the Pierce Administration; H. H. Simms, *A Decade of Sectional Controversy*,

1851-61 (1942), good on interpretation; R. H. Shryock, *Georgia and the Union in 1850* (1926); P. O. Ray, *The Repeal of the Missouri Compromise* (1909); T. C. Smith, *Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest* (1897) and *Parties and Slavery*, already cited. Biographies of some of the leading characters on the political stage in the midnineteenth century are also informing. See especially W. E. Dodd, *Statesmen of the Old South* (1911); P. G. Auchampaugh, *Robert Tyler, Southern Rights Champion, 1847-1866* (1934); C. M. Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun, Sectionalist, 1840-1850* (1951), Carl Schurz, *Henry Clay* (2 vols., 1899); G. G. Van Deusen, *Life of Henry Clay* (1937); G. F. Milton, *The Eve of Conflict: Stephen A. Douglas and the Needless War* (1934); C. M. Fuess, *Daniel Webster* (2 vols., 1930) and *Carl Schurz, Reformer* (1932); D. L. Dumond (ed.), *Letters of James G. Birney, 1831-1857* (2 vols., 1938); and Frederick Bancroft, *The Life of William H. Seward* (2 vols., 1900).

The Struggle for Territory, and Intensification of Sectional Conflict. In addition to the references for this chapter listed above, see E. W. Miller, *The Peopling of Kansas* (1906); F. H. Hodder, "The Genesis of the Kansas Nebraska Act," *Wisconsin Historical Society Proceedings*, Vol. LX, pp. 69-86 (1913) and "The Railroad Background of the Kansas Nebraska Act," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. XII, pp. 3-22 (1925); L. W. Spring, *Kansas: The Prelude to the War for the Union* (1885); Eli Thayer, *A History of the Kansas Crusade* (1889); H. A. Trexler, *Slavery in Missouri, 1804-1865* (1914); M. M. Quaife, *The Doctrine of Non-Intervention with Slavery in the Territories* (1910); R. V. Harlow, "The Rise and Fall of the Kansas Aid Movement," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XLI, pp. 1-25 (October, 1935); Charles Robinson, *The Kansas Conflict* (2nd ed., 1898), the work of a "Free State" leader; and R. V. Harlow, *Gerrit Smith, Philanthropist and Reformer* (1939). The Dred Scott decision is discussed in Charles Warren, *The Supreme Court in United States History* (2 vols., rev. ed., 1926); B. C. Steiner, *Life of Roger Brooke Taney* (1922); A. J. Beveridge, *Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1858* (2 vols., 1928); Vincent C. Hopkins, *Dred Scott's Case* (1951); and C. B. Swisher, *Roger B. Taney* (1935). See, too, F. H. Hodder, "Some Phases of the Dred Scott Case," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. XVI, pp. 3-22 (1929). On John Brown the best biography is O. G. Villard, *John Brown, 1800-1859: A Biography Fifty Years After* (1910). H. P. Wilson, *John Brown, Soldier of Fortune; A Critique* (1913) is distinctly hostile and contains "little which is creditable to Brown or worthy of emulation and much that is abhorrent." R. P. Warren, *John Brown: The Making of a Martyr* (1929) is a balanced account. J. C. Malin, *John Brown and the Legend of Fifty-Six* (1942) challenges many of the older views concerning "Bloody Kansas."

Political Realignment and the Election of 1860. The changes in party alignment are best described in the following: Jesse Macy, *Political Parties in the United States, 1846-1861* (1900); A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South* (1913); A. W. Crandall, *The Early History of the Republican Party, 1854-1856* (1930); W. S. Meyers, *The Republican Party* (1928); H. R. Mueller, *The Whig Party in Pennsylvania* (1922); R. F. Nichols, *The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854* (1923) and *The Disruption of American Democracy* (1948); R. J. Bartlett, *John C. Frémont and the Republican Party* (1930); William Baringer, *Lincoln's Rise to Power* (1937); F. Curtis, *The Republican Party* (2 vols., 1904); and T. C. Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest* (1897). On Know-Nothingism and the American party, see R. A. Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860* (1938); L. D. Seisco, *Political Nativism in New York State* (1901); and L. F. Schmeckebier, *History of the Know Nothing Party in Maryland* (1899). On the election of 1860 the outstanding source is R. H. Luthin, *The First Lincoln Campaign* (1944), a definitive work. See also Chapters 9 and 10, Volume II of Allan Nevins, *The Emergence of Lincoln*, previously cited; E. D. Fite, *The Presidential Campaign of 1860* (1911); and J. G. Randall's scholarly biography of Lincoln, the first two volumes of which appeared in 1945 under the titles *Lincoln the President* and *Springfield to Gettysburg*. Valuable, too, is Ollinger Crenshaw's *The Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860* (1945) and W. E. Baringer, *A House Dividing: Lincoln as President Elect* (1945).

The South Secedes. On the background of secession, consult F. M. Green, *Con-*

stitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860 (1930), C. R. Fish, *The American Civil War: An Interpretation* (1937); Avery Craven, *The Repressible Conflict, 1830-1861* (1939); E. M. Coulter (ed.), *The Course of the South to Secession, An Interpretation by Ulrich Bonnell Phillips* (1939); and H. K. Beale, "What Historians Have Said About the Causes of the Civil War" in Social Science Research Council, *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography* (1946). Special studies on secession are: C. P. Denman, *The Secession Movement in Alabama* (1933); Percy Rainwater, *Mississippi, Storm Center of Secession 1856-1861* (1938); J. C. Sitterson, *The Secession Movement in North Carolina* (1939); Avery Craven, *The Coming of the Civil War* (1942); P. G. Auchampaugh, *James Buchanan and His Cabinet on the Eve of Secession* (1926); D. L. Dumond, *The Secession Movement, 1860-1861* (1931); C. H. Ambler, *Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1851* (1910); and H. T. Shanks, *The Secession Movement in Virginia 1847-1861* (1934).

War. In addition to the bibliographic references already cited for this chapter, consult Allan Nevins *The Emergence of Lincoln*, Vol. II, chaps. 13-14. These chapters may be supplemented by A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict*, cited earlier. Mary Scrugham, *The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861* (1921); U. B. Phillips, *The Life of Robert Toombs* (1913); W. A. Linn, *Horace Greeley* (1903); W. H. Hale, *Horace Greeley, Voice of the People* (1950); Louis Pendleton, *Alexander H. Stephens* (1908); J. B. Ranck, *Albert Gallatin Brown* (1937); L. A. White, *Robert Barnwell Rhett: Father of Secession* (1931) and W. E. Dodd, *Jefferson Davis* (1907).

CHAPTER XXII

The Civil War

The most adequate single volume treatment of the Civil War will be found in Volume VI of Edward Channing's *History of the United States* and J. G. Randall, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, both of which have been cited earlier. Randall's bibliography is the best general guide to the literature of the period 1850-77. A third volume that should also be consulted is G. F. Milton's well-balanced and succinct account, *Conflict: The American Civil War* (1941). Other brief works worth examining are J. K. Hosmer's, *The Appeal to Arms, 1861-1863* (1907) and *Outcome of the Civil War, 1863-1865* (1907), both in the American Nation series; W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmunds, *A History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861-65* (1905); and A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict, 1850-1865* (1934). For more detailed accounts, see these works already cited: J. F. Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, Vols. III and IV, which are condensed into one volume, *History of the Civil War, 1861-1865* (1917); James Schouler, *History of the United States of America*, Vol. VI; and J. B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States During Lincoln's Administration* (1927).

The Armed Forces. See especially the comprehensive study by F. A. Shannon, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865* (2 vols., 1928). See F. L. Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States* (1915); A. H. Meneely, *The War Department, 1861* (1928); C. H. Wesley, *The Collapse of the Confederacy* (1937), which attributes collapse to breakdown of morale; N. W. Stephenson, "The Question of Arming the Slaves," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 295-308 (1913); E. N. Wright, *Conscientious Objectors in the Civil War* (1931); J. G. Randall, *The Confiscation of Property During the Civil War* (1913); W. B. Hesseltine, *Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology* (1930); E. M. Lonn, *Desertion during the Civil War* (1928); T. L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-1865* (2nd ed., 1901); A. B. Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy* (1924); J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865* (1901), which has good bibliogra-

phy. E. A. Pratt, *The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest* (1915), good on influence of railroads; F. B. C. Bradlee, *Blockade Running During the Civil War and the Effect of Land and Water Transportation on the Confederacy* (1925). The literature on army life is enormous. The following are a good sampling: B. I. Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb, The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (1943); John Gibbon, *Personal Recollections of the Civil War* (1928); O. L. Jackson, *The Colonel's Diary: Journals Kept Before and During the Civil War* (1922); E. P. McKinney, *Life in Tent and Field 1861-1865* (1922); Leander Stillwell, *The Story of a Common Soldier of Army Life in the Civil War, 1861-1865* (2nd ed., 1920); G. E. Pickett, *Soldier of the South; War Letters to His Wife*, edited by A. C. Inman (1928); A. N. Lytle, *Bedford Forest and His Critter Company* (1931); and U. R. Brooks (ed.), *Stories of the Confederacy* (1912); F. A. Shannon, "The Life of the Common Soldier in the Union Army, 1861-1865," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. III, pp. 465-82 (1927). For medical aid the best works have long been published. See J. K. Barnes (ed.), *The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion* (6 vols. 1870-88). See also C. J. Stillé, *A History of the United States Sanitary Commission* (1866); W. E. Barton, *The Life of Clara Barton, Founder of the American Red Cross* (1922) and L. P. Brockett and M. C. Vaughan, *Woman's Work in the Civil War* (1867).

From Bull Run to Appomatox. For the military history of the Civil War the best brief account is to be found in Randall's *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, cited earlier. It may be supplemented by K. P. Williams *Lincoln Finds a General* (2 vols., 1949), severe on McClellan; C. E. McCartney, *Lincoln and His Generals* (1925); T. A. Dodge, *A Bird's Eye View of our Civil War* (rev. ed., 1897); J. C. Ropes and W. R. Livernore, *The Story of the Civil War* (4 vols., 1894-1913), good for battles and campaigns; C. C. Anderson, *Fighting by Southern Federals* (1912); S. L. French, *The Army of the Potomac from 1861 to 1863* (1906); R. M. Johnston, *Bull Run; Its Strategy and Tactics* (1913); Alexander Kearsay, *A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1861-1862* (1930); R. S. Henry, *The Story of the Confederacy* (1931); John Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville, A Strategic and Tactical Study* (1910); J. D. Cox, *The March to the Sea: Franklin and Nashville* (1882); N. M. Curtiss, *From Bull Run to Chancellorsville* (1906); A. A. Humphreys, *The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65* (1883); T. R. Hay, *Hood's Tennessee Campaign* (1929); Stanley Horn, *The Army of Tennessee* (1941); Morris Schaff, *The Sunset of the Confederacy* (1912); C. R. Ballard, *The Military Genius of Abraham Lincoln: An Essay* (1926); D. S. Freeman, *Lee's Dispatches: Unpublished Letters of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. A. to Jefferson Davis and the War Department of the Confederate States of America, 1862-1865* (1915). For the conflict in the border states, see E. C. Smith, *The Borderland in the Civil War* (1927); J. C. McGregor, *The Disruption of Virginia* (1922); E. M. Coulter, *The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky* (1926); Wiley Britton, *The Civil War on the Border . . .* (2 vols., 1890-9); E. M. Violette, *A History of Missouri* (1918). Memoirs and biographies of the military leaders are indispensable. See especially Hamilton Basso, *Beauregard, the Great Creole* (1933); D. C. Seitz, *Braxton Bragg, General of the Confederacy* (1924); J. F. C. Fuller, *Grant and Lee* (1933), a comparative appraisal by a British soldier; A. L. Conger, *The Rise of U. S. Grant* (1931); Adam Badeau, *Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, from April, 1861 to April, 1865* (3 vols., 1868-81) old but valuable; Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant* (1897); U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (2 vols., 1885-6); A. P. James, "General Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Storm Center of the Confederate Army," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. XIV, pp. 342-59 (1927); R. O'Connor, *Hood, Cavalier General* (1949); D. S. Freeman, *R. E. Lee, A Biography* (4 vols., 1934-5) and *Lee's Lieutenants* (3 vols., 1942-4), both definitive; Sir Frederick Maurice, *Robert E. Lee, the Soldier* (1925); H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad, *James Longstreet, Lee's War Horse* (1936); G. B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story . . .* (1886); W. S. Myers, *A Study in Personality, General George Brinton McClellan* (1934); Gamaliel Bradford, *Union Portraits* (1916) and *Confederate Portraits* (1914); George Meade, *The Life and Letters of*

General George Gordon Meade, *Major General United States Army* (2 vols., 1913), written by Meade's son and edited by George Gordon Meade, his grandson; G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* (2 vols., new ed., 1936); interesting, but not always reliable; H. K. Douglas, *I Rode with Stonewall* (1940); E. A. Moore, *The Story of a Cannoneer Under Jackson* (1910); W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman* (2 vols., 1875); B. H. Liddell Hart, *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American* (1929); R. S. Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters; Correspondence between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (1894); E. S. Miers, *The General Who Marched to Hell* (1951); P. H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs* (1888); J. W. Thomason, Jr., *Jeb Stuart* (1930); J. A. Wyeth, *Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest* (1899); Freeman Cleaves, *Rock of Chickamauga* (1948); A. M. Stickles, *Simon Bolivar Buckner* (1940); E. P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative* (1907). On naval operations, consult A. T. Mahan, *The Gulf and Inland Waters* (1883); J. R. Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers* (1883); D. D. Porter, *The Naval History of the Civil War* (1886); J. P. Baxter, III, *Introduction of the Ironclad Warships* (1933); C. B. Boynton, *The History of the Navy During the Rebellion* (2 vols., 1867-8); J. T. Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy* (1887); F. B. C. Bradlee, *Blockade Running During the Civil War and the Effects of Land and Water Transportation on the Confederacy* (1925); W. M. Robinson, Jr., *The Confederate Privateers* (1928); J. D. Hill, *Sea Dogs of the Sixties* (1935); Meriwether Colyer, *Raphael Semmes* (1913); A. T. Mahan, *Admiral Farragut* (1892); H. W. Briggs, *The Doctrine of the Continuous Voyage* (1926). No bibliography of the military history of the Civil War should omit reference to the Commander in chiefs of the Union and Confederate armies. On Lincoln, see J. G. Randall, *Lincoln, the President* (2 vols., 1945), excellent; Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln: The War Years* (4 vols., 1939); N. W. Stephenson, *Lincoln* (1922); J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History* (10 vols., 1890); B. J. Hendrick, *Lincoln's War Cabinet* (1946) and W. E. Barton, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln* (2 vols., 1925). The best works on Jefferson Davis are W. E. Dodd, *Jefferson Davis* (1907); H. J. Eckenrode, *Jefferson Davis, President of the South* (1923); Allen Tate, *Jefferson Davis: His Rise and Fall, A Biographical Narrative* (1929); and R. M. McElroy, *Jefferson Davis* (1937). V. H. Davis, *Jefferson Davis, Ex-President of the Confederate States of America; A Memoir by His Wife* (2 vols., 1890) has much valuable material but is badly organized. There is also much helpful material on Davis in F. L. Owsley, *State Rights in the Confederacy* (1925) and R. F. Nichols "United States vs. Jefferson Davis," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXXI, pp. 266-84 (1926).

Financing War. For the North the best information is in D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* (12th ed., 1936); Horace White, *Money and Banking Illustrated by American History* (5th ed., 1914); W. C. Mitchell, *A History of the Greenbacks with Special Reference to the Economic Consequences of their Issue: 1862-65* (1903); D. C. Barrett, *The Greenbacks and the Resumption of Specie Payments, 1862-1879* (1931); A. M. Davis, *The Origin of the National Banking System* (1910). Also consult the following biographical studies: E. P. Oberholtzer, *Jay Cooke, Financier of the Civil War* (2 vols., 1907); Henrietta Larson, *Jay Cooke, Private Banker* (1936); and J. W. Shuckers, *Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase* (1874). On Southern financing of the war the best works are J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865. A Financial and Industrial History* (1901); J. L. Sellers, "An Interpretation of Civil War Finance," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXX, pp. 282-297 (January, 1925); and H. D. Capers, *The Life and Times of C. G. Memminger* (1893).

Europe and the Confederacy. The most important work on this subject is E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (2 vols., 1925). It should be supplemented by J. P. Baxter, III, "The British Government and Neutral Rights," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 9-29 (1928) and F. L. Owsley's chapter in *Essays in Honor of William E. Dodd* (1935), edited by Avery Craven. See also H. D. Jordan and E. J. Pratt, *Europe and the American Civil War* (1931);

J. M. Callahan, *The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy* (1901); W. R. West, *Contemporary French Opinion on the American Civil War* (1924); F. L. Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy; Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America* (1931); M. L. Bonham, Jr., *The British Consuls in the Confederacy* (1911); T. L. Harris, *The Trent Affair* (1896); Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867* (1932); B. P. Thomas, *Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867* (1930); J. D. Bulloch, *The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe* (2 vols., 1884); John Bigelow, *France and the Confederate Navy, 1862-1868* (1888). On Maximilian in Mexico, consult B. Harding, *The Phantom Crown* (1934); L. M. Case, *French Opinion on the United States and Mexico, 1860-1867* (1936); Count E. C. Corti, *Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico* (2 vols., 1928) and P. F. Martin, *Maximilian in Mexico* (1914). The following biographical studies are indispensable: Margaret Clapp, *Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow* (1947); L. M. Sears, *John Slidell* (1925); Beckles Willson, *John Slidell and the Confederates in Paris (1862-65)* (1932) and Frederic Bancroft, *The Life of William H. Seward*, already cited.

Social and Economic Conditions in the North. Chapter 27 of J. G. Randall's, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* is excellent. It may be supplemented by A. C. Cole, *The Irrepressible Conflict*, chap. 14; E. D. Fite, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War* (1910); J. G. Randall, *Constitutional Problems under Lincoln* (1926); Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., *Freedom of Speech* (1920); Noah Brooks, *Washington in Lincoln's Time* (1895); E. J. Benton, "The Movement for Peace Without Victory During the Civil War," *Western Reserve Historical Society Collections* (1918), the story of the Copperheads; E. S. Dana and others, *A Century of Science in America, 1818-1918* (1918); G. F. Milton, *Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column* (1942); Wood Gray, *The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads* (1942); E. C. Kirkland, *The Peace Makers of 1864* (1927), excellent; and A. O. Craven, *Democracy in American Life* (1941).

Social and Economic Conditions in the South. In addition to J. G. Randall's *The Civil War and Reconstruction* and A. C. Cole's *The Irrepressible Conflict*, consult J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America*, cited earlier; N. W. Stephenson, *The Day of Confederacy: A Chronicle of the Embattled South* (1919), in the *Chronicles of America* series; and R. S. Henry, *The Story of the Confederacy* (1931). From the pens of women contemporaries come revealing pictures. Typical of these are Eliza F. Andrews, *The War Time Journal of a Georgia Girl, 1864-1865* (1908); Myrta L. Avery, *A Virginia Girl in the Civil War, 1861-1865* (1903); Mary B. Chesnut, *A Diary from Dixie* (1905); and J. L. Underwood, *The Women of the Confederacy* (1906). Foreign visitors to the South during the war also give information about conditions, though their accounts are not always to be trusted. Of the more reliable see W. H. Russell, *My Diary North and South* (1863) by the best war correspondent of the *London Times*; C. C. Hopley, *Life in the South: from the Commencement of the War* (2 vols., 1863); A. J. Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States: April-June, 1863* (1864); and T. D. Ozanne, *The South as It Is* (1863). There is also much useful material in G. L. Tatum, *Disloyalty in the Confederacy* (1934); B. I. Wiley, *The Plain People of the Confederacy* (1943), excellent, and *Southern Negroes, 1861-1865* (1938); M. P. Andrews, *The Women of the South in War Times* (1920); F. B. Simkins and J. W. Patton, *Women of the Confederacy* (1936). Also consult R. W. Patrick, *Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet* (1944); L. B. Hill, *Joseph E. Brown* (1939), Civil War Governor of Georgia; Robert Meade, *Judah P. Benjamin* (1943), member of the Davis cabinet; W. M. Robinson, *Justice in Grey* (1941); C. W. Ramsdell, "The Confederate Government and the Railroads," *American Historical Review*, Vol. XXII, pp. 794-810 (1917) and "The Control of Manufacturing by the Confederate Government," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. VIII, pp. 235. Also see J. B. Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital* (2 vols., 1866).

Government by Coalition. The several works already listed for this chapter dealing primarily with political parties and political changes cover this topic. In addition

there is exceedingly valuable material in the *Diary of Gideon Welles* (3 vols., 1911) edited by J. T. Morse, Jr.; J. S. Wise, *The End of an Era* (1899); Edward Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1916* (2 vols., 1916); Stewart Mitchell, *Horatio Seymour of New York* (1938); W. E. Binkley, *The President and Congress* (1947); and B. A. Williams, *House Divided* (1947).

INDEX

- Aberdeen, Lord, 391, 541
- Abolitionism, 499-503; societies, 500;
W. L. Garrison and, 501; in North-
west, 502; South and, 502; enters pol-
itics, 565-6; and Free Soil party, 570
- Adams, Abigail (Mrs. John), 172, 494
- Adams, Isaac, steam press, 521
- Adams, John, 109, 115, 134, 148, 150,
151, 156, 163, 171, 181, 251; in Hol-
land, 166; minister to Britain, 199;
Vice-President, 226; President, 244-8;
personality, 245; prevents war with
France, 248-9
- Adams, John Quincy, 267, 278, 342,
343, 345, 375, 477, 566, 567; at St.
Petersburg, 313; treaty with Indians,
321; protest to Russian minister, 343-
4; President, 361-2; background and
personality, 362; program and ac-
complishments, 363
- Adams, Samuel, 133, 138-139, 143, 145,
148, 173, 207; circular letter to colo-
nies, 132; committees of correspond-
ence, 139, 143; summons to mass
meeting, 140; attempt to arrest, 147
- Adet, Pierre A., 244-5
- Adventists, divisions of, 523, 524
- Agassiz, Louis, 499
- Agrarians, 457
- Agriculture: colonial, 48-54; tools, ma-
chinery, 52-3, 396-401, 446; meth-
ods, management, 53-4; and Revolution,
173-4; during Confederation,
199; in 1800, 254
Northern: 393-413; 1810-40, 394;
societies, 394-5; papers and maga-
zines, 395-6; land values, 400; spe-
cialization and commercialization,
400-01, 405-10; expansion and reor-
ganization, 401-05; labor problem,
402; farm women, 404; Western *vs.*
Eastern, 405-10; lack of leadership,
money, credit, 410-13; marketing
facilities, 411-13
Southern: 414-38, 560; farm land,
414-17; social classes, 417; tobacco
culture, 422-3; cane sugar, 423-4;
rice culture, 423-4; cotton, 424-6;
marketing problems, 426; methods,
426-8; organizations, 427; magazines,
- Agriculture (*continued*)
427-8; farms, 428-9; plantations,
429-31; slave system, 431-8; land
grant colleges, 639
- Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 59
- Alabama, 633
- Alamance, battle of, 46
- Alamo, battle of, 538
- Albany: Congress, 118-19; Plan, 118-
19, 121; Regency, 363, 385
- Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), 249,
251, 284; victims of, 250
- Alien Enemies Act, 249
- Alienation, practice of, 45
- Allen, A. B. and R. L., 395
- Allen, Chief Justice, 47
- Allen, Ethan, 164; Green Mountain
Boys, 192; convert to Deism, 258
- Ambrister, Robert, 342
- Amendments, Constitutional, 213; Bill
of Rights, 228
- American, defined, 112
- American Fur Company, 327-9
- American System, 362, 385, 389, 592
- American Temperance Union, 492
- Ames, Fisher, 242, 250, 368
- Amherst, General, 125-6
- Amish, 523
- Anabaptists, 29
- Anderson, Major Robert, 602, 604
- André, Major John, 167
- Andros, Sir Edmunds, 99, 107
- Anglican Church, 29, 77, 78, 79, 178
- Annapolis Convention, 206
- Annapolis Naval Academy, 272
- Anne, Queen (England), 35
- Antietam, battle of, 618
- Anti-Federalists, 215, 216, 218, 235; on
Constitution, 223
- Anti-Masonic party, 368 *n.*, 382
- Anti-slavery crusade: colonization so-
cieties, 500-01; petitions, 566. *See*
also Abolitionism
- Appleton, Nathan, 602
- Appomattox Courthouse, battle of, 623
- Arbuthnot, Alexander, 342
- Architecture, 71-3, 92-3; 269-70
- Arkansas, admitted to Union, 330-31
- Arnold, Benedict, 165; expedition to
Quebec, 164; treason of, 167

- Aroostook War, 391
 Arthur, Timothy Shay, 493
 Articles of Confederation, 188-90; approval and ratification, 190, 192; suggestion to revise, 206
 Artists, 93, 268-9
 Arts, 92-3, 268-71
 Asbury, Francis, 179
 Asbury, John, 260
 Ashburton, Lord, 390
 Association, the, 145, 146, 147, 157
 Associationists, 506
 Astor, John Jacob, 326-9
 Astoria, founding of, 327
 Atlanta, burning of, 622
 Austin, Stephen F., 415, 537

 Bache, Benjamin Franklin, 250, 266
 Bacon, Nathaniel, 98
 Bainbridge, William, 307
 Balboa, Vasco Nuñez de, 11
 Baldwin, Joseph G., 518
 Baltimore, Lord, 44
 Baltimore: British raid on, 310; trade center, 465
 Bancroft, George, 499, 515
 Banister, John, 91
 Banking, rise of, 7
 Bank of North America: loans for Revolution, 161; founding of, 161, 230, 233; opposition to, 232-3
 Bank of the United States, 352-3; and Western settlers, 324; opposition to, 353-4; Jackson and, 379-83; failure of, 383
 Banks: colonial land, 108-09; people's, 354
 Baptist Church, 81, 259, 338; divisions of, 523
 Barbary pirates, 199, 246, 285, 486
 Barlow, Joel, 196, 265
 Barnard, F. A. P. 561-2
 Barnard, Henry, 498
 "Barnburners," 570, 576
 Barry, William T., 371
 Barton, Clara, 614
 Bartram, John, 91
 Batchelder, Samuel, 442
 Bates, General Edward, 643
 Baton Rouge, capture of, 620
 Bayonne Decree, Napoleon's, 301-02
 Beaumarchais, Pierre, 166
 Beauregard, General P. G. T., 604, 617
 Becker, Carl, 137
 Becknell, William, 543
 Bedfordites, 124
 Beecher, Catharine, 498
 Beecher, Henry Ward, 580
 Beecher, Lyman, 526

 Bennett, James Gordon, 519, 520
 Benton, Thomas Hart, 323, 324, 370, 383, 534, 540, 549
 Bering, Vitus, 532
 Berkeley, Lord John, 26, 27
 Berkeley, Sir William, 97-8, 101
 Berlin Decree, Napoleon's, 296
 Berrien, John M., 371, 373
 Beveridge, Albert J., 587
 Bible Society of the Confederate States, 615
 Biddle, Clement, 127
 Biddle, Nicholas, 380, 381, 382, 383
 Bill of Rights, 228
 Birney, James G., 500, 501, 566
 Black Hawk War, 321, 332-33
 Blackwell, Antoinette Louisa Brown, 495
 Blackwell, Dr. Elizabeth, 495, 614
 Blackwell, Henry Brown, 495
 Blackwell, Dr. Samuel C., 495
 Blair, Montgomery, 643
 Blennerhasset, Herman, 294
 Blockade, Civil War, 616, 629-30, 640
 Blodget, Samuel, 270
 Bloomsbury Gang, 124
 Bolívar, Simón, 363
 Bonaparte, Napoleon. *See* Napoleon I
 Bonus Bill, 355
 Boone, Daniel, 193
 Booth, John Wilkes, 648
 Boston: colonial, 74; *Liberty* episode, 133; Massacre, 134; Tea Party, 141; Port Bill, 142; trade with East, 486; literary center, 507, 513
 Broune, George, 501
 Bowdoin, James, 203, 204, 206
 Brackenridge, Hugh H., 263
 Bradford, William, 25
 Bragg, General Braxton, 621
 Brahmins, 513
 Branch, John, 371, 373
 Brandywine, battle of, 165
 Breckinridge, John C., 592, 594
 Brewster, William, 90
 Brient, Lemuel, 258
 Bridger, Jim, 329
 Brisbane, Albert, 503, 505
 British Empire, 21. *See also* England
 Brook Farm, 506
 Brooklyn Heights, battle of, 163
 Brooks, Preston, 581
 Brown, Charles Brockden, 263-4, 267
 Brown, David, 250
 Brown, John, 581; raid on Harper's Ferry, 589-90
 Brown, John (of Providence), 138
 Brown, Joseph E., 608
 Brown, Moses, 441

- Bryant, William Cullen, 515, 522
 Buccaneers, English, 12-13
 Buchanan, James, 578, 582; President, 582; expansionist plans, 585; and secession, 602-03
 Buckminster, William, 407
 Buel, Jesse, 395, 410
 Buena Vista, battle of, 548
 Bull Run: first battle, 617; second battle, 618
 Bunker Hill, battle of, 158
 Burgoyne, General John, 164, 165
 Burke, Edmund, 124, 141, 146, 147, 170
 Burnside, General Ambrose, 615, 618-19
 Burr, Aaron, 244, 290; Vice-President, 252; duel with Hamilton, 290 *n.*; and Louisiana, 294; tried for treason, 294
 Butler, Andrew P., 581

 Cabet, Étienne, 503, 504
 Cabinets, Presidents and, 674-9
 Cabot, John, 11
 Cabral, Pedro Alvarez, 11
 Cadore, Duc de, 302
 Caholia, capture of, 168
 Calhoun, John C., 342, 360, 370, 375; and Indian settlements, 321; favors bank of U. S., 352; views on tariff, 353, 358; quoted, 354-5; Bonus Bill, 355; Vice-President, 359, 370; *Exposition and Protest*, 365, 372; and Eaton tempest, 371-2, 373; reply to Jackson's toast, 373; resignation as Vice-President, 373; and nullification ordinance, 376; and Compromise Tariff of 1833, 377; and Texas, 539, 540; and Compromise of 1850, 571-2; interpretation of Constitution, 599
 Calhoun, Mrs. John C., 371-2
 California: gold rush, 402; 551-8; Americans in, 543, 544-6; annexation of, 549; ceded to U. S., 551; routes to, 552-6; immigrants, 556-7; population (1850), 557; inflation in, 557; admission to Union, 557-8
 Callender, James Thompson, 235, 250, 266
 Calvert, Sir George, 26
 Calvinism, 29, 78, 79; Dutch, 81, 82; in 1800, 258, 259; and transcendentalism, 508. *See also* Puritanism
 Cambridge, literary center, 513
 Camden, battle of, 168
 Cameron, Simon, 592-3, 643
 Campbellites, 523
 Canada: English acquisition of, 120, 122, 123; during Revolution, 164; Canada (*continued*)
 Westerners' desire for, 303, 304; War of 1812, 307-10; *Caroline* affair, 390-1
 Canadian-American border, 341
 Canals, 472-7
 Canning, Robert, 345
 Capitalism, rise of, 7-11
 Carey, Matthew, 266-7
 Carolinas: settlement of, 26, 27; land system, 42; land speculation, 47
Caroline affair, 390-1
 Carpenters' Union, Boston, 455
 Carroll, Charles, 478
 Carroll, Father John, 179
 Carson, Kit, 329, 549
 Carter, Henry W., 483
 Carteret, Sir George, 26, 27
 Cartier, Jacques, 14
 Case, Jerome I., 446
 Cass, Lewis, 373, 569, 570
 Castine, Maine, 311
 Catholics, Roman, 29-33, 524; in Maryland, 81; after Revolution, 178, 179; anti-Catholicism, 526-8
 Caucus system, 368
 Cedar Creek, battle of, 623
 Central America, 12; Buchanan on, 585
 Cerro Gordo Pass, 548
 Chaffee, Mrs. C. C., 583
 Champlain, Samuel de, 14
 Chancellorsville, battle of, 619
 Chandler, Zachary, 642
 Channing, William Ellery, 258, 506, 513; quoted, 539-40
 Charles II, 26, 27, 28
 Charleston, 420; fur export center, 55; tea unloaded in, 141; British attack on, 168; Jackson sends fleet to, 376; literary and cultural center, 517
 Chase, Salmon P., 573, 578, 593, 623, 625, 643, 645-6, 647
 Chase, Samuel, 286-7
 Chattanooga, occupation of, 621
 Chauncey, Charles, 258
 Checks and balances, in Constitution, 212-13
 Cherokee Indians: treaty with, 193; Georgia and, 321
 Cherry Valley massacre, 157
Chesapeake affair, 398, 300
 Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, 476
 Cheves, Langdon, 380
 Chickamauga, battle of, 621
 China, trade with, 486
 Chittenden, H. M., 328
 Christian Commission, United States, 614

- Church: and emigration, 29-33; in colonies, 82-5; after Revolution, 178-9; and state, separation of, 178-9; and anti-slavery campaign, 500
- Church of the Latter Day Saints. *See* Mormon Church
- Cincinnati, western land office, 288
- Civil liberties, Civil War period, 641-2
- Cincinnati, founding of, 196
- Cincinnati, Order of, 217
- Cities: development of, 4, 5, 7; colonial, 74-7; in South, 420
- Civil War: beginning of, 604; volunteer system, 606, 607; North and South compared, 606-07, 612; conscription, 606, 607-08; draft riots, 608-09; supplying armed forces, 609-15; munitions from Europe, 610, 611; medical and surgical lacks, 613-14; relief work, 614-15; Bull Run to Vicksburg, 615-20; blockade, 616, 629-30; naval warfare, 616; war in West, 616; Gettysburg to Appomattox, 620-3; financing, 623-9; taxation and tariff, 624-5; paper money, 626; attitude of Europe, 629-33
- Social and economic conditions: North, 636-9; South, 639-42; coalition government, 642-8; and individualism, 649
- Clark, George Rogers, 168, 198, 291
- Clark, Lewis Gaylord, 522
- Clark, William, 291, 326
- Clarkson, Thomas, 500
- Class structure: in 1800, 255; in South, 417-21
- Clay, Henry, 313, 359, 360, 375, 382, 383, 541; leader of War Hawks, 305; spokesman for West, 325; favors bank of U. S., 352; "home market" argument, 358; Secretary of State, 361; American System, 362, 385, 389, 592; and Compromise Tariff of 1833, 377; and subtreasury bill, 387; and Tyler, 389-90; resigns from Senate, 390; and road building, 467; 1850 Compromise resolutions, 571, 572, 573
- Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850), 554
- Clermont, 470
- Cleves, Langdon, 380
- Clinton, DeWitt, 278, 473, 474-5, 497
- Clinton, George, 235, 290, 300, 306
- Clinton, Sir Henry, 167, 168
- Clipper ships, 489
- Cloud, N. B., 427
- Coal, anthracite, 444
- Coalition government, Civil War, 642-8
- Cobb, Thomas W., 356
- Cobbett, William, 237, 246, 266
- Cogswell, Joseph G., 499
- Colburn, Warren, 278
- Colden, Cadwallader, 91, 138, 154
- Cold Harbor, battle of, 622
- Coleman, William, 266
- Colleges: colonial, 84-5; 88-90; in 1800, 274-5; in West, 337; growth of, 498-9; founded during Civil War, 639; land grant, 639
- Colles, Christopher, 473
- Colman, Henry, quoted, 401
- Colombia, treaty with, 554
- Colonial Currency Act (1764), 128
- Colonies, English: establishment of, 23-8; causes of emigration to, 28-33; population, 33-5; land systems, 40-5; settlement map, 41; agriculture, 48-54; lumbering, 54, 56-7; fur trade, 54-6; fisheries, 57-60; manufacturing, 60-4; commerce and trade, 64-8, 100-04; currencies, 68-70, 107-10; houses, 71-3, 92-3; country life, 71-4; education, 74, 87-90; town life, 74-7; travel in, 76-7; religion, 77-82, 115-16; church, decline of, 82-5; intellectual interests, 85-91; newspapers and magazines, 86-7; libraries, 90; political control, 94-9; corporate, 96; proprietary, 96; royal, 96; royal governors, 96-7, 99; forms of government, 97-9; industrial regulation, 104-07; currency policies, 107-10; land policies, 107-10; conflicting cultures, 112-16; British plans for reform, 116-20; military defense, 119-20, 126, 147; administrative crisis, 120-3; trade with French, 121-2; Greenville program, 124-9; and western territory, 125, 126; tightening of trade laws, 125, 126-9; protest of, 129-31; commercial boycott, 132; pamphlets and resolutions, 132; troops from England, 133; first Continental Congress, 143-7; independence, 147-52
- Columbia Fishing and Trading Company, 535
- Columbia Fur Company, 329
- Columbus, Christopher, 5-6, 10-11
- Commerce: rise of, 7-11; colonial, 64-8; after Revolution, 177-8; treaties of, during Confederation, 199; British interference with, 296-300; inland, paths of, 474; overseas, 485-90; and War of 1812, 486-7. *See also* Trade
- Commonwealth vs. Hunt*, 462
- Communist Manifesto*, 503

- Compromise of 1850, 569-75; approval of, 573; failure of, 575-82
- Committees of correspondence, 139, 143
- Concord, battle of, 147
- Confederate States of America: organization, 597-8; documents, 599; faith in King Cotton, 599-600; population, 606; conscription acts, 607, 608; supplying armed forces, 609-11; Impressment Act, 610, 611; tax on agricultural products, 611; relief associations, 614-5; finance, 623, 628-9; blockade, 629-30; European aid, 633-5; social and economic conditions, 639-42
- Confederation: background of, 185-7; Articles of, 188-90; frontier problems and affairs, 193-9; commercial treaties, 199; depression during, 199-202; anti-British feeling, 200; movement for stronger union, 205-08
- Confiscation Acts (1861, 1862), 646
- Congregationalists, 79, 81, 115, 178, 258
- Connecticut: settlement, 25; land system, 42; Fundamental Orders, 80; surrender of western lands, 192
- Conscientious objectors, Civil War, 608
- Conscription, Civil War, 606, 607-08
- Conscription Act, 608, 611
- Conservatives: and Revolution, 136-9; and Confederation, 187-90; and Lincoln, 643-4
- Constitution, United States: drafting, 208-14; executive branch, 210-11; Congress, 210, 211, 213; President, 211; judicial system, 211-12; checks and balances, 212-13; amending, 213; elections and voting, 213; Senate, 213; states' rights, 214; ratifying, 214-21; launching, 225-8; as symbol, 227-8; Bill of Rights, 228; Eleventh Amendment, 252 *n.*; Twelfth Amendment, 252 *n.*; Confederacy and, 599
- Constitution*, victories of, 307
- Constitutional Convention, 207-14; delegates, 207-08; held in secrecy, 208; slavery issue, 210; compromise, 213
- Constitutional Union party, 592
- Constitutions, state, 176
- Continental Congress: First: invitation to, 143; representation at, 143-4; irregularly elected, 143, 145; radical-conservative conflict, 143-7 Second: membership of, 148; speech of R. H. Lee, 150; Declaration of Independence, 151-2; finance during Revolution, 158-62; mistakes of, 162-3
- Continental expansion: Land Ordinance Act (1785), 287-8; Harrison Land Act, 288; Louisiana Purchase, 288-90; explorations under Jefferson, 291; roads and canals, 291-3; land companies, 293; international intrigue, 294-5; motives for, 529; slavery issue and, 531; manifest destiny, 530-1; Oregon country, 531-7, 541, 542-3; Texas, 537-42; California, 543, 544-6; New Mexico, 543-4; Mexican War, 546-51; California gold rush, 551-8; map, 553; routes to West, map, 555; slavery, politics, and, 565-9
- Contreras, battle of, 549
- Convention of 1800, 248
- Convention of 1818, 341
- Cook, Captain James, 532
- Cooke, Elisha, 56
- Cooke, Jay, 625
- Cooper, James Fenimore, 516, 522
- Cooper, Thomas, quoted, 360
- Copley, John Singleton, 93, 268
- "Copperheads," 608, 641, 642
- Corinth, occupation of, 620
- Cornell, Ezra, 481
- Corn Law (1689), 67
- Cornwallis, Lord, 168; surrender at Yorktown, 170
- Coronado, Francisco Vasquez, 12
- Corporate colonies, 96
- Corporations, industrial, 446-7
- Cotton in South, 424-6; King, 560, 599-600; during Civil War, 629-30
- Cotton, John, 80
- Council of New England, 25
- Country life, colonial, 71-4
- Courts, in Constitution, 211-12
- Cowpens, battle of, 168
- Cove, Tench, 181
- Craske, Charles, 521
- Crawford, William, 361
- Creek Indians, in Georgia, 321
- Creole* affair, 392
- Crèvecoeur, St. Jean de, 112
- Crimean War, 488
- Criminal law, 179-81
- Crittenden Plan, 603
- Crockett, David, 518
- Crown Point, capture of, 164
- Crusades, 4-5, 7
- Cuba, desire to purchase, 578
- Cultures, conflict of, 112-16
- Cumberland (National) Road, 467

- Currency: colonial, 68-70; Continental, 158-60; Confederation, 201; in West, 323-4; Jackson's administration, 383-4; Civil War, 626-9
 Currency Act, Colonial, 128, 129, 131
 Curtis, Dr. Josiah, 452
 Cutler, Manasseh, 195
 Cutler, Seth, 450

 Dallas, George, 568
 Dana, Charles A., 503, 506, 521
Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 351
 Davenport, John, 26
 Davis, Jefferson, 430, 561, 615, 640; railroad project, 576; on Harper's Ferry raid, 590; President of Confederacy, 607
 Dawes, William, 147
 Deane, Silas, 166
 Dearborn, Major General Henry, 283, 309, 310
 DeBow, J. D. B., 484
De Bow's Review, 598
 Debtors' reform, 179-81
 Decatur, Stephen, 307
 Declaration of American Rights, 144
 Declaration of Independence, 151-2, 187, 190; of rights and grievances, 129
 Declaratory Act, 131
 Deere, John, 402
 Deism: in United States, 257-8; of Jefferson, 282
 De Lancey, James, 177
 Delaware, 27, 28; Swedish settlement in, 15; founding of, 24
 Democracy: *See* Jacksonian democracy; Jeffersonian democracy
 Democratic party: nucleus of, 363; first convention, 368; in 1829, 370; Jackson and, 370-4; split over nullification, 377; opposed to Whigs, 385; Loco-Focos, 387-8; Tammany Hall, 457; elects Polk, 541; Oregon and Texas issues, 541, 542; slavery question, 566; division along sectional lines, 567-8; Wilmot Proviso, 568-9; evasion of issues, 575; elects Pierce, 575, 576; dissatisfaction with, 579; elects Buchanan, 582; split over Kansas, 587; defeat of 1860, 591-6
 Democratic-Republicans, 235
 Dennie, Joseph, 267
 Depression periods: Confederation, 199-202; Civil War, 636. *See also* Panic
 De Soto, Hernando, 12
 D'Estaing, Comte, 167
 Dew, Thomas R., 564
Dial, 496, 508

 Diaz, Bartholemew, 10
 Dickens, Charles, quoted, 469
 Dickinson, John, 129, 132, 141, 207
 Dickson, David, 427
 Dinwiddie, Governor, 118, 125, 134
 Disciples of Christ, 338
 Dix, Dorothea Lynde, 496-7
 Donation Land Act (1850), 543
 Dongan, Thomas, 82
 Douglas, Stephen A., 571, 575; and Kansas-Nebraska Act, 576-7; obtains land grant for Illinois Central Railroad, 481; and popular sovereignty, 586-8; debates with Lincoln, 588; election of 1860, 592
 Dow, Neal, 493, 579
 Draft riots, Civil War, 608-09
 Drake, Sir Francis, 12, 532
 Dred Scott decision, 583-4, 588, 646
 Duane, William J., 266, 383
 Dudington, Lieutenant, 138
 Dunkers, 29, 523
 Dunlap, William, 261, 262
 "Dutch," Pennsylvania, 45
 Dutch East India Company, 14
 Dutch Reformists, 81
 Dutch West India Company, 24, 54
 Dwight, John S., 506
 Dwight, Timothy, 258, 264, 265, 459

 Early, General Jubal, 622
 East India Company, 24, 140, 141, 142
 East Indies, trade with, 486
 Eaton, John W., 371, 373, 374
 Eaton, Peggy, 371-2, 373
 Eaton, Theophilus, 26
 Economic conditions: in colonies, 39-70; during Revolution, 172-5; in 1800, 254; basis of sectionalism, 560-3; Civil War: North, 636-9; South, 639-42. *See also* Agriculture, Manufacturing, Panic, Trade
 Education: colonial, 84-5, 87-90; after Revolution, 181-2, 271-8; secondary, 275; elementary, 275-6; sectarian and charity, 276; district school system, 277; textbooks, early, 277-8; in West, 336-7; free schools, and labor parties, 458-9; for women, 494-5; public school, 497-8; universal, struggle toward, 497-9; and Civil War, 638-9; agricultural, 639
 Edwards, Haden, 537-8
 Edwards, Jonathan, 84-5 n.
 Electricity, experiments with, 481
 Eliot, Jared, 91
 Elizabeth, Queen, 16, 20, 23, 29, 30, 32
 Ellsworth, Henry L., 395, 396

- Emancipation Proclamation, 632, 644-5
 Embargo Act (1807), 299-300, 301
 Emerson, Dr. John, 583
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 508-10, 513, 572, 590
 Emigration to colonies, 28-33; 35, 36-40
Empress of China, ship, 532
 Engels, Friedrich, 503
 England, rise of, 9; raids on Spanish treasure, 12-13; settlements in America, 15-21; motives for colonization, 16-21; mercantile doctrine, 20; colonies in seventeenth century, 21; naval stores supplied to, 57. *See also* Great Britain
 English Bill (1858), 587
 English East India Company, 24
 Entail system, abolition of, 177
 Era of Good Feelings, 351-6, 361
 Erie Canal, 318, 320, 325, 473-6, 484-5; and agricultural competition, 406
 Escheat, practice of, 45
Essex case, 296-7, 307
 Europe: medieval, 3-7; trade with Orient, 8-9; munitions for Confederacy, 610, 611; attitude toward Civil War, 629-33
 Eustis, William, 308
 Evans, Oliver, 443, 477, 478
 Everett, Edward, 499, 592
 Excise taxes, 233; on liquors, 234-5
 Expansion, continental. *See* Continental expansion
Ex parte Milligan, 641
 Ezra Church, battle of, 622
 Factory system: origins of, 439-42; cotton manufacture, 441; improved machinery, 442-3; growth of, 442-7; owners, 447-8; workers, 448-52; labor conditions, 452-4; and labor movement, 454-6. *See also* Manufacturing
 Fairs, colonial, 65
 Fallen Timbers, battle of, 239
 Farragut, Admiral David G., 620
 Federal government, organizing, 223-5
Federalist, *The*, 217
 Federalists, 215, 216, 217, 219, 222; disappearance of party, 361
 Female seminaries, 278
 Feminists, 495-7
 Ferries, steamboat, 470
 Fessenden, Thomas Green, 395
 Feudal estates, in colonies, 42, 44-5
 Feudal system, 9-10
 Fillmore, Millard, 573
 Finance: Continental Congress and, 158-62; Confederation, 201; Hamilton's policies, 229-31; problems in West, 323-5; bank and tariff acts, 353-5; Jackson's administration, 379-85; depression of 1837, 386; agricultural problems, 410-13; railroad, 480-1; Civil War, 623-9; Confederate States, 628-9
 Fisheries: precolonial, 57; colonial, 57-60; conflict with French over, 58-9; Grenville measures, 127; Treaty of 1783, 200; Convention of 1818, 341
 Fisher's Hill, battle of, 622
 Fisk, Dr. Wilbur, 535
 Fitch, John, 470
 Fitzhugh, George, 561
 Five Forks, battle of, 623
Fletcher vs. Peck, 351
 Flint, Timothy, 338
 Florida: ceded to England, 120; East and West, 126; Southerners' demand for, 304; West, seizure of, 304; East, seizure of, 341-2, 343, 367
 Floyd, John B., 534, 561
 Foote, Augustus, 372
 Force Bill, 376, 377
 Foreign affairs: under Confederation, 197-9; under Federalists, 236-40; Jefferson and, 295-300; Madison and, 300-13, 327-8; after War of 1812, 341-6; John Adams and, 363; Jackson and, 378-9; Van Buren and, 390-1; Tyler and, 541-3, 545; Polk and, 546-51; Pierce and, 578; Europe, and Civil War, 629-33. *See also* Continental expansion; Mexican War; War of 1812
 Fort Donelson, surrender of, 619
 Fort George, 328
 Fort Henry, surrender of, 619
 Fort Moultrie, evacuation of, 602
 Fort Orange. *See* Albany.
 Fort Pickens, 604
 Fort Sumter, 602-3, 606; surrender of, 604
 Fort Ticonderoga, capture of, 164, 165
 Forty-niners, 552
 Foster, Hannah Webster, 263
 Fourier, Charles, 503, 504-05
 Fourierism, 505
 France: rise of, 9; colonial possessions, 14-15; trading posts, 14-15; fur trade, 55; conflict over fisheries, 58-9; driven from North America, 120; colonial trade with during wars, 121-2; American alliance with, 165-7, 169; and Treaty of Paris, 171; emigrants from, in Ohio, 196; danger of war with, 245-6; X.Y.Z. affair, 246-7; na-

France (*continued*)

- val war with, 246, 248; sale of Louisiana, 288-90; confiscation of American ships, 302; reaction to Monroe Doctrine, 344; spoilation claims, Jackson and, 378-9; treaty with, 379; and Civil War, 631; in Mexico, 634-5. *See also* Huguenots
- Franklin, Benjamin, 77, 86, 89, 90, 141, 163; land speculation, 47; quoted, 90-1, 106, 119; scientific achievements, 92; Albany plan, 118-19; before House of Commons, 130; and Declaration of Independence, 151; at French Court, 166; appeasement of French, 171; at Constitutional Convention, 207; denounced as "democrat," 246
- Franklin, James, 86
- Franklin, state of, 193-4
- Fredonian Rebellion, 537-8
- Freedom: of press, Zenger trial, 87; religious, after Revolution, 178-9
- Freehold, ownership by, 42
- Freeport Doctrine, 588
- Free Soil party, 569-70
- Frelinghuysen, Theodore J., 84
- Frémont, John C., 549, 582, 647
- French and Indian War, 56, 120-2; cost of, 123
- French-Canadians, in New England, 451
- French Revolution, 236-8
- Freneau, Philip, 249, 261, 265, 266
- Frontier (*see also* *West*): Germans on, 45-6; Scotch-Irish on, 45-6; colonial, 45-7; Easterners and, 46; land speculation, 47; religion, 82, 259; British plans for, 116-18; Revolutionary War on, 153, 156, 167-8; problems under Confederation, 190-6; F. J. Turner on, 334-6; and American civilization, 334-9
- Fugitive Slave Act, 575, 645
- Fuller, Margaret, 494, 496, 503, 508
- Fulton, Robert, 470
- Fur trade: colonial, 54-6; in Far West, 325-9; control of, 326-9
- Gadsden purchase, 551, 578
- Gage, General Thomas, 142, 147
- Gag rule, 566
- Gallatin, Albert, 283, 284, 291, 313, 441; proposes roads and canals, 291-3, 467 *n.*
- Gallipolis, French settlement, 196
- Galloway, Joseph, 144, 148, 156
- Galloway, Samuel, 127
- Gama, Vasco da, 10-11
- Garland, Hamlin, 404
- Garrison, William Lloyd, 501, 502, 513, 540, 601
- Gaspée* affair, 138-9
- Gates, Horatio, 163, 165, 168
- Geissenhainer, Frederick W., 443
- Genêt, Citizen Edmund Charles, 237-8, 245
- George II, 124
- George III, 111, 124, 125
- Georgia: settlement of, 26, 27; held by British, 168; Indians in, 321-2; surrender of western lands, 192; Yazoo grants, 293; Sherman's march through, 622
- Germans: colonial population, 34-5; as redemptioners, 36; on colonial frontier, 45-46; agriculture of, 51; sect peoples, 81, 83-4, 523; colonial newspapers, 86; in Pennsylvania, 253-4; in westward movement, 316; in Missouri, 330; in Michigan, 331; in Wisconsin, 333; nineteenth century immigration, 450, 451; and slavery, 597
- Germantown, battle of, 165
- Gerry, Elbridge, 207, 245, 246
- Gettysburg, battle of, 614, 620-1
- Ghent, Treaty of, 312-14
- Gibbons, Thomas, 470
- Gibbons vs. Ogden*, 350
- Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 17, 19, 23, 42
- Gilmour, William, 442
- Godey's Lady's Book*, 522
- Godwin, Parke, 503, 505-6
- Gold Rush, California, 551-8
- Gore, Obadiah, 444
- Gorges, Sir Ferdinando, 17, 26
- Goulding, John, 442
- Granger, Percy, 283
- Grant, Ulysses S., 615, 616; background of, 619; command of Northern forces, 620-3
- Graphic arts, development of, 270
- Gray, Robert, 534
- Grayson, William, 518
- Great Awakening, 84
- Great Britain: colonial trade with, 66, 68; administration of colonies, 94-110; attitude toward colonists, 112-13; and colonial reform, 116-20; Indian policy, 125-26; commercial boycott against, 132; use of coercion, 139-42; and Revolutionary War, 162-5; naval supremacy, 170, 489; relations with, after Revolution, 197-8, 199; and Northwest, 238-9; seizure of American ships and sailors,

- Great Britain (*continued*)
 239-40, 297; interference with American trade, 296-300; War of 1812, 307-11; in Far West, 327-8, 341, 536, 541-2; Jackson and, 378; Webster-Ashburton negotiations, 390-2; Industrial Revolution, 440; immigrants from (1820-60), 451; aid to Texas, 540-2; and Civil War, 610, 630, 631, 632-3. *See also* England
- Great Lakes. 341; British hold on, 197; steamboats on, 471-2
- Great Revival, 259
- Greeley, Horace. 503, 519, 584, 590; quoted, 505, 601
- Green, Duff, 371
- Greene, General Nathaniel, 168
- Green Mountain Boys, 192
- Greenville, Treaty of, 239
- Gregg, Josiah, 543
- Grenville, George, 124, 134
- Grenville program, 124-9
- Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty of, 551
- Guilford Courthouse, battle of, 168
- Gulf states, settlement of, 316
- Habeas corpus*, 644; suspension of, 641-2
- Hairston, Samuel, 429, 430
- Hakluyt, Richard, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19
- Hale, John P., 576
- Hale, Mrs. Sarah J., 522
- Half-Way Covenant, 82
- Hall, James, 338
- Halleck, General Henry W., 618, 619, 620
- Hamilton, Alexander, 205, 206, 207, 208; Secretary of Treasury, 161, 225; quoted, 215, 216; *Federalist* papers, 217; *Report on the Public Credit*, 229; financial policies, 229-31; *Report on the National Bank*, 230; *Report on Manufactures*, 230, 234; funding proposals, 231-2; and Citizen Genêt, 238; plans attack on Spanish America, 248; *Evening Post*, *The*, 266; death of, 290 n.
- Hamilton, Andrew, 87
- Hamilton, Paul, 308
- Hammond, James H., 427, 564
- Hampton, Wade, 429, 430
- Hampton Roads, naval battle, 616
- Hancock, John, 127, 133, 147, 148
- Harlem Heights, 163
- Harmar, General Josiah, 239
- Harper, William, 564
- Harper's Ferry, raid on, 589-90
- Harrisburg convention on tariff, 359
- Harrison, William Henry, 310, 386; governor of Indiana territory, 303-4; President, 388-9
- Harrison Land Act (1800), 288, 322
- Hartford Convention, 311-12, 361
- Hartford wits, 264
- Harvard, John, 88
- Hat Act (1732), 105, 106
- Hawkins, Sir John, 12
- Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 508, 511, 512
- Hayne, Paul Hamilton, 517, 518
- Hayne, Robert Y., 376; debate with Webster, 372-3
- Helper, Hinton Rowan, 590-1
- Henderson, Richard, 193
- Henry VIII, 29, 30
- Henry, Joseph, 481, 499
- Henry, Patrick, 115, 116, 135, 168, 207; Virginia resolutions, 129
- Herkimer, General Nicholas, 165
- Hessians, in Revolution, 163, 164
- Higginson, Thomas Wentworth, 589
- Hildreth, Richard, 515
- Hoban, James, 270
- Hoe, Richard M., 321
- Holland: revolt from Spain, 12, 13; colonies in America, 35; aid in American Revolution, 166-7, 170
- Holley, Horace, 337
- Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 513, 514
- Holy Alliance, 345-6
- Homestead Act, vetoed, 585
- Hone, Philip, 387, 472
- Hood, General J. B., 622
- Hooker, General Joseph, 615, 619, 620
- Hooker, Thomas, 80, 82
- Hopkins, Lemuel, 264
- Hopkins, Mark, 499
- Hopkins, Stephen, 129
- Hornet*, victories of, 307
- Horseshoe Bend, defeat of Creeks, 367
- House of Representatives, 211, 213
- Houston, Sam, 538
- Howe, Elias, 443
- Howe, General William, 163, 164, 165, 167
- Howe, Lord Richard, 163
- Hudson's Bay Company, 55, 326, 534, 535, 536
- Huguenots, 14, 35, 517
- Hull, William, 309, 310
- Humanitarianism, 492-9
- Humphreys, David, 215, 264
- Hundley, D. R., 433, 435
- "Hunkers," 570 n.
- Huse, Caleb, 610
- Hutchinson, Anne, 81
- Hutchinson, Thomas, 42, 140

- Icarian communities, 504
 Iceland, colonization of, 6
 Ide, William B., 549
 Immigration: colonial, 33-40; 1820-60, 450-2
Impending Crisis of the South, 590-1
 Imprisonment for debt, 460
 Indentured servants, 36-7
 Independence, 147-52; spread of idea, 148; Declaration of, 151-2, 187, 190
 India, water route to, 10
 Indians: British policy toward, 125-6; hostility of, 116-17; Loyalist cooperation with, 157; treaties with, 193, 194, 321; in Southwest, 198; in Northwest, 238-9, 303-04; and westward movement, 320-2; settled in Great Plains, 321; Black Hawk War, 332-3
 Indigo, cultivation of, 52
 Industrial arts, 271
 Industrial Revolution, 440
 Industry: *See* Factory system, manufacturing
 Infant school, 276-7
 Ingham, Samuel D., 371, 373
 Inheritance, property, after Revolution, 177
 Inland waterways, 469-72
 Inns and taverns, 76
 Insane, care of, 496-7
 Internal revenue law, Civil War, 624
 Intolerable Acts (1774), 142, 143, 144, 148
 Inventions, 1790-1860, 444-5
 Iowa, settlement and admission, 333-4
 Irish: in colonies, 35; nineteenth century immigration, 451, 523, 526
 Irish famine, 488
 Iron production: in colonies, 62-3; British restrictions on, 105-06; improvements in manufacture, 443
 Irving, Washington, 515, 516

 Jackson, Andrew, 294, 361, 538, 539; battle of New Orleans, 310-11; and Cherokee Indians, 322; invasion of Florida, 341-2; President, 365, 370, 382-3; background and personality, 366-7; as symbol, 369; spoils system, 370-1; break with Calhoun, 373; conflict with South Carolina, 374-7; on nullification ordinance, 376; and American rights abroad, 378-9; and Bank of United States, 379-83; and legislative branch of government, 382; as political leader, 382; "Specie Circular," 384
 Jackson, Francis James, 301
 Jackson, General Thomas J. (Stonewall), 615, 616, 617, 619
 Jackson, James, 232
 Jackson, Rachel, 371
 Jacksonian democracy: nature of, 366-9; key doctrines of, 369; break-up of, 388-92
 Jacksonians, 363-5
 "Jacobins" in America, 237
 James I (England), 24, 30, 32
 Jamestown, Virginia, 24, 39
 Jay, John, 144, 171; in Spain, 166; negotiations with Spanish, 198-9; *Federalist* papers, 217; Chief Justice, 225; criticism of, 242
 Jay Treaty, 243-4, 245, 297, 298; terms of, 241-2; importance of, 242-3
 Jefferson, Thomas: debt to English firms, 35; and Declaration of Independence, 151; and systems of entail and primogeniture, 177; religious freedom statute, 178; on education, 181-2; Secretary of State, 225; and Citizen Genet, 238; runs for President, 244-5; and Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, 251; President, 251-2; architect, 270; library of, 278; background and accomplishments, 279-82; on urban proletariat, 280-2; cabinet of, 283; naval program, 284-5; sends warships to Mediterranean, 285; affairs in West, 287-95; Louisiana purchase, 288-90, 292; Lewis and Clark expedition, 291, 292
 Jeffersonian democracy: theory of, 279-82; practice of, 282-7
 Jeffreys, Thomas, 17
 Jews: in colonies, 35, 81; in 1800, 256
 Johnson, Andrew, 647
 Johnson, Richard M., 386
 Johnson, Sir William, 47
 Johnston, General Albert Sidney, 615, 619
 Johnston, General Joseph E., 615, 617, 621
 Johnston, Samuel, 175
 Joint Occupation Agreement (1818), 536
 Jones, Jethro V., 427
 Jones, John Paul, 170
 Journalism: in 1800, 265-8; Middle Period, 519-22
 Judicial system, in Constitution, 211-12
 Judiciary Act: 1789, 225; 1801, 284, 285, 286

 Kansas: territory, 577; settlement, 580-1; Lecompton Constitution, 585-6, 587; request for land grant, 587

- Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), 577-8, 579
- Kaskaskia, capture of, 168
- Kearney, Colonel Stephen W., 549
- Keith, Sir William, 108, 120
- Kelley, Hall Jackson, 534-5
- Kelly, William, 443
- Kendall, Amos, 371, 481
- Kendrick, John, 534
- Kenesaw Mountain, battle of, 622
- Kennedy, John Pendleton, 518
- Kent, Chancellor, 368-9
- Kentucky: settlement and statehood, 193; Resolutions, 250, 251, 282
- Kettell, Thomas P., 562
- Kilburn, George, 443
- King, Rufus, 215, 352, 356
- King George's War, 59, 120
- King's Mountain, battle of, 168
- King William's War, 58, 120
- "Kitchen cabinet," Jackson's, 371
- Knickerbocker Group, 515
- Know-Nothing party, 527, 579, 582
- Knox, General Henry, 204, 225
- Labor: agricultural, 402; child, 452; factory conditions, 452-4; early organizations, 454-5; movement, rise of, 454-6; 10-hour day, 460, 462-3; convict, 460-1
- Labor parties, 456-61; mechanics' lien laws, 459-60; and imprisonment for debt, 460
- Labor unions, 461-3
- Lafayette, Marquis de, 169
- Lambert, John, 486
- Lancaster Pike, 465
- Lancastrian school, 276
- Land Act (1820), 323
- Land banks, colonial, 108-09
- Land grant colleges, 639
- Land Ordinance (1785), 287
- Land systems: colonial, 40-5, 107-10; after Revolution, 177
- Larkin, Thomas O., 544, 547
- Latin America, Monroe Doctrine and, 343, 345, 346
- Latin grammar school, 88, 275
- Latrobe, Henry, 270
- Laurens, Henry, 113
- Lawrence, James, 307
- Lawrence, Kansas, sack of, 581
- Leasehold, ownership by, 42
- Lecompton Constitution, 585-6, 587
- Lee, Arthur, at French Court, 166
- Lee, Charles, 163, 164, 167
- Lee, Jason, 536
- Lee, Richard Henry, 150; quoted, 216-17; *Letters from the Federal Farmer* . . . , 217, 218
- Lee, Robert E., 606, 615, 616, 617-18; in Mexican War, 548; at Harper's Ferry, 589; joins Confederate forces, 599; and conscription, 611; commander in eastern Virginia and N. Carolina, 617; at Chancellorsville, 619; defeat at Gettysburg, 620-1; final battles, 622; surrender, 623
- Legal Tender Act (1862), 626
- Legaré, Hugh S., 517
- Lehigh Coal-Mine Company, 444
- Leopard*, attack on *Chesapeake*, 298
- Lewis, Captain Meriwether, 291
- Lewis and Clark expedition, 291, 292
- Lexington, battle of, 147
- Liberator*, 501
- Liberia, settlement of, 500, 646
- Liberty party, 566
- Lieber, Francis, 499
- Lincoln, Abraham: and Supreme Court, 382; on Dred Scott decision, 584; background of, 587-8; debates with Douglas, 588; elected to House, 588; election of 1860, 591-6; vote for, 594, 595; and preservation of Union, 603-04; and the conduct of the war, 615-16, 617, 618, 619; proclaims blockade of South, 629; Emancipation Proclamation, 632, 644-7; suspends writ of *habeas corpus*, 641; coalition cabinet, 643; and Conservatives, 643-4; and Radicals, 644-7; reelection, 647-8; assassination, 648
- Lincoln, General Benjamin, 204
- Lincoln, General Levi, 283
- Lisa, Manual, 326
- Literature: in 1800, 261-5; Middle Period, 512-19
- Livestock: in colonies, 50-1; improvement, 398-400; production, 406
- Livingston, Robert R., 151, 288, 289, 470
- Livingston, William, 207
- Locke, John, 114, 115, 116
- Loco-Foco party, 387-8
- Logan, James, 91
- Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth, 513, 522
- Longstreet, Augustus, 518
- Longstreet, General James, 621
- Lookout Mountain, battle of, 621
- Louisiana: transferred to Spain, 120; Purchase, 288-90, 292, 378-9; admitted to Union, 329; fixing of boundaries, 341
- Louis Philippe (France), 378-9

- Lovejoy, Elijah, 502
 Lowell, Frank Cabot, 442
 Lowell, James Russell, 513, 514, 547-8, 572
 Loyalists: in Revolutionary War, 153, 157; treatment of, 158
 Lumbering: colonial, 54, 56-7; British restrictions on, 106-07
 Lundy, Benjamin, 500, 501
 Lutheran Church, 29, 81
 Lyon, Mary, 498
 Lyons, Matthew, 250

 McClellan, George B., 615, 644; commander, Army of Potomac, 617, 618; runs for president, 647
 McCormick, Cyrus H., 446
 McCulloch vs. Maryland, 348-9, 354, 380
 Macdonough, Captain Thomas, 310
 McDougall, Duncan, 327
 McDowell, General Irvin, 617, 618
 McFingal, quoted, 264
 McKay, Donald, 489
 Mackinaw Company, 326
 McLane, Louis, 374, 383
 Maclay, William, 226, 228
 McLeod, Alexander, 390-1
 McLoughlin, Dr. John, 536
 Macon's Bill No. 2 (1810), 302
 Madison, Dolly, 284
 Madison, James, 181, 207, 283; *Federalist* papers, 217-8; funding proposal, 231-2; President, 300; and neutral rights, 300-06; and War of 1812, 307-11
 Magazines: colonial, 86-7; in 1800, 267-8; agricultural, 395-6; Middle Period, 521-2
 Magellan, Ferdinand, 11
 Maine: settlement, 26; British victory, War of 1812, 311; admitted to Union, 330, 356; boundary dispute, 391; first prohibition law, 493-4
 Majority rule, 377
 Manifest destiny, 530-1, 567, 578
 Mann, Horace, 498, 572
 Manorial estates, 43, 44
 Manufacturing: colonial, 60-4; British restrictions on, 104-06; Revolution and, 174, 177-8; Confederation and, 200; Hamilton's report on, 230, 234; textiles, 441-2; 1812-20, 442; inventions, 442-3, 444; concentration of, 445-7. *See also* Factory system
 Marbury vs. Madison, 285-6, 347
 Marcy, William, 567, 570 n., 578
 Marietta, founding of, 196
 Marion, Francis, 168

 Marsh, Dr. John, 545
 Marshall, James, 551
 Marshall, John, 223, 245, 246, 470; Chief Justice, 285-7; and Burr's trial, 294-5; decision on Indians in Georgia, 322; background and accomplishments, 346-7; cases, 347, 348-9, 350, 351, 354, 380
 Martin, Luther, 207, 210
 Martineau, Harriet, 452-3
 Marx, Karl, 503
 Maryland: settlement of, 26, 27; land systems in, 42, 44; Toleration Act (1649), 81; and Articles of Confederation, 190, 192; Declaration of Rights, 257; Lee's invasion, 618
 Mason, George, 210
 Mason, James M., 633
 Mason, John, 26
 Mason, John, the Reverend, 274
 Mason, John Y., 578
 Mason-Dixon line, 577
 Massachusetts: founding of, 24; Great Migration, 25; land system, 42; colonial mint, 69; committees of correspondence, 139, 143; commercial boycott, 132; military force quartered in, 132-4, 142; Boston Massacre, 134; Boston Tea Party, 141; Government Act, 142; surrender of western lands, 192; during Confederation, 203-04; manufacturing in, 445; corporate form of factory control, 446. *See also* Boston
 Massachusetts Bay Company, 24
 Mather, Cotton, 91
 Mather, Richard, 60
 Maximilian, in Mexico, 635
 Mayflower Compact, 25
 Mayhew, Jonathan, 115, 258
 • Maysville Road veto, 372, 374, 385, 469
 Meade, George G., 615, 620-1
 Mechanics' lien laws, 459-60
 Mechanics Union of Trade Associations, 455, 456
 Melville, Herman, 511-12
 Memminger, C. G., 628
 Mennonites, 523
 Mercantile doctrine, English, 20, 116
 Merrimac, Monitor and, 616
 Merry, Anthony, 284, 294
 Methodist Church, 179, 256, 259-60, 338; divisions of, 523
 Mexican War, 402, 546-51; inception of, 546-8; battles, 548-9; outcome of, 549-51; and slavery issue, 570
 Mexico, 12; and Texas, 537-40; U. S. claims against, 546; Buchanan's rec-

- Mexico (*continued*)
 commendations. 585; French interven-
 tion, 634-5
 Mexico City, 549
 Michigan, settlement and admission,
 331-2
 Milan Decree, Napoleon's, 296
 Militia system, compulsory, 460
 Miller, William, 523-4
 Mills, Robert, 270
 Mining, of lead, 332
 Minnesota, settlement and admission,
 334
 Minority rule, 377
 Mint Act, 232
 Minutemen, colonial, 147
 Miranda, Don Francisco de, 248
 Missionaries: Christian, early, 5;
 French, in Wisconsin and Michigan,
 331-2; in Oregon, 535-6
 Missionary Ridge, battle of, 621
 Missions, Spanish: in New Mexico, 12;
 in California, 544
 Mississippi Company, 125
 Mississippi River: control of, 198;
 Pinckney Treaty and, 243; channel of
 West-East trade, 325; transportation,
 470, 484
 Missouri, 606; admitted as slave state,
 330
 Missouri Compromise, 330, 356, 567,
 603; and Kansas-Nebraska territories,
 577
 Mitchell, John, 91
Moby Dick, 512
 Molasses, from West Indies, 64, 67
 Molasses Act (1733), 103, 127
 Monarch: rise of, 9-10; merchant class
 and, 10
 Monarchy, fear of in United States,
 225-6
Monitor, Merrimac and, 616
 Monmouth, battle of, 167
 Monroe, James: in France, 245, 288; in
 England, 297, 298; Louisiana Pur-
 chase, 288, 289; President, 352
 Monroe Doctrine, 343-6, 635
 Monterey, victory at, 548
 Montgomery, Richard, 164
 Montreal, 164; projected campaign
 against, 309, 310
 Moody, Paul, 442
 Moravian Brethren, 29, 81, 83, 523
 Morgan, General Daniel, 168
 Morgan, William, 368 *n.*
 Mormon Church, 523, 524-6
 Mormon trail, 554, 556
 Morrill, Justin, 624
 Morrill Act (1862), 639
 Morris, Gouverneur, 267
 Morris, Robert, 207, 486; superintend-
 ent of finance, 161-2; Secretary of
 Treasury, 224-5
 Morris, Roger, 177
 Morse, Jedidiah, 258
 Morse, Samuel F. B., 481, 526
 Morton, Sarah Wentworth, 263
 Motley, J. L., 515
 Mott, Lucretia, 494
 Mountaineers, Southern, 418-19; senti-
 ment for Union, 597
 Murray, Lindley, 278
 Murray, William Vans, 248
 Museum of Natural History, Philadel-
 phia, 269
 Napoleon I, 248, 297, 301, 302; Louisi-
 ana Purchase, 289, 290; war with
 Britain, 295-6; defeat of, 310; and
 American commerce, 466
 Napoleon III, and Mexico, 634-5
 Narváez, Panfilo de, 12
 Nashville, battle of, 622
 Natchez, capture of, 620
 National Academy of Design, 269
 National Banking Act, 628
 National Banking System, 627-8
 Nationalism: after War of 1812, 340;
 Jacksonian democracy as, 369; Jack-
 son and, 374-9
 Nationalization Law, 284
 National Republican party, 381, 382;
 changes name to Whig, 385
 National (Cumberland) Road, 467
 National states, rise of, 9-10
 National Trades' Union, 461
 Native American party, 527
 Natural rights, concept of, 114, 115
 Navigation Acts, 100, 101, 102-3, 127,
 199
 Navy: Jefferson and, 284-5; Civil War,
 616
 Navy Department, organization of, 246
 Nebraska: territory, 577; settlement of,
 580
 Negroes: free, in South, 419; slaves,
 419-20; population in South (1810-
 60), 432; anti-slavery crusade, 499-
 503; colonization societies, 500-01;
 New York City draft riots, 609. *See*
also Slavery, Slaves
 Nelson, Admiral Horatio, 296
 New England: land system, 42-3; agri-
 culture, 48; fisheries, 58, 59; whaling
 industry, 60; prison reform, 181; dis-
 trict school system, 277; and War of
 1812, 307-08, 311; Hartford Conven-
 tion, 311-12; road building, 466; lit-

- New England (*continued*)
 erature, 513-15; emigration, to Kansas, 580
 New England Emigrant Aid Company, 580
New England Farmer, 395; quoted, 411, 412
New England's First Fruits, 61
 Newfoundland fisheries, 57, 58, 171
 New Hampshire: settlement of, 26; mobs in, 202
 New Harmony, Indiana, 504
 New Haven, founding of, 26
 New Hope Church, battle of, 622
 New Jersey: settlement of, 26, 27; division of, 27; land systems in, 44; agriculture in, 49, 50; liberty of conscience, 81
 New Jersey Plan, 209, 211
 New London Society United for Trade and Commerce, 108
 New Mexico: Americans in, 543-4; ceded to U. S., 551
 New Netherlands, 14, 24; fur trade, 54
 New Orleans: trade center, 198, 484; battle of, 310-11, 367; capture of, 620
New Orleans, steamboat, 470
 Newport, R. I., held by British, 167
 Newspapers: colonial, 86, 87; and Alien and Sedition Acts, 250; in 1800, 266-7; Western, 337-8; Middle Period, 519-20; and slavery issue, 590
 New York City: colonial, 74; occupied by British, 164; in 1800, 254-5; fire of 1835, 384; trade center, 465-6; entrepôt of New World, 488-9; draft riots, 609
 New York State: acquired by conquest, 27; land systems, 42, 43; agriculture, 49; patroon estates, 72, 73; surrender of western lands, 192; road building, 466; literature, 515-16
 Nicaragua: travel across, 554; filibustering expeditions against, 585
 Nicholson, James, 170
 Nonimportation Act (1806), 297, 299
 Nonintercourse Act (1809), 301, 302
 Nootka Sound Convention, 532
 North, Lord, 137, 139, 146, 148
 North, Simeon, 443
 North: Revolutionary War, 153-5; agriculture in, 393-413; manufacturing in (1860), 446; economic diversification of, 560; dependence on South, 560-1; reaction to secession, 601-02; plans to save Union, 603-4; Civil War, 636-9
 North American Hotel Party, 457
 North Carolina, 27; Regulators, 46; surrender of western lands, 192; ratification of Constitution, 219
 Northwest: Virginia claim, 191; settlement of, 194-6; British refusal to withdraw from, 197-8; Jay Treaty and, 242-3
 Northwest Company, 326, 534
 Northwest Land Ordinance, 194, 195, 196
 Novelists: early, 261-4; Western, 338
 Nullification ordinance, 376; withdrawal of, 377
 Ogden, Aaron, 470
 Oglethorpe, James, 26, 27
 Ohio: Virginia's claim to, 192; Indian claims to, 194; settlement map, 317; road building, 466
 Ohio Company of Associates, 125, 195, 196, 317
 Ordinance of 1787, 356
 Oregon: under joint occupation, 341; claims to, 531-2, 542-3; Americans in, 531-7; discovery, exploration, occupation, 532; America's title to, 532, 533-4; fur trade, 534; settlement, 535-6; missionaries in, 535-6; acquisition of, 541, 542; trail, 554, 555
 Oregon Compromise, 567
 Oriskany, battle of, 165
 Orleans, territory of, 329
 Orr, Hugh, 440-1
Osborn et al. vs. The Bank of the United States, 380
 Ostend Manifesto, 578
 Otis, James, 115, 129, 132
 Owen, Robert, 276, 503, 504
 Owen, Robert Dale, 457
 Pacific Fur Company, 327
 Pacific steamship companies, 489, 490, 552
 Paine, Thomas, 148-50, 207, 236-7, 258; quoted, 257
 Painters, 93, 268-9
 Palmerston, Lord, 390, 391
 Pamphleteering, 148-50, 235
 Panama Conference (1826), 363
 Panic: of 1819, 379; of 1837, 386, 461, 462, 488; of 1857, 584; of 1860, 602
 Paris, Treaty of, 120, 122, 170, 171, 197, 198
 Parker, Theodore, 503, 508, 513, 572, 589
 Parkman, Francis, 513, 515
 Parties, political. *See* Anti-Federalists; Democratic party; Federalists; Re-

- Parties, political (*continued*)
 publican party; Republican party;
 Jeffersonian; Know-Nothing party;
 National Republican party; Prohibi-
 tion party; Whig party
- Parsons, General Samuel, 195
- Paterson, William, 209
- Patriots, Revolutionary War, 153, 156-7,
 158
- Paulding, James Kirke, 515-6, 522
- "Pauper" schools, 459
- Peabody, Elizabeth, 498
- Peace Convention Plan, 603
- Peach Tree Creek, battle of, 622
- Peale, Charles Willson, 93, 268, 269
- Peck, Jedidiah, 250
- Peddlers: colonial, 65; Yankee, 483
- Pemberton, General J. C., 620
- Penn, William, 26-7, 35
- Pennsylvania: settlement of, 26-7, 28;
 land systems, 43-4; agriculture, 49,
 50; religious freedom, 81-2, 178;
 Whisky Rebellion, 234-5; road build-
 ing, 465; canal system, 476
- Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts,
 269
- Pennsylvania "Dutch," 45
- People's banks, 354
- Perry, Oliver Hazard, 309-10
- Philadelphia, 27; colonial, 74; library,
 90; occupied by British, 165; descrip-
 tion of prison in, 180-1; Constitu-
 tional Convention, 207-14; national
 capital, 232; population (1880), 254;
 trade center, 465, 486
- Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike
 Company, 465
- Philadelphia Society for Assisting Dis-
 tressed Debtors, 181
- Philip II (Portugal), 11, 13
- Phillips, Wendell, 513, 601, 645
- Phyfe, Duncan, 271
- Pickens, Andrew, 168
- Pickering, John, 286
- Pickett, George E., 621
- Pierce, Franklin, 576
- Pietests, 29, 83
- Pilgrims, 24, 25; trade in wood and
 furs, 54
- Pinckney, Charles Coatsworth, 207,
 245, 246, 251, 290, 300
- Pinckney, Thomas, 243, 244
- Pinckney, William, 297, 298
- Pinckney Treaty (1795), 243, 288
- Pinkney, William, 356
- Pitt, William, 124, 141, 146, 147
- Pittsburgh, 287, 288, 319, 470, 543
- Plantations: in South, 429-31; overseers,
 430-1
- Planters, in South, 417
- Plattsburgh, campaign against, 310
- Plymouth, founding of, 24, 25
- Poe, Edgar Allan, 519, 522
- Political parties, 235-6; new, 360-5;
 conventions, 368; labor parties, 456-
 1; Civil War, 642
- Politics: conflict, and emigration, 33;
 control, in colonies, 94-9; slavery,
 expansion and, 565-9
- Polk, James K., 541; and Oregon, 542;
 and Mexican War, 546, 547
- Polly* case, 296
- Polo, Marco, 5, 6, 17
- Polygamy, among Mormons, 525, 528
- Ponce de León, 12
- Pontiac, Indian leader, 126, 332
- "Poor whites," in South, 418
- Pope, General John, 615, 618
- Population: colonial, 33-5; Negro, 39,
 40; in South, 40; at turn of century,
 253-4, 287; of Old West, 316; sta-
 tistics (1790-1860), 670-1
- Porter, David, 307
- Portugal: early voyages and discoveries,
 6-10; claims in new world, 11, 12
- Postal service, 77
- Power development, 443-4
- Pre-emption Act (1841), 390
- Presbyterian Church, 84, 115, 256, 259,
 338; Scotch-Irish and, 33-4, 35, 81;
 divisions of, 523
- Prescott, William, 513, 515
- President, provisions in Constitution, 211
- President*, battle with *Little Belt*, 303
- Press: freedom of, Zenger trial and, 87;
 abolition and, 503. *See also* News-
 papers
- Preston, General, 608
- Prevost, Sir George, 310
- Primogeniture, law of, 42; abolition of,
 177
- Princeton, battle of, 164
- Prisoners, as emigrants, 38
- Prison reform, 179-81
- Popular sovereignty, 571, 577, 587, 588,
 591, 592
- Privateering, 148
- Privy Council, and colonies, 95, 96
- Proclamation of 1763, 126, 134
- Prohibitionists, 492-4; party, 579
- Proprietary colonies, 26-7, 96; inden-
 tured servants in, 37; land system in,
 42
- Proprietors, town, 43
- Protective Associations, Kansas, 580
- Protestants, 12, 29; after Revolution,
 178-9; dissension among, 522-3. *See*
also Calvinism, Baptist Church, Meth-

Protestants (*continued*)

odist Church, Presbyterian Church,
Puritanism

Providence, Rhode Island, 26

Public school, 497-8

Puerto Rico, 122

Puritanism, 77-81; decline of, 83

Puritans: settlements, 25; and trans-
cendentalism, 507

Put-in-Bay, battle of, 309-10

Putnam, Rufus, 196

Quakers, 29, 32, 77, 81, 82, 115, 178,
523, 608

Quartering Act (1765), 128-9, 131,
133, 142

Quebec: settlement of, 14; Arnold's
expedition to, 164

Quebec Act, 142

Queen Anne's War, 59, 120

Quincy, Josiah, Jr., 134

Quitrent system, 43 *n.*, 44, 177

Radicals: colonial, 136-9; and Con-
federation, 187-90, 202; and Civil
War, 644-7

Railroads: early, 477-8; difficulties,
met, 478-9; locomotives, 479; growth
of, 479-80; financing, 480-1; tele-
graph and, 481-2; in 1860, 482;
transcontinental, plans for, 576

Raleigh, Sir Walter, 16, 17, 23, 42, 58

Rambouillet Decree, Napoleon's, 302

Randall, James G., 645

Randolph, Edmund, 207, 208, 209, 225

Randolph, John, 293, 308, 353, 364

Rappists, 523

Raymond, Henry J., 505

Reaper, and agriculture, 403

Redcoats, British, 133, 147

Redemptioners, 36

Reeder, Andrew H., 580-1

Reform, 491-528; treatment of insane,
496; abolitionism, 499-503; educa-
tion for women, 494-5; prohibition,
492-4; universal education, 497-9;
women's rights, 495-6; utopianism,
503-07

Reformation, 16

Regulators, North Carolina, 46

Religion: religious wars, 14; cause of
emigration, 29-33; in seventeenth
century, 77-82; sects in colonies, 81-
2; freedom, 81-2, 178-9; Great Awak-
ening, 84; in colonies, 115-16; and
Constitution, 227-8; in 1800, 255-60;
in West, 338; Middle Period, 522-8.
See also Church

Republican party: formation of, 579;
and Kansas, 581, 582; composition of,
582

Republicans, Jeffersonian, 235; triumph
of, 248-52

Revere, Paul, 147, 270, 271

Revolutionary War: causes of, 111-12;
Lexington and Concord, 147; as civil
war, 153-8; finances, 158-62; cam-
paigns, 162-5; French aid, 165-7,
168-9, 170; Spanish aid, 166, 170; in
West, 167-8; in South, 168; naval
operations, 170; Dutch aid, 170;
Treaty of Paris, 170, 171; social and
economic conditions, 172-5; profiteer-
ing during, 173; consequences of,
175-84

Resaca, battle of, 622

Rhett, Robert Barnwell, 608

Restraining Act (1775), 147, 150

Rhode Island: settlement of, 25-6;
Roger Williams and, 81; religious
freedom in, 178; ratification of Con-
stitution, 219; struggle over paper
money, 202-03, 205; cotton mills in,
446

Rice culture, 52, 423-4

Richmond, in Civil War, 616, 617

Riley, General Bennet, 557

Ripley, George and Sophia, 503, 506

River transportation, 469-71, 483-4

Roads and turnpikes, 464-9

Roanoke Island settlement, 23

Robertson, James, 193, 194; negotiates
with Spanish, 198

Rochambeau, Comte de, 169

Rocky Mountain Fur Company, 328-9

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 382

Roosevelt, Nicholas, 470

Rosecrans, General William, 621

Rowson, Susannah H., 263

Royal colonies, 96

Ruffin, Edmund, 427, 564

Rum and molasses trade, 64, 67, 68,
103-04, 127

Rush, Benjamin, 278; prison reform,
181; on education, 272-3

Rush, Richard, 267, 345

Rush-Bagot Agreement, 341

Russia: mediator in War of 1812, 313;
and Pacific Northwest, 343, 344

Russian-American Fur Company, 532

Ryswick, Peace of, 58

St. Augustine, Florida, 12

St. Clair, General Arthur, 196, 239

St. Leger, Colonel Barry, 164, 165,

St. Louis, fur-trade center, 326

- Salem: founding of, 25; trade with East, 486
- Salt Lake City, 525
- Sanitary Commission, United States, 614
- San Jacinto, battle of, 538
- Santa Anna, General, 538, 544, 545
- Santo Domingo, 289
- Santa Fé, 12, 543, 544; trail, 554, 555
- Saratoga, battle of, 165, 167
- Sargent, Lucius, 493
- Savannah, occupation of, 168
- Scholfield, John, Arthur, and James, 441
- Schuyler, General Philip, 473
- Schwenkfelders, 523
- Science: colonial, 83, 91-2; in 1800, 257; Middle Period, 499
- Scioto Company, 196, 197
- Scotch-Irish: in colonies, 33-4, 35, 81; on frontier, 45-6, 316; and slavery, 597
- Scott, Dred, decision, 583-4, 588, 646
- Scott, General Winfield, 391, 548, 575, 604, 617
- Secession: New England and, 311-12; of South, 596-601; abolitionists and, 601-2; Northern attitude, 601-04
- Sectionalism, 340; in Era of Good Feeling, 351-6; federally financed improvements, 354-5; tariff issue, 357-60; emergence of Whigs and Democrats, 360-5; economic basis, 560-3; slavery and, 563-5, 582-7; conflict, 587-91; election of 1860, 591-6; secession, 596-601. *See also* Continental expansion
- Sects, religious, 29, 523
- Sedition Act, 249
- Senators, selection of, 213
- Separatists, 25
- Seven Days battles, 618
- Seven Pines, battle of, 617
- Seven Years' War. *See* French and Indian War
- Sevier, John, 198
- Sevier, Robert, 193
- Seward, William H., quoted 403; 573, 643-4
- Sewing machine, invention of, 443
- Shays, Daniel, 204
- Shays' Rebellion, 204, 205
- Shenandoah Valley, campaign in, 622-3
- Shepherd, James, 447
- Sheridan, Philip, 615
- Sherman, Roger, 151, 207, 208
- Sherman, General William T., 615, 616, 620, 621-2
- Shiloh, battle of, 619-20
- "Shinplasters," 626, 627
- Shipping: shipbuilding, 63-4, 66; colonial, 64, 65-6; during confederation, 200; coastwise, 485; overseas, 485-90; imports and exports, 487-8; Britain, leader in, 489; clipper ships, 489; steamships, 489-90. *See also* Commerce
- Silliman, Benjamin, 499
- Simms, William Gilmore, 517
- Simpson, Sir George, 545
- Silver Bank, 108
- Skidmore, Thomas, 457
- Skinner, John S., 395
- Slater, Samuel, 441
- Slavery: in colonies, 39-40; tobacco production and, 52; Jefferson's proposal, 194; issue at Constitutional Convention, 210; Missouri Compromise, 355-6; system, 431-8; dealers and traders, 433, 435; planters' profits, 437-8; expansion, and issue of, 531; defense of, 563-5; politics, expansion and, 565-9; anti-slavery petitions, 566; territory (1850), 574, 575; propaganda, 590-1
- Slaves: Negro, 419-20; gang system, 430, 431, 437; hiring, 435; classes of, 435-6; control of, 437; insurrections, 437
- Slave trade, 39-40; "triangular trade," 68; and Webster-Ashburton negotiations, 391-2; *Creole* affair, 392; closing of, 431; advertisements, 436
- Slidell, John, 546, 547, 633
- Sloat, John D., 549
- Smith, Caleb, 593, 643
- Smith, Hyrum, 525
- Smith, Jedediah, 328, 544
- Smith, Gerrit, 589
- Smith, Captain John, 17, 24, 58, 60
- Smith, Joseph, 524
- Smith, Robert, 283
- Smith, William, the Reverend, 87
- Social conditions: in colonies, 71-93; during Revolution, 172-5; in 1800, 253-5; on frontier, 334-9; Civil War: North, 636-9; South, 639-42
- Society for alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons, 181
- Society for the Relief of Distressed Debtors, 180
- Sons of Liberty, 130, 141, 144
- Soulé, Pierre, 578
- South: seventeenth-century, 44; land speculators, 47; agriculture, 49, 51-2, 421-31; fur trade, 55; homes of planters, 72; colonial grievances, 134-5; and Revolutionary War, 168; and protective tariff, 357-60; the land,

South (*continued*)

414-17; social classes, 417-21; farms, 417; "yeomanry," 417-8; planters, 417, 429; "poor whites," 418; mountaineers, 418-9; slaves, 419-20; cities, 420; tobacco, 422-3; rice, 423; sugar cane, 423-4; cotton, 424-6; plantations, 429-31; slave system, 431-8; manufacturing (1860), 446; and abolitionism, 502; literature, 516-19; economy of, 560-3; dependence on North, 561-2
 Secession of, 596-601: reasons for, 598-9; debt to North, 1860, 602; Civil War conditions, 639-42; blockade running, 640. *See also* Civil War; Cotton in South; Negroes; Slavery
 South Carolina, 27; land speculation, 47; liberty of conscience, 81; held by British, 168; surrender of western lands, 192; Andrew Jackson and, 374-7; nullification ordinance, 376, 377; literature, 517-8; secedes, 597
 Southern-Desert trail, 554, 555
 Southwest: secessionist movement in, 198; Spanish in, 198, 243; Yazoo land companies, 293; expansion into, 550; slavery issue in, 570-1
 Spain: rise of, 9; claims in New World, 11-13; aid in Revolution, 166, 170; and Western territory, 171; relations after Revolution, 198-9; Jay Treaty and, 243; and Louisiana, 288; loss of Florida, 342, 343; intervention during Civil War, 635
 Sparks, Jared, 514-15
 Speculation: land systems and, 46-7; during Revolution, 160; boom, after 1834, 384; in Kansas, 580-1; Civil War, 637-8, 640
 Spice Islands, 10, 14
 Spoilation claims, French, 378-9
 Spoils system, 370-1
 Spottsylvania Courthouse, battle of, 622
 Squatter sovereignty, 569, 571
 Stagecoaches, 76-7, 468
 Stamp Act (1765), 109, 128, 129-31, 136; repeal of, 131
 Stamp tax, 120
 Standish, Miles, 90
 Stanton, Edwin M., 643
 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 494
 Stark, Colonel John, 165
 State Guardianship party, 457
 Staten Island, occupation of, 163
 States: finances, during Revolution, 158-62; organization, after Revolution, 176; boundary disputes, 186;

States (*continued*)

surrender of western territory, 192; new, proposed names of, 194; ratification of Constitution, 214-15, 218-21; religious sects in 1800, 256, 257; ten-hour day legislation, 462-3;
 States' rights, 214; in New England, 311; Webster-Hayne debate, 372-3; and conscription, 608
 Steamboats: invention of, 469-70; on rivers, 469-71; on Great Lakes, 471-2; on wheels, 477; and domestic trade, 484. *See also* shipping
 Steam power, 443-4
 Steamships, 489-90
 Stephens, Alexander H., 600, 608
 Stephenson, George, 477
 Stevens, John, 477, 478
 Stevens, Thaddeus, 642
 Stiegel, Henry William, 271
 Stockton, Robert F., 549
 Stone, Lucy, 494, 495
 Stony Point, battle of, 239
 Story, Joseph, ruling of, 350 *n*
 Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 590
 Strikes: early use of, 454; declared legal, 462
 Stringfellow, B. F., 565
 Stuart, Gilbert, 93, 268, 269
 Stuart, General J. E. B., 618
 Stuyvesant, Peter, 27
 Subtreasury bill, 387-8
 Subtreasury Act, 389
 Suffolk Resolves, 144
 Suffrage: colonial requirements, 98; extension, after Revolution, 175-6; universal manhood, 368
 Sugar Act (1764), 127, 128, 129
 Sugar culture, 423-4
 Sumner, Charles, 513, 581, 642
 Sumter, Thomas, 168
 Sunday School, 276
 Supreme Court, 211, 212; *Marbury vs. Madison*, 285-6, 347; *Worcester vs. Georgia*, 322; *McCulloch vs. Maryland*, 348-349, 354; *Gibbons vs. Ogden*, 350; *Dartmouth College vs. Woodward*, 351; *Fletcher vs. Peck*, 351; Jackson on, 381-2; *Dred Scott vs. Sanford*, 583-4; *ex parte Milligan*, 641
 Susquehanna Company, 119
 Sutter, John A., 545, 551
 Sweden: rise of, 9; settlement in America, 15, 35
 Swiss, in colonies, 35
 Symmes, John Cleves, 196
 Symmes Company, 317

- Tallmadge Amendment, 355, 569
 Tallyrand, demands of, 246
 Tammany, Sons of 457-8, 459; Aaron Burr, head of, 244
 Taney, Roger B., 373, 383, 641, 646; Dred Scott decision, 583-4
 Tappan, David, 259
 Tariff: during Confederation, 200, 202; Hamilton's proposal for, 233-4; of 1816, 353, 357; sectional opinions on, 357; of 1820, 357-8; of 1824, 358-60; of abominations (1828), 364-5, 372, 374-5; of 1832, 375-7; nullification ordinance, 376, 377; of 1833 (Compromise), 377; of 1842, 389-90; of 1846, 568; of 1857, 624; Civil War, 624
 Taverns, colonial, 76
 Taxation: on tea, 137, 140-1; excise, 233-5; Civil War, 624-5
 Taylor, John, 233-4, 235, 427
 Taylor, General Zachary, 546-9, 569, 570
 Tea, tax on, 137, 140-1
 Tecumseh, Indian leader, 303, 304
 Telegraph, invention of, 481-2
 Temperance movement: societies, 492; legislation, 493-4. *See also* Prohibitionists
 Tenant farming, 413
 Ten-hour day, 460, 462-3
 Tennent, Gilbert and William, 84
 Tennessee: settlement and statehood, 193-4; Army of, 621
Ten Nights in a Barroom, 493
 Territories: manufacturing (1860), 446; and slavery, 582-7. *See also* Continental expansion; names of states
 Texas, 388; Americans in, 537-40; independence, 538; desire for annexation, 538-40; acquisition of, 541-2; annexation of, 542
 -Textile production: in colonies, 61-2; mills, 443
 Thames River, battle of, 310
 Theater: colonial, 93; writing for, 261-2; Western, 338
 Thirteenth Amendment, ratification, 647
 Thomas, J. B., 356
 Thomas, General George H., 621
 Thomson, Charles, 144
 Thoreau, Henry David, 508, 510-11, 513
 Thresher, and agriculture, 403
 Ticknor, George, 499
 Ticonderoga, Fort, capture of, 164, 165, 192
 Tidewater region, in Revolution, 153, 155-6
 Timrod, Henry, 517
 Tippecanoe, battle of, 304
 Tobacco culture, 51-2, 422-3
 Toombs, Robert, 570
 Tordesillas, Convention of, 12
 Tories, confiscated estates of, 177
 Townshend, Charles, 131
 Townshend Acts, 131-4, 136, 137
 Trade: growth of, 4 with Orient, 8-9; colonial, 64-8; regulation, 100-04; during Revolution, 174-5; 1790-1842, 464-9; Erie Canal and, 473-6; and transportation, 483-5; coastal, 485. *See also* Commerce.
 Trade Acts, British, 125, 126-29
 Trade unions, 461-3; Trading companies, 23-6
 Transcendentalism, 507-12
 Transportation: roads, 464-9; rivers, 469-71, 483; canals, 472-7; railroads, 477-82; shipping, 485-90; in Confederate states, 611
 Transylvania Company, 193
 Transylvania University, 337
 Treaties: Aix-la-Chapelle, 59; Paris (1756), 120, 122; Paris (1783), 170, 171, 190, 198; with Indians, 193, 194, 321; commercial, 199; Greenville, 239; San Lorenzo (Pinckney), 243; Tripoli, 285, 486; Ghent, 312-14; commercial, with France, 379; Webster-Ashburton, 392, 536; Guadalupe Hidalgo, 551; Clayton-Bulwer, 554
Trent affair, 633-4
 Trenton, battle of, 164
 Trevett, John, 202
Trevett vs. Weeden, 203
 Tripolitan Peace Treaty (1805), 285, 486
 Trist, Nicholas P., 551
 Trumbull, John, 264, 269
 Turner, Frederick Jackson, 45, 334-6
 Turner, Nat, insurrection, 437, 502
 Tyler, John, 388-90; President, 389-90; resignation of cabinet, 390; annexation of Texas, 540, 541
 Tyler, Royal, 261, 263
 Underground Railroad, 503
 Unions, trade, 461-3
 Unitarianism: revolt, 258, 259; and transcendentalism, 507-08
 United Company of Philadelphia for Promoting American Manufactures, 440
United States, victories of, 307
 United States Agricultural Society, 396
 Universalists, 523

- Utopianism, 503-07
 Utrecht. Peace of, 59
- Vail, Alfred, 481
 Vallandigham, Clement L., 641
 Valley Forge, winter quarters, 165
 Van Buren, Martin, 360, 364, 370, 371, 373, 374, 382, 541, 570; President, 385, 386; background and personality, 385-6; Subtreasury bill, 387-8
 Vancouver, Captain George, 532
 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 554
 Van Rensselaer, Stephen, 309
 Varnum, James M., 202, 203
 Vera Cruz, occupation of, 548
 Vermont: independent republic, 192-3; becomes a state, 193; mobs in, 202
 Verplanck, Gulian, 516
 Verplanck Bill, 376
 Verragano, Giovanni da, 14
 Vespuccus, Americus, 11
 Vice-President, election of, 386
 Vicksburg, surrender of, 620
 Vikings, voyages of, 6
 Vincennes, capture of, 168
 Virginia: naming of, 23; founding of, 24; land speculation, 47; colonial grievances, 134, 135; Bill of Rights, 176; claim to Northwest, 191, 192; Plan, 208-09, 211, 603; ratifying convention, 223; Resolutions, 250, 251, 282; Army of, 618
 Virginia Company, 23, 42, 44
Virginia (Merrimac), 616
- Wade, Benjamin, 642
 Walker, Robert J., 568, 585, 586
 Walker, William, 585
 Walpole, Robert, 124
 Walpole Company, 134
 Ware, Henry, 259
 War Hawks, 305, 306, 308
 War of 1812: sea battles, 307; New England's attitude, 307-08; disasters, 308-09; after Napoleon's defeat, 310-11; Russia, mediator, 313; results of, 313-14, 341; and commerce, 486-7
 Warren, Josiah, 503
 Washington, George, 125, 132, 134, 169, 223, 272; commander in chief, 148, 162, 170; and Charles Lee, 164; President, 224; and department heads, 226; Farewell Address, 243-4
 Washington, D. C.: burning of, 310; slaves liberated in, 646
 Waterways, inland, 469-72
 Watson, Elkanah, 394, 473
 Wautauga Association, 193
- Wayland, Francis, 499
 Wayne, "Mad Anthony," 239
 Webster, Daniel, 352, 360, 368, 386, 513; on conscription law, 311-12; on tariff, 357-8; debate with Hayne, 372-3; resigns as Secretary of State, 390; on Compromise of 1850, 572
 Webster, Noah, 205-06, 277
 Webster, Pelatiah, 205
 Webster-Ashburton negotiations, 390-2; Treaty (1842), 392, 536
 Weems, Parson, 224
 Weld, Theodore, 502
 Welles, Gideon, 643
 Welsh: in colonies, 35; nineteenth century immigration, 450, 451
 Wentworth, Mark Hunking, 56
 Wesley, John and Charles, 83, 259, 260
 West, 45, 116-18; British acquisition, 120, 122, 123; expansion in, 287-95; after War of 1812, 315; settlement of, 316-25; routes to (1760-1840), 319, 320; Indian relations, 320-2; trade with East, 324-5; Far, fur trade in, 325-9; settlement beyond Mississippi, 329-34; education, 336-7; books and newspapers, 337-8; theater, 338; religion, 338; opposition to Second Bank of the U. S., 353-4; Jacksonians, 363-5; universal manhood suffrage, 368; agricultural expansion, 401-05; manufacturing (1860), 446; demand for roads, 466
 West, Benjamin, 93, 268
 West Indies, 12; population, 33; trade with, 67, 68, 128, 175, 199, 200, 239, 240, 242, 378
 Western Reserve, cession to U. S., 192
 Weston, Thomas, 24
 West Point Military Academy, 167, 272
 West Virginia, admitted to Union, 597
 Whaling industry, 60
 Wheelock, Eleazar, 89
 Whig party: absorbs Anti-Masonic party, 368 *n.*; formation of, 385; and Van Buren, 387, 388; campaign of 1840, 388-9; dissension, 389-91; election of 1848, 569, 570; evasion of issues, 569, 575; Conscience, 570, 576; election of 1852, 575; dissolution, 579
 Whisky Rebellion, 234
 Whisky tax, repeal of, 284
 Whitefield, George, 83, 84
 Whitman, Dr. Marcus, 536
 Whitman, Walt, 511
 Whitney, Eli, 443
 Whittier, John Greenleaf, 513, 514, 572-3, 601
 Wilberforce, William, 500


- Wilderness, battle of, 619, 622
 Wilkes, Captain Charles, 633-4
 Wilkinson, James, 198, 294, 295
 Willard, Emma, 278, 498
 Williams, Roger, 25-6, 80-1, 82, 259
 Willis, Nathaniel Parker, 516
 Wilmot, David, 568
 Wilmot Proviso, 568-9, 570, 571, 572
 Wilson, James, 207, 227
 Wilson, Woodrow, 382
 Winchester, battle of, 622
 Winthrop, John, 25, 28-9, 58, 79, 91
 Winthrop, John, Jr., 90
 Wirt, William, 382, 383
 Wisconsin, settlement and admission, 331, 332-3
 Women: education for, 278, 494-5; farm, 404; in factories, 449-50, 452-3; gradual emancipation, 494; in professions, 495; rights of, 495-7
 Woodbury, Levi, 374, 483, 575-6
 Woolens Act (1699), 104
 Worcester *vs.* Georgia, 322
 Workingmen's parties, 387, 456-61
 Wright, Frances, 455, 494, 503
 Wyeth, Nathaniel J., 535
 Wythe, George, 207
 Wyoming massacre, 157
 XYZ affair, 246-7
 Yale, Elihu, 89
 Yankee traders, 483; in California, 544
 Yazoo land companies, 293
 Yorktown, Cornwallis' surrender, 170
 Young, Brigham, 525
 Young, Ewing, 535, 545
 Young Men's Christian Association, 614
 Zenger, John Peter, 87

A NOTE ON THE TYPE

The text of this book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face which belongs to the family of printing types called "modern face" by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia borders on the general design of Scotch Modern, but is more freely drawn than that letter.

The book was composed, printed, and bound by KINGSPORT PRESS, INC., *Kingsport, Tennessee.*

Designed by HARRY FORD.



UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



128 008

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY